Irian Jaya: The Intractable Conflict Author(s): Justus M. van der Kroef Source: Asian Affairs, Vol. 6, No.

2 (Nov. - Dec., 1978), pp. 119-133 Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30171703 . Accessed: 21/03/2013 23:16
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Conflict IrianJaya:The Intractable

JUSTUSM. VAN DER KROEF

of the socalledFree PapuaMovetheircampaignagainstthe insurgents

ment (Organisasi Papua Merdeka-OPM) in Indonesia's easternmost

N APRIL 1978, Indonesian militaryforcessharplyaccelerated

provinceof Irian Jaya, or West New Guinea. Withinweeks, these opnear the border erations--conductedclose to OPM rebel strongholds sourceof concern of Papua-NewGuinea--had becomea considerable which (as the AustralianFinancialReto the Australiangovernment, viewput it) was now facing a "potentially because explosivesituation" of its specialeconomicand securitycommitments to the newly-independentstateof Papua-NewGuinea.' some 640 IrianJayavillagershad crossedthe border By mid-July, into Papua-NewGuinea as a resultof the Indonesianmilitaryaction; and in subsequent followed.In the face of weeks, additionalhundreds adversepublicityover the severityof the Indonesianmilitary action Ambassador to Papua-New Guinea, againstthe rebels,the Indonesian felt constrainedto point out that recent Major GeneralSurjowinoto, Indonesian aerialbombings of borderrebelpositionshad involved"nonlethal"plastic bombs, containingno shrapnel.But more concern developed when Indonesianpatrols reportedlystrayedinto Papua-New in pursuitof the insurgents, Guineaterritory settlements and destroying attackedvillagessuspected planesrepeatedly gardens.After Indonesian of harboring insurgentsnear or on the border,the Port Moresbygovernment-despite considerablecriticism-pulled back its frontier rein orderto forestalla clash with the Indonesians. enforcements The tactical wisdomof Indonesia's use of OV-10F aircraft,specially designedtwin-engine planes, againstthe scatcounterinsurgency teredOPM guerrillas has been widelyquestioned. One leadingAustral1Cited in Asia ResearchBulletin, August 31, 1978, p. 476.

119

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ian dailyremarked in this connectionthat attacksby jet aircraftagainst insurgentsoperating under jungle cover are "highly ineffective, as Vietnamproved,"and would simplylead the insurgents"to cross the borderwith theirfamiliesto seek sanctuary."2 Papuanresistanceto Indonesiancontrol, in the opinion of most observers,has never involved more than two or three hundredor so OPMguerrillas. But sympathy for the OPM oppositionmove"regular" ment among the Papuanpopulationof Irian Jaya, which totals about of guerrillas 900,000, is muchbroaderthan the numbers would suggest. Thereis some evidenceof "part-time," or occasionalguer"irregular," rilla activityon the part of hundredsof other individuals.And among Irian Jaya'ssmall indigenouselite, there is also (in the words of one Australianresearcher)"a passionatePapuannationalism," which is as anothernoted Australianspecialiston strongnow as when it surprised Indonesiawhen he visited Irian Jaya nearly 15 years ago.3Australia's grant of total independenceto adjacentPapua-New Guinea on September16, 1975, continuesto inspirethe severalhundred Papuanexiles fromIrianJaya who over the yearshave found sanctuary in the eastern halfof the island,and also scoresof Papuanemigresin the Netherlands. The anti-Indonesian Papuanmovement,directedtoward the achievement of independencefor Irian Jaya and its transformation into a Republik PapuaBarat (Republicof West Papua) is now more than 15 yearsold; and despiteseriousinternaldisputesamongthe OPM leadership, the movementshows no sign of disappearing-as the renewed Indonesianmilitaryoffensivesince April again confirms. For Indonesia,alreadyconfrontedwith secessionistmovementsin Acheh (North Sumatra),East Timor,and, in morelatent form, in the SouthMoluccas,the OPM problemis particularly nettlesomebecause of its impacton two immediately states,Papua-NewGuinea neighboring and Australia.The OPM'sevident stayingpower has increasinglybecome a significant dynamicof the IrianJaya problem.By July 1978, in the assessmentof one Australian observer, "OPM credibility"kept increasingin proportionas weeks of systematicIndonesianbombing and patrolactivityfailed to have any visible effect on the insurgency.4
2 Post-Courier (Port Moresby), May 23, July 24 and 26, 1978; Sydney Morning Herald, July 12, 1978 (also in Indonesian News Selections, hereafter cited as INS, September 1978, p. 8). 3 June Verrier,"IrianJaya, 1975," New Guinea (Sydney), August 1975, p. 14; and Herbert Feith, "Visitto West Irian,"Nation (Sydney), April 18, 1964, p. 7. 4 Sydney Morning Herald, July 29, 1978 (INS, September 1978, p. 10).

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Irian Jaya: The Intractable Conflict

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Sympathyin Papua-New Guinea for "our Papuan brothers"in Irian Jaya is clearly growing, while some Papuan advocates of the the possibilityof the RepublikPapua Barat idea are now articulating eventualunificationof "West"New Guinea (Irian Jaya) with "East" New Guinea (Papua-New Guinea). Some years ago, one long-time Papuanemigrenationalistleader,Nicolaas Jouwe, put the matterthis way.5 One cannotcall WestNew Guineaby the artificial nameWestIrian considerit to be part of Asia, (Irian Jaya) and geographically while the easternpart of the island is consideredto be a part of Oceania.The peoples of Papua/New Guinea and West Papua/ New Guinea ("WestIrian") wouldvery much want to be united. At the moment, there are few political leaders in Papua-New Guineawho openlyendorseJouwe'sideas. On the contrary, as we shall official is not to the OPM in see, policy any way, but rather encourage to maintainfriendlyrelationswith Indonesiaon the basis of mutual respect for each other's territory.On the other hand, the idea of a mergerof the two halves of New Guineawas reportedly given serious attentionamonga segmentof the Papua-NewGuinealeadership more thana decadeago, and the OPM'sstruggleinevitably keepsthe concept In the meantime,the seeminganomalyof Papua-New Guinea alive.6 in the UnitedNationsurgingthe completeindependence representatives of NamibiafromSouthAfrica, while at the same time refusingto considerthe OPM'sdemandfor an independent RepublikPapua Barat, is becominga matterof publicdebatein Papua-NewGuinea.'
II

The originsof the OPM'sstruggle lie in the program of accelerated selfand economic undertaken the Dutch government development by governmentin Irian Jaya (then West New Guinea) in the period after World War II. West New Guinea was the one part of their former East Indiesempirewhich was not transferred to the sovereignty of the
5 Nicolaas Jouwe, "Irian Irridenta, Papua's Worden Door Vreemed Ras Onderdrukt,"Zelfbeschikking (Groningen), Janmary-February 1972, p. 16. 6 See John Wilkes, ed., New Guinea, Future Indefinite?Proceedingsof the 34th Summer School, AustralianInstituteof Political Science, Sydney (London: 1968), p. 81. 7 "WhyNamibia, but not Irian Jaya?"Post-Courier,July 10, 1978.

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IndonesianRepublic at the close of the latter'sindepenindependent dence struggle (1945-49). After a campaign of increased political pressureand militarythreat, Indonesiaformallyacquiredfull control over West New Guinea (calling it first Irian Barat or West Irian, and laterIrianJayaor GreaterIrian) on May 1, 1963, underthe termsof a UnitedNationsagreement. This agreement provided,however,that before the end of 1969, the Papuaninhabitants of the territory would be the to in an "act of free choice" opportunity participate (the given term "plebiscite" was carefullyavoided) as to whetherthey wished to remainwith Indonesiaor becomeindependent.8 In July and August 1969, the "actof free choice"did in fact take place in Irian Jaya. But outside observerswere almost unanimousin of the exercise.9The questioningthe fairness and representativeness Bolivian diplomat,Dr. F. Ortiz Sanz, who was the principalUnited Nationsrepresentative in West New Guinea at the time of the "act of free choice,"noted that the Indonesiansat all times exercised"a tight politicalcontrolover the Papuans,"and he expressedhis "reservation" as to whetherPapuanfreedomof choice--which the Indonesianshad pledgedto guarantee--hadin fact prevailed.'0 As early as 1962, when the Jakartagovernmentwas gradually takingovercontrolof WestNew Guineafromthe Dutch, independencemindedPapuansclashedviolentlywith the Indonesianmilitary;and in subsequent years, there was to be continuousfighting.On April 27, 1967, the Indonesianmilitarycommander, BrigadierGeneralBintoro, confirmed thattherehad been a Papuanuprising in the town of Mariokand that the Indonesian Air Force had been compelledto strafe wari, the town, killing40 people.Late in April 1969, some 30,000 Kapakau tribesmen in and aroundthe town of Enarotaliin the westernCentral Highlandsof Irian Jaya, rose in revolt against Indonesianofficials, hoisting the "West Papua" flag and temporarilyoccupying several airstrips. With the proclamation of an independent RepublikPapua Barat,
8 For a detailed and well-balanced analysis of the Dutch-Indonesian dispute over West New Guinea and the UN involvement, see William Henderson, West New Guinea, The Dispute and Its Settlement (South Orange,N.J.: Seton Hall University Press, 1973). 9 Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesiaand West New Guinea: The New Dimensions of Conflict," Orbis, Summer 1970, pp. 366-400. 1o Report of the Secretary General Regarding the Act of Self-Determination in West Irian, United Nations General Assembly. Twenty-fourthSession, November 6, 1969, A/7723, p. 70.

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near MarkasVictoriaon July 1, 1971, by a self-styled Papuangeneral namedSethRumkoren(formerlya lieutenant in the Indonesian Army), the scatteredand sporadic Papuan resistancemovement acquired a new point of organizational focus. A greatermeasureof coordination also developedamong Papuanemigres,and especiallyamong Papuan residents in the Netherlands, manyof whomhad been in Dutchcolonial servicebeforetheIndonesian takeover. At no time, however, did Rumkorenestablisheffective control over all Papuanrebel groups, some of which-like the "Free Papua Movement"(GerakanPapua Merdeka-GPM)---continued to operate The term OPM therefore denoted the anti-Indonesian independently. But Papuanmovementin general,ratherthan a unifiedorganization. Rumkoren's100-manguerrillaforce, operatingunder the name West Papua National LiberationArmy (KOPASTEM), did encourage a resistance. Thusin August 1973, therewere wider,if poorlyorganized, foreign reportsof new Papuanuprisingsin the Baliem Valley, where insurgents using capturedIndonesianweaponsoccupiedthe airfieldat Wamenaand repeatedlyengagedin ambushesof Indonesianpatrols.1 sourcesare to be believed,therewerenew By 1977, if Papuaninsurgent rebel attackson Wamena;additionalguerrillabases were being established despitean intensification of Indonesianaerial attacks;and "the copperpipelineof the huge American-owned FreeportIndonesiaLtd. copperminingcompany(was) beingblownup at different placesevery nineor ten days."12 The circumstances these and similarincidentsare not surrounding clear. It wouldprobably be incorrectto view all of theseclashes, always as Papuan emigre quartershave been wont to do, as expressionsof OPM or "nationalist" Papuanfervor. Thus, the 1973 Baliem Valley to rising appears have been inspired,at least in part, by Papuan dissatisfactionover the inadequateimplementation of local, Indonesiandirected Papuan economic developmentprojects, when agricultural equipmentand other suppliesprovidedby the Indonesiangovernment were (allegedly) suddenlytaken away by the IndonesianArmy and sold in the marketsof the territorial Moreover,the capital,Jayapura.'3
11"FiveThousandin 'StoneAge' War,"Sunday Telegraph(London), August 19, 1973. 12 Provisional Revolutionary Government of West Papua New Guinea (London Office), South Pacific News Service, Press Release No. 59, October 15, 1977, p. 1. 13 "Guerrillas Attack Patrol in IrianJaya,"Post-Courier,September3, 1973.

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interiorof IrianJaya remainsone of the least developedregionsof the as the Dutch learnedlong world,whereany policy of "modernization," resistance. ago, is apt to encounter On the otherhand, thereis little doubt that in dealingwith Irian Jayaand its population,Indonesianofficialsquicklyfell into something the Papuans.The akin to a colonialmentalityas they soughtto "uplift" was sharpenedby the influx of Makassareseand resultingresentment other Indonesiansfrom nearby islands into Irian Jaya, where they in virtualcontrolof the local distributing themselves quicklyestablished trade.'4Though Papuansare increasingin the local civil service, two Australian researchers have noted that "themiddleand upperechelons of the bureaucracy" in IrianJaya "arestaffedverylargelywith persons
from other provinces."15

Givenits limitedmeans,the Indonesian development government's effortin IrianJaya,both undertaken and projected,has been considerable. On a per capitabasis, the centralgovernment's subsidiesto Irian Jayahave been severaltimeshigherthanfor the provinceson the island of Java. Subsidiesto Irian Jaya rose from $24.3 million for routine expenditureand $1.9 million for developmentin 1970-71, to $53.2 million and $14.4 million, respectively,in 1978-79. Literacy, health modernization are demonstrable care, and community prioritiesof Indonesian developmentpolicy;16 and while'administrative bottlenecks and shortageshave occasionallyimpededimplementation, the obvious of these economic cannot be reconciled with the oftenreality programs articulated Papuannationalistsentimentabout allegedlyrapaciousIndonesian of the area. exploitation On the otherhand,concretemeasurestowardaccelerated development (as the Dutch also discovered)have sharpened Papuanpolitical self-awareness and strengthened a distinctiveregionalnationalism. Not has nationalism to thrive on its own only Papuan symbolsand begun heardcharge-repeated ad nauseam mythology,such as the frequently by Papuannationalistleaders like the late HermanWomsiwor,self1971, pp. 66-67. Ross Garnaut and Chris Manning,"An Economic Survey of West Irian,"Bulletin of Indonesian EconomicStudies (AustralianNational University), November 1972, p. 58. 16Asia Research Bulletin, August 31, 1978, p. 47. For the Indonesian development effort, see Departemen Dalam Negeri, Sektor Chusus Irian Jaya, Laporan PembangunanLima Tahun Irian laya (Jakarta: 1970-75), and Task Force PembangunanMasjarakatpedalaman Irian Barat (Propinsi Irian Barat, Keputusan Menteri Dalam Negeri/Ketua Sektor Chusus Irian Barat, Jakarta: 1972).
15

14 Far EasternEconomic Review, May 22,

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styled "Vice Presidentof the ProvisionalGovernment of the Republik Barat"-that the Papua in IrianJayahas Papuanindependence struggle alreadycost 30,000 Papuanlives at the hands of the Indonesians.'? It has also been able to profitfromconflicting Indonesian statements as to the conditionof the insurgency in IrianJaya, whichin turn keep erodown credibility. ing the Jakarta government's On February18, 1976, for example,Indonesian ForeignMinister Adam Malik dismissedforeignreportsof large-scale uprisingsin Irian and on February19, 1976, Jakartaradio reported Jaya as unfounded; thatthe "security situation" in IrianJaya was now morestable,"thanks to the awareness of the people of the region."IrianJaya militarycommanderBrigadierGeneralImamMunandaralso reportedat this time that abouta thousandPapuanswho had previously "goneastray"(that had is, joined the insurgents)had now returnedto their villages to resume a normallife.'8A week later, however,the Indonesian Ambassador to Papua-New Guinea, BrigadierGeneralRijitro,was quoted by Australian radioas sayingthat "rebelsare givingtrouble" in IrianJaya, and had even slippedinto the territory's capital, Jayapura,and killed bothciviliansand soldiers,even thoughrebelnumbers, to the according had dwindledto "about500."9 Ambassador, On June 1, 1978, GeneralMunandar was quotedby the Indonesian wire servicesas statingthat the securitysituationin Irian Jaya "is excellent, everythingis in order, and developmentefforts run unhamLess thanthreeweekslater,however,Munandar pered."20 was reported by Reuter'sfrom Jayapuraas havingwarnedthe Papuanrebels to surrenderlest theybe "crushed," and as condemning the OPM for attemptto ing destroypublic order. Munandar's warningcame after Papuan insurgents,in a daring raid, had kidnappeda numberof Indonesian militaryand civil officialsand held themfor ransom.21 In June 1977, the
17Tilman Ziilch, Von Denen Keiner Spricht, Unterdriickte Minderheiten-Von der Friedenspolitik Vergessen (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 1975), p. 140. On the 30,000 Papuans killed by the Indonesians,see also the report of Henk de Mari in De Telegraaf (Amsterdam), October 11, 1974. On Papuan nationalist symbolism and mythology, see, for example, the "Black Book" published by the representativesof the "Provisional Government of West Papua"in the Netherlands: ZwartboekNieuw Guinea, Een van de laatste Strohalmen van het Kolonialisme in deze Wereld (The Hague: Information Service, Provisional Government, Republic of West Papua, 1977). 18Agence France Presse despatch, Jakarta, February 18, 1976; and Radio Jakarta, Domestic Service in Indonesia, February 19, 1976 (Foreign BroadcastInformation Service, hereafter cited as FBIS, February 19 and 20, 1976). 19 Radio Melbourne,OverseasService in English, February26, 1976 (FBIS, March2, 1976). 20Antara Daily News Bulletin, June 2, 1978, p. 111.

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Australianpress reportedthat Dhani tribesmenhad risen in revolt againstIndonesianrule, while other reportsindicatedthat local Indonesianpolice stationsat Arso and Paget, near Jayapura,had been atWhile conceding tacked,and a numberof local police officialskilled.22 thatthe Dhanishad risen,an Indonesian deniedthat militaryspokesman they had rebelled against the Indonesiangovernment,and suggested insteadthat the unrestwas a manifestation of a kind of tribal unrest whichtourists, anxiousfor glimpsesof "theprimitive life of tribes," liked to see.23 Othermilitaryofficialshad alreadyadmitted,however,that the Dhani insurrection had in fact cost the lives of at least six Indonesian soldiersand 20 Papuans,that severalairstrips had been blockedby the torch.24 to the Dhani, and government posts put Amidsuchcontradictory andin lightof thedifficulty which accounts, foreign journalistshave in entering and moving about Irian Jaya in orderto assessthe situationfor themselves,the extent of Papuanresistance today can only be speculatedupon, though quite evidentlyit is chronicand often appearsto be extensive.Throughits "LondonInformationOffice,"the RepublikPapua Barat has continuedto reportdetailedaccountsof ongoingpopularresistance, of whichone may perhaps be citedby way of illustration.25 In Yamas (a villageheavilyhit by bombingattacksin the last 12 months), villagersassistedby OPM militantshave captureda platoon of 43 Indonesiansoldiers.Enragedby the slaughterof their of theirhomesand men, women,and children,and the destruction food gardens,the villagerskilled the 43, throwingthe corpsesin the river. In the Holomba-Waris-Bewani area, fightinghas continued,with more than 30 Indonesiantroopsbeing killed in engagements. Between June 16th and June 30th, more than 350 small armswere Withthe help of thesearms,freedom captured by freedomfighters. attackedGenyem(nearJayapura)on June25th, 26th, and fighters
21Straits Times (Singapore), June 21, 1978. 22 CanberraTimes, May 28, 1977; and Tapol Bulletin (London), June 1977, p. 2. 23 Antara despatch,Jakarta,December 5, 1977. 24 NRC-Handelsblad (Rotterdam), May 27, 1977. 25 Republic of West Papua New Guinea, London Information Office, News Bulletin, August 13, 1978, p. 1.

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27th. In the attacks, 23 RPKAD (that is, Indonesian) troops were captured. Musa Gewai from Sarmi village led the attacks. Whatever the veracity of such reports (which have never been denied by the Indonesians), a new high in the OPM's campaign was reached when well-authenticated accounts indicated that guerrilla units of the socalled National Liberation Army (Tentara Pembebasan Nasional-Tepenal), led by Martin Tabu, captured nine Indonesian military and civil officials on May 16, 1978, among them the Commander of the Jayapura Military District, Colonel Ismael, and the Irian Jaya provincial intelligence chief, Colonel Ameral. Tabu variously demanded a ransom of $400,000 for his prisoners, and an international conference, to be called by Australia and Papua-New Guinea, to discuss the independence of Irian Jaya.2" Though three of the hostages were killed, the remainder were eventually set free after it became apparent that neither Canberranor Port Moresby could be coerced into calling such a conference, and that public opinion in Papua-New Guinea was beginning to turn against the OPM because of the incident. But the capture of Ismael is widely believed to have launched a new insurgent tactic of terrorkidnapping, thus deepening the bitterness of the OPM-Indonesian confrontation. III Serious as the OPM struggle may sometimes appear to be, Indonesian control over Irian Jaya is not in any immediate danger. A principal reason for this is the organizational fragmentation of the OPM itself. Martin Tabu's Tepenal, for example, which numbers perhaps 50 regulars, is an offshoot of Rumkoren'sKopastem force, and was created after Tabu and Rumkoren reportedlyfell out over a question of tactics. From its inception, the hothouse Papuan emigre environment in the Netherlands, with its ancillaries among dissident Papuans in Irian Jaya itself, has fostered organizational fissions and tactical quarrels. Early in April 1963, for example, some 40 Papuan exiles in the Netherlands established the first Papuan independence organization to claim resistance followers in Irian Jaya itself, the Front Nasional Papua. Marcus W.
26Haagse Courant (The Hague), May 31, 1978; Nederlands Dagblad (Amersfoort), May 30, 1978; Post-Courier,June 9, 1978.

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Kaisiepo,a formermemberof the New GuineaCouncil,the territory's proto-parliament duringthe Dutchcolonialera, becameFNP Chairman. of the state of "West Kaisiepo also proclaimedhimself "President" Melanesia."AnotherformerNew Guinea Council member,Nicolaas Jouwe,secededfrom the FNP in August 1964 to form the West Papua
Freedom Committee (Komite Kemerdekaan Papua Barat-KKFB),

active in addressing whichbecameparticularly petitionsto the United of to Nations,and in appealing the Organization AfricanUnity and to
the member states of OCAM (Organisation Commune Africain et Malgache).

The Papuan businessmanHerman Womsiwor,meanwhile,who was at odds with both Kaisiepoand Jouwe, became a principalforce Governbehind the formationof yet a third group, the "Provisional ment"of the RepublikPapuaBarat,proclaimed on July 1, 1971, with Womsiworwas named "Vice GeneralSeth Rumkorenas "President." President,"and helped to forge what might be called its Japanese connection,the Nippon-Papua FriendshipAssociationin Tokyo. The General of this association is Matsumiya Tomio, who served Secretary as a lieutenant in the Japanese Armyin WestNew GuineaduringWorld War II. He and his fellow members,most of them reportedto be exservicemen and estimatedat about 10,000 in number,have been colequipment,and possibly weapons as lecting funds, communications
well, for the partisans of the Republik Papua Barat.27

One of Rumkoren's followers,JacobPray,whosename appearson some RepublikPapuaBarat documentsas "President of the Senateof the Republicof West Papua,"fell out with Rumkorenin 1976. This in that Rumkoren and many had an ethnicbackground, splitapparently of his followersare from the Biak region, whereasPray's supporters come from the Jayapuraarea.28 GovBy July 1978, the "Provisional and ernment"had a new "Cabinet," in which Pray was "President" Rumkoren"DefenseMinister."More recently, the "Provisional Govhas againbeen throwninto disarray. ernment" Early in October 1978, Guinea authorities arrested at Papua-New Pray Vanimo,near the Irian border crossing.He and a Jaya border,because of an unauthorized
27 Coen van Harten, "Papoea's in Nederland: Verdeeldheid en Geheimzinnigheid,"Elsevier's Magazine (Amsterdam), March 13, 1976, pp. 17-19; Haagse Courant, May 31, 1978. 28 Peter Hastings, "The Papua New Guinea-Irian Jaya Border Problem," Australian Outlook, April 1977, p. 55.

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had hopedto makecontactwith the PrimeMinister followerreportedly of Papua-New Guinea, Michael Somare. Somewhatearlier, two of closestfollowers,Dr. DariusMauryandAmosIndey,had crossed Pray's Some Kopainto Papua-NewGuineaand requested politicalasylum.29 to theleadership of Martin now appearto havegravitated stemelements Nicolaas Jouwe has been while Tabu, apparently attemptingto rally in a new "Cabinet." various OPMadherents The persistentfactionaldisputesand lack of coordinationwithin the OPM movementhave not preventedsupporters outside Irian Jaya from providingvarious groups of insurgentswith weapons, supplies, and publicity.It is the presentauthor'simpressionthat the NipponAssociationplaysan important role here. One knowlPapuaFriendship Australian Robert Darroch, journalist, recentlyreported(after edgeable an investigation in New Guinea) as follows.30 That the rebelsare now gettingsome outsidehelp is undeniable: the extentis still not known,at least not publicly.Militarysources told me that there had been persistentrumorsof ships landing armsalong the New Guineacoast for the rebels. Europeansand had been seen with Prai'smen... Sumsof up to otherforeigners $40,000 have been collectedfor the rebel cause in Japan,mainly of ex-servicemen to the FPM (that by an organization sympathetic is, OPM). Otherfunds have come from Holland and even Australia.
Since July 1, 1975, the Republik Papua Barat has had an official in-

formation officein Dakar,Senegal,one of the OCAM (formerFrench states in Africa, virtuallyall of whichbefore the final "act of colonial) free choice"in Irian Jaya in 1969, and duringUN discussionsof the "act"itself, had expressed for the OPM cause. SenegalPresisympathy
29Asiaweek (Hongkong), October 13, 1978, p. 12; Far Eastern Economic Review, March 10, 1978, p. 24. On November 3, 1978, the "InformationOffice" of the "Provisional Government" of the Republik Papua Barat in Dakar, Senegal, issued a press release describing "recent splits within our revolutionaryranks."The press release charged that Pray had attemptedto persuade as the leading ideology," but that he had been reRepublik leaders to adopt "Marxism-Leninism buffed and that "our struggle is a national liberation struggle, not a class struggle."Pray's recent arrestmakes the matter academic for the moment. But it is not clear to what extent Pray's alleged overturesto the "EasternBloc" (as the earlier cited press release puts it) reflect an ongoing rift in OPM ranks. 30Robert Darroch, "PapuaNew Guinea-Another East Timor?"Bulletin (Sydney), November 19, 1977, p. 18.

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dent LeopoldSenghorsupportsthe Information Office,whichis run by Ben from "prithe Republik's Minister," present"Foreign Tangghama, vate discretionary funds,"althoughOCAMdoes not, so far as is known, In the Netherlands, the Stichting send help to the OPM in IrianJaya.31 Door de Eeuwen Trouw (FoundationFaithful Throughthe Ages), a of conservative and ReformedChristian supporters privateorganization themselves withthe RepublikPapua of the Papuancause,haveidentified Barat, althoughother Papuan emigres domiciled in Holland, among themNicolaasJouwe,have been sharplycriticalof the Foundation.

IV
But the most important foreignpoliticalfulcrumof the IrianJaya question is Papua-NewGuineaand Australia.Both PortMoresbyand Canberra have been determinednot to let the OPM strugglebecome a casus belli between themselvesand Jakarta.The Indonesiangovernment's invasion and annexation of PortugueseEast Timor in December 1975 had producedpublic reactionsin both countriessharply criticalof Indonesianpolicy. Papua-New Guinea has cooperatedwith Indonesiaover the yearsin clarifyingits borderwith Irian Jaya, and in 1973 a new border agreementwas signed. The Papua-New Guinea government, althoughrecognizingin principlethe concept of political warnedPapuanrefugeesfrom IrianJaya that its asylum,has repeatedly and agitation. territory maynot be usedfor anti-Indonesian propaganda In 1974, Papua-New Guineaenteredinto a formal arrangement with Indonesiawherebyit agreed to returnPapuan refugeesto Irian Jaya exceptwhenpoliticalasylumhadbeengranted. In morerecentyears,as the OPM insurgency persisted,Indonesia has seemedparticularly anxiousto developits variousagreements with Papua-New Guineainto the kind of formalbilateralsecurityarrangement it now has with Malaysia.32 This arrangement, directedagainst Communist in the Borneo border involves guerrillas jointpatrolregion, acrossthe frontier,and other militaryoperationsto ling, "hotpursuit" stamp out the insurgency.But the Papua-New Guinea government, mindfulof domesticpublic sympathyfor the OPM cause, has thus far resistedsuchIndonesian overtures.
Hastings, loc. cit., p. 55. 32 Nonie Sharp, The Rule of the Sword, The Story of West Irian (Malmsbury, Aus.: Kibble Books-Arena, 1977), p. 52.

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At the conclusion of Prime MinisterMichael Somare'svisit to Jakartain January1977, a communique was issued in which the two countriespledgedthat their respectiveterritories would not be used to conducthostile activitiesagainsteach other. But Papua-New Guinea continuesto resistIndonesianpressure for more forcefulaction against the OPM. An exampleis the statementof ForeignMinisterEbia Olewale at the conclusionof a visit to Jakartain May 1978, in which he stressedthe "complex faced by Papua-NewGuineain dealproblems" with from Irian "wished ing refugees Jaya.He addedthathis government to act responsibly, aspectsand other takinginto accounthumanitarian international obligations."33 In recentmonths,intensified Indonesian military operations against OPM insurgentshave increasedthe streamof Papuanrefugeesfrom Irian Jaya into Papua-New Guinea. By mid-September 1978, Port that "atleast 1,000 Irianese-and possiblyas Moresbysourcesreported many as 1,400-have crossed the northernborder into Papua-New sickness,hunger,and tales of haGuinea"in recentweeks, "bringing rassment The 1974 borderarrangement, under by Indonesian troops."''34 whichtheborder betweenPapua-NewGuineaandIndonesia is officially "sealed"and Port Moresby (except in cases of requestsfor political Irian Jaya Papuanrefugees,is now asylum) is committedto returning under severe strain.35Indonesian forces straying into Papua-New Guineaterritory have createdfurther problems.WhileJakarta officially "welcomed" PremierSomare'sreassurance that his government would not tolerateOPM use of Papua-NewGuineaterritory, the First Secretaryof the Indonesian Embassyin Port Moresbycreateda furor when he demandedthat Papua-New Guinea take firmeraction against the OPM, and that "if we wantedto invadePapua-NewGuinea,we would do it now when it is still weak. We would not wait until later when
Papua-New Guinea becomes strong.""'36

Port Moresbyappearsto see its principalforeign policy role in links betweenASEAN (the Associationof SoutheastAsian promoting Nations,a largelyeconomicregionalgroupingthat includesIndonesia, Malaysia,Singapore,the Philippines,and Thailand), with the newly
33Antara Daily News Bulletin, May 27, 1978, p. 1. 84Far EasternEconomic Review, September15, 1978, p. 37. a5Nonie Sharp,"WestIrianWar Heats Up," National Times (Sydney), August 5, 1978. 36 Far EasternEconomic Review, June 2, 1978, p. 30; and Antara despatch,Jakarta,June 14, 1978 (FBIS, June 16, 1978).

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Asian Affairs

and emergingstatesof Melanesiaand Polynesia.To bring independent aboutsuch a linkagebetweenASEAN and the "SouthPacificForum," as the new regionalassociationof South Pacific states is known, good relationsbetweenPort Moresbyand Jakartaare seen as essential.During his May 1978 visit to Jakarta,ForeignMinisterOlewaleproposed that a "diaMochtar Kusumaatmaja, to his Indonesiancounterpart, logue"betweenthe two regionalgroupsbe initiated.In turn,the Suharto concernednot to exacerbatePapua-New Guinea opinion government, to accentuatethe positive in its relafurther,has also been attempting tionswith its neighbor.In September1978, for example,Port Moresby to start exwas informedthat Indonesiawas "at any time prepared" tendingtechnicalassistanceto Papua-NewGuineafor the development of small industriessuch as weaving,leathercraft,and roof tile manufacture.37 Australiahas not been anxiousto go throughanother periodof bad has been mindfulof the tensionsof the Canberra relations withJakarta. early 1960s, which resultedfrom Indonesia'smilitant"confrontation" policy aimed at acquiringDutch-heldWest New Guinea. A friendly, in Australia'snational stable Indonesianneighborfiguresprominently Australia and Indonesiahave held In securitystrategy. recent years, joint naval maneuvers,and the AustralianAir Force has even assisted Indonein Irian Jaya in aerial mapping.38 the Indonesiangovernment sians have receivedtechnicalmilitarytrainingat Australianfacilities. considersthe OPM to be a domestic Officially,the Frasergovernment Indonesianproblem;and to the extent that the Papuaninsurgencyin IrianJayahas spilledoverinto Papua-NewGuinea,Canberra views the matteras something for the Jakartaand Port Moresbygovernments to solve. Australiahas refusedto join in sponsoring an international conferenceon Irian Jaya, as Papuaninsurgentshave urged it to do. On July 21, 1978, Australian ForeignMinisterAndrewPeacock said that while his government was aware that on "rareoccasions"Indonesians had been crossingfrom Irian Jaya into Papua-New Guinea, he expressed"hope"that such incidents"wouldbe handledby Papua-New Guineaand Indonesiain an amicableand properway."39 At the same
Antara despatch, Jakarta, 23, 1978(FBIS,September September 25, 1978). Herald,July 30, 1977,citedin Nonie Sharp,The Rule of the Sword,p. 75. 38SydneyMorning Overseas in English, Service July21, 1978(FBIS,July26, 1978). 39 RadioMelbourne,

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time, steppedup Indonesian militaryactivityalong the borderdid elicit of But the Australianambassador an Australian concern. in expression that Australiahad "a positive to have emphasized Jakartawas reported andobviousinterest" in good relations betweenPapua-NewGuineaand and that Australia "does not want to be seen as taking Indonesia, sides."40 has complained Meanwhile,the Papua-New Guinea government that Australianjournalistsworkingin Port Moresbyhave been mainand it is true that the Austainingcontactswith IrianJaya insurgents; tralianpressgives extensivecoverageto the OPM insurgency,thereby the impressionthat the problemis not going away. In strengthening some academicand intellectualcirclesin Australia,and in the influentrade union movement,Indonesia'sSuhartogoverntial, left-oriented ment is held in low regard,becauseof the political prisonerproblem, Indonesia's occupationof East Timor,and the allegedlyunequalsocial is benefitsof its economicdevelopment policies. The OPM insurgency accentuated in these circlesas yet anotherdarkaspectof a neighboring Asian regime with which the Fraser governmentis said to maintain and comfortablerelations.On the other hand, much too sympathetic Fraser's criticshave not persuasively arguedthatthe Australian governmenthas meaningful in dealingwith a problemthat policy alternatives a domestic remains Indonesian affair. essentially As the anti-Indonesian movementin Irian Jaya is now more than 15 years old, however,and shows no sign of going away at any time soon, both Papua-New Guineaand Australiamay find themselvesincreasinglyat loggerheads.In a numberof African states, moreover, among whom Papuanemigreshave issued appealson behalf of "Neby an "alien"race, groids of the Pacific"allegedly being suppressed for the and the "New Guinea cause"also has OPM irredentist sympathy some potential. It is evident that despite the 1969 United Nations"actof free choice,"the worldhas not heardthe last of the supervised WestNew Guineaproblem.
Ibid., July 24, 1978 (FBIS, July 26, 1978). After a meeting in Jakarta between Sir Arthur MacDonald, Chief of Staff of the Australian armed forces, and Indonesian leaedrs at the close of October 1978, it was agreed that during 1978-79, Australia would give Indonesia $6.9 million in military aid, including Nomad N-22B aircraft, military vehicles, spare parts for naval patrol craft (previously supplied), and communications equipment. Radio Jakarta, Domestic Service in Indonesian, October 27, 1978 (FBIS, October 31, 1978).
40

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