R. DOUBLE JEOPARDY 1. Requisites a.

Valid complaint or information

Icasiano v Sandiganbayan FACTS: Petitioner Aurelio G. Icasiano, acting MTC Judge of Naic, Cavite, issued two (2) orders of detention against complainant Romana Magbago for contempt of court because of her continued refusal to comply with a fifth alias writ of execution. Magbago, in return, filed an administrative complaint with the SC against petitioner for grave abuse of authority, manifest partiality and incompetence. The SC however dismissed the complaint for lack on merit. It appears that prior to the dismissal, complainant also filed with the Office of the Ombudsman the same complaint, TBP-8700924 but this time imputing to petitioner violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act. This too was dismissed for lack of merit by Tanodbayan Gonzales. However, the Tanodbayan received another complaint, TBP-87-01546, from the same Magbago. The records of the case were allegedly among those transmitted to the then newly created office of the Ombudsman; unfortunately, the transmitted records did not contain the earlier resolution of dismissal in TBP-87-00924. Being unaware of that fact, Special Prosecutor Cruz Jr. who was assigned to investigate the second complaint filed conducted a preliminary investigation. Later, the corresponding information against petitioner for this complaint was field with the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner filed a motion for reinvestigation but this was denied. Petitioner thus moved to quash the information accused shall be placed in double jeopardy in so far as the resolution of the Hon. Supreme Court in Administrative Case No. RTJ-87-81. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the accused would be placed in double jeopardy in so far as the resolution of the Hon. Supreme Court in Administrative Case No. RTJ-87-81 2. Whether or not the accused would be placed in double jeopardy in so far as the dismissal by the Tanodbayan of the first complaint TBP-87-00924 HELD: 1. No. The accused would not be placed in double jeopardy in so far as the resolution of the Hon. Supreme Court in Administrative Case No. RTJ-87-81 It is correct for the Sandiganbayan to hold that double jeopardy does not apply in the present controversy because the Supreme Court case (against the herein petitioner) was administrative in character while the Sandiganbayan case also against said petitioner is criminal in nature. When the Supreme Court acts on complaints against judges or any of the personnel under its supervision and control, it acts as personnel administrator, imposing discipline and not as a court judging justiciable controversies. Administrative procedure need not strictly adhere to technical rules. Substantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction. Criminal proceedings before the Sandiganbayan, on the other hand, while they may involve the same acts subject of the administrative case, require proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. To avail of the protection against double jeopardy, it is fundamental that the following requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a competent court; (c) a valid arraignment; (d) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (e) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. All these elements do not apply vis-a-vis the administrative case, which should take care of petitioner's contention that said administrative case against him before the

Supreme Court, which was, as aforestated, dismissed, entitles him to raise the defense of double jeopardy in the criminal case in the Sandiganbayan. 2. No. Accused would not be placed in double jeopardy in so far as the dismissal by the Tanodbayan of the first complaint TBP-87-00924. The dismissal by the Tanodbayan of the first complaint cannot bar the present prosecution, since double jeopardy does not apply. As held in Cirilo Cinco, et al. vs. Sandiganbayan and the People of the Philippines, a preliminary investigation (assuming one had been conducted in TBP-87- 00924) is not a trial to which double jeopardy attaches. In Gaspar vs. Sandiganbayan, this Court also held:Moreover, there is no rule or law requiring the Tanodbayan to conduct another Preliminary investigation of a case under review by it (him). On the contrary, under Presidential Decree No. 911, in relation to Rule 12, Administrative Order No. VII, the Tanodbayan may, upon review, reverse the findings of the investigator, and thereafter "where he finds a prima facie case, to cause the filing of an information in court against the respondent, based on the same sworn statements or evidence submitted, without the necessity of conducting another preliminary investigation. In the present controversy, it will be noted that a preliminary investigation was conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman in TBP-87-01546 to accord the herein petitioner due process even if it could be argued that in TBP-87-01546, the Ombudsman was merely reviewing the Tanodbayan's original dismissal of the complaint in TBP-00924 (involving the same parties and the same facts), and he could have filed the information even without a new preliminary investigation. b. Filed before a competent court

People v Galano FACTS: A criminal complaint for estafa was filed in the municipal court of Batangas, Batangas (now City Court of Batangas City) against the accused-respondent Gregorio Santos by complainant, Juanito Limbo. Santos was arrested, and upon his arrest, posted a bail bond for his provisional liberty. The accused was thereafter arraigned and he pleaded not guilty to the charge. Then, the case was heard on its merits. However, the accused jumped bail. As a result, his bail bond was forfeited and the case against him archived by the municipal court of Batangas, Batangas. It was not until about nine years later, when the accused was re-arrested, and the trial of the said case resumed. While the said case was pending trial, private respondent Gregorio Santos filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that the Batangas court did not have territorial jurisdiction over the case, the evidence showing that the crime was committed in Manila. Finding the motion meritorious, the Batangas City Court issued an order dismissing the case for lack of territorial jurisdiction over the crime charged. Sometime later, the complainant Juanito B. Limbo refiled the same case against Santos in the Fiscal's Office of Manila. A preliminary investigation was conducted and later the corresponding information was filde. Accused filed a motion to dismiss criminal Case No. 22397 on the grounds of prescription and double jeopardy. ISSUE: Whether or not the criminal case shall be dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy HELD: No. The criminal case shall not be dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy. There is manifestly no jeopardy, because he was not acquitted by the Batangas court which on the basis of the evidence could neither

convict him because it was thereby shown to have no jurisdiction over the offense.

c.

Valid plea

People v Balisacan FACTS: Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide. To this charge the accused, upon being arraigned, entered a plea of guilty. In doing so, he was assisted by counsel. At his de oficio counsel's petition, however, he was allowed to present evidence to prove mitigating circumstances. Thereupon the accused testified to the effect that he stabbed the deceased in self-defense because the latter was strangling him. And he further stated that after the incident he surrendered himself voluntarily to the police authorities. Subsequently, the court a quo rendered a decision acquitting the accused. As stated, the prosecution appealed there from. Prosecution appealed from such decision of acquittal claiming that the trail court erred in acquitting the accused if the offense charged despite the latters plea of guilty. The Court found the appeal meritorious. ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy. HELD: No. The appeal did not place the accused in double jeopardy. It is settled that the existence of a plea is an essential requisite to double jeopardy. In the present case, it is true, the accused had first entered a plea of guilty. Subsequently, however, he testified, in the course of being allowed to prove mitigating circumstances that he acted in complete self-defense. Said testimony, therefore as the court a quo recognized in its decision had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty and the court a quo should have required him to plead a new on the charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. This was not done. It follows that in effect there having been no standing plea at the time the court a quo rendered its judgment of acquittal, there can be no double jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein.

Court which was later re-raffled to Branch 5 stationed in Cebu City presided over by respondent Judge Celso M. Gimenez, who dismissed the petition in a decision for lack of merit. As a result, petitioners, in their instant petition, argued among others that tthe decision of the municipal trial court dated June 13, 1990 dismissing the case against them was a judgment of acquittal, and may no longer be set aside without violating petitioners' right against double jeopardy. ISSUE: Whether or not the municipal trial court's dismissal of Criminal Case No. 5204 against petitioners precludes a subsequent reconsideration or reversal of such dismissal as the same would violate petitioners' right against double jeopardy HELD: For double jeopardy to be validly invoked by petitioners, the following requisites must have been obtained in the original prosecution; a) a valid complaint or information; b) a competent court; c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. Jurisprudence on double jeopardy as well as the exceptions thereto which finds application to the case at bar has been laid down by this Court as follows: However, an appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal (of the criminal case) by the trial court shall not constitute double jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express consent of the defendant; (2) the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the case; and (3) the question to be passed upon by the appellate court is purely legal so that should the dismissal be found incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant. For double jeopardy to attach, the dismissal of the case must be without the express consent of the accused. Where the dismissal was ordered upon motion or with the express assent of the accused, he is deemed to have waived his protection against double jeopardy. In the case at bar, the dismissal was granted upon motion of petitioners. Double jeopardy thus did not attach. This doctrine of waiver of double jeopardy was examined and formally introduced in People v. Salico where Justice Felicisimo Feria stated:. . . when the case is dismissed, with the express consent of the defendant, the dismissal will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense; because, his action in having the case dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right or privilege, for the reason that he thereby prevents the court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against him. Petitioners insist that the June 13, 1990 decision of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) is an acquittal since it was issued after it had allegedly considered the merits of the prosecution's evidence. This is unmeritorious. The MTC decision dismissing the case is not an acquittal from the charge considering that no finding was made as to the guilt or innocence of the petitioners. In fact, the original case was dismissed without the proper information having been filed, it appearing that the proper charge should have been, "disturbance of public performance," punishable under Article 153 of the Revised Penal Code instead of "grave threats," under Article 282 of the same penal code. This procedure is provided in Section 10 and 14 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Jurisprudence recognizes exceptional instances when the dismissal may be held to be final (to which double jeopardy attaches), disposing of the case once and for all even if the dismissal was made on motion of the accused himself, to wit: 1. Where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused after the prosecution has rested, which has the effect of a judgment on the merits and operates as an acquittal.

d.

Termination of the case

Paulin v Judge Gimenez FACTS: The jeep ridden by private respondent and Barangay Captain Castro Belme Mabuyo was overtaken by the Nissan Patrol ridden by herein petitioners, the spouses Dr. Ramon and Angela Paulin, smothering the former with dust. Because of this incident, Mabuyo followed the Nissan Patrol until it entered the back gate of Rattan Originals in Tanke, Talisay Cebu and upon inquiry discovered that the vehicle belonged to and was driven by petitioner Dr. Ramon Paulin. Later, while Mabuyo was investigating some problems of his constituents in Kilawan at Tanke, Cebu, Dr. Ramon Paulin and his wife, Angie, allegedly pointed their guns at Mabuyo while Jose Bacho, a companion of the spouses, acted as back-up. Mabuyo instructed one of the barangay tanods to call the police in Talisay and the rest to block the exit of the spouses and their lone companion. Sensing that they were outnumbered, the spouses put their guns down and upon the arrival of the police officers, they were brought to the police station. Station Commander P/Lt. Ariel Palcuto filed a complaint for "grave threats," against the spouses Paulin and Bacho, herein petitioners, Criminal Case No. 5204. On November 20, 1989, the station commander filed a complaint for, "grave threats and oral defamation," against private respondent Mabuyo, Criminal Case No. 5213. The cases were jointly tried and the MTC of Talisay, Cebu (Branch IX), acting on a motion of the spouses Paulin and Jose Bacho, dismissed Criminal Case No. 5204. Mabuyo filed a, "Motion for Reconsideration," of the said dismissal order which the court granted in a resolution. At the hearing of Criminal Case No. 5213 on, petitioners vigorously sought the setting aside of the July 3, 1990 resolution in Criminal Case No. 5204, but the same was denied in another resolution. Thus, petitioners filed petition for "certiorari, prohibition, damages, with relief for preliminary injunction and the issuance of a temporary restraining order" with the Regional Trial

2. Where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused, because of the denial of his right to a speedy trial which is in effect a failure to prosecute. Petitioners' motion to dismiss premised on procedural grounds cannot be considered a demurrer to evidence nor was the dismissal sought by them predicated on the denial of their right to speedy trial. Hence, the exceptions mentioned find no application in the instant case, especially so because when the municipal trial court dismissed the case upon petitioners' motion, the prosecution still had to present several witnesses. NOTES: 1. Acquittal and Dismissal; Difference: Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because the evidence does not show that defendant's guilt is beyond reasonable doubt; but dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty. Dismissals terminate the proceedings, either because the court is not a court of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or information is not valid or sufficient in form and substance, etc. (People v. Salico) 2. Section 10 and 14 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure; Application: Sec. 14. Amendments. If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Rule 119, Sec. 11. In Section 11 of the same Rule, it is provided: When it becomes manifest at any time before judgment, that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, and the accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged, or of any other offense necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be discharged, if there appears to be good cause to detain him. In such case, the court shall commit the accused to answer for the proper offense and dismiss the original case upon the filing of the proper information. 3. An order of dismissal which resulted to the violation of the prosecutions right and opportunity to prove its case cannot give rise for a claim of double jeopardy: a. Where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of jurisdiction. Hence, the violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional error (Gumabon v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons) as the decision rendered in disregard of the right is void for lack of jurisdiction. (Aducayen v. Flores) b. Where the order of dismissal was issued at a time when the case was not ready for trial and adjudication, the order is null and void (People v. Pamittan) The Court found that the prosecution was denied due process as it never had the chance to offer its evidence formally in accordance with the Rules of Court in view of the trial court's order of dismissal. The trial court was thereby ousted from its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process by aborting its right to complete the presentation of its evidence and, therefore, the first jeopardy had not been terminated. Hence, the remand of the case for further hearing or trial is merely a continuation of the first jeopardy and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy. (People v. Bocar) The Court reiterated its previous ruling in the Bocar case, holding that the trial court exceeded it's jurisdiction and acted with grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack of

jurisdiction, when it pre-emptively dismissed the case and as a consequence thereof, deprived the prosecution of its right to prosecute and prove its case, thereby violating its fundamental right to due process. With such violation, its orders are, therefore, null and void and cannot constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy. (People v. Albano) e. "Where the trial court prematurely terminated the presentation of the prosecution's evidence and forthwith dismissed the information for insufficiency of evidence, may the case be remanded for further proceeding?" This Court, applying the Bocar case, ruled that the order of the Court of Appeals reinstating the criminal case for further hearing by the trial court does not violate the rule on double jeopardy inasmuch as the trial court was ousted from its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process. The municipal trial court thus did not violate the rule on double jeopardy when it set aside the order of dismissal for the reception of further evidence by the prosecution because it merely corrected its error when it prematurely terminated and dismissed the case without giving the prosecution the right to complete the presentation of its evidence. It follows then that the decision of respondent regional trial court sustaining that of the court of origin cannot be said to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion (Saldana v. Court of Appeals)

Upaz v Judge Ulep FACTS: State Prosecutor (SP) Esteban A. Molon, Jr. filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Quezon City an information against accused Petronila C. Tupaz and her late husband Jose J. Tupaz, Jr., as corporate officers of El Oro Engravers Corporation, for nonpayment of deficiency corporate income tax for the year 1979 the Tax Code of 1977. The MeTC dismissed the information for lack of jurisdiction and denied the subsequent motion for reconsideration. Sometime later, SP Molon filed with the RTC two (2) informations, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-91-17321 and Q-9l-17322, against accused and her late husband, for the same alleged nonpayment of deficiency corporate income tax for the year 1979. Criminal Case No. Q-91-17321 was raffled to Branch 105, presided over by respondent Judge Benedicto B. Ulep; Q-91-17322 was raffled to Branch 86, then presided over by Judge Antonio P. Solano. Accused filed with the RTC a motion to dismiss/quash information (Q-91-17322) for the reason that it was exactly the same as the information against the accused pending before RTC, Quezon City, Branch 105 (Q-91-17321). Judge Solano however denied the motion. Subsequently, accused Petronila C. Tupaz filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105, a petition for reinvestigation, which Judge Ulep granted. Senior State Prosecutor Bernelito R. Fernandez later o considered the reinvestigation terminated as there were no new issues raised, and no cogent reasons existed to alter, modify or reverse the findings of the investigating prosecutor. He considered the reinvestigation as terminated, and recommended the prompt arraignment and trial of the accused. Accused was then arraigned (Criminal Case No. Q-9117321) where she pleaded not guilty to the information therein. Subsequently, the prosecution filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105, a motion for leave to file amended information in Criminal Case No. Q91-17321 to allege expressly the date of the commission of the offense. Despite opposition of the accused, the trial court granted the motion and admitted the amended information. Later on, nonetheless, Judge Ulep issued an order directing the prosecution to withdraw the information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-17322, pending before RTC Branch 86, after discovering that said information was identical to the one filed with RTC Branch 105. Thus, State Prosecutor Alfredo P. Agcaoili filed with the trial court a motion to withdraw information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-17321. Prosecutor Agcaoili thought that

c.

d.

accused was charged in Criminal Case No. Q-91-17321, for nonpayment of deficiency contractor's tax, but found that accused was exempted from paying said tax. He filed with a motion for consolidation of the two criminal cases and this was granted on the same day. After the consolidation, however, Judge Ulep granted the motion for withdrawal of the information in Criminal Case No. Q91-17321 and dismissed the case, as prayed for by the prosecution. Hence, Prosecutor Agcaoili filed a motion to reinstate information in Criminal Case Q-91-17321, stating that the motion to withdraw information was made through palpable mistake, and was the result of excusable neglect since he thought that Criminal Case No. Q-9117321 was identical to Criminal Case No. Q-90-12896, wherein accused was charged with nonpayment of deficiency contractor's tax. Over the objections of accused, motion was granted and RTC ordered information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-17321 reinstated. Petitioner assailed the reinstatement of the information, claiming that it exposed her to double jeopardy. ISSUE: Whether or not the reinstatement of the information in Criminal Case Q-91-17321 exposed the accused to double jeopardy HELD: Yes. The reinstatement of the information in Criminal Case Q-91-17321 exposed the accused to double jeopardy. Petitioner contends that by reinstating the information, the trial court exposed her to double jeopardy. Neither the prosecution nor the trial court obtained her permission before the case was dismissed. She was placed in jeopardy for the first time after she pleaded to a valid complaint filed before a competent court and the case was dismissed without her express consent. When the trial court reinstated the information charging the same offense, it placed her in double jeopardy. On the other hand, the Solicitor General contends that reinstating the information does not violate petitioner's right against double jeopardy. He asserts that petitioner induced the dismissal of the complaint when she sought the reinvestigation of her tax liabilities. By such inducement, petitioner waived or was estopped from claiming her right against double jeopardy. The Solicitor General further contends that, assuming arguendo that the case was dismissed without petitioner's consent, there was no valid dismissal of the case since Prosecutor Agcaoili was under a mistaken assumption that it was a charge of nonpayment of contractor's tax. Petitioner's contention is sustained. The reinstatement of the information would expose her to double jeopardy. An accused is placed in double jeopardy if he is again tried for an offense for which he has been convicted, acquitted or in another manner in which the indictment against him was dismissed without his consent. In the instant case, there was a valid complaint filed against petitioner to which she pleaded not guilty. The court dismissed the case at the instance of the prosecution, without asking for accused-petitioner's consent. This consent cannot be implied or presumed. Such consent must be expressed as to have no doubt as to the accused's conformity. As petitioner's consent was not expressly given, the dismissal of the case must be regarded as final and with prejudice to the re-filing of the case. Consequently, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the information against petitioner in violation of her constitutionally protected right against double jeopardy. People v Quizada FACTS: In three separate complaints filed with the office of the provincial fiscal of Surigao del Sur, Cipriana B. Tranquilan accused Maria L. Quizada of having spoken of her statements which are offensive and insulting. On the basis of these complaints, and after preliminary investigation, the assistant provincial fiscal filed three separate informations for grave oral defamation against Quizada for having disparaged Tranquilan. Upon arraignment the accused pleaded not guilty to all the three informations. Thereafter, she

moved to quash the same on the ground that the charges should have been initiated not by the fiscal but upon complaint of the offended party herself pursuant to Rule 110, Section 4 (now Section 5), of the Rules of Court and Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial judge thus dismissed the charges and denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecution. When prosecution challenged the dismissal, accused claimed that reversal of the dismissal and the reinstatement of the cases would violate her right against double jeopardy under Article IV, Section 22 (now Article III, Section 21) of the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not the reversal of the dismissal and the reinstatement of the cases would violate the accuseds right against double jeopardy HELD: No. The reversal of the dismissal and the reinstatement of the cases would not violate the accuseds right against double jeopardy. The allegation of double jeopardy is plainly without merit. As we have repeatedly stressed, double jeopardy will attach if (a) a valid complaint or information (b) is filed before a competent court or tribunal, and (c) after the accused shall have been arraigned and entered a plea, (d) he is acquitted or convicted or the case is dismissed without his express consent. The first three requisites are present in the case at bar but the fourth is not. It was the petitioner herself who moved to quash the charges against her on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction. The dismissal was made not only with her express consent but, indeed, upon her own motion. There are only two occasions when double jeopardy will attach even if the motion to dismiss the case is made by the accused himself. The first is when the ground is insufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution, and the second is when the proceedings have been unreasonably prolonged in violation of the right to a speedy trial. None of these exceptions is present here. People v City Court of Silay FACTS: Private respondent Ernesto de la Paz, Pacifico Senecio, Jr. y Sebusa Romeo Millan y Delejero and Wilfredo Jochico y Magalona, were charged with "falsification by private individuals and use of falsified document" .After the prosecution had presented its evidence and rested its case, private respondents moved to dismiss the charge against them on the ground that the evidence presented was not sufficient to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Acting on this motion, respondent court issued its order dismissing the case with costs de oficio principally on the ground that the acts committed by the accused as narrated above do not constitute the crime of falsification as charged. A petition for review was jointly filed by the City Fiscal of Silay City, Marcelino M. Paviera, and the Law Offices of Hilado, Hagad & Hilado, the latter as private prosecutors, praying that the order be set aside and that respondent court be directed to continue with the trial of the aforementioned case. Private respondents claim that there was no error committed by respondent court in dismissing the case against them for insufficiency of evidence and that for this Court to grant the present petition would place said respondents in double jeopardy. On the other hand, the People asserts that the plea of double jeopardy is not tenable inasmuch as the case was dismissed upon motion of the accused, and the dismissal having been made with their consent, they waived their defense of double jeopardy, citing various cases in support thereof. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused can avail of the plea of double jeopardy

HELD: Yes. The accused can avail of the plea of double jeopardy as against the petition for review. It is true that the criminal case of falsification was dismissed on motion of the accused; however, this was a motion filed after the prosecution had rested its case, calling for an appreciation of the evidence adduced and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused. Thus, all the elements of double jeopardy are here present, to wit: (1) a valid information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction of the crime charged, (2) a court of competent jurisdiction, and (3) an unconditional dismissal of the complaint after the prosecution had rested its case, amounting to the acquittal of the accused. The dismissal being one on the merits, the doctrine of waiver of the accused to a plea of double jeopardy cannot be invoked. On the other hand, the Court finds the dismissal of the criminal case against the private respondents was erroneous. As correctly stated in the Comment of the Acting Solicitor General, the accused were not charged with substitution of genuine "tarjetas" with false ones. The basis for the accusation was that the accused entered false statements as to the weight of the sugar cane loaded in certain cane cars in "tarjetas" which were submitted to the laboratory section of the company. The act of making a false entry in the "tarjetas" is undoubtedly an act of falsification of a private document, the accused having made untruthful statements in a narration of facts which they were under obligation to accomplish as part of their dutiesErnesto de la Paz, as overseer of Hda. Malisbog, and the other accused as scalers of the offended party, the Hawaiian-Philippine Company, thereby causing damage to the latter. However, although the order of the respondent court in dismissing the case was clearly erroneous and although a miscarriage of justice resulted from said order, such error cannot now be righted because of the timely plea of double jeopardy. NOTES: 1. Comparable cases; dismissal on merits: a. The Court dismissed an appeal taken by the People against an order of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte dismissing a criminal case upon motion of the accused after the presentation of evidence by the prosecution as such appeal if allowed would place the accused in double jeopardy. There the accused was charged with estafa by obtaining from Pedro Miguel a ring valued at P16,500.00 and issuing a check for $5,000.00 in Payment thereof which turned out later to be counterfeit to the damage and prejudice of said Pedro Miguel in the aforementioned amount of P16,500.00. After the presentation of the evidence of the prosecution, the accused moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the evidence showed that the ring belonged to somebody else, Banang Jaramillo, and not to Pedro Miguel as alleged in the information and that the element of damage was absent. This motion was opposed by the Assistant Provincial Fiscal but notwithstanding said opposition, the trial court dismissed the case on the ground that Pedro Miguel was a mere agent of the true owner of the ring and therefore not the real offended party. The Assistant Provincial Fiscal appealed to this Court, but the Solicitor General moved for the dismissal of the appeal on the ground that it would place the accused in double jeopardy, and the Court agreed with the Solicitor General, stating that it cannot be seriously questioned that the trial court had grievously erred in his conclusion and application of the law, and in dismissing outright the case; however, the error cannot now be remedied by an appeal because it would place the accused in double jeopardy. (People vs. Acosta) b. Petitioner Catilo was charged with murder before the Court of First Instance of Batangas presided by respondent Judge.

Petitioner was arraigned and after the prosecution had rested its case petitioner moved for the dismissal of the charge for insufficiency of evidence. This motion was granted by the Judge and his order was promulgated in open court to the accused. Later in the day, Judge Abaya set aside his order of dismissal motu proprio and scheduled the case for continuation of the trial on specific dates. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the defense counsel but because respondent Judge failed to take action, the accused filed an original action for certiorari with this Court. In granting relief to petitioner Catilo, the Court, through Justice Marcelino R. Montemayor, held: From whatever angle we may view the order of dismissal Annex "A", the only conclusion possible is that it amounted to an acquittal. Whether said acquittal was due to some "misrepresentation of facts" as stated in the order of reconsideration, which alleged misrepresentation is vigorously denied by the defendant-petitioner, or to a misapprehension of the law or of the evidence presented by the prosecution, the fact is that it was a valid order or judgment of acquittal, and thereafter the respondent Judge himself advised the accused in open court that he was a free man and could not again be prosecuted for the same offense. (Catilo vs. Hon. Abaya) 2. Power of the Court to modify its order; Applicable only to a judgment of conviction: The inherent powers of a court to modify its order or decision, under section 5, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court claimed for the respondent to set aside his order of dismissal, does not extend to an order of dismissal which amounts to a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case; and the power of a court to modify a judgment or set it aside before it has become final or an appeal has been perfected, under section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, refers to a judgment of conviction and does not and cannot include a judgment of acquittal. Comparable case; When error can no longer be righted because of the timely plea of double jeopardy: On September 21, 1956, an Information for homicide was filed with the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija against Gloria Nieto who, upon arraignment pleaded guilty to the charge but notwithstanding that plea, the trial judge acquitted her on the Page 254 ground that although the accused was a minor "over 9 and under 15 years old" the Information failed to allege that she acted with discernment. Thereafter the prosecution filed another Information for the same offense stating therein that the accused Gloria Nieto was "a child between 9 and 15 years" and alleging in express terms that she acted with discernment. The defense filed a motion to quash this second Information on grounds of double jeopardy, and the trial court already presided by another Judge, Hon. Felix V. Makasiar, now Justice of this Court, granted the motion. The prosecution appealed to this Court from said order. In its Decision, the Court dismissed the appeal and sustained the order of then Judge Makasiar, deploring that as a result of a mistaken view taken by the trial judge who acquitted the accused Gloria Nieto despite her plea of guilty there was a miscarriage of justice which cannot be righted and which leaves the Court no choice bat to affirm the dismissal of the second Information for reasons of double jeopardy. (People v Nieto)

3.

Esmena v Pogoy FACTS: Petitioners Generoso Esmea and Alberto Alba and their co-accused, Genaro Alipio, Vicente Encabo and Bernardo Villamira were charged with grave coercion for having allegedly forced Reverend Father Tomas Tibudan to withdraw the sum of five thousand pesos from the bank and to give that amount to the accused because the priest lost it in a game of cards. The case was calendared on October 4, 1978 presumably for arraignment and trial. Upon the telegraphic request of Father Tibudan the case was

reset on December 13, 1978. Because Esmea and Alba were not duly notified of that hearing, they were not able to appear. The two pleaded not guilty at their arraignment. No trial was held after the arraignment because complainant Father Tibudan requested the transfer of the hearing to another date. In the meantime, the fiscal lost his record of the case. So, the hearing scheduled on June 18, 1979 was cancelled at his instance. On that date, respondent judge issued an order setting the trial "for the last time on August 16, 1979, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning". When the case was called on that date, the fiscal informed the court that the private prosecutor received from complainant Father Tibudan a telegram stating that he was sick. The counsel for petitioners Esmea and Alba opposed the cancellation of the hearing. They invoked the right of the accused to have a speedy trial. Their counsel told the court: " ... we are now invoking the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial of the case. ... We are insisting on our stand that the case be heard today; otherwise, it will (should) be dismissed on the ground of invoking (sic) the constitutional right of the accused particularly accused Alberto Alba and Generoso Esmea. Respondent judge provisionally dismissed the case as to the four accused who were present because it "has been dragging all along and the accused are ready for the hearing" but the fiscal was not ready with his witness. The court noted that there was no medical certificate indicating that the complainant was really sick. Later however, fiscal filed a motion for the revival of the case, attaching a medical certificate under oath attesting to the fact that Father Tibudan was sick of influenza on August 16, 1979. The fiscal cited the ruling that a provisional dismissal with the conformity of the accused lacks the impress of finality and, therefore, the case could be revived without the filing of a new information The accused did not oppose the motion and so respondent judge granted the same. Esmea and Alba filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of double jeopardy. They pointed out that they did not consent to the provisional dismissal of the case. Hence, the provisional dismissal amounted to an acquittal which placed them in jeopardy. Its revival, according to them, would place them in double jeopardy. ISSUE: Whether the revival of the instant grave coercion which was provisionally dismissed (after the accused had arraigned) because of complainant's failure to appear at the would place the accused in double jeopardy, considering constitutional right to have a speedy trial case, been trial, their

and (c) the accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or information. When these three conditions are present, the acquittal or conviction of the accused or the dismissal or termination of the case without his express consent constitutes res judicata and is a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is included therein. Previous acquittal (autrefois acquit), previous conviction (autrefois convict) or the dismissal or termination of the case without his consent precludes his subsequent indictment for the same offense as defined in section 9. In the instant case, petitioners were placed in jeopardy by the provisional dismissal of the grave coercion case. That provisional dismissal would not have place the petitioners in jeopardy if respondent judge had taken the precaution of making sure that the dismissal was with their consent. In this case, it is not very clear that the petitioners consented to the dismissal of the case. It is the practice of some judges before issuing an order of provisional dismissal in a case wherein the accused had already been arraigned to require the accused and his counsel to sign the minutes of the session or any available part of the record to show the conformity of the accused or his lack of objection to the provisional dismissal. The judge specifies in the order of provisional dismissal that the accused and his counsel signified their assent thereto. That procedure leaves no room for doubt as to the consent of the accused and precludes jeopardy from attaching to the dismissal. The petitioners were insisting on a trial. They relied on their constitutional right to have a speedy trial. The fiscal was not ready because his witness was not in court. Respondent judge on his own volition provisionally dismissed the case. The petitioners did not expressly manifest their conformity to the provisional dismissal. Hence, the dismissal placed them in jeopardy. Even if the petitioners, after invoking their right to a speedy trial, moved for the dismissal of the case and, therefore, consented to it, the dismissal would still place them in jeopardy. The use of the word "provisional" would not change the legal effect of the dismissal If the defendant wants to exercise his constitutional right to a speedy trial, he should ask, not for the dismissal, but for the trial of the case. After the prosecution's motion for postponement of the trial is denied and upon order of the court the fiscal does not or cannot produce his evidence and, consequently, fails to prove the defendant's guilt, the court upon defendant's motion shall dismiss the case, such dismissal amounting to an acquittal of the defendant" . Thus, dismissal of a criminal case upon motion of the accused because the prosecution was not prepared for trial since the complainant and his witnesses did not appear at the trial is a dismissal equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the defendant for the same offense. Toyoto v Ramos FACTS: Gerry Toyoto, Eddie Gonzales and Dominador Gabiana belong to a group called the "Urban Poor" which conducted a march, demonstration and rally along Northbay Boulevard in Navotas, Metro Manila. Subsequently, they (among others) were accused of violating Presidential Decree No. 1835 (Codifying the Various Laws on Anti-Subversion and Increasing the Penalties for Membership in Subversive Organizations [January 16, 1981]). Petitioners were arraigned and they pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. The prosecution was able to present only one witness despite repeated postponements. This prompted the accused to move for the dismissal of the case and this was granted by Judge Vicente B, Echaves, Jr. The order of dismissal was dated November 9, 1984, but on December 5, 1984, when the petition for habeas corpus was filed, the respondents had not released and they refused to release the petitioners on the ground that a Preventive Detention

HELD: Yes. The revival of the instant grave coercion case, which was provisionally dismissed (after the accused had been arraigned) because of complainant's failure to appear at the trial, would place the accused in double jeopardy, considering their constitutional right to have a speedy trial The rule on double jeopardy (non bis in Idem or not twice for the same) is found in section 22, Article IV Bill of Rights) of the Constitution which provides that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." This is complemented by Rule 117 of the Rules of Court which provides as follows: (Section 7 in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure) SEC. 9. Former conviction or acquittal or former jeopardy. When a defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the defendant, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. In order that legal jeopardy may exist, there should be (a) a valid complaint or information (b) before a court of competent jurisdiction

Action had been issued against them. Petitioners, at this time, had been in detention for over one year.The return filed by the respondents states that petitioners Toyoto, Gonzales and Gabiana were released to their relatives on December 8, 1984, pursuant to the order of the Minister of National Defense. The order (Annex 1) is dated November 30, 1984, and orders the "temporary release" of the petitioners. The respondents pray that the petition be dismissed for having become moot and academic in view of the release of the petitioners from detention. The petitioners would have their case considered moot and academic only "if their release would be permanent." ISSUE: Whether or not the case should be considered moot and academic when petitioners release be made permanent HELD: Yes. The case should be considered moot and academic when petitioners release be made permanent Ordinarily, a petition for habeas corpus becomes moot and academic when the restraint on the liberty of the petitioners is lifted either temporarily or permanently. We have so held in a number of cases. But the instant case presents a different situation. The question to be resolved is whether the State can reserve the power to re-arrest a person for an offense after a court of competent jurisdiction has absolved him of the offense. An affirmative answer is the one suggested by the respondents because the release of the petitioners being merely "temporary" it follows that they can be re-arrested at anytime despite their acquittal by a court of competent jurisdiction. We hold that such a reservation is repugnant to the government of laws and not of men principle. Under this principle the moment a person is acquitted on a criminal charge he can no longer be detained or re-arrested for the same offense. This concept is so basic and elementary that it needs no elaboration. People v CA and Tangan FACTS: Tangan was charged with the crime of murder with the use of an unlicensed firearm against Generoso Miranda when the two parties got engaged in a fight while both driving along Roxas Boulevard. After a reinvestigation, however, the information was amended to homicide with the use of a licensed firearm, and he was separately charged with illegal possession of unlicensed firearm. On arraignment, Tangan entered a plea of not guilty in the homicide case, but moved to quash the information for illegal possession of unlicensed firearm on various grounds. The motion to quash was denied, whereupon he filed a petition for certiorari with this Court. Said petition was dismissed and the joint trial of the two cases was ordered. After trial, the lower court acquitted Tangan of illegal possession of firearm, but convicted him of homicide. The privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense and the ordinary mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party and of passion and obfuscation were appreciated in his favor. Tangan was released from detention after the promulgation of judgment and was allowed bail in the homicide case. Private complainants, the heirs of Generoso Miranda, filed a petition for review challenging the civil aspect of the court a quo's decision, but the same was dismissed for being premature. On the other hand, Tangan appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment of the trial court but increased the award of civil indemnity to P50,000.00. His subsequent motion for reconsideration and a motion to cite the Solicitor General in contempt were denied by the Court of Appeals. The office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of the prosecution, alleging grave abuse of discretion, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65naming as respondents the Court of Appeals and Tangan, where it prayed that the appellate court's judgment be modified by convicting accusedappellant of homicide without appreciating in his favor any mitigating circumstance. General later withdrew its motion for

extension of time. Tangan filed a Reply asking that the case be submitted for decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed by the Solicitor General shall be dismissed as it violates the right of the accused against double jeopardy HELD: Yes. The petition for certiorari filed by the Solicitor General shall be dismissed constitutes a violation the right of the accused against double jeopardy. The prosecution cannot avail of the remedies of special civil action on certiorari, petition for review on certiorari, or appeal in criminal cases. Likewise, the writ of certiorari cannot be used by the State in a criminal case to correct a lower court's factual findings or evaluation of the evidence. Thus, the Solicitor General's petition for certiorari under Rule 65, praying that no mitigating circumstance be appreciated in favor of accused-appellant and that the penalty imposed on him be correspondingly increased, constitutes a violation of Tangan's right against double jeopardy and should be dismissed. NOTES: 1. When conviction is not a bar to subsequent prosecution: However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which, necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of the following instances: (a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission constituting the former charge; (b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after a pleas was entered in the former complaint or information; or (c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the fiscal and of the offended party, except as provided in section 1(f) of Rule 116. In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfies or serves in whole or in part the judgment, he shall be credited with the same in the event of conviction for the graver offense. People v Feleciano FACTS: An Information was filed against Rodel de la Cruz and Carlos Feliciano, both security guards, imputing them for the killing of one Teresita Fuentes y Osorio. The prosecution sought the discharge of accused Rodel de la Cruz so that the latter could testify against his co-accused Carlos Feliciano. Pending resolution by the trial court on the motion, Carlos Feliciano and Rodel de la Cruz were arraigned where they entered a plea of not guilty. The court a quo granted the motion of the prosecution and the name of Rodel de la Cruz, an accused turned state witness, was forthwith stricken off from the Information. After trial, the court found Feleciano guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal by direct participation of the crime of Robbery with Homicide. Assailing his conviction, accused argues that the trial court erred in discharging de la Cruz to be the state witness against him. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the trial court erred in discharging de la Cruz to be the state witness against him 2. Whether or not the discharge of de la Cruz precludes his subsequent prosecution for the same offense as it would violate his right against double jeopardy HELD: 1. Yes. The trial court erred in discharging de la Cruz to be the state witness against him.

Despite an obvious attempt to downgrade his own participation in the crime, state witness de la Cruz, nevertheless, did not renege from his agreement to give a good account of the crime, enough to indeed substantiate the conviction of his co-accused, now appellant Carlos Feliciano, by the trial court 2. Yes. The discharge of de la Cruz precludes his subsequent prosecution for the same offense as it would violate his right against double jeopardy.

questions which are propounded to him, and which he had been compelled to answer, and that any material concealment or suppression of the truth on his part will deprive him of the immunity provided by the constitution; and the witness must testify to something which, if true, would tend to criminate him. This immunity is only granted to those who earn it by testifying in good faith. In our judgment any other construction would be an insult to and a libel upon the intelligence of the people of Oklahoma, an outrage on law, and a prostitution of justice. (US v de Guzman) People v Uy FACTS: Rabel Campos, was found dead with several stab wounds along the National Highway of Maputi, Naawan, Misamis Oriental. Teofilo Panangin (Panangin), was arrested as a suspect in the commission of the crime. During the investigation conducted, Panangin executed a Sworn Statement with the assistance of Atty. Celso Sarsaba of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), confessing that he and his former employer Louel Uy were responsible for the death of Campos. Thus, a case for murder was filed against Panangin and Uy. During the trila, when the prosecution rested its case, Panangin a demurrer to evidence on the ground that when he executed his extra-judicial confession, his rights under Sec. 12, Bill of Rights of the Constitution were violated in that he was man-handled and detained and while being handcuffed his extra-judicial confession was taken by Tamayo who, however failed and never informed him of his constitutional rights as accused. Uy, also with leave of court, filed a separate demurrer to evidence essentially echoing the grounds-bases of Panangins demurrer. The trial court, granted the demurrer, acquitting the accused for insufficiency of evidence. Petitioners appealed to the grant of demurrer to evidence. ISSUE: Whether or not the grant of the demurrer of evidence may be appealed by petitioners without violating the accuseds right against double jeopardy HELD: Yes. The grant of the demurrer of evidence may be appealed by petitioners without violating the accuseds right against double jeopardy. The general rule in this jurisdiction is that a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. People v. Court of Appeals explains the rationale of this rule: In our jurisdiction, the finality-of-acquittal doctrine as a safeguard against double jeopardy faithfully adheres to the principle first enunciated in Kepner v. United States. In this case, verdicts of acquittal are to be regarded as absolutely final and irreviewable. The fundamental philosophy behind the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy is to afford the defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose and safeguard him from government oppression through the abuse of criminal processes. As succinctly observed in Green v. United States "(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the AngloAmerican system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty." (Underscoring supplied) The same rule applies in criminal cases where a demurrer to evidence is granted. As held in the case of People v. Sandiganbayan: The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is filed after the prosecution had rested its case, and when the same is granted, it calls for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused. Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for

It is widely accepted that the discharge of an accused to become a state witness has the same effect as an acquittal. The impropriety of the discharge would not have any effect on the competency and quality of the testimony, nor would it have the consequence of withdrawing his immunity from prosecution. A discharge, if granted at the stage where jeopardy has already attached, is equivalent to an acquittal, such that further prosecution would be tantamount to the state reneging on its part of the agreement and unconstitutionally placing the state witness in doubt jeopardy. The rule, of course, is not always irreversible. In an instance where the discharged accused fails to fulfill his part of the bargain and refuses to testify against his co-accused, the benefit of his discharge can be withdrawn and he can again be prosecuted for the same offense. In this jurisdiction, it is the trial court judge who has the exclusive responsibility of ensuring that the conditions prescribed by the rules on the discharge of the accused exist. This grant is not one of arbitrary discretion but rather a sound judicial prerogative to be exercised with due regard to the proper and correct dispensation of criminal justice . But that there would be the possibility of error on the part of the judge is understandable. A trial judge cannot be expected or required to inform himself with absolute certainty at the outset of the trial as to everything which may develop in the course of the trial in regard to the guilty participation of the accused in the commission of the crime charged in the complaint. If that were possible, the judge would conveniently rely on large part upon the suggestion and the information furnished by the prosecuting officer in coming to the conclusion as to the "necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested, as to the "availability of other direct or corroborative evidence," and as to who among the accused is the "most guilty," and so the like. Then, there would be little need for the formality of a trial. Thus, here, even while one might be convinced that state witness Rodel de la Cruz would, on the basis of evidence ultimately submitted, appear to be equally as, and not less than, guilty in conspiracy with appellant Carlos Feliciano, the hands of the State are now stayed and the Court must assure the exemption of the witness from punishment. NOTES: 1. Comparable case; When an accused who was discharged as a state witness may still be prosecuted: In Wisconsin, the immunity clause contained a proviso providing that persons committing perjury when called upon to testify could be punished therefor. Oklahoma law suffered from the absence of any reservation; thus observed Justice Carson "x x x We have no such reservation in our constitutional provision; and, as before said, if we should follow the precedents, when the witness does not speak the truth, the State would be left without redress, although the witness had violated the purpose and spirit of the constitution. We cannot believe that it was the purpose of the intelligent and justice-loving people of Oklahoma, when they voted for the adoption of the constitution, to grant immunity to any man, based upon a lie, or, in other words, that they intended that the commission of perjury should atone for an offense already committed. It is a familiar rule of common law, common sense, and common justice that a legal right cannot be based upon fraud. We therefore hold that the witness who claims immunity on account of self-incriminatory testimony which he had been compelled to give must act in good faith with the State, and must make truthful replies to the

to do so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there. Like any other rule, however, the above-said rule is not absolute. By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon a clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void. This Court finds that the trial court committed not only gross reversible error of judgment but also was actuated with grave abuse of discretion, exceeding the parameters of its jurisdiction, in holding that Panangins retracting of his confession shows that the execution thereof was involuntary and that in any event it was inadmissible as it was a fruit of [a] poisonous tree. The trial court blindly accepted the claim of the defense that the confession was not made voluntarily on the basis of an affidavit executed by Panangin on July 1, 2002 or more than 5 months after his sworn statement-confession was given and after the prosecution rested its case, which affidavit Panangin was not even called to identify and affirm at the witness stand, hence, hearsay. The decision of the trial court undoubtedly deprived the prosecution of due process as it was not given the opportunity to check the veracity of Panangins alleged retraction. It bears emphasis that the State, just like the accused, is entitled to due process. People v. Bocar so teaches: The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the States right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction. Any judgment or decision rendered notwithstanding such violation may be regarded as a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Moreover, the exclusion of the extra-judicial confession on the basis of Panangins unsubstantiated claim that it was not voluntarily made is contrary to what People v. Porio instructs: A confession is presumed to be voluntary until the contrary is proved and the declarant bears the burden of proving that his confession is involuntary and untrue. Appellant was unable to discharge this burden. He failed to present evidence that he was intimidated or practically forced to execute or sign his Sinumpaang Salaysay. All the above facts indicate that appellant executed his Sinumpaang Salaysay freely and voluntarily. To hold otherwise is to facilitate the retraction by appellant of his solemnly made statements at the mere allegations of force, intimidation, violence or torture, without any proof whatsoever. Bare assertions will certainly not suffice to overturn the presumption of voluntariness. En passant, on the defense claim that in the execution of his sworn statement, Panangin was not properly apprised of his constitutional rights by the assisting counsel, Atty. Sarsabas testimony shows otherwise. The trial courts ruling that even if Panangins confession were not retracted, it is still inadmissible, being the fruit of [a] poisonous tree or illegal arrest, The inadmissible evidence termed as fruit of a poisonous tree in jurisprudence is that contemplated in

above-quoted constitutional provisions. It refers to object, not testimonial, evidence. And it refers to an object seized in the course of an illegal search and seizure. In fine, since as reflected above, the trial court committed not only gross errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion in the grant of the defenses demurrer to evidence, no valid judgment was rendered, preventing jeopardy to attach. A remand of the case for further appropriate proceedings is thus warranted and it does not violate the accuseds right against double jeopardy. NOTES: 1. Comparable case; the remedy of special civil action of certiorari: To question the jurisdiction of the lower court or the agency exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, the remedy is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner in such cases must clearly show that the public respondent acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but it generally refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. (People v CA) People v Hon. Enrique C. Asis FACTS: Respondent Jaime Abordo, while riding his motorcycle on his way home, was met by private complainants Majait, Calvez and Montes. An altercation ensued between them. Abordo shot Majait in the leg while Calvez was hit in the lower left side of his abdomen. Montes escaped unhurt. Abordo was charged with two (2) counts of attempted murder but was only held liable for Serious Physical Injuries for shooting Calvez and Less Serious Physical Injuries with regard to Majait. It also appreciated four (4) generic mitigating circumstances in favor of Abordo. With respect to the complaint of Montes, Abordo was acquitted. Acting on Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuno's Indorsement of the October 11, 2005 letter of Assistant City Prosecutor Nida C. Tabuldan-Gravino, a relative of Calvez, the OSG filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA. The CA, in the assailed Resolution, dismissed the petition outright. According to the appellate court, the filing of the petition for certiorari was the wrong remedy. As the State was questioning the verdict of acquittal and findings of lesser offenses by the trial court, the remedy should have been an appeal. Moreover, the petition for certiorari placed the accused in double jeopardy. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari 2. Assuming that it erred, whether or not the case may be remanded to the CA without placing the accused in double jeopardy HELD: 1. Yes. The CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal, is the remedy to question a verdict of acquittal whether at the trial court or at the appellate level. In our jurisdiction, we adhere to the finality-ofacquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. The rule, however, is not without exception. In several cases, the Court has entertained petitions for certiorari questioning the acquittal of the accused in, or the dismissals of, criminal cases.

Thus, in People v. Louel Uy, the Court has held: Like any other rule, however, the above said rule is not absolute. By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void. In People v. Laguio, Jr., where the acquittal of the accused was via the grant of his demurrer to evidence, We pointed out the propriety of resorting to a petition for certiorari. Thus: By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial courts granting an accused's demurrer to evidence. This may be done via the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order, being considered void judgment, does not result in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an original special civil action via certiorari, the right of the accused against double jeopardy is not violated. In this petition, the OSG claims that Abordo's acquittal in Criminal Case No. N-2213 was improper. Since appeal could not be taken without violating Abordo's constitutionally guaranteed right against double jeopardy, the OSG was correct in pursuing its cause via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the appellate court. It was a serious error by the CA to have deprived the petitioner of its right to avail of that remedy. As the case was summarily dismissed on a technicality, the merits of the petition for certiorari were not at all discussed. Thus, the proper recourse would be a remand to the CA. 2. No. The case cannot be remanded to the CA as it would place the accused in double jeopardy. While a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy, the review of the records, however, shows that the case need not be remanded to the CA for appropriate proceedings. The OSG's petition for certiorari, which forms part of the records, would not merit a favorable review even if it would be given due course simply because it is bereft of merit. The rule is that "while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice." The case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan, presents an instructive exception to the rule on double jeopardy, that is, when the prosecution has been denied due process of law. "The rationale behind this exception is that a judgment rendered by the trial court with grave abuse of discretion was issued without jurisdiction. It is, for this reason, void. Consequently, there is no double jeopardy." A reading of the OSG petition for certiorari filed before the CA, however, fails to show that the prosecution was deprived of its right to due process. Primarily, the OSG petition does not mention or even hint that there was a curtailment of its right. Unlike in Galman, the prosecution in this case was never denied its day in court. Both the prosecution and the defense were able to present their respective evidence, testimonial and documentary. Both parties had their opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and scrutinize every piece of evidence. Thereafter, the trial court exercising its discretion evaluated the evidence before it and rendered its decision. Certainly, there was no mistrial. The arguments proffered in the said petition call for a review of the evidence and a recalibration of the factual findings. At the outset, the OSG faulted the trial court for giving full faith and credit to the testimonies of Abordo and his witnesses. It wrote:

In ruling that private respondent had no intent to kill private complainants, respondent judge thus accorded full faith and credit to the testimonies of private respondent and his witnesses Julito Bernadas and Melquiades Palconit. His findings, however, are contrary to law and the evidence. Therefore, he acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It further pointed out that the CA "failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion." Subsequently, in its memorandum, it merely reiterated the purported errors of the trial judge in appreciating and assessing the evidence of both the prosecution and the defense. Apparently, it wants a review of the trial court's judgment which it claimed to be erroneous. The OSG then proceeded to show how the evidence should have been appreciated by the trial court in its favor and against Abordo to demonstrate that there was intent to kill on his part. What the OSG is questioning, therefore, are errors of judgment. This, however, cannot be resolved without violating Abordo's constitutionally guaranteed right against double jeopardy. An appellate court in a petition for certiorari cannot review a trial court's evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. Errors of judgment cannot be raised in a Rule 65 petition as a writ of certiorari can only correct errors of jurisdiction or those involving the commission of grave abuse of discretion. Summing them all up, the CA clearly erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it by the OSG on the ground that it was the wrong remedy. There is, however, no need for the remand of the case to the CA as the petition for certiorari, on its face, cannot be given due course. NOTES: 1. Comparable case; An error in judgment cannot be remedied by certiorari: Petitioner, via a petition for review on certiorari, prays for the nullification and the setting aside of the decision of public respondent acquitting private respondent claiming that the former abused her discretion in disregarding the testimonies of the NBI agents on the discovery of the illegal drugs. The petition smacks in the heart of the lower court's appreciation of the evidence of the parties. It is apparent from the decision of public respondent that she considered all the evidence adduced by the parties. Even assuming arguendo that public respondent may have improperly assessed the evidence on hand, what is certain is that the decision was arrived at only after all the evidence was considered, weighed and passed upon. In such a case, any error committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. An error of judgment is one in which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors by the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, and its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law. Since no error of jurisdiction can be attributed to public respondent in her assessment of the evidence, certiorari will not lie. (People v. Hon. Tria-Tirona)

Cerezo v People FACTS: Petitioner Joseph Cerezo filed a complaint for libel against respondents Juliet Yaneza, Pablo Abunda, Jr., and Vicente Afulugencia (respondents), as well as Oscar Mapalo (Mapalo).Finding probable cause to indict respondents, the Quezon City Prosecutors Office (OP-QC) filed the corresponding Information against them. Respondents thereafter filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Motion to Re-evaluate Prosecutions Evidence before the OP-QC. The OP-QC reversed its earlier finding and recommended the withdrawal of the Information and consequently, a Motion to Dismiss and Withdraw Information was filed before the RTC . During the intervening period, respondents were arraigned where all of them entered a not guilty plea. In deference to the prosecutors last resolution, the RTC ordered the criminal case dismissed. Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the said Order, arguing that the OP-QC resolution which recommended the withdrawal of the information has not yet attained finality, considering that the same was the subject of a Petition for Review filed before DOJ. The RTC deferred action on the said motion to await the resolution of the DOJ. Subsequently, the Secretary of Justice promulgated his resolution reversing and setting aside the disputed OP-QCs resolution, and directing the latter to refile the earlier Information for libel. The RTC issued its first assailed Order granting petitioners motion for reconsideration and ordered the pre-trial of the case. In such order, the Court rejected argument raised by the accused that double jeopardy sets in to the picture considering that the order of dismissal as well as the withdrawal of the Information was not yet final because of the timely filing of the Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, it stated that it can still set aside its order. Moreover, the RTC claimed there is no refiling of the case nor the filing of a new one; the case filed remains the same and the order of dismissal was merely vacated. Respondents, in assailing the order, elevated their claims to the CA through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, arguing in the main that the RTC Orders violated their constitutional right against double jeopardy. CA held that the RTC erred in ordering the reinstatement of the case as it resulted to placing the accused in double jeopardy. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid termination of the case as to place the accused in double jeopardy when the RTC ordered the reinstatement of the case HELD: No. There was no valid termination of the case as to place the accused in double jeopardy when the RTC ordered the reinstatement of the case Hon.Waldo Flores v Atty. Montemayor FACTS: A motion for reconsideration of was filed regarding the SCs Decision dated August 25, 2010 setting aside the October 19, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstating the Decision dated March 23, 2004 of the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 03-1-581, which found the respondent administratively liable for failure to declare in his 2001 and 2002 Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SSAL) two expensive cars registered in his name, in violation of Section 7, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 in relation to Section 8 (A) of R.A. No. 6713. The OP adopted the findings and recommendations of the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC), including the imposition of the penalty of dismissal from service on respondent, with all accessory penalties. In the motion, it was argued, among others, that respondent was subjected to two (2) administrative/criminal Investigations equivalently resulting in violation of his constitutional right against double jeopardy. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was placed in double jeopardy when he was subjected to two administrative/criminal investigations

HELD: No. The accused was not placed in double jeopardy when he was subjected to two administrative/criminal investigations Respondent asserts that since the PAGC charge involving nondeclaration in his 2001 and 2002 SSAL was already the subject of investigation by the Ombudsman in OMB-C-C-04-0568-LSC, along with the criminal complaint for unexplained wealth, the former can no longer be pursued without violating the rule on double jeopardy. Double jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was convicted or or acquitted or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. It was held that none of these requisites applies where the Ombudsman only conducted a preliminary investigation of the same criminal offense against respondent public officer. The dismissal of the case during the preliminary investigation does not constitute double jeopardy, preliminary investigation not being part of the trial.

2. Crimes Covered
People v Sarabia FACTS: Three informations for grave coercion were filed against petitioner. The Court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one crime of Grave Coercion in the three cases On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, RTC of Bohol affirmed the decision of the Municipal Trial Court and denied denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals likewise dismissed petitioner's appeal and affirmed in toto the decision of the lower court. It subsequently denied reconsideration of its decision. Petitioner raises the plea of double jeopardy. He contends the incident which gave rise to this case is also the subject of a criminal case for robbery with violence against or intimidation of person wherein he was convicted, and which is now on appeal with the Court of Appeals ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner may raise the defense of double jeopardy HELD: No. Petitioner cannot raise the defense of double jeopardy. To raise the defense of double or second jeopardy, the following elements must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first. With respect to the third element, under Rule 117, 7 of the Rules of Court, the test is whether one offense is identical with the other or whether it is an attempt or frustration of the other or whether one offense necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the other. On the other hand, Rule 120, 5 provides: Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved, when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter. The third requisite, identity of offenses, is absent in this case. The crime for which petitioner now stands charged is not the same as the crime of robbery with violence against or intimidation of person for which he was convicted. Neither is the former an attempt to commit the latter or a frustration thereof. And the former crime does not necessarily include, and is not necessarily included in, the first crime charged.

a.

Doctrine of Supervening event

People v Judge Villarama FACTS: Jaime Manuel y Ohide was charged with violation of Section 16, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. During the arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. After the prosecution rested its case, counsel for private respondent verbally manifested in open court that private respondent was willing to change his former plea of "not guilty" to that of "guilty" to the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, R.A. No. 6425, as amended. That same day, the respondent Judge issued an order directing private respondent to secure the consent of the prosecutor to the change of plea, and set the promulgation of decision on January 30, 1991. On January 30, 1991, respondent Judge postponed the promulgation of the decision to February 18, 1991 to give private respondent another opportunity to secure the consent of the prosecutor. Also, on the said date, the private respondent filed his Request to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense. On February 18, 1991, respondent Judge issued another order postponing the promulgation of decision to give private respondent further opportunity to secure the consent of the prosecutor. Prosecutor filed his Opposition to the Request to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense on the grounds that: (1) the prosecution already rested its case on November 21, 1990; (2) the possibility of conviction of private respondent of the crime originally charged was high because of the strong evidence of the prosecution; and (3) the valuable time which the court and the prosecutor had expended would be put to waste. On February 21, 1991, private respondent filed his Reply to Opposition with Leave of Court to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense, alleging therein, among other matters, that the Rules on Criminal Procedure does not fix a specific period within which an accused is allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense. R, respondent Judge rendered a decision granting the accused's motion. When said motion was assailed on because of the absence of the consent of the prosecutor to the plea to a lesser offense, counsel for the private respondent maintained that the private respondent's change of plea and his conviction to the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, RA No. 6425 as amended is no longer open to review otherwise his constitutional right against double jeopardy will be violated. ISSUE: Whether or not the motion granting the plea to a lesser offense may not be reviewed on the ground that it would violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy HELD: No.The motion granting the plea to a lesser offense may still be appealed since it was rendered without the prosecutors consent. Said review will not violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy The right against double jeopardy given to the accused in Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court applies in cases where both the fiscal and the offended party consent to the private respondent's change of plea. Since this is not the situation here, the private respondent cannot claim this privilege. Instead, the more pertinent and applicable provision is that found in Section 7, Rule 117 which states: Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of the following instances: (c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the Fiscal and of the offended party; Under this rule, the private respondent could still be prosecuted under the original charge of violation of Section 16 of RA 6425 as amended because of the lack of consent of the Fiscal who also represents the offended party, i.e., the state. More importantly, the trial court's approval of his change of plea was irregular and improper.

b. Inseparable Offenses Perez v CA

FACTS: Yolanda Mendoza filed a criminal complaint against Eleuterio Perez for Consented Abduction A judgment of conviction was rendered against Perez. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, and acquitted Perez of the crime of Consented Abduction. In its decision, the CA manifested that the crime committed is Seduction not Abduction. Subsequent to petitioner's acquittal complainant Yolanda Mendoza filed another criminal complaint against Perez, this time for Qualified Seduction. Petitioner invokes double jeopardy to question the filing against him of an information for Qualified Seduction after he was acquitted for Consented Abduction. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was placed in double jeopardy when after being acquitted for the Consented Abduction, he was charged subsequently of Qualified Seduction HELD: No. The accused was not placed in double jeopardy when after being acquitted for the Consented Abduction, he was charged subsequently of Qualified Seduction. The rule on double jeopardy is that, "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense" The term "same offense" means Identical offense or any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof or any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. There is no question that petitioner was validly charged with the crime of Consented Abduction before a court of competent jurisdiction. That he had been arraigned and had pleaded not guilty to the charge for which he was subsequently acquitted is likewise undisputed. In the case at bar, the only issue posed by petitioner relates to the Identity of the two offenses of Consented Abduction and Qualified Seduction. In support of his argument that the filing of the subsequent information for Qualified Seduction is barred by his acquittal in the case for Consented Abduction, petitioner maintains that since the same evidence would support charges for both offenses a trial and conviction for one, after he was acquitted for the other, would constitute double jeopardy. Stated otherwise, petitioner would rely on the "same evidence" test in support of his claim of double jeopardy. It is true that the two offenses for which petitioner was charged arose from the same facts. This, however, does not preclude the filing of another information against him if from those facts, two distinct offenses, each requiring different elements, arose. As this Court stated: A single act may be an offense against two statutes and if each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under either statute does not exempt the defendant from prosecution and conviction under the other. The plea of double jeopardy cannot therefore be accorded merit, as the two indictments are perfectly distinct in point of law howsoever closely they may appear to be connected in fact. It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or Identical offense. A single act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar prosecution under the other. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other.

An examination of the elements of these two crimes would show that although they may have arisen from the same set of facts, they are not Identical offenses as would make applicable the rule on double jeopardy. There are similar elements between Consented Abduction and Qualified Seduction, namely: (1) that the offended party is a virgin, and, (2) that she must be over twelve (12) and under eighteen (18) years of age. However, two elements differentiate the two crimes. Consented Abduction, in addition to the two common elements, requires that: (1) the taking away of the offended party must be with her consent, after solicitation or cajolery from the offender, and, (2) the taking away of the offended party must be with lewd designs. On the other hand, an information for Qualified Seduction also requires that: (1) the crime be committed by abuse of authority, confidence or relationship, and, (2) the offender has sexual intercourse with the woman. Moreover, the very nature of these two offenses would negate any Identity between them. As this Court has stated: ... the gravamen of the offense of the abduction of a woman with her own consent, who is still under the control of her parents or guardians is "the alarm and perturbance to the parents and family" of the abducted person, and the infringement of the rights of the parent or guardian. But-in cases of seduction, the gravamen of the offense is the wrong done the young woman who is seduced.

among the crimes subjecting the public officer charged therewith with suspension from office pending action in court, is a penal provision which violates the constitutional prohibition against the enactment of ex post facto law. Paragraph 3 of Article 24 of the Revised Penal Code clearly states that suspension from the employment or public office during the trial or in order to institute proceedings shall not be considered as penalty. It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension. Those mentioned in paragraph Nos. 1, 3 and 4 of said Article 24 are merely preventive measures before final judgment. Not being a penal provision, therefore, the suspension from office, pending trial of the public officer charged with crimes mentioned in the amendatory provision committed before its effectivity does not violate the constitutional provision on ex post facto law. People v Ferrer FACTS: Respondents Co and Tayag both assail the constitutionlaity of the Anti-Subversion Act, under which they are both being charged. They claimed, among others that said law is bill of attainder. The court a quo struck down the law as a bill of attainder allegedly because it "tars and feathers" the Communist Party of the Philippines as a "continuing menace to the freedom and security of the country; its existence, a 'clear, present and grave danger to the security of the Philippines.'" By means of the Act, the trial court said, Congress usurped "the powers of the judge," and assumed "judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CCP without any of the forms or safeguards of judicial trial. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in declaring the AntSubversion Act as a bill of attainder HELD: Yes. The trial court erred in declaring the Ant-Subversion Act as a bill of attainder. Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be enacted." A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its essence is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The constitutional ban against bills of attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of powers by confining legislatures to rule-making and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function. History in perspective, a bill of attainder was employed to suppress unpopular causes and political minorities, and it is against this evil that the constitutional prohibition is directed. The singling out of a definite class, the imposition of a burden on it, and a legislative intent, suffice to stigmatize a statute as a bill of attainder. When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify the Communist Party of the Philippines or the members thereof for the purpose of punishment. What it does is simply to declare the Party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for the purposes of the prohibition, stated in section 4, against membership in the outlawed organization. The term "Communist Party of the Philippines" issued solely for definitional purposes. In fact the Act applies not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any other organization having the same purpose and their successors." Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct. Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to charge Communists in court, as the law alone, without more, would suffice to secure their punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially established. The Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and that they joined the Party, knowing its subversive character and with specific intent to further its basic objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing

S. EX-POST FACTO LAW AND BILL OF ATTAINDER

1.

Ex-post Facto Law a. Kinds b. Characteristics

Bayot v Sandiganbayan

FACTS: Petitioner and some of his co-accused were convicted by the Sandiganabayan in all but one of the thirty-two (32) cases of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents which were filed against them. While the cases are appealed and pending review, Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 was passed amending, among others, Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019. The said section, as amended, provides that, Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for and offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings had been filed against him." Thereafter, in other cases pending before the respondent court in which herein petitioner is one of the accused, the prosecution filed a motion to suspend all the accused-public officers pendente lite from their respective offices or any other public office which they may be occupying pending trial of their cases. This was granted by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that "to apply the provision of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 to the herein accused would be violative of the constitutional guarantee of protection against an ex postfacto law. ISSUE: Whether or not the application Section 15 of B.P 1915 to accused is violative of the protection against ex post facto law HELD: No. The application Section 15 of B.P 1915 to accused is not violative of the protection against ex post facto law. There is no merit in petitioner's contention that Section 13 of Republic Act 3019, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, which includes the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document as

Government by force deceit, and other illegal means and place the country under the control and domination of a foreign power. As to the claim that under the statute organizational guilt is nonetheless imputed despite the requirement of proof of knowing membership in the Party, suffice it to say that is precisely the nature of conspiracy, which has been referred to as a "dragnet device" whereby all who participate in the criminal covenant are liable. The contention would be correct if the statute were construed as punishing mere membership devoid of any specific intent to further the unlawful goals of the Party. But the statute specifically required that membership must be knowing or active, with specific intent to further the illegal objectives of the Party. That is what section 4 means when it requires that membership, to be unlawful, must be shown to have been acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." The ingredient of specific intent to pursue the unlawful goals of the Party must be shown by "overt acts." This constitutes an element of "membership" distinct from the ingredient of guilty knowledge. The former requires proof of direct participation in the organization's unlawful activities, while the latter requires proof of mere adherence to the organization's illegal objectives. Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies individuals and not activities, this feature is not enough to render it a bill of attainder. Indeed, it is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder. But when the judgment expressed in legislation is so universally acknowledged to be certain as to be "judicially noticeable," the legislature may apply its own rules, and judicial hearing is not needed fairly to make such determination. In the Philippines the character of the Communist Party has been the object of continuing scrutiny by this Court. In 1932 we found the Communist Party of the Philippines to be an illegal association. In 1969 we again found that the objective of the Party was the "overthrow of the Philippine Government by armed struggle and to establish in the Philippines a communist form of government similar to that of Soviet Russia and Red China." More recently, in Lansang vs. Garcia, we noted the growth of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the organization of Communist fronts among youth organizations such as the Kabataang Makabayan (KM) and the emergence of the New People's Army. After meticulously reviewing the evidence, we said: "We entertain, therefore, no doubts about the existence of a sizeable group of men who have publicly risen in arms to overthrow the government and have thus been and still are engaged in rebellion against the Government of the Philippines. Nor is it enough that the statute specifies persons or groups in order that it may fall within the ambit of the prohibition against bills of attainder. It is also necessary that it must apply retroactively and reach past conduct. This requirement follows from the nature of a bill of attainder as a legislative adjudication of guilt. As Justice Frankfurter observed, "frequently a bill of attainder was ... doubly objectionable because of its ex post facto features. Therefore, if [a statute] is a bill of attainder it is also an ex post facto law. But if it is not an ex post facto law, the reasons that establish that it is not are persuasive that it cannot be a bill of attainder." Indeed, if one objection to the bill of attainder is that Congress thereby assumed judicial magistracy, them it must be demonstrated that the statute claimed to be a bill of attainder reaches past conduct and that the penalties it imposes are inescapable. As the U.S. Supreme Court observedwith respect to the U.S. Federal Subversive Activities ControlAct of 1950: Nor is the statute made an act of "outlawry" or of attainderby the fact that the conduct which it regulates is described with such

particularity that, in probability, few organizations will come within the statutory terms. Legislatures may act to curb behaviour which they regard as harmful to the public welfare, whether that conduct is found to be engaged in by many persons or by one. So long as the incidence of legislation is such that the persons who engage in the regulated conduct, be they many or few, can escape regulation merely by altering the course of their own present activities, there can be no complaint of an attainder. This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of the Anti-Subversion Act. Section 4 thereof expressly states that the prohibition therein applies only to acts committed" After the approval of this Act." Only those who "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliate themselves with, become or remain members of the Communist Party of the Philippines and/or its successors or of any subversive association" after June 20, 1957, are punished. Those who were members of the Party or of any other subversive association at the time of the enactment of the law, were given the opportunity of purging themselves of liability by renouncing in writing and under oath their membership in the Party. The law expressly provides that such renunciation shall operate to exempt such persons from penalliability. The penalties prescribed by the Act are therefore not inescapable. NOTES: 1. Bill of attainders: When a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial: a. Those which disqualified those who had taken part in the rebellion against the Government of the United States during the Civil War from holding office, or from exercising their profession b. Those which prohibited the payment of further compensation to individuals named in the Act on the basis of a finding that they had engages in subversive activities c. Those which made it a crime for a member of the Communist Party to serve as an officer or employee of a labor union 2. Not Bill of attainders; does not satisfy no. 1: a. Section 23 (b) of the Industrial Peace Act, 18 requiring labor unions to file with the Department of Labor affidavits of union officers "to the effect that they are not members of the Communist Party and that they are not members of any organization which teaches the overthrow of the Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional method b. A statute prohibiting partners or employees of securities underwriting firms from serving as officers or employees of national banks on the basis of a legislative finding that the persons mentioned would be subject to the temptation to commit acts deemed inimical to the national economy c. A statute requiring every secret, oath-bound society having a membership of at least twenty to register, and punishing any person who becomes a member of such society which fails to register or remains a member thereof, was declared valid even if in its operation it was shown to apply only to the members of the Ku Klux Klan. Bill of attainders: When the judgment expressed in legislation is so universally acknowledged to be certain as to be "judicially noticeable," the legislature may apply its own rules, and judicial hearing is not needed fairly to make such determination: the New York legislature passed a law requiring every secret, oath-bound society with a membership of at least twenty to register, and punishing any person who joined or remained a member of such a society failing to register. While the statute did not specify the Ku Klux Klan, in its operation the law applied to the KKK exclusively. In

3.

sustaining the statute against the claim that it discriminated against the Ku Klux Klan while exempting other secret, oathbound organizations like masonic societies and the Knights of Columbus, the United States Supreme Court relied on common knowledge of the nature and activities of the Ku Klux Klan. The Court said: The courts below recognized the principle shown in the cases just cited and reached the conclusion that the classification was justified by a difference between the two classes of associations shown by experience, and that the difference consisted (a) in a manifest tendency on the part of one class to make the secrecy surrounding its purpose and membership a cloak for acts and conduct inimical to personal rights and public welfare, and (b) in the absence of such a tendency on the part of the other class. In pointing out this difference one of the courts said of the Ku Klux Klan, the principal association in the included class : "It is a matter of common knowledge that this organization functions largely at night, its members disguised by hoods and gowns and doing things calculated to strike terror into the minds of the people;" and later said of the other class: "These organizations and their purposes are well known, many of them having been in existence for many years. Many of them are oath-bound and secret. But we hear no complaint against them regarding violation of the peace or interfering with the rights of others." Another of the courts said: "It is a matter of common knowledge that the association or organization of which the relator is concededly a member exercises activities tending to the prejudice and intimidation of sundry classes of our citizens. But the legislation is not confined to this society;" and later said of the other class: "Labor unions have a recognized lawful purpose. The benevolent orders mentioned in the Benevolent Orders Law have already received legislative scrutiny and have been granted special privileges so that the legislature may well consider them beneficial rather than harmful agencies." The third court, after recognizing "the potentialities of evil in secret societies," and observing that "the danger of certain organizations has been judicially demonstrated," meaning in that state, said: "Benevolent orders, labor unions and college fraternities have existed for many years, and, while not immune from hostile criticism, have on the whole justified their existence." (New York ex rel. Bryant vs. Zimmerman) 4. Not a Bill of attainder: Not an Ex post facto law: the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Charter of the City of Los Angeles which provided:... [N]o person shall hold or retain or be eligible for any public office or employment in the service of the City of Los Angeles, in any office or department thereof, either elective or appointive, who has within five (5) years prior to the effective date of this section advised, advocated, or taught, or who may, after this section becomes effective, become a member of or affiliated with any group, society, association, organization or party which advises, advocates or teaches or has within said period of five (5) years advised, advocated, or taught the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United States of America or of the State of California. In upholding the statute, the Court stressed the prospective application of the Act to the petitioner therein, thus:... Immaterial here is any opinion we might have as to the charter provision insofar as it purported to apply retrospectively for a five-year period to its effective date. We assume that under the Federal Constitution the Charter Amendment is valid to the extent that it bars from the city's public service persons who, subsequently to its adoption in 1941, advise, advocate, or reach the violent overthrow of the Government or who are or become affiliated with any group doing so. The provisions operating thus prospectively were a reasonable regulation to protect the municipal service by establishing an employment qualification of loyalty to the State and the United States.... Unlike the provisions of the charter and ordinance under which petitioners

were removed, the statute in the Lovett case did not declare general and prospectively operative standards of qualification and eligibility for public employment. Rather, by its terms it prohibited any further payment of compensation to named individuals or employees. Under these circumstances, viewed against the legislative background, the statute was held to have imposed penalties without judicial trial. (Gardner vs. Board of Public Works) People v Sandiganbayan FACTS: Paredes was charged for violation of Section 5 (a) of R.A No. 3019 because allegedly persuaded, induced and influenced the Public Lands Inspector to violate existing law, rules and regulations by recommending approval of the free patent application. The accused asserts that since at the time of the alleged commission of the crime (January 21, 1976) the period of prescription was ten (10) years under Sec. 11 of R.A. No. 3019, the crime should have prescribed in 1986. The prosecution seems to agree with the movant's statement as to the term of the prescriptive period with the qualification that the period of prescription should have commenced to run from March 28, 1985, when the complaint was allegedly filed by the Republic for the cancellation of the title. Meanwhile, on March 16, 1982 Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 was approved amending Section 11 R.A. No. 3019 by increasing from ten (10) to fifteen (15) years the period for the prescription or extinguishment of a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. ISSUE: Whether or not the prescriptive period of the crime charged be increased to 15 years applying B.P 195 HELD: No. B.P 195 should not be applied retrospectively as to increase the prescriptive period of the crime charged from 10 years to 15 years. Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, amending Section 11 R.A. No. 3019 by increasing from ten (10) to fifteen (15) years the period for the prescription or extinguishment of a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, may not be given retroactive application to the "crime" which was committed by Paredes in January 1976 yet, for it should be prejudicial to the accused. It would deprive him of the substantive benefit of the shorter (10 years) prescriptive period under Section 11, R.A. 3019, which was an essential element of the "crime" at the time he committed it. Protection from prosecution under a statute of limitation is a substantive right. Where the statute fixes a period of limitation as to a prosecution for a particular offense, the limitation so fixed is jurisdictional, and the time within which the offense is committed is a jurisdictional fact, it being necessary that the indictment or information be actually filed within the time prescribed. Fact that the statute of limitations is jurisdictional necessarily determined that a prosecution within the period specified is an essential element of the offense. (People vs. Allen, 118 P 2d, 927.) Unless statutes of limitation are clearly retrospective in their terms, they do not apply to crimes previously committed (22 CJS 576; People vs. Lurd, 12 Hun 282; Martine vs. State, 24 Tex 6) To apply B.P. Blg. 195 to Paredes would make it an ex post facto law for it would after his situation to his disadvantage by making him criminally liable for a crime that had already been extinguished under the law existing when it was committed. An ex post facto law is defined as: A law passed after the occurrence of a fact or commission of an act, which retrospectively changes the legal consequences or relations of such fact or deed. By Art. I, Sec. 10 of U.S. Const., the states are forbidden to pass "any ex post facto law". Most all state constitutions contain similar prohibitions against ex post facto laws.

An "ex post facto law" is defined as a law which provides for the infliction of punishment upon a person for an act done which, when it was committed, was innocent; a law which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; a law that changes the punishment or inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; a law that changes the rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than was required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the offender; a law which, assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes a penalty or the deprivation of a right which, when done, was lawful; a law which deprives persons accused of crime of some lawful protection to which they have become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or of the proclamation of amnesty; every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage . Since an ex post facto law is proscribed by our Constitution (Sec. 22, Article 111, 1987 Constitution), the Sandiganbayan committed no reversible error in ruling that Paredes may no longer be prosecuted for his supposed violation of R.A. 3019 in 1976, six (6) years before B.P. Blg. 195 was approved on March 16, 1982. The new prescriptive period under that law should apply only to those offenses which were committed after the approval of B.P. 195. Rodriguez v Sandiganbayan FACTS: Respondent Digno A. Roa filed an affidavit-complaint before the Office of the City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro charging petitioner with the crimes of estafa, falsification and usurpation of public functions. The State Prosecutor Lopez issued a resolution finding petitioner, together with Isidro Udang and Josefa Ebora Pacardo, "probably guilty of estafa thru falsification." However, before this resolution could be approved by the then Undersecretary of Justice Catalino Macaraig, Jr., the Office of the Tanodbayan was created and the entire records of the case were transferred to it. Petitioner now sought that the Sandiganbayan be declared as without jurisdiction over the case against him on the ground, among others, Presidential Decree No. 1606 creating the Sandiganbayan was an ex post facto law as it eliminates the right of the accused to recourse to the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not PD 1606 is an ex post facto law HELD: No. PD 1606 is not an ex post facto law

wont of advocates, of the fact that there is no review of the facts. What cannot be sufficiently stressed is that this Court in determining whether or not to give due course to the petition for review must be convinced that the constitutional presumption of innocence has been overcome. In the sense, it cannot be said that on the appellate level there is no way of scrutinizing whether the quantum of evidence required for a finding of guilt has been satisfied. The standard as to when there is proof of such weight to justify a conviction is set forth in People v. Dramayo. Petitioner's view that "based on the standpoint of territorial jurisdiction, the Sandiganbayan is a National Court with station in the City of Manila, and therefore, the tremendous expenses to be incurred by the petitioner and his witnesses in coming back and forth to the City of Manila are factors that are really prejudicial to the petitioner." This Court is fully aware of the harsh reality that expenses are a necessary evil in the prosecution or defense of a suit. But the fact alone that a person may, by circumstances, be put to a greater expense in defending his cause in court of justice cannot justify the categorization of P-1606 as an ex-post facto legislation. For as petitioner himself pointed out: It is now well-settled that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not prohibited. Katigbak v Solicitor General FACTS: Petitioner sought to be declared as unconstitutional for being an ex post facto law Republic Act No. 1379, "An Act Declaring
Forfeiture in Favor of the State of Any Property Found To Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the Proceedings Therefor because it imposes the penalty of

forfeiture on a public officer or employee acquiring properties allegedly in violation of said law at a time when that law had not yet been enacted. ISSUE: Whether or not R. A 1379 is an ex post facto law HELD: Yes. R.A 1379 is an ex post facto law. Rosario Nasi-Villar v People Bill of Attainder a. Definition b. Characteristics People v Ferrer
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The fallacy in characterizing Presidential Decree No. 1606 as an expost facto law in so far as the statutory right of recourse to the Court of Appeals is denied petitioner, has been exhibited by Chief Justice Fernando in the case of Nuez v. Sandiganbayan , reiterated in De Guzman v. People of the Philippines and the Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L54288, December 15, 1982. It was there expounded that: The test as to whether the ex-post facto clause is disregarded, in the language of Justice Harlan in the just-cited Thompson V. Utah decision taking from an accused any right that was regarded, at the tune of the adoption of the constitution as vital for the protection of life and liberty, and which he enjoyed at the time of the commission of the offense charged against him.' The crucial words are "vital for the protection of life and liberty," of a defendant in a criminal case. Would the ommission of the Court of Appeals as an intermediate tribunal deprive petitioner of a right vital to the protection of his liberty? The answer must be in the negative. In the first place, his innocence or guilt is passed upon by the three-judge court of a division of respondent court. Moreover, a unanimous vote is required, fairing which, "the Presiding Judge shall designate two other justices from among members of the Court to sit temporarily with them, forming a division of five justices, and the concurrence of a majority of such division shall be necessary for rendering judgment." Then if convicted, this Court has the duty if he seeks a review to see whether any error of law was committed to justify a reversal of the judgment. Petitioner makes much, perhaps excessively so as is the