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Strategic Analysis
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Conventional War in the Presence of Nuclear Weapons

Manpreet Sethi Published online: 06 Jun 2009.

To cite this article: Manpreet Sethi (2009): Conventional War in the Presence of Nuclear Weapons, Strategic Analysis, 33:3, 415-425 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700160902790100

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Strategic Analysis Vol. 33, No. 3, May 2009, 415425

1754-0054 0970-0161 RSAN Strategic Analysis, Analysis Vol. 33, No. 3, February 2009, pp. 00

Conventional War in the Presence of Nuclear Weapons

Manpreet Sethi

Strategic Analysis Manpreet Sethi

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Abstract: Nuclear weapons cannot obviate wars, but can change its complexion and influence the manner of its conduct. In order to keep nuclear weapons from entering into real warfare, it is important to intelligently judge an adversarys nuclear thresholds and to calibrate ones own conventional strikes. For India, the exploration of this space is particularly important in order to deny Pakistan a free hand to indulge in subconventional conflict even as it holds the threat of an all-out nuclear war against an Indian conventional response. This article examines the Indian experience in this regard on the basis of Kargil, 1999. It concludes that limited war with precise, clearly articulated objectives, calibrated use of military force, and astute use of politico-diplomatic space offers scope for conduct of conventional war in the presence of nuclear weapons.

level and kind of attack large enough to be useful, but small enough to be well below the threshold risking . . . nuclear retaliation (Albert Wohlstetter, 1964). To find such a precise manner of applying military force that can be meaningful and yet removed from the risk of escalation to the nuclear level has remained the dilemma for the execution of conventional war in the presence of nuclear weapons. Countries with nuclear weapons, it is normally believed, do not go to war with one another. Nuclear deterrence is expected to superimpose restraint and curb military risk-taking. The threat of escalation of the conflict to the nuclear level and the fear of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) are supposed to cast a constraining influence on the behaviour of nations. This supposition is derived from the experience of the superpowers during the Cold War and the fact that they avoided every instance of crisis that could have brought them into direct conflict with one another. Of course, the nuclear stability at the level of the two rival superpowers contrasted with a more volatile situation at the lower levels of their allies. This came to be known as the stabilityinstability paradox1 and was used to explain the proxy wars that happened between the two ideological blocs even as they steered clear of any direct confrontation with one another. Consequently, though conventional wars during the Cold War were fought in the shadow of nuclear weapons, they were mostly proxy wars between nations that were themselves not nuclear, and of the kinds that never really threatened the territorial security or survival of the superpowers. If that was threatened, as in the case of the Cuban missile crisis, then it was expected that the breakout of any conventional hostility would rapidly escalate to the nuclear level. Given this presumption, the focus then shifted to the very conduct of nuclear war itself and on issues specific to such war fighting, e.g. the use of tactical nuclear weapons, efficacy of first strike or counterstrike doctrines, calculation of numbers of nuclear weapons to prevail and claim
Manpreet Sethi is Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi.
ISSN 0970-0161 print/ISSN 1754-0054 online 2009 Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses DOI: 10.1080/09700160902790100 http://www.informaworld.com

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victory in a nuclear war, etc. Caught in this maze of issues, little attention was paid to the conduct of conventional war in the presence of nuclear weapons. In fact, prior to 1999, the only direct conventional war between two nuclear-armed neighbours was the Ussuri river conflict between the USSR and China in 1969. This revealed, to some extent, the limitations on conventional war in the presence of nuclear weapons. However, it is only post-Kargil that many dimensions of a limited war of the conventional kind between two nuclear-armed nations of unequal capabilities (conventional, nuclear, and of pain infliction and absorption) have been more closely studied.2 This interest, in fact, primarily emerged out of the apprehensions about the security of the region inhabited by two new nuclear neighbours with a history of wars and a relationship unsettled enough to carry the risk of deterrence breakdown due to routine border skirmishes. This regional reality sent analysts into overdrive after 1998 as they predicted the certainty of a nuclear exchange. The occurrence of the Kargil conflict within a year of the overt nuclearization of the region seemed to justify their pessimistic prognostications. None, however, had deliberated the possibility of confining a conflict between the two nations to a conventional level without an automatic nuclear escalation. Therefore, the manner in which operations unfolded during the two months of the Kargil conflict served to be an eye opener for most in Pakistan, India, and beyond. Ten years after Kargil, a lot more thought has been devoted to the conduct of conventional war in the presence of nuclear weapons. Given the fragile nature of Indo-Pak relations on account of Pakistans revisionist ambitions, coupled with its use of nuclear deterrence as a defence for its offensive strategy of sub-conventional conflict,3 the challenge for Indias security rises several fold. In fact, India is required to build the credibility of its nuclear deterrence in such a way that it is able to counter the adversarys attempt to blur the lines between conventional and nuclear war. While Pakistan threatens to lower the bar for breakdown of nuclear deterrence, India must not only raise the nuclear threshold, but also devise adequate conventional responses that can be safely executed in the situation of a nuclear overhang. How is this possible? How can India respond to sub-conventional warfare with conventional tactics that operate in the presence of nuclear weapons without bringing them into the calculations? What new rules must be followed? How does the nature of warfare change in the presence of nuclear weapons? This article examines these questions in the backdrop of the sub-continents experience in Kargil in 1999 and seeks to suggest some policy options for the future. Kargil, 1999 In May 1999, barely one year after going nuclear, Pakistan infiltrated approximately 5,000 of its regular soldiers in the guise of mujahideen across the Line of Control (LoC) separating the Indian and Pakistani controlled regions of Kashmir. Their mission was to seize strategic pieces of territory and then compel the Indian Government to negotiate the status of Kashmir. Pakistani leaders, military as well as civilian, believed that their recently demonstrated nuclear capability would deter India from using its conventional military superiority against Pakistan even as they pursue a provocative strategy of cross-border terrorism. According to one analyst, Islamabad is convinced that the mere threat of approaching the nuclear threshold will prevent India from seizing the strategic initiative and military dominance of events, permitting Pakistan to escalate the crisis at will without the fear of meaningful Indian retribution.4 Even

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amidst fighting in Kargil, Pakistan military leaders insisted there is no chance of the Kargil conflict leading to a full-fledged war between the two sides.5 Interestingly, this was similar to the advice given by senior US military officers to President Kennedy during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. They urged a limited American attack on Cuba because the USSR would not dare counter-attack in Germany. Pakistani military counsel too was based on the belief that nuclear deterrence afforded it near-assured immunity, and the predominant view was that The Indians cannot afford to extend the war to other areas in Kashmir, leave aside launching an attack across international boundaries [because of the] risk of nuclear conflagration.6 This assumption was based on the Pakistani projection of a carefully cultivated nuclear strategy that escalation to the nuclear level was inevitable if India were to launch a major conventional attack. By suggesting this linkage, the army was sure it could continue its proxy war to raise the military and economic costs for India without endangering its own security. In Western literature, this has been described as the risk maximizing approach that relies on the enemys fear that pressure exerted from his side could provoke a viscerally violent response rather than a rationally restrained one.7 By suggesting a low nuclear threshold, Pakistan has banked on uncertainty or irrationality about its actions as a means to impose deterrence. Pakistans plan in Kargil was premised on this logic that India would find its military options checkmated by the presence of a nuclear overhang and would be compelled to negotiate despite facing the prospect of losing a slice of its territory. Also, given that ever since May 1998, an anxious United States had consistently described South Asia as a dangerous nuclear flashpoint, Pakistan surmised that Washington would immediately intervene to resolve the crisis and formalize a new status quo in Kashmir. This internationalization, it was naturally believed, would work in Pakistans favour and hand it a military victory. The Pakistan Army was convinced of the brilliance of [its] military strategy.8 However, things did not go exactly according to Pakistani plans. Indias response, hesitant in the first two weeks while the military still believed that the action in the area was by unusually well-armed irregulars and terrorists, became far more resolute as soon as greater clarity about the ground situation emerged. The army and the air force coordinated their actions with a clear objective of dislodging the Pakistani forces. But the political leadership imposed on them the constraint of confining their military operations to the Indian side of the LoC. While this imposition came with its operational challenges and a higher rate of military casualties, it did widen the firebreak between the Indian conventional military action and the Pakistani nuclear tripwire.9 Meanwhile, two factors worked in Indias favour. Firstly, having already claimed that the intruders were not really its own troops but independent mujahideen, Islamabad could not provide its troops with any reinforcements to fight the Indian military offensive that came in the form of infantry, artillery, as well as air attacks. Secondly, once the international community knew of the subterfuge, Pakistan was established as the aggressor and was pressured, even by its traditional friends Washington and Beijing, to withdraw from the occupied heights. In fact, the United States, which in previous Indo-Pak wars had shied away from assigning blame to a particular party for the crisis, squarely condemned Pakistans incursions and intentions across the LoC. China too counselled the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to abandon the venture. A more sympathetic response from its allies might have emboldened Pakistan to carry on. But faced with diplomatic isolation, escalating casualties, and economic losses, Sharif was

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compelled to reconsider continuing military operations, even in the face of advice to the contrary by his own military commanders.10 The conflict ended in July 1999, roughly two months after it began, as an illthought out misadventure by Pakistan. However, it illustrated the limits that nuclear weapons cast on actions of nations. Pakistan realized that the acquisition of nuclear weapons had not provided it with a carte blanche on disruptive actions across the border. Rather, it placed clear limits on how far it could, or should go, so as not to breach the limits of Indian tolerance. There can be no denying that the presence of nuclear weapons certainly raises the threshold of provocation, and therefore Pakistan is able to exploit far greater space at the lower level of conflict to indulge in acts to destabilize India. Yet there is a threshold that must not be breached, and sensing that, Pakistan found it prudent to abandon action in response to Indian eviction operations in 1999. Meanwhile, India too felt the weight of nuclear weapons and exercised caution on its possible courses of action. Nevertheless, it also discovered and displayed scope for retaliatory military action that had to be intelligently exploited and astutely meshed with politico-diplomatic measures. The entire episode, in fact, brought out several lessons for the major assumptions that underlie Pakistans nuclear strategy, Indias options, and overall conduct of war in the presence of nuclear weapons. Limited war: new forms, new dimensions In January 2000, the then Defence Minister of India, George Fernandes, proclaimed a doctrine of limited conventional war under nuclear conditions, thereby signalling that there was room for India to conduct a military riposte against Pakistans subconventional conflict. He said, Nuclear weapons did not make war obsolete; they simply imposed another dimension on the way warfare was conducted . . . conventional war remained feasible, though with definite limitations, if escalation across the nuclear threshold was to be avoided.11 The same thought had been echoed in the early 1990s by Martin van Creveld, a well known analyst on war: From central Europe to Kashmir, and from the Middle East to Korea, nuclear weapons are making it impossible for large sovereign territorial units, or states to fight each other in earnest without running the risk of mutual suicide.12 Of course, a number of factors other than nuclear weapons are also responsible for changing the nature of warfare from total to limited wars in contemporary times.13 The most important limitation on war where adversaries possess nuclear weapons is cast by the presence and impact of these weapons. Their shadow imposes constraints on the range of military options and the nature of coercive use of force that nations can indulge in. It demands greater caution so as to avoid potential cost of miscalculation. Leaders of nuclear-armed nations must be constantly aware of the risks involved, especially in the show of force. While the desire to win the dispute requires a demonstration of resolve and a willingness to fight, any unrestrained coercive manoeuvring could, however, end up committing countries to a war neither of them wanted in the first place and whose results could be catastrophic for both. For instance, despite the widely expressed civilian and military opinion to strike against Pakistan once the identity of the mujahideen as regular Pakistani soldiers was established beyond doubt, the Indian political leaders still imposed upon the military to undertake operations in such a way that the threat of escalation was minimized. Therefore, in an unprecedented gesture, the use of air power was limited to the Indian side of the LoC. No strikes were authorized across

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the border, not even at the terrorist infrastructure known to exist in Pakistanoccupied Kashmir (PoK). This decision was in stark contrast to the Indian response to Pakistans Operation Gibraltar in 1965 when General Ayub Khans military regime sent Pakistani regular forces disguised as Kashmiri dissidents into the region. This operation too was premised on the belief that India would not have the stomach to spread the conflict beyond the disputed territory, thus enabling Pakistan to succeed in its revisionist plans of territorial occupation. At the time, India, despite its weak military position so soon after its defeat by China in 1962, had not hesitated to extend the conflict beyond the international boundary. The case with Kargil was just the opposite. Despite its position of conventional superiority, India imposed limits on its own ability to wage war. This proved to be as much a revelation to Pakistan as to the larger international community that had described this region as the most dangerous flashpoint. The sense of responsibility and maturity displayed by India helped shape a range of perceptions across several capitals. Kargil highlighted the criticality of the politico-diplomatic dimension of limited wars in a situation of nuclear overhang. Even as the Indian military moved on the ground to oust the infiltrators, attempts were simultaneously mounted to diplomatically isolate Pakistan and expose its offensive designs to alter the status of the LoC. In fact, Kargil, for the first time, made India reap the benefit of internationalization of the Kashmir issue, a ploy often used by Pakistan and desisted by India. In this instance, US intervention sought by Pakistan turned to Indias advantage for two reasons. Firstly, as the Indian Army routed enemy forces and moved closer to the LoC, the risk of extension of war increased and New Delhi was willing to accept US intervention to control Pakistan. Secondly, following the show of Indian maturity and self-control in handling a provocative situation, the US perception of India and its nuclear status underwent a change. This enabled the blossoming of a strategic relationship that was far more understanding of the Indian security environment and its compulsions. Therefore, the United States, who earlier never tired of straitjacketing its nuclear policies into the same mould for India and Pakistan, is today willing to treat the two differently. For the future too, India needs to understand the role of external players in a bilateral relationship between two nuclear-armed neighbours. An adept use of growing Indian influence with the United States could certainly help to keep Pakistan from playing the game of nuclear brinkmanship. This is not to suggest that India should depend on the United States or other states to deal with its security concerns vis vis Pakistan. But to highlight that in the Indo-Pakistan relationship, especially in the presence of nuclear weapons, the role of external powers would be greater given their own apprehensions of nuclear use that could break the existing norm of non-use which would have wider implications for international security. India can exploit this to its own advantage. Yet another important dimension of limited war is that it can only have limited objectives and, therefore, does not have the ability to resolve problems forever. The most it can hope to achieve is to restore and reinforce the status quo because the threat of escalation would prevent the enforcement of a permanent solution unless it is acceptable to both sides. In fact, for this reason, it may be said that in the presence of nuclear weapons, Pakistan can never hope to militarily resolve the issue of Kashmir with India. It will have to ultimately find a political solution. It is a different matter, though, whether Pakistan is really interested in resolving the issue of Kashmir or whether it only uses this to further its military strategy of bleeding India through proxy war.

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Limited war: operational issues Given that the nature of limited conventional war is different, it is natural that its operational conduct must also follow a different set of rules. At one level, nuclear weapons mean the end of classical conventional war of the kind envisaging acquisition of large swathes of territory, or a blitzkrieg effort to cause high military attrition. Any such measure is certain to breach the threshold of an adversarys levels of tolerance, especially one with weaker conventional capabilities, thereby increasing its dependence on use of nuclear weapons. Therefore, if nuclear deterrence is to be maintained, the war needs to be fought differently at the conventional level, so that the risk of escalation to the nuclear level is minimized. It may be said with some certainty that for a rational and reasonable leadership, the use of nuclear weapons can only be a measure of last resort, taken only when the survival of the state is at stake. If that is so, then it follows that as long as conventional war does not pose a threat to state survival, it would not breach the nations nuclear threshold. But if state survival were at risk, then even the threat of a massive nuclear retaliation may not prove an effective enough deterrent. An illustration of this is found in the Chinese behaviour in the Korean conflict in early 1950, when despite being non-nuclear, China was not deterred by the threat of American nuclear use when it perceived that General MacArthurs offensive towards the Yalu River threatened Manchuria, and hence the security of the Chinese state. Disregarding the blatant American threat, Beijing entered the war. However, the same China was deterred in 1953 when the issue at stake was the unification of Korea and not a threat to its existence as a state. Drawing a lesson from this, it may be concluded that any conflict with Pakistan must be conducted with a clear limited objective of not threatening its fundamental existence or survival as a nation-state. An assessment of Pakistans red lines, therefore, becomes critical. In 2002, General Khalid Kidwai of the Strategic Plans Division, the organization in charge of Pakistans strategic assets and policy, had spelt out four generic thresholds for Pakistan.14 These were: loss of large parts of territory; destruction of a large part of land or air forces; large-scale economic strangulation; and large-scale internal subversion or political destabilization. Evidently, the broad areas covered by this articulation (made only that one instance) are clearly meant to indicate a low nuclear threshold for Pakistans nuclear use. However, it is imperative that the Indian national security establishment draws up its own estimation of the credibility of these thresholds. For instance, on the space threshold, it can be determined that Pakistan could bear a deeper penetration by India into the barren desert areas than a similar depth in the populated areas of Punjab. Similarly, air strikes against terrorist infrastructure and assets in PoK are likely to evoke less response than targeting military assets elsewhere in Pakistan. Such assessments are necessary in the case of every threshold if India is not to be self-deterred from undertaking punitive action against provocative conduct of subconventional war by Pakistan. In this regard, the views offered by Abdul Sattar, Agha Shahi, and Zulfikar Ali Khan in an article in October 1999 appear far more credible. In their essay Securing Nuclear Peace, they argued that Pakistan would be forced to consider nuclear use in case of national contingencies which would arise if India threatened the existence of the Pakistani state by (1) inflicting a major defeat on the Pakistani military; or (2) occupying or threatening to occupy Pakistans vital urban, population, economic centres or communication nodes.15 Except for these, other

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local contingencies could be met with conventional means. General Karamat too expressed a similar viewpoint when he stated that Pakistans nuclear and missile forces will respond to a nuclear or missile attack, or for a response if aggression threatens survival, that is in extremis as a last resort.16 If that is so, and it does appear most logical, then the trick for India lies in creating only local and not national contingencies. This could be attained through a restrained, calibrated use of force instead of an all-out employment of military capabilities. Normally, militaries do not welcome constraints on the use of their resources. For them, the achievement of victory in war is the final and singular objective and the entire military might is meant to be effectively used as a tool in the pursuit of this goal. However, if an all-out war was to be fought with nuclear weapons, then victory at the cost of losing a nation, or even a part of it, would turn out to be self-defeating. Therefore, the very definition of victory and defeat changes. In an all-out conventional war, the difference between the victor and the vanquished is clear, based on the evidence of which side has suffered greater losses and damage. But in limited conventional wars fought in the presence of nuclear weapons, this distinction is blurred. As explained by Jasjit Singh, as war starts to move down the intensity spectrum, victory and defeat shift more into political and psychological dimensions.17 Indeed, considerations such as perceptions and public mood (created by the ubiquitous media), economic costs, and diplomatic pressures determine the victor and loser in such warfare, which might be very different from purely military results. As far as actual military operations in such a war are concerned, the following caveats must be honoured: (a) Maintaining control over escalation and de-escalation. In such a war, it would be prudent to place the onus of escalation on the adversary while retaining the initiative with oneself. This may be enabled through the effective utilization of those arms of the military that offer the maximum possibility of highly calibrated escalation and, even more importantly, the ability to de-escalate. Therefore, use of such instruments as special forces (specially raised and trained for the purpose), or air power, or even maritime power with the requisite capabilities would be preferred options because they enjoy, in varying measure, the advantage of flexibility of employment, calibrated control over military engagement, and hence over escalation. Air power provides obvious benefits in this regard while land forces have little advantage in terms of escalation control. Once engaged in combat, the army cannot be disengaged unless one side either concedes defeat or a ceasefire is agreed upon. The use of air power demonstrates resolve while simultaneously offering flexibility of disengagement, thereby facilitating retention of control. Therefore, for the effective, precise application of force, it is necessary that objective analysis be made of the advantages and limitations of every service in different scenarios. Such issues need to be adequately considered and deliberated upon in peacetime in order to provide rapid and ready options during a period of crisis. (b) Crafting options for military action. In order to keep below the adversarys nuclear threshold, military strikes must be tailored to undertake short, shallow strikes/thrusts into adversary territory in areas that would make a difference. In fact, the military strikes would either need to be restricted in depth

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into enemy territory and spread over a wider geographical expanse, or limited in geographical scope as deeper but narrow thrusts into adversary territory. Speed is also of the essence. The April 2004 Cold Start doctrine of the Indian Army proposes some fresh military options to address these issues. Drawing upon the Warsaw Pact strategy of swift advance [with] the ability to attack from a standing start,18 the basic idea of Cold Start is to have a ready, mobile lethal force (eight integrated battle groups) with integral logistics capable of mounting an offensive, with air cover. The idea behind this plan is to avoid a long preparation time to advance quickly into enemy territory for shallow penetration attacks so as to present him with impossibly difficult choices at every turn.19 This would place the onus of escalation of hostilities on the adversary while retaining Indias upper hand in both conventional and nuclear exchange. (c) Clear articulation of political and military objectives. A limited conventional war has specific objectives. In fact, Henry Kissinger had once aptly described such a war as an attempt to affect the opponents will, not to crush it.20 Premised on certain precise goals, the exact objectives of the war must be clearly articulated for the adversary and the domestic audience. This would serve two essential purposes: one, it provides a clear indication to the adversary that the goals of the operation are strictly limited, and hence there is no intention to breach, or even reach anywhere near, its stated or perceived thresholds of tolerance. This obviously reduces potential for miscalculations and misperceptions. Two, it would enable better management of domestic expectations, thereby providing the much-needed legitimacy and support for the operations. In a democracy, it is imperative that the popular mood supports the action and this can go a long way in earning international support and legitimacy too. (d) Display of political resolve. Along with military preparedness, it is critical to showcase firm political resolve and determination to achieve the articulated objectives. In fact, display of military preparedness in the absence of political resolve sends wrong signals to the adversary, thereby degrading deterrence at every level. Therefore, the politico-military action must together exhibit enough decisiveness from the beginning of the action when conventional operations are still at lower levels so that a miscalculation of resolve by the adversary does not tempt him to take escalatory actions. If that happens, then escalation would be far quicker, and more difficult to control. For example, in the case of the Ussuri river conflict, the Soviets put up with minor skirmishes of the Chinese during 19591969. But the surprise major Chinese attack on Chen Piao Island evoked a strong Soviet counter-attack causing considerable Chinese casualties. This was quickly followed up by the threat of use of nuclear weapons against China. This show of resolve helped to de-escalate the situation far more easily than if the Soviets had shown themselves to be less decisive at an early stage. (e) Identification of thrust areas of modernization. The presence of nuclear weapons makes it all the more necessary to have strong conventional capability so that nuclear defence becomes the last and not the only recourse.21 But given the nature of military strikes that can best be carried out in the presence of nuclear weapons, it becomes imperative that India must consistently build up its conventional capability that is best suited to cater for such operations.

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Therefore, the thrust areas for modernization must include reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence capabilities that can enable precise target acquisition and attack, as well as air attack capabilities with precision guidance in order to minimize the risk of collateral damage. This would not only reduce chances of escalation but also garner greater acceptance from major powers that could then be counted upon to bear down upon the adversary to see reason and temper its responses accordingly. (f) Maintenance of high nuclear threshold. It is imperative that India continuously works at enhancing the credibility of its nuclear deterrence. This demands moving towards a survivable counter-strike capability. Given its No First Use posture, India has to increase the survivability of not just the warhead or the delivery vehicle but also the entire command and control structure, communication networks, and above all ensure the survival of the political will to retaliate. Survival of the weapon would mean little if the political leadership is not adequately prepared to understand the demands of nuclear deterrence. Also, it must be appreciated that political will in a democracy depends a great deal on the perceived legitimacy of action. National will arises from, and can be built by, articulating and encouraging a clear understanding of national interest and policy options to pursue them. These are challenging issues and must be accorded the attention they deserve. Conclusion It is obvious that nuclear weapons cannot obviate wars. However, they do change its complexion and influence the manner of its conduct. In fact, in order to keep nuclear weapons from entering into real warfare, it is important to intelligently judge the thresholds and calibrate conventional strikes. For India, the exploration of this space is particularly important in order to deny Pakistan a free hand to indulge in sub-conventional conflict even as it holds the threat of an all-out nuclear war if India was to respond with a conventional strike. Describing the security challenges faced by India, Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee had said in 2005, Few other countries in the world face the full spectrum of threats to their security as India does, from low intensity conflicts to an unfriendly nuclearized neighbourhood. In such a situation, the important challenge for the country is to manage the risk of conventional conflict so that it does not graduate into an unwanted nuclear exchange. Even though theoretically any conventional war could escalate to the nuclear level, if India were to be self-deterred by this thought it would mean complete erosion of both its conventional and nuclear deterrence capabilities. The conduct of limited war with precise, clearly articulated objectives, calibrated use of military force, and astute use of politico-diplomatic space offers an alternative form of conventional war in the presence of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, in order to minimize any risk of escalation, India must on the one hand keep the use of its coercive force well below the assumed red lines of the adversary, and on the other illustrate its ability to handle the adversarys nuclear use by retaliating with enough capability and resolve to inflict damage that would impose a cost far beyond the value of the stake that made the first use of nuclear weapons against India thinkable.

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First articulated by Liddell Hart in 1954, the concept was further fleshed out by Glenn Snyder in 1965 in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis in The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror, in Paul Seabury (ed.), The Balance of Power, Chandler, San Francisco, 1965, pp. 185201. 2. The issue of inequality of nations is interesting because much of the Cold War literature was predicated on both sides being roughly comparable in nuclear war fighting capabilities. This prompted analysts such as Herman Kahn to identify not less than 44 steps in the escalation ladder. He opined that both sides could exchange blows of equal intensity at each step of the ladder as they steadily climbed up to higher levels of destruction. This situation obviously does not apply to India and Pakistan. 3. Pakistans strategy of fomenting cross-border terrorism has been variously described as proxy war, asymmetric warfare, or low intensity conflict. While these are co-terminus, this article, however, uses sub-conventional conflict because the author considers this term best describes the gravity of the activity. It is a kind of warfare that uses asymmetric means and proxy players, but is certainly not low intensity given the number of casualties it has caused to the Indian armed forces. Yet, it is pitched below the level of regular, conventional warfare and hence is sub-conventional. By the same logic, Indias limited war is above sub-conventional conflict, but still below conventional warfare. Some arguments expressed in this article on the linkages between sub-conventional and nuclear warfare draw upon the chapter The Shadow Dance written by the author for her forthcoming book Nuclear Strategy: Indias March Towards Credible Deterrence, Knowledge World, New Delhi (forthcoming). 4. Yossef Bodansky, Pakistans Nuclear Brinkmanship, Freeman Centre for Strategic Studies, Israel, at http://www.freeman.org. 5. Ihtasham ul Haque, Peace Linked to Kashmir Solution, Dawn Weekly Wire Service, June 26, 1999. As cited in Peter Lavoy, Scott Sagan, and J. Wirtz (eds.), Planning the Unthinkable, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 2000, pp. 248249. The section on Kargil, 1999 is a revised version of the authors earlier published paper entitled Nuclear Deterrence and Conventional War: A Test of Indias Nuclear Strategy, Air Power Journal, 3(3), Monsoon 2008, pp. 99118. 6. Quoted in Zahid Hussain, On the Brink, Newsline, June 1999, pp. 2425. It is a different matter that in 2007, Lieutenant General (Retd.) Asad Durrani admitted at an international conference that despite having nuclear weapons in 1999, Pakistan withdrew from Kargil because in crisis countries are self deterred because caution and fear of consequences take over. As quoted in Bharat Karnad, Indias Nuclear Policy, Pentagon Press, New Delhi, 2008, p. 131. 7. Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Oxford University Press, London, 1960. For more on Pakistans nuclear strategy see Manpreet Sethi, Pakistans Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy, Air Power Journal, 2(3), Monsoon 2007. 8. These are the words of Benazir Bhutto who has stated that the Army had shared the plan with her when she was Prime Minister, but that she had vetoed it even though she had sensed that the army chief was taken in with the brilliance of military strategy. See Samina Ahmed, Nuclear Weapons and the Kargil Crisis, in Lowell Dittmer (ed.), South Asias Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan and China, East Gate, London, 2005, pp. 137149. 9. Bharat Karnad, n. 6, p. 110. 10. There has been a war of words between Pakistans political and military leadership of the time, with each blaming the other for the Kargil debacle. General Musharraf has never tired of recounting the political mishandling of the situation and their attempts to spin the events disingenuously. See Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, Free Press, New York, 2006, pp. 9598. On the other hand, Nawaz Sharif has maintained that he was never briefed on the military operations in Kargil. 11. George Fernandes, The Challenges of Limited War: Parameters and Options, inaugural address at the National Seminar organized by IDSA, January 5, 2000. 12. Marin van Creveld, On Future War, Brasseys, London, 1991, p. 194. (emphasis added). 13. For a detailed analysis of the many factors that are leading the trend to limited wars, see Jasjit Singh, The Dynamics of Limited War, Strategic Analysis, 24(7), 2000, pp. 12051220.

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14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

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These were stated in an interview to Paulo Cotta Ramusino and M. Martinelli, Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan, report by Landau Network, Centro Volta, January 21, 2002. As cited by Gaurav Kampani, Placing the Indo-Pakistani Standoff in Perspective, Monterrey Institute of International Studies, California, 2002. Jehangir Karamat, Missile Acquisition by Pakistan: Military Strategic Imperatives, South Asian Survey, 11(2), 2004, pp. 169176. Jasjit Singh, n. 13. The 2007 IsraelLebanon war presents a good illustration of this point. Bharat Karnad, n. 6, p. 115. Ibid., p. 126. G.V. Vaidyanatha, Conventional War in the Nuclear Age, at http://www.members. tripod.com/jnu-matrix/conv-war.html (emphasis added). Henry Kissinger, Limited War: Nuclear or Conventional? A Reappraisal, in Donald G. Brennan (ed.), Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security, George Braziller, Inc., New York, 1961, p. 146. Italics in original.

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