Professional Documents
Culture Documents
FYI
Latest on this dispute.
Bonnie
Original Message
From: Dan Marcus
Sent: Friday, March 12, 2004 4:12 PM
To: 'Downs, Pat, Ms, OSD-USDI'; Bonnie Jenkins; Steve Dunne; Graham Giusti
Cc: Deitz, Robert, Mr, DoD OGC; Aly, Stewart, Mr, DoD OGC; Gainor, Sharon, CPO, DoD OGC;
Lehner, Johnathan, Mr, DoD OGC; Jones, Dawn T, LtCol, OSD-USDI; 'dan.levin@usdoj.gov1;
'Brian.H.Hook@usdoj.gov'; Dalton, William, Mr, DoD OGC; Sweatt, Susan, COL, OSD-USDI;
Eaves, Jennifer, LCDR, OSD-USDI; 'pzelijkow@9-llcommission.gov'; Chris Kojm
Subject: RE: Schultz Report - Terms of Loan Arrangement (FOUO)
Pat -- per an arrangement with Dan Levin that we had made with respect to draft Staff
Statement 5, on Diplomacy, we secure-faxed the drafts of Nos. 6 and 7 with the same
"Subject to Classification Review" notation on each page. I take responsibility for not
having thought through whether, in light of the more sensitive nature of this material and
its likely subsequent distribution by Dan, we should have included specific classification
markings. The Commission and its staff have religiously safeguarded all of the thousands
of documents that have been produced to us over the last year and there is no reason you
should have any concern about lending us copies of the Schultz documents.
Original Message
From: Downs, Pat, Ms, OSD-USDI [mailto:Pat.Downs@osd.mil]
Sent: Friday, March 12, 2004 11:52 AM
To: Bonnie Jenkins; Dan Marcus; Steve Dunne; Graham Giusti
Cc: Deitz, Robert, Mr, DoD OGC; Aly, Stewart, Mr, DoD OGC; Gainor, Sharon, CPO, DoD OGC;
Lehner, Johnathan, Mr, DoD OGC; Jones, Dawn T, LtCol, OSD-USDI; 'dan.levin@usdoj.gov1;
'Brian.H.Hook@usdoj.gov'; Dalton, William, Mr, DoD OGC; Sweatt, Susan, COL, OSD-USDI;
Eaves, Jennifer, LCDR, OSD-USDI; Downs, Pat, Ms, OSD-USDI
Subject: RE: Schultz Report - Terms of Loan Arrangement (FOUO)
I regret to inform you that we are deferring a decision to allow loan arrangements for our
restricted-read-access documents, such as for the Schultz document, as below.
As you probably know by now, we have identified what appears to be sensitive and highly
classified information in Staff Statements #6 and #7. This situation causes us concern.
I am hopeful that through the DoJ we can agree on appropriate security arrangements to
ensure adequate protection of classified information. Once that is done, hopefully in
short order, we would be happy to reconsider any loan arrangements you desire. Pat
Original Message
From: Downs, Pat, Ms, OSD-USDI
Sent: Thursday, March 11, 2004 3:01 PM
To: 'Bonnie Jenkins'; 'dmarcus@9-llcommission.gov'; 'sdunne@9-llcommission.gov'; 'mhurley®
9-llcommission.gov1
Cc: Aly, Stewart, Mr, DoD OGC; Gainor, Sharon, CPO, DoD OGC; Lehner, Johnathan, Mr, DoD
OGC; Jones, Dawn T, LtCol, OSD-USDI; Downs, Pat, Ms, OSD-USDI; 'Brian.H.Hook@usdoj.gov'
Subject: RE: Schultz Report - Terms of Loan Arrangement (FOUO)
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Bonnie,
Yes, the Schultz report will be included in the Friday delivery. The Schultz document is
being provided to you on a loan basis for up to 30 days. The same groundrules apply to
this document that apply to other restricted-read-access documents. That is, any notes
taken based on the document should not quote portions of the document verbatim; notes
should be properly classified; and no copies of the document, in whole or in part, should
be made. Please call me if you have any questions. Pat
Original Message
From: Bonnie Jenkins [mailto:bjenkins@9-llcommission.gov]
Sent: Thursday, March 11, 2004 2:15 PM
To: Downs, Pat, Ms, OSD-USDI
Subject: RE: Unintended Delivery of Read-Access DoD Documents (FOUO)
Yes.
Will you be able to send over the Shuultz piece?
Bonnie
Original Message
From: Downs, Pat, Ms, OSD-USDI [mailto:Pat.Downs@osd.mil]
Sent: Thursday, March 11, 2004 2:01 PM
To: Bonnie Jenkins; Dan Marcus; Steve Dunne
Cc: Aly, Stewart, Mr, DoD OGC; Gainor, Sharon, CPO, DoD OGC; Lehner, Johnathan, Mr, DoD
OGC; Jones, Dawn T, LtCol, OSD-USDI; Downs, Pat, Ms, OSD-USDI; 'Brian.H.Hook@usdoj.gov1
Subject: RE: Unintended Delivery of Read-Access DoD Documents (FOUO)
Thank you, Bonnie. We are doing a document delivery to the 2100 K St SCIF on Friday. Can
you please get the documents to Diana Campagna by Friday. Pat
Original Message
From: Bonnie Jenkins [mailto:bjenkins@9-llcommission.gov]
Sent: Monday, March 08, 2004 4:13 PM
To: Downs, Pat, Ms, OSD-USDI
Subject: RE: Unintended Delivery of Read-Access DoD Documents (FOUO)
Pat,
I have the documents. I will have them ready for pick up Wednesday.
Bonnie
Original Message
From: Downs, Pat, Ms, OSD-USDI [mailto:Pat.Downs@osd.mil]
Sent: Monday, March 08, 2004 11:30 AM
To: Dan Marcus; Steve Dunne
Cc: Aly, Stewart, Mr, DoD OGC; Gainor, Sharon, CPO, DoD OGC; Lehner, Johnathan, Mr, DoD
OGC; Jones, Dawn T, LtCol, OSD-USDI; Downs, Pat, Ms, OSD-USDI; 'Dan.Levin@usdoj.gov1;
1 Brian.H.HookSusdoj.gov'; Bonnie Jenkins; Mike Hurley
Subject: Unintended Delivery of Read-Access DoD Documents (FOUO)
Dan, Steve,
In mid-January, we faxed a few documents over to the Commission. To the best of my
knowledge, they were materials that the Commission staff needed for the interview of Mr.
Wolfowitz. These materials had just recently been identified. Because time was critical,
the documents did not pass through our normal review process. We have since discovered
that 9 of the approximately 20 pages faxed should have been intended for read-only access
in accordance with DoJ guidelines.
The Bates numbers for the read-access documents are: 65710-65712, 65715-65717 and 65722-
2
65724 (these 3 pages are duplicates of 65715-65717). We will need to arrange for return of
the 9 pages and any copies that the Commission staff may have made. I would like to have
Ms. Gainor, who heads our document processing facility, pick up the materials during her
next
delivery run to your SCIF this week, probably on Wednesday. Can you
please
inform your SCIF managers and appropriate Commission staff to have the the
materials ready.
I regret any inconvenience our oversight may cause you. Many thanks. Pat
This may contain information exempt from mandatory disclosure under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA).
Mike Hurley
From: Bonnie Jenkins
Sent: Friday, March 12, 2004 12:15 PM
To: Philip Zelikow
Cc: Team 3
Subject: FW: Schultz Report - Terms of Loan Arrangement (FOUO)
FYI:
Bonnie
Original Message
From: Downs, Pat, Ms, OSD-USDI [mailto:Pat.Downs@osd.mil]
Sent: Friday, March 12, 2004 11:52 AM
To: Bonnie Jenkins; Dan Marcus; Steve Dunne; Graham Giusti
Cc: Deitz, Robert, Mr, DoD OGC; Aly, Stewart, Mr, DoD OGC; Gainor, Sharon, CPO, DoD OGC;
Lehner, Johnathan, Mr, DoD OGC; Jones, Dawn T, LtCol, OSD-USDI; 'dan.levin@usdoj.gov1;
'Brian.H.Hook@usdoj.gov1; Dalton, William, Mr, DoD OGC; Sweatt, Susan, COL, OSD-USDI;
Eaves, Jennifer, LCDR, OSD-USDI; Downs, Pat, Ms, OSD-USDI
Subject: RE: Schultz Report - Terms of Loan Arrangement (FOUO)
I regret to inform you that we are deferring a decision to allow loan arrangements for our
restricted-read-access documents, such as for the Schultz document, as below.
As you probably know by now, we have identified what appears to be sensitive and highly
classified information in Staff Statements #6 and #7. This situation causes us concern.
I am hopeful that through the DoJ we can agree on appropriate security arrangements to
ensure adequate protection of classified information. Once that is done, hopefully in
short order, we would be happy to reconsider any loan arrangements you desire. Pat
Original Message
From: Downs, Pat, Ms, OSD-USDI
Sent: Thursday, March 11, 2004 3:01 PM
To: 'Bonnie Jenkins1; 'dmarcus@9-llcommission.gov1; !sdunne@9-llcommission.gov1; 'mhurley®
9-llcommission.gov'
Cc: Aly, Stewart, Mr, DoD OGC; Gainor, Sharon, CPO, DoD OGC; Lehner, Johnathan, Mr, DoD
OGC; Jones, Dawn T, LtCol, OSD-USDI; Downs, Pat, Ms, OSD-USDI; 'Brian.H.Hook@usdoj.gov'
Subject: RE: Shultz Report - Terms of Loan Arrangement (FOUO)
Bonnie,
Yes, the Shultz report will be included in the Friday delivery. The Schultz document is
being provided to you on a loan basis for up to 30 days. The same groundrules apply to
this document that apply to other restricted-read-access documents. That is, any notes
taken based on the document should not quote portions of the document verbatim; notes
should be properly classified; and no copies of the document, in whole or in part, should
be made. Please call me if you have any questions. Pat
Original Message
From: Bonnie Jenkins [mailto:bjenkins@9-llcommission.gov]
Sent: Thursday, March 11, 2004 2:15 PM
To: Downs, Pat, Ms, OSD-USDI
Subject: RE: Unintended Delivery of Read-Access DoD Documents (FOUO)
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 2O3O1-5OOO
NOV 6 2003
INTELLIGENCE
Dear Phil:
CDs containing:
• 10 channels were delivered November 5, 2003
• 8 channels are scheduled for delivery by close of business November 10,
2003
• 4 channels are scheduled for delivery by close of business November 12,
2003
• 6 channels are scheduled for delivery by close of business November 14,
2003
• 18 channels are scheduled for delivery by close of business November
19, 2003
The Department of the Air Force has assured me that materials responsive to
your request will be delivered to the Commission not later than November 15,
2003. The materials will be delivered earlier if they become available.
Detainee-related Materials
In your October 31, 2003, memo, you laid down a preferred order of
delivery for detainee-related materials. In fact, the accelerated production of
responsive materials will be facilitated by providing materials to you when their
processing—reviews, redactions, excerpts, etc.—has been completed.
• MFRs: The first batch of material extracted from the MFRs that is
responsive to your requests is scheduled for close of business
November 19, 2003. Deliveries are scheduled to be completed by
close of business November 30, 2003, with interim batches of
materials delivered earlier if they become available following the
DOD review process. The MFRs are longer in length and more
complex than the IIRs.
Policy Materials
The delivery of policy materials entails DOJ review before being delivered.
The delivery schedule for those materials, therefore, could be affected by DOJ's
review. We have made arrangements, however, with DOJ to expedite its review of
these materials, and DOJ does not anticipate delay.
As the Secretary of Defense made clear in his discussion with the Vice
Chairman and Senator Gorton on November 5, 2003, he has instructed all DOD
components to be responsive to the Commission's requests and to proceed as
rapidly as possible to assist the Commission in meeting its deadline.
Stephen A. Cambone
Copy to:
Secretary of Defense
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Secretary of the Air Force
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Counsel of the DOD
The Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
Director, Joint Staff
Chair, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
Vice Chair, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
Senator Gorton
TOTflL P.04
Guardian | US defends role for evangelical Christian Page 1 of 1
The Pentagon stepped up to defend the high-level appointment of an evangelical Christian general who has
described America's "war on terror" as a struggle between Judeo-Christian values and Satan.
Lieutenant General William Boykin, a veteran of the elite Delta Force, is to head the hunt for high-profile targets
such as Osama Bin Laden and Mullah Omar as the deputy under secretary of defence for intelligence.
But the appointment became a source of embarrassment to the Bush administration yesterday after details
emerged of the general's sermons to evangelical Christian groups depicting the "war on terror" as a religious
crusade. "We in the army of God, in the house of God, kingdom of God have been raised for such a time as this,"
Gen Boykin told an audience last year, according to an investigation in the Los Angeles Times.
The impression of a Christian holy warrior is reinforced in other speeches quoted by the Los Angeles Times, in
which Gen Boykin likens Islamist radicals to the Ku Klux Klan who do not represent the true faith.
The general delivered some of his sermons in military uniform. At one event he described a standoff with a Somali
warlord in these terms: "I knew my God was bigger than his. I knew that my God was a real God, and his was an
idol."
He also said the George W Bush's presidency was ordained by God. However, President Bush is unlikely to
appreciate the bulk of the general's comments, which defy the administration's claims that the campaign against
terrorism is not a war against Islam.
Yesterday the defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, said Gen Boykin was a fine soldier. Although he told
reporters he had not read Gen Boykin's remarks, Mr Rumsfeld said he could not prevent military officials from
making controversial statements.
Muslim groups in the US said yesterday Gen Boykin's comments go even further, reinforcing the notion in the
Arab world that the Bush administration's rhetoric on terror is mere camouflage for a larger project of subduing
Muslim and Arab nations.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4776582-103602,00.html 10/17/03
Mail:: INBOX: Action Item for DoD Page 1 of 1
Philip,
http://kinesis.swishmail.com./webniail/imp/message.php?actionID=148&rnailbox=INBOX&... 10/2/03
Mail:: INBOX: Commissioner Gorelick followup Page 1 of 1
Bonnie, et al, I talked to Lorrie this morning re DoD/JCS. She has good
insight and contacts. Attached paper contains essence of the discussion. She
has a nice rolodex, as well
Miles
http://kinesis.swishmail.com./webmail/imp/message.php?actionID=148&mailbox=INBOX&b... 9/4/03
Mail:: INBOX: PC Briefing Page 1 of 1
A <P S 83 P f f HI & fc [a -a B
INBOX Compose Folders Options Search Problem? Help Addressbook Tasks Memos Calendar Logout Open Folder'
90.10MB/476.84MB (18.89%)
Thanks,
BJ
> Folks,
>
> Team 3 is having a very informal gathering with Jamie Gorelick this Wednesday
>
> at 2:00 at 21st. We are going to discuss some of her specific concerns
> regarding DoD preparedness to protect the homeland against terrorism both
> prior
> to 9-11 and today. While the discussion will likely focus on the role of DoD,
> I
> am inviting those of you who have expressed an interest in the area of posse
>
> comitatus.
>
> Best,
>
> Bonnie
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Move | Copy jThis message to
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Mail:: INBOX: Re: DOD Docs Page 1 of 1
Just wanted to update you regarding DoD production of documents, per your note.
I spoke with Diana. She said that we now have in our possession (here at K
Street) some documents responsive to our paragraphs 10 and 15.
Diana is going through many boxes of recently arrived documents and will log
these in as she works her way through what has been delivered.
Mike
> Mike,
>
> I looked at the document request list I forwarded to you. After reviewing the
>
> list, I know what is supposed to be at K street. I already have responses to
>
> paragraphs 6 and 11. Please ask Dianna if she has received any documents in
> response to paragraphs 5, 10 and 15. The list says they have been delivered.
>
> The responses to the other paragraphs are still not delivered to K Street
> (according to the list Pat sent). She can begin to check and I can get back
> to
> her on it when I get back.
>
> Best,
>
> Bonnie
http://kinesis.swishmail.com./webmail/imp/message.php?actionID=148&mailbox=INBOX&... 8/27/03
Mail:: INBOX: DOD Docs Page 1 of 1
I looked at the document request list I forwarded to you. After reviewing the
list, I know what is supposed to be at K street. I already have responses to
paragraphs 6 and 11. Please ask Dianna if she has received any documents in
response to paragraphs 5, 10 and 15. The list says they have been delivered.
The responses to the other paragraphs are still not delivered to K Street
(according to the list Pat sent). She can begin to check and I can get back to
her on it when I get back.
Best,
Bonnie
http://kinesis.swishmail.com./webmail/imp/message.php?Horde=6e3f79a9f02ffce501efa47a9... 8/25/03
Mail:: INBOX: Fwd: DoD Status Update - 22 August (FOUO) Page 1 of 1
86.56MB/476.84MB (18.15%)
Date: Sat, 23 Aug 2003 15:48:13 -0400
From: "" <bjenkins@9-11commission.gov>^
To: "" <mhurley@9-11 commission.gov>4?
Subject: Fwd: DoD Status Update - 22 August (FOUO)
Part(s): |g] 2 Document Status - 8-22doj-pmd.doc application/msword 146.92 KB |§|
Mike,
Please check with Diana to see if any additional documents from Request #6 has
arrived. I already have the responses to the budget requests (they are in my
office - I think it is paragraphs 6 and 11). Please keep Kevin posted.
B3
Dan, Steve,
Enclosed is courtesy copy of our most recent update on the status of
document and briefing requests.
I will be out of the office from Monday, 25 Aug. thru Thurs., 28 Aug. Ms.
Janet Edghill will fill in for me during this time. She can be reached at
703-614-4665 and is copied on this e-mail. You can also contact Ms. Faith
Corson at 703-614-7671.
Should you have any new requests f9r information or interviews during this
time, please send them to Ms. Edghill with a copy to Col Susan Sweatt and
Ms. Corson. Thanks. Pat
«Document Status - 8-22doj-pmd.doc»
Pat Downs
OUSD(I)
3C-281 Pentagon
703-695-1860
This may contain information exempt from mandatory disclosure under the
Freedom of information Act (FOIA). Exemption(s) may apply.
http://kinesis.swishmail.com7webmail/irnp/message.php?actionID=148&mailbox-INBOX&b... 8/24/03
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
22 August 2003
Document Request #1
staff.
Document Request #2
r
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
4
August 25, 2003
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Document Request #3
&» report
info
supplement to document processing facility on 8/6. The
materials have completed DoD review process. Delivered
8/15.
Document Request #4
4-9b. Air Traffic Control AF/XOHP Received further amplification from Miles
Logs Mr Huddleston Kara, Commission staff, on 8.4.
/Mr Hurckes "Commission learned at Andrews Tower that
flight strips are held for 15 days unless there
is need to hold them further for investigation.
If someone is telling us that they were
shredded, then we need a piece of paper
explaining why flight strips for 9/11 were not
held and why they were routinely destroyed
even though the SOP allows that."
NORAD rechecking.
NORAD Logs- NORAD Delivered 8/15.
VIGILANT
GUARDIAN
4-11 DoD Exercises JCS Arrived FEDEX to JCS on 8/20. Sent to
document processing facility on 8/22.
Estimated delivery 8/25.
4-12 NORAD's NORAD Arrived FEDEX to JCS on 8/20. Sent to
AMALGAM VIRGO document processing facility on 8/22.
01/02 Exercise Estimated delivery 8/25.
4-13 OSD docs on USD(P) Search for documents underway to include
7
August 25, 2003
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
8
August 25, 2003
r
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
4-25 NMJIC SDO log JCS Delivered 7/7. (Part of Document Request #1 ,
Item 2)
4-26 NSOC SDO log NSA Possible Executive Privilege issue. In
coordination with DoJ/NSC as of 7/28.
4-27 NIMA imagery logs NIMA Delivered to document processing facility
7/18. Contains some "B" material, to be
handled separately. Non-"B" materials
estimated delivery date: 8/29.
w ANMCC SDO logs JCS DDO and most subordinate position logs are
not available. Logs from CWO and Site-R
personnel are located and were delivered 8/8.
4-29 NEACAP SDO logs JCS Delivered: 8/8 and 8/15.
4.30
•HEP TRANSCOM SDO JCS 6 TRANSCOM Ops Officer logs delivered
logs 8/15.
4-31 ACC SDO log ACC Delivered 7/25.
(AF/XOHP)
4-32 NORAD Reg 55-1 1 NORAD Requested document was superceded
approx 5 years prior to 9/1 1 . Copy will be
provided as well as the CON PLAN in effect
on 9-11. Delivered 8/1 5.
4-33 SECDEF, WHS, USD(P) USD(P) schedules delivered to document
DEPSECDEF, and processing facility 7/18. Estimated delivery:
USD(P) schedules 8/25.
for 9-1 1
•BR NSA data NSA NSA providing Commission staff access to
the information as of 7/30.
•Sim JCS DoD threat JCS Delivered: 7/25.
level
4-36 JCS/DoD Order to JCS Delivered: 7/25.
DEFCON 3
Document Request #5
/Mr Hurckes
HBP Overall ACC Delivered to Document Processing Facility on
scenario (AF/XOHP 7/22. Delivered: 7/25.
Mr Huddleston
/Mr Hurckes
10
August 25, 2003
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Document Request #6
Under review.
6-2 SECDEF/JCS JCS/J3 JCS: 3 documents were located however,
policy/docs on general USD(P) SAP and FP access needs to be
CT policy WHS/ Larry coordinated prior to document delivery. 3
1/1/98-19/20/01 Horner x disks containing Focal Point material
require special handling and access. OSD
and JS coordinating. 1 classified disk
delivered to Document Processing Facility
on 8/22.
Under Review.
6-3 SOCOM/CENTCOM or JCS/J3&J5 JCS: GENICOM has requested an
OSD/JCS strategy USD(P) extension until 8/25 to facilitate their
papers WHS/ Larry search. SOCOM initial search did not
Re: JSOC Horner identify any documents but are continuing
1/1/98-12/31/01 to search. J3 has no responsive
documents. SAP review.
Under Review.
6-4 OSD/JCS papers for JCS/J3 No JCS documents were identified
Pres/VP Transition USD(P) responsive to this request.
Team WHS/ Larry
RE: Terrorist Orgs Horner USD(P) to compiled by 8/15
Distributed to Policy Pocs primary search
underway in SO/LIC and ISA - 7/22.
Approximately 7 pages have been located
thus far. They will be delivered to the
processing facility on 8/13.
12
August 25, 2003
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Under Review.
6-5 OSD/JCS and JCS/J3 JCS has no data to support. CENTCOM
CENTCOM docs USD(P) requests extension until 8/25 to facilitate
RE: Navy Forces WHS/ Larry search.
Horner
Navy tasked to fleet 7/25. Delivered 3
documents to document processing facility
on 8/12. Delivered final responsive
document 8/21.
13
August 25, 2003
r
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Search completed.
wjJilSJi OSD/JCS, DoD IG DoDIG Ten reports compiled 7/1 7
CT/FP Reports and Delivered to the document processing
Audits JCS facility: 7/25.
Under Review.
Under Review.
6-14 SECDEF tasking on CT USD(P) USD(P) Estimated delivery to document
andFP processing facility: 8/15
1/1/98-9/20/01
WHS delivered 2 documents to document
processing facility 7/23. Search
completed.
Under Review.
14
August 25, 2003
r
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
6-16 COCOM Intel Req. for DIA OLA Delivered to document processing facility
CT and FP 8/5. Expected delivery 8/25.
1/1/98-9/20/01
15
August 25, 2003
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Briefing Request #1
Briefing Request #2
Briefing Request #3
Briefing Request #4
16
August 25, 2003
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
17
August 25, 2003
Mail:: INBOX: Fwd: Additional Detailed Briefs Page 1 of 1
I agree with Bonnie's list (below) of additional briefs we should request from
DoD, following-on to what we learned in the 4-hr general brief yesterday.
A brief on AQSL (Steve Cambone commented this would be a sensitive one, having
to do with plans re AQ leadership);
A brief on ROEs;
Please let Bonnie and I know, and Bonnie will work with Pat Downs to schedule.
Thanks,
Mike
Mike,
Best,
Bonnie
http://kinesis.swishmail.com./webmail/imp/message.php?Horde=6e3f79a9fD2ffce501efa47a9... 8/22/03
Mail:: INBOX: Additional Detailed Briefs Page 1 of 1
Best,
Bonnie
http://kinesis.swishmail.com./webmail/imp/message.php?Horde=6e3f79a9f02ffce501efa47a9... 8/22/03
Mail:: INBOX: MFR on Feith Briefing Page 1 of 1
Thanks,
Mike
Augu:
Advertise Subscription
Nation/Politics
Nation/Politics Commentary Classifieds
http://www.washtimes.com/national/20030813-120409-8659r.htm 8/13/03
y
Thomas H Kean
CHAIR DOD BRIEFING REQUEST NO.
Lee H. Hamilton
VICE CHAIR The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
Richard Ben-Veniste
requests an orientation and briefing on how the Northern Command is
structured and prepared to conduct operations to deter, prevent and defeat
MaxQeland threats and aggression aimed at the United States and its territories within
Fred F. Fielding the NORTHCOM area of responsibility. The briefing should also include
the following:
Jamie S. Gorelick
Skde Gorton A. How NORTHCOM operations will interact with relevant federal
agencies, such as the DHS, FAA, FBI, TSA, NORAD, and the National
John Lehman
Guard in carrying out its missions; and
Timothy J. Roemer
James R. Thompson
B. Posse comitatus legal constraints in relation to the carrying out of
NORTHCOM missions.
Philip D. Zelikow
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR The requested briefing is for general background purposes only and will
not be a substitute for later interviews the Commission and its staff may
wish to conduct. Please schedule this orientation and briefing at the
earliest possible date.
Steve Cambon
Lt Gen Jerry Boykin
Philip Zelikow
Bonnie Jenkins
Kevin Scheid
Mike Hurley
Tasks
Proposing visit to commands got the attention of higher levels of DoD which responded
to find out what we really want, and then prepared a new specific briefing for us.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
11 August 2003
Document Request #1
Document Request #2
Document Request #3
Document Request #4
August 12,2003
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
4-9b. Air Traffic Control AF/XOHP Received further amplification from Miles
Logs Mr Huddleston Kara, Commission staff, on 8/4.
/Mr Hurckes "Commission learned at Andrews Tower that
flight strips are held for 15 days unless there
is need to hold them further for investigation.
If someone is telling us that they were
shredded, then we need a piece of paper
explaining why flight strips for 9/11 were not
held and why they were routinely
destroyed even though the SOP allows that."
• TRANSCOM SDO
logs
JCS TRANSCOM Ops Officer log delivered to
document processing facility 7/31.
4-31 ACC SDO log ACC Delivered 7/25.
4-32 NORAD Reg 55-1 1 NORAD Requested document was superceded
approx 5 years prior to 9/1 1 . Copy will be
provided as well as the CON PLAN in effect
on 9-1 1 . Delivered to document processing
facility: 8/8.
4-33 SECDEF, WHS, USD(P) USD(P) schedules delivered to document
DEPSECDEF, and processing facility 7/18. Estimated delivery:
USD(P) schedules 8/8.
for 9-1 1
NSA data NSA NSA providing Commission staff access to
—
the information as of 7/30.
JCS DoD threat JCS Message was provided to document
• level processing facility on 7/22. Delivered: 7/25.
JCS/DoD Order to JCS Message was provided to document
™ DEFCON 3 processing facility on 7/22. Delivered: 7/25.
8
August 12, 2003
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Document Request #5
9
August 12,2003
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Document Request #6
completed.
6-4 OSD/JCS papers for JCS/J3 No JCS documents were identified
Pres/VP Transition USD(P) responsive to this request.
Team WHS/ Larry
RE: Terrorist Orgs Horner USD(P) to compiled by 8/15
Distributed to Policy Pocs primary search
underway in SO/LIC and ISA - 7/22.
Collection in progress; delivery to
document processing facility to start 8/8.
11
August 12, 2003
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
12
August 12, 2003
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
13
August 12, 2003
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Briefing Request
Briefing Request #2
Briefing Request #3
14
August 12, 2003
9/11 COMMISSION BACKGROUND BRIEFINGS
OUTLINE
- - National Guidance
- - DoD Guidance and Authorities (e.g. ROE)
-Plans ^it^iM/j - .-fsert/
c,^, kf"- f
- Organizational Changes ' '
-Activities ^ ^xo'"
- Context/Key Events
~ f\) r \
\i$jUJftX- * ftf/-CJL fO.^.iA/Jf
-JL^&
flUG nu. r'DO
Thomas H. Kean
CHAIR Memorandum
Lcc H. Hamilton
VICE CHAIR
For: Major General James A. Hawkins, USAF
Richard Ben-Veniste
Vice Director, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Max Clebnd
From: Philip Zelikow
Frederick F. Fielding Executive Director
J.imie S. Goreliclc
Subj: Proposal for August Site Visits to USCENTCOM
Slade Gorton (and SOCCENT), USSOCOM and JSOC
John F. Lchnwn
Date: August 5, 2003
Timothy J. Roemer
James R. Thompson
Per our telephone conversation today, please find attached the proposed
itinerary and plans for travel to the above-mentioned military sites. The
proposed plan includes briefings and meetings. Please contact our POC
Philip D. Zclikow
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR Bonnie Jenkins at 202-331- 4078 if you have any questions.
We propose to begin each site visit with briefings and conclude by meeting
with the Commander and any other members of the Command the
Commander deems appropriate (for example, possibly the J3 and J5).
301 7'1' Street SW, Room 5125
Washington, DC 2CH07
T 202.331.4060 F 202.296.5545
www.9-1 lcommission.gov
HO 756 P.3/3
AUG. 5.2003 5:08PM
08/05/03
V. Proposed Meetings
1 "CT* in this document refers to counterterrorism issues related Usama bin Laden, Afghanistan (including the
Northern Alliance and/or the Taliban), Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Sudan.
'
^ UNITED'
Lee H. Hamilton
VICE CHAIR The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
Richard Ben- Veniste
requests an orientation/briefing from the Joint Intelligence Task Force-
Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT) on the following topics:
MaxQeland
Fred F. Fielding 1). How the JITF-CT was organized to provide intelligence to DoD
regarding a possible terrorist attack prior to September 11, 2001;
Jamie S. Gorelick
Slade Gorton 2) How the JITF-CT is now organized to provide such intelligence
following the September 11 attacks;
John Lehman
Timothy J. Roemer 3) The types of intelligence support provided to DoD and its military
components, including support to CT operations in Operation Enduring
James R. Thompson
Freedom;
Philip D. Zelikow
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 4) The single database that contains terrorist-related intelligence and law
enforcement information in a single repository, enabling detailed link,
pattern, and trend analysis; and
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States requests a
orientation/briefing from the Joint Intelligence Task Force-Combating Terrorism on how
the Task Force was organized prior to September 11, 1991 to provide intelligence to DoD
in preparation for a possible terrorist attack. The Commission is also interested in how
the Task Force is now organized to provide such intelligence following the September 11
attacks. Please schedule this orientation/briefing at the earliest possible date.
General Counsel
Mail:: INBOX: Fwd: DoD Attendees at our 7/24 Meeting (U) Page 1 of 1
UNCLASSIFIED
Miles,
As you requested, the following lists DoD personnel who attended yesterday's
meeting:
USD(Intelligence)
Mr. Richard Haver
Ms. Patricia Downs
Ms. Faith Corson
Ms. Janet Edghill
Ms. Marilyn Blackmon
Ms. Stephanie Brewer
DoD OGC
Mr. Stewart Aly (Legal Counsel)
Ms. Sharon Gainor (Legal Counsel - Document Processing Facility)
Mr. Harvey Dalton (Intelligence)
USD(Policy)
Mr. Robert Doheny (SO/LIC)
JCS
Col Susan Kuehl, USAF (J3/NMCC)
CAPT Hal Dronberger, USN (CJCS Legal Counsel)
Maj Jeanne Meyer, USAF(CJCS Legal Counsel)
Lt Col Marshall Mantiply, USAF (J5)
DIA
Mr. Robert Berry (General Counsel)
Mr. Sal Ferro (Congressional Affairs)
http://kinesis.swishmail.com/webmaiVimp/message.php?actionID=148&mailbox=INBOX&b... 7/25/03
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Document Request #2
Document Request #3
Document Request #4
4-25 NMJIC SDO log JCS Delivered 7/7. (Part of Document Request #1,
Item 2)
4-26 NSOC SDO log NSA Action to be completed. Estimated delivery:
7/18. Possible Executive Privilege.
4-27 NIMA imagery logs NIMA Delivered to document processing facility:
7/18.
4-29 NEACAP SDO logs JCS Data being compiled. Estimated delivery
beginning: 8/5.
4-31 ACC SDO log ACC Data being compiled. Estimated delivery:
7/25.
4-32 NORAD Reg 55-1 1 NORAD Data being compiled. Estimated delivery: 8/5.
Document Request #5
7
July 24, 2003
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Document Request #6
6-16 COCOM Intel Req. for DIA OLA Data being compiled. Estimated delivery
CT and FP to document processing facility: 8/15.
1/1/98-9/20/01
10
July 24, 2003
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Briefing Request #1
Briefing Request #2
Briefing Request #3
11
July 24, 2003
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
12
July 24, 2003
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
COPIES: 1 PAGES:
_ RESTRICTED
The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:
FROM:
TO:
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
Jamie Gorelick's issue
Bonnie
>
> Bonnie:
> I apologize. I only just read your notes on Adm Siglar's briefing. It was
> buried under the blizzard of paper on my desk.
> I read them closely this morning. What he said was very, very interesting.
> I
> think many of his points we will hear again and again: that CT was just one
> of
> many competing priorities; that it took 9/11 to move it to the head of the
> list, etc.
> We will definitely benefit from scheduling a formal interview of Adm Siglar.
> Thanks to you and Dan for meeting with him. Great work!
> Mike
>
http://kinesis.swishmail.com/webmail/imp/message.php?Horde=6e3f79a9f02ffce501efa47a9... 7/18/03
Mail:: INBOX: The Admiral Siglar Briefing Page 1 of 1
Bonnie:
I apologize. I only just read your notes on Adm Siglar's briefing. It was
buried under the blizzard of paper on my desk.
I read them closely this morning. What he said was very, very interesting. I
think many of his points we will hear again and again: that CT was just one of
many competing priorities; that it took 9/11 to move it to the head of the
list, etc.
Thanks to you and Dan for meeting with him. Great work!
Mike
http://kinesis.swishmail.com/webmail/imp/rnessage.php?Horde=6e3f79a9f02ffce501efa47a9... 7/18/03
07/17/03 Bonnie D. Jenkins
Overall question - was the military engaged regarding the issue of CT prior to 9-11? The
general assessment is that it was not.
Sigler: That is an interesting question. If the belief that the military was not engaged is
correct, then why was it not?
A terrorist attack against the US was a matter of when, not if. Many were saying this. So I
when the problem comes, one would be ready if one made the right investments in '^
preparation. It was hard to get this resourced because so many other priorities existed.
The question is, how much was enough at the time if a major attack had not yet occurred?
What could we have afforded not to do in preparation for an attack?
Many were talking about and looking at the issue. We were doing things at CENTCOM.
CTjwas one of many priorities and it did not jurnpjojhejiead_of the list until after 9-11._
If we blame anyone hereTithas to be the peoplewho did know. Some knew but were not
given a voice or were not talking loud enough. Were the CINCs pounding on the tables?
Clark knew the system and was working the system and yet he could not get the US to do
what it is doing now. This is indicative of anorganizationa] problem and maybe not a
problem because people were not doing their jobST^—•
There was a SOCENT liaison located at CENTCOM but working for the J3. SOCENT
was working the CT problem hard. But the problem is that the CIA, FBI and local law
enforcement was not showing SOCENT enough information. Yet, SOF was always in a
stovepipe doing their own thing and was very secretive. The SOF work in CT issue was
so highly classified that many did not know about it. Many were working hard on the CT I
but the issue had not reached a critical mass and they could not force the issue if there
wasjio jtttack. Now after 9-11 they have been joined with the combmeo^armed forces,
and we have a better idea of what SOF is doing. T~ ~~
The SOF was focused on al Qaeda and the UBL. UBL got briefed twice a week and there
was concern in CENTCOM about the threat. I believe there were several messages that
went from CENTCOM to OSD about CENTCOM's concerns about al Qaeda.
There were competing priorities for CENTCOM. The first major competing priority was
Iraq and^jadflam. There were many on-going military operations, for example, Desert (^- • ~ A
Fox. These were very time-consuming. The second competing priority was the Theater L gjfr. r6"^
Engagement Plan (TEP) now called the Theater Security Cooperation. This was also very a '
time-consuming. Also there is the normal day-to-day tasks in addition to other
contingencies that arise in the AOR.
There are two types of plan processes. The first is the deliberative,(J5) and the second is
the crisis action plans £J3). There are five different plans within J5.
1. Operations plans. There are two types:
a. those fully fleshed out
b. those not fully fleshed out
both are on the shelf and we can pull them, update them and execute them
when there is a crisis;
2. Concept plans. These are based on the following idea: "I have identified a
problem and I need to know how to deal with it." CT was a con plan.
We did have a CT plan. We had 27 plans and CT was one of them. Again, the problem
wasjwjiere was thejMJQrjty? Where did CT fit into the overalllicherrieTQinny watch we
also had the embassy bombings. Should that have beerra~waKB=npJcall? It occurred
overseas and not many Americans died. We realized we were on an up-ramp regarding al
Qaeda but we were not at the level yet to devote national assets required andto reorganize
the bureaucracy the way we needed to in order to^ address the issue. -$t—-^ "
An attack was inevitable and we could not reorganize ourselves to prevent it. We needed /I
to do more. The problem is therefore three fold: „ ft /&/v£ > ? ^t/i?^1-*
1. the way we were organized , f^> ^<(j^J^ ' I '
2. too much on nyj pTate ^
3. there were no priorities ^
Were plans discouraged because some feared that by having them they would become
self-fulfilling?
Possibly.
Not all agencies of the US government are organized or culturally able to do the types of
planning DoD does. But the war on terrorism is an interagency problem (financial, legal,
diplomacy, nonproliferation, etc). The military is supposed to be the minor part if it is
done correctly. -
Did the military not trust Clinton?
If so, not on my level. I did not detect that on Zinni's level or in the JCS. It was not that
way at CENTCOM.
J2 CINCENT
1. Bob Noonan, now the Director of Army Intelligence
Adm Sigler is not aware of any change in plans or update of plans following the embassy
bombings. We should speak to J3 folks for that information.
There is a general distrust among military officers regarding plans. Some of it is cultural
and some of it is codified. The military is action oriented and generally does not prefer to
rely on plans.
Weinberger Doctrine
One: The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular
engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies;
Two: If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should
do so wholeheartedly and with the clear intention to winning;
Three: If we decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined
political and military objectives;
Four: The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed - their
size, composition, and disposition - must be continually reassessed and adjusted if
necessary;
Five: Before the United States commits combat forces abroad, there must be some
reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected
representatives in Congress; and
Six: The commitment of the US forces to combat should be at a last resort - only after
diplomatic, political, economic, and other efforts have been made to protect our vital
interests.
Beyond The Weinberger Doctrine wysiwyg://134/http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1995/CST.hl
policy?"2
2 of 19 7/3/03 3:36 PM
x/ger Doctrine wysiwyg://134/http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1995/CST.hl
situations!
tested.
after World War I that the United States can not afford to
3 of 19 7/3/03 3:36 PM
07/03/03 Bonnie D. Jenkins
Suggested Publications: The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1997 AFSC Pub 1 and the
Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations 13 Apr 95 Joint Pub 5-0 (we have both of these)
There are two different types of military planning processes at the Pentagon:
1) the deliberative planning process, which follows a formal structure (as outlined in the
Joint Staff Officers' Guide) and results in operations plans and contingency plans.
Rumsfeld is changing some of the planning process now. Note: there is some
civil/military tension. It has come to a head with Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz; and
2) crisis response planning, which follows a less formal, reactive structure with no formal
rules. This varies by administration.
In general, planning goes from various civilian officials, to the JCS, to the CINCdoms.
The CINCS construct the military plans. The CINCS are responsible for developing
operations plans for their own regions based on the guidance received. Other military and
civilian officials review the plans. In reality, however, the procedure is constantly
interactive and constantly being revised. Most plans have a two-year cycle and are
reviewed by the SecDef every two years. Plans are very hard for most civilians to
understand, let alone to assess. It was very hard for the NSC in particular to get its hands
around military planning issues.
The "op" plans, of which there are less than half a dozen, are quite large, numbering
thousands of pages. There are more contingency plans, and even more of the minor
contingency plans.
CINCS - they always have opportunities to influence the policy process. It is not always
just top-down. The CINCS are responsible for the warfight so they want to influence
resource allocations. Joint monthly readiness reviews by the CINCS was established
because the CINCs wanted more say in resource allocations.
1 Time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD): This is the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
data, non-unit-related cargo and personal data, and movement data for the plan.
07/03/03 Bonnie D. Jenkins
SOCCENT was the key for deliberate planning regarding SOF in Afghanistan. A
problem with SOF is that they are very secretive and this secrecy makes it hard for them
to coordinate with others. SOFs are very compartmentalized so we don't know where
they are or what they are doing.
The 1993 bottom-up review did list terrorism as a major concern. The military was to focus
on terrorism and prepare for dealing with potential terrorist threats. This led to a DIA
assessment of the threat. But from 1993-1995, the focus was more on hostage rescue and
state-sponsored terrorism. In 1998, the threat assessment was broadened to include force
protection for foreign deployed troops, e.g. in Bosnia there was tremendous concern
regarding Mujahedin attacks.
On September 12, there was apian on the shelf for Afghanistan. While prior planning
was done, as noted earlier, not much attention was paid to Afghanistan. The plans on the
shelf were likely those used as the basis of planning for Enduring Freedom. So, there was
some work done because they were told to plan something.
There was criticism that the Clinton administration was spending resources doing silly
things (e.g., taking children to school, rather than focused on warfighting. There was also
a concern that the administration got involved in military action that contradicted the
Weinberger Doctrine. Perry got it right when he said to use force when interests are
commensurate with the costs and risks involved. The Perry approach was that every case
is to be assessed on its own merits (use the military and assets when the risks are weighed
against the threat to US interests). However, there was no 9-11 yet so our "image" was
not going to deal with a war and it was difficult in that case to energize the Pentagon (ie.
serious threat needed to justify action). Now you have 9-11. Costs and risks of inaction
are too high. This administration is much more forceful with the military.
Did the military trust Clinton to use force responsibly? Yes, they disliked Clinton until
they saw Rumsfeld ©.
Tom: Never had a bad experience. The military planners did not resent me because I was
a democrat. However, there was some evidence of military suspicion of the Clinton
administration, but it had little effect. A bigger issue was simply military resistance to
civilian officials doing planning.
The Clinton White House was only going to spend a certain amount of political capital on
the military. After the "gays in the military" issue, they were only willing to push the
military but so far. They wanted the military and defense not to be a problem (ie. did not
want crises and the military in general, to be an issue). They also did not want to spend
too much money.
The military does not always present extreme options such as Tomahawks versus full-
blown invasion. At USAF, they developed five to six air options before the conflict,
recognizing the importance of flexibility.
07/03/03 Bonnie D. Jenkins
At the upper levels, it is very much personality driven. When Clinton came in, it was
tense. There was a suspicion of Powell. The administration had not worked with the
military before. This was exacerbated by the Somalia and Bosnia situations. Over time,
the Perry-Shalikashvili relationship was great, but before that there was tension. Cohen
had a good relationship with the Chairman but a bad relationship with the Combatant
Commanders.
Intelligence
Intelligence reform in the 1990s emphasized intelligence support for the warfighter.
There were numerous institutional and interagency changes, and technological
investments, to encourage this. However, to get a major change in collection, you need
high-level civilian attention (need high-level SecDef attention).
Intelligence has many assets and involved agencies. A great deal of time and effort has
been spent improving intelligence to help the warfighter. It is much better now. Iraq is an
example of the success of this. Once the war started, there were huge improvements.
How can we prioritize what is needed from intelligence? One way to address this is to
have more interaction between the military and intelligence. There are now more
representatives from the agencies embedded in the military staff. We need to continue
having liaisons.
The 1C now has more innovative techniques. A lot is ad hoc (going around the system).
Overall however, the 1C is not quick enough to adapt to the new threat. The 1C must
think creatively of going after high value targets.
Communication between the White House and Pentagon is pretty bad sometimes.
While the NSC advises the president, to second guess the CINCs is very unusual. As
noted, it is hard for civilians to assess large operations and plans.
Lessons Learned
What are the lessons?
Dave: should have invested more in threat assessment. More HUMINT. How has intelligence
changed to ensure the right people have the right information?
There was a failure of the government to understand the threat prior to the attack. What
resources were devoted to learning more about this threat at the time? Was there resistance to
07/03/03 Bonnie D. Jenkins
understanding the threat? Where did this resistance come from and what lied behind this
resistance? This is really an inside the beltway issue.
Tom: should have had more interactions with guard, reserves, state and local 1st
responders. Should have focused on communications, training, equipment, and other
difficulties.
My questions:
1. Was there or was there not something on the shelf?
2. Where did the communication gap occur? Principals, CINCs? Why was Afghanistan
a "backwater" issue when the President, Clark and Tenet kept saying terrorism was so
important and were asking for military options?
3. More information on JSOC's position on these issues.
4. Did the military just not want to engage?
- what are the real underlying reasons for this lack of desire to engage or to be
creative in developing plans despite the request to do so.
5. Are we wrong? Did the military really provide the best options? Was the intelligence
simply not adequate for the warfighter?
6. How can I get access to the "plan" that was on the shelf?
7. What about the USAF plans referred to (more information needed)?