FoucaultandtheProblemofKant

FoucaultandtheProblemofKant

byNicholasT.Parsons

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Source: PRAXISInternational(PRAXISInternational),issue:3/1988,pages:317328,onwww.ceeol.com.

ARTICLES: FOUCAULT, KANT, HABERMAS AND SCIENCE

S. Parsons

The last two hundred years have witnessed repeated claims to have overcome the problematic established by Kant in the Critique ofPure Reason. From the perspective of the social sciences, the consequences of any distancing of investigations from the Kantian problematic are potentially fruitful. Kant claimed that his writings were concerned, ultimately, with one question - what is man?' With this, any superseding of Kant ought thus to enable the investigation of man to proceed in a novel way. One of the most recent writers claiming to have superseded the Kantian problematic is Foucault. In this paper I shall 1) outline the problems Foucault encounters in his "archaeological" investigations, 2) reveal how these problems result from Foucault's uncritical adoption of the Kantian problematic, 3) argue that Foucault's later writings merely replicate the identified problematic. In short, the paper will argue that, contrary to many suggestions, Foucault's theories do not allow for any novel understanding of man.

The Age of Man

For Foucault, Kant's writings are a product of a definite historical period, termed by Foucault the "Age of Man. " This characterisation reflects Foucault's argument that, prior to the arrival of the "Age of Man" at the end of the Eighteenth Century , man as he is conceived today did not exist. Thus, for the Classical Age which immediately preceded the Age of Man, " ... man, as a primary reality with his own density, as the difficult object and sovereign subject of all possible knowledge, has no place."? However, with the ending of the Classical Age, man arrives on the scene in an ambiguous position: man is both that which knows and that which is known, both the subject and object of knowledge. The ambiguous position of man is reflected through the four 'motifs' which, for Foucault, characterise the Age of Man. The motifs are: 1) Finitude: man is limited in both what he knows and how he knows. 2) The empirical and transcendental: man appears empirically, yet cannot be reduced to the merely empirical. 3) The cogito and the unthought: man is within the world, yet is apart from it. 4) The retreat and return of the origin: man seeks to uncover and complete that which he has lost. As these four motifs define the understanding of man embodied in the Age of Man, Foucault can claim to have overcome the understanding of man characteristic of
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this age if he avoids replicating these four motifs in his analysis. This is indeed the claim Foucault makes for his archaeologial analysis, the aim of which is to:
... free the history of thought from its subjection to transcendence ... My aim was to analyse this history ... to map it in a dispersion that no pre-established horizon would embrace: to allow it to be deployed in an anonymity on which no transcendental constitution would impose the form of a subject; to open it up to a temporality that would not promise the return of any dawn. 3

If Foucault's analysis does transcend these four motifs, then the Age of Man is effectively at an end. Given this, one strategy for analysing Foucault's claims consists in investigating the extent to which his own theory replicates these motifs. This framework is adopted by Rabinow and Sullivan, who reveal that Foucault's archaeological investigations do not escape from these motifs. 4 However, this strategy adopted by Rabinow and Sullivan is of dubious validity. If Foucault has mischaracterised the Age of Man, then his own analysis may remain locked within the concerns of this Age, even if the four identified motifs are not replicated. I shall thus argue that this is indeed the case: that Foucault misconstrues the nature of the argument advanced by Kant - identified with the Age of Man - and is thus unaware of the extent that he adopts the Kantian problematic.

Archaeological Investigations
In describing his form of historical analysis as 'archaeology', Foucault seeks to distinguish such an analysis from what he terms the 'history of ideas' approach, where the object of analysis is identified from the start as a continuous and unified field. For Foucault it is discontinuity, not continuity, which defines the area of investigation. To this end, archaeology is concerned with the investigation of the appearance of particular statements - it seeks to discover " . . .how it is that one particular statement appeared rather than another ... ?"5 This investigation of the appearances of statements is conceived, from the start, as a "pure inquiry" which seeks to identify unity between and amongst statements. Unity is not presupposed, but is to be searched for: "One is led therefore to the project of a pure description of discursive events as the horizon for the search for the unities that form within it. "6 As the search for unities takes the form of discovering how anyone statement appeared, the analysis is not merely concerned with describing the appearance of statements, but also seeks to offer an explanation of these appearances. Foucault's analysis is thus concerned with identifying specific rules relating to the appearance of statements - a statement is analysed in order to grasp " ... its existence and the rules that govern its appearance."? These rules governing the appearance of statements are grouped into a 'system of formation' , defined as a " ... complex group of formations that functions as a rule. "8 As Foucault has defined the search for unity in terms of discovering rules relating to statements, then clearly the relevance of such rules must be carefully explored. What is the status of the rules of formation in explaining how one statement appeared rather than another? As already indicated, rules govern the appearance of statements - they are costrong' or determining rules. Can this characterisation of rules be more firmly developed? Foucault continues by defining rules as " ... conditions of

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existence (but also of co-existence, maintenance, modification, and disappearance) in a given discursive division."9 Rules for Foucault are thus analogous to Searle's 'constitutive rules'. Searle differentiates between constitutive and regulative rules thus:
Regulative rules regulate a pre-existing activity, an activity whose existence is logically independent of the rules. Constitutive rules constitute (and also regulate) an activity the existence of which is logically dependent on the rules. 10

As Foucault defines rules as conditions of existence, then clearly any statement cannot exist in the absence of the relevant rule: the existence of any statement is dependent upon the relevant rules of formation. Indeed, Foucault does characterize rules as constitutive when explaining the relationship between the rules of formation and objects of discourse. However, the nature of this relationship requires an introduction. Foucault argues that the system of formation is composed of four different ,'formations' '. That is, each system of formation is composed of rules referring to the formation of objects, enunciative modalities, concepts and strategies. As the formation of objects provides the clearest illustration of Foucault's understanding of "rules", the analysis can be confined to this specific formation. In speaking of the formation of objects, Foucault again wishes to distance his own analysis from standard "history of ideas" approaches. Whilst such approaches assume that any unity between statements occurs because such statements refer to the same object, which thus occurs independently of the statements, Foucault advances a contrary argument. Statements do not refer to the same object, but actively constitute the object: "Each of these discourses in turn constituted its object and worked it to the point of transforming it altogether." 11 As discourse constitutes the relevant object and thus allows it to exist, Foucault speaks of a discourse/object: the object cannot exist independently of discourse. The rules of formation are thus constitutive: they allow objects to exist at specific historical periods. Rules of formation constitute objects - they are: " ... the body of rules that enable them to form as objects of discourse and thus constitute the conditions of their historical appearance. "12 This constitutive understanding of rules is maintained when introducing the idea of the 'referential' of the statement. Here: "A statement is linked to the 'referential' that is made up ... of laws of possibility, rules of existence for the objects that are named. "13 Clearly, any object can only exist, is only possible, through specific rules. Objects can only appear in discourse if the relevant rules of existence are operative. Discursive rules allow objects to exist: "Discursive relations ... are ... at the limits of discourse. . .they determine the group of relations that discourse must establish in order to speak of this or that object." 14

Accounting for Historical Change

Having identified this understanding of rules as constitutive in Foucault's work, it is puzzling to be confronted by another, much weaker, understanding of rules of formation. Thus, we find that: "We must not forget that a rule of formation is (not) the determination of an object ... but their principle of multiplicity and dispersion."15 Here, rules of formation are not concerned with conditions of

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existence, but with multiplicity and dispersion: " This discursive formation ... is the principle of dispersion and redistribution. . . of statements. ' '16 This description of rules bears more of a relationship to Searle's account of regulative rules. Statements and discourse/objects are not dependent upon rules for their existence, but for their dispersion and redistribution. Why are the rules of formation now described in such a way that their original status as constitutive of existence is directly contradicted? The answer to this ambivalence in the status of rules can be discovered if the original intention ofFoucault's analysis is recalled. Foucault is concerned with historical change - the Age of Man signified a radical departure from the Classical Age, yet one which, Foucault claims, is itself now coming to an end. The transition from one age to another, from one discursive formation to another, is described by Foucault thus:
To say that one discursive formation is substituted for another is not to say that a whole world of absolutely new objects emerges ... it is to say that a general transformation of relations has occurred that statements are governed by new rules of formation. 17

However if rules are rules of formation of objects - i.e. constitutive rules - then discourse/objects must be radically transformed when the corresponding rules of formation are changed. If rules are rules of existence, then the same object cannot appear when a different rule of formation is operative. However, Foucault wishes to state that the same configurations can reappear under different rules: "One can, on the basis of these new rules, describe and analyse phenomena of continuity, return and repetition.":" New rules thus allow continuities to be identified, even though the original rules of existence have been replaced. Foucault offers two contradictory accounts of rules of formation. On the one hand, such rules are rules of formation, conditions of existence; they are constitutive. On the other hand, when the question of historical transformation is being addressed, such rules are merely principles of dispersion and redistribution: they are regulative. What is the relevance of these two apparently contradictory accounts of the function of rules? In order to answer this, it is necessary to probe deeper into Foucault's archaeological analysis. As the account offered of historical change has already been identified as a problematic area, then Foucault's account of temporal relations would appear to offer a significant area for investigation.

The Time of the Statement

In developing his analysis, Foucault moves from investigating the discursive formation governing statements to a concern with the statement itself. Foucault argues that this change in the subject of investigation permits greater accuracy: "What we have called 'discursive practice' can now be defined more precisely .. .it is a body of anonymous, historical rules ... the conditions of operation of the enunciative function.":" The analysis centred around the enunciative function is intended to complement the original analysis of the discursive formation: "The two approaches are equally justifiable and reversible. The analysis of the statement and that of the formation are established correlatively. ' '20 As the two approaches are complementary, the earlier identified four formations (objects, enunciative

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modalities, concepts and strategies) are retained in a modifiedform. Thus, restricting the analysis, as before, to the rule of formation of objects, Foucault introduces the "referential of the statement" (rules of existence of objects named), now governed by the "enunciative function". Archaeological analysis can thus be described as the uncovering of a discursive system, where the enunciative system more accurately reflects the subject of analysis: "To describe statements ... is to uncover what might be called the discursive formation ... the discursive formation is the general enunciative system that governs a group of verbal performances. ' '21 The enunciative function operates in what Foucault terms an "enunciative field": as the enunciative function "governs" verbal performances, it is to be expected that this function "assigns" a position to the statement. This is indeed the case, as is made clear when Foucault offers an account of the relationship between the statement and time:
At the very outset, from the very root, the statement is divided up into an enunciative field in which it has its place and status, which arranges for its possible relationship with the past, and which opens up for it a possible future. 22

The temporal relationship of the statement - the relationship between the particular statement and past and possible future statements - is arranged by the enunciative field. In line with the initial exploration of the discursive formation, we find here that the statement's temporal positioning is determined, although determination now comes from the enunciative field. However, again, when the subject of historical change is addressed, the relevant relationship is profoundly modified:
Enunciative analysis presupposes that one takes the phenomena of recurrence into account. Every statement involves a field of antecedent elements in relation to which it is situated, but which it is able to reorganise and redistribute according to new relations. It constitutes its own past, defines, in what precedes it, its on filiation, redefines what makes it possible or necessary, excludes what cannot be compatible with it. 23

Here, the.statement is not assigned its temporal relationship; rather, the statement defines its own temporal relationship. It is the statement, not the field, which defines relationships to the past and future. Again, it is precisely when the phenomena of historical change is included in the analysis that references to recurrences, redistribution and reorganisation appear, all as the responsibility of the statement.

The Possibility of Archaeology

The ambivalence initially unearthed in the case of rules of formation, and now also identified when the enunciative function is introduced, does not, however, merely indicate a difficulty with Foucault's theory in explaining historical change. Rather, this ambivalence is essential to the very possibility of the archaeological project itself, for the following reasons. As noted earlier, Foucault wishes to signal the end of the Age of Man. However, as each specific Age is governed by different systems of formation, then the Age of Archaeology is itself not immune from governance by a system of formation. Foucault recognises this when introducing the 'archive' of the archaeologist, where an 'archive' refers to the system of formation of statements within each Age: "It is

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not possible for us to describe our own archive, since it is from within these rules that we speak.' '24 The archaeologist is himself governed by the rules of his own historical archive. However, this admission raises problems for the earlier claim that archaeology was offering a "pure description of discursive events". How can the description offered by the archaeologist be pure if it is also determined by the historical situation of the archaeologist? It can now be appreciated how the ambivalance in the account offered of the relationship between the statement and temporality allows the status of archaeology to be securely maintained. On the one hand, as the statement can assign its own temporal position, then archaeological statements can themselves determine relationships to the past and future. The end of the "Age of Man" can thus be deemed to have arrived at any time. The overcoming of the Age is decided by the statement determining the necessary time-relations. On the other hand, as the temporal position of the statement is also claimed by the enunciative field, it is the time-relations determining the statement which dictates the passing or otherwise of the Age of Man. According to the first formulation, the archaeologist can abstract himself from any notion of objective time-relations and the statements define relationships to past and future: archaeology is "pure" . According to the second formulation, the archaeologist is embedded within objective time-relations conferred by the enunciative field within which he works: archaeology is a historical product. The first formulation allows the archaeologist, through appealing to the temporal autonomy of the statement, to claim freedom for himself. The second recognises that the archaeologist has no autonomy: if the Age of Man has not already been surpassed, then any statements produced are a product of the time of Man. Thus the conundrum: the end of the Age of Man can be decreed at any time, in so far as statements can assign their own temporal relations, yet the end of the Age of Man is a product of history, in so far as the temporal relations of the statement are assigned to it. The contradictions in the accounts offered concerning the relationship between the statement and temporality thus allows Foucault to claim both that the Age of Man has ended (a different archive is governing statements) and yet be able to claim that this is so at any time (statements can determine past relationships). The ambivalence identified in the temporal positioning of the statement is thus necessary for the possibility of archaeological analysis itself. This ambivalence explains, I suggest, a position Foucault takes within the analysis which other commentators have found mysterious, given the apparent dismissal of consciousness within the analysis. Foucault writes: "In the analysis proposed here, the rules of formation operate not only in the mind or consciousness of individuals, but in discourse itself.' '25 If the argument advanced here is correct, Foucault's claim that rules operate, not merely in discourse, but in the consciousness of individuals, becomes explicable: ultimately, the whole legitimacy of an archaeological analysis is predicated upon the idea that the statements of the archaeologist can consciously determine the ending of the "Age of Man" .

Foucault and the Kantian Problematic

As Foucault recognises, Kant was concerned with the question of human finitude. Unfortunately, Foucault totally misinterprets the nature of this concern with fmitude,

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thus essentially replicating its framework. Kant speaks of finitude in order to differentiate the capacities of man from those of non-human beings (specifically, God). Thus, Kant speaks of a divine understanding: " ... which should not represent to itself given objects, but through whose representations the objects should themselves be given or produced.' '26 Whereas a non-human understanding can produce objects, a finite understanding cannot, but is dependent upon objects being given. As a fmite understanding cannot product objects, the Critique ofPure Reason is concerned with how judgements can be made about objects which are" given' , to a finite mind. Kant explores the a priori judgements actually made in a section entitled Analogies ofExperience. Here, the impossibility of constructing the objects of experience leads Kant to confer a regulative status to the Analogies. "For since existence cannot be constructed, the principles (of pure understanding) can apply only to the relations of existence, and can yield only regulative principles. "27 Kant is quite explicit that, as existence cannot be constructed, judgements of experience cannot be constitutive: "An analogy of experience ... is not a principle constitutive of the objects, but only regulative.' '28 As judgements can only be made concerning already existing objects, Kant must face the problem as to how the finite mind can orient itself to such objects. How can man make judgements concerning an existence which confronts him? Kant argues that any orientation is only possible if man is receptive to objects, and such receptivity is possible through sensibility: "The capacity (receptivity) for receiving representations through the mode in which we are affected by objects, is entitled sensibility. Objects are given to use by nreans of sensibility ... "29 As sensibility allows receptivity towards objects, sensibility cannot itself arise from objects. That is, sensibility is a priori, not empirical: "The pure form of sensible intuitions ... must be found in the mind a priori. This pure form of sensibility may itself be called pure intuition. "30 By pure intuition, Kant signifies space and time: a finite mind is receptive to objects only in so far as such objects are structured a priori in space and time. As all "representations" are temporal (only those from extemalobjects being also spatial), then time assumes a crucial role in the exploration of the possibility of knowledge of objects: "Whatever the origin of our representations ... they must all, as modifications of the mind, belong to inner sense. All our knowledge is thus finally subject to time, the formal condition of inner sense. ' '31 Given the importance of time to Kant's account of knowledge of given objects, it is not surprising to find that time is also crucial to the argument advanced in the Analogies:
The three modes of time are duration, succession and co-existence. There will, therefore, be three rules of all relations of appearances in time, and these rules will be prior to all experience, and indeed make it possible. 32

For Kant, the rules governing the relations of experience are provided by the categories. Thus, in the Analogies, Kant argues that experience is only possible in so far as the rules provided by the categories are brought into relationship with time, both the categories and time maintaining an a priori status. With this introduction of categories as rules, it is now possible to illustrate how the problems already identified with Foucault's analysis can be traced back to Kant. Whereas Kant conferred a regulative status upon the rules of relations, in acknowledgement that experience cannot be constructed, Foucault confers a constitutive

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role on the rules of formation - thus, for example, rules are conditions of existence. The problems already identified with Foucault's analysis can be traced directly back to this modification of the basic Kantian framework. In introducing rules as constitutive, Foucault, in effect, defines rules in terms of Kant's definition of God: rules are constitutive, they create existence. However, such a move precludes any possibility of the relevant phenomena being introduced independently of the specific rules. Consequently, when Foucault speaks of historical change, rules now become defined in line with Kant's account of regulative rules: rules redistribute and disperse. Yet whereas Kant argued that judgements of experience could only be explained if the crucial importance of time was acknowledged, Foucault neglects the question of time. In not appreciating the true relationship between his own analysis and that offered by Kant, Foucault was unable to recognise that time presented a fundamental problem for his analysis which had to be addressed. However, although the problems that Foucault confronts in accounting for historical change can be traced back to a misreading of the Kantian project, can his problematic analysis of time also be traced back to Kant? To be sure, Foucault's misreading indicates why time appears as a problem: Foucault does not explore the question of time. However, this neglect does not necessarily suggest that the specific problems encountered by Foucault can be traced back to Kant. In order to reveal how derivative Foucault's analysis is upon the framework established by Kant, it must be shown how Foucault's account of temporality replicates a problematic already established by Kant. Such an argument can now be advanced.

Freedom and Temporality

In defining all possible objects of experience as temporal, Kant was forced to acknowledge the problem of freedom. In the second Analogy, through elaborating upon the relationship between rules and time,Kant had argued that all appearances were subject to the law of causality. However, if all appearances were subject to causal laws, then freedom was impossible within nature, as Kant acknowledged:
By freedom ... I understand the power of beginning a state spontaneously. Such causality will not, therefore, itself stand under another cause determining it in time, as required by the law of nature. Freedom, in this sense, is a pure transcendental idea. ' ,33

As this makes clear, the central problem for relating freedom and causality lay with the question of time: freedom must be removed from "determination in time". In removing freedom from time, Kant could argue that t~e act of freedom was not subject to the law of causality. However, whatever the merits of introducing freedom as a "transcendental idea", not subject to time, the advocated solution suffered from one crucial problem. For Kant, time consisted in successive 'moments', and events in time were thus themselves successive (if causally determined). However, although the initiation of events could, as a production of freedom, be removed from time, such events could only be apprehended by any observer as continuing a causal series:
No action begins in this active being itself, but we may yetquite correctly say that the

active being of itself begins its effects in the sensible world ... In doing so, we should

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not be asserting that the effect in this sensible world can begin of themselves; they are always predetermined through antecedent empirical conditions, though solely through their empirical character .... 34

Although the introduction of freedom as a "transcendent idea" allowed Kant to claim that free acts were those begun spontaneously, without reference to antecedent "causes", this was not the case for the observation of the acts of freedom. As all appearances are temporal, and as the second analogy had established the applicability of causality to all appearances, then the effects of "freedom" could only be perceived, by an observer, as continuing an already determined series:
If, for instance, I at this moment arise from my chair, in complete freedom ... a new series ... has its absolute beginning in this event, although as regards time this event is only the continuation of a preceding series. 35

Why should the problem of reconciling the spontaneous freedom of the act of origination with the perception of the same act as the continuation of a time-series arise? In the second analogy, Kant indicates the fundamental problem:
... It is ... an indispensable law of the empirical representation of the time-series that the appearances of the past time determine all the succeeding time, and that these latter, as events, can take place only in so far as the appearances of past time determine their existence in time, that is, determine them according to a rule. For only in appearances can we empirically apprehend this continuity in the connection

of times." Unless acts of freedom were apprehended as a continuation of a preceding series, then time itself could not be perceived as a continuum. As time, for Kant, was a series of moments, the empirical apprehension of time - the perception of time through objects in time - must itself be serial. If any act of freedom could not be apprehended as continuing an already existent series, then each individual act would initiate a new time-series. The impossibility of apprehending acts of freedom as anything other than continuations of series was forced upon Kant because of the demands of the unity of time. With Foucault, this recognition ofthe need for unified time is lost. The requirement of historical change - indeed, the need to allow for the possibility of archaeological analysis itself - leads Foucault to transgress the principle of the unity of time. In neglecting the problem Kant had already identified - that introducing differing series necessarily implies differing time series - Foucault is forced to accept different understandings of temporality into his analysis. Thus time assigns the statement, but the statement assigns time. These two different perspectives on temporality are, as Kant recognised, fundamentally incompatible. This investigation of the Kantian problematic thus sheds the following light upon Foucault's archaeological investigations: 1) Foucault's archaeological analysis is predicated upon an understanding of rules - rules as constitutive - which Kant had specifically rejected as not applicable to man. 2) However, Foucault cannot maintain consistency in his account of rules. When the subject of historical change is introduced, rules take on the appearance of regulative rules.

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3) However, throughout his account of rules, Foucault neglects the question of time which Kant had already identified as crucial. Such neglect leads Foucault to introduce two different perspectives on temporality, depending upon whether questions of existence or historical change are being addressed. 4) These two different perspective on temporality, in turn, replicate a problematic which Kant had already identified and attempted to resolve. This problematic is uncritically adopted by Foucault, resulting in two different understandings of a unified temporal series. 5) As with Kant, the problem of temporality is raised when the question of autonomy, or freedom, appears. In accounting for historical change, Foucault seeks to grant statements autonomy from specific enunciative functions. However, in granting autonomy, Foucault is left with two distinct understandings of temporality. 6) Foucault is thus unable to reconcile the autonomy required for repetition across historical change with the account offered of rules as constitutive. Foucault blurs the nature of the regularity of the statement, and is subsequently blind to the problem of temporality thus encountered. 7) The archaeologist is rule governed, yet seeks freedom. He appears within two distinct temporal series.

On the End of Man

Towards the end of The Order of Things, Foucault poses the following question:
Ought we not rather to give up thinking of man, or, to be more strict, to think of this disappearance of man - and the ground of possibility of all the sciences of man - as closely as possible in correlation with our concern with language. 37

In this paper, I have argued that the central thrust of Foucault's archaeological analysis can be centrally located within a Kantian problematic. To this extent, speaking of the possibility of the end of the sciences of man is somewhat premature. However, does Foucault escape the Kantian problematic in his later writings? I shall indicate that this question is to be answered in the negative. Foucault remains within the same problematic in his later writings, a state of affairs that can be indicated through examining the contortions some of his defenders are led to. The 'radicalness' or otherwise of Foucault' s writings have formed the focus of a number of recent studies. In a spirited defense of the radicalness embedded in Foucault's position, Ross has advanced the following argument:
What makes a discourse radical is less what is said than how - but how here refers to the multiplicity of force relations that constitute the discourse. In other words, a discourse is radical in virtue of its conditions and achievements. 38

What are the conditions in virtue ofwhich a discourse is radical? Ross elaborates: "I am speaking here of discourse that is constituted by and within historical conditions. "39 Ross's defence of Foucault's position reveals how the ambivalence in the position of the archaeologist is retained throughout Foucault's work. On the one hand, the very attempt to defend Foucault's record indicates the ascription of a certain

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responsibility to Foucault: it matters that Foucault is seen as radical. On the other hand, if, as Ross suggests, Foucault's discourse is a product of the historical conditions, and the description "radical" is merely a virtue of these conditions, then it is immaterial whether Foucault is radical or not. That is, Foucault may be radical, he may' not be: any responsibility attaches to the historical conditions of production, not Foucault himself. Ross thus seeks to defend Foucault as "radical", but the very defence absolves Foucault of any responsibility for being "radical". Foucault creates the time for his own work, yet time determines the status of this work. However, Foucault's later work does not merely replicate the ambivalence in the position of the author: it also remains undecided as to the relationship between constituting and constituted. Again, another defence of Foucault - this time by Connolly - indicates why this is so. Connolly is concerned with Foucault's more recent pronouncements on power, and writes: "The subject, on Foucault's reading, is not 'dead'; it is very much alive and very much the effect of modern disciplinary institutions. "40 The subject is the 'effect' of modem institutions: it is (without too great a travesty) constituted by institutions. However, Connolly proceeds to offer a different account of the position of the subject:
But if power produces the subject, in what way does power constrain or limit the self? .. Power produces and constrains, then, but the target of constraint is not the self as agent, but that in selves which resists agentification."

Now, the constitutive abilities of power are seriously curtailed: we have a self which "resists" such power. Indeed, power also "constrains": but what is constrained? The "self' which resists agentification, the "self' which power cannot produce. Power produces the subject, but the self is independent of this productive power: the subject is still alive and well. However, it would appear that Foucault would be unwilling to accept Connolly's characterisation. Rather than placing the' 'self" which resists power as external to such power, Foucault argues the opposite: "Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority to power." 42 So has Foucault, contrary to Connolly's exegesis, overcome the ambivalences and contradictions identified in his archaeological period? Unfortunately not, as his later account of the relationship between discourse and power indicates:
Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it ... discourse is both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance."

Discourse produces and is produced by power: power is produced by and yet produces discourse. The ambivalences, so essential to the analysis, and so indicative of moving uncritically within the orbit of Kant's thought, remain.
NOTES
1. In the Logic Kant writes - 'At bottom all this could be reckoned to be anthropology", 1. Kant Logic, trans. R. Hartman & W. Schwarz (New York, 1974),29. 2. M. Foucault The Order of Things: An Archaeology ofthe Human Sciences, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith, (London, 1970), 310.

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