Democracy and Terrorism: Current Trends in Terrorism and counterterrorism: Application of Domestic and Israeli Counterterrorism Lessons

A Master Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of American Public University by Yehuda J. Lev In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts July 2013 American Public University Charles Town, WV

Acknowledgements The initial research that led to this monograph would be hard to imagine without the authors personal life and career experiences. However, while what had originally, to be a concise, relatively short document, became impossibility in light of the writers wish to truly add a substantial document to the general academic database on the topic of democracy and counterterrorism. A special effort has been made to use as much credible, balanced and up- to- date literature as possible as well as the latest other media publications. Among a long list of intelligence and counterterrorism writers, experts and analysts, it was the vast contribution of Daniel Byman, Peter l. Bergen, Boaz Ganor,Audrey Kurth Cronin, Paul R. Pillar and Ami Pedahzur that played a major role in shaping this work. Furthermore, the American Public and Military University National Security and Counterterrorism curriculum and its professors, especially Brigadier General U.S. Army (Retired) Ronald S. Mangum and the Director of National Security Program and Military Studies Program, Doctor Edward J. Hagerty, Ph.D. played an important role in guiding and encouraging the author through the shaping, creation and publication attempts of this work.

July 2013.

ABSTRACT Of THE THESIS

The U.S. has so far failed to defeat Islamist terrorism. Through research and comparative analysis of related literature, this work suggests that there are lessons to be learned from Israels counterterrorist model and applied to the U.S. model. Most of such lessons focus on changes to the effectiveness of the U.S. intelligence community and U.S. public resilience.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER

PAGE

ACKNOWLEGEMENTS 2

I.

ABSTRACT.. 3

II.

TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

PART ONE: INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW.............8

III.

INTRODUCTION 9

IV.

LITERATURE REVIEW .11

PART TWO: MODERN TETTORISM CHALLENGE: WHAT TO EXPECT? PRACTICAL AND ACADEMIC APPROACHES............................. 43

V.

FIGHTING TERRORISM EFFECTIVELY WITHOUT GIVING UP ON THE VERY FOUNDATION OF DEMOCRACY A FALLACY OR ACTUAL POSSIBILITY..44

VI.

FIGHTING TERRORISM ON A NATIONAL LEVEL..52

VII. COMBATING TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM: THE COLLABORATIVE

APPROACH OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 57

CHAPTER

PAGE

VIII. EXAMINIG THE EFFICACY OF TERRORISM AS A POLITICAL TOOL.. 62

IX.

TERRORISM AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: ARE TERRORISTS LIKELY TO OBTAIN AND USE WMD?................................................................. 73

PART THREE: DEMOCRACIES AT WAR: THE AMERICAN AND ISRAELI CT PARADIGMS TESTED 90

X.

THE COUNTERTERRORISM MODELS OF THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL A BACKGROUND..91

XI.

CAN AMERICAN AND ISRAELI DEMOCRACIES ULTIMATELY DEFEAT TERRORISM?.......................................................................................................................92

XII.

THE WMD TERRORIST THREAT TO ISRAEL..103

XIII.

THE ISRAELI COUNTERTERRORIST APPARATUS.109

XIV.

THE SHAPING OF ISRAELS COUNTERTERRORISM PARADIGM.. 115

XV.

ISRAELS OFFENSIVE CT TOOLS: MORAL, LEGAL AND PRACTICAL

PERSPECTIVES.128 Overview..128 CHAPTER PAGE

Targeted Killings. 130 Other Israeli Counterterrorism Measures: Defensive and Punitive Counterterrorism Measures.......................... 145 Overview145 Israeli Administrative Counterterrorist Measures. .152 Israels Punitive CT Measures153

XVI. THE ISRAELI CT MODEL: PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS. ..156

XVII.

CAN LESSONS FROM FIGHTING PALESTINIAN TERRORISM BE APPLIED TO THE STRUGGLE WITH AL QAEDA?......................................... . 159 General Lessons from Worldwide Struggle with Terrorism.167 International Cooperation in the CT struggle167 Intelligence and Counterterrorism: the Nature & Quality of Intelligence Needed to Disrupt Terrorism: The U.S. and Israeli perspectives.. 171

XVIII. THE UNITED STATES COUNTERTERRORISM PARADIGM: THE USE OF LETHAL FORCE IN THE U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM: MORAL, LEGAL AND EFFICACY ISSUES 183

XIX.

OTHER U.S. CT MEASURES ..

194

Administrative: The Patriot Act.. 194

Torture and Indefinite Detention 195 CHAPTER PAGE

Renditions and Extraordinary Renditions...198

EPILOGUE202

XX.

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY.. ...203

XXI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.. . 204

XXII. METHODOLOGY: RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS...209

XXIII. REFERENCES.....212

PART ONE: INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW

The worst enemy of any progress is a closed mind

INTRODUCTION The current American model of combating terrorism in its various forms failed to secure the American people against future terrorist attack. Moreover, it is incapable of granting security against possible weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attack on the Homeland. Despite the fact that no currently known security means can assure complete fail-safe protection - searching for new, additional ways to weaken, if not destroy terrorism - is highly indicated. Certain nations and governments are open to changes even in well accepted, often proven effective, existing counterterrorist measures. America has made its initial step towards modernization of its counterterrorism paradigm, after the end of the cold war. In a recent book, Find Fix Finish: Inside the Counterterrorism Campaigns that Killed Bin Laden and Devastated Al-Qaeda, writers Peritz and Rosenbach launch a probe into the development of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy. This process began with the transition from slow, hesitant, irresolute responses, (e.g. Beirut 1983, Somalia 1993, Tanzania and Kenya 1998, USS Cole 2000 etc.) into a more mature strategy, which currently focuses on the problem of fixing i.e. pinpointing the exact location of the terrorist target; and thus the intelligence heart of the problem.

 The fundamental assumption of the Cold War that neither side wanted to risk annihilation was null and void, since the terrorists were willing to martyr themselvesthe find-fix- finish doctrine [of the cold war as seen in Korea or Vietnam] had to evolve as well the finishing is relatively easy. In this world its the finding thats the hardest-to-do function, its the intelligence thing (Peritz and Rosenbach 2012, 5). Intelligence, remains the heart of the U.S. counterinsurgency/counterterrorism capability problem, in the short and middle term. Arguably, in the far future terrorism will be dealt with through soft power, or smart power, reaching out for the hearts and minds of the population, in the midst of whi ch, terrorists thrive. Both, the United States and Israel are two closely allied democracies sharing the threat of terrorism. This paper discusses various measures and tools used by the United States and Israel in their struggle against terrorism in general, suicide terrorism, and the WMD threat from transnational terrorists. Can lessons from the long Israeli counterterrorist campaign be applied to the American counterterrorism strategy? Some claim that the American political and social system is completely incompatible with the Israeli one. This writer begs to differ.

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IV. LITERATURE REVIEW Main research question and hypothesis, in the context of literature review The state of Israel is an example of a vibrant and thriving democracy, flourishing, despite a perpetual state of emergency and the constant need to protect its citizens from Palestinian terrorist attacks. Israel has been engaged in counterterrorist struggle, for over sixty-four years, of its existence. There is no other state in the world that combated terrorism on a daily basis, for as long as Israel. However, this alone is not a guarantee that the Israeli counterterrorism model is better than other state CT models. Some claim that Israel feels like a police state. This inconsolably contrasts with the American democratic principles. Such misconception stems from the fact that Israeli security deeply penetrates many walks of the daily life, of its citizens, and it overtly infringes on certain civil rights that may be held as sacred by some. It is important to understand, that for the average Israeli citizen, who served/s in the IDF, protected the very homeland of his ancestors and himself - terrorist threat is a daily thing; theoretically, never further than a minute, or a few yards away. Israelis do not feel threatened by the fact that there are many armed people everywhere, and that the General Security Services (GSS aka Shabak or Shin Bet) theoretically can and very often are monitoring, tracking or arresting security suspects. This is why they exist. This writer suggests that the Israeli perception can be summarized in the following: If I have done nothing wrong,

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why should I be afraid of the police? Or, why should I fear the GSS/FBI eavesdropping on me; or reading my e-mails, if I have nothing to hide? This is the small price the vast majority of Israelis willingly pay for their security. Any suggestion that Israel feels like a police state is misinformed, possibly stemming from biases and mass media distortions - rather than from a true, indepth Israeli experience. Could the U.S. possibly open up to consider possible application of hard-learned lessons, from the Israeli counterterrorism experience? Indeed, the situations of the U.S. and Israel versus terrorism are not alike. Agreeably, the day-to-day threat to the U.S. Homeland is lesser than the daily terrorist threat to Israel and Israelis. Terrorist attacks were never a part of everyday American life. However, both countries face the ultimate threats of suicide and WMD terrorism. Arguably, most of Americas struggle with terrorism is overseas, in far away lands, such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Saudi Arabia or Yemen; while most of the daily Israeli counterterrorist struggle takes place takes place within miles from Jerusalem, Haifa or Tel Aviv and very often, also inside Israels sovereign territory. Accordingly, the intelligence undertakings, and the problems of fixing the location of the targets, faced by the two countries are often different. There is also a major difference in the size of both countries, and the cohesiveness and cultural homogeneity of their societies; not to forget the uniqueness of each of the two respective societies in terms of historical experience. This writer hypothesizes that while it is indeed, impossible to apply all the Israeli counterterrorism experiences to the U.S. situation and counterterrorism needs, there are some valuable Israeli lessons that can, and should be applied to the American CT strategy. Accordingly, the purpose of this work is to seek and analyze literature pointing to possible

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beneficial lessons, that can be gleaned by studying the Israeli counterterrorism model - and applying the relevant concepts to the American counterterrorism strategy in order to augment it. In 2006, Larsen and Pravecek have posited, in their Comparative U.S.- Israeli Homeland Security research that, Despite the benefits that may accrue from adopting some of these lessons, the United States is unlikely to adopt many of them. Differences in country size, culture, attitudes toward security, historical experiences, and bureaucratic design contribute to the propensity of the United States to continue developing a homeland security strategy with the least impact on individual civil liberties and its populations accustomed way of life (Larsen and Pravecek 2006, XiV). Consuella Pockett, (2005) preceded the above-mentioned study in her own, pointing with some degree of protectiveness over American achievements, to some applicable lessons from the Israeli Homeland Front experience. She contends, There are certain lessons the United States can learn from Israels 35-year battle against terrorism. We must not forget however thatmany of Israels security initiatives are simply not practical or feasible for implementation within the United StatesFurthermore, the Home Front Command is a well established organization that has been in existence for nearly 12 years, while the Department of Homeland Security is a relatively new organizationThe fact that the Home Front Command [in Israel] is much more established organization than the U.S. DHS explains the vast progress it has made (Pockett 2005, 2). Although major differences exist between any two democracies, their respective political and legal systems, cultures and life styles; this should hardly be a sufficient reason to wave their respective counterterrorism lessons aside as irrelevant.

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Review of literature regarding American and Israeli approaches to information sharing Although the sharing of terrorism-related information within the U.S. intelligence community has supposedly improved, there is still a lot to be desired. In 2010, Mark Hoseneball, writing for the Daily Beast posited, More than nine years after 9/11, Americas intelligence sharing system continues to be impeded by legal and technical difficulties. As a result, important intelligence reports may be slow to reach those officials who could to take action on them(Hoseneball 2010). Moreover, Anthony Quiggin states, At present, no indication exists that the US government will solve its intelligence and internal information-sharing problems in the foreseeable future. At the same time the DHS model of a centralized bureaucracy trying to control all aspects of an issue does not appear to be functioning well, at least on the information sharing level. (Quiggin 2007, 142). Arguably, the same can be posited regarding the law enforcement cooperation, its intelligence sharing and collaboration. Yet, the Israeli intelligence-sharing example seems different. Indeed, the Israeli intelligence community has had it share of turf wars, stovepiping, and other information sharing problems, in spite of its relatively small size. However, after the Israeli 2006 relative debacle in Lebanon, the Israeli IC has regrouped by way of shrinking the bureaucracy involved in the intelligence sharing process. The IDF and police were brought inside Shin Bets command center to ensure that they had access to all information. Local commanders could reach out directly to Shin Bet [the Israeli General Security Service or GGS] regional leaders, decentralizing

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information sharingThe situation is hardly perfectYet by the standards of U.S. intelligence, where coordination is more cumbersome, Israels sharing of information is impressive (Byman 2011, 343). Interestingly, only five years earlier, the Israelis thought that following the 9/11 tragedy, the stove-piping issues of the U.S. intelligence community were solved, and suggested learning from the U.S. new approach, as described by Ami Pedahzur (2007) in his book The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle Against Terrorism: [The Israelis thought that] instead of implementing organizational reforms that will end up in new series of struggles between various agencies, the agent model that is employed in the United States should be adopted, with certain adjustments. The idea is to establish a main headquarters for the struggle against terrorism that will serve as a hub of a network that will send out its arms to each and every one of the various intelligence thwarting forcesRepresentatives of all the forces in charge of coping with terrorism will be stationed full-time at the headquarters. Their job will be real time coordination(Pedahzur 2007, 146-147).

Review of literature regarding the challenge to U.S. national security from terrorist acquisition of WMD. This work extensively addresses also the issue of nuclear terrorism, and the additional challenges stemming from the possible connection between suicide terrorism and WMD. While not the main purpose of this paper, this writer additionally observes that there seem to be a strong link between suicide terrorism and the threat faced by both, the American and the Israeli people. The United States is currently engaged in a race against time, with terrorist groups like al-Qaeda, which pursue a two-decade-long quest to obtain WMD and use them against the U.S. Homeland. Although little was written about al-Qaedas

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intentions to destroy Israel, the threat has been expressed in its fatwas, as well as in Iranian official declarations. Al-Qaeda, has literally, committed to killing millions of Americans, while using nuclear or biological weapons. It is of further concern that the U.S. might loose this race, lest it will accommodate some adjustments to its perception of civil, humanitarian and moral rights, and unless it adapts new/adjusted set of laws and rules-ofengagement vs. al Qaeda, and like terrorist groups. These adjusted rules must enable Americas only real, short-term, line of offensive-defense: the Intelligence Community and the Military - to act with minimal constraints. Uri Fisher, in his article on the realism in the options of deterring terrorism, suggests, The U.S. must ask whether it wants to be a nation that is associated with targeted killings, assassinations, and threatening families of terrorists to establish deterrence. Concern over the cost of compromising our ideals undoubtedly undermines efforts to make our enemies believe we are willing to punish them no matter at what expense. To effectively deter terrorists the U.S. will have to accept the price that comes with violating some human rights, responding with overwhelming force, alienating certain allies, and even eliminating those assets and people that terrorists may hold dear (Fisher 2007, 15). Are only suicide terrorists linked to a potential WMD attack on the U.S., or is such an attack likely to be conducted by non-suicide terrorists as well? It is another secondary, hypothetical suggestion, that it takes an international group like alQaeda, which has access to extensive funds, contacts with Transnational Organized Crime (Rollins, Wyler and Rosen 2010), and which employs the services of suicide terrorists to carry out a major WMD attack on the Homeland (The White House 2011). However, it can be argued that a local group can execute a lesser attack, one involving chemical or radiological, crude weapon. This, in fact, is well established in Graham Allisons book, Nuclear

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Terrorism: the Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (2004). Allison outlines several scenarios of nuclear bomb construction arguably, with relative ease. However, in truth, such is not the case. Far more worrisome is Allisons precise description of some of the ready to go, small enough for a suitcase or a backpack tactical nuclear weapons, with a yield of from 0.25 KT and higher, found in the Russian and U.S. nuclear arsenals. (Allison 2004, 46-49). There is no current information on other nations possession of such, tactical, nuclear weapons. (This is however, arguably, a relatively easy feat to achieve such capability by a nuclear-weapons state actor). It is in this context, that the issue of suicide terrorism is addressed in this work.

Review of literature regarding the SUICIDE element of current terrorism Current international terrorism is strongly characterized by its suicide terrorism element. Suicide terrorism, just like any other type of terrorism, despite its particular, indiscriminate bestiality and the carnage it brings - still has its advocates; moreover, it still justifies the old adage ones man terrorist is another mans freedom fighter. Unfortunately, terrorists are (usually) not insane; or lone, unsupported wolfs. Certain groups and individuals, within the general, Muslim population support al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Robert Pape, and K. Feldman, in their book Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism & How to Stop It (2010), posit, Understanding that transnational suicide terrorism is a rare phenomenon largely associated with the progressive radicalization of specific types of groups of individuals with multiple national loyalties under extremely unusual circumstances has important implications(Pape 2010, 82).

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Walter Laqueur, in his book, No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty First Century, (2003), and in various shorter essays, reiterates that terrorism by default, has always had its antagonists, as well as its supporters and it comes in various shapes and forms. No all- embracing definition [of terrorism] will ever be found for the simple reason that there is not one terrorism, but there have been many terrorisms, greatly differing in time and space, in motivation, and in manifestation and aims(Laqueur 2007). Most probably, the 1972 Munich Olympic Games Massacre signaled a new terrorist era of indiscriminate, international terrorism targeting whole societies. It was one step behind suicide terrorism. The enduring image of the 1972 Olympic Games remains a terrorist in a ski mask, instead of an exhilarating athletic performance Terrorism became more prominent in the worlds consciousnessbecause terrorists continued to choose targets for their symbolic value and for maximum media coverage. [At first] they did not want a lot of people dead but they did want a lot of people watching. (Responding to Terrorism: Challenges for Democracy 2003). Currently, the term terrorism signifies a deliberate and systematic use of violence against civilian populations during political conflicts, executed by either state or non-state actors, aiming at terrifying whole populations and thus creating coercive pressure to change political decisions of governments to fit terrorist goals. Between 1968 and 2006 there were at least 24,930 terrorist incidents worldwide (MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base n.d.). These incidents took place in at least 146 out of 196 currently existing countries. Moreover, suicide terrorism became prevalent, with Americans becoming one of its main targets. Between 1980- 2003 there were about 350 suicide terrorist attacks around the world - of

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which fewer than 15% could be considered as directed against Americans. However, during a six-year period from 2004 to 2009, there were 1,833 suicide attacks of which 92% targeted Americans and America (Pape 2010, 2). While many instinctively point to September 11, 2001 as a game changer, suicide terrorism, can be argued as used often throughout history; the Sicarii zealots; the Hashashin, or the Kamikaze pilots, embarked on missions knowing that their chances to survive were nil. Arguably, suicide terrorism cannot be deterred by threat of retaliation against the attackers. Suicide terrorism thus is the ultimate fanatic expression of terrorism, and thus most likely to be linked to WMD, as an ultimately destructive and lethal terrorist tool. President Obama in his 2010 and 2011 NSS contends that the ultimate threat to the U.S. is presented by weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is immediate, persistent, growing, and evolving. The recently updated National Security Strategy (NSS) underscores this by stating there is no greater threat to the American People than weapons of mass destruction, particularly the danger posed by pursuit of nuclear weapons by violent extremists and their proliferation to additional states. (DTRA Procurement, DefenseWide 2011, 4). Review of literature regarding Al-Qaedas WMD threat to attack the United States and its allies In 1998 al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, declared that acquiring and using weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was his Islamic duty -- an integral part of his jihad. Systematically, over the course of two decades, he dispatched his top lieutenants to attempt the purchase or development of nuclear and biochemical WMD. He has never given up this goal. Indeed, in a 2007 video he repeated his promise to use massive weapons to destroy the global status quo; destroy the

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capitalist hegemony and help create an Islamic caliphate. (Mowatt-Larssen 2010). Following 9/11, in 2002, an al-Qaida spokesman Abu Gheith wrote: We have not reached parity with them. We have the right to kill 4 million Americans 2 million of them children and to exile twice as many and wound and cripple hundreds of thousands. Furthermore, it is our right to fight them with chemical and biological weapons, so as to afflict them with the fatal maladies that afflicted the Muslims because of the [Americans] chemical and biological weapons (Abu Gheith 2002). This threat did not diminish; actually, it may have escalated: The probability that the U.S. will be hit with a weapons of mass destruction attack at some point is 100 percent, Dr, Vahid Majidi, the FBIs assistant director in charge of the FBIs Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate, tells It would most likely employ chemical, biological, or radiological weapons rather than a nuclear one (Kessler 2011). This issue is still widely disputed. Proponents of the theory that a WMD terrorist strike is imminent are often seen as alarmist and at the same time those who contend the opposite, are often perceived as nave. Although deterrence, as a strategic concept is mostly inapplicable to countering terrorism - this suggestion too, is debated. International terrorists have no land, no nation to defend and they are willing to sacrifice their own lives to advance their goals. However, Ayman al-Zawahiri in Knights Under the Prophets Banner (2001), emphasized the importance of a land-base/s; a safe haven/s, to be used as an address to attract international volunteers, to conduct their training, and as a base to stage attacks from. Furthermore, the terrorism expert Daniel Byman posits that, Al Qaedas own thinkers stress the importance of maintaining a haven and seems to have little faith in decentralized, bottom-up effortsAyman al-Zawahiri contended even as his movement was being expelled from Afghanistan that, the Mujahid [fighter for the faith] Islamic movement will not triumph against the world coalition unless it possesses a Islamist base in the heart of the Islamic world (Byman 2011, 3).

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Moreover, the analyst Stewart Patrick, in his book, Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats and International Security, posits: for financial or political reasons, a nuclear-armed rogue state might provide nuclear technology or even weapon to other pariah regimes or terrorist groups with fewer qualms about using one. And even if they did not intentionally do so, as former U.S. senatorSam Nunn has pointed out, The more countries that have this fissile material, the more likely the risk of diversion or theft of fissile material becomes (Patrick 2011, 110). Patrick adds, Probably the greatest WMD threat involving nonstate actor comes from al-QaedaA July 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate stated that al-Qaeda will continue to try to acquire and employ chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear material in attacks, and would not hesitate using them. Other nonstate actors, such as organized criminals or militant groups, could also attempt to acquire WMD materials for political leverage, or to sell them to rogue states or terrorist groups (Patrick 2011, 111). And yet, it is Stewart Patrick, who also negates some of the proliferation fears: On the whole, however, concerns that weak states particularly the weakest states will acquire or transfer WMD are probably overblown. Poor countries generally do not have the financial resources or human capital to develop or purchase the technology and equipment needed to produce a nuclear weaponThe exception that proves the rule is North Korea, a totalitarian regime willing to starve its population in order to pursue nuclear, biological and chemical weaponsthe greatest proliferation threatmay come from a handful of relatively strong statesprimarily Syria, Russia, Iran, India, China and Egypt all have civilian nuclear programs as well as well known or suspected WMD stockpiles (Patrick 2011, 117). Currently, there is no overtly known source, state or otherwise agent, ready and willing to supply terrorists with WMD; particularly with the most devastating nuclear and biological devices. However, the instability and the questionable security of such weapons sources in countries like Russia, Pakistan, N. Korea, Iran, Egypt or Syria, along with the remote possibility of such weapons being

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shared with terrorist group, by a rouge state (e.g. N. Korea or Iran), can not be overlooked. This threat is reiterated in view of the current, (February 12, 2013) third N. Korean successful nuclear test, the continuous N. Korean threatescalation (towards S. Korea and the U.S.) and the Iran N. Korea collaboration on the nuclear issue. Indeed, Iran's nuclear weapons program bears many striking similarities to the research being undertaken in North Korea. The delivery system for Iran's nuclear device is an advanced form of the Soviet-era Scud missile just like the North Koreans. And Iranian scientists are working on a project similar to the North Koreans which would enable them to attach a nuclear device comprising enriched uranium to the missilesthe fact that North Korea has been able to detonate three nuclear devices with relative impunity will only serve to encourage Iran that, when the time comes, it will be able to test a device of its own without any unwelcome interference from the West (Coughlin 2013). Review of literature regarding the concepts of Deterrence and Punishment in the context of counterterrorism It seems logical to suggest that rogue states, and unstable states with civilian nuclear capability, may become a likely source of WMD materials acquired by terrorists. On the other hand, it is just as logical to argue, that no sane stateactor, rouge as it may be, would agree to relinquish the control it has over WMD or their precursors and share such weapon with a terrorist group, which is virtually uncontrollable and thus expose itself to international punishment, or even a massive retaliation by the target country. With that in mind, on February 6, 2013 the governments of U.S., U.K. and France released a Joint Statement on Nuclear Terrorism in which they undertake to share the collective responsibility to inform and strengthen international measures designed to secure sensitive information, technology or nuclear material from access by

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terrorists, and to develop emergency response measures (The White House 2013). The U.S. needs to develop a better ability to identify the origins of possibly illegally obtained WMD, and to be able to attribute illegal WMD transfer by a state to a terrorist group. However, even if that is achieved, it will remain difficult to prove that such transfer was done with the consent of a specific government, and not by some rogue, non-state element within that state. Some posit that the U.S., in order to preserve its deterrence must be ready to retaliate, on the basis of even limited and imperfect information about the origins of the WMD, or the precursors needed to build it. A punishment should be in place also for negligence and carelessness in this respect: . The U.S. must clearly communicate its willingness to severely punish those states that, because of mismanagement of CBRN, risk loss or theft of critical materials from their storage facilities. Such a policy stance would be extremely contentious and may damage the relationship of the U.S. have with a number of states. However, until CBRN attribution becomes certain to establish a meaningful deterrent mechanism against states that knowingly transfer sensitive materials the U.S. must also threaten those states that do not adequately secure their CBRN materials (Fisher 2007, 8). Philip Geelhood in his 2009 thesis suggests a more cautious approach to the culpability of a state actor: The analysis of deterrence theoryindicates that an inviolable redline should be broadly established to deter the purposeful transfer of nuclear materials or weapons to terrorists; this line should only be shifted to include unintentional transfer [by] only those few adversarial states that possess nuclear weapons or fissile materials that may potentially sponsor terrorist groups, and with whom the real potential for security cooperation is nonexistent (Geelhood 2009, 72-73). Regarding the effectiveness of deterrence against suicide terrorism,

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Graham Allison, in his book Nuclear Terrorism: the Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe states, the ground troops of Islamist terrorism are unaffected by a fear of death, making deterrence inoperable as strategy. Even if Osama bin Laden and his deputies wish to stay alive to carry on jihad, they operate in the dark alleys and caves of the world, without a home base against which the United States could retaliate. (2004, 130). This statement somewhat flawed. It would be wrong to assume that all terrorists, even suicide terrorists have nothing to loose, in spite of their declared willingness to die for their cause. Terrorists are after all, human beings with their circles of family and friends. Their families occasionally have valuable personal assets and cherish their personal lives; which they stand to lose, as part of punishment inflicted on terrorists or as unfortunate and tragic collateral damage. As in the case of bin Laden or Ayman al Zawahiri and others, it would be wrong to think that al Zawahiri did not grieve over his wife and son, killed in one of the allied airstrikes targeting him. Indeed, some of the ground troops of al Qaeda may fit the title desperados; this however is almost never the case of top al-Qaedas leadership. They want to remain alive and to continue sending others to do the holy work. Thus, there may be some degree of deterrence affecting terrorists, after all. However, the loss of ones loved ones can also serve as motivation for even more stubborn terrorism. For some individuals, suggests the analyst Ami Pedahzur in his book Suicide Terrorism, (2005) - the crisis, some individuals were, for example, subjected to, e.g. the loss of a loved one/s, could well be one of the precipitating factors motivating predisposed potential individuals, (terrorist or not), to become suicide terrorist, in their quest for revenge. (Pedahzur 2005, 125).

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The fact that all international terrorist groups are led by leaders that usually does not entertain the idea of self-emulation, leads to an early speculation, that most suicide terrorist attacks cannot be attributed only to the suicide bombers alone; in the vast majority of the cases, the planning, the mobilization, the training and the indoctrination, that leads the suicide bomber to self-emulation are done by some level of group leadership. (Pedahzur 2005, 170-181). In that respect, it may be posited that, that in all likelihood, a group led by a surviving leader may become the culprit behind a prospective WMD attack (especially, a nuclear or biological attack), whereas the chances of survival for the actual person/s who sets and detonates the device - are very small. The leadership of his group is usually, remote from the attack, and survives. In the example of 9/11, the 19 terrorists were a select group, trained by a high echelon of al-Qaeda - which indeed survived. Graham Allison (2004), bases his theory of ultimate preventive catastrophe not on deterrence, but on massive preventive measures, which he summarizes as the Seven Yeses [seven major undertakings we must do]. Interestingly, the U.S. government, whether it read Allisons book or not, is in fact very much engaged in following much of Allisons recommendations. The sad fact remains, that some of the key issues are not addressed well enough. Making the prevention of nuclear terrorism an absolute national priority. (U.S. government does just that). Fighting a strategically focused war on terrorism. (We do just that). Conducting a humble foreign policy. (U.S. does poorly). Building a global alliance against nuclear terrorism. (U.S. observes very slow progress). Creating the intelligence capabilities required for success in the war on nuclear terrorism. (The U.S. must improve sharing and HUMINT capabilities) Dealing with dirty bombs. (America should improve detection capabilities). 25

Constructing a multilayered defense. (The United States needs massive improvement in this area). (Allison 2004, 199-201).

Review of literature regarding the use of targeted killings: efficacy and legal issues. Daniel Byman in his 2009 article expresses his opinion on the topic of targeted killings for the Brooking Institute. He posits, Killing terrorists is difficult, is often ineffective, and can easily backfire. Yet it is one of United States few options for managing the threat posed by al QaedaU.S. drone attacks in Pakistan has killed dozens of lower ranking and at least 10-mid and highranking leaders from al Qaeda and the Taliban(Byman 2009). Interestingly, in 2006 Byman wrote an article with an near- identical title, in which he carefully outlined the risks, as exemplified by the Bush administrations abolishing of many, long-standing U.S. limits on punitive and preventive actions and the need for authorization of special measures, (including secret prisons; domestic surveillance without court authorization; holding of enemy combatants and their rendition to third countries for interrogation). All of which caused international outcry, and have caused many Americans to question the legitimacy of their governments CT policy. In 2005 Jerry Smith evaluates in his thesis, the effectiveness of Israels counterterrorism strategy. He derives some interesting insights: When a suicide attack occurs, the Israeli citizens want action to be takenthe Israeli government sees [the targeted killing] as an opportunity to solve two problems at the same time. They can take out the senior key figure of the terrorist organization responsible for the attack, while also giving the victims families some sense of justice (Smith 2005, 57).

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Diane Leigh Maye contrasts this point of view in her 2006 thesis on the same topic. Leigh Maye evaluates seven Israeli actions aimed at countering Palestinian resistance. By addressing Palestinian terrorists as resistance, Leigh Maye is rendering Palestinian terrorism, certain legitimacy as combatants of a guerrilla war. In a highly biased, but interesting paper, she focuses on targeted assassinations (as contrasted with killings); home demolitions; collective punishment; border controls; administrative detention; controls on terrorist financing, and technological advances. (Leigh Mae, 2006, V). Maye correctly posits that Israels policy of targeted killings has come under severe scrutiny by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International; she also correctly assesses the poor efficacy of targeted killings as root problem solution in the long run: The assassinations have not thwarted number of attacksnor do they have history of ending the terrorist organizations existence. To the contrary, the attacks may have provoked an even stronger response (Leigh Maye 2006, 39). However, Smith contends: International law prohibits assassinations[however] terrorists are considered to be common enemies of humankindMany times after a leader is removed there tends to be internalstrugglefurthermore, group will tend to spend more time and resources to stay alivethe Israeli policy of targeting ticking-bomb terrorists does not deserve the kind of condemnation it is receiving (Smith 2005, 35). Moreover, Byman highlights the Israeli practice of targeted killings and emphasizes Israels General Secret Services and the IDFs uniquely transparent approach and nationwide-garnered support, towards these unfortunate, yet sometimes, absolutely necessary kinetic operations. (Byman 2006, 108-111).

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The United States is a firm, unrelenting, believer in democracy. Democracies vary, among other things - in their respective perception of their citizens rights as humans and as citizens; as well as in their perception of the human rights of terrorists. Most current counterterrorism measures, used by Israel, (e.g. blowing up houses of terrorists; the security barrier; enhanced interrogation; targeted killings etc.) are occasionally contested not only by the terrorists themselves and the Arab countries; but also by the Israeli legal system and by Israels otherwise closest allies, including the United States. Furthermore, Israels CT practices are severely scrutinized also by segments of the Israeli population. Naturally, one of the most contested methods is targeted killings of terrorists. Arguably, this method would probably, be less contested than it is, if the actual casualties of these strikes would have been terrorists only. The socalled collateral damage is severely criticized. However, the vast majority of Israelis support the hard line of their government. Had the American people shared Israels experience of daily suicide bombings, they too, might have decided, that better red than dead; meaning: if the current system is incapable of defending me its time to re-evaluate, and possibly change it, using whatever measures needed to assure survival. Alas, the world is not perfect, and the U.S. population and other allied populations include people that often see targeted killings and especially targeted killings of Americans-turned-terrorists, as questionable, or even outright illegal under the 5th Amendment to the Constitution of the U.S. and under International Law. The near-total opaqueness of the application of drone strikes, by the CIA, does not help the case for killings without due process. Many free press articles

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cover the debate over this and other CT issues. David Brooks writing recently in the New York Times suggested, [Machiavelli] puts too much faith in the self-constraint of his leaders. Machiavelli tells us that men are venal self-deceivers, but then he gives his Prince [aka Obama] permission to do all these monstrous things, trusting him not to get carried away or turn in a monster himself. Our founders were more careful. Our founders understood that leaders are as venal and untrustworthy as anybody else. They abhorred concentrated power, and they set up checks and balances to disperse it. Our drone policy should take account of our founders superior realism. Drone strikes are easy, hidden and abstract. There should be some independent judicial panel to review the kill lists. There should be an independent panel of former military and intelligence officers issuing reports on the programs efficacy.(Brooks, David. 2013). It is interesting to recall Francis Fukuyamas End of History in that context. In 2008 Fukuyama suggested, in an interview to the Daily Beast, an upgrade to his 1992 original thoughts, Democracy is built around institutions that are quite difficult to put into place, especially the rule of lawI did not imagine back in 1992 [that] the U.S. could become so controversial and damaging to the prospect of democracythere needs to be a re-emphasis on the use of American soft power (Fukuyama In Philips 2008). Contrary to the thoughts of Fukuyama is afore mentioned Daniel Bymans suggestion in his 2011 article, The aggressive U.S. drone campaign in Pakistan has played an important role in weakening al-Qaeda and should be continued. The Drone campaign will not end al Qaeda presence in Pakistan, but it does keep the organization on the run and reduces its operational effectiveness. (Byman 2011). On this very topic of targeted killings, Richard Murpy and Afsheen John Radsan, wrote their legal analysis and assessment, of Due Process and Targeted Killing of Terrorists. There, on page 405 they state, under Boumediene, [Boumediene vs. Bush] the executive has a due process obligation to develop fair, rational procedures for its

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use of targeted killing no matter whom it might be targeting anywhere in the world. To implement this duty, the executive should, following the lead of the Supreme Court of Israel (among others), require an independent, intra-executive investigation of any targeted killing by the CIA. These investigations should be as public as is reasonably consistent with national security. Even in war on terror, due process demands at least this level of accountability for the power to kill suspected terrorists (Murpy & Radsan 2009, 405). Yet another legal opinion, by David Kretzmer, suggests that unless realistic standards of conduct for states involved in armed conflicts with terrorist groups exist, these states actions may be no better - than the actions of the terrorists themselves, when they resort to targeted killings (both acting in an environment infected by lawlessness). However, Kretzmer adds that whatever the lawlessness rules may be, they are better than none. (Kretzmer 2005). With due respect to Kretzmer, this statement is contradictory and confusing. In yet another legal opinion by Kristen Eichensehr, published in the Yale Law Journal, she criticizes the Israeli Supreme Court, asserting that the Israeli Supreme Court, in its first ruling on the issue of targeted killings, has weakened the international laws protection to all civilians, by extending the meaning of direct participation of terrorists in terrorism: terrorists are civilians under the law of armed conflict and thus are lawfully subject to attack only when the directly participate in hostilities. But the court also expanded the traditional definition of direct participationBy disregarding the direct participation requirements important evidentiary function, the court weakened the protection that international law affords to all civilians, not just to terrorists (Eichensehr, 2007). To summarize, the morals, humanity and the legal posture, of targeted killing is highly disputed, as is its efficacy. However, while the whole array of

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counterterrorist current tools is badly flawed, it is, arguably, the best we have in the short term. When thinking about more distant future, something that strategists should and must do, new elements, still in their early stages of development, such as the application of soft power, smart power, state building, democratic institutions creation, etc., should be considered with much more vigor than has been thus far.

Review of literature regarding preparedness. Can we outlive a WMD attack? On the American home front, while the older American generations still recall the fallout shelters and the nuclear attack drills of the Cold War era - for younger generations, this is (arguably, prematurely) only nostalgia. Graham Allison, is totally convinced that nuclear terrorism is inevitable even today, despite all the efforts to mitigate it. If such threat indeed materializes, it will be a real catastrophe. The U.S. will arguably, survive a single nuclear blast. However horrible, such calamity will not topple the United States. Not even close. It would be a devastating, world-changing event, but the United States would live to fight another day. However, the country should have a plan on how to soften the blow, respond, and ultimately recover from an attack(Frost 2012). In view of the current nature of international terrorism, there is a strong and renewed need for educating the American public about the new real world of terrorist threats: Very little, if any, anti-terrorism training is conducted in U.S. schools or the population at large. In Israel, on the other hand, there is a much greater focus on the citizens responsibility to

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prepare for, and respond, should a terror attack or natural disaster occurthe complementary Israeli programs include Israels layered response (Larsen and Pravecek 2006, xii). It stands to plain logic that effectively drilling the population in various contingencies, (chemical, radiological, thermonuclear and biological), creating a better preparedness of the homeland for dealing with conventional and other terrorist attack/s, and better preparing the U.S. emergency medical services for just such contingencies - all these are measures should be led by the US government, but executed mostly by state and local agencies. Current U.S. regulations indeed provide for significant federal intervention, yet the bureaucracy involved is still hindering the executive federal capability. As we have seen so far, we were absolutely unprepared for 9/11, but much worse, years later - we were still unprepared to deal with a mere hurricane. As Katie Frost observes, The United States has spent billions working to prevent the catastrophe of a nuclear terror attack but has done little to prepare for itThe creation of the DHSleft many onlookers scratching their heads, unaware of who held authorityThe lethargic response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 highlighted the flaws in FEMAs national infrastructure and its capability to assist a devastated community. There is little evidence of substantive improvement since thenAssuming national assistance doesnt arrive in force for at least two days, the lions share of initial response will land on the shoulders of state and local responders (Frost 2012). Moreover, in spite of New York City, being perhaps the most prepared municipality in the nation it is still woefully unprepared for nuclear terrorism. Frost continues: A featured strategic goal [of the] DHS is developing a culture of preparedness, yet nothing focuses on the education and knowledge of the publicWe need commercials, billboards, and vast expansion of the Citizen Corps programPreparedness

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programs should also be incorporated into high school curricula (Frost 2012). For the Israelis preparedness is a way of life. This is an integral part of coping with terrorism, as well as with the inherent wish of Arabs and Muslims to annihilate the Jewish state. It is an existential question. Israel does not have any significant strategic depth, to depend on. Israel is no larger than New Jersey. During the 1991, U.S. invasion of Iraq, the Israelis had a taste of the true meaning of the whole country being under the Iraqi Scud attacks. The HAGA (i.e. HAGANA EZRAHIT aka Civil Defense) which being an offshoot of the IDF, and in charge of Civil Defense, was quickly revised, augmented and renamed the Home Front Command, (HFC aka Pikud Haoref). HFC became an integral Command within the IDF. In a strategic foresight of things to come, the HFC efficiently distributed millions of gas masks and atropine self-injectors, along with massive, national education effort that prepared every Israeli residence, and every single Israeli individual of all ages, to the eventuality of the feared WMD attack. (In 1991 the focus was on chemical WMD). Although Larsen and Pravecek also posit that, Israel is also way ahead of the United Sates in its practice of sharing information between bureaucratic organizationsand in requesting and sharing responsibility for civil defense. The Mossad, Shin Bet, and the local police units share a common intelligence pool, and work together closely when necessary(2006, 86-87), such was not the case, at the time when Larsen and Praveceks work was published. 2006 arguably, signifies the beginning of the welcome change described above (the actual GSS reform initiative began in the 1990s). It was not for some time that the fruits of the changes started to be felt.

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It may be a constructive idea to consider some of the above-mentioned current Israeli practices, through the eyes of the American needs, and adapt what is possible. Both, the United States and Israel are forced to use extraordinary measures to deal with their respective terrorism problems. Despite the fact that Americans do not feel the day-to-day terrorist threat, as the Israelis feel it - the civil populations of both countries are in danger. The threat shared by the Israelis, is not only personal, but also national and existential. In some ways, younger Americans are luckier than Israelis, because they seem to lack the tragic element of imagination required to perceive the nature of an existential threat. Certain elements of that perception may have been was lost with the end of the Cold War. The tragic events of September 11, 2001 shook the American public to the core, but like Pearl Harbor, they did not create a realistic existential threat. In truth, arguably, the threat to the United States is not existential. Many claim that President Obamas reiteration of the nuclear and other WMD threats to America is overblown, as a result of the heritage of the previous administrations V.P. Cheney stating in February 2009: that such [ true WMD] an attack was high probabilityIn other words, if there were an attack on the United States that killed many tens of thousands, it would be the Obama administrations fault, since in Cheneys telling, it was the Bush administrations extralegal policies that kept America safe after 9/11, including safe from terrorists wielding weapons of mass destruction (Bergen 2011, 229). Even if America were to be attacked by a terrorist nuclear device, this would not threaten the very existence of the United States. An existential threat to the U.S. can come only from a massive nuclear threat from a major nuclear power; such

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threat is currently, arguably, unrealistic. One of the challenges of this paper is, the understanding of the extreme asymmetry and contrast, between the convictions/intentions of al-Qaeda-cores leadership - and the superhumanitarian convictions of some good folks everywhere; who are convinced that no matter how terrible the terrorists deeds and intentions are they should still be treated in a humanitarian way, afforded a fair trial and a due process. As we recall, while according to the Bible, the Ten Commandments tell us Thou Shalt Not Kill, (Exodus 20:13), under certain circumstances, when a foe attempts to kill you you have the legal right to kill him first in self-defense. (The one who is going to kill you shall be killed before he succeed"). This understanding underscores the spirit in which terrorist threats should be treated. This is the underlying attitude, around which a consistent, coherent CT strategy/tactic should be built and applied. On October 16, 2003 Donald Rumsfeld, then the Secretary of Defense, addressed a letter to the top echelon of the U.S. counterterrorism administration. He asks: Are we winning or losing the Global War on Terror? Is DoD changing fast enough to deal with the new 21st century security environment?...We have mixed results with Al QaidaHave we fashioned the right mix of rewards, amnesty, protection and confidence in the US? Does DoD need to think through new ways to organize, train, equip and focus to deal with the global war on terror? Today, we lack metrics to know if we are winning or losingAre we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us? (Rumsfeld 2003). In 2012, Audrey Kurth Cronin, suggests the following reply: Ten years into a trillion dollar effort to answer the attacks of September 11, 2001, it is difficult to tell whether U.S. counterterrorism is achieving its intended effectsexperts still debate whether or not the United States is winning the fight against al Qaeda(Kurth Cronin, 2012, 1).

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And yet Cronin also admits that al-Qaeda repels rather than attractsonly two percent of Muslims in Lebanon, five percent in Turkey, and 15 percent in Jordan support al Qaedaratings for Osama bin Laden [before his death] had dropped off a cliff: in Jordan they went from 56 percent in 2003 to 13 percent in 2011 and in Pakistan from 52 percent in 2005 to 18 percent in 2011 (Pew Global Attitudes Project 2011 In Kurth Cronin 2011, 11). It seems that some major shift in the United States CT strategy is required. This is a change that goes way beyond whatever wisdom can be arguably, gleaned from the application of lessons learned from another country fighting terrorism, like Israel. Arguably, al Qaedas major vulnerability, as self-admitted, by this groups current commander, Ayman al Zawahiri in his 2005 letter to Abu Musab el Zarqawi urging the latest to prepare to the U.S. withdrawal by refraining from further alienation of the Iraqi masses, (a mistake exemplified in Talibans deeds in Afghanistan) is its difficulty to continue mobilizing popular support. The lack of public support was and is a fact far from lost on the al Qaeda core leadership. While bin Laden has enjoyed a certain amount of personal popularity in much of the Muslim world, that has not been translated into mass support for al_qaeda in the manner that Hezbollah enjoys such support in Lebanon. That is not surprising there are no Al Qaeda social welfare services or schools. An alQaeda hospital is a grim oxymoron. Even al-Qaedas leaders are aware of the problem of their lack of mass support (Bergen 2011, 301). The alluded-to shift is a philosophical and a pragmatic one. The United States relates to its counterterrorist struggle in the context of global counterinsurgency, instead of fighting al Qaeda and its affiliates in a more simplistic counterterrorist context. Current US model as seen in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Middle East, Africa and South Asia tends to attribute a measure of legitimacy to al Qaedas struggle, by portraying it more as insurgents, than the plain terrorists they really are. Moreover, counterinsurgency campaign is much more costly, and in this case disproportionate: At a time when there were more

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than 100,000 troops in Afghanistan, the total number of al-Qaeda operatives inPakistan was more than 300and the number in Afghanistan was, according to Leon Panetta50-100, maybe less. The imbalance is

obvious(Kurth Cronin 2012, 19). Thus the response to al-Qaeda and its affiliates should arguably be, more along the lines of the Israeli response to Palestinian terrorism; however, avoiding the inconsistency exemplified in the Israeli CT model of action/reaction. Some experts claim that al Qaeda is declining; we should thus allow it to continue to decline and avoid invigorating it through exaggerated media coverage and highlight their mistakes. Furthermore, the method of polarization of the internal disputes and arguments, within the group and between it affiliates, should be fostered, through a clever manipulation of the existing differences within the Islamist movement regarding their various differences (e.g. attitudes towards killing of innocents, the application of Sharia law, who is a real Jihadist and who should be labeled as apostate or infidel etc.). As wisely put by Cronin, For a decade, the United States has struggled to find a counter narrative in the fight against al Qaeda, a way to shore up moderates without tainting themOur role should be to avoid directly interfering, even as we support the emergence of pluralistic forces that could represent a counter-mobilizing force that inspires millions of young ArabsNow Americans must reverse the widespread impression that the only change they support is change they effect, and shrink the tendency to be so selfcentered as to miss an historical paradigm that may be delivering the best answer to al-Qaida imaginable (Kurth Cronin 2011, 23). It is with this nagging question in mind enter this paper.

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References Abu Gheith. 2002. Why We Fight America: Al-Qaida Spokesman Explains September 11 and Declares Intentions to Kill 4 Million with Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Jewish Post of New York. (n.d.). http://tinyurl.com/a39bvgb. (accessed February 10, 2013). Allison, Graham. 2004.Nuclear Terrorism: the Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe. New York: Owl Books. Bergen, Peter L. 2011. The Longest War: the Enduring Conflict Between America and Al-Qaeda. New York London Toronto Sydney: Free Press.

Bin Laden, Osama. 1998. Saudi Arabia Text of Fatwa Urging Jihad Against Americans London Al-Quds al-'Arabi in Arabic Summary/Review of Reports Concerning Threats by Osama Bin Laden to Conduct Terrorist Operations Against the United States and/or her Allies 23 February 1998 to 16 June 1998 (includes original February "fatwa"). https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/news/osama.htm (accessed February 7, 2013). Brooks, David. 2013. Florence and the Drones. The New York Times: (February 7, 2013). http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/08/opinion/brooks-florence-and-thedrones.html.(accessed February 11, 2013). Byman, Daniel. 2006. Do Targeted Killings Work? Tit for Tat. Foreign Affairs: (March/April). http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61513/daniel-byman/do-targetedkillings-work.(accessed February 11, 2013). Byman, Daniel l. 2009. Do Targeted Killings Work? Brookings: (July 14). www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2009/07/14-targeted-killings-byman. (accessed February 11, 2013).

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Byman, Daniel. 2011. A High Price: the Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism. New York: Oxford. Byman, Daniel L. 2011. Denying Terrorist Safe Havens: Homeland Security Efforts to Counter Threats from Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. Brookings. House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on oversight, Investigations and Management: (June 3). www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2011/06/03-terrorism-byman (accessed February 11, 2013).
Cole.Leonard A. 2007. Terror: How Israel has Coped and what America Can Learn. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Coughlin, Con. 2013. North Koreas Nuclear Test will Boost Iran. The Telegraph: (February 12). http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/concoughlin/100202556/north-koreasnuclear-test-will-boost-iran/ (accessed February 12, 2013).

Eichensehr, Kristen. 2007. On Target? The Israeli Supreme Court and the Expansion of Targeted Killings. The Yale Law Journal Vol.116 No.8. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1148841 (accessed February 11, 2013). Frost, Katie. 2012.Nuclear Terrorism: Are You Prepared. The Belfer Center. Harvard. The Kennedy School Review. http://isites.harvard.edu/icb/icb.do?keyword=k74756&pageid=icb.page414662 (accessed February 12, 2012). Fukuyama, Francis. 2008. Fukuyama: The End of the End of History. In Philips, Mathew. The Daily Beast: ( September 19). www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2008/09/19/francis-fukuyama-back-tothe-end-of-history.html.(accessed February 11, 2013). Geelhood, Philip. 2009. Deterrence of Nuclear Terrorism Via Post-Detonation Attribution: Is the United States on Target? Phd assr. Naval Postgraduate School. Monterey, California: (December). www.dtci.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA514153.(accessed February 12, 2013).

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Hoseneball, Mark. 2010. Nine Years After 9/11, Intelligence Sharing Is Still Hobbled. The Daily Beast: (September 24). http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/blogs/declassified/2010/09/24/nin e-years-after-9-11-intelligence-sharing-is-still-hobbled.html. (accessed February 10, 2013). Kessler, Ronald. 2011. FBI: 100 Percent Chance of WMD Attack. NEWSMAX: (February 14).www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/zawahiri-weapons-massdestruction/2011/02/14/id/386055.(accessed February 10, 2013). Kindt, Michael T. 2006. Building Population Resilience to Terror Attacks: Unlearned Lessons from Military and Civilian Experience. The Counterproliferation Papers; Future Warfare Series No. 36. U.S.A.F Counterproliferation Center: Air University: Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. http://cpc.au.af.mil/PDF/monograph/buildingpopres.pdf. (accessed February 3, 2013). Kretzmer, David. 2005. Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or Legitimate Means of Defense? The European Journal of International Law Vol. 16 No. 2. http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/16/2/171.ful.pdf.(accessed February 11, 2013). Kurth Cronin, Audrey. 2012. U.S. Grand Strategy and Counterterrorism. ORBIS: (January 4). http://policy.gmu.edu/portals/0/pdfs/Cronin/Grand_Strategy_and_CT_Orbis_Cr onin.pdf. (accessed February 15, 2013). Laqueur, Walter. 2003. No End to War. New York: The Continuum Publishing Group Inc. Laqueur, Walter. 2007. Terrorism: A Brief History: Historical Context for the Phenomenon of Modern-Day Terrorism. AMERICA.gov. http://www.america.gov/st/peacesecenglish/2007/May/20080522172730SrenoD0.6634027.html (accessed February 11, 2013). Leigh Maye, Diane. 2006. Measures of Effectiveness: Israeli Counterterrorism Strategies and Tactics During the Al-Aqsa Intifada. PhD assr. Naval Postgraduate School. Monterey. California: (September). www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA457277 . (accessed February 13, 2013).

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Larsen, Jeffrey A. and Pravecek, Tasha L. 2006. Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security. The Counterproliferation Papers: Future Warfare Series No. 33: USAF Counterproliferation Center: Air University: Maxwell Air Force Base: Alabama. http://cpc.au.af.mil/PDF/monograph/comparativeusisraeli.pdf See also: http://tinyurl.com/azz5mxa. (accessed January 15, 2013). Mowatt-Larssen, Rolf. 2010. Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or Reality. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Harvard: (January). http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19852/al_qaeda_weapons_of_ mass_destruction_threat.html. (accessed February 6, 2013). Murphy, Richard and Radsan, Afsheen John. 2009. Due Process and Targeted Killing of Terrorists. Social Science Research Network: (March1). http://ssrn.com/abstract=1349357. (accessed February 11, 2013). National Strategy for Counterterrorism. 2011. The White House. www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf (accessed February 6, 2013). Pape, Robert A. 2005. Dying To Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks. Pape, Robert A. and Feldman, James K. 2010. Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism & How to Stop It. London: The University of Chicago Press. Patrick, Stewart. 2011.Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security. Oxford New York: Oxford University Press. Pedahzur, Ami. 2005. Suicide Terrorism. Cambridge: Polity. Pedahzur, Ami.2007. The Israeli Secret Services & the Struggle Against Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press. Peritz, Aki and Rosenbach, Eric. 2012. Find Fix Finish: Inside the Counterterrorism Campaigns that Killed Bin Laden and Devastated Al- Qaeda. New York: Public Affairs.

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Pockett, Consuella B. 2005. United Sates and Israeli Homeland Security: A Comparative Analysis of Emergency Preparedness Efforts. The Counterproliferation Papers: Future Warfare Series No. 33: USAF Counterproliferation Center: Air University: Maxwell Air Force Base: Alabama. http://cpc.au.af.mil/PDF/monograph/usandisraelicompare.pdf See also: http://tinyurl.com/azz5mxa. (accessed January 15, 2013).

Quiggin, Thomas. 2007.Seing the Invisible: National Security in an Uncertain Age. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. Rollins, John, Wyler Liana Sun and Rosen, Seth. 2010. International Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Security Threats, U.S. Policy, and Considerations for Congress. CRS Congressional Research Service: (January 5). http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/134960.pdf (accessed February 12, 2013). Rumsfeld, Donald. 2003. Global War on Terrorism. Global Security. Memo: (October 16). www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/rumsfeldd20031016sdmemo.htm. (accessed February 14, 2013). Smith, Jerry D. 2005. The Effectiveness of Israels Counter-terrorism. PhD assr. Strategy.Naval Postgraduate School. Monterey. California: (March). http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2005/05Mar_Smith.pdf (accessed February 13, 2013). The White House. 2011. Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime. National Security Council: (July 25). http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc/transnational-crime (accessed February 12, 2013).

Zawahiri, Ayman. 2001. Knights Under the Prophets Banner. Serialized in AlSharq al Awsat (London): (December). Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, document FBIS-NES-2001-1202. Maintained online by FAS. http://fas.org/irp/world/para/aymanh_bk.html (accessed February 11, 2013).

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PART TWO: THE MODERN TERRORISM CHALLENGE WHAT TO EXPECT? PRACTICAL AND ACADEMIC APPROACHES

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V. Fighting International Terrorism Effectively Without Giving up on the very Foundation of Democracy a Fallacy or an Actual Possibility? Current U.S. experience in Iraq, Eurasia, South Asia, Africa and the Middle East attest to multiple challenges regarding the effective confrontation of international terrorist groups. Transnational groups like al-Qaeda are few, but more localized terrorist groups that share al-Qaedas convictions and are loosely connected with this amorphous group - seem to pop up recently like mushrooms after a rain, in many places in the world. Following 9/11, the notion was that although the US embarked on a world-wide anti-terrorism campaign, the focus of this struggle was at first Afghanistan and many thought that a successful elimination of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan will deal a death blow to worlds fanatic Islamism. However, such was not the case. While the U.S. and its allies have been stubbornly fighting al-Qaeda core in Afghanistan, this terrorist entitys philosophy obviously resonated well with the emotions of large segments of Muslim populations around the world. Moreover, the U.S. counterterrorist strategy identifies many Islamist terrorist groups as part or affiliate of alQaeda. This approach is arguably, wrong. The onset of this perception can be traced back to 2001-2002, when America took its fight not only to al Qaeda core in Pakistan, but also to the Taliban, which indeed supported al Qaeda but was never a part of it. In fact, while US troops fought the Taliban, al-Qaeda core cleverly retreated into the high Tora Bora Mountains and caves and the U.S. command repeatedly declined intelligence (CIAs) suggestions to follow and finish them; thus completely decimating al Qaeda. (Bergen 2011, 70-75). Although many Muslim terrorist groups retained their independence from al-

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Qaeda, they are strongly influenced by al-Qaedas religious and political views and many of them became al-Qaedas affiliates, spreading the Islamist terrorism throughout the world. Moreover, directly al-Qaeda-sponsored groups flourished as well and seem to be the constant focus of current counterterrorist efforts. Some of the more active ones are for example, Lashkar-e-taiba and Tehrik-italiban in Pakistan, the Afghan Taliban; the Jemaa Islamiyah in Thailand, Singapore and the Phillipines; the Al Shabaab in Somalia, AQI in Iraq; AQIAP in Arabia and others. Like the mythological Medusa, or like cancer Islamist fanaticism keeps spreading. One of the challenges of this paper is to come up with suggestions how to better confront the U.S terrorist challenge. On at least two occasions, both as Director of the C.I.A. and as Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta belittled the presence of al-Qaedas combatants in Afghanistan, stating in 2010, that there were only about 50-100 or so al-Qaeda fighters left in Afghanistan. (Huffington Post 2010). More recently, in September 2012, Mr. Panetta said that: he views rogue Afghan troops and police turning their guns on allied forces attacks as the last gasp of a Taliban insurgency [historically, but possibly wrongly, linked with al-Qaeda and perceived as one and the same] that has not been able to regain lost ground (Telegraph 2012). Just shortly later, in January 2013, David Wood, Reporting for the Huffington Post, asked Secretary Panetta, how the administration could justify continued U.S. involvement in the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan, in view of the facts that after spending $641 billion; 2,162 dead Americans, and 18,188 wounded - the Pentagon reports that this insurgency, that was supposed to have been beaten - is still active and resilient; the Afghan government is still corrupt; and the Afghan security forces are still unable to fight their own war. Panetta

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responded: We have poured a lot of blood and treasure into this war We have made a lot of progress and were not gonna walk backward. (Huffington Post 2013). However, strong words alone do not win wars, and the fact remains that according to the Pentagon, despite hard fighting by U.S., Allied and Afghan forces, the insurgency has nevertheless retained its capability to carry out attacks at almost the same level as last year. (Huffington Post 2013). In an excellent article, the terrorism expert Audrey Kurth Cronin suggests in 2012, that the U.S, should separate its struggle against al Qaeda from its fighting other terrorist groups. Al Qaedas presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan has been indeed severely decimated, but the numbers of the allied forces facing al Qaeda do not add up, and they point to a gross disproportion in the US involvement in Eurasia. If indeed the number of al Qaeda Pakistan was in 2010 reportedly, somewhat more than 300 (Leiter 2010), and the number of al-Qaeda Afghanistan, is as stated above 50-100, why was the size of the American and allied forces in Afghanistan close to 100,000 (in 2010)? It seems clear that the US NSS views all Islamists as al Qaeda, which is wrong. By doing so the U.S. is playing into the hands of al Qaeda by portraying it as a massive movement, at a time that it is in fact, already small and arguably, continuously losing ground. Moreover, the US all-inclusive strategy attributes certain degree of legitimacy to al Qaeda and its affiliates by treating it more as an insurgency and thus, like a form of legitimate guerrilla warfare struggling for self determination. Terrorismi.e. the deliberate targeting of civilians by nonstate actors for symbolic political effects is never legitimateAl Qaedas terrorism is causing a backlash that is killing the group and, while no one wants innocent people to be targeted, the United States is foolish to interfere with that backlashframing al Qaeda as a global insurgency is a mistake[it is} a formula for national

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bankruptcy, strategic irrelevance, and loss of American primacy Kurth Cronin 2012). Currently, America and its allies are faced with Islamist terrorism all over the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa, in the Sahel and in the African Horn. The latest development being NATOs involvement in Libya, France and U.S. involvement in Algeria, Mali, Nigeria, as well as continued activity in Somalia, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen and Sudan. At the same time, we cant omit the ominous developments in Syria; the persistent instability in Pakistan; the green-on-green Afghan military attacks against the US and allied forces. Nor can continuous terrorism in Iraq, the state sponsored terrorism by Hezbollah, the Iranian nuclear threat, and the terrorist activity of the Hamas and other Palestinian factions be ignored. One may ask: is this an Arab Spring, or rather the radical Islamist one? Where has the United States and the West gone wrong? For one thing, it has gone wrong by failing to follow its own NSS, that attempted to separate the former administrations war on terror from the current war against al-Qaida and its affiliates. While the Obama administration, in its wish to diminish the scope of the struggle from a worldly one, to one more focused on al Qaeda - it in fact did little more than change the struggles name. Indeed, the war in Iraq came to an official end and American troops were mostly withdrawn; yet it is too early to claim a final victory in view of the ongoing subversive activity there (Markey and Kareem 2013). Moreover, Obamas declaration regarding the planned pull out from Afghanistan by 2014 and the current commitment to withdraw 34,000 US troops there by early 2014, was met with a lot of skepticism. This skepticism is the result of wrong American framing of the war

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against al Qaeda, and the war with the Taliban as one. Such approach has little to do with advancing real American interests. In fact, it delays the US disengagement from its longest war yet. In Afghanistan, for example, formerly disparate forces have aligned against the United States (the Haqqani network, numerous Taliban factions, drug lords, war lords, and so forth), neighboring Pakistan is providing sanctuary and to some degree supporting them, we are saddled with propping up a government in Kabul that lacks legitimacy, and our aims have grown so dramatically since 2001 that it is difficult to see how our aims will be able to achieve themThe operation in Afghanistan should never have been about protecting civilians and holding territory, but about eliminating the possibility of al Qaeda attacking the United States again (Kurth Cronin 2012, 19). Democracies indeed face severe dilemmas when confronting terrorist violence. As the world has learned, massive or even moderate, military intervention often alienates the population and paves the path for increased terrorist support. It also damages the legitimacy of existing governments, their police and security forces, their judiciary and thus the rule of law - as weve seen in Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and recently in Libya, Algeria and Mali. The inability of a certain regimes to exercise their authority over part, or all of their sovereign territory, provides new safe haven opportunities to transnational terrorism and transnational organized crime. In this respect, the democratic world faces two challenges. First, the current counterterrorist paradigm of fighting fire with fire, may seem almost contrary to the concept of democracy, and thus contradictory to the upholding of democratic fundaments and principles, such as humanitarian behavior, high moral standards, ensuring civil rights, preserving a system of checks and balances and the rule of law. Second, democracy, unlike the amorphous notion of say, establishment, is a more

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concrete concept. We have erred before and we are probably erring currently by attempting to impose democracy upon countries, regimes and peoples that are not yet ripe to understand and absorb the depth of the meaning of democracy. Have we created a real democracy in Iraq? It seems that at the very best, Iraq may serve as a laboratory for ideas about how to wring stability out of chaos which is arguably, the number one policy challenge of the twenty-first century. Is it even remotely possible, that Iraq, of all places, might offer some new ideas about how situations of widespread anarchy can be combated? Some claim, it is the beehive that produces the honey. However, if this analogy is used for the outcome in Iraq, it seems that Iraq is a nested by hornets, yellow jackets and wasps, rather than bees. [Iraq] was the case that despite a continuing plague of suicide bombings, significant sections of the country were slowly recovering from large-scale violence, as well as from the effects of decades of brutal dictatorship? The very U.S. military that had helped to bring about anarchy in Iraq was now worth studying as a way to end it, both here and elsewhere in the Third World(Kaplan 2006). Democracies come in many forms and sizes. There are no two identical democracies; and yet, many share the principles of certain set of freedoms, a government freely elected of the people, by the people and for the people and the rule of law. Some regimes, in spite of names like the democratic republic of X etc., are not truly democratic. The fact that some Middle Eastern and African states are autocracies, does not attest to their being exactly bad, but rather suggest that their constituents, (many of whom were until not too long ago ruled, by capitalistic, colonial powers), are not yet ready to accept and assimilate democratic principles. Unfortunately, often-ruthless autocrats, currently rule some of these countries, while other countries and territories are in effect, ruled

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by de-facto terrorists (e.g. Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, etc.). Timur Kuran in his book, The Long Convergence: How Islamic Law Held Back the Middle East, suggests that Islams economic restrictions and not Islams cultural restrictions, held back the progress in countries where Islam was the main religion. He claims, if the regions autocratic regimes were magically to fall, the development of strong private sectors and civil societies could take decades (Kuran 2011, 281-283). Interestingly, back in 2001 the Freedom House stated, the gap in freedom has only widened over the last twenty years. While every region of the world has registered significant gains for democracy and freedom, the countries of the Islamic world have experienced a significant increase in repression (New Study Details 2001). A decade later the Arab Spring arrived. In its 2013 report the Freedom House stated that, Worst of the WorstNine [countries] have been given the surveys lowest possible rating of 7 both political rights and civil liberties: Eritrea, Equatorial Guinea, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Two territories, Tibet and Western Sahara were also ranked among the worst of the worstIn [Middle East and North Africa]a region notable for sectarian polarization, civil strife, and repressive autocracies, freedom scored some grudging but nonetheless impressive gains in 2012. Gains: TunisiaLibya and Egyptmoved from Not Free to Partly Free. Declines: Syria suffered by far the worst repercussions from the Arab Spring. Declines were also seen in Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates (Freedom in the World 2013). Overall, the current outcome seems a little more positive than a decade ago; thus we are indeed facing a slow process. After all, it took France over eighty bloody years to come out of the French revolution and gradually implement democratic principles, which gradually spread through the world. The American Civil War

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which lasted only 5 years, was in many ways an industrial war, not only a war about civil freedom - and its end did not signify an automatic transition to true democracy, despite of the fact that much of the French original ideas were already born and ready to adopt. If an important single lesson should be learned from the US attempt to impose democracy upon Iraq, it probably is that it does not work well in the long term. even if the brave demonstrators in Tunisia or Egypt or elsewhere do succeed in permanently overthrowing their dictators, their prospects for lasting freedom have nothing to do with rhetorical support from Washington, but depend rather on whether those countries have the broader political and economic infrastructure necessary to sustain democracy. If our experience in Iraq and Afghanistan have taught us anything it is that the removal of tyranny alone is insufficient to create stable democracy (Calabresi 2011). As currently seen in both Egypt and Tunisia the slogans freedom and democracy are still contested there on a daily basis, while the situation in Iraq is grave and the forecast is arguably, pessimistic. A volatile and contradictory mixture of self-interests and unrealistic democratic ideals often propels the United States grand strategy for national security. This is arguably, the reason behind the fact that so far, soft power was used limitedly and its track record is far from exciting. Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan are still at the very best week, failing or failed countries, torn by ethnic, religious, social and financial cleavages. Current day terrorism in its transnational variety, may be the result of activity on the part of a movement, a loose network or even a common idea, whether secular, religious or nationalist/political in nature. Be the case as it may, the repeated attempts to eliminate terrorism by military means alone continuously prove to be faulty. Is it possible that this has been due to the lack of consistency

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and inability to see the suppressive military option all the way through? Israel, for example, has been fighting Palestinian terrorism mostly through military offensive/defensive means for over 65 years, and the end of the Israeli Palestinian conflict is still uncontainable. The anti-Israeli terrorism continues. The Basque separatist movement in Spain (ETA), born in the 1950s officially announced its readiness to disband only in November 2012. It was however, not the result of a successful military suppression; nor was a military success the reason for the near-termination of the IRA activity in Ireland. For all we know, the IRA resurfaced again, after the official 2006 IRAs turning its back on violence. Even in June 2012, a day before Queen Elizabeth II shook hands with a former commander of the IRA, the Belfast police fought youths throwing Molotov cocktails as part of the newly rising tensions there. (IRA 2012). It should have been clear, especially in the aftermath of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars that military intervention alone, however massive and potent, will not only fail to eliminate terrorism against Americans and America; it also acts as a catalyzing agent in building distrust, hatred, and grievance to anything perceived as self-centered, Western or American.

VI. Fighting Terrorism on a National Level. There is a major difference between fighting terrorism on the national level and fighting terrorism internationally. The terrorist threat to U.S. is somewhat hard to compare with the terrorist threat to Israel. While the US has to fight both homegrown and foreign terrorists, Israel is relatively safer from homegrown terrorism, and its foreign terrorism brand is right next-door, making counterterrorism much more localized than Americas global perception of a

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global war on terrorism (GWOT). Hamas, Hezbollah and other Palestinian factions, pose mostly, a localized threat and in spite of Hezbollahs and Hamas proliferation in the international community, this does not make the existential threat to Israel larger. It does however, magnify the overall threat to the United States, both globally and internally, due to Americas globally widespread interests and its democratically inherent openness to Hezbollah and Hamas sleeper cells to be created and activated, within the American Homeland. On the national level, terrorism is typically fought by a three-prong approach: 1). Using the judicial model, according to which terrorism is viewed as a crime. 2) Frequent application of the military model, which responds to terrorism as an act of insurgency and revolt against the authority of the state. 3). An attempt to erode the support base of terrorists, through successful resolution of the grievances that led to the conflict in the first place. All three counterterrorist measures have been used by the U.K. in Ireland; by Spain in the case of the ETA and in Sri Lanka, in its dealings with the Tamil Tigers (LTTE). It may be argued that Israel as well, used and still uses all three approaches, but a coherent pattern, and the strategy of such use, if present, is lost on this writer. Terrorists easily target democracies because of their relatively open political systems. By contrast, North Koreas ultra-suppressive regime probably does not experience any acts of terrorism, because the police-state regime is so suppressive that no insurgency is realistically possible. The same is arguably, happening in less suppressive systems in Saudi Arabia, Qatar or Iran. Another example of successful suppression of terrorism on a state level is the case of the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) in Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankan governments system has evolved from liberal into an suppressive one, due to the inability of an open

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political system to cope with massive terrorist attacks, that took the form of political assassinations (of political leaders), political kidnappings, attacks on the military and indiscriminate killing of non-combatants by suicide terrorists. However, as a trade-off, the open political system, evolved to a highly suppressive one, often described as brutally disregarding human rights, acting with complete impunity towards its militarys involvement in political assassinations and disappearances. (Denyer, 2012). Sri Lanka has obviously chosen to sacrifice its civil liberties, as the only way to effectively deal with the LTTE, which has been until 2009 possibly, the most sophisticated and ruthless nationalist/separatist terrorist group. As we have seen in the case of the LTTE, suppression of human rights, if chosen, as an acceptable CT approach can be effective, yet the cost of such success may be too high and may in fact lead to the erosion, or even dismantling of democratic structures. An argument can be made, that such is the case of the U.S.A and its 2001 Patriot Act, which has somewhat infringed on rights and civil liberties of the American people, in a manner unprecedented since the Civil War. The judicial rulings allowing the FBI to demand, without a specific warrant, judicial oversight or public review, information from Internet services providers, are an example of such an infringement. In truth, the Patriot Act of 2001 is not realistically endangering the American democracy in any way because the U.S. population as well as its legislature are acutely aware of the current situation and monitor the situation constantly. In Russia too, critics claimed that the governments harsh and suppressive response to Chechen Islamist terrorism, hurt Russias relatively new democratic institutions. Indeed the measures taken by the Russian government following the

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Beslan school tragedy (2004) included a revision of Russias territorial administration. Currently, democracies forego a sobering process, as a result of a better understanding that confronting current Islamist, religious and nationalist fanaticism, is different from other forms of terrorism. Democracies must develop a unique understanding that Islamist international terrorism requires specific adaptation and a specifically tailored set of defensive measures. The U.K. in 2001, shortly after 9/11, passed the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act, leading to the creation of an extra-judicial option allowing for indefinite detention without trial of non-British nationals suspected of linkage to terrorism. In order to avoid criticism based on singling those affected by the new act, the Act was revised in 2005, to include all Britons as well as foreigners. (MI-5 Legal Framework 2012). As expected, this provision was harshly criticized and seen as opposed to the British 1998 Human Rights Act and as incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. The eventual compromise suggested that terrorism cases would be thus treated and investigated as criminal acts; a solution adapted partially, also by the U.S. legal system. However, the U.S. has yet to solve this legal issue further, since it still indefinitely holds certain suspected individuals against which there is not enough unclassified criminal evidence (i.e. when open trial might endanger intelligence sources or unique methods) indefinitely (i.e. Guantanamo DF). In the same vein, the very concept of democratic application of counterterrorism contradicts itself, because it suggests applying noble, moral and humanitarian rules, to a war against a substate adversary that fights in asymmetric way, projecting its deepest disrespect and disregard to democratic morals and norms.

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The same question rises when a given democracy is expected to provide humanitarian, economic or military aid to underdeveloped countries. The so-called developed world is tasked with helping other, underdeveloped or all together, failed states. The flow of humanitarian aid to the needy countries is at times obstructed due to these countries involuntarily serving as safe havens to terrorist groups. Such is the case of Yemen, Somalia, Zimbabwe, Niger, Mali, Pakistan, Egypt, Malaysia, the FSU republics and currently Syria, among others. The U.S. attempts to deal with this issue by making the recipients of USAID sign on agreements conforming to anti-terrorist conditions. In many cases a major chunk of the help to weak nations is in the form of military aid, which aims at stabilization of local regimes and their respective security forces. It is unfortunate, yet arguably unavoidable, that large part of an aid given to a country in need - is military in nature, because such aid does little for the immediate relief of poverty and disease, needed so badly by local populations. At times, Western help is deliberately given to countries, which were previously observed as repressive (e.g. Pakistan, Egypt or Indonesia). In an attempt to prevent certain countries from falling into the hands of fanatic Islamists, democracies, are at times forced to choose what is perceived as the lesser evil, by supporting undemocratic, suppressive, autocratic leaders, as long as they help the West to obstruct terrorism. (Large 2005). Uganda is one of the countries that currently have a Western outlook regarding counterterrorism. New Ugandan CT legislature uses a definition of terrorism so broad, that it may be used even to prosecute members of local trade unions involved in an illegal strike or other form of peaceful, civil disobedience. (Statement by Honorable 2011). But not all countries, even among the new

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and developing ones, are ready to endorse and accept new counterterrorism legislations, at a heavy price to their civil rights. For example, in 2003, in Mauritius the president and his deputy, resigned after the Prevention of Terrorism Special Measures Regulations have been affirmed and applied. In another example, Kenya withdrew similar legislation after strong public opposition. It enacted such legislation only in 2012 after a long and stubborn political struggle. (Kibaki signs historic anti-terrorism 2012). A survey of Caribbean, African and Asian nations regarding anti terrorism legislation conducted in 2004, states that: for many, the fight against terrorism in the Commonwealth has meant that justification has been found to further limit their existing freedoms (in Large 2005). The unwillingness of certain new countries to adopt anti-terrorism legislature has been often harshly criticized by U.S. and the West and in some cases, resulted in strained diplomatic relations.

VII. Combating Transnational Terrorism: the Collaborative Approach of the International Community. International cooperation in counterterrorism is conducted on both regional and fully-flagged international level. Such cooperation is based on formation of regional and international organizations. Thus, the UN is the umbrella for international organizations, while regional organizations such as the EU, the African Union, the Organization of American States (OAS), NATO, or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) - act mostly on the regional level. The complexity of coordinating counterterrorist policies and activities

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among such diverse agents can be disheartening, yet ultimately, it means collaboration and cooperation in the gathering of intelligence; its analysis and dissemination; law enforcement cooperation through the Interpol and direct international cooperation; conduct of joint interdiction operations; cargo security and inspections; cooperation in the fields of port and aviation safety; cyber security; terrorist movement monitoring; telecommunications monitoring; financial oversight of suspicious/criminal banking activity, as well as joint military maneuvers and exercises. Moreover, in certain cases, like Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya or Somalia and Mali the international cooperation includes war cooperation. The counterterrorist international activity is closely scrutinized by various Human Rights organizations. At times, seasoned democracies like the United States, the U.K., France or Israel, choose to pursue a certain counterterrorist tactic, which does not follow the strict international rules of war because the Geneva Conventions does not directly apply to terrorism. One must keep in mind that the Geneva conventions were created and evolved following WWI and WWII. The legal status of International Law is very challenging when applied to international terrorism. The struggle with international terrorism, which has no sovereign nation-state-base willing to take the responsibility and the punishment for their deeds, is very problematic. Due to many gray areas, new nation states often seek to follow in the path of the older democracies, which serve as a model. This may initiate a problem: If an established democratic power utilizes military tribunals in non-war settings, claims exception from the Geneva conventions or international law, or advocates targeted assassination or the use of torture, this sets a precedent and an example for others. (Large 2005).

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While this example may be currently pointing to American behavior, it certainly is not an American-alone attribute. However, while for example, Israel, a vibrant democracy, also resorts to targeted killings of terrorists - Israel is considered an odd one: it is not a party to the NPT, and occasionally uses questionable interrogation techniques, and other undemocratic, CT measures. However, there is little doubt that new state-actors are more strongly influenced by the American model, than by the Israeli one. It is much easier to ignore the Israeli deeds and example, but much harder to disregard the American role model. Moreover, since 9/11 democratic reforms are no longer a prerequisite for becoming a member of the international community. In fact, the U.S and its allies cynically support autocratic regimes. Autocracies such as Saudi Arabia, the Gulf Arab Emirates, Yemen, Columbia and others are reinforced not based on the virtue of their humanitarian or civil practices, but rather as long as they participate in international counterterrorist efforts. Less-than-democratic nations, for example Russia, or some of the FSU republics, are not only not real democratic models; they are often outright contrary to the very essence of democracy. It seems that currently the concept of democracy is increasingly challenged as the best, most effective and just form of governance, at least as far as fighting terrorism is concerned. Following well over a decade of intense fighting al-Qaeda and its affiliates by the U.S. and its allies, including the indigenous Afghan forces, and likewise attempts in Iraq, suggest that al-Qaeda may have been temporarily threatened and suppressed - but it was by no means eliminated. On the contrary, al-Qaeda and affiliate resurgence seems obvious in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and other locations in the Middle East and Africa. In fact, supporters of al-Qaeda are often

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described as freedom fighters, rising against the U.S and the Middle Eastern suppressive autocracies, which were and still are supported, by the U.S.-led hypocritical West. That is the West, that while supporting autocracies in the Middle East attacked the Taliban in the name of democratic values. (Wright 2006, 237-8; 416-17). On November 12, 2012 the Organization for Security and Cooperation In Europe (OSCE) convened in Vienna. Its 57 member states, represented by more than 180 counterterrorism officials, law enforcement officers, the judiciary, and civil society experts met in order to examine good practices on upholding the rule of law in preventing and combating terrorism through an improved, adequate criminalization of terrorist offences, and establishing effective criminal procedures. While, such events, and their outcome are of great value, it is important to keep in mind that due to the legislative and constitutional differences among the large number of new and old states, effective outcomes are likely to be partial and slow to take hold. Ann Witkowsky, Acting Principal Deputy Coordinator of the Bureau of Counterterrorism, in the U.S. Department of State stated on that occasion, The international community has made great strides over the past decade in tactical counter-terrorism taking individual terrorists off the streets, disrupting cells, and thwarting conspiracies, but to be effective over the long term, our national and collective efforts must also focus on strategic counterterrorism (Strong Rule of Law 2012). This statement underscores the fundamental weakness of current international stance on fighting international/ transnational terrorism. Since different states apply different laws to combating terrorism, current day terrorists, exploit the borderless EU, the corruption in Russia and other FSU republics, the weakness of the new African democracies, the porous African borders and can move rather

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unhindered, almost anywhere. There is a fundamental lack of common strategic approach, uniform laws and law enforcement procedures. This obstacle can be surely understood in view of the existing weakness even on the tactical level, where the laws and procedures of each country come into play. How can a strategic approach, unifying all countries under counterterrorism legal banner be achieved when the interests of different state actors are so varied and often contradictory? Is there a way other than the state actors military, law enforcement, and the judiciary, to realistically further approach counterterrorism? A French representative to the above mentioned convention, the Judge, Jean-Paul Laborde, in his address suggested, All of us recognize that focusing entirely on militaristic, police and harsh law enforcement measures will in the long run weaken what we need most in the fight against terrorism the support of the people (Strong Rule of Law 2012). This is arguably, a flawed perception. It may take the population years to adjust to living with a constant threat of terrorism, yet if people are educated about terrorism and accordingly more vigilant and prepared, they will not necessarily weaken. There should be an international new trend of building national and international resiliency to terrorism. resilience is a key attribute in being prepared to deal with crisis and adversity whether it comes in the form of attack, a disaster, or a combat situation, and to recover in its aftermath. Resilience is a skill that can be improved both for individuals and communities, through building confidence, efficacy, problem solving skills, and social connectedness (Kindt 2006, 31). The case of the U.K. people during WWII Nazi Blitzkrieg can serve as a good example. Moreover, Israel too, with its 65 years of continuous living with terrorism can attest to the resilience of its civil populace under continuous

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terrorist threat. Furthermore, during the 1950s and the 1960s, the American population learned to live with a constant threat of a nuclear annihilation. It learned and assimilated some tools and behaviors that may be ridiculed today, for their efficacy in the event of a nuclear attack; nevertheless, these skills and tools helped the American people build their resilience and to persevere under the stress of a nuclear threat. Each situation, each threat, nuclear, biological or else, demands a focused, continuous effort to build, or to restore the resilience of former decades and update and upgrade it, according to the characteristics of current threats.

VIII. Examining the efficacy of terrorism as a political tool Terrorism, in all its current presentations is designed to terrify the civilian population and create enormous pressure on governments. Pressure so severe, that the respective government cannot deal with and either give-in to the terrorist demands - or collapse. The assertion that terrorism is a weapon of the weak, is only correct in the context of comparison between the robust military, bureaucratic and economical power and the limited combatant ability of terrorist groups. There are many theories attempting to explain the motivation of terrorists, as well as theories attempting to define the best tools to eliminate terrorism. It is fairly uncontroversial that it is the state that establishes the opportunities for violence within society. In the same vein, some suggest that, the state is efficient at killing and unrestrained states are far more deadly than the most destructive oppositional groups. The trick as states try to build capacity in low capacity places like Afghanistan and Iraq is to build a state capable enough to reduce violence but restrained enough to refrain from wide-scale

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repression.Building rule of law, and strong and responsive institutions are the answer to reducing violence (Young 2012). It possibly resonates well with some, but it is arguably, like asking, to eat the cake, and still have it. In most cases of current terrorism, the terrorists do not necessarily end up winning and attaining their goals; or at least they do not gain a decisive, final victory over the state. It may seem hard to negate the claim that blowing up the Madrid train in 2004, the London subway in 2005, or the Beslan 2004 massacre in Russia, not even to mention 9/11, were successful terrorist acts. It is however, imperative to switch at least temporarily, from the tactical perspective and to observe much wider array of terrorist attacks throughout the world, from a different point of view. No matter which terrorist group we are dealing with, they all have their ultimate goals, which usually are the destabilization of an existing regime/system, its collapse and its replacement by an alternative system sought as appropriate by the terrorists. Analysis of terrorist groups and their ultimate aims, methods and successes reveal that groups are more often than not, self-destructive and generally ineffective in the long run. Instinctively, one would assume that terrorist decision-making process follows the strategic model; but that is not necessarily so. Abrahms (2008, 88-93), suggests several tendencies of terrorist groups and organizations that contradict strategic thinking: 1. Terrorists do not achieve their declared political goals by attacking civilians. Attacking civilians makes governments more resolute and stubborn in their struggle with terrorists.

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2. While terrorism may be thought as last resort terrorists never use terrorism as such. (There are however, escalations in the forms of terrorism). Terrorists very infrequently seize opportunities to renounce their violence and become parties to peaceful solutions. Typically, terrorists reflexively reject government proposals to compromise, even if these offer significant concessions towards their formal political goals. 3. Certain terrorist attacks, such as kidnappings or bombings and suicide bombings, are often carried initially by anonymous perpetrators, which preclude the target countries from even suggesting political concessions. There is no one to talk to. (E.g. the September 11, 2001 attacks were not initially claimed by bin-Laden). 4. Even when faced with continuous failures to achieve their goals, or even if their claims have been resolved (e.g. the LTTE in Sri Lanka 1998, 2001) terrorist organizations often resist disbanding. 5. Terrorists can be much more effective if they would have strategically planned their actions. 6. Terrorist organizations, according the strategic model, should disband when it becomes clear that they fail to advance their political goal, yet they sometimes persevere for decades. This is possible, because terrorist goals are very often flexible. Goals that change with the passage of time, while the organizations remain. Such for example, is the case of al-Qaeda and its mujahedeen, who first fought the Soviets, in Afghanistan and than switched their target to the U.S. (after the Soviet demise and withdrawal). However, their ultimate goal was updated/adapted according to the

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change of target. Only during the 1990s al-Qaeda developed the idea of replacing the West with a caliphate etc. These trends are puzzling, and challenge the strategic model of terrorist organizations. These puzzles undermine several core assumptions: 1) That terrorists are motivated by rather stable political goals. 2) That they logically weigh the expected outcomes of their actions. 3) That they opt to use terrorism, because of its perceived political effectiveness. Since psychiatric studies ruled out the possibility that terrorists are insane, it implies that maybe their official statement of their goals, does not reflect their number one objective. What is the terrorist number one objective then? Abrahms (2008, 94) suggests an alternative explanation for terrorist bonding in groups and organizations, by introducing the natural system model: There is comparatively strong theoretical and empirical evidence that people become terrorists not to achieve their organizations declared political agenda, but to develop strong affective ties with other terrorist members. Does this make terrorist stronger? Does it make terrorists more effective? Maybe so, but according to Abrahms, only if we fail to apply all our most common strategies to each terrorism case: 1) Punitive strategies and a strict no-concessions paradigm (mostly favored by state leaders). 2) The belief that terrorism can be defused through political accommodation, and the envigorating of the fire under a stalled peace processes (if such is present). 3) Using the model of state building and democracy promotion.

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The socio/psychological natural system model should be given a serious consideration. Several of the concluding counterterrorist suggestions established by Abrahms and others, should clearly be further studied, and arguably, implemented; not in place of the previously mentioned three common approaches, but rather along with them. A greater investment in the absorption of dislocated populations, such as the angry Muslims of Europe or the Muslim communities in the United States - is necessary. Democratic societies must improve their records of fighting bigotry and xenophobia. However, no appeasement is suggested; instead - intelligence penetration of Muslim communities and terrorist organizations is a must. Patient cultivation of double agents and insertion of undercover operatives into such communities and group is very risky, but cannot be ruled out. Further cultivation of HUMINT in general, is the way to proceed. This does not mean dropping the other strategic tools, but rather accommodating all available tools and using them more wisely. Some studies attempt to prove that terrorism tend to be almost completely ineffective. In 2008, a study conducted on 648 terrorist groups between 19682006 in the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database, showed that only about 4% obtained their strategic goals. This study also found that all terrorist groups eventually end. Most of the groups in the sample studied, ended by joining the political process. Military force has rarely been the primary reason behind a terrorist groups end. (Jones & Lubicki 2008). Interestingly, religious groups proved to be much more resilient than others. However, none of the religious groups that ended has achieved a victory since 1968. Furthermore, In 2008 Max Abrams concluded that when terrorist attacks are combined with indiscriminate

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force (as in suicide terrorism), bargaining result is not likely; the pain suffered by the population significantly decreases governments readiness for concessions. since the first intifada, Palestinian violence has created pressure on Israel to change the status quo. Paradoxically, terrorism has simultaneously convinced Israelis that Palestinians are not committed to a two-state-solution, which has eroded support for making territorial concessions(Abrams 2008, 75). And yet, Audrey Kurth Cronin does not see the Palestinians (for example) as necessarily incompetent actors. Even if terrorist do not reach for the most catastrophic weapons (WMD) a terrorist attack may, in her opinion, dramatically change the policy or perception of a major state actor. Moreover, terrorism might prompt a negative domino effect leading to regional war, and even a nuclear war. (Kurth Cronin 2009, 166). For example, if al-Qaeda or its affiliate, were to obtain access to a Pakistani or Russian nuclear missile and successfully targets the U.S. or an European ally, or Israel, this may cause a retaliation against the source country of the nuclear device and thus cascade down to a more extensive nuclear war. While this is a very remote possibility, we should never completely rule it out. Kurth Cronin persuasively advocates her seven possible terrorist groups termination modes: decapitation, negotiated settlement, achievement of aims, implosion of the group, forceful suppression, tactical reorientation, and finally, as she precipitates al-Qaedas end, she suggests, that it might fully transform into an insurgency. Kurth Cronin sees little hope for al Qaedas end, resulting from decapitation, (as indeed seen today, after bin Ladens demise). The prospective killing of al Zawahiri, is not necessarily a wise move. (He is an unpopular successor to bin Laden and we may even benefit from him remaining as a leader). Further decimation of al-Qaeda by Special

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Forces and drone strikes is believed by many to be ineffective as well; and may possibly enhance Al-Qaidas mobilization capability. However, a possible groupimplosion or Transitioning out of terrorism and toward criminality or full insurgency is the final, worrisome precedent for al Qaeda (Kurth Cronin 2009, 191). While the alluded, possible transfer into a criminal entity may be questionable, there are stubborn claims of al Qaeda mingling with TOC in West Africa, in the Sahel, in the Tri Border Area of South America (TBA), as well as profiting from Talibans involvement in Afghan drug trade. (Ehrenfeld 2011; see also Shanty 2006 and Bronstein 2010). While al Qaeda core is sometimes claimed to be uninvolved in direct profiting from criminal activities, its more remote tentacles, especially in Latin America, and Africa, as well as its indirect affiliates, are indeed heavily involved in transnational criminal activity (Roth, Douglas and Wille 2004?). The variety of contrasting opinions expressed by respected scholars and analysts can be confusing. It seems that Audrey Kurth Cronin, Max Abrahms, Rebert Pape and many others, based their opinions regarding the actual efficacy of terrorism, on large and convincing databases. While some scholars suggest that terrorism is an inefficient coercive tool, others think otherwise. Contrary and clashing views in the academia are common. Yet at times, such contrasts are the result of analyzing the issue at hand, from a very specific perspective, rather from different factual data. If the issue is viewed from a different point of view the outcome may be different. For example, although the PLO (during the first intifada, 1987-1993) did not score politically against the Israelis, the PLOs failure made way for the rise of the religious Islamism in the form of Hamas and other radical Islamist factions, which perpetuate terrorism until this very day.

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Furthermore, terrorism, as a punitive action against the state, may not be as ineffective as it may seem; as can be seen in the approach to the effectiveness of suicide terrorism by Robert Pape. Unlike Abrahms, Pape suggested in 2005, that of the thirteen suicide terrorist campaigns that were completed during 19802003 period, seven correlated with significant policy changes by the target government. Such for example, is the case of Hezbollah attacks against the US military in 1983 (Beirut Embassy and Marine Barracks attacks); the Hezbollah attacks against Israeli military and GSS headquarters and military HQ in Lebanon (Tyre) in 1983-1982 respectively; Hamas attacks in Israel in 1994, and in 199495; or the Sri Lankan government entering sovereignty negotiations with the Tamil Tigers (LTTE), in 1993 and again in 2001. (Pape 2005, 64-76). And yet, as Pape further clarifies, terrorist victories are limited to a rather tactical scope: suicide terrorism can coerce states to abandon limited or modest goals, for example, by withdrawing from territory of low strategic importance, or, as in Israels case in 1994 and 1995, by temporary and partial withdrawal from a more important area. However, suicide terrorism is unlikely to cause targets to abandon goals central to their wealth or security (Pape 2005, 75). In his 2010 Book Cutting the Fuse, Pape further expands on the reasons behind suicide terrorism, which are not to be separated from terrorism in general. In several examples involving the U.S. robust military presence in the Gulf, in Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon, he successfully proves that the U.S. occupation is more significant contributor to Islamist terrorist attacks than Islam as a religion alone. (Pape 2010, 329). To be sure, Pape makes his case not only based on the American imperial experience; he asserts that his data base includes, for the first time, complete and exact data of terrorist attacks between the years 1980-

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2009, (Pape 2010, 7). Papes statistic data suggests that since 2004 the world has witnessed a substantial growth in suicide terrorist attacks, nearly 500% more than all the years from 1980-2003. (Pape 2010, 9). Among his more prominent, non-American examples, are the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (analysis of Hezbollah and Hamas) and the struggle of the LTTE in Sri Lanka. Some of his main conclusions are: Over 95% of all suicide attacks are a response to foreign occupation. Transnational terrorists like al-Qaeda are motivated by foreign occupation. Suicide terrorism poses the greatest threat to the United States and its allies today: While it is true that chemical, biological and nuclear weapons are more destructive than airplanes hitting buildings, it is the potential marriage of any mass casualty technology with suicide operations that most increases the danger of an attack since having individual terrorists guide these weapons greatly increases the odds of success. (Pape 2010, 330). In order to curb terrorism in general and suicide terrorism in particular, the U.S. and its allies and particularly Israel, should try to reduce their reliance on foreign occupation, as a main strategy ensuring national interests. Terminating military intervention in the struggle with terrorism completely is impossible; especially when attempting to obtain short term, tactical goals. To elaborate more on the topic of the effectiveness of terrorist groups, a wide range of studies suggests that the increase in the violence of terrorist acts and the growing pain to the target public - the lesser is

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terrorists coercive effectiveness. There is a tendency to view terrorist more discriminate attacks, singling military personnel or other government officials - as guerrilla attacks, which gives the terrorists certain legitimacy. Overall, studies show that acts of terrorism in general, create more support for right-winged political leadership in the target countries. Although Israel is an obvious choice to prove this statement, such trends are not unique to Israel. In a study published in 2011 by Christophe Chowanietz, he analyzes the reaction of mainstream political parties to acts of terrorism. This is a statistical analysis of 181 terrorist incidents in five countries (Germany, Spain, France, U.K. and U.S.), over the period 1990-2006. The overall results point to the conclusion that as terrorist attacks happen repetitively, they are more likely to cause more criticism. The attacks magnitude, in terms of casualties and damage, will also cause intensive rallying around the flag. As previously stated, the public of a country attacked by terrorists is unlikely to support concessions to the terrorists and is likely to support harsh measures to be taken by the government in retaliation. In the case of Israel for example, terrorist attacks cause the public to increasingly believe that the Palestinians are not really motivated by a relatively modest goal of a two-state solution and they rather seek to harm Israelis no matter what. I was ready to divide the land but they are notbecause they say either them or us, I say usas long as the other side [Palestinians] is not ready to recognize our right to exist as a nation state of the Jewish people, I am not ready to forego a millimeter. I am not even willing to talk about territory. After landfor-peace [the Oslo accords of 1993] became landfor-terror and

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land-for-rockets, I am no longer willing to bury my head in the sand (Leibler 2012). In a much similar way, the Chechen terrorism in Russia convinced the Russian population that the Chechens will harm the Russians no matter what, on top of any separatist demand they may have (Abrahms 2011, 591). It is thus puzzling why terrorists, in view of the poor fruits for their toils, are still perpetrating terrorist acts. For one thing, terrorists not necessarily read terrorism related studies; moreover, while not insane, they may very well be wrongly convinced that their efforts will eventually yield the desired results. Interestingly, al-Qaeda, the Hezbollah and the Hamas, all relate to three prominent victories to prove their way correct: the U.S. and French pull out from Lebanon after the 1983 suicide attack; the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, and the U.S. pull out from Somalia in 1994. All three cases in question portray what is better perceived as guerrilla warfare, than terrorism. Another important explanation for the perpetuation of terrorist acts, is the fact that, Whereas terrorist acts generally fail to promote government concessions, the violence against civilians can perpetuate the terrorist group [life] by attracting media attention, spoiling peace processes, and boosting membership, morale, cohesion, and external support. (Abrahms 2011, 592). Eventually, no matter how one looks upon the terrorist phenomenon, there is no realistic way to totally discredit its effectiveness. This however is a far cry from declaring terrorism effective. Thus, each case of terrorism, each terrorist group must be studied within the context of the root reasons for its creation, the society within which it operates, its targets and its declared goals. Moreover, in spite of the constant gradual decimation of al Qaeda, it is by far the most resilient and pervasive international terrorist movement. Al-Qaeda is

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arguably, the hardest terrorist idea to find, to contain, to fix and to defeat, because of its global scope and outreach. Unlike the case of Israel and the Palestinian conflict, however distant may the Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement be it is still closer than the ultimate defeat of al Qaeda, which will arguably, keep on evolving and morphing for many years to come.

IX. Terrorism and WMD: are terrorists likely to obtain and use WMD? Once convincing arguments have been made regarding the efficacy of terrorism, and how to deal with it the best we can, in its conventional form, the likelihood of a terrorist incident involving the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) must be assessed. For the purpose of this paper the definition of WMD will include the CBRN weapons only and will explicitly exclude conventional explosives. Based on the previous part of this paper, some may conclude that if al Qaeda follows the Strategic Model and indeed fights to obtain political, nationalist and/or religious goals it is very likely to continue the terrorist campaigns of its choosing. As can be deduced from current affairs, while al-Qaeda core has been heavily depleted, it is not dead, not as an idea nor as an actual group. In fact, no matter what is the actual motivation behind the perpetuation of terrorist activity, this activity is certain to continue in the foreseeable future. Although suggested by many, perhaps the most eloquent positing of this truism is that of Walter Laqueurs:

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 Even in the unlikely case that all global conflicts will be resolvedthis will not necessarily be the end of terrorismthere are bound to be ups and downs as far as the frequency and the political impact of terrorism is concerned. But there is a huge reservoir of aggression, and for this reason terrorism will be with us as far as one can look ahead. (Laqueur 2003, 231). No popular claim suggesting the demise of terrorism in general and suicide terrorism in particular, can be pointed to. Furthermore, as Pape has posited before, it is the potential marriage of any mass casualty technology with suicide operations that most increases the danger of an attack (Pape 2010, 330). It is common logic, that although terrorists mostly fail to achieve their ultimate goals, terrorist violence as a coercive tool works at least to a certain degree. Moreover, although a mute question, at this point it remains to be seen, whether the coercive power of terrorism will be enhanced should terrorist combatants obtain effective weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Although the United States would most probably, survive a single, major WMD terrorist attack, (even a nuclear one), the results of such an attack would be hard to imagine. While many analysts project that terrorist WMD attack on the U.S. and/or its allies is a fait accompli, this assessment should be revisited from the viewpoint of pure logic, scientific data and the existing intelligence. As currently as the end of 2012, some analysts like the Pentagons outgoing counsel general; Jeb Johnson was quoted as saying to the Oxford Union: there will come a tipping pointat which so many of the leaders and operatives of al Qaeda and its affiliates have been killed or captured such that al Qaeda as we know ithas been effectively destroyedAt that pointour efforts should no longer be considered an armed conflict (Zakaria 2012).

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However, it remains questionable, whether the al Qaeda ideology could be defeated so soon, the answer to this question is not as logically forthcoming as it may seem. While curbing our military offensive may indeed be logical from the economic perspective, we must keep in mind that all al-Qaeda needs in order to resurrect, is a single, successful, high-magnitude attack. Such attack is possible, and arguably, forthcoming. Suicide terrorism is not often affiliated with anything even remotely close to insanity. Ariel Merari states in his book, Driven to Death that, personal reason for committing suicide cannot be found in the case of most suicide bomber nowadays (Merari 2010, 13, 221-222). Merari also makes a clear distinction between personal suicide (which stems from personal, intolerable emotional pain), and a terrorist-group-related suicide bombing; whereas the suicide bombing is seen by the community and by the perpetrator, mostly as an altruistic deed. (although it carries some personal benefits). Thus, if we disregard for the purpose of this paper, the unlikely possibility that a terrorist WMD attack will be perpetrated by some crazy professor lone wolf - we are dealing with individuals, which either may perpetrate such an attack in order to further their political, nationalist and religious goals; or do so, for less logical reason of gaining the best media coverage, more supporters and new volunteers, recognition and funding for their group etc., as well as their, afore mentioned, social need for camaraderie. The most likely reason is some form an amalgamated version of all reasons mentioned. Arguably, it would be impossible to get a better media coverage, and world attention - than al-Qaeda got through the September 11, 2001 conventional attacks. It seems that the

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repetition of a similar-sized attack would be satisfactory. Yet some analysts believe that terrorists feel that escalation is a must. Laqueur for one, suggests that, It is only a question of time until radiological, chemical, or biological weapons will be used more or less systematically by terrorist groups; the first steps in this direction have been made(Laqueur 2003, 226). We have learned from such first steps, mentioned above by Laqueur, that seemingly, the realistic chances of terrorists actually building an effective weapon of mass destruction, from scratch are very small, due to the technical & scientific complexity and the hardships involved in obtaining the nuclear/biological or chemical and/or radiological materials. In the period between 1993- 1995 the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo terrorist group which was formidably organized, very well funded; possessed several real estate properties (used for conducting WMD related biological and chemical experiments); as well as medical doctors, chemists and biologists - failed to successfully disperse the sarin nerve agent (of which they successfully produced tons of), which is an easier task than dealing with, the manufacturing and the deployment of a stable biological or nuclear weapon. (Fletcher 2012). Aum Shinrikyo was a religious cult, without realistic nationalist grievances. However, it wanted to put an end to the word, in the form they new. (Aum Shinrikyo Closer Look n.d.). Al Qaedas leadership has much more realistic goals, both political and religious. As expressed in bin Ladens 1998 fatwa [judgment/ruling]: On that basis, and in compliance with God's order, we issue the following fatwa to all Muslims The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies -- civilians and military -- is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the

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al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of Almighty God, "and fight the pagans all together as they fight you all together," and "fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in GodWe -- with God's help -- call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God's order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it. We also call on Muslim ulema, leaders, youths, and soldiers to launch the raid on Satan's U.S. troops and the devil's supporters allying with them, (bin-Laden 1998). While the 1998 fatwa is very specific about who to kill and why, it does not explore bin Ladens intimate thoughts as to how to bring total destruction on the Crusaders and Jews. In fact, bin Ladens strategys was well linked to the concept of a War of a Thousand Cuts. It seem clear that knowing that he did not have the ultimate weapon of destruction, bin Laden linked his terrorist campaign directly to causing immense economic harm, so well exemplified in 9/11. It is certain, that Sept. 11 was intended to create a serious economic setback for the U.S. According to [the Americans] own admissions [said bin Laden on Al Jazeera interview in Nov. 2001]the share of the losses on the Wall Street market reached 16% they said this number is a record. The gross amount that is traded in that market reaches $4trillion;so if we multiply 16% with $4 trillion to find out the loss that affected the stocks, it reaches $640 billion of losses (Gartenstein Ross 2011). Bin Laden new that this description falls short of the actual full damage, incurred through adding up the building and construction losses, lost productivity etc., reaching the figure of $1 trillion; an estimate, believed to be overall accurate. In an October 2004 video, Osama made clear that al-Qaeda sought to involve America and its allies in economically draining wars, not only on American soil, but also all over Americas allied Muslim world. (Gartenstein-Ross 2011).

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Furthermore, following the major crisis of the U.S. economy in 2008, America became so economically weak, that since then, al-Qaeda and its affiliates may be perceived as indeed pursuing the thousand cuts, bleeding America to bankruptcy. To bring America down we do not need a big strikeIn such an environment of security phobia that is sweeping America, it is more feasible to stage smaller attacks that involve less players and less time to launch and thus we may circumvent the security barriers America worked so hard to erect. (AQIAP to INSPIRE in Gartenstein-Ross 2011). However, that was not bin-Ladens only plan. Al-Qaeda has attempted to manufacture weaponized chemical agent in Afghanistan in the 1990s and unsuccessfully used chlorine gas in Iraq, under the tutelage of Abu Musab alZarqawi. Al-Qaedas core leadership arguably never officially supported Zarqawis attempt. Although occasionally, training its volunteers in Afghanistan in the use of chemical agents, bin-Laden kept on asserting that acquiring of more potent WMD is an Islamic duty, and offered a number of explanations for the rationale of using such weapons as means to escalate the killing and fighting against you (Americans), on grounds of destroying an international conspiracy to control the world (Mowatt Larssen 2010). Bin-Ladens threats were not empty ones: he signaled a very specific reason for using WMD in alQaedas quest to destroy the global status quo, and thus to create optimal conditions for the overthrowing of the autocratic regimes of the Middle East. Bin Ladens argument was that although Islam outlaws weapons of mass destruction, they are justifiable as means to counter the American hegemony. In order to destroy America and the West, bin-Laden advocated the ultimate WMD (and thus the nuclear and the biological ones), that can cause real mass casualty and not

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secondary, small size attacks, through the use of chemical or radiological weapons. "If Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants had been interested in . . . small-scale attacks, there is little doubt they could have done so now" (MowattLarssen 2010). Al-Qaeda spent at least a decade attempting to steal, buy or construct improvised nuclear device (IND) and possibly, to also obtain or create from scratch biological weapons. There are claims that alQaeda indeed attempted to develop a weaponized anthrax weapon, a project supposedly, supervised personally, by al-Zawahiri. (Joscelyn 2008). Although in 2011, some cracks appeared in the FBI case against the late Bruce Ivin (Markon 2011), these cracks, never pointed to al-Qaeda as the culprit behind the anthrax letters case of 2001. At worst, this case may remain unsolved. Nevertheless, the United States started ramping up its bioterrorism strategy in 2009, with President Obamas overt acknowledgement that the damage from a massive terrorist biological attack is on par with a nuclear attack: When it comes to the proliferation of bio weapons and the risk of an attack, the world community faces a greater threat based on a new calculus. President Obama fully recognizes that a major biological weapons attack on one of the worlds major cities could cause as much death and economic and psychological damage as a nuclear attack. (Tauscher 2009). The Reagans and Bush Sr. administrations were already deeply involved in the issue of biological weapons, vis a vis Soviet Unions Gorbachev, as part of the Cold War. (Hoffman 2009, 306, 350, 366-367). Yet, there arguably must have been some obviously highly classified information, that led Hillary Clinton, while speaking before the Review

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Conference Of Biological and Toxin Weapons in Geneva, on December 7, 2011, to state, In 2001, we found evidence in Afghanistan that al-Qaida was seeking the ability to conduct bioweapons attacks. And less than a year ago, [2011], al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula made a call to arms for and I quote brothers with degrees in microbiology or chemistry to develop a weapon of mass destruction.(Clinton 2011). Furthermore: crude, yet effective weapons, may be produced, with little means and effort, even by less than scientists and these weapons may effectively sicken many. Many pathogens are daily used in legitimate biological research, and thus may be deviated to serve dual purposes. At times, a legitimate research aimed at saving lives, may also be used to manufacture deadly diseases. Moreover, the detection tools developed so far are very slow and inadequate. PHYSorg advised in January 2013, that new, faster and improved equipment has recently surfaced. (PHYSorg 2013). Additional information about some advances in the field of bio detection has been posted also on other websites (New BioDetection 2013). Regarding the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1975, Secretary of State, H. Clinton suggested that despite the fact that countries that have never joined the Convention no longer claim that acquiring biological weapons is their legitimate goal - the international community must improve its domestic and international capabilities of bio - detection and response-time. We need public health systems that can quickly diagnose outbreaksand mobilize the right medical resources and personnel. By making any one country more secure, we make the international community more secure at the same time (Clinton 2011). 80

In truth, the microbiological and biological engineering knowledge and technology are already spread all over the world. There is no stopping this Genie. It is utterly up to the individual state actors to safeguard the microbiological knowhow. Theoretically, each country, as well as terrorist group, can take their pick of any bacteria or virus strands, since these exists freely in the nature and they can hire scientist/s to improve their bug of choice through genetic engineering. However, in order to successfully weaponize bacteria or virus, the major problem is to stabilize the bio agent and make it viable for an extended period of time; then find a tested and successful way to deliver the bio agent to the target. Since, once the out of the bottle, the results of a bio attack are at best a well-educated guess and the disease spores can spread uncontrollably, there is always a probability of a blowback (the disease causing the sickening of the population of the aggressor as well). For that reason, although a well equipped laboratory can produce the spores of choice, the only effective way to protect oneself from a biological attack, is by having a pre-emptive intelligence, and protection capability. Such capability not only discloses the potential perpetrator, but also the bacteria/virus involved and thus allows for faster identification of existent contamination and a simultaneous inoculation of the population against it (in case of a viral attack e.g. smallpox), or distribution of appropriate antibiotics to fight mass bacterial infection (e.g. anthrax, plague etc.). In fact, the potential horrors of biological warfare, mortality and economically wise, can be even more troubling than a localized, limited yield nuclear attack (such as Hiroshimas). With the development of biological warfare, this type of weaponry by default, became

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the weak mans nuclear bomb and it indeed questions the actual deterrence of the nuclear powers. A pre-emptive, (or retaliatory) bio attack, may take some time (hours, days or weeks) to recognize (due to bacterias/viruss incubation period), and may be very difficult to attribute to any specific aggressor. Since in the case of Islamist fanaticism we are often faced with suicide terrorism, it is easy to imagine a suicide bomber or several bombers infected with a certain very contagious and lethal disease (or a combination of deadly bacteria and viruses), boarding planes destined for the U.S. or any allied country and all they have to do is shake hand, sneeze, or, just breathe(Hoffman 2009).

While there is no good, fact-based, answer to the question, why terrorists and especially al-Qaeda, have so far failed to realize their WMD threats; there is a good possibility that such efforts were timely thwarted and kept classified in the archives of the intelligence community. On the other hand, it is possible that while a less threatening WMD (chemical or radiological) could have been obtained by al-Qaeda, it might have been perceived as not effective enough, and was thus shunned by the group. This suggestion is contested in view of the U.S. 1998 strike on the Sudanese pharmacological facility of Shifa. The U.S. Department of State released a concise official rationale for the bombing of Shifa: The facilities the U.S. attacked on August 20, 1998 were central to the bin Ladin networks ability to conduct acts of terror around the world. ...the U.S. has reliable intelligence that the bin Ladin network has been actively seeking to acquire weapons of mass destructionincluding chemical weaponsfor use against United States interests. Therefore, the U.S. also attacked one facility in Sudan associated with chemical weapons and the bin Ladin network. This facility is located within a secured chemical plant in the northeast Khartoum area. U.S. intelligence over the past few months has indicated that the bin Ladin network has been actively seeking to

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acquire chemical weapons for use against United States interests. Bin Ladin has extensive ties to the Sudanese Government and its industrial sector. The U.S. is confident this Sudanese Governmentcontrolled facility is involved in the production of chemical weapons agents (Barletta 1998, 117). Some of the other common explanations for absence of WMD terrorist attacks in the U.S. are: The protective measures, hastily erected by the DHS and the government, prevented the repetition of attacks. (This reasoning was favored by the Bush administration). In view of the failure of FEMA during Katrina crisis of 2002, the above suggestion about the efficacy of the U.S. preparedness is hard to take seriously. Tightening of immigration procedures prevented another 9/11. While almost certainly the improved border security turned away, or nailed few suspicious characters or prospective terrorists, it certainly did but little to deal with the homegrown brand. Moreover, it is probable that al-Qaedas leadership has foreseen such U.S. steps and possibly started to rely more on non-Arabs, with foreign, European or Asian passports. More than 300 million (!) people are legally admitted into the U.S. every year. Arguably, at least a few of them are Middle Eastern. If terrorists havent filtered into the country in potentially damaging numbers, this cant be because of U.S. border security. It must be because they arent trying very hard or because they are far less dedicated, diabolical, and competent than the common image would suggest (Mueller 2006, 117). Terrorists are very patiently lying down, and patiently waiting for the right moment. While it may take a long time to plan an attack, the length of this time-out is relative. The preparation of 9/11 took only about two

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years. They did not allow years upon years to lapse between the next operations and Madrid, for example, took less than six months to plan and execute. In view of the fact that the Iraq invasion, served as a harsh provocation - one would expect an attack in the U.S. soon after 2003. Yet, In May 2003al-Zawahiri, promised attacks in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Egypt, Yemen and Jordan and shortly thereafter, Osama himself cited Italy, Japan, Australia, and the United States as targets. (Mueller 2006, 179). Only three years later, some of the Middle Eastern, countries mentioned in the threats (not all, despite a direct threat) were attacked. The history of biological threats, as stated before, goes back to the Cold War. However, back then they were not linked to terrorism. In 2003, the U.S. government, after weighing the intelligence regarding al-Qaeda and WMD, issued a warning, that there was a high probability of an al-Qaeda WMD attack in the next two years. (Mowatt-Larssen 2010). In view of the disclosures regarding the possibility that the Bush administrations intentions to invade Iraq, relied on inadequate intelligence, the whole WMD scare may have been a disinformation at best. However, administrations have changed, and political convictions of the present administration remained convinced in the seriousness and merit of al-Qaedas WMD threat. President Obama reiterated this threat (with a specific focus on nuclear attack) as the biggest threat to the existence of the U.S. in his 2010 and 2011 National Security Strategy. Moreover, the magnitude of the terrorist WMD threat is reiterated also by the fact that it is repeatedly stated in other major documents reflecting this Administrations policy.

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 The Danger of nuclear terrorism is the greatest threat to global security. Terrorist organizations, including al-Qaida, have engaged in efforts to develop and acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and if successful, they are likely to use them. (NSC 2011, 8). In the same document, President Obama also repeats that the major threat to the United States continues to be from al-Qaeda and its affiliates, and that while binLadens demise marked the most important strategic milestone in the American efforts to defeat al-Qaida, al-Qaida continues to pose a direct and significant threat to the United States (NSC 2011, 3). The presidential reiteration of the nuclear and other WMD threats, points out to an extremely high level of the presidential confidence in the quality of the intelligence at his disposal. While different analysts may suggest bias or alarmism, it seems that the administration is indeed convinced that the threat is very real and possibly imminent. For the sake of addressing this issue in a balanced way, additional points of view will be addressed.

As President Obama posited, bin-Ladens demise, is certainly not the end of alQaida and its affiliates. Moreover, the theoretical WMD threat to the United States is not totally limited to al Qaeda, as the threats source. However unlikely, other groups, allegedly unaffiliated with al Qaeda, may surprise us all with a new threat and new capabilities. One potentially significant, threat in this respect, is the threat from Hezbollah. Already back in the 1990s, the world faced a diffusion of suicide terrorism a tactic: despite the profound theological differences between the Salafist/jihadist views of Al Qaeda and the Shiite Hezbollah, Bin Laden sent his operatives to talk to the Hezbollah leadership. They

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came back with what were effectively operational blueprints for how to plan and execute suicide attacks, especially against hard targets like embassies. The East African embassy attacks resulted in part from this example of diffusion. In the 1980s Hezbollah was really thought of as an innovatorThe subsequent history of suicide terrorism is best thought about as a diffusion process (Horowitz 2008). Islamist fanaticism is likely to thrive also because for a decade, while bin Laden eluded the U.S., he very likely became a model martyr and an example to follow. Current events in the Middle East, the African Horn, the Sahel and North Africa, as well as current developments in Eurasia and South Asia, all point out to the fact that bin Ladens philosophy is still well entrenched in the hearts of many followers, all around the world. All the social, political and religious forces that triggered the Islamist terrorist threat are still in place. Moreover, bin-Ladens death, or even a complete destruction of al-Qaeda (if it were to happen), are very unlikely to significantly undercut fanaticism and terrorism and only time will tell, if the U.S. and its allies will prevail in the face of the continuing radical Islamist threat (Cordesman 2011). We now know, that bin-Ladens death indeed did not cause any al-Qaeda implosion, but we are still wondering as to what will happen next. In his excellent book, The Longest War, Peter Bergen dedicates a lot of serious thought and ink to the severity of al Qaedas WMD attack threat. Bergen suggests that in attacking America on September 11, 2001 bin-Laden expected a cascade effect that will bring about something like Samuel Huntingtons Clash of Civilizations. But that did not happen. (Bergen 2011, 92). It seems that his call for a holy war was not accepted by the Muslim masses. While anti American demonstrations were held in several major Muslim cities like Jakarta and Karachi, these demonstrations were not really massive and

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impressive. Moreover, the vast majority of the Muslim governments reacted by supporting the fight against, nor for, al-Qaeda. Bin-Ladens grand project of transforming the Muslim world into a militant caliphate has been a resounding failure (Bergen 2011, 93). Moreover, 9/11 caused the occupation of additional Arab lands by the United States and at the same time, the Middle Eastern autocracies became even stronger than before. While the Bush administration became alarmist, regarding the possibility of a future al Qaeda attacks on the U.S. the administration was not alone in sharing such frightening image of the future. Bergen suggests, that for years after 9/11, surveys by foreign Policy magazine of about one hundred of the countrys top foreign policy experts, showed that about one quarter of them consistently believed that a very largescale attack by al-Qaeda was likely within months, while some two thirds expected such attack within five years. (97). Even years later, in December 2008, the congressionally authorized Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism concluded in its report: it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013. The Commission further believes that terrorists are more likely to be able to obtain and use a biological weapon than a nuclear weapon (World at Risk 2008, XV). On November 8, 2001 bin-Laden supposedly said to a Pakistani journalist Hamid Mir who interviewed him, that if the United states were to use nuclear weapon against al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda would possibly retaliate with chemical and nuclear weapons of its own. Mir also claimed that al-Qaeda has nuclear weapon and keeps it as a deterrent (Mir 2001). While it is true that bin-Laden possibly entertained the idea of obtaining a nuclear weapon, and according to Peter Bergen, he turned to a retired Pakistani nuclear scientist Dr. Sultan Bashiruddin,

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shortly before the 9/11 attacks (Bergen 2011, 215-217) - the two meetings between bin-Laden and the nuclear scientists lead to nothing, but with the arrest and the interrogation of John Walker Lindh, the CIA learned that allegedly, the second wave of the 9/11 would involve WMD. In June 2002, Abu Ghaith, alQaedas spokesman, (and bin Ladens son in law, who was recently arrested and awaits a trial in the U.S.) explained the logic behind al Qaedas plan to use WMD: We have not reached parity with them. We have the right to kill 4 million Americans 2 million of them children and to exile twice as many and wound and cripple hundreds of thousands. Furthermore, it is our right to fight them with chemical and biological weapons, so as to afflict them with the fatal maladies that afflicted the Muslims because of the [Americans] chemical and biological weapons (Abu Gheith 2002). Abu Gheits statement was followed by a 2003 fatwa by the Saudi cleric al-Fadh, who religiously sanctioned the use of WMD to kill American civilians, while comparing the catapults of Mohammads times withWMD. Interestingly, al Qaeda has always made their grandiose WMD intentions publicly clear, despite the fact that privately some al Qaeda leaders were aware that their WMD program was strictly an amateur affair Another wing of al Qaeda assessed, correctly as it turned out, that these types of weapons [WMD] would only bring small tactical benefits because the group was likely to only acquire or build weapons that were quite primitive. But even al-Qaeda doves understood that they should call those primitive devices (Bergen 2011, 219). While Bergen belittles the terrorist threat of WMD terrorist attack, and bases his analysis on well compiled incidents, and even scientific assumptions as to the prospective threat of a crude radiological detonation. Based on Graham Allisons findings in his 2004 book Nuclear Terrorism, there are at least two options that

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al-Qaeda could use if it realistically desired to obtain a nuclear weapon. One option would be to use the black market and TOC connections to purchase a tactical nuclear device of a very low or moderate yield of 0.25 KT (Allison 2004, 47-49) from the Russian arsenal (It remains unknown, how well are these weapons currently secured), or to build a crude nuclear device, which would promise only partial nuclear explosion, and thus not a fully developed chainreaction (fizzle), yet potent enough to be catastrophic. Scientists of the Nuclear Control Institute in Washington D.C. declare, that in order to build a nuclear device terrorists would need only10 kg of Pu 239, or 52 kg of a 94% enriched U235. (Carson et..al. n.d.). Some variation on the quantity of fissile material needed to build an IND is presented by the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission of the UN, but the risks remain the same. (Ferguson and Potter 2009). There are many claims reporting the theft, or unexplained disappearance of various amounts of both, Pu 239 and HEU. And yet, according to Peter Bergen, back in 2002 a former UN weapons inspector David Albright concluded that, it was virtually impossible for al-Qaeda to have acquired any type of nuclear weapon, [other] U.S. government analysts also came to the same conclusion (Bergen 2011, 222). If such was indeed the final verdict on the topic, it suggests that President Obama and his administration, reiterated the nuclear threat only to protect their back in a case of an attack. The truth is probably somewhere between the alarmists and those who belittle the nuclear threat. In any case, this threat cannot be just overlooked. Continued awareness, increased preparedness and general vigilance regarding WMD terrorist threat must be exercised.

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PART THREE: DEMOCRACIES AT WAR: THE AMERICAN AND ISRAELI COUNTERTERRORISM PARADIGMS TESTED

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X. The Counterterrorism Models of the United States and Israel: Background There are major differences between the United States and Israel, with regard to the mutual threat of terrorist attacks. Both, the US and Israel face the terrorist threat. While Israel lives with a daily terrorist attack threat, since its independence, the U.S. has experienced many terrorist incidents throughout its existence, however, most of the terrorist incidents that occurred on US soil, were relatively small, and not very concerning to the America public as a phenomenon, with one or two exceptions: the 1995 bombing in Oklahoma City, and the 1993 attempt to topple the Twin Towers of the Trade Center by al Qaeda. Israelis have faced, since the 1948 declaration of independence, a continuously evolving, mostly escalating terrorist process, with occasional lulls. Both countries experienced a surge in terrorist activities with the onset of suicide terrorism. For Israel this process begun in 1982, with the Hezbollah bombing of against the Israeli GSS headquarters in Tyre, Lebanon. For the U.S. this process started back in 1983, with the Hezbollah suicide attack on the Marine Barracks and the U.S. Embassy in Lebanon; and later, the Libyan bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 in December 1988. For the sake of objectivity, it is of value to mention that entirely unrelated to Israel or the US, 1980 was the year the suicide bombings started worldwide. This phenomenon was arguably, started by the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq.1983 was also the beginning of the Sri Lankan LTTE suicide terrorist activities. While suicide terrorism, is not new, it was restarted in the 1980s after

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a long break, since WWII, and its targets were primarily overseas Americans, and American property there. In the 24-year period from 1980 to 2003, there were just under 350 suicide terrorist attacks around the world of which fewer than 15% could reasonably be considered directed against Americans. By contrast, in the six years from 2004 to 2009, the world has witnessed 1,833 suicide attacks of which 92% are antiAmerican in origin. America has made progress in bringing Western institutions to Iraq, but democracy has not proved to be a panacea for reducing terrorism (Pape and Feldman 2010, 4). While anti American terrorism, in general, and suicide terrorism in particular, at no time in American history, actually threatened the American public on a daily, and widespread basis; from the very onset of such attacks against Israel was accepted as a direct threat to the Israeli civilian public, and moreover, it was perceived as a symbolic threat to the very continued existence of the Israeli society and state.

XI. Can the American and Israeli Democracies Ultimately Defeat Terrorism? The definition of defeat can be misleading and it is yet another open-ended question whether or not, defeating terrorism means killing, or forever imprisoning every single terrorist. Audrey Kurth Cronin posits, Ten Years into a trillion dollar effort to answer the attacks of September 11, 2001, it is difficult to tell whether U.S. counterterrorism is achieving its intended effects, much less explain how it fits within a viable American grand strategy. As dramatic changes unfold in the Arab world, experts still debate whether or not the United States is winning the fight against al Qaeda (Kurth Cronin 2012). The 2012 - 2013 dramatic events, be it Ben Ghazi attack on the American diplomatic mission on September 11, 2012; the hostage taking by a large scale,

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and well planned, multinational Islamist terrorists on the East Algerian gas plant on January 23, 2013 (Amir 2013); the July 23, 2013 massive suicide terrorist attacks on the Iraqi Abu Gharib and Taji prisons, (Schreck 2013) and the liberation of several hundreds of major al-Qaeda operatives or the July 30, 2013 Taliban attack on Pakistani prison in Peshawar further, and the freeing of close to 200 Islamist fighters (Shah Sherazi 2013) - support the above Cronins question. Has al Qaeda indeed been weakened, or has it just changed its strategy and spread out, like a metastasizing cancer? Are our allies and we successful in diminishing the number of prospective terrorists (al-Qaeda and other Islamist volunteers)? Are our allies effectively denying al Qaeda and it affiliates safe havens? And most importantly: are we ready to absorb a future attack and are we able to effectively respond to one? So far the US government have pursued a mostly, open ended strategy/policy, with the actual cessation of all US military activities overseas only somewhere in the dim future. The Obama administration, doubtlessly, realizes the huge costs of the U.S. massive deployment in Afghanistan and is indeed taking the steps required to withdraw and thus help the U.S. troubled financial status. However, Both the U.S. and Israel are still adhering to terrorist body counts as metrics to estimate counterterrorism success. We dont know any better and sadly, body count is a poor indicator of al Qaedas capability to hit us once, or more than one time, and maybe even to hit us with WMD. After all, as said before, all al-Qaida needs to resurrect, is one single devastating attack. Somewhere along this longest U.S. war, the American leadership lost the focus on what arguably, should be our strategic target the decimation of al Qaeda, and our battle

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calculus was expanded to include the Taliban, which should not be confused with al Qaeda and it is very questionable if the U.S. should be still fighting it. Yet another question is whether or not The West should be fighting al Qaedas affiliates and which ones, of the so many, should it fight and how? While there is a general agreement that al Qaeda core, (in Afghanistan/Pakistan), has been effectively diminished, the most dangerous and active al Qaeda branch is currently in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP). Moreover, al-Qaedas North African branch (AQIM) and the Iraq node, (AQI), are also very potent and dangerous. Furthermore, we also face homegrown American-born or bred, alQaeda affiliates. The American public has not been educated in terrorist attack preparedness. If al Qaeda will successfully attack the homeland, it will bring back, not only the traumas of the past; it will challenge the American economy, and its national interests and shake the very core of our democratic structures, morals, norms and beliefs. Since it is clear that assuring 100 percent impregnability to terrorist attack is impossible, the U.S. government must clearly focus our counterterrorism strategy on attainable goals, or else we may be engaged in chasing al Qaedas shadows forever. Kurth Cronin states, Fear is not a strategy. Zero risk is a fantasy. To regain their balance and perspective after a decade of action and apprehension about al Qaeda, Americans and their government should return to the basics of strategic thought, particularly the relationship between ends, ways and means(Kurth Cronin 2012). In view of the fact that completely defeating al Qaeda and its affiliates seems out of reach at this point, should the international community attempt to diffuse terrorism by resorting to nonviolent measures, reconciliation, peace processes, and democratization? Hardly. Al Qaeda and its affiliates, Hamas and Hezbollah

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and other Palestinian groups, are unlikely to accept a politically negotiated settlement, which will disarm them and diffuse the various groups as unnecessary. In fact the opposite may happen, if the world attempts to approach terrorists with peaceful measures alone, terrorists tend to ramp up their attacks during peace processes, precluding concessions. Democracies are widely seen as the preferred host for terrorist groupsand clearly, withholding concessions does not deter terrorists from committing the violence (Abrahams 2011, 592). It seems that the best way to deal with terrorism is possibly, somewhere between the different approaches described above. Since terrorism is an amorphous entity, there are no two identical forms or terrorist groups. Each group requires a well focused and perfectly tailored, coherent strategy. Currently, we must seek to tailor the response to al-Qaeda, or Hamas and Hezbollah, not along any ideas of rapprochement; (in spite of al Qaedas notorious suggestion of truce (Cole and Shubailat 2009), al Qaeda never showed any interest is any kind of negotiations or settlement; nor did the U.S.). Israeli Palestinian Oslo accords prove that Palestinian Terrorist organizations would rather continue fighting than renouncing violence and the very annihilation of Israel. It seems that as mentioned before, the very perpetuation of the existence of a given terrorist group, could very well be a goal on its own. Without removing any of the CT tools we have and after defining how we conceive al Qaedas and each other terrorist groups end we must choose the tools to reach this goal. A coherent strategy, (one defining a clear an consistent path of means for an end) will not abandon the use of force, but whatever final

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means are chosen, they must logically fit the goal of ending al-Qaeda or other terrorist group. While such coherent plan is arguably, easier to create with respect to local groups, with clearly defined, localized grievances (e.g. Hamas etc.), the case of the transnational and global aims of al-Qaeda, makes the creation of such coherent plan extremely challenging. Terrorism is defeated every time, that those who were the terrorists, either renounce the use of violence, and join peaceful political process to pursue their goals; or whenever they are suppressed hard enough to forever stop significantly hurting the civilian public, the military and the legal political processes. The example of Sri Lanka and the LTTE, is an example of such terrible suppression of terrorism by the government, that it indeed made the LTTE capitulate and lay down their arms. However, as stated before, suppression has its democracydefeating, costs. While democracies must retain their high moral standards, appeasement or any sort of capitulation, to terrorist demands, will not defeat terrorism; carefully measured and balanced suppression, along with other nonviolent counterterrorist measures - eventually might. Although it may sound as a biased statement, the application of both the offensive and defensive measures, as a long-term tactics, is likely to eventually defeat Palestinian terrorism and less assuredly - al Qaeda. Suppression in this context is not the military offensive measure only. It is the result of combining military, intelligence, law enforcement along with homeland preparedness, which create a resilient public, (strong in the face of terror and providing strong support to its government). Palestinian terrorism is very different from the global Islamist terrorism challenge of alQaeda. Indeed, one has to be aware that the actual connection between al-Qaeda and Israel is at present time slim. Yet it may prove tragic to accept a notion that

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such connection is altogether nonexistent. In 2011, the world first heard about the alleged al-Qaeda amassing in the Sinai Peninsula. However, despite some similarities with al-Qaeda, at least for now, the terrorists that in July 2011 and in August 2012 attacked and killed Egyptians from El Arish, and in 2012, Egyptian border patrol soldiers (and in April 2013 fired rockest from Sinai into Eilat, Israel and Aqaba, Jordan) - were not al-Qaeda, although they identified themselves as such. (Vick 2011). Israel is diligently monitoring information regarding al Qaedas potential threat to Israel. This writer knows of the GSS alQaeda section, and assumes that it is very likely that the Mossad and the IDI (Israeli Defense Intelligence forces of the IDF) respectively, have analogous alQaeda-oriented collection and analysis specialized entities. While radical Islamism and terrorist tactics that currently challenge the international community have little connection to the Israeli Palestinian conflict, it remains hard to contest the fact that the 1979 Iranian Islamist revolution,(which created the Hezbollah), as well as the establishment of al Qaeda by bin-Laden drew strength and initiative from the Soviet pullout from Afghanistan (1989); Israels withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000; the U.S. instant withdrawal from Lebanon (1983); the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza (2005); and the Spanish withdrawal from Afghanistan (after Madrid in 2004). Indeed terrorism and specifically Islamist radical fanaticism, challenges the whole world, no matter how it is named and whether it is directly or indirectly linked with al Qaeda, or with its ideology and political goals. In spite of temporary setbacks, which further empowered Islamist terrorism, it seems acceptable that in the long run, al least theoretically, democracies can defeat terrorism. They can do so through a clear threat perception and through moral consistency. Yet

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before one decides on consistency, there are some changes to the current concept of democracy that seem to be mandatory, if we want to win the war on terror. In this vein, the free world must assimilate the contention that endurance, consistency and resilience are our strategic weapons. In the war on terror, the world as an international community, must unite behind the banner of targeting: terrorists, their facilities, finances and state sponsors. Moreover, certain legislative changes are necessary: Democracies need to drastically alter their legislation and policies, as well as international law, vis-a-vis the war on terror. Until recently, most democratic legislatures considered terror a crime best dealt with by the judiciary. After 9/11, legislation in some of these countries changed rapidly, but not enoughInternational law, meanwhile, is still based on the percepts of conventional warfare and especially the experiences of WWIIWe must find the proper legal balance between the need to ensure security and the need to ensure basic libertiesAlthough passing through security at an airport may seem inconvenient, it is nonetheless a necessary precaution. (Yaalon 2007, 21). Finally, nobody is born terrorist; terrorism is being taught and indoctrinated. What is so hard for Westerns to understand is why the Islamist education system dehumanizes Americans, Israelis and Jews (and then some) as infidels to be annihilated; why Islamic schools (madrasas), wherever they are, be it the Palestinian occupied territories, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan or Iran, promote a culture of Jihad and martyrdom, thus the culture of death, instead of life. Glorification of life - not of death, must be the target of future Islamic education. This is where our battle for hearts and minds must be focused. Until such change in Islamic education will materialize we have little chance of truly defeating Islamist terrorism, and changing the Islamist frame of mind. The democracies of the world must unite in their attempt to promote a major change

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in the core values of the Middle Eastern countries. Islam is not the source of jihad and martyrdom people who prefer a fictional afterlife to happiness and fulfillment in this life are. In that respect several steps should be made or continued: Monitoring efforts made by terrorists in every aspect of the battle for the hearts and minds, research and operational tools, treating it as a legitimate subject and as an intelligence task The media constructed by the terrorist organizations, encompassing television, radio, the press and the Internet, has to be studied and monitored (Gilboa and Lapid 2012, 174-175). Sober declassifying intelligence and making it available to individuals and institutions dealing with the battle for hearts and minds in Israel and abroad: that includes declassification of information regarding terrorist activity, terrorist military structure, funding, brainwashingsupport from sponsors (Gilboa and Lapid 2012, 175). Sober declassification of counterterrorist methods and their implementation. Recording not only success, but also failures. It is much better to disclose our CT measures and truthfully argue those opposing them, by explaining our realistic options and trade-offs in case we cease deploying certain controversial CT options (e.g. targeted killings). Transparency, within logical limits, may consolidate support to CT activities through better understanding of the options we have when facing terrorism.

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Some say that Israel attracts attention like a magnet. Back in the 1980s there were said to have been more foreign reporters in Jerusalem than in any other major capital, with the exception of Washington and Moscow. The reason for that is not too hard to understand. Israel is probably the most controversial and condemned state in the International community. The fact that Israel is situated on the holy land of three main religions, one of them being Christianity focuses the attention of the Christians of the United States and Europe on Israel. Islam claims its connection to this land, and especially to Jerusalem, thus focusing the attention of some 1.3 billion Muslims around the world on Israel. Being the people of the Book, higher moral standards are expected for Israel and Israelis and serve as yet another reasoning behind the frequent criticism of Israel. Most critics somehow overlook the multiple nature of moralities, the complexity of judging the whole country, or the acts of the Israeli government, and its military, as well as its parliamentary democracy in the context of their own biases, or norms - as defined in the behaviors of other countries. Indeed, comparing Israel and the United states, on just about any issue is very instructive. Speaking of differences, there are arguably, no other two democracies that are more different. One is huge and relatively rich, and the other is tiny, and while not poor, possibly best defined as bordering on wellbeing. While the U.S. is extremely multicultural, Israel is rather homogenous. A President governs the American democracy. The American legislature is completely independent. Both, are separately elected for fixed terms Israel is a parliamentary, democratic regime, where the tenure of the government depends on the continued support from the legislature (Knesset), the Prime Minister is the leader of the largest party and may lose his/her chair if support wanes; no

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matter how long he/she has been at the states helm. There is also a very significant difference in the location of the current enemies of these two democracies. The current enemies of the United States are mostly (with some exceptions of homegrown enemies), located very far from its shores and homeland, while most Israels enemies are no more than a short bus ride from its centers and some, like in the US, live within its sovereign territory. Furthermore, both democracies are very engaged in their respective national security. According to the CIA World Fact Book, Israel allocates some 7.5 percent of its gross national product to the military, (#6 in the world), while the United States allocates somewhere near 4 percent of its GNP for the same purpose (# 23 in the world). Interestingly, most democracies typically allocate one or two percent for this very purpose. (Military Expenditures 2006-2012). Israel does not have a Constitution. There is a codex of basic laws, which were passed by the Knesset, and they serve as the laws of the land. They are as abiding, and as strongly observed, as the laws stemming from any constitution; they are, at the same time, often debated upon. The United States Constitution, conceived by the Founding Fathers, is upheld with unprecedented rigor, almost as if it were sacred. While it indeed preserves the human rights and civil liberties, it is often the source of bitter struggle and harsh disputes over the interpretation of its various articles, and amendments. While Israel, from its inception promised and preserved civil liberties and human rights, based on the British and American legal systems, the United States, is a country that until not too long ago, did not have, de facto, equal rights neither for women, nor for certain origin and skin color. The United States is constantly evolving, and progress is constant and clear to see by all. In this

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respect it is important to acknowledge, that although Israel does not have to deal with the huge cultural diversity of the United States, it would be incorrect to assume that Israel is free of sectarian discrimination, or that women are always paid same wages as men in the same position. However, if there is one really vital difference between the Israelis and the Americans, it is arguably, in the amount of trust the people are expressing towards one another and the amount of trust the public has to its respective government, military and the various authorities and agencies. According to James Madisons Federalist Papers 10: A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole and there is nothing to check inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democracies have been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security Indeed, Americans observe a great amount of suspicion and mistrust towards any authority, and they fear of being potentially, in danger of being deprived of their basic Constitutional rights. This core belief is a guiding light in their perception of their government. One may rightly question the source of the Israeli unusual, amount of trust, which Israelis have towards each other; the camaraderie, so often exhibited in personal relations, as well as towards the government. This work has not researched this question scientifically; however there are certain factors, which are anecdotally familiar, from a life-long experience within the Israeli community, that undoubtedly contribute to the unique cohesiveness of the Israeli society. Among the most vital cohesiveness enhancers are the following common experiences: 1) the vast majority of Israelis are Jewish and whether secular or orthodox, the religion equals nationality concept, serves as a social

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glue. 2) The founding fathers of Israel came mostly from Poland, Russia and Europe and shared much of the same culture, as well as a socialist, and a humble vision of themselves and of the Israeli State; a state created to serve as a refuge for the Jewish Diaspora. 3) Many of the founders of Israel were survivors of the Holocaust and these survivors were forever bonded by the memories of near total annihilation of the Jewish people. 4) The current generations of Israelis are often descendants of the Holocaust victims and survivors. They thus continue to uphold much of the same attitudes, towards Jewish and Israeli existential issues. 5) Most Israelis, undergo a mandatory three-year service in the IDF, which serves as a maturing mechanism, as well as additional social glue, and results in a true peoples army, which is a near sacred and very highly trusted, protector of the Jewish/Israeli people and the Jewish state. While the American people find protection in the Separation of Powers and the system of Checks and Balances, so do the Israelis. In spite of the trust Israelis have in their government, both the Israelis and Americans, respectively, insist on the separation between the White House and Congress, and the separation of the government [of Israel] from the Knesset; knowing that it helps to lessen the madness that can come from any one institution taking over.

XII. Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorist Threat to Israel Interestingly, while there is a lot of talk and debate regarding the WMD terrorist threat to the U.S., there is hardly any such talk regarding Israel. While WMD threat of annihilation of the Jewish state has been expressed numerous times, by states like Iran, and Libya, (in the past), there is very little talk coming directly

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from terrorist sources. Indeed, as suggested by William Walker, if we assume for a while, the point of view of Israels adversaries, Israel has indeed been a principal driver of enmity of every kind in the Middle East, and a principal driver of quests for WMDIsraels nuclear capability and supremacy in conventional weapons have encouraged and legitimized WMD proliferation within the region. Where unable to gain access nuclear technology, states have turned to CBW instead (Walker 2004, 66). Naturally, this truism however right, is oblivious to the fact that Israel developed its arguable, nuclear capability with French help, in the 1950s and on; but it never threatened any nation with its nuclear capability, and never even acknowledged it as existent. Nobody has tried to call Israels bluff, thus far. However the threat from Iran, is realistic enough to create an atmosphere of alarmism in spite of the fact that even if Iran were to cross the red line portrayed by the Israeli Premier Benyamin Netanyahu on September 27, 2012 (Heller 2012), and continue enriching its uranium it would take additional considerable time to create a nuclear weapon, as we can learn from the more nuclear-advanced case of North Korea. (South Korea and U.S. 2013). Moreover, although due to Israels small size and its high population density, it would have a very hard time to survive even a single nuclear attack, even if it indeed has as it is suggested, between 80 and 200 nuclear bombs ready; or moreover as claimed: The Third Temples Holy of Holies: Israels nuclear weapons U.S. Army Col. Warner Farr said Israels nuclear arsenal has grown from an estimated 13 nuclear bombs in 1967 to 400 nuclear and thermonuclear weaponsIsraels navy could deploy weapons on [its] submarines. Israel will then have a second strike capability(U.S. Air Force Says Israel2002). By merely admitting to such legendary capability - it would arguably, silence even the hateful Ahemedinajads of Iran. However, the fact that no matter how many bombs Israel might have, if it has no strategic depth and cant allow for at

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least 1/3 of it population, along with at least 50 percent of its vital infrastructure, to be annihilated - all these imaginary claims of its suggested deterrence capability could very well be a nonsense. Moreover, even more threatening for Israel, is the idea of any country sharing its nuclear or other WMD capability, with Hezbollah or al-Qaeda. Although such scenario seems unrealistic, it may prove real after all. On January 16, 2013 Israels Ambassador to the UN Ron Prosor said: the prospect of Hezbollah acquiring chemical weapons through mishandling or via [Syria] is frightening (Wilner 2013). As widely known, already in August 2012, Syria acknowledged its chemical weapons warning to the world: No chemical weapons will ever be used [said Syrian Foreign Ministry Spokesman] Unless Syria is exposed to external aggressionThe weapons are under supervision of the Syrian armed forces (Ghitis 2012). Much more realistic is the version voiced by the outgoing Israeli Ambassador to the UN Danny Gillerman, who told the New York Times in February 2008: The real fear is not that the Iranians will be crazy enough or stupid enough to launch a missile at Israel, but that they will have no compunction about providing rouge regimes and terror organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah with weapons of mass destruction (Benhorin 2008). Even the above version is not necessarily realistic. After all, if Hezbollah, (which is a very capable terrorist organization), obtains CBW from Syria or Iran, and uses them against Israel, the retaliation might be against the state whos signature will be on such weapons; thus theoretically, Israel might retaliate accordingly, andthe world would be at the edge of a nuclear abyss. On February 9, 2013 the Israeli PM Netanyahu urged the EU to join other nations which have already declared Hezbollah a terrorist organization; a request seconded by John

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Brennan who called on the EU to take proactive action to uncover Hezbollahs infrastructure and disrupt the groups financing schemes and operational networks in order to prevent future attacks. (Jerusalem Post Editorial 2013). Such a move would empower the EU to freeze many of Hezbollahs assets. David Siegel, the Israeli Consul General to the U.S. spoke to the GOP on February 13, 2013 and added: Global Jihadists and Al Qaeda are coming to fight in Syria on both sides of the divideThe longer this continues, the more deeply embedded in Syria these powerful and dangerous organizations areTheyll take [these WMD systems] and disappear throughout the Middle EastWe wont let terrorists, who are the most dangerous in the world Al Qaeda, Hezbollah and others be equipped with the most dangerous weapons in the world (Stone 2013). Yet another related question is whether there is a significant difference between the WMD terrorist threat to Israel from Hezbollah, and the WMD threat to Israel from Hamas. On August 10, 2012, the deputy speaker of the Palestinian, newly elected parliament in Gaza Strip Ahmad Bahr, was heard shouting: Oh Allah, destroy the Jews and their supporters. Oh Allah, Destroy the Americans and their supporters. Oh Allah, count them one by one, and kill them all, without leaving a single one. That cry was echoed by Yussuf al Sharafi, a Hamas member of the Palestinian Legislative Council: Allah, take the Jews and their allies, Allah, take the Americans and their alliesannihilate them completely and do not leave anyone of them (Keyes 2012). This kind of rhetoric is far from new, in view of the continuous conflict with Israel. This conflict is currently in remission due to the agreement reached in November 2012. Interestingly, with Khaled Meshaals, (the supreme Hamas leaders), refusal to back Basir Asad in failing Syria, the safe haven Hamas had there was terminated, and Hamas operatives had to look for new alliances and safe havens in Egypt, Turkey and Qatar. However, Hamas emerged from the

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latest confrontation with Israel stronger than before, and with a degree of new support within its Sunni allies in the Middle East. Moreover, it did not lose its support from the Shia Iran and Hezbollah and in the future, Israel will have to confront a better-armed Hamas. While the chance of reconciliation between the Fatah and Hamas went amiss (in fact, none of the involved parties was interested: Fatah was afraid of being overrun by Hamas, Hamas, did not want anything to do with possible peace negotiations with Israel); and Israel too would arguably, rather see the division in the Palestinian camp as an ongoing, reassuring that the Palestinian will not unify as a single entity; harder to deal with. Furthermore, Hamas, in a way like Hezbollah, is not a monolithic entity. While it is interested in resistance, it is also interested in politics, (very possibly more interested in politics than resistance). Indeed, its involvement and attempted help to the Palestinian civilization (medical, educational etc.) is no way near the infrastructure developed by the Hezbollah in Lebanon, but it can not be disregarded. (Shaikh 2012). Back in January 2009, an arms convoy on its way from Iran to the Gaza Strip was destroyed in Sudans eastern Red Sea, by an unidentified aircraft. In April 2011, alleged smugglers of a shipment of Iranianmade mustard and other nerve agent, were killed in Port Sudan by a mysterious aircraft strike. Israel denied comment (Israeli Strikes Kill WMD-related Hamas 2011). All this information, even if true, is at best anecdotal. There are no public statements by Israeli officials regarding WMD threat from either Hamas or Hezbollah. Although in truth, Hezbollah posits a grave potential danger to both the U.S. and Israel, this threat does not, at this time, include WMD. Moreover, in a relatively recent statement (September 3, 2012) Hassan Nasrallah openly

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declared that the Hezbollah does not have, and does not need WMD to pummel Israel in a war. (Hezbollah: We Dont Have Chemical Weapons 2012).

The WMD terrorist danger to Israel may be smaller than the danger to US. While the imminent threat to the United States is mostly from al Qaeda (and very currently also from North Korea), the WMD threat to Israel is mostly from Iran, and it is not very likely that Iran, or any other Middle Eastern country, may release WMD into the unpredictable hands of terrorists. At the same time, the great difference between al Qaeda as a non-state, transnational actor, and Hezbollah, which has evolved into a guerrilla type insurgency; deeply involved in a legitimate political system in Lebanon - is that while Hezbollah presents a grave potential future danger to the U.S., EU and other parts of the world - at this time, Hezbollah is carefully building its infrastructure in Latin America, EU, the U.S and other parts of the world. Hezbollah is currently focused on twin activity: political and social activity within Lebanon, and diversified criminal activity elsewhere as part of Transnational Organized Crime (Hezbollah in Latin America 2011). Although it is theoretically, like al-Qaeda interested in expelling the West from the Middle East, it is presently unlikely to participate in overt and large terrorist attacks against the U.S. The future however, may be holding some very unpleasant surprises from Hezbollah to the West. While some may suggest that Hezbollah is more likely to get politically assimilated in the Lebanese society, such development is not very likely, because Hezbollah is manipulated by Iran. If Iran will become involved in a regional war due to its nuclear ambitions, Hezbollah might be accordingly, activated to attack not only Israel. It may be requested also, to stage terrorist attacks in the U.S. and elsewhere. However, it

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should be clear that no matter what terrorist group is threatening the United States - no terrorist threat to the U.S. is truly existential. The U.S. can survive much more than a single terrorist attack of any kind. Unfortunately, this is not necessarily the Israeli situation. Thus, however theoretically small is the WMD threat to Israel it cannot be disregarded. This section did not expand on the theoretical threat to Israel from transnational, al Qaeda type of terrorism. At present time, the Israeli IC carefully monitors such threat. The GSS has a dedicated al Qaeda section, and it is probably true that the same can be said about the rest of the Israeli IC. As it turns out it is Hamas, of all things, that blocks any current al Qaeda foothold in the West Bank and Gaza. Not out of love for Israel though

XIII. The Israeli Counterterrorism Apparatus Israel has been affected by terrorism from its very birth as a nation on every level. Terrorism affects directly and indirectly most of Israeli government ministries and institutions. It is arguably true that every Israeli share part of the daily burden of terrorism. However, the coping framework that Israeli authorities developed in order to deal with this threat is divided between three dimensions: intelligence, security and civilian. This part of the paper will focus mainly on the offensive dimension of the Israeli model and thus the intelligence and security dimensions. The Israeli intelligence community is constructed from three separate entities: Military Intelligence (a.k.a. Israel Defense Intelligence, IDI, know also as AMAN); the Institute for Special Operations (Mossad); and the Israeli General Security Service aka Israel Security Agency (GSS aka ISA aka Shabak or Shin Bet). The

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Israeli National Police (INP), as well as the Department of Political Research of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are not an official part of the IIC, but the INP is a de facto participant; and has been known to generate its own CT leads and cases, through special intelligence and CT units (e.g. YAMAM or TZASMA a.k.a. Tzevet Samim Mivttzai Artzi, which originally was a national anti-drug unit in the 1970s and 1980s.). In spite of the fact that all above-mentioned entities share the task of fighting and thwarting terrorism as one of their missions, counterterrorism per se, is the main mission of the GSS. And the GSS is accepted as the first and foremost authority with regard to counterterrorism. In principle, the GSS jurisdiction was limited to the State of Israel and the occupied territories; Aman was responsible for Arab countries and the Middle East; and Mossad handled special operations and intelligence in the rest of the world. The problem with this division is that in order to enhance their reputation, prove their importance, and secure resources, intelligence organizations tend to compete with one another. Thus, when they identify a promising lead, they tend to overlook geographical boundaries (Pedahzur 2009, 71). Moreover, when a promising lead is identified by one of these agencies, there still is to some degree, an inherent tendency to develop such lead alone, without sharing; despite specific operational needs (such as SIGINT or VISINT, that can be best performed by IDI/AMAN). In the very same manner, while the GSS, often reached out of Israel and the occupied territories, using human assets it obtained through its cover of various foreign individuals, posted in Israel. Both, the GSS and the Mossad occasionally developed promising leads linked to the occupied territories, and even more so, to Israels neighbors (e.g. Jordan, Syria or Lebanon), which arguably, should have been AMANs domain, according to the official IDI mandate.

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 An examination of the relations among the Israeli intelligence agenciesshows that often at the root of their disagreements have nothing to do with intelligence or operational matters at all, but are the expression of generic problems in public organizations, which tend to be highly territorial and compete over prestige and resources. These problems are far from being exclusive to Israel (Pedahzur 2009, 74). The above description is no longer entirely adequate. Following the 2006, second Lebanon war, a rethinking prompted by Hezbollahs relative success, prompted reorganization within the GSS, which led to a much improved paradigm of sharing. Shin Bet [aka GSS] began to work closely with special police counterterrorism unitsThe IDF and police were brought inside Shin Bets command center to ensure that they had access to all information. Local commanders could reach out directly to Shin Bet regional leaders, decentralizing (and thus speeding up) information sharingthe situation is hardly perfect. There is still fighting over scarce SIGINT assets, and Shin Bet relies on the IDF for aerial surveillance and other expensive platformsYet by the standards of U.S. intelligence, where coordination is more cumbersome, Israels sharing of information is impressive (Byman 2011, 343). The changes the GSS has gradually enacted were possibly based not only on Israeli innovative thinking, but also on lessons learned from the post 9/11 reorganization of the U.S. CT struggle. Israel realized that it should create a single, central headquarters for the struggle with terrorism, like the CTC, but with certain specific, Israeli adjustments. These were outlined in Pedahzurs description: instead of implementing organizational reforms that will end up in a new series of struggles between the various agenciesthe idea is to establish a main headquarters for the struggle against terrorism that will serve as a hub of a network that will send out its arms to each and every one of the various intelligence and thwarting forcesit will enable daily coordinationand rapid deployment of the necessary resources whena threat is detected

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by one of the intelligence organizations. Representatives of all the forces in charge of coping with terrorism will be stationed fulltime at the headquarters. Their job will be real time coordination (Pedahzur 2009, 146). The GSS collects, analyzes, assesses the terrorism related intelligence, and evaluates the threats. It formulates and disseminates concrete warnings regarding the likelihood of terrorist attacks. The intelligence products are also used in preparation of offensive and defensive activity against terrorist organizations. While the GSS is sometimes paralleled with the FBI, such comparison is somewhat flawed. The GSS, is less concerned with law enforcement and forensic aspects, which are the forte of the FBI. Although the GSS interrogates its suspects and investigates cases of terrorism or espionage, it has relatively lower interest in the procedure of indictment and the prosecution of the suspects; it attempts to produce a constant flow of actionable intelligence, and thwart terrorism; any other tasks are arguably, secondary. To arrests its suspects in terrorism, the GSS collaborates with the INP, IDFs Special Forces and the Border Patrol. When a terror suspect is ready for indictment, he/she is often passed to the police to deal with most of the aspects of the arrests and prisoner transfer. The GSS has its own prosecutors, which often work as a team with Israels Attorney Generals office and the police to reach indictment, prosecution and eventually - incarceration. The Israel National Police has the mandate over internal security in Israel, and as such it has a responsibility to prevent terrorist attacks within Israel. It shares with the GSS the reasonability for foiling and thwarting terrorist attacks, either by acting upon intelligence from the GSS or other branches of the IC, or by acting on its own intelligence and by proactively locating and neutralizing, prospective

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attackers on their way to their targets. The INP is also entrusted with securing of sensitive facilities, crowded areas, as well as providing emergency management to attack sites, following an attack. The INP operates a large number of highly qualified bomb squads, capable of responding to multiple and simultaneous alerts regarding suspected objects, with the objective being - neutralizing IEDs . The INP also provides all forensic services through its Identification and Forensic Science Division. (Ganor 2007, 277). During the 1950s the INP has established the Border Patrol (BP a.k.a. Mishmar Hagvul or MAGAV) as an auxiliary arm, which at that time was responsible for the safety of villages located close to Israels green line borders. Currently, the BP is used to augment the police during large-scale public events. It also augments the IDF by patrolling and helping to preserve the order in the West Bank, and along the Gaza Strip border with Israel. The BP hosts the YAMAM, which is a highly trained SF unit, tasked with a variety of kinetic missions such as the interception and arrests of terrorist suspects, and intervention in hostage situations. The Yamam, which is located in more than a single base, also serves as an equivalent of S.W.A.T. to augment the INPs during problematic, criminal arrests. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) are responsible for protecting Israels borders, from foreign invaders. Currently, it focuses on preventing terrorist penetration to Israel, controlling the West Bank, and preventing Palestinian, terrorist infiltration of Israel, from Gaza and the West Bank. The IDF is tasked with conducting offensive kinetic activity against terrorist organizations wherever they are: in Gaza, West Bank and in Arab states that sponsor terrorism.

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Both the IDF and the INP created a number of units specializing in undercover and overt operations aimed at the apprehension or the killing of terrorist leaders and combatants, within their Palestinian strongholds. (e.g. units like Duvdevan, Shimshon, Yamas, Gideonim etc.). While the main mission of the IDF is to protect the sovereign borders of Israel from external attack by a hostile nation/s; as part of the lessons learned from the 1991 Iraq Gulf war, a new reality had to be recognized: the external borders could not stop missiles and the HAGA Command (Civil Defense) which was linked to the IDF, was found insufficient, (in size, capability and authority) in view of the new threats to the homeland. In 1992, the Israeli government decided to create the Homeland Front Command (HFC), which has been created as an integral part of the IDF; its commander has a dual sub ordinance: directly to the IDFs COS (Chief of Staff) as part of the IDF, and directly to the Minister of Defense. This unique structure gave the new command all the independence and the respective responsibilities of an IDF combatant command. As such it focused on the protection of the civilian population of Israel in times of war, massive terrorist attacks (e.g. during the 2006 war with the Hezbollah), as well as in case of natural disasters. The HFC became the first and foremost authority on Civil Defense in Israel. It is assisted by the voluntary police units of Civil Guard, (also known as MASHAZ aka Mishmar Ezrahi), and other voluntary, and semi-voluntary organizations (e.g. the Israeli equivalent of the Red Cross: MDA a.k.a. Magen David Adom etc.). The new command can arguably, and to a limited degree, be seen as a rough, Israeli equivalent of the U.S. National Guard. One of the additional objectives of the HFC is to relieve the IDF regional commanders of their partial responsibility for the civilian populations safety in wartime, which they had until 1992. The creation

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of the HFC liberated the regional IDF commanders from much of their internal obligations; thus allowing the IDF to focus solely on protecting Israel outwards. (Israelis and Americans 2013).

XIV. The Shaping of Israels counterterrorism paradigm. Counter terrorism experts like Boaz Ganor and Ami Pedahzur correctly claim, that Israel has never developed a straightforward, coherent, official doctrine for counterterrorism. Various policy makers and heads of the security apparatuses, held various opinions regarding the goals and the means to be defined in the struggle with Palestinian terrorism. Some of the hawkish Israeli leaders believe that terrorism can be eliminated completely, by adhering to the war model. Others argue that terrorism can be contained, only well enough, not to affect policymakers. Yet others suggest, that although terrorism could indeed be eliminated through the war model, such approach is not practical due to the constraints imposed by the international community (Pedahzur 2009, 3). The supporters of the war model prevailed over the past sixty-five years; however, it is not to say, that there were no periods of defensive attitude to counterterrorist struggle. In fact if anything characterizes the Israeli CT model, it is rather its lack of consistency and its lack of coherence, (and thus the lack of narrow, focused, definition of the final ends to be achieved and the consistent application of chosen means, until the goal is reached). In fact as Ganor posits, [during] 1994-2000the Israelis emphasized using all means necessary to deal with terrorism, cripple the ability of terrorists to carry out attacks, and reduce terrorisms influence on the morale of the Israeli public[but] When decision makers realized that fundamentalist Islamic groups were continuing their showcase attacks on Israel, and the [Palestinian] Authority was not making use of its capabilities,[to use its own militia to arrest terrorists as

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agreed], Israels policies underwent a change: security apparatuses would now operate within the [Palestinian] autonomy, although in a discreet manner. Under cover units and Special Forces concentrated on eliminating senior terrorist leadersIn October 1994, after a suicide attack Yitzhak Rabin announced that he had directed the security forces to eliminate terrorist leaders. (Ganor 2007, 279). Moreover, this opinion is strongly seconded by Avraham Shalom and Yuval Diskin two of the former heads of the Israeli General Secret Service (GSS aka SHABAK), clearly state in interviews, that when it comes to making a final decision regarding a CT operation Israeli politicians (many of whom were former generals) expect the Shabak, military or else to present them with an option which is agreed upon by all so that they dont have to be the once to make the final decision, and thus take the responsibility, and often the ultimate blame for the results. Yet these decisions are always tactical, never strategic (The Gatekeepers 2013). However, not long after Israels counterterrorism apparatus engaged in frequent targeted killing of terrorist leaders and specific combatants, it became clear that the deterrence effect that Israel expected to achieve through the implication of this method, failed to deter the Hamas and other terrorist factions. In fact the opposite better exemplifies the result of the application of this paradigm. In fact, Israel failed to deter suicide terrorism through the application of targeted killings and other, nonlethal and punitive CT methods (e.g. house demolitions, enhanced interrogations, deportations, administrative detentions, etc.). However, this failure does not suggest that suicide terrorism deterrence is outright impossible. It only suggests that Israel has not found the right formula to attain such deterrence, till this very day.

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it is reasonable to conclude that Israels deterrent policies were not effective. While offensive and defensive actions achieved impressive successes in thwarting attacks, the total number of attempts was not reduced, and indeed it increased. If the objective of Israeli actions was to deter the organizations, their leaders, and their operatives from carrying out suicide attacksthe objective was not fulfilled. In spite of this, it is not possible to conclude that it is necessarily impossible to deter terrorists or suicide bombers, only that the tactics used by Israel did not achieve this objective and that efforts must be made to tailor new methods to the unique challenges of suicide bombings (Ganor 2007, 281). Existing data suggests, that although the long-term objective of deterrence and ending terrorism in general (and suicide terrorism in particular), was not obtained, Israels immense thwarting efforts were not entirely lost on the adversaries, nor on the Israeli public. In fact, the Israeli public, consistently, gives the GSS and IDF a 100 percent, unequalled trust. (Byman 2011, 344). For one thing, the terrorists understood that Israels resolve is undiminished, and that continued terrorism, (which was unprecedented in scope between 2001 and 2005), is unlikely to break the Israeli resolve and its public resilience. Moreover, it is definitely unlikely to bring about the collapse of the Israeli society and state, nor is it advancing in any way, any negotiated solution to the Palestinian problem. Secondly, targeted killings offered the Israeli population in general and those directly affected by acts of terrorism, some sense of rough justice being done. This in turn, also caused the respective prime minister and his cabinet to retain the political power and popular support. However, targeted killing and other non-lethal CT measures used by Israel were also a widely used reason for international criticism and political pressure. Moshe Yaalon, a former IDF COS (2002-2005) contends that terrorism can be ultimately defeated through the war model, if the application of this model is

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prolonged and continuous. He suggests that capitulation to terrorism only generates more terror. Indeed, in 1983, when the Hezbollah bombed the Marine barracks outside Beirut, the U.S. (and the French) immediately pulled out from Lebanon, where they were applied as a U.N. Peace keeping force. Not Hezbollah, nor Iran, has ever paid for this horrible act. In another case, in 1989, after spending ten years attempting to establish firm foothold in Afghanistan, the Soviet army withdrew. These withdrawals were, and still are used as a proof of Islams victory and they encouraged Islamists to pursue new non-Islamic targets, considered to be a threat to Islam. This later led to the creation of al Qaeda and eventually, to the horrors of September 11, 2001. The Israeli pull-out from Lebanon in 2000, closely followed by Hezbollahs occupation of most of Lebanon; as well as the Israeli pull-out of the Gaza Strip in 2005, gave further impetus to terror organizations and eventually led to the legalization of Hamas, as the true representative of the Palestinian population of the Gaza Strip - through the 2006 elections. All these examples show that giving up to terrorism does not quench terrorisms blood thirst; on the contrary, it invigorates it. The issue eventually boils down to the effect such retreats or pullbacks have on the resilience of the civilian public. The respectable democratic society (i.e. Israeli or American, for example) must be and remain, psychologically resilient. [it] must be able to absorb terrors costs economically, emotionally, and in terms of lives lost rather than surrender to it. Democratic societies are uniquely susceptible to terrorism and can be easily manipulated by terrorists. A perfect exampleoccurred in Spain, where the public responded to the 2004 Madrid train bombings by electing a government that immediately withdrew Spanish troops from Iraq. (Yaalon 2007, 10).

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The terrorism expert Ami Pedahzur, contends also that terrorized public, that is unsatisfied with its government response to terrorism can terminate, or shorten the political careers of the elected leadership. Thus the leadership feels under pressure to counter the psychological impact of terrorism on the public. Furthermore, defensive model has proven to be successful in offering physical protection to civilian centers. Yet applying it is usually a long process, sometimes much longer than the tenure of an elected policymaker. Hence it does not have the same impact of the war model.Successful offensive operations, which take place immediately after a terrorist attack, reassure the terrorized public, boost morale, and carry political perks that are very appealing for elected officials (Pedahzur 2009, 8). The assumption, that the war model does not offer a real solution to the problem constantly creates constant pressures to innovate; meaning: to come up with some new trick, new CT method, that will prove more efficient in answering the terrorist challenge. In Israel, this challenge is often exemplified by the competition among the various branches of the IC and the special CT units. Innovation is important in order to remain relevant and to assure continued flow of funds to the respective organization or unit. Although such competition encourages out of the box thinking, it may at times be destructive, by way of creating unwillingness to share knowledge and information. One of the manifestations of this problem in Israel was the unhealthy competition between Special Forces units. Such competition often ignored the respective units specific fortes and caused choosing another unit, despite of it objectively being less suitable for the task at hand. The war model, in its CT application relies on highly sophisticated technological minor-tactical-warfare, which is considered better for CT operations, than the use of traditionally oriented and equipped army

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units. This claim can be exemplified by the past frequent use of the IDFs special forces elite unit, named SAYERET MATKAL, in many complex operations, for which (in spite of this units near phenomenal versatility and adaptability) this unit was not always the best choice. The competition was often vis a vis the INPs afore mentioned, YAMAM. While SAYERET MATKAL is agreeably a great unit, it does not specifically, specialize in say, hostages release and counterterrorism related arrests, through its everyday training and missions. It is a deep-enemy-territory-penetration intelligence unit. SAYERET MATKAL is very famous and admired (by the Israeli public) unit. Moreover, some Israeli leaders were its commanders, while in the IDF. (E.g. Binyamin Netanyahu and Ehud Barak, or Moshe Yaalon). It is thus attributed almost mythological capabilities. The INPs YAMAM was established with its reason dtre being counterterrorism. It became internationally highly regarded and envied, by the much more powerful IDF which favored its own SAYERET MATKAL. In many cases, the YAMAM was the first one to arrive and be ready for action in a CT situation, but was voted down, and substituted by SAYERET MATKAL. (A classic case to prove this point is the Nahshon Waxman/Wachsman 1994 abduction and failed release attempt. (Haberman 1994). The prolonged Israeli and worldly experience contends that no swift victory is predictable or possible in the war against terrorism. The public must be aware of the fact that the struggle will be likely very long and with many casualties, along the way. It is the role of the leadership to influence the civilian public on the necessity of confronting terrorism continuously, until its defeat and not be lured by the false premises of some form of appeasement, capitulation or surrender. Furthermore, even if public is being readied, the leadership and even more so,

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the military leaders, have to define what constitutes a victory in such struggle. Surely a decisive victory is not one attained by killing a single person; not even a person like bin Laden. As Moshe Yaalon posits, To draw an analogy from boxing, victory over terror is achieved through winning points rather than knockouts. A decisive victory is thus gained by winning various tactical engagements, reducing the overall threat to civilians, and strengthening the broader societys resilience in the face of terrorism (Yaalon 2007, 11). The citizens of Western democracies expect accountability from both their political and military leaders and often blame their politicians because of nottimely thwarted terrorist attacks. Arguably, this may be seen as a psychological mechanism that allows average citizens to believe that they retain a degree of control over their livesthrough participation in the democratic process (Yaalon 2007,11) Moreover, civilians expect absolute safety promised and actually obtained. They have hard time understanding, that in face of terrorism, such guarantees available are non-existent. Foolproof protection is impossible. In the political world, the frustration of civilians over inability to foolproof citizenry against terrorism, can also be used by the political opposition against the political leadership; claiming that the government, that was in power at the time of given terrorist attacks was incompetent in its war against terror. Such, as afore mentioned, was the case of the Spanish government that fell after the 2004 Madrid train bombings, or the case of Benyamin Netanyahu and the Likud replacing Shimon Peres as PM of Israel, after the 1996 Hezbollah suicide

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terrorist campaign. This was also the case the 1999 Ehud Baraks replacement of Benyamin Netanyahu. The military and IC leadership as well, is being scrutinized by the public for their use, or abuse of coercive power. In a democracy, any military/intelligence entity is limited by the need for a public support for their use of force. This is the inherent result of the democratic system of checks and balances. In this respect, the Israeli public is no different from other democratic publics. It has been for many years, split regarding the attitude to the Israeli Palestinian conflict. The Israeli public is split over two main issues: the future outcome of the said conflict and the persuasion of some Israelis, that we have missed opportunities to restore peace, by way of a two state solution. This kind of division hinders the development of a necessary consensus regarding the legitimacy of the use of force. Terrorists recognize the importance of legitimacy in democratic states, and the Palestinians exploited it to manipulate both Israeli and international opinion, thus causing major problems for Israeli commanders (Yaalon 2007, 14). No matter how split the Israeli public was in April 2002, it reunited in the face of the second intifada, and PM Ariel Sharon, defying intelligence, as well as some of his first line generals, sent the IDF to retake the West Bank despite fears of failure and massive Israeli casualties. It was the correct choice, as a tactical decision to stop Yasser Arafats empty promises to police his own and stop the suicide bombers from penetrating Israel. Some of the methods were brutal, but Operation Defensive Shield suppressed Palestinian terrorism, including Hamas and Fatahs deadly suicide bombings. Though its impact was not fully apparent until three years later, the operation restored normalcy on both sides of the green line. Even though the second intifada claimed seven times as many Israeli lives as the Second Lebanon War, most

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Israelis seem to have erased it from their memory (Issacharoff and Harel 2012). Within the Israeli CT activities, it seems reasonable to believe in offensively pursuing and thwarting terrorist activity, within their immediate surroundings. Operating in the periphery of terror land allows IDF to control the circumstances of engagement. IDF keeps the initiative, and occasionally achieves surprise. Yaalon neatly posits that: All these lessons emphasize the importance of relaying first on offense, then the fence, and finally defense the fence being the Israeli Protective Barrier ( Yaalon 2007, 15). Thus, the Israeli operational principles of counterterrorism are: Keeping timely Intelligence as the heart of the offense. Defensively/offensively providing realtime information leading to successful terrorist interdiction and the destruction of their infrastructure. It also suggests effective collection and dissemination of early warnings. The offensive kinetics must be precise, and must stress avoiding collateral damage. Intelligence and information First. The IDF and the IC must have the ability to obtain and convey all-source intelligence: VISINT, SIGINT, HUMINT OSINT and C4I (Command, control, communications, computers, and information) to the front lines. Only by integrating intelligence units and wide-source information can be effective to find, fix and finish the low-signature targets exemplified by terrorists. Creativity and Flexibility within the offensive paradigm.

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recognize and finish terrorists act on a moments notice, this is indeed an operational problem. Operational units must thus be always ready for a fast deployment. These units must be well trained and highly adaptable to changing conditions. Moreover, the surprise element is a must have; without which the apprehension of terrorists is impossible. Since terrorists prefer to shield themselves by non-combatant civilian population, they notably seek refuge in the crowded refugee camps, where the population (which often serves as their lookouts), also aids them. Here the need for creativity, on the part of Special Forces, is imminent in view of the inherent, suspicious nature, of terrorists and the fact that they quickly learn new lessons and spread any innovative methods seen in use by the IDF. Creativity and innovation in the SF must thus be constantly encouraged on every level. The leading principal is: [the one] who dares-winssuccess is built on taking risks, and a single setback should not warrant a return to the defensive mode of operation (Yaalon 2007, 16). Gaza presents a unique challenge: the decision to work from the periphery in, necessitates the use of targeted killings or military incursions. Because no freedom of movement exists (for the IDF), arrest missions such as conducted in the West Bank are nearly impossible in Gaza. Any arrest operation inside Gaza, would necessitate massive troops, unlike the platoon-size operations conducted in the West Bank. (Yaalon 2007, 16). The role of defensive measures in security operations Defensive measures are complementary to the offensive ones. Such measures are highly inconvenient to both sides. The roadblocks, curfews, checkpoints and closures saved many Israeli lives, but at the same time made life very difficult to the Palestinian civilian population and these control means,

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continuously create deep resentment and a sense of humiliation, in the Palestinian population; as well as harm the Palestinian economy. The Security Barrier has proven to be an effective defensive system; however, although it reduced the number of suicide bomber infiltrations of Israel, this system is not foolproof. Terrorists, by default, will never stop looking for ways to circumvent any defensive system, the barrier included. (17). Achieving Security, while attempting to also Win Hearts and Minds. As mentioned before, defensive measures, in the form of checkpoints or closures, as well as outright offensive measures like targeted killings, undermine the very possibility to win the heart and minds of the Palestinian population. There is no exact formula for striking the balance, so very needed between the carrots and the sticks. Thus, the fact that Palestinians for example, get free medical care in Israeli hospitals pales in comparison to the everyday buildup of hatred and humiliation. Hearts and minds will not be won in Gaza, anytime in the near future. This however, does not mean that the battle for hearts & minds should be limited to Palestinians, and to the current generations only. Israel must continue this battle for the hearts and minds of the international community, and future Palestinian generations. This must be done by better understanding of the Palestinian plight; strongly influencing Israeli peace-related perceptions as presented by the various media outlets; as well as a conscious educational effort, aimed at mitigating the devastating results of Palestinian hateful, anti-Israeli, anti-Jew and antiZionism educational effort, which often results in the creation of new terrorist cadres.

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Safeguarding Arms Purity at War (TOHAR HANESHEK in Hebrew). The struggle with terrorism is characterized by its asymmetry. While Israel is attempting to maintain the highest moral standards possible, terrorists inherently play by a different set of rules, or arguably, without any rules whatsoever. Since every war, by its very nature, poses severe challenges to the morality of the adversaries, in the Israeli-Palestinian context, the Israeli and the worldly public opinion are truly judging only Israeli morality. Israeli military and IC know, that it is extremely important to display high moral standards in order to maintain strong resolve as a moral nation and to eventually, prevail in the long battle for the hearts and minds of the Palestinian civilian population. In spite of constant criticism by other democracies, as well as by other, non-democratic nations, the IDF and the IIC, attempt to maintain the highest moral standards, in the face of public scrutiny regarding the use of force against terrorist organizations acting from within civilian population that protects them, despite the fact that in reality, terrorists do not care much about the fate of the public. In the case of Israel, arguably unlike in the case of other nations facing terrorism, the whole nation is at war. When a whole society is at war, the use of force by that society is heavily criticized, and such society must do its very best to preserve this societys peacetime values, no matter what. The Bible teaches us refrain from murder and killing, while the Talmud grants us the option to kill first in self-defense. On the terrorism battlefield it is sometimes difficult to discern right from wrongdoing. Thus, education of the whole society, and especially, those directly involved in the fighting - is necessary. The IDF thus stresses the education of the moral rules of engagements on this unique battleground, especially to the commanders of the

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various military units. The military, intelligence and police commanders are the role models, the behavior of which is copied by their subordinates. High professional conduct must be maintained at all cost. However, the continuous situation whereas, Israel is constantly fighting within civilian areas and civilian population, may bring about a dangerous degree of desensitization. Some claim that this is the result of the fighters survival instinct that makes Israelis capable of more easily enduring the complexity of this battleground. This unique battleground also blurs the difference between civilians and combatants and may prevent Israeli soldiers from making the right distinction between a terrorist and an innocent civilian. Dehumanization of the enemy; the perception that the enemy is inhuman, evil, because he/she is himself, or is a supporter-of suicide bombings, - is easy. Suicide terrorism makes no logical sense to the Western mind. Thus Israeli soldiers may be tempted to treat any Palestinian inhumanely. Some regrettably do. Anyone who tells you that there were no moral offenses during the [second] intifada is lying. Members of our [Israeli] forces deliberately vandalized property, looted and stole. We also killed people by mistake. But we were able to check ourselves and mete out punishment where necessary, especially when people committed offenses that were not just judgment errors in the heat of the battle (Baram in Issacharoff and Harel 2012). It is also possible that at times, soldiers assume that all their actions are inclusively correct, as part of their acting in self defense. Thus, any act of selfdefense or attempt to survive, may be assumed as moral. Combat experience is another factor which should be considered; especially, when considering the behavior of lower ranks and younger soldiers, who are often inexperienced. Some suggest that youth leads to a tendency to characterize their view of the world - in terms of black and white; with little or no gray

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areas. Experiencing the Palestinian adversary in black and white only, may lead to moral mistakes and is thus, yet another challenge to the commanders.

XV. Israels Offensive Counterterrorism Tools: Practical, Moral and Legal Perspectives

Overview Over the years of the Israeli Palestinian conflict, decision makers learned that it was not enough to examine the effectiveness of Israeli counterterrorism policy in quantitative terms only. Metrics like the number of Israeli/Palestinian casualties were not telling enough, when the leadership had to face also international and national media outlets and public opinion. Boaz Ganor, suggests that when examining the effectiveness of the CT struggle it is valuable to consider four main terrorism-related factors: counterterrorist operational capability; motivation to perpetrate new attacks; groups internal morale; and the morale of the victimized, targeted population. (Ganor 2005, 105-111). Accordingly, several aspects should be examined, when attempting to evaluate the CT efforts: Operational Capability the degree the CT actions diminish or enhance terrorist capability to perpetrate attacks. Damage to terrorists internal image damage to the groups image within its civilian population, which is its source of support, funding and mobilization. Damage to its fundraising capabilities - how does the CT operations affect the groups capability to continue their financing through donations, money laundering and through various criminal activity. 128

Disrupting the administrative capabilities of the group (training, arming, etc. whatever is needed to continue operations).

To what degree has the CT action contributed to limiting groups freedom of movement.

Actual damage to groups personnel, resulting from the CT activity. Motivation - while the aim of CT actions is to diminish the terrorists motivation, we have to acknowledge that sometimes, it fires back and increases the motivation to perpetrate new attacks, due to increased frustration and hatred (towards Israel/Jews).

Terrorist groups internal morale: successful CT operations aim to decrease the groups morale by triggering fear, loss of confidence in groups leadership, leading to increased fear among group supporters and possibly leading to lesser expectations and some degree of openness to political compromise. However, CT offensive operations may, just as well, have the opposite effect: an increased stubbornness, increased daring, increased mobilization and public support - as a blow back resulting from some offensive tactics, deemed as too much (e.g. targeting Hamas political figures).

Morale of those who suffer from the acts of terror. Terrorism causes psychological and physical damage. The civilian population targeted by terrorists expect the government to get justice done by hitting at the attack perpetrators in retaliation and vengeance. CT operations are thus also targeted to boost popular morale and support for the political leadership; as well as to intensify the national resolve to stick to national goals, norms and beliefs. 129

Targeted Killings By far, the most controversial counterterrorism tool is the Targeted Killing of terrorists. This terminology is relatively new, although the intentional killing of terrorist leaders, proponents and combatants is very old; in truth, it can be traced, at least, as far back as the Biblical times and the example of King David ordering the killing of his chief of staff (Uriah Hachette). Throughout history, assassinations were a clandestine political tool, used by a wide variety of governments not necessarily to deal with terrorists, but rather with all kinds of politically unwanted and harmful dissidents and political leaders. Professor Steven R. David, in 2002, defined the difference between an assassination and targeted killing. Assassination suggests a connotation of murder by treacherous means, which is arguably, not the case when discussing targeted killing of bloody-handed terrorists. It is also usually accepted that assassinations relate to the killing of political adversaries, in order to silence legitimate opposition. Terrorists, who target and indiscriminately kill innocents, are usually not considered as political leaders, although they are certainly political players, whether we like it or not. (David 2002, 2-3). Although we know today about a number of assassinations and assassination attempts, carried out by secret services like the Soviet KGB, the Russian FSB, the CIA, the Israeli Mossad, and many others; such actions were rarely publicly admitted by the sponsoring state. While in some cases they were conveniently leaked, so the gains from their attribution to the right party could be obtained (e.g. retaliation, deterrence etc.) this seldom the case. The common denominator of these actions was the fact that

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the targeted individuals caused an unacceptable degree of harm to a nation, or posed a real political threat to the leadership of the state behind the killing; yet, they often were living away from the state they were acting against, often on a constant move or in hiding and the state could not bring them to public trial. In other cases, the state did not want a public trial, or could not prove their guilt through commonly accepted criminal evidence, that they indeed deserve to die. Assassinations (and assassination attempts) were at times, carried out also, by sane or insane individuals, over political, religious or personal issues (e.g. the assassination of Lincoln, Lenin, the attempt on President Reagans life, etc.). Assassinations deprived the targeted individual from the due process of law, the fair trial, which all democracies claim to assert their constituents. While Israel targeted and successfully killed, the Black September terrorists that perpetrated the 1972 Munich Olympic Games Massacre, this was not yet called targeted killing. This was an act of clandestine retribution-through-execution. In fact, after a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv in 1994, which killed twenty-one Israelis and injured forty-three, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin openly announced, that he directed the security forces to eliminate terrorist leaders that organize the terrorist attacks. (Ganor 2007. In Art and Richardson 2007, 279) However, it was in view of the onset of the second intifada, in September 2000 and the spat of high intensity and magnitude, suicide bombings by Hamas, the Islamic Jihad and other Palestinian terrorist factions, that Israel has openly declared the targeted killing of terrorist leaders and combatants as its formal and overt policy. Since assassination is inherently viewed in a negative context, Israel has chosen to use targeted thwarting or interceptions instead (Shapiro 2001). The evolution of targeted killings since 1972 until current times has been widely

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elaborated on by many. However, even the highly eloquent explanations offered by Ganor, does not render the reader with a definitive answer to whether the use of this method is legal and moral or not. Due to the fact that targeted killings are conducted against terrorist entity, which is not directly compatible with the worldly experiences of WWII, the Geneva Conventions, and the deliberations of the International Red Cross an obscurity arises from the lack of new tools, new spectacles, through which targeted killings of terrorists should be viewed. Some of the main, open issues are: the very definition of terrorists; are they to be treated according to the laws of war, in spite of the fact that they are civilian combatants of sorts? The Geneva Conventions, the Red Cross and the International Courts (e.g. ICTY, ICT, ICC, etc.) were meant to deal with armies, soldiers and civilians, and in some cases - with a third category: insurgents or guerrillas but not terrorists. Guerrillas are often recognized as political players, legitimately representing the population of sovereign states. Currently, the Hezbollah, deemed as a terrorist group by Israel, the U.S. and some of the West, indeed represents the Palestinian refugee population in Lebanon; while Hamas is arguably, the true representative of the Palestinian population of the Gaza Strip. None of the two populations mentioned, is recognized as a sovereign people or state. Thus Israel, in its decision to target terrorists that plan, help, train, equip, send and dispatch those who actually execute terrorist attacks against Israel, are now viewed by Israeli authorities as anything but guerrilla combatants - and as such, Israel occasionally, kills them after very careful deliberation, which is backed by Israel Supreme Court rulings (2004) and upon the careful approval by top political and military leadership. This does not solve some critical question. Not only the question of the legality of targeted killings,

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but also the morality of it; the effectiveness of this method or the fate of the innocent by-standers, commonly referred to as the collateral damage. The policy of targeted killing is consistent with Jewish and current Israeli law, and is considered legal with most of the current interpretations of the International Law. David posits Regarding Jewish law, the Rodef [assailant] injunction that appears in the Bible (Exodus 22:1) makes it abundantly clear that if someone is coming to kill you, you are obliged to kill them first. This obligation applies not only for ones protection, but for the defense of ones community as well. As such, Jewish law does not only permit killing a terrorist, before he can act - it requires it (David 2002, 14). The Israeli law, based on its Basic Law (which is the closest Israeli legislation ever came to a Constitution), prohibits the violation of life of any person, yet it states that this provision may be suspended for a proper purpose, and to extent no greater than is required (Basic Law1992, 150). Prior to the second intifada, the Prosecutor General (Attorney General) of IDF has issued three conditions, which were mandatory to rendering a specific targeted killing - legal: the name of the targeted individual, has been submitted to the Palestinian Authority (PA), with an arrest request, which was thus ignored by the PA; Israeli authorities were unable to arrest the said individual themselves; and the killing must be the only way to prevent an imminent future terrorist attack. An IDF team of lawyers led by Daniel Reisner further scrutinized these provisions. (Byman 2011, 314315). In 2002, Reisner drew a new set of guidelines for targeted killing. In order for a targeted killing to be legal, the following conditions must be met:

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The target is a combatant. The target is unreachable, and thus cannot be arrested. Senior civilian officials approve the operation. Efforts are undertaken to avoid/reduce civilian casualties (such efforts must be consistent with the principle of proportionality of potential collateral damage, with the damage to be caused by the target, if not killed).

The operation takes place in areas that Israel does not effectively control. The target must be an individual posing a future threat. Not just somebody with past-time, blood on his/her hands.

For years, Israel attempted to avoid its direct linkage to a certain terrorist killing, because of international scrutiny and harsh criticism. Indeed, Mossad agents preserve such anonymity to this day, unless they are uncovered due to missions failure (e.g. the Lilhammer affair in 1973, or the failed assassination attempt of Khaled Mashal in Jordan, 1997). Moreover, some of the members of the IDF elite SF units (e.g. Duvdevan. See links under Duvdevan), use undercover methods to briefly infiltrate Palestinian hostile areas and either carry out a targeted killing or apprehension and arrest of suspected terrorists. The Duvdevan and Shimshon units are the descendants of the pre-independence, Jewish Mistarvim military intelligence unit. While Duvdevan/Shimshon are used for intelligence gathering missions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, their main mission is apprehension, arrest or targeted killings of terrorists. During a typical operation, while undercover posture is best retained for future activity, it is sometimes blown, due to operational circumstances. In any case, the IDF and the GSS officially

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acknowledge their operations, and especially targeted killings, as part of IDFs and GSSs transparency paradigm (see: IDF Failed to Investigate 2012).

While Israeli soldiers, intelligence operatives and police officers, act within the limitations of the Israeli law, these practices are not necessarily accepted as legal in the eyes of the international community and the International Law. Moreover, sometimes even the rulings of the Israel Supreme Court are internationally challenged. In 2005, in more than 30 cases the targeted killings failed, yet approximately 150 civilians, who were near to the locations of the targeted killing attempts, were unintentionally killed as well. International and local objections to the killings argued that since Israel is the formal occupier of the West Bank and Gaza Strip these areas should fall under police jurisdiction and thus Israel must deploy only the law enforcement model there. The Supreme Court however, held a broader definition of the term combatant than the one used with regard to army combatants, because of the Palestinian populations involvement in supporting terrorists; acting as human shields for the terrorists, and thus actively participating in terrorism. This ruling of the Israel Supreme Court clearly, exculpated the IDF for killing the relatives, recruiters, planners and group leaders of a known terrorist when striking the terrorist himself. The Supreme Court added that the future threat does not have to be imminent; the target can simply be a member of a terrorist group and thus presumed to be involved in attacks[however] Israel must first try to arrest, but if that is not feasible, killing is considered legal (Byman 2011, 318). However, when the Israeli government asked the Supreme Court to rule on the recognition of terrorists as unlawful Combatants in order to differentiate them from legal combatants and civilians, (because terrorists indeed, try to

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blend-in with the rest of the population; they indeed, do not obey the law and as such, should not be subject to the Geneva Conventions, Red Cross and other military war rules) the court decided to take no stance on this question and left open the issue of what rights terrorists have. (Byman 2011, 318-319). In yet another legal opinion by Kristen Eichensehr, published in the Yale Law Journal, she criticizes the Israeli Supreme Court, asserting that in its first ruling on the issue of targeted killings, it has weakened the international laws protection to all civilians, by extending the meaning of direct participation of terrorists in terrorism: terrorists are civilians under the law of armed conflict and thus are lawfully subject to attack only when the directly participate in hostilities. But the court also expanded the traditional definition of direct participationBy disregarding the direct participation requirements important evidentiary function, the court weakened the protection that international law affords to all civilians, not just to terrorists (Eichensehr, 2007). International Law complicates things because it is by default, applied to individuals, groups and populations, based on WWI and WWII experiences mostly. It is not that the asymmetry context, within which terrorism acts is lost on international lawyers; it is the fact that international law has so far failed to adapt to current day realities, by passing new and more applicable laws to fit current terrorism. This failure stems from international diversity of interests, norms, morals and perceptions that International Law represents.

As mentioned before, assassination per se, violates the International Law. However, if one is lawfully engaged in armed hostility, it is not considered assassination to target such individual, because lawful engagement in an armed

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hostility (i.e. insurgency or guerrilla war) deals with individuals who are lawful combatants, and thus viewed pretty much like soldiers. Moreover, terrorists are widely recognized as enemies of human kind and as such warrant their engagement with extreme prejudice. (Li 2010). Another complex legal issue is the one regarding the ambiguity of the Israeli engagement with the Palestinian terror groups. Is Israel in a state of war with the terrorists? And is Israel using treacherous (and thus forbidden) methods in its struggle with terrorism. Robert David posits: there are two points of ambiguity in the Israeli case regarding its adherence to international law. First, is whether Israel is actually at war with the PalestiniansIsrael is not at war since war is between two armies or two states and the Palestinians are neither. But since Israel is in armed conflict with Palestinians,[it is] allowed to target combatants.The second.. area of ambiguityis using treacherous means when it kills terroristsIt is true that Israelis have used deception in some of their killingsIsraelis have disguised themselves as women or Arabs to facilitate getting their target. [However,] what distinguishes the killings in the second intifada from the pastis precisely the open and military nature of the attacks. The use of helicopter gunships of F-16 to kill suspected terroristsInternational lawyers may disapprove of the Israeli actions but few would argue that it violates the ban on assassination. (David 2002, 15). Historically, it was Premier Golda Meir, who promised, ordered and authorized the first official targeted killings of the Black September terrorists involved in the Munich Olympic Games 1972 massacre: Goldas dark eyes glazed straight at them [the family members of the victims] I want to share my plans with you. Ive decided to pursue each and everyone of them, not one of the people involved in any way will be walking on this earth for much longerWe will chase them till the last (Klein 2005, 100). Boaz Ganor (2005), elaborates also on the so called boomerang effect which is applied to the possible result of targeted killings. It has been frequently stated that targeted killings do not deter terrorists from further attacks; furthermore, it

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has been often posited that it makes them more revengeful, hateful, and thus potentially provokes murderous retaliatory terrorist attacks, which arguably, would not have taken place otherwise. Others suggest, that the claims that targeted killings increase the overall number of terrorist attacks, are hard to prove. Moreover, the alluded retaliatory terrorist attacks are hard to prove as such. One of the most prominent examples of the said boomerang effect, was the Hezbollah attack on the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992; which probably indeed was correctly linked with the targeted killing of the Hezbollah leader Abbas al- Musawi. However an attempt to link the rather unique, chain of suicide bombings to the targeted killing of Yihye Ayash (aka the Engineer), the infamous Hamas bomb maker, attack planner, recruiter and suicide bombers dispatcher is questionable. The capability to execute such attacks was already there; the killing of Ayash may have rather sped up the process and rate of normal suicide attacks. As suggested by Ganor: Those who favor offensive action claim that boomerang effect is merely the invention of terrorist organizations, as part of a sophisticated and calculated psychological warfare aimed at ensuring their immunity from military attack. Those who oppose offensive action believe that the boomerang effect should be taken seriously, and that it actually dictates a policy of restraint and avoiding offensive action against terrorist organizations Israels offensive actions may increase motivation but certainly do not increase capability to carry out attacks. Offensive action against the organization is liable to increase its activists motivation for vengeance and because the capability is already there, the organizations leaders are likely toperpetrate an attack. (Ganor 2005, 133). The efficacy of targeted killings as a CT tool is frequently contested, not only by international organizations and international community, but also by segments of the Israeli society and members of various human and public rights organizations (Stein 2001). However the most ambiguous question is whether

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or not, targeted killing are a successful CT tactic. In truth, the offensive and defensive tools available to any society faced with a terrorism problem are very limited; hence as such, no terrorism-afflicted society can just disregard or dismiss any tool in its CT arsenal. As the Israeli experience exemplifies, all tools must be used in a careful, legal and balanced way. Variables, like the number of terrorist attacks, or the number of casualties of such attacks, are not necessarily good predictors of the efficacy of the CT tools used at a given time, because a variety of unrelated variants are likely to influence terrorist response to targeted killings, simultaneously with their emotional wish for revenge. Such unaccounted-for variants may be for example: personal changes within the terrorist organizations; changes in what terrorists prioritize in a given period; lull periods in terrorist attacks; peace negotiations, etc. In a similar way, the above-mentioned, unaccounted-for changes may be also confused with successful or unsuccessful application of certain CT measures. This problem is even more comprehensive due to the fact that in the Israeli experience, there was no one period of time, during which only one offensive CT measure was applied. There is no way to gauge the effect of targeted killings alone, since they were always applied along with road blocks, check points, administrative detentions, deportations, house demolitions or the erection of the Security Barrier. Moreover, one should note, that targeted killings effect might be also affected by the way this CT method by itself, is being carried out: are targeted killings by snipers, or undercover Special Forces less or more deterring than a strike from a airborne platform of some kind? There is no univocal reply to this question; The IDF and GSS decide on the best method according to how it fits the targets behavior, his/her location (e.g. within civilian population, schools

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and children and the prospective collateral damage; the urgency of the case: has the terrorist has been dispatched and is on his/her way to carry out an attack? The danger to Israeli troops/snipers stemming from a high-risk incursion to Palestinian controlled territory, etc.). The Israeli way of application of targeted terrorist killings has never been as consistent, systematic and continuous as it was during the second intifada. Some observe, that the second intifada could be considered as a laboratory for examining this CT method, as never done before. (Kober 2007). During the second intifada, Israel has successfully targeted and killed more than 253 terrorists, an unprecedented number, in comparison to the previous application of this method. Interestingly, some claim that the method of decapitation of the leaders only, seems to have been temporarily abandoned - (after the 2002 killing of a PFLP political activist Mustafa Thabet, who was perceived by the Palestinian population, as a political figure only) - in favor of targeting relatively low ranking terrorist operatives. During the period between 2000 and 2004 some 159 attempted targeted killings, were carried out through a variety of application methods. These resulted in 317 Palestinian fatalities, out of which almost 80 percent (253) were indeed combatants. Choosing to target the leadership not only rightly fits with the common logic, it is also allegedly confirmed by the influence of such choice on the Stock Exchange. As for seniority, an assassination will probably be most effective if the target is a senior leader with specialized knowledge and skills. At the same time, successful assassinations would also tend to increase significantly the motivationto retaliate. Conversely, an assassination targeting a low-rank terrorist is likely to have both a relatively small effect in reducing the capability of his organization and also in increasing motivation for retaliation (Zussman and Zussman 2006, A196).

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Interestingly, Zussman and Zussman also deduct, from their Stock Marked response to targeted killings study, that the killing of high ranking terrorist military leadership made the stock market rise; however, the stock market declined, following the killing of terrorist groups political leaders. (Zussman and Zusman 2006, A204). Yet, Kobler argues that, unlike the elimination of military leaders, which proved to be ineffective, the decapitation of Hamass political and spiritual leaders seemed to have accounted for the organizations decision to suspend hostilities against Israel, which essentially meant the end of the second intifada (Kobler 2006). Who is right then? This question is arguably, answered by the comprehensive approach-change, adopted by the IDF: since 2002: In a significant shift from the IDF legal advisors emphasis on targeting combatants only, Israel raised the stakes again when it began a comprehensive campaign against the military, organizational, and political leadership of its opponents (Byman 2011, 316). Indeed, many Israeli proponents argue that the peace process is stalled and cannot advance, as long as terrorists are unafraid to continue their actions. As history have shown, cease fire only played into Palestinian extremism hands. Inherently, the Palestinians used cease-fires merely for rearming. One may correctly argue, that the actual Israeli gains from targeted killings remain controversial. Despite of the 2002 Israeli shift in their targeting choices and despite the conclusion that cease-fires are used by Hamas only for rearming, the November 2012 spat of fighting brought about the cessation of the rocketing attacks on Israel, - the fighting was stopped in favor of a negotiated cease fire, one more time. It can be safely assumed, that during the next round of fighting, (which can be arguably accepted as granted,), Israel will face a better-prepared and better-armed Hamas.

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In 2005, Jerry Smith evaluates in his thesis, the effectiveness of Israels counterterrorism strategy as a whole. When a suicide attack occurs, the Israeli citizens want action to be takenthe Israeli government sees [the targeted killing] as an opportunity to solve two problems at the same time. They can take out the senior key figure of the terrorist organization responsible for the attack, while also giving the victims families some sense of justice (Smith 2005, 57). Diane Leigh Maye contrasts this point of view, in her 2006 thesis, on the same topic. Leigh Maye evaluates seven Israeli actions aimed at countering Palestinian resistance. By addressing Palestinian terrorists as resistance, Leigh Maye renders Palestinian terrorism certain legitimacy as combatants of a guerrilla war. Maye correctly assesses the poor efficacy of targeted killings as root problem solution for the long run: The assassinations have not thwarted number of attacksnor do they have history of ending the terrorist organizations existence. To the contrary, the attacks may have provoked an even stronger response (Leigh Maye 2006, 39). However, Smith contends, International law prohibits assassinations[however] terrorists are considered to be common enemies of humankindMany times after a leader is removed there tends to be internalstrugglefurthermore, group will tend to spend more time and resources to stay alivethe Israeli policy of targeting ticking-bomb terrorists does not deserve the kind of condemnation it is receiving (Smith 2005, 35). Yet another study of the efficacy of targeted killings against Palestinian terrorism was conducted Hafez and Hatfield who concluded in their 2000-2004 differenced and lagged time-series analysis, which targeted killings have no significant impact on rates of Palestinian violence. Targeted Killings did not increase or decrease Palestinian attacks whether in the long or short run. While targeted

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assassinations may be a useful political tool, signaling the adversary states determination to punish the perpetrators, or placate angry public at home, there is but little evidence that they really impact the course of terrorism (Hapez and Hatefield 2006). As before, when it comes to concluding who is right and who is wrong in their conclusions regarding the efficacy of the targeted killings and the other Israeli offensive and defensive CT tools, it is up to the reader to draw his/her own conclusions. The issue of deterrence with regard to the Palestinian terrorism is somewhat complex. While some, like Ganor, claim that Israeli CT measures however successful, did not deter the Hamas Hezbollah and others from perpetrating attacks - it is true that the hard hand approach of Israel in thwarting Palestinian suicide terrorism, may have increased the hatred and demand for revenge in the Palestinian organizations; but the systematic decapitation of Hamas, (and other groups) leaders, as well as mid level combatants, created real capability losses in the terrorist groups. In 2002 the suicide attacks related deaths peaked, (188) and in 2003. The average lethality per attack - has peaked as well (5.5) (Byman 2011, 366-368). By decapitating the leaders and the engineers, Israel created a situation, whereas much of the terrorists top echelon, both leadership and bomb-making capability - was extinct. It is arguably wrong to suggest that: every dead terrorist is instantly replaced by a new one. In the longer run, the quality matters. The loss of leadership and much of the technical know how probably indeed caused the drop in the number of suicide attacks.

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.simply swapping one militant for another does not work. The number of skilled terrorists is often quite limited. Generators of terror such as bomb makers, trainers, document forgers, recruiters, and leaders are scarce in number and require many months if not years to perfect their skills. If these generators of terror can be eliminated through arrests or killings, the organization as a whole is disrupted (Byman 2011, 365). The exact success of the targeted killings is hard to gauge also due to the erection of the Security Barrier, which agreeably, prevented many suicide attacks. In an interesting quantitative and qualitative PhD paper, Pia Jansen concludes that there has been a remarkable decline in the average number of fatalities per terrorist incident in Israel from 2001-2005. She further posits that, Israel have not only been successful in countering the volume of attacks, but that they may have been able to thwart the effectiveness of the attacks, which again indicates that they have succeeded in reducing the terror organizations overall capability(Jansen 2007, 321). In direct relation to targeted killings Byman summarizes: Given all the drawbacks, why does Israel continue with targeted killings? The reason is simple: targeted killings work. The strikes have disrupted Hamas, PIJ the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, and other Palestinian terrorist groups; they have depleted the number of skilled operatives; and they have forced the remaining militants to spend more time in hiding than in plotting future attacks. Targeted killings are not the only important tool in Israels arsenal, but when these killings are combined with the security barrier and an increased ability to arrest suspects, the number of Israeli deaths from terrorism declines precipitously (Byman 2011, 312). Moreover, Byman also emphasizes Israels General Secret Services and the IDFs uniquely transparent approach and nationwide-garnered support towards these unfortunate, yet sometimes, absolutely necessary kinetic operations. (Byman 2006, 108-111).

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If there is any single Palestinian indication of how successful have the Israeli targeted have been in suppressing Palestinian terrorism, it can be found in the Palestinian, first and foremost request, during the negotiations for the cease-fire in 2012: 1.a. Israel should stop all hostilities in the Gaza Strip land, sea and air including incursions and targeting of individuals (Kaphle 2012).

Other Israeli Counterterrorism Measures: Defensive and Punitive Counterterrorism Measures

Overview The terminology offensive and defensive, with regard to the Israeli CT model, can be misleading since both, offensive and defensive measures can be considered pre-emptive or preventive, in certain occasions; thus, even the defensive measures, often contain offensive elements. In this context administrative measures like detainment, can be viewed as both defensive and offensive. The most prominent goal of all these measures is to jointly, or separately, prevent acts of terrorism against Israel. While some Israeli leaders decidedly, belittle defensive measures (e.g. closures, checkpoints etc.), for their part in thwarting or deterring terrorist attacks - it is harder to belittle some major defensive projects, such as the Israeli Airport Authority security measures, the securing of sensitive installations, infrastructure and national monuments and symbols, or the Security Barrier erected since 2003, which is said to have prevented over 75% of suicide terrorist attacks (Ganor in Art 207, 283). Nonetheless, Israel has very long borders, comparatively to its small size. Securing borders is not only an

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American problem; even in a state as tiny as Israel, an airtight border security is virtually impossible. Nor is it possible to have a guard everywhere, at all times. Moreover, the Israeli public lives within a very short distance from Israels borders, and thus, is in constant and very realistic, danger from Palestinian terrorists. Infiltration of Israel by Palestinians is done on a daily basis. Ways to circumvent the checkpoints are daily tested, and Palestinians continuously create new paths on their way to their legal or illegal work place in Israel. This practice, may however be waning down, with the completion of the Security Barrier. In the same vein, despite the ongoing debate as to the efficiency and the legal standing of the Security Barrier, the reader is herewith provided with additional data, to help create an educated opinion on that topic. The Israeli version of a Security Barrier is not a unique and original invention of Israel. Likewise protective barriers have been built in quite a few places in the world: Iraq-Kuwait (1991, 120 miles long); Iraq-Saudi Arabia (2006, 559 miles long); Afghanistan-Pakistan (2005, 1500 miles long); India Pakistan (2007, 435 miles long), etc. (Walls of the World 2012). In 2002, following the huge increase in suicide bombing in Israel, the government decided to build a physical obstacle in order to improve the operational capability of fighting terrorism and to prevent terrorist infiltration from the West Bank, into Israel. The ideas behind the fence were to prevent uncontrolled passage of residents of the West Bank into Israeli territory, as well as to prevent weapons smuggling and the infiltration of terror cells and individuals, wishing to augment existing terrorist cells in Israel (Mersel 2006, 80).

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Despite the historical views of the founding fathers of Israel (e.g. Yigal Alon) that claimed that no modern country could surround itself with a fence or walls, in 2001 and on, the wall became clearly detrimental to Israels protection from Palestinian suicide bombers. Avi Dichter, a former head of the GSS is cited saying that the barrier was crucial for stopping terrorism, and stopping suicide bombers from entering Israel. Furthermore, one of the leaders of the terrorist group Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Ramadan Abdallah Shalah is quoted as saying, in an interview to Al-Sharq, in March 2008, that the barrier limits the ability of the resistanceto carry out suicide bombing attacks within Israeli territory (Byman 2011, 325, 328). Due to the fact that the route of the Security Barrier makes several detours resulting in the effective incursion and inclusion of some of the West Bank as partial enclaves, within the Israeli territory, many critics accused Israel of a land grab and creating a de facto new border with the future Palestinian state. The original route of the barrier indeed included some indisputably Palestinian lands. The land grab as it was often defined, was contested as illegal, mostly because it would infringe upon some of the Palestinian petitioners basic liberties, to access their agricultural lands, their access to water wells; thus also affecting their shepherding, as well as their access to fruit and olive plantations and thus undermining the livelihood of some 35,000 Palestinian village residents and their children. These Palestinians also claimed to have lost their access to schools and medical facilities (Mersel 2006, 80). As in other cases of offensive or defensive CT measures, the case of the Security Barrier was eventually, overviewed and ruled upon, by the Israeli Supreme Court (ISC), which ruled the Barrier somewhat illegal.

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the Court [ISC] rationalized in [2004], that even if it can be assumed that building the fence would achieve and promote national security, and even if there is no alternative means that is less restrictive, some of the seizure actions were illegal under principals of international law and Israeli administrative law because the damage they caused to the individual was not proportional to the gain brought about (Mersel 2006, 81). The ruling by the International Court declared the Separation Barrier as illegal, period. While the ISC did not declare the mere building of the fence illegal, it did rule that the placement/route of the barrier was disproportionately harmful. The eventual ruling of the ISC effectively decreased the annexed Palestinian land, by 15 percent (Byman 2011, 327). The impact of the barrier was intense. It did effectively, block almost all terrorist infiltrations from the Gaza Strip, and much of the infiltration from the West bank. It is however, not impregnable. Israeli Arabs (some 20 percent of the Israeli civilian population, or 1.5 million, that did not leave their lands in 1948), which have an Israeli citizenship, Israeli ID, and do not experience any limitations on their movement, have on quite a few occasions, linked with the West Bank Palestinians in the perpetration of terrorist attacks. However, this is not the only concern regarding the final outcome of the Barrier: currently, even those Palestinians that are participants in the Israeli economy, as highly valued workers in Israeli agriculture and construction, are often stopped by the barrier. The long waiting, slow traffic progress, at the barrier checkpoints, (where they display their special working passes and are searched for explosives), and the frequent closures, cause direct damage to the Israeli economy, as well as exacerbate the anger and the hatred towards Israel.

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Israelis are very open about the human costs of the Barrier. The former COS of IDF Moshe Yaalon wrote: Any defensive measures taken by Israel including traffic checkpoints, closures, and curfews- inevitably led to Palestinian suffering and to violations of their civil rights (In Byman 2011, 331). And the Israeli politician Uzi Dayan, a firm believer in the effectiveness of the Barrier contends that, The barrier also poisons communal relationsI dont think that good fences make good neighborsIf Frost [See Robert Frosts Mending Wall] had terrorists for neighbors rather than irate New Englanders, he would build a fence.(In Byman 2011, 331). The Security Barrier is not just a passive, physical obstacle; it is heavily armed with various types of motion detectors, video cameras and other sensors, as well as sniper nests and observation points, affording better security and arguably, a certain degree of deterrence. Indeed, as Byman (2011) suggests, despite the security wall along the Gaza Strip, Hamas unsuccessfully attempted to mount many suicide operations. The cost of the completed Security barrier is said to be around $2Billion. Indeed a large amount of money. According to US estimates, the construction of the planned Great Wall of Mexico would be $4-$8 Billion (U.S.- Mexico Border Fence 2008). However, from a bit cynical point of view, the cost of a single USAF F/A-18 Horne,t is $94 Million, F-35 Lightning II is $122 Million, a single F-22 Raptor is $350 Million and a single B-2 Spirit is $ 2.4 Billion (Top 10 Most Expensive Military Planes 2012). Historically, there is no significant stretch of the Israeli land borders, and its coastline, that has not been penetrated by terrorists and used to launch an attack. It is thus hard to disregard the opinion of one of the former gatekeepers

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(heads of the GSS) Carmi Gilon, cited by Boaz Ganor (translated from Hebrew) who says: It must be remembered that the number of possible targets for terrorism is almost infiniteit is impossible to place a guard at every location in the country. The only solution is pinpoint intelligence that leads to the terrorist about to carry out the attack, and your ability to cripple or stop him beforehandMost of our resources should not be invested guarding buses but in operational intelligence, so we can get to the terrorist before he places the bomb (In Art 2007, 284). Although Gilon is indeed correct, his argument is faulty, because his logic implies that using guards on buses, inside malls and movie theatres for example, is too costly and inefficient. Gilon implies that if the money invested in passive defensive measures would have been applied to theoretical creation of better intelligence products; this would have been more effective. This is not completely true: Gilons argument is theoretical at best; we dont know how would a dramatic shift of funds from passive-defensive means towards theoretical intelligence, affect the actual thwarting of terrorist attacks. We know for fact, that guards of public places did, in fact, stop suicide terrorists, more than few times; sometime at the cost of their own lives (Bennet 2002), in other cases guards, along with members of the public stopped suicide terrorists from mounting a crowded bus, or from entering a crowded restaurant. Although ideally, Americans, Israelis, and everybody else would love to always have hard, operational intelligence ready to thwart any terrorist attempt - in reality, although Israeli CT has excelled in this respect, for as long as Palestinian terrorism continue, Israel will probably always need additional intelligence, which is often not attainable, no matter how much Israel invest in growing its intelligence potential. This is the unquenchable thirst that characterizes the

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very nature of intelligence work. Israelis have the greatest respect for the work of the GSS, IDF and the rest of the IIC; but the need to augment intelligence capabilities by passive-defensive measures should be an accepted reality. Additional measures, such as police patrols, police presence, bus guards, mall guards etc., will for the foreseeable future, be part of the Israeli life and its landscape. Life in Israel has created highly vigilant and wary public, which is made of individuals who in many cases are the ones who locate IEDs and neutralize suicide bombers, either alone, or together with the police. However, Palestinian terrorism is not deterred by Israels last line of defense, aka the civilian guards, and the public. Occasional successes in foiling an attack by ordinary civilians or hired guards did not increase the Israeli deterrence effect. There is no known effective way to deter suicide bombers. In 2008 Ehud Olmert, then Israels Prime Minister, considered an actual legislation according to which, the house of the family of the suicide bomber will be demolished and razed, thus penalizing the family of the dead terrorist for his deeds. Even if that such legislation have not created a public uproar (which it did), while suicide terrorists have emotional ties to their families, their perception is that their sacrifice in becoming a martyr, overrides all other concerns. Moreover, in some cases, the act of martyrdom is strongly encouraged by the bombers family. (Chehab 2007, 85-90). When public vigilance succeeds foiling a terrorist plan, yet the perpetrators manage to escape arrest - the attack is likely to be only postponed, and possibly attempted in a different place, on a different occasion. Suicide bombers are no longer easy to identify. It is next to impossible to define what makes for a positive identification of a prospective suicide bomber. Suicide bombers are not always nervous or smiling; they do not always perspire

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profusely and so on it is rather, a combination of a wrong person in the wrong place at the wrong time, odd behavior andvibes that cannot be explained but which are somehow sensed by everyday Israelis. Statistically, civilian vigilance plays a major role in the identification of suspicious objects and people. This unique capability of many Israelis, also strengthens the Israeli public psychologically, and gives it some sense of control over their environment. While many countries look up to their government alone, to take care their security, Israelis largely share the security burden with their government and are seen as an active and valuable partner in counterterrorism and other security measures. As posited by the 2009 U.S. Homeland Security Institute Report for the DHS: The [Israeli] public is treated [by the Israeli government] as a key partner in counterterrorism.(McGee et. al. 2009, 3).

Israeli administrative counterterrorist measures Israeli authorities deploy several administrative measures, which aim at limiting the liberties of the Palestinian population in order to retain peace and order and prevent terrorism. The most prominent administrative measure is the closure (SEGER Heb.). There are four types of most commonly imposed closures: 1). Closure imposed for a predetermined period of time, during Palestinian memorial days (e.g. the Earth Day a.k.a. Yum-el-Ard), or during Jewish holidays; 2) Protective closures, due to a concrete warning about an imminent attack attempting to stop any Palestinians from moving inside a certain area of the West Bank, and temporarily stopping the movement through the IDF checkpoints. 3) Closures following a terrorist attack aimed at allowing for fast

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and effective movement of IDF in their attempt to arrest the perpetrators of the attack. 4) In the past, closures intended to exert pressure on the Palestinian Authority, to comply with certain security request from Israeli authorities (e.g. arresting fugitives etc.). Closures are often confused with punitive measures. They indeed cause a lot of suffering on the part of Palestinians, yet their purpose, from the Israeli point of view, is very logical as a security tool, to control the movements of Palestinians and prevent attacks against Israelis. The IDF has stated that during 2008 it has removed 140 roadblocks and eight central checkpoints in an effort to improve freedom of movement for the civilian Palestinian population in Judea, Samaria and the Jordan Valley. As of July 2009, Israeli authorities report that an additional 27 checkpoints and 140 roadblocks have been removed. 1500 permits have been issued to Palestinian public officials, allowing them to pass freely through the Israeli crossings into Israel. According to IDF sources, in the West Bank there are 504 remaining dirt roadblocks and 14 checkpoints (Behind the Headlines 2009).

Israels punitive counterterrorism measures The aim of CT punitive measures is to remove threatening, dangerous elements from within the Palestinian society, in order to prevent attacks, promote public security and also to extract some revenge from Palestinians found responsible for attacks they were linked to and deter others from following in their footsteps. All the punitive CT approach is based on the enactment of punitive actions, without providing the subjecst of these actions, with the full due process prior the administration of these means. The Israeli authorities actions are however,

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based on existing laws and regulations, which clearly define acts considered as forbidden by state laws and as endangering the safety of the Israeli society. The main punitive counterterrorism measures in Israel include: demolition or the sealing (with concrete) of the houses of terrorists, and especially suicide terrorists; administrative detention of terror suspects; deportation of suspects; confiscation of funds deemed to be related to terrorist activities and the imposing of administrative fines. Administrative deportation has been considered to be the most severe punishment and actively removed key figures involved in unrest and terrorism. It is also the most contested punitive measure and one that often cause an escalation in tensions and unrest; such actions, have had sometimes, a selfdefeating results. Deportation of Palestinians from the occupied territories, should not however, be confused with mass deportation of population from occupied areas, which is banned by the U.N. international community, based on the Geneva Conventions. Thus Israeli deportations of Palestinians targeted individuals only. The act of deportation can be appealed in absentia by representative of the deported before the Israeli High Court of Justice (It is a special convening of the ISC). The highest number of deportees in the 1990s was the deportation of 415 radical Islamist political activists to Lebanon in 1992. Due to a U.N. Security Council intervention, this deportation was terminated after one year, during which the deportees, which were hosted and sponsored by Hezbollah that instructed them in terrorism related actions, such as the preparation of IEDs, military training, and terrorist attacks related training. According to the most recently updated statistics, the last deportations were

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conducted in 2004 and included only 3 Palestinians. (Deportations from the West Bank to the Gaza Strip 2013). Administrative detentions are one of the more common, as well as more effective punitive measures. It is based on emergency regulations, dating back to the British Mandate over Palestine (1920-1948). The idea is simple and effective: removal of the detainee, who is considered to be a violence inciter and his incarceration for a limited period of time (up to six month a t a time); a period which can be both, appealed to the ISC (by the detainee), and extended according to the states security needs, after legal review of each case. Detention is mostly used to deal with individuals which otherwise would have to be publically tried, forcing the authorities to reveal secret information (e.g. how the evidence against the said individual was obtained). Meir Dagan, former head of the GSS, stated in a 1999 interview, cited by Ganor: It is impossible to act in the State of Israel without administrative detention. It is one of the best tools in our possession to make use of intelligence without exposing it to the other side (Ganor 2005, 292). Doubtlessly, detaining an individual for longer than a few hours is contrasted with the very concept of democracy. However, one should consider that democracies faced with continuous acts of terrorism, must defend themselves somehow. Detention is the only tool which allows for the use of intelligence in the possession of the state, without disclosing it to the terrorist entities and terrorism supporting population. BTselem, the Israeli Human Rights Organization, suggests that the most recent peak in administrative detentions has been in February and April of 2012, with over 300 detainees detained for a period of over two years (Duration of Administrative Detention 2013).

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House demolition and house razing. This punitive measure is legally based on Emergency Defense Regulations, created closely with the creation of the State of Israel. The original logic behind this CT method was not punitive at the time it was created. In its source, the regulation provided a local military commander with the legal right to use such measure to maintain order and security, within the area under his command. It was a deterrent. Although house demolitions were often appealed to the Israeli High Court of Justice, the appeals were mostly turned down. In principle, the demolition of a Palestinian house is ordered in cases that the house dweller was a terrorist. The appeals of house demolition cases were often based on the claim that the other owners of the said house had no knowledge of the terrorist activities of the individual/s, which were proved to be suicide (or non suicide) terrorists. In July 2012, upon the order of Israels minister of defense Ehud Barak, an area including 8 small Palestinian villages, which was for years acclaimed by the IDF as needed for IDF training and as an IDF fire zone, has been ordered for demolition. However, Baraks order did not deprive the inhabitants from using the said land for their farming - when not in use by the IDF. (Hass 2012).

XVI. Israeli Counterterrorism model: preliminary conclusions. As the terrorism experts Boaz Ganor and Ami Pedahzur, stated, Israel never formulated a definitive CT policy or strategy. The Israeli approach to countering terrorism is thus a compilation of extensive experience, arguably, the most extensive CT experience today. When attempting to classify or categorize Israeli counterterrorism model, one can only point out to certain CT tactics, as opposed to comprehensive strategy. In the Israeli case, lacking a precise, coherent,

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strategy has proven to be occasionally beneficial to Israel, because it was not forced to stick to an inflexible set of decisions, made at one point in time. Israel was thus, able to adapt its CT to its most current needs and pressures without contradicting former decisions. However, such benefit does not come without a tradeoff: lack of coherent CT strategy often made Israeli authorities more exposed to outside pressures, whether by its own public, or by international public opinion as outlined in various forums (e.g. U.N. general assembly, the Red Cross and other various NGOs and specific countries). These pressures are possibly, the main reason behind the lack of consistency in Israels approach to terrorism, and the occasional shifting of the emphasis from utterly offensive measures to more permissive and lenient ones and back. In this respect one may want to examine the Palestinian behavior. Every time the Israelis have shown flexibility and a wish to talk peace the Palestinians stepped up their defiance. This happened clearly in the aftermath of the 1993 Oslo accords, and again after Israels pullout from Lebanon in 2000. Although since the most recent cease fire in December 2012, by and large, calm was observed; there were several incident of rockets fired from Gaza and Sinai into Israel. While Israel may be criticized for not having a written and well-defined CT strategy and policy, it remains a fact that it was able to counter terrorism successfully for extended periods of time, thus allowing its population to regain their peace and composure. Unlike what some may think, life in Israel is good, in almost every respect. Israel has been wise, in setting as a goal, not the total eradication of the Palestinian terror, but rather its confinement, containment, so as to minimize terrors success in ensuing physical damage, carnage and psychological and political pressure.

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In the offensive field Israels biggest achievement its unique intelligence capability, which evolved along with the threat, while constantly investing in more comprehensive understanding of their adversaries, and innovating the CT tools, methods and units accordingly. In the defensive field, Israels major CT achievement is the creation of the lasting bond and partnership between its civilian population, its security apparatuses and the government. Israelis are probably, the worlds most CT oriented people. They take pride in their ability to stand up to terrorism and in spite of the fear, horror and trauma, rationalize the fact that the number of injuries and fatalities from car accidents, is many times the number of terrorism casualties. Israel is being criticized as being somewhat a police state. Although undeniably, Israeli democratic liberties are infringed upon each time Israelis are asked to identify themselves or open their bags for a security search; this infringement is not only accepted as a necessary evil; in fact, sometimes, when a guard does not perform his/her task with diligence he/she is reprimanded by the public. Moreover, largely because the wisdom of involving the judiciary in the CT process and safeguarding its independence from the executive, Israel was able to preserve the true spirit of democracy, at least as well and arguably better than states like the US, France or UK. What took place in Israel as a gradual application of appropriate legislature and Jurisprudence happened to the U.K., U.S., in the form of shock treatment. The September 11, 2001 bombings triggered a cascade of emergency legislature at least in the US (2001), the U.K. (2001), Italy (2001), Germany (2002), Norway (2002), to mention a few (Counter Terrorism Legislation 2005). The new laws triggered understandable concern from large segments of the respective

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populations, which do not share the Israeli level of confidence and trust it has in its government. In view of the global expansion of Islamist terrorism, other nations, other democracies beside Israel, will arguably, have to accept certain infringement of their democratic liberties in order to more effectively confront transnational terrorism.

XVII. Can Lessons from Fighting Palestinian Terrorism be Applied to the Struggle with Al Qaeda? While lessons from the Israeli struggle with two, very different, types of terrorism (one carried out by Hamas and other Palestinian factions and the other carried out by Hezbollah), are likely to benefit the U.S. CT efforts, it is suggested by some, that Palestinian terrorism, Hezbollah terrorism, and other forms of terror, be it the LTTE, the FARC, the Chechens, Or the IRA etc, - none apply to the al Qaeda model and the al Qaeda related counterterrorism. Indeed, al Qaeda is different from any other terrorist group mentioned in this paper. It is in truth, the only truly transnational terrorist group. It conducts its activities both in a hierarchical and horizontal venues. Unlike all other groups, which are focused on actions directed at a single state and its sovereign territory and its civilian population al Qaeda targets the whole world - even if its current efforts are focused on the U.S. and its allies mainly as symbols of all evil. Although the Hezbollah is widely diffused around the world, it is still no match in popularity to al Qaeda, which can boast significant and autonomous presence in some 100 states, despite the fact that a poll released in 2008 by Terror Free Tomorrow,

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found that only 24 percent of Pakistanis had a favorable opinion of bin-Laden in 2008, as compared to 46 percent a year before. In a similar way, the poll suggests that al Qaedas popularity has dropped from 33 to 18 percent (Bajoria and Bruno 2012). Al Qaeda has an international communications and propaganda systems, as well as funds collection system/s. Al Qaeda operatives meet and train in various and ever changing, locations throughout the world; it is also involved in criminal activities, along with fund raising activities in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, Asia, and even throughout Europe and the United States and Canada. Moreover, al Qaeda has evolved beyond being just a terrorist group of several thousands sworn in members (possibly more or less); al-Qaeda is currently an idea or as suggested, a brand name or a franchise. It is unique. Without negating any part of the myth of al Qaeda, it is clear that in spite of al Qaedas innovations, it still shares a respectable number of common traits with other terrorist groups. The lessons to be learned are thus, from each and every terrorist - combating experience. At this point in time, no country, including the U.S., can afford to disregard the lessons learned from CT struggles of other countries. However, the applicability of such lessons is naturally, selective. AlQaedas and its affiliates motivation is a mixture of political (nationalist) and religious reasoning, much like some of the other terrorist groups. Like others, alQaeda and its affiliates, are is still conducting its business in secrecy; it has to constantly hide from its persecutors, train and mobilize new combatants, show strong Internet presence, affect the world news and execute terrorist attacks - to prove its continuous existence, just like other terrorist groups. Under the impact of the loss of its base in Afghanistan and under relentless pursuital Qaeda was forced to reconfigure itself from a unitary bureaucratic organization into an ideology and a loose

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confederation of groups. It has become a true transnational entity that has networkedwith numerous like-minded groups (Art and Richardson 2007, 582). While the founding fathers of al-Qaeda came from Egypt, Algeria and Saudi Arabia, the new generation came also from Muslim diasporas in W. Europe and their descendants. Each of al-Qaedas affiliates has its own agenda, but they all share the common set of beliefs regarding the West, Palestine and naturally the U.S. These beliefs are summarized in the following: the West is implacably hostile to Islam; the only way to address this threat and the only language that the West understands is the logic of violence; and jihad is the only option (Hoffman 2003, 10). Since the United States is the leader of the West, (and arguably, the rest of the world), it is only natural for it to become al-Qaidas main target. The Idea of liberal democratic regime does not resonate well with al-Qaedas thinking; it rebels not only against Western democracies, but also against the autocracies of the Middle East: it wishes to replace the present autocratic systems there with a theocratic, undemocratic and suppressive regime, based on the Sharia law being mandatory and the creation of a new caliphate, that will engulf the whole Islamic culture. It is clear that al Qaeda and its affiliates tap onto the existing sea of hatred and resentment towards the colonializing West and its puppet, corrupt, autocratic and secular regimes. As mentioned before, in spite of tactical successes of the U.S. and its allies in Afghanistan, the dwindling numbers of al-Qaida core say little about the actual situation of the jihadist, worldwide movement. Many claim that unlike the theory of Moshe Yaalon with regard to the possibility to defeat Palestinian terrorism, by

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consistent and complete suppression (Yaalon 2007, 20), suppressing al Qaeda et.al. is much more challenging and difficult, because it is so widely metastasized. Since 9/11, al Qaeda and jihadist terrorists in general are putting more emphasis than ever on recruitment from the Muslim diasporic community, especially those living in the West. Although the diasporic jihadists may be less capable than those trained in Afghanistan, as resolute[resulting from the Iraq War experience]the jihadists have become particularly adept in urban terrorist warfare that can be just as easily applied in the United States and Europe as in Iraq and the Middle East (Art and Richardson 2007, 584). On the other hand, these 2007 conclusions by Richardson are arguably, contested by recent statistics: a 2012 Pew Research Center Study conducted in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan and Turkey shows that a majority of Muslim citizens hold unfavorable views of al-Qaeda one year after Osama bin-Ladens death. For the record, in Pakistan, only 13 percent of Muslims have a positive view of al-Qaeda, with 55 percent holding an unfavorable view of it and just over 30 percent have no opinion at all. In Lebanon and in Turkey, the number of alQaeda enthusiasts is portrayed by 2% and 6% respectively. It seems that alQaeda is most popular in Egypt (possibly due to the fact that Ayman al Zawahiri, Osamas successor is originally from Egypt). 21 percent of Egyptians surveyed, presented a favorable view of al-Qaeda (Fox 2012). Furthermore, Richard Wike, Pews Global Attitudes Projects associate director, is cited saying that al-Qaedas popularity has changed little over the past year (2011-2012), since bin-Ladens death; however, throughout the decade plus since 9/11, support for al Qaeda dropped sharply. Wikes is cited saying, Typically when people are exposed to extremism and extremist violence in their own country, we tend to see people reacting in a negative way (in Fox 2012). Indeed, for example in Jordan, confidence in al-Qaeda dropped dramatically from 61 percent in 2005 to 24

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percent in 2006, after al-Qaeda carried out several suicide bombings in Amman, Jordans capital. By 2011, only 13 percent of the Jordanians reported confidence in bin-Ladens leadership (Fox 2012). This however, is unfortunately not the whole picture. As mentioned earlier in this work, while al-Qaeda core in Afghanistan has been arguably, effectively dealt with - its off-shots in the Maghreb (AQIM) and in the Middle East, specifically in Libya, Algeria, Mali, Yemen, Sudan and Syria are a source for serious concern to the U.S. and the rest of the free world. Recent attacks on U.S. facilities in Benghazi, (September 11, 2012) and the natural gas complex in Algeria, (January 2013), along with the strengthening of an Al Qaeda franchised group Jabhat al Nusra in Syria; as well as the recent arrest of al-Qaeda related terrorist network in Canada and the jihadist terror attack in Boston, MA (although not directly linked to al-Qaeda the idea is there); are all pointing at a metastasized al-Qaeda capability. Al Nusra is of particular concern to the U.S. due to its AQI backing and support, as well as due to its already large membership, estimated at 10,000 fighters including some with Western nationalities, which may refocus its attention on another target, once the Syrian civil war is over (Miller and Warrick 2013). Back in April 2012, Bruce Riedel, a Brookings institution fellow focusing on the Middle East warned, that despite the decrease in popularity, al-Qaeda still poses a significant threat to international security. In his words, cited in U.S. News, Low approval ratings are not really relevant in terrorism. If 10 percent of Muslims support [al-Qaeda] that means 100 followers, a huge pool to recruit a few suicide bombers. (Fox 2012). Mr. Riedel could hardly be more correct. As recently stated by unidentified senior U.S. intelligence source,

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 one of the most concerning things were seeing is crossfertilization and cross- pollinization of affiliates. The newer groups have more diverse memberships, abundant access to weapons and a willingness to collaborate that serves as a multiplier effect (Miller and Warrick 2013). These new developments pose new challenges to the U.S. and counterterrorism strategy, which was until very recently focused mostly on al-Qaeda Afghanistan and on the Taliban. The shift in al-Qaedas profile, challenges the future of the drone related intelligence and targeted killings of al-Qaeda members. The U.S. is not as well prepared for such challenges from the HUMINT respect, as well as from the angle of using the drones in far away countries, where the U.S. does not have as many ready landing strips, nor necessarily, the consent of the state in which al-Qaeda is present. While in the short term, al-Qaeda affiliates provide new justification for the U.S. to use its drone tactics, it is suggested that these CT wars may well be expected to continue for another decade or more. The U.S. has recently disclosed plans to build a drone base in Niger, to make intelligence collection over Mali possible. While nothing has yet been said about targeted killings there, this would have been an expected move on the part of the U.S. However, for now, the U.S. relies on regional allies and on France to deal with the terrorists in Mali and Niger. The flow of combatants and weapons has transformed AQIM and made it more resilient. It became a focal point for migration of combatants ousted from their previous posts, where they suffered setbacks (e.g. Yemen, Pakistan, Afghanistan etc.). As correctly stated, In its broader incarnation, the group [AQIM] is one of the most diverse affiliates, drawing militants from Mali, Mauritania, Libya, Egypt and Sudan. The organizations amorphous membership also illustrates what U.S. officials described as an increasingly fluid militant network (Miller and Warrick 2013).

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An increasingly important is also the fact that al-Qaeda core is not funding any of its new, affiliated groups. Moreover, it is currently, not much more that a blessing giver and possibly an adviser. However, the affiliates still look to alQaeda core for varying degrees of guidance and affirmation. David Cohen, the Treasury Departments undersecretary for terrorism was cited saying: Unable to rely on al Qaeda [central] for help, regional affiliates such as AQIM have been forced to raise their own funds, mostly through criminal enterprisesTheir money is self-generated, predominantly through kidnapping ventures and other criminal enterprises (Miller and Warrick 2013). With due respect granted to al-Qaidas activity in the Maghreb, the Arabian Peninsula remains an al-Qaedas franchise stronghold (in Yemen), which is capable and committed to carrying attacks against the United States. However, the al-Qaeda metastasized threats are evident to all Western democracies and their worldwide facilities. Indeed, Western governments are warning their embassies, businesses and tourists of the terrorist hazards and threats. In view of the French intervention in the Algerian gas pipeline and the Mali hostage incidents, the French government with population a 10 percent of which, is of North African descent, is bracing for a possible wave of retaliatory terrorist attacks in France.

To conclude this section, it seems reasonable, that lessons can and should be learned constantly, from the experiences of every country, which is threatened by terrorists and is involved in counterterrorism. There is no way to directly apply everything learned from the decades of fighting Palestinian terrorism, to the struggle with al-Qaeda. But there are some points to be made.

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The use of force alone is unlikely to defeat al-Qaeda. Even local groups like Hamas, PIJ and alike, were not defeated and completely destroyed by Israeli military. Moreover it took Sri Lankan governments 24 years, to defeat the local LTTE through the application of extreme measures, which badly undermined the democratic nature of the existing regime. With alQaeda being more an idea and a formula for global terrorism, force alone is insufficient.

The Israelis have never really tried to battle for the hearts and minds of the Palestinians. The very nature of the Israeli Palestinian conflict negates the very concept of positively approaching the Palestinians; this is, simply put two people locked in a deadly struggle over the same tiny piece of land. Positive Israeli gestures towards Palestinians (e.g. medical care, the Oslo accords, etc.) have been dwarfed by both, the offensive and the defensive Israeli measures. Interestingly, although Israeli retaliatory and preemptive violence against Palestinians, leads them to support more radical factions and more radical attitudes towards the conflict, this effect is temporary, and according to a study, supposedly, vanishes completely within 90 days (Jaeger et.al. 2008). The lesson for fighting against alQaeda is: refrain from occupation. If the US has to fight it should do so, as much as possible, by remote control to minimize the alienating effect of occupation on those who host al-Qaeda.

The United States has a much better chance than Israel, of waging a successful campaign for the hearts and minds of the Muslim population, by

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driving a wedge between the Muslim public at large, and the destructive path of al- Qaeda.

General Lessons to be Learned from the Worldwide Struggle with Terrorism

International Cooperation in CT Struggle is a Must Most of terrorist groups not affiliated with al-Qaeda, portray a picture of localized activity and accordingly, require a mostly localized counterterrorist struggle. However, is some cases as exemplified by the Hezbollah, the most daring, complex and lethal attacks, were carried not in the Hezbollah locale, but in far away lands, e.g. Argentina (the attacks on the Israeli Embassy in 1992, and the Argentine Jewish Cultural Center in 1994); the 2002 failed plot to attack U.S. and Israeli naval vessels in Singapore Straits; the 2009 foiled attempt to attack Israeli and Egyptian targets in Sinai; and the 2012 Burgas, Bulgaria attack on Israeli tourists. Although Israel has shown it capability to retaliate against terrorists overseas, when facing terrorism as well spread as al Qaedas affiliates, a great deal of international cooperation is needed in order to successfully counter terrorist attempts. It is notable, that while most countries seem to

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cooperate with the U.S. in al-Qaeda related terrorism cases (e.g. the Dar el Salam, and Nairobi 1998 bombings; the 2000 USS Cole: September 11, 2001 attacks: the Bali 2002 attacks in Indonesia; the 2004 Madrid: 2005 London, and Sharem al Sheikh; 2008: and 2011 Mumbai, India etc.) Michael Chertoff, who led the U.S. DHS, already back in 2005 correctly suggested that, If we are going to challenge the kind of interdependence that terrorist networks thrive upon, we have to be able to confront the network anywhere it operates, and that means we have to be able to function internationally and do it in partnership with overseas allies (Fiorill 2005). While some of this international cooperation is exemplified in law enforcement cooperation, the main purpose of international cooperation regarding counterterrorism is focused on intelligence collaboration. In the Cold War era, the U.S. had a considerable pool of human intelligence sources; however, following the demise of the Soviet Union, the interest in HUMINT waned, in favor of the magic of SIGINT, MASINT and COMINT. With the new need for infiltration of al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups, the U.S. have found itself in a dire renewed need of HUMINT to supplement and complement the digital intelligence. Typically, human assets take a long time to acquire and to develop; it is thus, that the U.S. had to lean heavily on foreign collaboration with the international intelligence community to augment its own, lacking, human sources. During the first decade of the 21st century, many terrorist plots succeeded, but an unknown, yet arguably, impressive number of al Qaeda, and affiliate plots, was foiled mostly due to good human intelligence, resulting from international cooperation, along with collaboration in

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surveillance and law enforcement; including international pre and post event investigation. It is interesting to see the far-sightedness of C.I.As Paul Pillar, in his writings, Terrorism and American Foreign Policy (2001), as well as in Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy,(2011); in both Pillar argues in favor of, Close cooperation with foreign intelligence services constitutes our most important and effective tool, by expanding the intelligence, police and international security resources directed against terrorist targetsImposing financial controls and limitations plays a secondary role in combating terrorismSelective military retaliation deters terrorism, demonstrates US resolve, encourages other governments to fight terrorism, and disrupts terrorist operations (Pillar in Moore 2008). Pillar does not see an end to the struggle with al Qaeda. Rather than winning against terrorism terrorism can at best be managed. And he sagely contends (in 2001) that the death of Osama bin Laden will not bring about the complete demise of al Qaeda. Pillar further suggests several policy recommendations to be implicated by the U.S. (Pillar in Moore 2008). The U.S. should insert a counterterrorism perspective into its foreign policy strategy. U.S. government must pay attention to a maximal range of terrorist threats, and not to focus solely on Osama, al-Qaeda, or on any particular other group or individual alone. All threats must be considered. (But not all must be fought). All available CT methods must be applied in a carefully balanced way. We must tailor different CT measures to meet different terrorist challenges. 169

The U.S must leverage the power of foreign governments to engage in the U.S. and other allied countries counterterrorism efforts.

Special efforts must be made to inform the American public about the terrorist threat, and the role the American public may (and possibly should) play in counterterrorism. Overall, the purpose of counterterrorism related intelligence is the disruption of as many terrorist cells and plots as possible; this will not only prevent attacks, but also damage the terrorist network and possibly disrupt terrorist activity in a longer run. As stated before, some claim that the killed and the apprehended terrorists are almost instantly replaced, but as we have seen in the Palestinian Hamas case, high ranking fighters or leaders were hard to replace and the effect of being openly targeted at all times, caused them to go into hiding and limited the damage they caused. Furthermore, as we know from the Osama case, he was deeply affected by the U.S. relentless hunt for him; and he shared his fears and concerns by warning other al Qaeda operatives of the dangers constituted by drones and other modern CT tools (McConnell and Todd 2013). Although the CT capabilities of the U.S. and its allies have improved on the national and international level, an ongoing international cooperation with foreign intelligence services is a must, because none of the countries targeted by al-Qaeda and its affiliates, can effectively seal its borders, and prevent terrorist infiltration. Not even Israel, which arguably, has come relatively close to such capability. (Levi 2008).

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Intelligence and Counterterrorism: The Unique Nature and Quality of Intelligence Needed to Disrupt Terrorism: the U.S. and Israeli Perspectives Starting on the national level, the U.S. has a troubled history as far as intelligence sharing is concerned. Good, effective intelligence sharing is arguably, the foundation for the obtaining of a reliable, finalized and actionable intelligence product. This problem is magnified many times over, when the sharing is needed on an international level, whereas the trust shared with foreign intelligence services is inherently low and tends to be extremely egocentric. America needs help from other countries, whether it likes it or notWorking with other services provides US intelligence several direct benefits, including access to specific informationdenied to large-scale US penetrationForeign services can also provide direct force to solve a particular problem [arrests etc.]. Finally, other intelligence services can mask American actions as local onesAt the same time, foreign services may harm US interests. They may have conflicting political missions[and] working with liaison often open the US to moral hazards. Foreign intelligence services are not bound by the peculiarities of the American legal system (Peritz and Rosenbach 2012, 221). Moreover, foreign help in counterterrorism, is not offered free of charge. There is a price for helping the U.S. to fight al-Qaeda and its affiliates. In exchange for services rendered to the US, it may be obliged to overlook certain moral and humanitarian issues related to the interrogation style, prisoner abuse, clandestine nuclear deals and human rights violations. This is a necessary evil, with which the US intelligence services must often cope, in order to gain the needed support.

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The intelligence failures that allowed 9/11 and the 2003 Iraq War to happen, point out to two U.S. intelligence problems; both, prior to 9/11, and in the aftermath of 9/11. It is still debated, whether 9/11 could have been thwarted if better intelligence sharing was experienced within the US IC. It is also arguable whether better intelligence, based on more sources could have prevented the Iraq 2003 war. Yet, there is no division over the fact that intelligence sharing within the US IC has been and unfortunately, still is - faulty. The problem of stove-piping or not sharing information gathered, even with sister agencies are not a unique problem of the US IC. It is in fact, an inherent problem of any intelligence agency; and some say and large bureaucracy. Information sharing has been repeatedly identified as one of the weakest points of various intelligence communities around the world.known as stove-piping or the silo- effect intelligence agencies are often good at moving information up and down their own chains of command, but do a poor job of sharing this information laterally. (Quiggin 2007, 140). A 2006 GAO report, surveying 26 US government agencies involved in the collection dissemination and the use of terrorism related intelligence, points out to the sad fact that between 2001 and 2006 there was still no government-wide policy, or process integrating CT-related information available. (Quiggin 2007, 141). However, in 2007 the US government has issued a National Strategy for Information Sharing, which declares: success in preventing future terrorist attacks depends upon our ability to gather, analyze, and share information and intelligence regarding those who want to attack us (National Strategy for Information Sharing 2007).

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It was the huge bureaucracy and red tape, that made the US IC extremely cumbersome and slow to react that often was the reason behind stove piping (i.e. moving information within each agency only, without sharing). Interestingly, for comparison and contrast, Israel, being a small country, with a tiny IC (in comparison to the US), also suffered from stove piping. An extensive review of the GSS in 1996 found that intelligence integration and sharing was not done properly. There was no clear hierarchy for decision-making, Different parts of the GSS organized according to region: one division might advise waiting before protecting a source, while another would advocate nabbing a suspect and interrogating him immediately. Each command had autonomy, which resulted in a mix of methods and philosophiesOn top of that there it was not clear where Shin Bets [GGS] responsibility ended and those of the Mossad and the IDF began (Byman 2011, 340). This foreign example of turf wars even within a single agency, demonstrates a problem that is inherent worldwide, and can be seen in its common example even in the inherent rivalry and turf wars between different police jurisdictions, sometimes named collar wars (Allen 1993, 203). The US government attempted to improve this situation by the 2005 Intelligence Reform Act, and the 2007 actual National Strategy for Information Sharing. The documents representing a set of visions, aspirations, rules and regulations, seen in a strategy is not enough; especially so, when such rules and regulations are not assimilated and shared by those who have to execute the said strategy. The original 2005 U.S. Intelligence Reform tried to deal with numerous issues: The overemphasizing of the Presidential Daily Brief (PDB),

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which created a tendency to focus on superficial intelligence product, listing mostly attention-grabbing, latest clandestine reports, without deep analysis. Changing the disappointing National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), which instead of being one of the ICs major products, were often too late, too long and too detailed, to serve high level policy makers in an optimal way. The source of this problem was the wish to present a unified analytic position (of the IC), which not necessarily portrayed the reality. Following the Iraq WMD quagmire, the analysts started to deploy risk aversion techniques whereas the intelligence product focused often on amalgamating all potential relevant data forcing the policy makers to draw their own conclusions. These issues clearly show a poor capability to balance the intelligence product (Lieberthal 2009). The new cadre of analysts hired by the IC lacked the deep immersion in the background of the country they were specializing in. They lacked the extensive knowledge of the countrys history, economics and politics; which are very important to correctly understand the information collected. Accordingly, it has been recommended that despite certain security vetting risks the recruits should be chosen from those that have and extensive experience relevant to the country of concern. Greater sharing not only of information, but also of competing opinions over a given topic. By getting more than a single analytic opinion from a single intelligence agency or discipline, a joint 174

leadership in developing an analysis was suggested, along with encouragement of presenting privately held opinions, even if they were contrary to the general position on a given subject. Accordingly, additional emphasis was placed also on the education of new IC recruits and assigning analysts systematically to provide support to senor policy makers, from the assistant secretary and up. Another suggestion was to develop a systematic and regular feedback flow from the policy makers to the analysts, and thus creating a better understanding between the supply end of the intelligence, and the demand. Analysts need to be better trained and equipped to understand the subtle effects of power dynamics between analysts and policymakers; and policymakers need to keep in mind that their power and positions are intimidating to many analysts who brief them (Lieberthal 2009). Lieberthal further outlines the obstacles still troubling the U.S. IC, even after 2007: Ongoing IC cultures of insularity and secrecy present major obstacles to realizing the ICs full potentialsome IC managers continue to deny information to other parts of the community because they do not utilize identical security screeningsanother example, the need for National Intelligence University has been understood for some time, but the ICs sixteen disparate agencies still resist merging their educationalprograms. This resistance highlights that the IC still has some distance to go in terms of individual agency cultures and mindsets (Lieberthal 2009). Moreover, the 2005 creation of the ODNI, without giving it and its head, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) a real mandate, created not much more that another layer of ineffective bureaucracy. Although 175

talented individuals staff it; the function of these individuals is at best unclear and at worst destructive. Beyond its information sharing and relationship building abilities two areas that the intelligence bureaucracy has improved apart from the ODNIs efforts the office has no added value in the fight against al Qaeda. The ODNI has yet to take center stage in thwarting an attack despite multiple chances to do so (Peritz and Rosenbach 2012, 225). The DNI has a broad job, but little actual power. He is theoretically, supposed to manage the sixteen IC agencies, which are frequently in dispute with one another and which often answer to different leaders, including the President. This makes the DNI the most likely fall guy to take the blame for whatever intelligence mishap or terrorist attack. However, as Peritz and Rosenbach suggest, the ODNI could become more valuable, if instead of regurgitating the already processed information and actual intelligence products of the IC before it reaches the President and the NSC, it could arguably, become more valuable, if it would become removed from the daily analysis, and focus on its own signature intelligence products, produced by a group of analysts made of the US governments highest experts in any given NS field who can focus on the big picture; way beyond the limited scope of the analysts of each IC participant and contributor. In reality, most of the time spent by the various analysts is spent on the so-called current intelligence. Such focus prevents them from conducting long term, strategic analyses. By creating a cadre of first-among-equals analysts, the ODNI could capitalize on the creative energies of its working populationthese particulars thinkers would be encouraged to challenge conventional wisdom (Peritz and Rosenbach 2012, 227).

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Though domestic information sharing is of grave importance to the counterterrorism effort, one must not overlook two important points: First, beyond the internal squabbles, states rely increasingly on other states for their security or their CT related training and equipment. Second, to combat transnational terrorist threats effectively, the information sharing, must expand to the international realm. After all, Muhammad Attas cell, made up largely from Saudi nationals, trained for quite a while in Hamburg, Germany, with the intention to carry attacks in the United States. Terrorists still come from various states, plan operations in states, and operate in states (Revron 2008, 3). Most terrorism activities, just like politics are local, and what makes alQaeda such huge challenge to the US, is its transnational nature. Interestingly, Hamas, another Muslim Sunni group, might be wrongly considered as brother-in- arms of al Qaeda. Yet this is not the case. In fact, Hamas holds a rather low opinion of al-Qaeda and has so far prevented al-Qaeda from obtaining a foothold in Gaza. Even the al-Qaeda affiliate, Jund al-Islam, (Army of Islam) group, that kidnapped the BBC reporter Alan Johnston in 2007, was quickly and brutally suppressed by Hamas. (Meshal: Johnstons Release 2007). At that time, al-Qaedas Zawahiri has softened his criticism of Hamas, attempting to use the isolation in which Hamas has found itself after the purge of FATAH from Gaza strip and the 2007 elections. Zawahiri indeed intended for al-Qaida to create presence in Palestinian territories and start its own anti Israel Jihad. (Baliani 2007).

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In 2012, the Obama administration produced a revamped National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding (2012). The emphasis is on the fact that information is treated as a National Asset, and as such Information Sharing Requires Shared Risk Management. In order to build and sustain the trust required to share with one another, the various IC agencies must work together to identify and collectively reduce risk, rather than avoiding information loss by not sharing at all. Moreover, the new NSISS declares that the purpose of information sharing is nothing else than Improved Decisionmaking. The 2012 NSISS thus focuses on achieving five goals:

A. Emphasis on working together, adopting common processes in order to build trust, simplifying information sharing agreements, supporting efforts through training, incentives and performance management. B. Developing clear policies for making information available to approved individuals. Secure information discovery and access, must rely on identity, authentication, and authorization control, wide data correlation, common information sharing standards and a rigorous process to certify and validate their use. C. Optimize mission effectiveness through shared services and interoperability. D. Strengthen information safeguarding through structural reform, policy, and technical solutions.

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E. Protecting Privacy, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. In order to maintain public trust, the US IC and government must be consistent in the way privacy is applied and the way civil rights and civil liberties are protected. The US must carefully adhere to and comply with the law by developing information sharing operations. As we execute the Strategy together, we will harness our collective resolve to treat information as a national asset, make it discoverable and retrievable by all authorized users, and arm those charged with preserving the security of the Nation. Only as we achieve the safety and success our country rightfully demands and fully deserves (National Strategy for Intelligence Sharing and Safeguarding 2012, 2). When one considers the magnitude of the effort and good will, that will be required to enact the demands stemming from this National Strategy, it may be rather overwhelming. In the much smaller, Israeli intelligence community, it is easy to detect the basic differences in approach to issues of sharing and safeguarding of intelligence in the U.S. and Israel. For one thing, the huge size of the U.S. IC with its 16 sister agencies, (not including several intelligence oriented agencies such as the Customs, the DEA, Coast Guard etc. which arguably, should be included in the sharing process, along with certain elements of law enforcement, even on the local level) it is clear that having a dedicated strategy is a must, if only due to the sheer size of the bureaucratic effort that is involved in sharing information on the national level; without even getting into the additional complexity of sharing on the international level. Israel, by contrast, officially, has only three intelligence agencies, (the GSS, the Mossad and the IDI); although, one should not omit the intelligence -

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oriented, Political Research Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as INP intelligence Division, both are at least de facto, intelligence agencies. The INP is tasked with several counterterrorism duties and responsibilities and is by and large, responsible for the actual arresting, thwarting element of CT efforts and participates in the interrogation of suspected terrorists. (Israel Police Intelligence Division 2013 website). Israel (despite its minute size), has experienced a severe sharing problem not only between its various IC agencies. In fact, the problems were inherent even inside the GSS alone, not to mention the vicious turf wars, between the GSS and the other sister agencies and the INP, which was frequently looked upon as an underdog. The Israeli society is rather cohesive, even if only just because of the fact that most of its members are of Jewish origin. The Jewish religion, into which most Jews are born, is an element that largely diminishes the risk of disloyalty and treason; however, it does not completely rule out such possibility, and cases to the contrary are dully noted (Gilboa and Lapid 2012, 250-257). Foreign agents, for example, can infiltrate Israel while posing as being of Jewish origin, and thus gladly accepted as new immigrants. Israel also attracts religious personnel of all kinds: clerics, monks and priests etc., who come to Israel under religious pretenses, and are granted certain diplomatic immunity. Naturally, all IC and police members are vetted to one degree or another, but only a minority of police officers, in intelligence related tasks, is vetted with considerable intensity, equivalent to other members of the Israeli IC and is cleared to deal highly classified information.

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Since the American society is much less homogenous and cohesive, a country of massive immigration and tourism (much more than Israel), it is understandable that the very act of recruiting new IC employees of all races and religions, is more than theoretically more risky. Moreover, it may be hard to understand that being an Israeli (not only a Jew) is very unique, from the security angle, since all Israelis are exposed rather evenly, to the terrorist threat, which makes for a more homogenous perception of the terrorist threat and Israels anti-terrorist stance. In spite of this interesting sociological and political feature, there are numerous Israelis that in the last two decades openly adopt an anti Zionist, antiIsraeli, pro-Palestinian stance, which creates an interesting vetting dilemmas. Moreover, in the past three decades, Israel must also deal with the problem of the extreme right. Although Israel has arguably experienced only one anti Israeli extreme-rightrelated, VIP assassination (the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin November 1995), the problem of Jewish Underground has cast a grim shadow of Israels self-perceived unity (Sprinzak 1999, 155-161).

The 1996 formerly mentioned GSS review, led to two significant changes: a somewhat improved central coordination and improved intelligence sharing. The coordination problem was partially resolved through the strengthening of the GSS headquarters, Over time Shin Bet [GSS] broke all the walls of compartmentalizationNow the information was open to anyone who might need it. Unlike the presumption of compartmentalization in most Western intelligence agencies, in Israel today [2011] the presumption is for sharing. Shin Bet

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officials need approval of the deputy director or the director to compartmentalize information, rather than the other way around (Byman 2011, 340-341). In 2002, the GSS claimed that the shared counterterrorism response has been able to prevent about 80 percent of terrorist attacks through preemptive intelligence. This however was not satisfactory, since the other 20 percent claimed many Israeli lives. Out of 155 attempted suicide bombings, 112 were stopped, while forty-three were actually carried out. It was not until 2006, that the GSS completed its reorganization in the face of continuing terrorist challenge: There are three geographic field offices that focus on Palestinian areas and Israeli Arabs. Another part of the organization works on al-Qaida, Hizballah, and other groups, at times in cooperation with the Mossad. A fifth division looks at Jewish extremism. To coordinate all the information, the desk at headquarters where analyst sat became Shin Bets counterterrorism brain. The desk operatives see all interrogations reports, SIGINT, and field agent reports and directs different collectors to completeand pursue new leads[and] coordinate with the IDF, air force and the policeIn the past Shin Bet favored agent runners and interrogators. Today the desk operatives run the show (Byman 2011, 341-342). A lesson to be learned here is that although the new changes in the GSS and IDFs approach to the terrorist challenge did not deter the Hamas and other Palestinian faction from attempting terrorist attacks, it has however, transformed overall terrorism from a massive, uncontrolled problem, into a manageable one, thus allowing the Israelis to conduct normal life once more. However, in as much as the CT doctrine improved, it has not become an actual long-term and coherent strategy. While it allows for additional flexibility in the almost instantaneous application of new or different CT

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measures, it is very open to outside political pressures, manifested in the multi-partisan Israeli democratic system, which is often self-destructive, in its inability to create a broad consent and support for CT measures and policies. Much of the problem is due to Israels unusual system of democracyministers are rarely chosen for their expertise, but instead to ensure that the prime minister can form a coalition to stay in government. In contrast to the American system, Cabinet ministers owe their primary loyalty to their party, and not to the prime minister As a result Cabinet turnover is frequent and political horizons are short term, driven by politics rather than the greater good (Byman 2011, 345). With due respect to the American democratic government system, where the choice of ministers is not always bipartisan, and the choice of new Supreme Justices is mostly a Presidential and partisan prerogative, possibly the final outcome is not necessarily much better, but it is open to Congressional oversight and is certainly more permanent and stable.

XVIII. The United States Counterterrorism Paradigm: The Use of Lethal Force in U.S. Counterterrorism: Moral, Legal and Efficacy Issues

As shown in the Israeli case of targeted killings, the debates regarding their efficacy and their legal limitations are still ongoing and although it is one of the limited options the world has at its disposal, when combating

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terrorism, the proponents of democracy, civil liberties and human rights are adamantly opposed to the systematic targeted killing of terrorists. From the logical point of view, with the limited CT capabilities we have at our disposal, it might be unwise to completely outlaw and stop using this ugly and imperfect method. The world have learned that national terrorism, and more so, transnational terrorism, cannot be fought by large armies and according to the rules of war applied in WWII. Daniel Byman expresses his opinion on the topic of targeted killings, for the Brooking Institute. He posits, Killing terrorists is difficult, is often ineffective, and can easily backfire. Yet it is one of United States few options for managing the threat posed by al QaedaU.S. drone attacks in Pakistan has killed dozens of lower ranking and at least 10-mid and highranking leaders from al Qaeda and the Taliban(Byman 2009). Interestingly, in 2006 Byman wrote an article with an near- identical title, in which he carefully outlined the risks, as exemplified by the Bush administrations abolishing of many, long-standing, U.S. limits on punitive and preventive actions; as well as the need for authorization of special measures, including secret prisons, domestic surveillance without court authorization, holding of enemy combatants and their rendition to third countries for interrogation. All of which caused international outcry and have caused many Americans to question the legitimacy of their governments CT policy. Usually, almost no method used, can remain secret forever. One way or another, almost everything leaks at some point or is officially declassified. The US exploits several CT measures, which are controversial. Targeted killings are only one of these measures. The White House has sanctioned, upon a certification by the Department of

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Justice, enhanced interrogation techniques, black sites, special electronic surveillance (without a warrant) etc. In the early post 9/11 stages, the American public, as well as most of the IC knew next to nothing about what has been going on, and what has already, been much more openly discussed by the Israelis. The eventual sharing of these secrets with the American public, proved detrimental in the way it has been conducted. It created a significant mistrust of the Bush administration and cast a dark shadow over the actions and the legitimacy of the C.I.A and its operations, which were deemed as contrary to the Constitutional rights, the American legislature stemming from: the United States Constitution and the International law. In 2005 Jerry Smith evaluates in his thesis, the effectiveness of Israels counterterrorism strategy. He posits: When a suicide attack occurs, the Israeli citizens want action to be takenthe Israeli government sees [the targeted killing] as an opportunity to solve two problems at the same time. They can take out the senior key figure of the terrorist organization responsible for the attack, while also giving the victims families some sense of justice (Smith 2005, 57). In view of the American continuous criticism of these questionable methods, (starting with the notable, 2001 condemnation of Israels targeted killings by Martin Indyk, then the US Ambassador to Israel), One must ask: are the American people oblivious to the limited options of conducting counterterrorist operations? Doesnt the very same logic apply to the Israeli and U.S. use of these method/s? In fact, while what indeed takes place within the Israeli decisionmaking process is rather transparent, (although not in a real

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time); as attested to by several of the commanders of the Shin Bet (The Gatekeepers, 2013) Israeli politicians, even at the highest levels, were often detached from the decision making process on the executive, field levels. Israeli political leaders such as Shamir or Rabin wanted to be handed a ready decision for each and every case where Palestinian terrorists were to be targeted and killed; even more so in cases involving possible collateral damage. Politicians were always in awe of the final results of kinetic operations and their international and national repercussions. According to Avraham Shalom, interviewed in The Gatekeepers (2013), One could not relate to them [the political leadership] seriously; could not believe them; nobody was giving official backing [to the decisions of the IDF or Shabak] . (The Gatekeepers 2013). Thus the Israeli CT apparatuses learned since the 1980s not to execute kinetic operations without the direct consent of the political leadership and their involvement and approval for each such operation. Yet the Israeli CT paradigm evolved further with the continuous involvement of the Israeli Attorney General, and the Israeli Supreme Court, which are currently always involved in such decisions. While the case of the killing of Osama bin-Laden indicate full involvement of the American political leadership in a kinetic action, it is so far unclear to what actual extent is the US President, the US Attorney General and Judicial involved in each kinetic operation. The media thus, plays an important role in providing a degree of transparence to the military and intelligence operations.

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In truth, although there are some obvious differences between the Israeli and American CT paradigms the continued use of targeted killing is simply an inevitable must. Even more than in the case of Palestinian terrorism the case of al-Qaeda and its affiliates the challenge of finding, fixing and finishing terrorists is currently even harder and more challenging. The American public, because of the assumption of not being threatened by daily terrorist attacks (like in Israel), considers terrorist threat as remote (the terrorist attack on the Boston Marathon in April 2013, comes as a sobering reminder). Americans are strongly susceptible to thinking that, it will not happen here, or it will not happen to me. Although in order to cope with the horror of terrorism, Israelis too, use such defense mechanisms; it seems, that at least statistically, the chances of being affected by a terrorist incident in the U.S. are much smaller than in Israel. In fact, even in Israel, the statistics are calming and the chances of an average Israeli (as opposed to say, a settler, living and travelling through hostile territory on a daily basis) being involved in a lethal car accident, or dying of heart disease or cancer, are much higher than the chances to be killed by terrorists. (Chapman 2012). Despite that, most Israelis are unlikely to arrive at the conclusion that due to the statistically low chance of being hit by terrorists, there is no need for preparedness, and the stubborn struggle with Palestinian terrorists. In fact, the Council on Foreign Relations, has published in its 2012 publication of the 2011 NCTC report the following statistics:

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 The number of U.S. citizens who died in terrorism attacks increased by 2 (two) between 2010 and 2011; overall a comparable number of Americans are Crushed to death by their television or furniture each year (Zenko 2012). It took 9/11 to bring the horrors of terrorism to strike home, unlike any terrorist attack before. Not even the Oklahoma City bombing. This is, after all, the rationale behind terrorism: terrifying the public beyond logic. The United States faces terrorist challenges overseas, as well as from within. Home born and bred American terrorists, are yet another good reason to set the statistics aside and prepare. Some additional traits characterize the difference in battlegrounds between the U.S. and Israel:

The U.S. can survive WMD attacks, but some of its allies arguably, cannot. And even the US may take decades to recover from such event.

Targeted killings (and specially drone attacks and Special Forces killing operations) are the only CT tolls that can reach terrorists wherever they are. Counterterrorism requires the use of force, and there is no way around that. It does not, however, require the indiscriminate use of force (Art & Richardson 2007, 590).

Elimination of al Qaedas top echelon, improves the chances of ultimately defeating it in the long run. While foot soldiers are easily replaced, leaders, technicians, communication and propaganda experts etc., are hard to find and it takes a long time to train. 188

Although Art and Richardson state, Do not count on decapitation to incapacitate the global jihadist terrorist network. Decapitation worked in the Peruvian, Turkish and Japanese cases because the [respective terrorist groups] were highly centralized around one individual. Bin Laden created a different type of organizationAl Qaeda has proved resilient in finding new leaders to replace the original ones taken down (Art & Richardson 2007, 590-591). The postbin-Laden reality suggests that bin Ladens demise did, in fact, create a significant void in al-Qaeda, but failed to defeat the group. However, continuous decapitation, of top and middle level operatives, is the correct way to continue for the foreseeable future. Some believe that in order to defeat terrorism You do not have to kill every single terrorist, you have to kill enough to create a critical mass that will stop them in their tracks (Avi Dichter in The Gatekeepers 2013).

Although the international law prohibits assassinations, terrorist are considered to be common enemies of humankind, (Smith 2005, 35), shouldnt people thus conclude, that even if targeted killings are not more righteous than assassinations, the International Law should be changed to exclude terrorists from International Laws protective shield?

There is no doubt that targeted killings can go wrong, and innocents can be mistakenly hurt or killed, as history shows. If that is the case, how can todays Americans or Britons criticize their government, when their public sat quietly when an American and U.K administrations endorsed

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the indiscriminate killing of hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians during WWII (in Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Dresden, Hamburg Tokyo etc.)???

It is obvious that in order to minimize mistaken killing of innocents, during the long hunt for terrorists, the hunting tools and hunting instructions must become as close as possible to mistake-free, through proper oversight (Juristic and top executive).

The United States is a firm, unrelenting, believer in democracy. Democracies vary, among other things - in the respective perception of their citizens rights as humans and as citizens. The United States also struggles with its perception of the human rights of terrorists. Most of the currently used counterterrorism measures used by Israel, (e.g. blowing up houses of terrorists; the security barrier, enhanced interrogation, targeted killings etc.) are occasionally contested, not only by the terrorists themselves and the Arab countries; but also by the Israeli legal system, and by Israels otherwise closest allies, including the United States. These deeds, embraced by both American and Israeli CT apparatuses, are also contested and criticized by the American and other countries publics. Furthermore, Israeli CT practices are severely scrutinized also by segments of the Israeli population. Naturally, targeted killings of terrorists is probably, the most contested CT method. Arguably, this method would probably, not be as contested as it is, if the actual casualties of drone strikes would have been terrorists only. The so-called collateral damage is understandably, severely contested. Had the American people shared Israels experience of daily suicide bombings, they too, might

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have decided, that better red than dead; meaning, if the current political and legal system is incapable of defending me its time to re-evaluate and possibly correct it, using whatever measures needed to assure my survival. Alas, the world is not perfect and the U.S. population and other allied populations, include people that often see targeted killings and especially targeted killings of Americans-turned-terrorists and the so called signature killings not only deplorable, questionable, but even outright illegal, under the 5th Amendment to the Constitution of the U.S. and under the International Law. The near-total opaqueness of the drone strikes conducted by the CIA, does not help the case for the killing of terrorists without due process. Many free press articles cover the debate over this and other CT issues. David Brooks writing recently in the New York Times suggested, [Machiavelli] puts too much faith in the self-constraint of his leaders. Machiavelli tells us that men are venal self-deceivers, but then he gives his Prince [aka Obama] permission to do all these monstrous things, trusting him not to get carried away or turn in a monster himself. Our founders were more careful. Our founders understood that leaders are as venal and untrustworthy as anybody else. They abhorred concentrated power, and they set up checks and balances to disperse it. Our drone policy should take account of our founders superior realism. Drone strikes are easy, hidden and abstract. There should be some independent judicial panel to review the kill lists. There should be an independent panel of former military and intelligence officers issuing reports on the programs efficacy.(Brooks, David. 2013). There is no disputing Brooks logic and the great foresight of our Funding Fathers, but one more, where was this democratic, civil and human rights American thinking during WWII or Vietnam??? Where was the intense need for transparency and oversight back then?

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The American democracy, as other stable democracies, obviously has some sanity to it after all. None of the American leaders of the 20th century turned to be an irreversible, heartless monsters, like Hitler or Stalin. Even during WWII and Vietnam, when grave atrocities were conducted with the knowledge of the American leadership, something has put an eventual stop to these atrocities before they got completely out of hand. And horrors like Nagasaki were not repeated. However, human kind developed an elephants skin as far as human suffering is concerned. The atrocities of Bosnia, Darfur or Rwanda, can easily dwarf all of al Qaedas current achievements. But we are dead-stuck in what terrorizes us, and interferes with our relatively secure lives. We are thus, by and large hypocrites. As we know more, about the terrible things humans can do to one another, we must strive to minimize our violent activities as much as possible. In the case of the US targeted terrorist killings, the judiciary and the very top of the government must oversee and approve the list of terrorist targets. Moreover, signature drone strikes, must be altogether, reconsidered. The case regarding the legality and Constitutional Rights regarding targeting of a terrorist who happens to be an American citizen, is of disproportional importance. If an American individual chooses to be a terrorist, or is the tragic case collateral damage, although far from perfect or humanitarian, such events must be accepted as sometimes, unpreventable. And finally, the CIA should reconsider its culture of opaqueness, which does little to improve its success rate, but creates an exhausting distrust of the whole American CT apparatus.

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It is interesting to recall Francis Fukuyamas End of History in this context. In 2008 Fukuyama suggested, in an interview to the Daily Beast, an upgrade to his 1992 original thoughts, Democracy is built around institutions that are quite difficult to put into place, especially the rule of lawI did not imagine back in 1992 [that] the U.S. could become so controversial and damaging to the prospect of democracythere needs to be a re-emphasis on the use of American soft power (Fukuyama In Philips 2008).

Contrary to the thoughts of Fukuyama is Daniel Byman suggestion in his 2011 article, The aggressive U.S. drone campaign in Pakistan has played an important role in weakening al-Qaeda and should be continued. The Drone campaign will not end al-Qaeda presence in Pakistan, but it does keep the organization on the run and reduces its operational effectiveness. (Byman 2011).

On this very topic of targeted killings, Richard Murpy and Afsheen John Radsan, wrote their legal analysis and assessment, of Due Process and Targeted Killing of Terrorists. There, on page 405 they posit, under Boumediene, [Boumediene vs. Bush] the executive has a due process obligation to develop fair, rational procedures for its use of targeted killing no matter whom it might be targeting anywhere in the world. To implement this duty, the executive should, following the lead of the Supreme Court of Israel (among others), require an independent, intra-executive investigation of any targeted killing by the CIA. These investigations should be as public as is reasonably consistent with national security. Even in war on terror, due process demands at least this level of accountability for the power to kill suspected terrorists (Murpy & Radsan 2009, 405).

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In yet another legal opinion by Kristen Eichensehr, published in the Yale Law Journal, she criticizes the Israeli Supreme Court, asserting that the Israeli Supreme Court, in its first ruling on the issue of targeted killings, has weakened the international laws protection to all civilians, by extending the meaning of direct participation of terrorists in terrorism: terrorists are civilians under the law of armed conflict and thus are lawfully subject to attack only when the directly participate in hostilities. But the court also expanded the traditional definition of direct participationBy disregarding the direct participation requirements important evidentiary function, the court weakened the protection that international law affords to all civilians, not just to terrorists (Eichensehr, 2007). To summarize, the morals, humanity and the legal posture, of targeted killing is highly disputed, as is its efficacy. While the whole array of counterterrorist current tools is badly flawed, it is arguably, the best we have in the short term. When thinking about more distant future, something that strategists should and must do, new elements, still in their early stages of development, such as the application of soft power, smart power, state building, democratic institutions creation, education etc., should be considered with much more vigor than has been thus far.

XIX. Other U.S. Counterterrorist measures. Administrative: The Patriot Act The Patriot act, (Uniting and Strengthening America By Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001) is possibly the most noteworthy piece of legislation enacted in response to the 9/11 attacks.

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Section 411 of the act expands the definition of the terminology of terrorist activity to include also whatever is considered as engaging in terrorist activity and makes an alien who provides material support(i.e., food, shelter, transport, funds etc.) to a terrorist removable, whether or not the alien knew that he was involved in terrorist activity (Grebinar 2003, 278). Section 412 of the Patriot Act deals with Mandatory Detention of Suspected Terrorists: Habeas Corpus. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment states that, no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. The Due Process Clause applies to all individuals, not just U.S. citizens. The Supreme Court held that illegal aliens are indeed granted the protection of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which grant also the right to due process. Interestingly, the provisions determining the legal aspects of the detention of alien terrorists do not mention a trial or a hearing/s required to determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, if the alien has indeed committed the terrorist acts he/she is accused of. To this day, many disapprove of the sweeping authority it grants U.S. officials and question the legislation, which seems to contradict the very principles on which a democracy is built. (Grebinar 2003, 280).

Torture and Indefinite Detention Although the issue of torture has not been explored before the U.S. courts and the Congress, and is not subjected to much contention, it remains problematic. The U.S. Supreme Court 2011-2012 term has ended with mixed results. The Court, without comment, let stand rulings upholding torture(Kravets 2012).

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The United Nations Convention Against Torture, which both Israel and the United States have ratified, defines torture as any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person to obtain information or a confession. Israels official, moderate measure of physical pressure, was a touch more honest than the Bush administrations enhanced interrogation techniques. But the intent was the same. The Israel Supreme Court has eventually terminated this practice in 1999, and the United States followed this rulings. In both countries, whatever security benefits may have been gained by torture were far outweighed by the damage done to a nation that betrays its own values. As Justice Barak wrote in his 1999 decision clarified, Although a democracy must often fight with one hand tied behind its back, it nonetheless has the upper hand (Schmemann 2009).

However, in spite of this democratic ruling, the debates around the alleged continued use of ill treatment and torture by the GSS, and in the U.S. is still on. The Israeli human right organization Btselem had the following 2011, condemnation of the 1999 ruling of the Israel Supreme Court, convened as the High Court of Justice. the court avoided declaring the methods torture or ill-treatment because such a finding would have rendered its judgment incompatible with international law, which requires states to prosecute and punish perpetrators of torture and ill-treatment and forbids them to cite "exceptional circumstances" as a justification for such actions. (Torture and Ill-Treatment 2011). It is the opinion of this writer, that the American justice system, although, arguably, politically influenced, is certainly competent and capable of dealing

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with terrorism and related issues of human rights, civil rights and civil liberties, as well as the international law. It seems that when terrorism is the concern, it is patriotism that unites all under the same democratic banner. While battling terrorism is constantly carried out, both, on the battlefields and inside courtrooms, it is in our best interests to conduct as much of this struggle as possible in the courtrooms, where justice can not only administered, but also seen. Indeed, some cases are very problematic, as evidence needed to effectively indict and convict terrorists is not always easily accessible; whether because of the need to preserve the anonymity of the source of the information or evidence, or because the evidence gathered, may be insufficient to justify a conviction, or may have been obtained through marginal means (i.e. psychological and/or physiological duress which can be contested in court).

Respected conservative Jurists Benjamin Wittes and Jack Goldsmith argued in March 2010 thatthe US should sidestep the issue of the courts and detain these individuals indefinitely. Dont bother trying them at allthe politically draining fight about civilian vs. military trials is not worth the costs [However], detaining people indefinitely rubs most Americans the wrong way (Peritz and Rosenbach 2012, 233-234). This is a real challenge. During such times, a democracy must protect its nation while preserving human right and civil liberties, including those of the terrorists. And yet this writer posits, that indefinite detention in case of some major terrorist leaders is a necessary evil, which can be exercised with grave limitations and, strict oversight by the Judiciary and the Executive. It may be an unfortunate truth, that many Americans are concerned that by the emulation of

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Israeli rationales and procedures in counterterrorism, the United States may be risking the deprivation of individuals from their basic rights. There are times when ideals and noble principles, may cause harm to the very democratic structure we are trying to protect. It is essential that people will continue questioning governments actions, and its ability to restrict the rights of others. Without such pressure, a government could easily abuse its powers, as we have seen in the rise of the Third Reich in Germany. However, we must also enable the actions of the government to react firmly and consistently to terrorist threats. Considering the current availability of WMD, we must keep in mind that, Terrorists today are not only willing to die for their cause, but they incorporate that willingness into the execution of their plans (Grebinar 2003, 284).

Renditions and Extraordinary Renditions Rendition is yet another controversial, but efficient tool in the counterterrorist tool bag. A rendition is the transfer of a captured fugitive or suspect to another country, without performing the formal, legal and diplomatic procedure of extradition. The first U.S. rendition took place in 1985. It was the 1985 arrests of the Palestinian terrorists involved in the hijacking of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro, and the murder of U.S citizen Leon Klinghoffer. The second case was conducted after President Reagan has signed a secret presidential directive authorizing the CIA to kidnap terror suspects anywhere in the world, in 1987. The arrest of Fawaz Yunis, a Lebanese implicated in the 1985 Hijacking of TWA Flight 847 and the murder of US Navy diver onboard, is an example of the style and methodology of the first terrorism-oriented renditions, during the pre 9/11 era. (Naftali 2005). During the Clinton administration formal steps were

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undertaken to prevent any inhumane treating of the rendered individuals. Thus, the country to which the suspect was rendered must have had a legal case pending against the rendered person prior to his rendition. (Peritz and Rosenbach 2012, 64). Although the original renditions of the 1990s designed by the CIAs Michael Scheuer, received the blessings of the US Supreme Court as legal, such was not the case with the post 9/11 renditions and extraordinary renditions. The extraordinary renditions are acts of kidnapping of suspects, without the knowledge and consent of the sovereign state in which the suspect resided at the time of the kidnapping. The state of Israel has been a relentless, somewhat legendary, practitioner of extraordinary renditions starting with the famous case of Adolf Eichmann (1960). However, by and large, most of Israeli renditions are in fact arrests of Palestinian terrorists, within the Gaza Strip or the West Bank (a.k.a. occupied territories) and thus does not involve the mitos of abduction, exchanging flights allover the-globe etc. After 9/11 the CIA was placed under extreme pressure to effectively neutralize al-Qaeda. This called for some marginal methods, that would place captured, wanted terrorists outside of the reach of judicial systems, for an undefined period of time:

The central effect of the post-9/11 rendition program has been to place captured terrorist suspects outside the reach of any justice system and keep them there. The absence of human rights guarantees and the introduction of enhanced interrogation techniques have led, in several cases examined, as we shall see, to detainees being subjected to torture (Alleged Secret Detentions report 2006).

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The Council of Europe (COE) human rights organizations pointed an accusing finger toward the US and the CIA, as the main culprit behind renditions. In its 2006 report, the COE alleges that some 14 EU countries colluded with the US in conducting these secret extrajudicial acts, implicating mostly Poland and Romania. Between 2001 and 2005, there were allegedly, some 100-150 cases of rendition and extraordinary rendition conducted by the CIA over EU. (Savage 2009). Although the Obama administration opposed renditions in 2009; extraordinary and ordinary renditions were, in fact, secretly and sparingly continued. In 2011 renditions were again formally adopted and limited only by the mandatory request that renditions will only take place to countries where there is a diplomatic assurance that they will not be treated inhumanely (Finn and Tate 2011). However, the US cannot in reality, control the deeds of the authorities of other states and thus assure humane treatment outside the US. It is additionally claimed by the same source, that the CIA operated a fleet of 26 leased, privately owned, planes to conduct a huge number of renditions in the period between 2001-2006, according to the allegations of the CEO (Finn and Tate 2011). Interestingly, according to a recent report, although more than 20 EU countries offered their support in extraordinary renditions to the CIA, many of the Western states are conspicuously missing from the new list of the 54 states listed in the new COE report. (Elgot 2013). Renditions of both types have certain important, advantages: For one thing rendition is an effective way of removing terror suspects and thus neutralizing them. Terrorists in captivity, cannot really harm anybody, although arguably, as

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was the case of Sheikh Ahmad Yassin (Hamas leader), he continued to be an inspirational figure, despite his incarceration (and later home imprisonment); In the case of the notorious Sheikh Yassin, because of his continuous instigation of violence against Israel he was eventually killed in a targeted killing by the IDF. Moreover, such individuals may become a reason for the abduction of allied civilian or military individuals by terrorists, that declare their release of their captives conditional upon the release of the rendered terrorist/s. Although renditions and the investigation of suspects by foreign authorities are very important for developing future intelligence, much of the information or even evidence collected during a rendition is inadmissible in US courts, which is guided by strict evidence admission standards. Rendition can also effectively disrupt a terrorist plot during its planning phase. Such was in the case of Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, arrested in Pakistan in 2003 and handed over to the CIA; thus thwarting the Bojinka plot. Furthermore, in some cases where the rendition placed the suspect in a nation, which upholds lower evidence-admission standards than the US, such country is likely to end the trial with a steep sentence, possibly much harsher than if the case were tried in US courts. In such a case, the world is a bit safer for a longer period. Renditions have some obvious disadvantages as well. Due to the very questionable nature of basing an arrest upon partial evidence, mistakes, which may cause embarrassment to the CIA (or any other arresting agency), as well as a possible anger from US allies, are common. In spite of efforts to avoid them, mistaken renditions do happen.

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EPILOGUE

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XX. Limitations of the Study Being a qualitative - descriptive study, only scantly supported by statistics can be an obvious limitation. However, numeral quantification of the attributes of various CT tactics, as stated in this work, is often, at best confusing, and at worst misinforming. Of much greater importance would have been the implications of further study into two related fields: First, the effect of the nexus between transnational terrorism and transnational organized crime, which could prove of great value when assessing the terrorist chances to acquire further funding, as well as WMD. Second, this paper discussed only marginally the role of the creation of public resilience in the face of terrorism. Such section is very instructive, especially with regard to the American public, which is currently, unprepared to absorb terrorist attacks survive and rebound back to normal life (McGee et.al. 2009). The current paper does not consider these fields as secondary, but their scope would have justified another separate paper. Some may posit that this work is biased in favor of extermination of terrorists at all costs and arguably, that it upholds the Israeli counterterrorism methods as more compatible with democratic ideals and norms than the CT methods, in reality are. This is not the intended case. Although the author had a first hand experience with the Israeli IC, a conscious effort was made to present a balanced view of the issues at hand, supporting the various claims made throughout the book with solid

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research. In the end, it is for the reader to decide what is the ultimate way to deal with terrorism. Finally, this work should be further extended into the realm of live interviews with counterintelligence operatives from the United States, and Israel at least. Unfortunately, the time frame and other obstacles, did not allow for that. Although much of the cited literature is indeed based, to some extent, on such interviews, the use of additional, current, live material could better portray the current situation and the option at hand.

XXI. Conclusions and Recommendations This work, has taken the reader over vast territory regarding the different nuances of counterterrorism. It exemplified the nature of the difference between most terrorist groups and al-Qaeda and its affiliates. In the end of the day, it seems that with the possible yet arguable, exception of the Hezbollah, only al-Qaeda is transnational in its scope, ideology and vision. While this paper reiterates that democracy cannot be imposed prematurely and forcefully; it also suggests that the further counterterrorist struggle, must be focused through a cohesive strategy on a narrowly defined enemy, like Hamas or al-Qaeda; so far, despite intense efforts to defeat both (and other) groups, and successfully secure democracies from terrorist threats failed and they are likely to at best, bring about the control and containment of terrorism, but not its defeat and surrender.

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Countries faced with terrorism must prepare for a long, continuous struggle with terrorist entities. And in order for their societies to survive, these societies must become, governmental partners to the CT struggle. Accordingly, these societies must be more educated about the threats they face, and about the ways to become more resilient when facing terrorist attacks. Although it is clear that current and mid-term counterterrorism must involve the use of aggressive, and occasionally lethal, military and law enforcement measures; and include temporary, and highly over sighted measures which at times are deemed as less-than-democratic the world must remember that terrorists defy it of any and all democratic principles, because the destruction of democracy and its substitution by an Islamist religious regime, is one of the main terrorist aims. And terrorists are agreeably, defined as the enemies of humanity. This is a war for the perpetuation of democracy. One must further remember, that although there is a strong likelihood that the U.S., or one of its allies, will become the victim of a terrorist WMD attack, it is also probable, that such attack will be relatively limited, and arguably, survivable by most allied countries. By no means, should even the terrorist threat of the use of WMD lead to any appeasement policy. Terrorists have proven, time and again, that they inherently see any peaceful reconciliation attempts as a sign of weakness, and have used any past peaceful attempts only to strengthen their terrorist attacks (e.g. Hamas, Hezbollah, LTTE, and alQaeda).

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The struggle with Islamist terrorism has taken us to foreign lands, some of which have in the past, been erroneously occupied. There is no such thing as good occupation and modern democracies must strive to refrain from future occupation of lands, during the course of the hunt after terrorists. Thus, the hunt for terrorists must be limited to pinpointed strikes, aimed at either decapitation of certain members from airborne platforms or, whenever intelligence allows a limited and very temporary, land incursions and kinetic operations; followed by a swift withdrawal of the Special Forces involved in the hunt. Any future capability to strike terrorist organizations and personnel depends more than anything else on intelligence. Democracies must not only develop their intelligence capabilities of all possible types; furthermore, they must further develop and improve their international intelligence and counterterrorism cooperation and collaboration with other CT entities around the world. The world must be led by thoughts and by the persuasion that terrorism has almost never won a war, but it did win a few battles. Terrorism must never, be allowed to win this struggle. The main hypothesis of this paper was the assumption that the United States, can and should learn from counterterrorism lessons learned by other countries faced with terrorism and specifically, the lessons learned by Israels sixty-five years of continued struggle with terrorism. Although, as elaborated on in this paper, the conditions of the battlefield, its size, the arms involved and the differences in the goals of Palestinian terrorism and al-Qaeda are outstanding; terrorists are terrorists, and suicide

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terrorists are just that wherever they are and act. Although the American technology may be more advanced than the Israeli and the structure of the American and the Israeli counterterrorism may be different, it was Israel that was first to use airborne platforms to kill terrorists through precision strikes, which precluded very large collateral damage. The U.S. introduction of drone strikes, has so far proven to be effective, although not in Israel, nor anywhere else, can anybody rightly claim, that CT measures of any kind, actually deterred terrorists from continuing their attacks. However, in several cases, massive repression of a terrorist group, led after decades of bloodshed, to a political solution (e.g. LTTE, ETA, IRA etc.). Yet another lesson can be learned from the structure of different CT bureaucracies, and their relative success in fighting terrorism. Although both, the American and the Israeli IC suffered, and still suffer from information sharing problems, so far it looks like the Israelis were able to improve their intelligence capability regarding CT, more than their American allies. The U.S. IC suffers from many maladies; one of the major ones being its humongous bureaucratic size, which hampers its information sharing as well as its ability to make fast decisions, so often needed in the CT battlefield. Reorganizations, are extremely difficult to execute, especially so in large organizations. It remains questionable whether even if it wanted, the U.S. would have actually, been able to truly reorganize the 16-agency structure of its IC. The creation of the ODNI did little to improve the situation. There must be a rethinking of the sharing process and procedures, so eloquently verbalized in the 2012 NSSI. If this strategy is worthy the paper it is

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written on, this may indeed be the key to improvement. Also the Israeli transparency regarding its CT measures and the extraordinary willingness of the Israeli GSS to share its information with its partners, attests to organizational maturity, and effectiveness. This also is a lesson to look into and consider. The Israelis use few CT measures that are inapplicable to the U.S. situation (e.g. house demolitions, closures, and curfews). However, targeted killings and detentions are tools shared and strongly criticized by the populations of both countries. It is rather easy to criticize the democratic behavior of a country, which tries to defend itself from terrorism. The tools at the disposal of a democracy fighting a terrorist threat are very limited. It is however, a survivalist struggle, at least for the Israeli state. Israels biggest disadvantage stems from the very occupation of the disputed lands. While Israels withdrawal options are very limited; this is not the case with the U.S. presence in Afghanistan/Pakistan/ Iraq. Terminating occupation will most likely create an atmosphere of diminishing hatred to the U.S. and its allies. While in the short turn a pullout from occupied lands, may be wrongly perceived as a sign of weakness; if accompanied by proper re-education and possibly, by smart power approach, including positive propaganda it may alienate transnational, and national terrorist groups and remove or dramatically diminish their popular support and funding sources. Terrorism cannot be altogether eradicated, but it can be contained and managed to a degree that it will cause little disturbance to normal life. For that reason, the CT

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efforts must not be limited to the use of force alone, but rather the use of other, above mentioned measures as well.

XXII. Methodology: Research and Analysis An attempt to quantitatively and qualitatively analyze the U.S. and Israeli CT models efficacy has been done by many. This work focuses more on the Israeli CT model and its questionable compatibility with the U.S. struggle against alQaeda and its affiliates. Such attempts are reflected by using variables like the number of suicide terrorist attacks, thwarted by American or Israeli authorities, respectively, in a given period of time (most Israeli data tends to focus on 20002005, the years of the second Palestinian upraising). Another variable is the number of fatalities that resulted from suicide/terrorist attacks. There is abundance of data regarding the relationship between the number of thwarted attacks and the number of casualties/fatalities. Yet another interesting analytical tool can arguably be, the statistical exemplification of al-Qaedas resonance with the Muslim public worldwide. In other words al-Qaedas decreasing popularity and the impact of this feature on the future of transnational terrorism. It is highly arguable to what extent can any of the above variables be used, as a stand-alone predictor of Islamist transnational terrorism. Any such set of figures is insufficient to be a reliable predictor of the future of terrorism. These figures can at best, help in understanding the terrorist dynamics in a given period. Moreover, it is hard to find U.S. military or CIA statistics comparable with those published by the Israeli authorities. One of the main differences between the American and the Israeli CT approach is the difference in transparency. The Israelis announce and take the blame for every terrorist killed; they are precise in stating numbers of casualties on both sides. The US, because of a variety of reasons (mainly the assumed need for secrecy and the public and legal scrutiny), plays their hand close to their chest; with certain exceptions made when major terrorist figures are eliminated.

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Furthermore, as stated above, the fact remains that despite the figures quoted by various researchers (from highly accredited scholars to research students), regarding the Israeli CT success or failure in effectively dealing with terrorism, there is no agreement among the scholars and the CT professionals, as to the efficacy of the Israeli CT model. Moreover, it is frustrating that there is no general agreement even with respect to the efficacy of one single CT tool, which is currently used by both countries (Israel is in fact, taking a break since November 2012 ceasefire agreement with Hamas) the targeted killings. This, after all, is the one variable that is reasonably easy to quantify, as opposed to evaluating the value of say, the Security Barrier, which is said to have prevented over 75 percent of suicide terrorist attacks during the 2003-2005 period (Ganor in Art 2007, 283). The only way to obtain such figure would be through accessing IDF and GSS official databases of intended terrorist attempts and thwarted ones. (Usually, attempts thwarted without casualties or damage, are not reported). While this work sparingly uses statistics, it is difficult to decide who is right in their data interpretation. Furthermore, the scope of this work has encountered some true dilemmas. For example: targeted killings decimate the number of terrorists in a certain organization. But some scholars posit that this is a fata morgana (mirage) because there is almost always a new leader, ready and waiting to fill in the shoes of his predecessor and certainly, a new combatant to take the place of the dead or captured one. Moreover, some claim that targeted killing cause a boomerang effect targeted killings are claimed to enrage terrorists even more, thus enhance volunteering and act as a catalyzing agent for ever- more-murderous attacks. In view of the fact that the escalation in alQaedas activity since 1993 (Trade Center), through US Embassies in Kenya and Zimbabwe 1998, the USS Cole in 2000, and finally 9/11 - was not caused by a significantly more efficient and resolute CT activity by the US - it is difficult to accept the boomerang effect as given. So, is the terrorism of Hamas, PIJ or Hezbollah different altogether from al Qaedas? Such is not the case, although very significant differences between al-Qaeda and other groups do exist, and are elaborated on, in this paper. The ideas behind sending a suicide bomber to a busy market in Iraq, and in Jerusalem, are very close and the indoctrination and reasoning of the suicide bomber are indeed very much alike. However, the

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arenas, the circumstances, are different and most of the difference stems out of al- Qaedas global reach and global intentions. In a way, Palestinian suicide bombers are much more nationalist and localized both in their goals and their battlefield, than the foreign legion of al Qaeda. The methodology that was decided upon as best suiting for this work, was that of a predictive and suggestive, analytic thesis, based mostly on qualitative and descriptive research. The careful examination and analysis of current literature and related historical facts on the topic, are likely to provide for a product that will best benefit the academic world and may possibly interest the respective counterterrorist administrations. This research involves many factors and exploits on their inter-relations. For example, this writer chose to expand on the actual risks of WMD being obtained and used by al-Qaeda against the U.S. and its allies. However, this part of the research is strongly connected to the overall threat posed by Islamist terrorism and it examines also similar threats to Israel. It is imperative to expand this research in the future and to analyze, through critical inquiry and document analysis (e.g. U.S NSS, NSCT, NSS, terrorist fatwas etc.), the actual relationship between documents and historical events and changes in CT measures. The thorough examination of many of the related scholarly books and much of the related articles and published works, provides a detailed perspective on both the past and the current situation, as well as allows for a cautious, exploratory, educated guesswork aimed at the future.

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XXIII. References Abrahms, Max. 2008. What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy. International Security. Project Muse. Vol.32 No.4. Mit Press: (Spring 2008). 78-105. http://olympiasummeracademy.org/2012/readings/Cycle_C/Abrahms_What%2 0Terrorists%20Want.pdf. (accessed February 4, 2013). Abrahms, Max. 2008. Why Terrorism Does Not Work. Belfcenter. Harvard. http://belfcenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/is3102_pp042-078_abrahms.pdf (accessed February 4, 2013). Abrahms, Max.2011. Does Terrorism Really Work? Evolution In the Conventional Wisdom Since 9/11. Defense and Peace Economics. Vol. 22(6) : (December). 583594. www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080.10242694.2011.635954 (accessed February 4, 2013). Abu Gheith. 2002. Why We Fight America: Al-Qaida Spokesman Explains September 11 and Declares Intentions to Kill 4 Million with Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Jewish Post of New York. (n.d.). http://tinyurl.com/a39bvgb. (accessed February 10, 2013). Allison, Graham. 2004. Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe. New York: Owl Books. Alleged Secret Detentions and Unlawful Inter-State Transfers Involving Council of Europe Member States. Draft Report. COE: (June 7, 2006). http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/committeedocs/2006/20060606_ejdoc 162006partii-final.htm. (accessed March 19, 2013). Amir, Ahmed. 2013. At Least 37 Hostages Killed in Algeria Gas Plant Standoff, Prime Minister Says. CNN. (January 23). http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/21/world/africa/algeria-hostage-crisis (accessed April 26, 20130).

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