FromPatriarchalSocialismtoSocialistDemocracy:ThoughtsonaNew TheoryofSociety

FromPatriarchalSocialismtoSocialistDemocracy:ThoughtsonaNewTheoryof Society

byReinhardMocek

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Source: PRAXISInternational(PRAXISInternational),issue:1/1991,pages:5164,onwww.ceeol.com.

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FROM PATRIARCHAL SOCIALISM TO SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY: THOUGHTS ON A NEW THEORY OF SOCIETY*

Reinhard Mocek Friedrich Engels is the originator of the profound proposition that a social class, as soon as it has come to power, begins to change society in its image.1 This proposition can be interpreted in two ways. It can mean that there is only one image, one conception which social action must necessarily serve. This reading conforms to the common interpretation. However, it is not difficult to recognize the second possible reading: here the metaphor image stands both for a totality of wishes, ideas, and ideals which vary considerably from individual to individual, and also for a set of quite clear-cut intentions of the people who represent a revolutionary movement. Thus here are the alternatives: either we speak of a predetermined abstract law of history which is made the highest practical dictate (and which a certain class, as slave to history, has to realize); or we speak of an image of subjective character, determined by what is longed for and pursued, the content of which derives fully from the hearts and minds of the prevailing majority of the people, but for which the most effective form still must be sought. Knowing full well that cleverly selected quotes from the classics prove everything (and nothing), I nevertheless cannot do without the fine words of Marx which emphatically support the second interpretation: History does nothing,. . . it fights no battles! It is rather the person, the real living person who does it all, who owns and fights; it is not history that needs the person as a means to achieve its ends as if it were a separate person rather, history is nothing but the activity of the person in pursuit of his ends.2 On the Situation The model of hitherto existing socialism must be evaluated in an entirely different way. Here we are dealing with self-sufficient command-socialism which, despite paying tribute to Marxist pretenses in the form of its selfprescribed seven law-like regularities, nonetheless neglected a central Marxist concern the subjective factor as the real active and determining [mastabgebende] force. It is significant that a conception of the person plays no role in these law-like regularities; nevertheless, if the leadership role of the communist party is determined by the claim of the general secretary not
* This article first appeared in Initial. Zeitschrift fr Politik und Gesellschaft, vol. 1, No. 1. (1990). It was completed by December 1989. Praxis International 11:1 April 1991 0260-8448

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only to have the last word on all social, political, economic and not infrequently scientific questions, but also to the power to carry out such control, without exaggeration one can speak of patriarchal socialism. Both the seven law-like regularities and the distorted leadership role of the revolutionary party neglected the historical subject - naturally not in their rhetoric but in the practice of political life as well as in theory. Certainly in other ways, the working person was always showered with attention by the functionaries in power: on the one hand through organized public thanksgiving celebrations and parades which had become increasingly insufferable - and on the other hand as the focus of economic policy. It would be unfair to portray the concurrence of economic and social policy, affirmed since the Eighth Party Congress of the SED3 as pure rhetoric. Obviously, the pursued welfare of the people and the preservation of a whole set of indisputable merits of the real socialist GDR (the right to work, to education, to recreation; the pursuit of political and economic equality for women; state care for the welfare of the new generation; housing politics, etc.) constituted the goals of its policies, which could be and were worthy of being identified with. Otherwise one could not explain the extensive, decade-long conformity of millions of members of the SED with its leadership members who valued the humanist and antifascist character of developments since 1945. But this socialism suffered from a Stalinist legacy: it was established and controlled from above and officially praised. It was not really grounded in a wide autonomous and participatory popular movement; indeed it became increasingly incapable of such identification. The contradiction between the party and the popular masses, formulated already in 1983 in the theses of the Central Committee of the SED on the occasion of the Year of Karl Marx, has, with bitter irony, proven decisive here however, this contradiction, viewed from the perspective of the dialectics of power, was called accord between the party and the popular masses, and was named from above the most important driving force. Instead of the social control of power, love and trust were demanded of the people, apparently the constitutionally most unsuitable means to prevent a misuse of power. In connection with the repression of dissidents and threats of penalty for even a suggested break with the duty of good conduct, chronic socio-pathological conditions have resulted. In addition, when the external picture drastically worsened through failed economic policy, and when whole sections of cities began to fall into disrepair the antagonism became obvious. All of this, however, happened against the background, so to speak, of the seven law-like regularities; and it occurred with certain variations in all socialist countries. With this it would seem that socialism of this character is to be finally expelled from the workshop of the social theorist. The question now is whether this model of socialism provides us with a conceptual basis that is applicable and workable in its fundamental features, and which must only be improved upon in one aspect or another; or whether we are dealing with a conception which fails in these very fundamental features. Indeed, no theoretician of socialism can avoid this question.

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Perhaps it is appropriate to review briefly and summarily the general law-like regularities mentioned above in order at least to suggest a new point of departure. More than this cannot be attempted in what follows. This bundle of laws (that is the list of characteristics of developed socialist society) includes the following factors: the swift and effective development of social productive forces; stable, evolving socialist productive relations; a strong socialist state power; the comprehensive development of socialist democracy; a high level of education for workers (here the productive effectiveness of the subjective factor was unequivocally taken into consideration!) and a simultaneous improvement of their working and living conditions; the socialist ideology and culture which penetrates all areas of social life; the necessity of a system for modern national security based on state of the art science and technology.4 It is apparent that these so-called law-like regularities are divided into normal requirements for stability and efficiency on the one hand, and the more rhetorical emphasis on a corresponding new type of social foundation on the other (in the different versions of these regularities the class-character of socialism, highlighted by the claim to leadership by the working class and its party, is emphasized).

The philosophical implications of Marxs novel idea, culminating in the idea of the emancipation of the person from all oppressive natural and social constraints, as well as in the demand for the self-realization of the person, are not present in this model of socialism. What remained, in fact, was the idea of a well-functioning political system, directed by the party of the working class, and which consistently provided its citizens with a bearable or even noteworthy level of well-being. In precisely this model of the general law-like regularities the humanist inspiration of the entire Utopian socialist movement and all ideal conceptions of the new person were abandoned. Now it can be observed that it was actually possible to pursue this model, and that the totally administered society of well-behaved citizens could actually be brought into being. The irony of history here is double. On the one hand, the majority of the people of this country (despite all the problems involved in making such a generalization) identified with their states goals of providing for the needs of the people, goals which they considered beneficial and humanistic, as long as the superiority of other states could be dealt with rhetorically. On the other hand, the socialist mass movement waved the right to all independence, only to recall it all the more radically after the collapse of the leadership. The gradual reform from above of given social structures, had it been introduced five to ten years ago, would have brought about little essential change in the party system, in the understanding of democracy, or in the passivity of the people over against the all-powerful state. Are the general law-like regularities applicable then, when the leadership reacts in a timely and flexible fashion to the consumer wishes of the masses? This question is obviously superfluous when one notes that the very economic inefficiency of such a model is grounded in the administered counter-creative social system itself. The question is justified, however, when one considers that patriarchal socialism actually could have reacted in time!

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Methodological Reflection is Necessary This dilemma requires a series of methodological considerations. It is common belief in the social-theoretical consciousness of this country it was even the firm conviction of the top state leadership and of the functionaries and planners at the lower levels that in order to plan and lead society, one merely need have the right theory. Accordingly, the managing and planning of society prove to be activities which are determined by theory, at least when responsibility for governing is first taken on by the state. With this, an unfortunate relationship between theory and practice creeps in. Some of these theories especially the general ones, which had to be followed continually and consistently (i.e., the above mentioned general law-like regularities of socialism) were nothing short of canonized; carefully considered debate regarding these laws was existentially dangerous, for it would contradict the states own understanding of itself, and thus explicitly contradict the state itself. In the practice of economic management it became clear that the more concrete sections of this theory in no way accomplished what one had expected. So, for a good 40 years in our country the law of value was constantly and consciously violated, and ones conscience was soothed by the belief that theoreticians would someday find an explanation for this. But the far more unpleasant consequence was the rampant subjectivism which ultimately forced itself into the highest post of the Politburo of the SED. Indeed, these two cases faith in the laws and yet the unwillingness to apply them are simply two sides of one and the same coin: in this case, the false assessment of the relationship between theory and practice in society. It was inevitable that the impact of this false assessment would fall to theoretical work and affect practice. A second methodological moment is at the same time of ideological character the belief in a more or less inescapable historical determinism. Here we are dealing with the common sins of both science and politics. It is hardly necessary to document the failures of socialist science; a look in the relevant textbooks would be sufficient. Indeed for some time now, some philosophers have been reworking the dominant mechanistic concept of law in the direction of a statistical, or stochastical perspective,5 but this has not penetrated the general consciousness of the wider socialist scientific community. Older convictions, according to which the process of history makes socialism unavoidable, were much too deeply rooted- ultimately such ideas are found in the writings of none other than Lenin.6 One was at best willing to make some concessions regarding the time involved, and observed, in part with awe and in part without comprehension, the way in which modern capitalism overcame the deep crisis of the sixties and how it was on the verge of surpassing socialism in all important indices. After the possibility of a military solution to the contest between the worldsystems was given up, a possibility which was, after all, accepted as part of socialist military doctrine into the eighties (think of it, now!), consideration of the actual situation proved to be of much consequence for the philosophy of history. Recent and quite current contributions have been made by

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philosophers and historians who maintain that history must be understood as a more or less necessary sequence of stages.7 Nevertheless, the thesis of the fundamental openness of history is on the increase among Marxists worldwide. In any case, undifferentiated tables measuring the supposed worldhistorical progress of the countries of this earth from primitive communism to socialism/communism remain an exemplary case of delusion, for they are notoriously simplistic. A glance at an economic-geographic atlas convinces one that of the 168 states on this earth roughly 25 are still largely characterized by quasi-primitive social productive relations, and more than 60 have a dominant pre-capitalist sector. Of the rest, 10 or 12 (depending on how one classifies) are socialist states fighting hard for their very existence. The apparent co-existence of historical forms dominates over their succession, and undermines the theory of succession. Yet it cannot be overlooked that elements of more advanced modes of production quickly embed themselves in the forms of existence of the less advanced. That history is open means that multiple alternatives are possible, among them certainly also several socialist alternatives. And openness means also that only when the dominant majority of the peoples of this world take the step toward a socialist social order will socialism/communism have any future. Communism in only half or in an even smaller portion of the world is impossible simply because the world market functions according to laws which are based upon the principles of commodity production - which are by definition inappropriate for communist society. Does this lead to an uncoupling of the systems? This is an absurdity given the globalization of the modern world and its dependence on cooperation. Rather, one must take into consideration that given a longer period of co-existence there will be considerable assimilation between societies and lifestyles, and that both advanced systems must pay increasing attention to the welfare of the person. Under both systems there have developed acceptable and attractive forms of life that will make visible the profile of a future modern society. The society of the future is not to be planned in advance on the drawing board of the social theorist; rather, it will result from the dialectical manifold of real social life processes. Assimilation, along with the dominance of a systemspecifically developed form of life, will most likely determine the future. A third methodological remark refers to our Marxist concept of science. The assumption that a scientific theory could present itself as uncontested, in the mantle of absolute truth, is simply absurd from the perspective of the theory of science. Indeed socialism has developed from Utopia to science; but obviously it has kept neither the first scientific form it received in the work of Marx and Engels, nor the second form it took on in the work of Lenin. The revisions are always incisive, and the assumption that these are mere precision adjustments, so small that the politician can afford to neglect them, is untenable.
Basically, this insight relates to the experience that in respect to social theories, the truth or falsity of a theory does not determine its utility; but rather its nearness to a real life and its practicability determine its utility where the

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fact that theories are near to real life usually indicates that one is dealing with theories to which all members of society can relate. I will come back to this. On the other hand this does not mean that social theories are not to be held responsible in respect to truth or falsity. Where possible, this should be forthcoming. Indeed according to its nature, a social theory should be justified by its success, or by an agreement between description and process, where the process can be completed without interventions informed by theory (yet, this is probably the most common case!). Only when social-theoretical and methodological errors are relentlessly accounted for is a new beginning on the basis of constant theoretical reflection possible. And this is bitterly necessary, even if there is a consensus as to a certain strategy and little interest for theoretical debates and extensive alternatives. Precisely this will have to distinguish the theoretician strictly from the politician each remains obligated to his field. A New Research Landscape for Studies in Ideology When the claim is given up that Marxist theory alone has authority on matters of truth, the question arises as to which alternative type of social theory, whether complementary or contrary to Marxism, can encourage reflection on socialism. To ask this question is immediately to reveal the problem: essentially, bourgeois thought does not appear capable of making contributions to socialist theory, unless one conceives of bourgeois arguments as to the impossibility of socialist society as being themselves a form of socialist theory. Nevertheless, I am convinced that social theory which is concerned with bringing about a social order worth living under is always relevant to the theory of socialism. When one reviews modern nonMarxist philosophical thought, it is no longer necessary to demonstrate that it has not only not lost its ability for rationality and humanity, but also that it forcefully describes the fate of the human species in these categories. This results not least from the fact that social problems are the essential problems of humanity, and have mobilized the intellectual energies of nearly all intellectual movements of our century. The resulting necessity of a new understanding of our, that is the Marxist, relation to the philosophy of the world can only be mentioned here. I would just like to single out two aspects which are important for a theory of socialism. On the one hand is the concept of theory which has already been problematized above, and on the other hand the possibility of comparing theories, or possibly the coherence among theories. On the first problem: as it has been shown, theories of strict instructive character have obviously failed, that is, theories which, in their general component, claim continual [historical] determination, and whose specific components have prescriptive character. The reason for this failure lies in the fact that processes (especially social processes) simply dont proceed deterministically; they are neither strictly causal nor predictable. Let this be stated rather conditionally here, for of course there can be processes in specific areas of given social reality which occur in largely determined

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fashion; just as it is also quite possible to direct social processes so strictly that over several years they become predictably uniform. This essentially applies to all planned economy, though even here it is evident that predictability has more or less narrow boundaries. Even a strictly planned economy cant get around the plurality of factors within social processes, but represents the attempt to choose from among them and to secure the reproduction of specific factors. In this sense, planning always interferes with the totality of a process. All such interference is based upon certain decisions which limit the scope of the interference; and consciousness of this must always accompany the interference. These phenomena have been variously examined in the social sciences in past few decades a summary reference to the literature will suffice.8 Two results of these discussions are important. First, every attempt to organize society according to a plan singles out only a limited number of subjective and objective conditions and factor from a totality. What follows from this is that precisely this totality should never be lost from view, nor should the plan ever become an end in itself. Thus, the smaller one keeps the selection of factors, the more reliable and flexible the plan is. The international social scientific discussion refers to these as theories or conceptions of medium-range, or as patchwork technologies (which have unjustly come into ill repute in our country). Here, the concept of theory under discussion is fundamentally put into question. If, as we determined, an application of very comprehensive theories is in fact impossible, because to apply them is to contradict the process-nature of the social, then one must distinguish between two meanings of the concept of theory. One can speak of a) theories which describe the content of processes and determine their course (these often taken the form of assertions about trends or laws); or b) theories which describe how social processes develop according to their inner nature, and thus makes it possible for us to observe them attentively and with an awareness of the direction in which they are developing. Such theories also make it possible for us to control our interventions through reflection on their effects, (naturally politics, and especially political economy, is always intervention in processes!). Here, social theory should become the cooperative partner of the politician.
It goes without saying that the social theorist is mainly interested in the second type of theory; and it only remains to be hoped that soon all socialist politicians will see things this way! The social theory is to be favored which explains occurrences, but itself does not attempt to bring new ones into being. The latter should be the explicit exception and should be entertained only with the awareness that (experimentally designed) implants in on-going processes always have various side effects which are rarely predictable. Does social theory for this reason oppose innovation? Of course not! That which is set free by innovation will always be embedded in the context of social and economic processes. The role of theory is to uncover the possibilities slumbering within processes, and to work out how they can be made relevant to economics or social policy. This also applies to transitional processes (to speak as a dialectician). Here, these possibilities can be understood as signals for

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processes in which qualitative changes occur. A glance at a well-known claim of Lenins suggests that this can be applied to society as a whole. According to this claim, monopoly state capitalism is the last step directly preceding socialist society - insofar as socialism is understood as constituted by monopolies (with their outstanding control of the forces of production!) and popular power. This leads unavoidably to the question as to which of the theory-types at hand serves our purposes. Beside the types mentioned above I will consider a third set of theories which enters into the field of the social theorist namely theories of non-deterministic character which begin with the assumption that the novel in processes is represented by singularities, that interconnections between effective components are not predictable, and that development is essentially systemic differentiation. No doubt, theories of [systemic] selforganization, as well as theoretical approaches around contemporary evolutionary theory can be mentioned. So as not to be misunderstood in respect to the last type of theory we are by no means dealing with biological theories which one once again might try to apply to society. Rather, we are dealing with insights into the character of processes in general, of which I can only comment upon one aspect without going into detail. Development can be observed as linear, but also as system-oriented; that is, in vocabulary more common for us, from the angle of progress or differentiation. When interaction and mutual dependencies become the decisive factors in the system, instead of competition and the elimination of the competitor, then a strategic change to an approach from the perspective of evolutionary theory seems appropriate from the working out of the conflict itself to control over the conflict. From elimination of the competitor to cooperation. One can simply take note of the fact that there are scenarios which exemplify this phenomenon. We arrive now at the second problem mentioned in the introduction to this section. This shift in orientation regarding the concept of theory raises an essentially ideological question which has significance for the pervasive ideological culture of our country. This will become clear when I contrast it with international contributions to social theory. The point of departure for such a comparison is the Marxist prognosis according to which the socialist-communist movement must seek the establishment of an association of free people in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.10 In the reality of the transition period to communism, however, this has not served as a goal; nor has Marxs reflection on the actual wealth of a society:
In fact, however, when the limited bourgeois form is stripped away, what is wealth other than the universality of individual needs, capacities, pleasures, productive forces, etc., created through universal exchange? The full development of human mastery over the forces of nature, those of so-called nature as well as of humanitys own nature? The absolute working-out of his creative potentialities, with no presupposition other than the previous historic development, which makes this totality of development, i.e. the development of all human powers as such the end in itself, not as measured on a

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predetermined yardstick? Where he does not reproduce himself in one specificity, but produces his totality? Strives not to remain something he has become, but is in the absolute movement of becoming?11 Especially now it seems important for two reasons to cite the whole quote. First, Marxs philosophy is intolerably reduced when it is identified with the concrete ideological platform of political parties. The quoted passage belongs in the canon of communist and worker parties, especially in those countries where a piece of real socialism has already been tried out, and yet whose politics has ignored this passage. This accusation only half applies, for this passage from Marx articulates a vision of human civilization, and really existing socialism wanted to make steps to the realization of this. With this the second reason becomes apparent. Marxist philosophy, in the wake of Marx, but especially since the end of the second world war and the beginning of the existence of a socialist block, considered the tension between this vision on the one hand and real living conditions under existing socialism on the other insufficiently, if at all, as a theoretical problem. My thesis is that there lies a broad research field for social scientific analysis between the Marxist analysis of the living conditions of the proletariat under free-market capitalism, and the prophetic Marxist vision of the culmination of human civilization. This field has been represented by Marxists who could hardly survive in the established communist parties, by Marxists outside of the communist movement, by bourgeois sociologists and social scientists who think and behave in a responsible manner, by theoreticians who have focussed on the basic conception of the person under the conditions of scientific-technical civilization, by anthropologists and physicians, by representatives of psychosomatic research, pedagogy, and last but not least, economic theory. All parties, especially communist parties, support their politics of liberation with a theory of the person which they do not consider in need of scientific scrutiny. The entire recent history of Marxism as theory represented by these parties is a history of the decline of a scientific concept of the person worked out in the Marxist tradition.12 From this standpoint, one gains a completely different perspective on recent non-Marxist thought in respect to the human being. This thought does not constitute expressed anti-communism, but rather represents considerations on a fundamental problem of the epoch. Considerations, mind you, not closure, not a finished product, but a plethora of insights which await their Marxist reworking a reworking which regards this thought with intentions besides those of refutation. And this is the second ideological challenge for us, namely the insight that there is a unity within the diversity of the current world philosophical culture. It is a unity in respect to the pursuit of knowledge about a rather distinct set of problems generally called world problems. The old Kantian question is fitting here: What is the human being?, for in its range it asks both about the creation of a life worth living as well as about the necessary social conditions for a contented life. What does this mean concretely? Research disciplines in the humanities, some of which we already have, some not yet, must be transcribed from the

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perspective of social theory and social policy. For example an end must come to the shadow-existence of psychology as a field of research relevant to the social sciences. It, and other humanities, belongs in the every-day consciousness of the people! What harm can it do when a people reflects publicly about itself? This also means that Marxist social theory will be venturing with productive intentions into domains which have been dominated by non-Marxist thought certainly with varying results. It would exceed our purposes here if I were to try to mention all relevant non-Marxist theoretical approaches.
As I see it, there are at least six approaches which are concerned with foundational questions as to the concept of the person, and which cannot be dispensed with for an understanding of the current problems of humanity. First to be mentioned is the work of Max Weber, who tried to explain modern society by way of specific processes of rationalization, and analyzed in this way effective capacities for social behavior and accommodation. Or Emile Durkheims conception, according to which individuals acquire the structures of a bearable social life in the context of a species actualizing itself norrnatively. Certainly we have to consider the theory of communicative action of Jiirgen Habermas which suggests we expand the human relation to the world which is individually experienced as basic need, in discourses. I will mention also the idea, which has its origin in several theorists, among them K. R. Popper, of the organization of open societies in which [in contrast to closed societies], the possibility for the conscious choice of social structures and the related identification with them is analyzed, and understood as a life-style characterized by rational problem-solving. Niklas Luhmann should not be left out, with his research on the many-layered nature of the meaning of social systems called a systemic symphony of levels of socialization with their capacity for reproducing themselves. And finally I will name Norbert Elias theory of civilization which allows us to appraise quite differently the process of humansocial evolution as the humanization of the human being. We are looking, so to speak, into other worlds of human objectification and yet when one engages with these worlds it becomes clear how novelly they assess todays life problems. We were actually quite impoverished for having never wanted to see them.

Are we then parting company with Marx? No. But we have enriched ourselves with much new knowledge on that middle ground which Marx left open - had to leave open - between his analysis of the proletariat of his day and the promise for the future represented by his concept of the person. And naturally we think here of Gramsci and Lukcs, of Bloch, and of the rich literature of the left, so little worked through in the social sciences, which always stood so close to, yet was so poorly treated by our movement. New Theoretical Approaches No one can simply pull a new model for socialism out of ones hat. The commendable preliminary work of the Berlin Philosophers Group13 stands quite alone in this area. But I will not connect my considerations directly to

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those of Brie, Segert, Krger and others, which are unfortunately difficult to find in publication; I would like to point out that I find the contributions of Krger on the type of civilization of modern society14 especially sound. I am primarily concerned here with that part of a philosophical theory of socialism which is based on the traditional interpretation of historical materialism, but which incorporates crucial elements of the aspects of the philosophy of Marx and Engels stressed above. Here I would like to suggest several theses for discussion. 1. According to Marx, the productive forces of society function as the backbone of social progress. As such, the productive forces create corresponding productive relations a formulation that requires two explanatory remarks. First, this creating remains always the work of people, also in pre-socialist social formations; there is no automatism in the relationship between productive forces and productive relations. Secondly, productive relations are measured and judged according to their effectiveness in respect to the productive forces. When a given form of productive relations does not correspond to the demands of modern productive forces, that is, either interferes with or retards the development of such forces, then one must ask the basic question, how this degree of economic inferiority relates to what is to the actual advantage of society. No doubt, questions as to the efficiency of scientific-technical progress remain fundamental to social development and its goal welfare for all yet questions as to the sense of this progress have increasingly the function of providing a prospect for the future, an importance which social theory must necessarily bring to bear on the practice of politics. The right of this theory, and other social scientific, and perhaps also philosophical disciplines, to participate in the drafting of the next strategic steps in scientific-technical progress, is an element which cant be dispensed with in the rejuvenation of socialism. The problem of progress in the development of socialist relations of production must be evaluated according to both aspects. So-called mixed forms of productive relations are to be preferred when they fulfill both basic requirements. 2. The widespread view, according to which dominant productive relations determine corresponding economic and social structures as well as the corresponding super-structure, is not maintainable in its traditional interpretation, for such structures are rooted in a specific form of the maintenance and use of power, and thus are the work of subjective forces. There is apparently no direct or one-sided dependency between the productive relations (that is the basis) and the political structure of a society (among other things the superstructure). What this relation genuinely looks like is a research question of the first order for social theory. In this context, research in the current Soviet literature is relevant, according to which personal misuse of power by functionaries of the party and the state lead to dramatic changes in the structure of productive relations. Here, one speaks of a reactivation of antagonistic contradictions. Hence, productive relations can also be influenced by non-administrative phenomena, that is, here, by socio-pathological processes.

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3. If the superstructure is not directly driven and structured by the basis, but rather exhibits a relatively independent structure as is the case of history which, of course, is influenced also by the corresponding dominant class relations (at least initially when new power relations are established), then new mechanisms for ensuring political openness and the restriction of power must be created. Beside traditional mechanisms (the social contract, the division of powers), especially the democratic potential of an informed public should be brought to bear. This applies particularly to the role of the media as a new factor for social theory, a factor which played almost no role in traditional Marxist social theory. Alone this shows how out of date this theory is! 4. In general, a theory of society should begin with the spheres of social life which are directly relevant to the experience of concrete individuals. Accordingly, the element of historical materialism which is relevant to the philosophy of history must be clearly differentiated from the element which is relevant to social theory. The forms of productive relations, which are connected to the development of productive forces, are fundamental to that element of historical materialism relevant to the philosophy of history. On the other hand, concrete social relations in lives of individuals [Lebensverhltnisse der Individuen] are foundational for the element relevant to social theory. The focus of Marxist social theory on the category of productive relations must be replaced by a focus on the culture of social and political life. Here, it is important to make the distinction between the historical subject as the agent behind the historical processes of an epoch on the one hand, and the concrete working people of a particular society on the other. The historical interests of certain classes have meaning for social theory as long as these are the powers which actually determine processes. There is no such thing as a historically determined right of a specific political party to leadership. The social subject chooses who is to represent its interests politically. 5. Social relations result from the actual life-process, not however from theoretical premises. The multiplicity of actual social relationships, the role of interests and interest groups, and the entire culture of social and political life are objects of social analysis in their openness and flexibility. The actual social life-process must be the point of departure for a theory of socialist society. 6. The state control of social life, that is, the organization of life according to prescribed rules for behavior, the resulting discipline, and the corresponding ossification of social structures, have come to greatly determine behavior. Here, social theory must participate in the re-cultivation of free, selfdetermining and democratic life. For example, alternative social practices are to be encouraged, and a foundation is to be promoted for social life characterized by self-realization and individual responsibility. In this sense, the importance of the element of social theory which is relevant to social education is not to be underestimated though this probably differs from the objectives of social theory in non-socialist countries. This includes the integration of the history of humanist social theory and culture into the

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curricula of primary and secondary education. The re-introduction of humanist educational values, as well as instruction in the basic questions of ethical life, must remedy the deficits in that which was considered worthy of being taught, and contribute to a fundamental rejuvenation of intellectual, aesthetic and ethical culture in its multiplicity; and it must simultaneously represent a commitment to humanism. 7. The cultivation and encouragement of the intellectual culture of a society is of crucial importance for its ability to compete, but also for the full realization of its potential for contributing to the development of world culture. Under intellectual culture is understood the degree to which a society is conscious of the role science and education play what their tasks are, and what possibilities they provide - in the lives of the people. Intellectual culture is tightly interwoven with the aesthetic and moral culture of a society, of a people. The old principle of the unity of the true, the good, and the beautiful should be quite applicable to socialist society. Socialism with a new profile? Indeed, the experiences have been bitter. What was socialist about this real socialism? Does socialism really measure itself according to property relations, or even only primarily according to these? The yardstick must certainly be the realities of human life. It can be maintained with confidence that these realities guarantee the efficiency and purpose of scientific-technical progress more stably, given the collective ownership of property; and that human life will flourish under these conditions better than under the conditions of capitalism. This confidence, however, proves nothing. Socialism will exist where not the progress of machines, but rather the progress of human self-determination and selfrealization is recognized by the subject of these processes itself. This is still a dream but theories do not consist merely of abstractions from hard reality. Translated by from the German by Amy Baehr and Igor Jasinski

NOTES
1. Marx/Engels, Werke, Vol. 18, p. 560. 2. Marx/Engels, Werke, Vol. 2, p. 98. 3. [SED stands for the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (The Socialist Unity Party of Germany) - A.B./I.J.] 4. See Kleines politisches Wrterbuch (Berlin, 1967), p. 589. 5. H. Hrz, Dialektisch-materialistische Entwicklungstheorie und die Struktur von Entwicklungsgesetzen, in Sitzungsberichte der AdW [Akademie der Wissensschaften] der DDR, 10/G/1975. 6. V. I. Lenin, Werke, Vol. 23, p. 64. 7. W. Eichhorn and W. Kttler, ... da Vernunft in der Geschichte sei, Formationsgeschichte und revolutionrer Aufbruch der Menschheit (Berlin, 1989). 8 See D. Bergner and R. Mocek, Gesellschaftstheorien (Berlin, 1986), p. 289ff. 9. See W. Wiesner, Vom Werden zum Sein. Energetische und soziale Aspekte der Evolution (Berlin-Hamburg, 1989). 10. Marx/Engels, Werke, Vol. 4, p. 482. 11. Marx/Engels, Werke, Vol. 42, p. 396. [Translation from Karl Marx, Grundrisse, Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy (Baltimore: Penguin, 1973), p. 488.]

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12. On the instructive debate of the twenties, before the Stalinist curtain, see S. Ktzel, Marxismus und Psychoanalyse (Berlin, 1987). 13. Forschungsprojekt: Philosophische Grundlagen der Erarbeitung einer Konzeption des modernen Sozialismus, Konferenzmaterial (Humbolt-Universitt zu Berlin, 1989). 14. H.-P. Krger, Die kapitalistische Gesellschaft als die erste moderne Gesellschaft, in Forschungsprojekt . . . p. 94-123.

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