DSA Alert September-2012

editor-in-chief
The country comes first - always and every time.

Dj vu: Non-alignment 2.0 A Policy Prescription for Disaster
he 1962 India-China War evokes painful memories of a deep and traumatic national humiliation. In military terms it was just a tactical battle with a mere 2-3 divisions involved from both sides. The problem lay in the sheer incompetence and ineptitude displayed by the Indian political and military leadership of that period and the tragic anchor premise of that era China would not wage war! 1962 was a watershed which mercifully led to the demise of Nehruvian liberalism. It led to the rise of Realism and Realpolitik in the Indian state. To that extent 1962 was a great blessing in disguise. It paved the way for the military stalemate of 1965 and then the historic victory of 1971 Bangladesh War. The 1962 War had started in September some 50 years back. Why remember it now? Because half a century past we are seeing a familiar pattern of events repeat themselves in a manner that is cause for serious national concern. We are seeing a return of the Nehruvian state with a new version of Non-alignment 2.0 and a new found conviction that war is just not possible. While rejecting the Indian Armys proposal for the mountain strike corps, the Finance Ministry had asked as to how durable was the Chinese threat? It was astounding to learn that the mandarins of our Finance Ministry expect China to disappear / fade away after a few years. The air of Dj vu is ominous. Consider these: In 1960 there was a serious Civil-Military clash between the then RM and Gen Thimayya over the issue of lack of military preparedness to take on China. The government had reduced defence expenditure then to just 1 per cent of the GDP. We have just had a similar spat in Civil-Military relations. One of the precipitating factors again was the excruciatingly slow pace of our defence acquisitions process that is opening serious windows of vulnerability vis a vis the China-Pakistan combine. In 1962 the prime cause of the disaster was a deeply entrenched mindset China wouldnt attack so it was ok to do tokenism via the Forward Policy and placate inflamed public opinion. In 2012 we have the NSC sponsored paper called Non-alignment 2.0 that starts from a premise that we must sit on the fence in the geo-political competition between USA and China. What is worse is the assumption that there is virtually zero probability of any Chinese attack because we are now a nuclear power. Military operations by China, if any, will only be in the form of small nibbles / bites. So we do not need any sound defences / counter-attack capabilities on our Himalayan border but only a tripwire / a thin red line. What is even more amazing is the policy prescription that should China or Pakistan attack we dare not think of a proportionate military response for we will get nuked. (Apparently our nukes will deter no one from a nuclear release.) This policy prescription enters the realm of the fantastic when it says that we train the Monpas, Adu Mishims and other tribes like the Bodos for guerilla warfare in the Chinese rear. Till here it sounds fine what is preposterous is the assumption that apparently the Chinese will be so terrified of our tribal guerillas that they wont dare attack. The author, unfortunately, forgets that from 1956-1961, the Chinese had ruthlessly crushed the Khampa rebellion in Tibet and then attacked us in 1962. So the notion that the Chinese PLA is terrified of asymmetric warfare is indeed fantastic. These policy prescriptions become disturbing when they are used to stop the raising of a strike corps for the Himalayas on the plea that it would provoke China. The authors of the paper want a thin red line a military tripwire in the Himalayas to draw the Chinese in and then let our NE tribals launch guerilla warfare in their rear. Meanwhile, they want the Indian Navy to launch a grandiose counter-attack on the Chinese SLOCs in the IOR. The Indian Navy will do well in any such attack on the Chinese SLOCs. Unfortunately, it will do little to alter the outcome of any land battle in the Himalayas. The concept that we tamely surrender on land and fight on the sea is not sustainable. The whole Non-alignment 2.0 paper exercise is a policy prescription for kowtowing to a rising China and waving the flag of surrender even before the hostilities begin. One would have thought that this bizarre, theoretical kite flying exercise was merely an attempt at appeasing China for the time being to buy time to complete our inordinately delayed military build-up. However, with the stalling of our Strike Corps, this kite flying has assumed dangerous proportions that could derail our much delayed military build-up. The need for a counter-offensive option against China had been keenly felt as far back as the 1980s during the tenure of the highly professional Gen Krishna Rao as the Chief. It has already been critically delayed. We thought we were heading for a Multipolar World Order where we would be one of the Poles of Power. We now see our security establishments official vision of a new Bipolar world with USA and China as the sole super powers and a cowering, quivering India pleading that it is Non-aligned so as not to annoy a rising China. It is a pathetic and defeatist vision and no one has the right to impose this Munich mentality on our country.
Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd)

September 2012 Defence AND security alert
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History teaches us hard lessons
Volume 3 Issue 12 September 2012

chairman shyam sunder publisher and ceo pawan agrawal founding editor manvendra singh editor-in-chief maj gen (dr) g d bakshi SM, VSM (retd) director shishir bhushan corporate consultant k j singh art consultant divya gupta central saint martins college of art & design, university of arts, london marketing and sales dhirendra sharma corporate communications tejinder singh creative vivek anand pant administration shveta gupta representative (Jammu and Kashmir) salil sharma correspondent (Europe) dominika cosic production dilshad and dabeer webmaster sundar rawat photographer subhash circulation and distribution mithlesh tiwari e-mail: (first name)@dsalert.org info: info@dsalert.org articles: articles@dsalert.org subscription: subscription@dsalert.org online edition: online@dsalert.org advertisement: advt@dsalert.org editorial and business office 4/19 asaf ali road new delhi-110002 (India) t: +91-011-23243999, 23287999, 9958382999 e: info@dsalert.org www.dsalert.org
istorical mistakes teach us lessons in our lifetime. It is a blessing in disguise if we are able to use it like a mirror to reflect our past to remind ourselves of the error of our ways, the shortfalls that we had shown and the grief that we had caused to ourselves or our nation. Reflections, both physical and esoteric, help us skirt the shortfalls of the past and make our present less burdened with psychological baggage and our future more assured and secure.
The war with China in 1962 was one such historical mistake which we cannot forget. There were some shortfalls at our end because of which we could not win the war against China at that point in time. But today, after almost 50 years, things are radically different;we are more confident, prepared and ready for any challenge. However, the Chinese attack of 1962 was what was known as a conventional attack. Today we are being confronted by what is called a pseudo-war unconventional, undeclared and clandestine in its methodology. It is being organised by China in conjunction with Pakistan with the intention of destabilising India through a thousand lethal cuts as per Chinese philosophy. Attempts to destabilise India by other means has been a persistent factor over this past half century but India has withstood it with resilience and confidence. The situation has changed drastically in 50 years on both sides of the Line of Actual Control created by the Chinese invasion of 1962. China has completed the four modernisations of its military and infrastructure and India has, belatedly, begun improving its manpower capability and infrastructure facilities. Indias defences have improved and our economic growth is an acknowledged fact. China may have developed the best technologies for its land forces and improved its aero power and naval forces and equipped them with the best of munitions but over the last five decades Indian forces have won three wars and are acknowledged to be the most battle-hardened in Asia. Today our forces are absolutely ready to take up any challenge by China or any other country for safeguarding our sovereignty. The times have changed. Our scientists and the research teams of the Defence Research and Development Organisation have developed cutting edge technologies for our defence forces and have made the forces tough and strong to take up any challenge on land, air or seas. Our nuclear programme has been on the right track and we are about to complete the nuclear triad of strategic forces on land, in the air and soon in the sea as well and have created a credible nuclear deterrent albeit of the minimal requirement. So China knows that India is no longer the pushover it was in 1962 and evidence of that was given to it in the short and sharp battle at Nathu La in 1967. And above all the morale of Indian forces is at the highest level and our defence establishments are well equipped with the best technologies developed within the country and some obtained from other countries which have made our forces one of the best armed elements in the world. So we are not worried for any reason that China may try to attack us in the near future because if it tries, this time it will be a debacle for them. I would like to mention here that the status of China in the UN is because of the soft attitude we had for them 50 years back. We insisted that China, a pariah at the time, should have its due place within the UNO but now we are the wiser and tougher and we have learnt from our history and we are not going to make such mistakes again. Dear readers, DSA will be completing three years this October and I wish to assure you that team DSA is committed and dedicated to bring to you non-partisan and dispassionate analyses, views and perspective on defence and security issues of national and global importance. I am also happy to inform you that we have recently tied-up with a world renowned organisation, Fleming Gulf, as the Strategic Partner for their first conference on Defence Modernisation in India Summit on 29th and 30th November, 2012 at New Delhi. I am sure it will be of great interest to the defence personnel and our friends in the defence industry. Please get in touch with team DSA for sponsorships and delegate registration. I invite you to be an active partner in Indias defence modernisation. Jai Hind!
nniversaries are always something to savour, reminisce, enjoy and to learn from. And more so when it relates to military anniversaries. For these are occasions for the young to gain inspiration and the nation to acknowledge the sacrifices of its braves. Veterans get to be recognised on these days, these ceremonies. Even if theyre forgotten for the rest of the year. Memorials are decorated and the citizenry of India feel as one with those who arent with them anymore. These are essential blocks of the nation building process, one of pride and association. Alas, none of this can be said for the memories of the 1962 War.
It was a war that neednt have been fought. It was a war into which late Jawaharlal Nehru dragged India, unprepared and confused. The result of which has been that India is still living in a denial about the war. Of course India lost the war, of that there is no doubt. But it was a war, even if India had to fight it, in which victory was possible if the Prime Minister of India and his military leadership been prepared for a fight. That wasnt the case and till today the country has a skewed sense of the war, mixing up history with emotion.
The genesis of the war is the McMahon Line and Chinas misgivings with it as far as India was concerned. It was in the process of, or had already agreed with, other countries afflicted by the same Line. In Indias case there was a hesitation and that was on account of the peculiar politics of PM Nehru. On the one hand he would bend over backwards to please Beijing, when India declined permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council because China was not a member (!), or shutting down Indias consulate in Lhasa; while on the other he would give refuge to the Dalai Lama and appear as the champion of Tibetan rights. This mixed up sense of self and of Indias place under the sun, pushed China into a position that neednt have been the result in any case.
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It is a fact that the Chinese did more to avoid conflict than the supposedly peace loving and non-aligned Nehru. But such was the self-image of Nehru that he wouldnt believe India was walking into an abyss. Surrounded by those who didnt know better, Nehru pulled and pushed India into a crisis that neednt have been the end result. Incompetent military leadership and insufficient military advice compounded the errors. The saga of Lt Gen Kaul has been much written that there is no reason to repeat it here. Suffice to say that whoever advised and somebody did, that the Air Force should not be used, was fit for a court martial and worse. At the end of the day all that separated India from at least a stalemate, if not a victory knicked out of the jaws of defeat, was the fact that Nehru did not think airpower should be used since it would escalate the conflict. A bizarre logic as ever existed.
The end result being that India is still to fight the ghosts of the defeat of 1962 and realise that China is no greater than our own country. The determining difference then and now, is only the quality of leadership, civil or military.
manvendra singh
pawan agrawal
contents
REMEMBERING 1962 September 2012
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An ISO 9001:2008 Certified Magazine
Volume 3 Issue 12 September 2012
A R T I C L E S India-China preparing for the inevitable

Amb K V Rajan
contents
6 12 16 19 24 30 37 C O L U M N S empirical glimpse: the global theatres of jihad Indias internal security challenges are significant Dr Rupali Jeswal Dr Vivek Lall 54 60
Chinas new military leadership

Jayadeva Ranade
the nuclear factor in the evolution of relations

Amb Arundhati Ghose
non-alignment 2.0: a policy prescription for placating China?

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd)
the ghosts of Henderson Brooks and Bhagat double, double toil and trouble
Vice Adm Vijay Shankar PVSM, AVSM, ADC (retd)
a changing trajectory: Chinese tracking of India and aerospace Dr Lora Saalman India-China equation
Maj Gen Afsir Karim AVSM (retd)
the China-US-India dynamic: 40 geopolitical jostling begins Dr Harsh V Pant geo-strategic balance
Maj Gen Dipankar Banerjee AVSM (retd)
44 47 51 63 66 70 74 84 F E A T U R E S the 1962 India-China war a case study of Chinese decision-making process lessons for future conflicts 78 DSA Research Team
India and China: new great game in the Indo-Pacific ocean region Cmde Ranjit Bhawnani Rai (retd) the two-front threat and warning intelligence Dr Prem Mahadevan cyberspace management getting critical in India Subimal Bhattacharjee the debacle at Se La: a classic example of military incompetence Maj Gen V K Singh (retd) India China: naval balance Rear Adm (Dr) S Kulshrestha (retd) Sino-Indian dispute and our preparedness Air Vice Marshal A K Tiwary VSM (retd) India-China relations: strategic stability, tactical aggressiveness Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (retd) for online edition log on to: www.dsalert.org
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STRATEGIC COMPETITION
Amb K V Rajan The writer has served as Indias Ambassador in France, USA, UK, Zambia, Algeria and Nepal. He has also held senior positions in the MEA including as Secretary (East) and Advisor to the Minister; led the Indian delegation, including as the Prime Ministers Special Envoy, to various international conferences and summit meetings; was co-Chairman of the India-Iran Joint Committee on the Iran-Pak-India Gas Pipeline, Member of the Oil Diplomacy Group set up by the Minister of Petroleum and Natural Gas. He is widely travelled and is a specialist on South Asian, Asian, European, American and African issues. He was Member, National Security Advisory Board and also President of the Association of Indian Diplomats. He writes and lectures regularly on foreign policy issues.
India-China Preparing for the Inevitable

D
espite recurring exhortations from diplomats and politicians on both sides to build a relationship between India and China of strategic mutual trust, strategic maturity, strategic stability, it is reasonably clear that the coming decades will witness intensifying strategic competition. Whether this can degenerate into a confrontation at some point in time, or worse, a conflict which neither country can afford, will largely depend on the extent to which China gives up the Middle Kingdom mentality and accepts its responsibilities as an equal member of the comity of nations, even if it is more powerful than most. The problem, of course, is that by the time it is clear what Chinas intentions really are, say in a decade or so, it might be too late for India to salvage its interests. This is the principal reason why India must prepare now for a possible conflict which it does not want, but cannot afford to lose.
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TRANSFORMATION
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Jayadeva Ranade
The writer is a former Additional Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India and is a security and intelligence expert. He is a seasoned China analyst with almost 30 years experience in the field. He has also dealt with matters relating to Terrorism and Pakistan. He has been directly involved in formulation of policy at the highest levels in the Government of India. He was conferred the Organisations two highest awards, both out of turn. He is presently a Distinguished Fellow with the Centre for Air Power Studies. He writes on strategic and security issues relating to China, Tibet and East Asia, his chosen fields of specialisation.
major overhaul of Chinas military leadership is underway. The changes in the CMC will have implications for India and Chinas other neighbours as the new appointees will redefine Chinas military doctrine, strategy and the PLAs role in safeguarding national and territorial interests. The induction of additional representatives from the PLAAF and PLAN into the CMC will mean greater emphasis on coordinated planning and conduct of Joint Integrated Operations (JIO). In the running for the post of PLA CGS to replace General Chen Bingde is Commander of the Shenyang Military Region, General Zhang Youxia (born: 1950), a princeling who was promoted full General in July 2011. He is one of the few Generals with battle experience having participated in the Sino-Vietnam War.
CHINASNEWMILITARYLEADERSHIP
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TRANSFORMATION
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OPTIONS FOR INDIA
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Amb Arundhati Ghose The writer joined the Indian Foreign Service in 1963. Served in various capacities in MEA and in Missions abroad in Austria, the Netherlands, Bangladesh and Permanenet Mission of India in New York. Was in charge of economic relations as AS(ER) when economic reforms were launched in 1991. Served in the Branch Secretariat of the Ministry to liaise with the Bangaldesh Government in exile in Calcutta. Served as Ambassador in Egypt, South Korea, as Permanent Representative to UNESCO and to the UN Offices in Geneva. Was also Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament. Was Member and Chairman of UN Secretary Generals Disarmament Advisory Board from 1998 to 2001. Currently on Global India Forum Kolkata as Vice President and Member of its Executive Council and Adjunct Fellow at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore. Was member of Task Force set up in 2007, by MEA on non-proliferation and Disarmament.
ccording to Reed and Stillman, with the coming of Deng (Xiaoping) regime (to power) earlier in the decade, the proliferation of nuclear technology into the Third World (from China) had become state policy. During 1982 to 1983, the Chinese handed over design details for the CHIC-4 nuclear device to Pakistan. Cold tests (in the laboratory) of implosion systems began in 1983. This would have enabled A Q Khan to have claimed to journalist Kuldip Nayar in 1987, that Pakistan had the bomb at that time: You dont have to test in the ground any more he said, You can test in the lab. Let me assure you, we have tested. We have it and we have enriched uranium. Weaponised the thing. Put it all together. This assistance continued through the 80s and 90s and included the testing by China of Pakistans first A-bomb on May 26 1990. These events of 1982 are as, if not more, significant than the 1962 War in India-China relations.
The Nuclear Factor

in the Evolution of Relations
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OPTIONS FOR INDIA
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FLAWED DOCTRINE
NON-ALIGNMENT 2.0: A POLICY PRESCRIPTION FOR PLACATING CHINA?
Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd) The writer is a combat veteran of many skirmishes on the Line of Control and counter-terrorist operations in Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab. He subsequently commanded the reputed Romeo Force during intensive counter-terrorist operations in the Rajouri-Poonch districts. He has served two tenures at the DGMO. He is a prolific writer on matters military and non-military and has published 24 books and over 100 papers in many prestigious research journals. He is Editor-in-Chief of Defence and Security Alert (DSA) magazine.
he Indian Security establishment recently released an important study entitled Non-alignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the 21st century (January 2012). This paper is a virtual policy prescription for placating an assertive China. At its very roots is an attempt to mollify China by assuring it that we are Non-aligned in any contest between the USA and China. This very anchor premise is flawed and needs debate. Instead of a Multipolar world order with India as one of the Poles, it presupposes a new Bipolar world order with USA and China as the two new super powers and a bit part role of a self-preserving neutrality for India. Non-alignment is elevated to the status of dogma. The paper advocates that it is in Indias interest to self-deter itself from any thought of matching proportionate responses to serious provocations by its adversaries. This is a seriously flawed narrative and cannot be permitted to slip into the policy domain without being challenged and subjected to wide-ranging debate and analysis. Based upon this the government has stalled the raising of a strike corps for the Himalayas so as not to annoy China. This return to Nehruvian sentimentality has dangerous overtones of Dj vu. We dont really seem to have learnt any lessons from the 1962 debacle. The prime anchor premise of that war was that China would not initiate any serious military action. It turned out to be seriously and tragically flawed. It would be even more tragic if we were to revert to that ridiculous anchor premise for a second time in just 50 years.
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FLAWED DOCTRINE
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FLAWED DOCTRINE
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CALAMITOUS INCOMPETENCE?
The Ghosts of Henderson Brooks and Bhagat Double, Double Toil and Trouble 1
Vice Adm Vijay Shankar PVSM, AVSM, ADC (retd) The writer holds an MSc in Defence Studies and is a graduate of the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, USA. He is the former Commander-in-Chief of the Andaman and Nicobar Command, C-in-C of the Strategic Forces Command and Flag Officer Commanding Western Fleet. His Command and operational experience are comprehensive and include Command of INS Viraat the aircraft carrier. He is a member of the adjunct faculty of the National Institute of Advanced Studies and he currently tenants the Admiral Katari Chair of Excellence at the United Services Institute.
n incisive analysis of the reasons behind our debacle in the 1962 India-China War. The Admiral writes India had blinded itself to every principle that governed national strategy making; from the absence of an understanding of the nature of war that was to be fought, to calamitous incompetence of leadership at the highest political and military levels. The fact of courtierships pervading control, disintegrating logistics and the sheer fantasies that replaced political and strategic orientation were the consequences of institutional ineptitude. One of the abiding puzzles of the entire episode which could have had a critical impact on the outcome was, why combat air power was not brought to bear on the operational situation.
1 Shakespeare, William. Macbeth Act 4 Scene 1. The three witches from the play await the coming of Macbeth, the man who they said would be king. The witches with their incantations are piling up toil and trouble till they yield twice the toil and double the trouble for Macbeth. 2 SunTzu.The Art of War, translated by Griffith, Samuel B, Oxford University Press, New York 1963, Chapter IV, Paragraphs 13-14, p 87. 3 Time Magazine, Cover feature, India: Never Again the Same. Friday, 30 November 1962. 4 Hopkirk, Peter, The Great Game, Oxford University Press 1990. Survey and delineation of the Northern borders of British India as a part of the shadowy struggle between Czarist Russia and Britain is a continuous refrain in the text.
5 Maxwell, Neville, Indias China War, New York, Random House 2000. General reference for the Sino-Indian border. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid.
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8 Graver, John W, Chinas Decision to go to War with India in 1962 in New Directions in the Study of Chinas Foreign Policy, Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S Ross Eds., Stanford University Press, 2006, pp 86-130. The Sino-Indian Boundary Question, full text of the Letter from Premier Zhou Enlai to Prime Minister Nehru, proposing the quid pro quo dated 07 November 1959 available at www.marxists.org/subject/ india/sino-india-boundary-question/ch04.htm Source: Sino Indian Border Question, Foreign Language Press, Peking 1962, p 47-50. 9 The Panchsheel Agreement signed between India and China on 29 April 1954 were a set of principles to govern relations between the two states. The 5 principles include: mutual respect for each others territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-agression, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and peaceful co-existence. Full text is in United Nations Treaty Series, Volume 229, pp 57-81. 10 Sinha and Athale, The Official History of the Conflict with China (1962), History Division of the Ministry of Defence: 1992, www.bharatrakshak. com 11 Noorani, A G, Publish the 1962 War Report Now, The Hindu, e-paper, 12 July 2012, Opinion.
12 Arpi Claude, The War of 1962: Henderson Brooks-Bhagat Report, Indian Defence Review Vol 26.1 Jan-Mar 2011. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid.
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15 See Woodrow Wilson Centre project on Cold War Archives at www.wilsoncentre.org/digitalarchive Collection on Sino-Indian geography. 16 Bhagwat, Vishnu, Betrayal of the Defence Forces: A Soldiers Diary. Manas Publication 2001. The fact of bureaucratic officiousness is a recurrent theme.
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CONCOMITANT ADVANCES
AChangingTrajectory:
ChineseTrackingofIndiaandAerospace
Dr Lora Saalman The writer is an associate in the Nuclear Policy Programme at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, based at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy in Beijing. She completed her PhD entirely in Chinese at Tsinghua University in Beijing, where she was the first American to earn a doctorate from its Department of International Relations.
n American Scholar working in China analyses the impact of the recent Agni V test in the Chinese media. Initial Chinese assessments of Indian military developments, she feels, were more prosaic and technology-based. The shift of attention towards Indias aerospace advances from the scientific to the strategic community, combined with the increasing range of Indias aerospace advances, suggests that Chinese evaluations and nationalism are likely only to harden. The strategic community will be applying what may be to worst-case scenarios, potentially responding in kind. This is how security dilemmas and arms racing start. This article seeks to address how to end the race before it even begins. A very informative article on Chinese perceptions of Indias Missile and BMD programme.
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Graph 4: Chinese attention paid to BMD-related capabilities Sources: See graph 1
1. As detailed in the authors talks at the Observer Research Foundation and the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (Three Dimensionality in Chinese Views on India and Space, www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yhep9pD8ziQ) in January and February 2011, as well as a journal article Divergence, Similarity and Symmetry in Sino-Indian Threat Perceptions, Vol. 64, No. 2, Sino-Indian Relations Issue, Journal of International Affairs, Columbia University Press, Spring/Summer 2011, pp. 169-194. The authors research revealed that the Chinese scientific and technical community has been the primary group interested in Indias aerospace developments. 2. Among these scientific journals, the most compelling is the periodical Daodan yu hangtian yunzai jishu (Missiles and Space Vehicles). Yet, it is not alone. The scientific journal Hangtian dianzi duikang (Aerospace Electronic Countermeasures) among others does not ignore Indias developments. The fact that these journals pay limited, if any, attention to other powers makes their focus on India all the more significant. Ma Junsheng, Yindu liehuo dandaodaodan tufang jishu xingneng fenxi (An Analysis of Indias Agni Ballistic Missiles Penetration Technology Capabilities), Hangtian dianzi duikang (Aerospace Electronic Countermeasures), Issue 6, 2008, pp. 1-4; Yindu jinyibu tuidong dandaodaodan fangyu xitong jihua (Indias Plan to Further Promote Ballistic Missile Defense System), Daodan yu hangtian yunzai jishu (Missiles and Space Vehicles), Issue 2, 2009, p. 11; Yindu lujun zhengshi liezhuang luji xing bulamosi xunhang daodan (Indian Army Officially Fields Land-Based BrahMos Cruise Missile), Daodan yu hangtian yunzai jishu (Missiles and Space Vehicles), Issue 4, 2007, pages unavailable; Dong Sichun and Gong Gao, Yindu jinxing diwen fadongji shiche (India Conducts a Cryogenic Engine Test), Daodan yu hangtian yunzai jishu (Missiles and Space Vehicles), Issue 4, 2007, pages unavailable; Liao Shaoxu, Yindu diwen huojian fadongji dianhuo shiyan beipo zhongduan (Interruption of Indian Cryogenic Rocket Engine Test Firing), Daodan yu hangtian yunzai jishu (Missiles and Space Vehicles), Issue 1, 2007, pages unavailable; Sun Weiping, Yindu jiang yanfa zaizhong 10 t de huojian (India is Developing a Rocket with a Load Capcity of 10 Tons), Daodan yu hangtian yunzai jishu (Missiles and Space Vehicles), Issue 2, 2007, pages unavailable; Yindu zhengfu pizhun 7450 wan meiyuan de dengyue jihua (Indias Government Approves a 74.5 Million Dollar Moon Landing Plan), Daodan yu hangtian yunzai jishu (Missiles and Space Vehicles), Issue 4, 2003, p. 44; Yindu chenggong jinxing bulamosi xunhang daodan di san ci feishe (India Succeeds in Conducting the Third Test Launch of the Brahmos Cruise Missile), Daodan yu hangtian yunzai jishu (Missiles and Space Vehicles), Issue 1, 2003, p. 39; Yindu jiang shengchan shecheng geng yuan de daodan (India Will Produce Missiles with Greater Range), Daodan yu hangtian yunzai jishu (Missiles and Space Vehicles), Issue 2, 2003, p. 24; Yu Tian, Yindu chenggong fashe shiyan tongxin weixing (India Succeeds in Launching an Experimental Communication Satellite), Daodan yu hangtian yunzai jishu (Missiles and Space Vehicles), Issue 3, 2001, p. 61; Xi Yin, Yindu de hangtian yusuan zengchang 6.4% (India's Space Budget Grows 6.4%), Daodan yu hangtian yunzai jishu (Missiles and Space Vehicles), Issue 3, 2001, p. 62; Yindu jiang ba huojian jianzao he weixing fashe deng huodong yijiao siying qiye (India Will Transfer Rocket Manufacture, Satellite Launch Among Other Activities to the Private Sector), Daodan yu hangtian yunzai jishu (Missiles and Space Vehicles), Issue 3, 2000, p. 10; Yindu kaishi yueqiu tance renwu de yanjiu (India Begins Research into Moon Exploration Missions), Daodan yu hangtian yunzai jishu (Missiles and Space Vehicles), Issue 3, 2000, p. 10; Yindu jiang shiyan jiada shecheng de liehuo shi daodan (India Will Conduct Tests to Expand the Range of the Agni Missile), Daodan yu hangtian yunzai jishu (Missiles and Space Vehicles), Issue 3, 2000, pp. 61-62; Yindu jigui weixing yunzai huojian fashe chenggong (Successful Launch of India's Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle), Daodan yu hangtian yunzai jishu (Missiles and Space Vehicles), Issue 1, 1995, p. 75; Yindu yi jianzao di 2 ge fashe tai (India Intends to Build Two Launch Pads), Daodan yu hangtian yunzai jishu (Missiles and Space Vehicles), Issue 4, 1995, 54; Yindu jiasu yanzhi tongbu weixing yunzai huojian (India is Accelerating the Development of a Synchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle), Daodan yu hangtian yunzai jishu (Missiles and Space Vehicles), Issue 5, 1995, p. 76. 3. A survey of databases, ranging as far back as 1981, reveals Chinese analysts working on aerospace have been looking at India since 1982. By the early 1990s, more in-depth analyses of Indias aerospace-related programs already began to emerge, proving to be a sustained phenomenon. Attention paid towards aerospace largely derives from two particular subsets, namely the Chinese technical and strategic communities. Of which, the technical community possess the most in-depth and far-ranging overview of India and aerospace. This trend is far different from other arenas in which Chinese focus on India beyond the occasional reference has been relatively recent. This overall attention within China towards Indias military modernization launched itself to a substantive degree in the mid-1990s, markedly accelerating in 2000 and 2005. Cai Hongkui and Shu Leiming, Yindu zhengzai qiaoran jueqi de hangtian daguo (India A Quietly Rising Aerospace Great Power), Zhongguo hangtian (Aerospace China), Issue 8, 1993, pp. 11-13; Liang Fushen, Cai Li and Gao Peng, Yindu hangtian jihua de jinzhan (Advances in Indias Aerospace Program), Zhongguo hangtian (Aerospace China), Issue 12, 1992, pp. 6-10; Yindu di er dai yaogan weixing IRS-1C (Indias Second Generation Remote Sensing Satellite IRS-1C), Zhongguo Hangtian (Aerospace China), Issue 2, 1993, pp. 26-29; Ye Minglan, Yindu di di daodan he hewuqi fazhan fenxi (Analysis of Indias Development of Surface-to-Surface Missiles and Nuclear Weapons), Zhongguo hangtian (Aerospace China), Issue 6, 1996, pp. 43-45; Yu Hua, Xiao hua qian duo ban shi de yindu hangtian (Spending Less, But Doing More in Indian Aerospace), Zhongguo hangtian (Aerospace China), Issue 12, 1996, pp. 7-11. This observation is substantiated by the authors exchanges with at least two members of Chinas second artillery, who have a pronounced interest in India and statements coming out from its leadership and military vis--vis China. Chart coverage is limited to 1999-2011. While Indias interest in and pursuit of BMD was mentioned before 1999, the author chose to limit the scope to the official inception of Indias BMD program. For reportage since 2011, while these analyses will be referred to in the body of this article, since full 2012 statistics are not yet available, they have been removed from the chart. 4. This observation is substantiated by the authors exchanges with at least two members of Chinas second artillery, who have a pronounced
Footnotes:
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interest in India and statements coming out from its leadership and military vis--vis China. 5. Chart coverage is limited to 1999-2011. While Indias interest in and pursuit of BMD was mentioned before 1999, the author chose to limit the scope to the official inception of Indias BMD program. For reportage since 2011, while these analyses will be referred to in the body of this article, since full 2012 statistics are not yet available, they have been removed from the chart. 6. Cai Jinman, Yindu jiakuai xiang shijie junshi qiangguo wanjin de bufa (India to Accelerate the Pace of Becoming a World Class Military Power), Guofang keji daobao (Defense Technology Industry), pp. 54-57; Peng Xiaolong, Wu Wenjun, Wang Jianfei, Yindu ye yao gao daodan fangyu xitong (India is Also Pursuing Ballistic Missile Defense), Xiandai junshi (Modern Military), October 2004, pp. 52-54. 7. Given that missile defense could refer to systems targeting both ballistic and non-ballistic missiles, this research cast the net wider than it might otherwise. The overall statistics may be higher than if dandao daodan fangyu xitong (ballistic missile defense system) had been used. However, in the interest of not excluding articles using the more popular and frequently used term fandao (missile defense), the author erred on the side of inclusion, rather than exclusion. Regardless, the same set of total articles was used to determine the country coverage. 8. Liang Jiahua Dongpin xicou zhu tiandun Poxi yindu haijun jianzai fan daodan xitong (Patching Together a Space Shield Analysis of Indias Carrier-based Anti-missile System), Jianzai wuqi (Shipborne Weapons), August 2003, pp. 42-45. 9. Wan Xuying, Yin, ba fandao de fei junheng fazhan (Imbalanced Development of Indias and Pakistans Missile Defense), Xiandai bingqi (Modern Weaponry), March 2000, pp. 9-12. 10. Lora Saalman, White Elephants to Weapons Systems: The Role of Arrow Missile Defense in Israeli-Turkish-U.S. Military Cooperation, Monterey Institute of International Studies, May 2004, http://www.miis.edu/docs/GSIPS-Arrow-Paper-Final-5-12-WR-2.pdf. 11. US team in Delhi to sell Patriot, Falcon, The Economic Times, September 2005, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/200509-10/news/27487788_1_anti-missile-system-multi-role-combat-aircraft-defence. 12. Liu Yibo, 2012: Yin fandao jiang zhangang: Ni lanjie zhongguo he bajisitan zhongcheng dandao daodan (2014: India ABM Guard: Intended to Intercept Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles in China and Pakistan, Zhongguo guofang bao (China Defense News), September 2011, p. 4; Du Zhaoping, Quanmian fandao bushu: Yin neng lvxian wancheng ma? (Comprehensive anti-missile deployment: Can India be the First to Complete It?), Zhongguo guofang bao (China Defense News), December 2007, p. 2. 13. Zhang Kanli, Yindu fandao jishu mei name xianjin (Yindu fandao jishu mei name xianjin), Guofang shibao (Defense News), August 2010, p. 3. 14. Zhang Chao, Yindu: Shuangceng fandao shiyan pinpin wei na ban? Dui yindu dazao wanquan gongchanhua shuangceng fandao xitong de zhuizong guancha (India: What are the Repeated Missile Defense Tests For? Following Complete Indigenization of a Missile Defense System), Zhongguo hangtian bao (Chinas Aerospace News), July 2010, p. 4. 15. Wei Dongxu, Meiguo tiaoqi quanqiu fandao jingsai (The United States is Provoking Global Missile Defense Race), Guofang shibao (Defence Times), March 2011, p. 1) 16. Kong Xiangwu, 2012 nian: Yin goucheng fandao lanjie wang? (2012: Is India Building a Missile Defense Interception Network?), Zhongguo guofang bao (China Defense News), October 2012, p. 13; Qian Feng, Yindu ye bian fandao wang (India is Also Compiling a Missile Defense Network), Renmin ribao (Peoples Daily), Date Unavailable; Liu Yibo, 2012: Yin fandao jiang zhangang: Ni lanjie zhongguo he bajisitan zhongcheng dandao daodan (2014: India ABM Guard: Intended to Intercept Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles in China and Pakistan, Zhongguo guofang bao (China Defense News), September 2011, p. 4; Du Zhaoping, Quanmian fandao bushu: Yin neng lvxian wancheng ma? (Comprehensive anti-missile deployment: Can India be the First to Complete It?), Zhongguo guofang bao (China Defense News), December 2007, p. 2. 17. The Swordfish radar system is a spin-off of Israels Green Pine radar system, suggesting another way in which India is integrating and making its own improvements to externally supplied systems. 18. Based on frequent interactions in China, in particular with a retired Senior Colonel of Chinas PLA at the 12th PIIC Beijing Seminar on International Security: Building A World of Sustainable Peace and Stability, Beijing, China, September 5-9, 2010. 19. Song Lifang and Zheng Caiming, Yindu fanweixing jihua zheshe kongtian yinyou: Fang zhongguo hangtian kegong jituan gongsi keji weiguwen, zhongguo gongchengyuan zhongshan yuanshi (India's Anti-satellite Program Reflects Space Concerns: Interview with the Advisor to the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation and Chinese Academy of Engineering Academician Zhong Shan), Zhongguo hangtian bao (China Aerospace Daily), January 2010, p. 4. 20. Feiyue haishi fudan? Cong yindu jinkou S-300V toushi e junshi dianzi gongye (Leap or Burden? From Indias Import of the S-300V Examining Russian Electronic Industry), Guoji guancha (World Outlook), July 2003, pp. 49-53. 21. Chen Guangwen Yindu, wanmei zhangwo fandao jishu? (Will India Completely Master Missile Defense Technology), Shijie bao (World News), March 2011, p. 15. 22. Based on series of interviews conducted at the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses in Delhi, India on June 21, 2012. 23. Zhang Chao, Yindu: Shuangceng fandao shiyan pinpin wei na ban? Dui yindu dazao wanquan gongchanhua shuangceng fandao xitong de zhuizong guancha (India: What are the Repeated Missile Defense Tests For? Following Complete Indigenization of a Missile Defense System), Zhongguo hangtian bao (Chinas Aerospace News), July 2010, p. 4. 24. India senior to China in missile programme, Press Trust of India, February 11, 2010. 25. Sagar Kulkarni Thiruvananthapuram, India readying weapon to destroy enemy satellites: Saraswat, Press Trust of India, January 3, 2010; Bharath Gopalaswamy and Harsh Pant, Does India need anti-satellite capability? Rediff News, February 9, 2010. 26. Guo Xuan, Zhongguo fandao jinzhui meiguo (Chinas ABM hot pursuit of the United States), Shijie bao (World News), May 2011, Page 1; Yu Feifan, Yindu fandao chaoyue zhongguo you yidian nan (It Would Be a Bit Difficult for Indias Missile Defense to Surpass Chinas), Shijie bao (World News), March 2010, pp. 15-16. 27. Li Rui, Li Xuwu, and Liu Xiaojian, Yindu fandao lanjie shiyan jinzhan (Progress in Indias Missile Defense Intercept Tests), Feihang daodan (Cruise Missiles), Pages Unavailable, Year Unavailable. 28. George N. Lewis and Theodore A. Postol, A Flawed and Dangerous U.S. Missile Defense Plan, Arms Control Today, May 2010, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_05/Lewis-Postol.
INDIA-CHINA EQUATION
Maj Gen Afsir Karim AVSM (retd) The writer is a well known retired Indian Army General and a military scholar who has authored several books on strategic affairs and military studies. He is a graduate of the Defense Services Staff College, Wellington and the National Defence College.
he writer takes a reflective look back at 1962 and the current state of the India-China balance. Commenting on our readiness for a two-front war he says the current Indian military profile suggests that India is rapidly building a military capability to alter the military equation on both the fronts. The Indian military infrastructure on the Indo-China border is being built-up rapidly and the IAF has begun to develop forward bases. India has enhanced the troop level both in the eastern and western sectors and has deployed new formations which are well equipped and trained for war in the high Himalayas. The army is planning to deploy a strike corps in the Eastern Sector and IAF has developed new airfields here all along the Sino-Indian border. Evidently India is building a military capability to contain China. With an increasing naval capability and longer reach in the Indian Ocean region India has the potential to dominate crucial sea lanes and threaten the Chinese lines of communication and vital supply routes.
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The China-US-India Dynamic:

Dr Harsh V Pant The writer is Reader in International Relations at King's College London and an affiliate with the King's India Institute.
Geopolitical Jostling Begins

M
any in India argue that given the high stakes that China and India have in each others economies, conflict between the two is highly unlikely. But as tensions in South China Sea exemplify, economic interdependence has never really been an antidote to conflict. New Delhi should watch Chinas behaviour closely and learn due lessons in dealing with the rising dragon in its vicinity. Against this backdrop of Chinas rise and relative US decline, it is imperative that India contribute to the Asian security dynamic to bring greater stability to the region especially as Sino-Indian relations become turbulent with each passing day.
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ifty years along the path of history it is time to take stock. Instead of learning from our past we hide our mistakes from posterity lest it hurt the reputation of leaders we have adored. Let us today critically reflect only on the current India-China balance; geo-politically, strategically and in military capability. At one stage only a few years ago, the world thought that India will outstrip China in GDP growth by the mid 2030s. That perception of rising capability led others to portray India as a potential swing power. The fulfilment of that prediction will have to wait. This translates into an enormous asymmetry in comprehensive power. The strategic challenge confronting India is to negate the two front scenario that faces it today. A strategy to undermine this may lie in developing alternate alliances ourselves as well as to exploit the vulnerabilities that China has to contend with in its periphery.
Maj Gen Dipankar Banerjee AVSM (retd) The Writer has served in all operational theatres and the wars of the Indian Army. Commissioned into the 1st Gorkha Rifles in December 1960 he has been an instructor at the Indian Military Academy, the College of Combat and twice at the Defence Services Staff College (once as Chief Instructor Army). He attended the Staff College at Camberley, UK and the National Defence College, New Delhi. For the last 23 years he has held Director level positions at leading think tanks in India and the region specialising in international security and strategy.
Geo-strategic Balance
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NAVAL BALANCE
New Great Game in the Indo-Pacific Ocean Region
perceptive article on the unfolding New Great Game in not just the IOR but what the writer calls the Indo-Pacific Ocean Region. The meteoric rise in Chinas GDP is fuelling the impressive rise of the PLA-Navy and its increasingly assertive stance in the South China and the Yellow Sea. The writer critically examines the naval balance between India and China and the consequences thereof. With the announcement of an American pivot plan in the East by President Obama and Defence Secretary Leon Panettas recent visit to India, the great game is revving up in earnest. Can India choose to be non-aligned in the context of a balance of power game which involves its primary security threat? Can we afford to sit on the fence? China has Pakistan as its key regional balancer for India and is engaging India in the Chinese game of surround called Weiqi (Go). We need to bandwagon with those countries that feel equally threatened by Chinas menacing rise. Its too late perhaps to sit on the fence.
Cmde Ranjit Bhawnani Rai (retd) The writer is a former Director Naval Intelligence and Director Naval Operations. Presently he is Vice President of Indian Maritime Foundation, New Delhi.
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SINO-PAK COLLUSION
The Two-Front Threat

and Warning Intelligence
Dr Prem Mahadevan The writer is Senior Researcher for Intelligence, Sub-state Conflict and Organised Crime at the Center for Security Studies in Zurich, Switzerland. Between 2002 and 2009, he completed an undergraduate degree in War Studies and postgraduate and doctoral degrees in Intelligence Studies from Kings College, London. He has written extensively on Indian and Pakistani intelligence agencies and his articles on Indian counter-terrorism have been made recommended reading for military officers in North America and Western Europe.
very interesting article which looks at the Intelligence aspects of a two-front war with China and Pakistan. Whichever country attacks India first, will pose the greater threat. This is because it will be involved in a general war, in which the second front will only be complementary action by its ally. Even so, events on the second front will ultimately determine the wars result. As it prepares to fight two opponents at once, the Indian Army needs to develop the capacity to act promptly on local intelligence warnings. Most importantly, it requires drawing up counteroffensive plans to strike the second aggressor while he is still off-balance and yet to consolidate his position.
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Empirical glimpse:
A
The columnist is an Intelligence and Terrorism Analyst, Clinical Psychologist and Clinical Hypnotherapist based in SouthEast Asia. She has also received training in specialised areas including counter-terrorism, intelligence and tactical operations. She specialises in cognitive learning processes and neural pathway response and how these factors apply to specialised trainings. She is an expert in the field of non-verbal micro and macro expression for deception and detection and also using non-verbal assets for psychological self-assessment in conjunction with Emotional Intelligence to enhance the human mind, personality, image and spirit. She is a member of ICPA (International Corrections and Prisons Association), IACSP (International Association for Counter-Terrorism and Security Professionals) and a member of APA (American Psychological Association), APP (Association of Professional Psychologists), UK Certified Hypnotherapist and General Hypnotherapy Register.
The Global Theatres of Jihad
Dr Rupali Jeswal
federal and democratic society is where freedom and the rule of law ensure the purposeful and successful life of the community. Core of federalism and democracy is in the security of the nation and its people and if personal security and freedom is curtailed and attacked by violence and terrorism, it is the very foundations of democracy, which is at stake. Security is like the air we breathe. Once we realise it is decreasing, it just might be too late to take preventive measures.
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HIGH-TECH A SINE QUA NON
Indias Internal Security

Challenges are Significant
A
s Indias counter-terror effort is yet far removed from the global sophistication levels, it has been estimated that by 2020, a significant 6 per cent of the global procurement in homeland security (HLS) will be from India. That is huge. Technology has to and will, play an increasing role in the entire gamut of security components counter-terrorism, border security, immigration, entry and exit point monitoring. In India, the central government and state governments have primarily been involved in providing security whereas the private sectors role has been minimal. Keeping in mind the huge financial and infrastructure requirements, there is a large potential for corporates to play a role in the internal security sector. They can develop critical technologies for the countrys unique challenges, supply sophisticated equipment and ensure timely implementation of a variety of security solutions.
The columnist is President and Chief Executive Officer, New Ventures, Reliance Industries Limited and Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation. Earlier he was Vice President and Country Head, Boeing Defence Space and Security and had also served as Managing Director of Boeing Commercial Airplanes in India. Prior to Boeing he worked for Raytheon and with NASA Ames Research Center in various multidisciplinary engineering fields. He has his PhD in Aerospace Engineering from Wichita State University in Kansas and his MBA from City University in Washington. He served as Chairman of the Defence Committee of the Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India (ASSOCHAM). He also served as the Chairman, Defence Equipment Committee, AMCHAM and is on the panel of the FICCI Defence Task Force. He had the distinct honour of representing 2,500 companies as Regional President of the Indo-American Chamber of Commerce, the only US-India bilateral chamber. In April 2012, he has been appointed as Chairman of the Indo-US Strategic Dialogue by the Indo-American Chamber of Commerce. The columnist has recently been appointed Co-Chair of the FICCI Homeland Security Committee along with Sh Gopal Pillai, Former Home Secretary, Government of India.
Dr Vivek Lall
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homeland security
C y b e r s p a c e m a n a g e m e n t
CYBER ONSLAUGHT
gettingcriticalinIndia
I
ndia has for the first time experienced a concerted offensive of cyber-terrorism from Pakistan that was picked up and fanned by elements hostile to the state to generate hatred between communities and large scale ethnic / communal violence. One part that originated from Pakistan was the injection of morphed images of the Tibetan earthquake and flood victims in Thailand in the web to pass off for victims of the Assam violence and persecution of Rohingyas in Myanmar. These were designed to whip up anger and hatred in the minority community. The second part of this cyber offensive was new. It saw a niche segment, targeted attack against the people of the north-east living in major metropolitan cities. The medium was mass SMSs circulated individually to the people of the north-east. Being individually targeted messages, these proved most potent in generating fear and panic and triggering mass flight of the targeted community. This entailed local supporters of the ISI misusing the data bases of the commercial service providers to get the list of the individuals of the north-east and engineer the targeted attack on this niche segment. This takes cyber warfare to a new cellular dimension that has proved to be highly effective even more so than the net-based social media because the attacks / threats became so individuated and personalised and thereby generate a high degree of panic that effects behaviour ( flight). The service providers need to ensure that their customer data bases are safeguarded from such dangerous elements and privacy is respected.
Subimal Bhattacharjee The writer is currently Country Head for India of General Dynamics, one of the top five US defence corporations. He is a well known strategic thinker and columnist on issues of cyberspace and security. The views expressed are personal.
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COMMAND FAILURE
THEDEBACLEATSELA:
A CLASSIC EXAMPLE OF MILITARY INCOMPETENCE
Maj Gen V K Singh (retd) The writer served in the Army for 35 years, his last appointment being Chief Signal Officer of the Western Army. In November 2000 he joined the Cabinet Secretariat, (R&AW), where he served up to June 2004, when he retired from government service. He has authored five books including India's External Intelligence Secrets of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) in 2007.
dismal historical narrative of the command failure at Se La. The degree of demoralisation after the initial battles of Namka Chu was such that no cohesive defence of Se La was even attempted. It makes a depressing litany of one of Indias worst military humiliations.
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A
Rear Adm (Dr) S Kulshrestha (retd) The writer has held the post of Director General Naval Armament Inspection at the NHQ prior to his superannuation. He is an ardent exponent of indigenisation and selfreliance in the field of military weapons.
most interesting comparison of India and Chinas sea power. The writer cites Nathaniel Barber to the effect that China would be unlikely to attack India before being quite prepared; at such a time when China was prepared, its foothold in the Indian Ocean region would be so strong that armed conflict would be unnecessary. In the next 10 years or so, if India wishes to maintain its influence with its closest neighbours, it would have to compete with Chinas direct investment in its neighbours infrastructure. The Indian Navy has graduated to one of the finest navies in the region both quantitatively and qualitatively and has the experience of operating aircraft carriers for over four decades. However even though it has a wide reach, it still does not have the numbers required for sea control along its coastline or sea denial in areas of its choosing. The Indian Navy will have a very significant role to play, even when it may not be able to match the PLAN in years to come, it has to transform itself into a major regional navy and possibly align with the US and its allies in East and South East Asia, such that the cooperative strength of the arrangements far outweighs the Chinese naval power in the region.
Indi a Chi n a: NAVAL BALANCE

ATTRIBUTE
A/C carrier SSBNs SSNs ASBMs Amphibious capability Naval aviation Major combatants Extended reach Aggressiveness Capability build-up Intl Joint operations
CHINA
~End 2012 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Not Yet Benign as of now Rapid Limited experience
INDIA
Yes Not yet Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Benign Slow Adequate experience
*Laymans comparison of naval force attributes
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Range rings for Chinese ASBM and other conventional anti-access capabilities
Source: http://www.chinasignpost.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Range-rings-map2.jpg
1. Nathaniel Barber, Kieran Coe, Victoria Steffes, Jennifer Winter, China in the Indian Ocean: Impacts, Prospects, Opportunities. Prepared for US governments Office of South Asia Policy, Workshop in International Public Affairs, Spring 2011 University of WisconsinMadison.
2. Walter C. Ladwig III, Delhis Pacific Ambition: Naval Power, Look East, and Indias Emerging Influence in the Asia-Pacific, in Asian Security, Vol.5, No. 2 (June 2009) 3. Lora Saalman, Divergence, Similarity and Symmetry in Sino-Indian Threat Perceptions. Journal of International Affairs, Spring/Summer 2011, Vol. 64, No. 2.
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AIR POWER BALANCE
T
Air Vice Marshal A K Tiwary VSM (retd) The writer commanded a MiG-29 Squadron in late 80s. His various command and staff appointments like Chief Operations Officer at a major Wing, operational planning at Command level, Director Concept Studies at Air HQ, Command of a major flying base, Head of the Training Team (Air) at Defence Services Staff College and Senior Directing Staff (Air) at National Defence College have conferred a rich practical experience. The air staff course at DSSC Wellington (TN), Command and Air War Course at the Air University, Maxwell Airbase, Montgomery (USA), all inducted and accelerated his interest in air war studies.
SINO-INDIAN DISPUTE AND OUR PREPAREDNESS
he writer carries out an appreciation of the air power balance between India and China. He concludes that the PLAAF will have modern aircraft for both air defence and long range strike and army support making use of their GPS called BeiDou-2 consisting of 35 satellites. It will have around 9 AWACS / AEW&C, Air Refuellers, Surveillance and Electronic warfare aircraft in support. Space imagery will present good intelligence on our target systems. The fighters will have modern air to air missiles including beyond visual range active missiles. Strike aircraft will have PGMs. H-6 will carry air launched cruise missile of 1,400 km plus range. The high altitude of TAR will reduce bomb load to around one third that of sea level. However todays PGMs have reduced the required bomb load for target destruction significantly. Air refuelling and high performance of Su-27, Su-30, and J-10 will offset altitude disadvantage to quite an extent. TBMs and GLCMs will not be affected much.
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1962 and now
AIR POWER BALANCE
Aircraft / Missiles Su-30 MK Su-27 / J 11 J-10 JH-7A J-8 II J-7 H-6 Cruise Missiles TBMs Airfield Hoping Gonga Dz Pangta Donshon Hotan Kashgar Shiquanhe Golmud Bangda Dequen Kunming Nachu Jey Kundo Chengdu Elevation 3,900 m 3,375 m 4,200 m 4,300 m 1,380 m 1,200 m 4,240 m 4,500 m 4,240 m 3,300 m 1,900 m 3,200 m 1,600 m 600 m Distance to IAF bases 300 km 300 km 360 km 450 km 600 km 800 km 300 km 1,000 km + 200 km 1,000 km 800 km 600 km 1,000 km 800 km
Quantity 100 171 80 70 180 471 57 In thousands In thousands
Role AD / GA AD / GA AD / GA GA AD AD Bomber Ground launched
Remarks
200 more to come Production rate to go up. Indigenous. Indigenous Indigenous Indigenous ALCM armed
Conventional warhead
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77
1962 and now
STRATEGIC CULTURE
DSA Research Team
LESSONS FOR FUTURE CONFLICTS

he 1962 War has generated a fairly sizeable volume of literature in China. It is surprising that these open sources are so little known and studied by Indian scholars and military historians. A study of the Chinese literature provides some very interesting insights into the Chinese motivations and planning for this conflict. It constitutes an excellent case study on the Chinese higher defence decision-making process for war that holds very important and useful lessons for the future. An understanding of the Chinese model for the higher direction of war (as it specifically relates to the Case Study of the 1962 Conflict), would be a highly instructive and very essential exercise in understanding the working of the Chinese National Security system and how it is likely to respond in future conflicts. It would provide very useful insights into the Strategic Culture of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), a facet that is vital for us to study and understand.
THE 1962 I N DI A -CHI N A WAR A CASE STUDY OF CHINESE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

T
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1962 and now
STRATEGIC CULTURE
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1962 and now
STRATEGIC CULTURE
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1962 and now
raising the antE?

n the Indian perception, there are several major areas of concern that are limiting the growth of the bilateral relationship. The foremost among these is the all-weather friendship between China and Pakistan that is, in Chinese President Hu Jintaos words, higher than the mountains and deeper than the oceans. The Indian government and most Indian analysts are convinced that China has given nuclear warhead designs, fissile material and missile technology as well as fully assembled, crated M-9 and M-11 missiles to Pakistan. China and Pakistan are also known to have a joint weapons and equipment development programme that includes Al Khalid tanks, F-22 frigates and FC-1 / JF-17 fighter aircraft. Chinas military aid has considerably strengthened Pakistans war waging potential and enabled it to launch and sustain a proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir and in other parts of India. By implication, therefore, it is also Chinas proxy war.
Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (retd) The writer is a Delhi-based defence analyst.
China fears that the growing US-India strategic partnership is actually a loose alliance and that the two countries are ganging up against China. It should be clear that India is unlikely to ever form a military alliance with the US unlike Pakistan, which is a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) of the US and is also Chinas all weather friend. India realises that its growing relations with its new strategic partners are causing some concern in China. China has viewed with some suspicion Indias willingness to join Australia, Japan and the US in a quadrilateral engagement to promote shared common interests in South East Asia. China also wishes to reduce what it perceives as the steadily increasing influence of the US over New Delhi
India-China Relations: Strategic Stability, Tactical Aggressiveness
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1962 and now
raising the antE?
86

DSA Alert September-2012

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DSA Alert September-2012

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editor-in-chief

The country comes first - always and every time.

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd)

An ISO 9001:2008 Certified Magazine

History teaches us hard lessons

Volume 3 Issue 12 September 2012

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

An ISO 9001:2008 Certified Magazine

Volume 3 Issue 12 September 2012

A R T I C L E S India-China preparing for the inevitable

Chinas new military leadership

the nuclear factor in the evolution of relations

non-alignment 2.0: a policy prescription for placating China?

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September 2012 Defence AND security alert

1962 and now

India-China Preparing for the Inevitable

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

1962 and now

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

1962 and now

Announces October 2012 3rd Anniversary Issue on

Aerospace power in South Asia:

The Emerging Balance

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

1962 and now

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

1962 and now

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

1962 and now

OPTIONS FOR INDIA

The Nuclear Factor

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

1962 and now

OPTIONS FOR INDIA

1962 and now

NON-ALIGNMENT 2.0: A POLICY PRESCRIPTION FOR PLACATING CHINA?

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

1962 and now

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

1962 and now

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

1962 and now

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

1962 and now

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

1962 and now

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

1962 and now

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

1962 and now

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

September 2012 Defence AND security alert