Fernando Lopez vs Gerardo Roxas Constitutional Law Judicial Power Defined Lopez and Roxas were the candidates

s for VP in the 1965 elections. Lopez won the election. Roxas appealed his lost before the PET. The PET was created by RA 1793. It is provided in the law that There shall be on independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal . . . which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the president-elect and the Vicepresident elect of the Philippines. In effect, a losing candidate would have the right to appeal his loss. Lopez assailed the law and he sought to enjoin Roxas and the PET from proceeding with the case. Lopez averred that the PET is unconstitutional for it was not provided for in the constitution. Also, since the PET is composed of the Chief Justice and the other ten members of the SC any decision of the PET cannot be validly appealed before the SC or that there may be conflict that may arise once a PET decision is appealed before the SC. ISSUE: Whether or not the PET is a valid body. HELD: Pursuant to the Constitution, the Judicial power shall be vested in one SC and in such inferior courts as may be established by law This provision vests in the judicial branch of the government, not merely some specified or limited judicial power, but the judicial power under our political system, and, accordingly, the entirety or all of said power, except, only, so much as the Constitution confers upon some other agency, such as the power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the Senate and those of the House of Representatives, which is vested by the fundamental law solely in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal, respectively. Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights. The proper exercise of said authority requires legislative action: (1) defining such enforceable and demandable rights and/or prescribing remedies for violations thereof; and (2) determining the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide said controversies or disputes, in the first instance and/or on appeal. For this reason, the Constitution ordains that Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the 1

jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to the limitations set forth in the fundamental law. The SC ruled that the PET is not in conflict with the constitution. RA 1793 merely added the courts jurisdiction and such can be validly legislated by Congress. It merely conferred upon the SC additional functions i.e., the functions of the PET. This is valid because the determining of election contests is essentially judicial.

Lansang Vs. Garcia Case Digest Lansang Vs. Garcia 42 SCRA 448 L-33964 December 11, 1971

Facts: In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party of the Philippines was holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of its candidates in the general elections scheduled for November 8, 1971, two hand grenades were thrown at the platform where said candidates and other persons were. Eight persons were killed and many more injured. Proclamation 889 was issued by the President suspending privilege of writ of habeas corpus stating that there is a conspiracy of rebellion and insurrection in order to forcibly seize political power. Petitions for writ of habeas corpus were filed by persons (13) who have been arrested without a warrant.

It was stated that one of the safeguards of the proclamation was that it is to be applied to persons caught in flagrante delicto. Incidentally, Proc. 889-A was issued as an amendment, inserting the word actually staging. Proc. 889-B was also issued lifting the suspension of privilege in 27 provinces, 3 sub-provinces and 26 cities. Proc. 889-C was issued restoring the suspension in 13 provinces and cities(mostly in Mindanao). Proc. 889-D further lifted the suspension in 7 provinces and 4 cities. Only 18 provinces and sub-provinces and 2 cities whose privilege was suspended. Petitioners maintained that Proclamation No. 889 did not

declare the existence of actual "invasion insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, however it became moot and academic since it was amended. Petitioners further contend that public safety did not require the issuance of proclamations stating: (a) that there is no rebellion; (b) that, prior to and at the time of the suspension of the privilege, the Government was functioning normally, as were the courts; (c) that no untoward incident, confirmatory of an alleged July-August Plan, has actually taken place after August 21, 1971; (d) that the President's alleged apprehension, because of said plan, is non-existent and unjustified; and (e) that the Communist forces in the Philippines are too small and weak to jeopardize public safety to such extent as to require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

A resolution was issued by majority of the Court having tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy itself of the existence of the factual bases for the proclamations. Now the Court resolves after conclusive decision reached by majority.

sessions in which relevant classified information was divulged by the government to the members of the SC and 3 selected lawyers of the petitioners. In the end, after satisfying itself that there was actually a massive and systematic Communist-oriented campaign to overthrow the government by force, as claimed by Marcos, the SC unanimously decided to uphold the suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus. Two conditions must concur for the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege to the writ (a) there must be "invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" or "imminent danger thereof," and (b) "public safety" must require the suspension of the privilege. President has three (3) courses of action: (a) to call out the armed forces; (b) to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (c) to place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. He had, already, called out the armed forces, proved inadequate. Of the two other alternatives, the suspension of the privilege is the least harsh.

Issue:

Petitioners contention that CPP-NPA has no ability, is negatived by the killing of 5 mayors, 20 barrio captains and 3 chiefs of police; that there were fourteen (14) meaningful bombing incidents in the Greater Manila Area in 1970. CPP has managed to infiltrate or establish and control nine major labor organizations; has exploited the (11) major student or youth organizations; about thirty (30) mass organizations actively advancing the CPP.

1. Whether or Not the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension (of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus) belongs to the President and his decision is final and conclusive upon the courts and upon all other persons. 2. Whether or Not public safety require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus decreed in Proclamation No. 889-A. Tuason v. Register of DeedsFACTS: Petitioners bought in 1965 from Carmel Farms Inc. a piece of land in Caloocan Cityby virtue of which they were issued a title in their names and they took possessionof their property. In 1973, President Marcos, exercising martial law powers, issuedPD 293 cancelling the certificates of titles of Carmel Farms and declaring the landscovered to be open for disposition and sale to members of the MalacaangAssociation Inc. ISSUE:

Held: The President has authority however it is subject to judicial review.SC declared that it had the power to inquire into the factual basis of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by Marcos in Aug 1971 and to annul the same if no legal ground could be established. Accordingly, hearings were conducted to receive evidence on this matter, including two closed-door 2

W/N the President has the power to cancel certificates of titles HELD: The Decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an obviously judicial function. Sincehe was never vested with judicial power -- such power, as everyone knows, beingvested in the SC and such inferior courts as may be established by law -the judicialacts done by him were under the circumstan ces alien to his office as chief executive

may take appeals to the CSC on said matter, if still timely.

The threshold question is whether or not the CHR has the power under the constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice or even a quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or dear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights.

Cario v. CHR, 204 SCRA 483 (1991)

The Court declares that the CHR to have no such power, and it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

FACTS: On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teacher, among them the 8 herein private respondents who were members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook mass concerted actions to dramatize and highlight their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latters attention.

The respondents were preventively suspended by the Secretary of Education. They complained to CHR.

ISSUE: WON CHR has the power to adjudicate alleged human rights violations

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e. receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

RULING: No. Hence it is that the CHR having merely the power to investigate, cannot and not try and resolve on the merits (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. 3

The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with the character of finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the Secretary of Education and subject to appeal to CSC, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected

Filipino citizenship. Petitioner contends that respondents petition for judicial declaration of election of REP vs.NORA FE SAGUN G.R. No. 187567 92012)Respondent is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta Borromeo, a Filipinocitizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City[3] and did not elect Philippine citizenship uponreaching the age of majority. In 1992, at the age of 33 and after getting married to Alex Sagun, sheexecuted an Oath of Allegiance[4] to the Republic of the Philippines. Said document was notarized byAtty. Cristeta Leung on December 17, 1992, but was not recorded and registered with the Local CivilRegistrar of Baguio City.Sometime in September 2005, respondent applied for a Philippine passport. Her application was denieddue to the citizenship of her father and there being no annotation on her birth certificate that she haselected Philippine citizenship. Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration of her election of Philippine citizenship and prayed that the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City be ordered to annotate thesame on her birth certificate Essentially, the issues for our resolution are: (1) whether respondents petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship is sanctioned by the Rules of Court and jurisprudence; (2) whetherrespondent has effectively elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with the procedure prescribed bylaw.The petition is meritorious.At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court from the decisions, finalresolutions and orders of the RTC may be taken where only questions of law are raised or involved.There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by theparties-litigants. On the other hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt or controversy arises asto the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct or not, is a question of law.[11]In the present case, petitioner assails the propriety of the decision of the trial court declaringrespondent a Filipino citizen after finding that respondent was able to substantiate her election of 4 Philippine citizenship is procedurally and jurisdictionally impermissible. Verily, petitioner has raisedquestions of law as the resolution of these issues rest solely on what the law provides given theattendant circumstances.In granting the petition, the trial court stated:This Court believes that petitioner was able to fully substantiate her petition regarding her election of Filipino citizenship, and the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City should be ordered to annotate in her birth certificate her election of Filipino citizenship. This Court adds that the petitioners election of Filipino citizenship should be welcomed by this country and people because the petitioner has the choice toelect citizenship of powerful countries like the United States of America and China, however, petitioner

has chosen Filipino citizenship because she grew up in this country, and has learned to love thePhilippines. Her choice of electing Filipino citizenship is, in fact, a testimony that many of our peoplestill wish to live in the Philippines, and are very proud of our country.WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Nora Fe Sagun y Chan is herebyDECLARED as FILIPINO CITIZEN, having chosen or elected Filipino citizenship.[12]For sure, this Court has consistently ruled that there is no proceeding established by law, or the Rulesfor the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual.[13] There is no specific legislationauthorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is part of ourcitizenry.[14] This was our ruling in Yung Uan Chu v. Republic[15] citing the early case of Tan v. Republicof the Philippines,[16] where we clearly stated:Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizenshipof an individual. Courts of justice exist for settlement of justiciable controversies, which imply a givenright, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy,granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an incident only of the adjudication of therights of the parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a

pronouncement relative totheir status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power. x x xClearly, it was erroneous for the trial court to make a specific declaration of respondents Filipinocitizenship as such pronouncement was not within the courts competence.

Philippine citizenshipshould not be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenshipfor those covered by the 1935 Constitution. If the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge underthe old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial challenge hadnot been commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution.[19] Being a legitimate child, respondents citizenship followed that of her father who is Chinese, unless upon reaching the age of majority, she elects Philippine citizenship. It is a settled rule that onlylegitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that illegitimate children are under theparental authority of the mother and follow her nationality.[20] An illegitimate child of Filipina need notperform any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to citizens of the Philippines;he automatically becomes a citizen himself.[21] But in the case of respondent, for her to be considereda Filipino citizen, she must have validly elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625,[22] enacted pursuant to Section 1(4), Article IV of the 1935Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship, to wit:Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with subsection (4), [S]ection 1,Article IV, of the Constitution shall be expressed in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the partyconcerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civilregistry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to theConstitution and the Government of the Philippines.Based on the foregoing, the statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines;and (3) registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry.[23]Furthermore, no election of Philippine citizenship shall be accepted for registration under C.A. No.625 unless the party exercising the right of election has complied with the requirements of the AlienRegistration Act of 1950. In other words, he should first be required to register as an alien.[24]Pertinently, the person electing Philippine citizenship is required to file a petition with the Commissionof Immigration and Deportation (now 5

As to the propriety of respondents petition seeking a judicial declaration of election of Philippine citizenship, it is imperative that we determine whether respondent is required under the law to make anelection and if so, whether she has complied with the procedural requirements in the election of Philippine citizenship.When respondent was born on August 8, 1959, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution,which declares as citizens of the Philippines those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines andelect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Sec. 1, Art. IV of the 1935 Constitutionreads:Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:x x x x(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, electPhilippine citizenship.Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching theage of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. The right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that *t+hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirtyfive are citizens of the

Philippines.[17] Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that *t+hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who electPhilippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority are Philippine citizens.*18+ It should be noted,however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of

Bureau of Immigration) for the cancellation of his alien certificateof registration based on his aforesaid election of Philippine citizenship and said Office will initiallydecide, based on the evidence presented the validity or invalidity of said election.[25] Afterwards, thesame is elevated to the Ministry (now Department) of Justice for final determination and review.[26]It should be stressed that there is no specific statutory or procedural rule which authorizes the directfiling of a petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship before the courts. The specialproceeding provided under Section 2, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court on Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry, merely allows any interested party to file an action for cancellation o

correction of entry in the civil registry, i.e., election, loss and recovery of citizenship, which is not therelief prayed for by the respondent. Be that as it may, even if we set aside this procedural infirmity, still the trial courts conclusion that respondent duly elected Philippine citizenship is erroneous since the records undisputably show thatrespondent failed to comply with the legal requirements for a valid election. Specifically, respondenthad not executed a sworn statement of her election of Philippine citizenship. The only documentaryevidence submitted by respondent in support of her claim of alleged election was her oath of allegiance,executed 12 years after she reached the age of majority, which was unregistered. As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, even that respondents oath of a assuming arguendo

on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly failed to comply with the proceduralrequirements for a valid and effective election of Philippine citizenship. Respondent cannot assert thatthe exercise of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitutes a positive act of electionof Philippine citizenship since the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of citizenship by election. The mere exercise of suffrage, continuous and uninterrupted stay in thePhilippines, and other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship cannot take the place of election of Philippine citizenship. Hence, respondent cannot now be allowed to seek the intervention of the court to confer upon her Philippine citizenship when clearly she has failed to validly elect Philippinecitizenship. As we held in Ching,[28] the prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship iscertainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute anaffidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Having failed to comply with the foregoing requirements, respondents petition before the trial court must be denied.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated April 3, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court,Branch 3 of Baguio City in Spcl. Pro. Case No. 17-R is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for judicialdeclaration of election of Philippine citizenship filed by respondent Nora Fe Sagun is hereby DISMISSEDfor lack of merit

Sinica v. Mula, G.R. No. 135691. Sept. 27, 1999 digested by: Ms. Joie Manuel In this case, assailed was the COMELEC Resolution on Oct. 6, 1998 in SPA No. 98-292, declaring the substitution of mayoralty candidate Teodoro Sinaca, Jr. by petitioner Emmanuel D. Sinaca as invalid. Facts: In the May 1998 elections, petitioner Emmanuel Sinica was a substitute candidate for the mayoral post of the Matugas Wing after their original candidate, Teodoro Sinica, Jr., was disqualified for 6

llegiance suffices, its executionwas not within a reasonable time after respondent attained the age of majority and was not registered with the nearest civil registry as required under Section 1 of C.A. No. 625. The phrase reasonable time has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made generally within three (3) years fromreaching the age of majority.[27] Moreover, there was no satisfactory explanation proffered byrespondent for the delay and the failure to register with the nearest local civil registry.Based

being convicted of bigamy. He was proclaimed winner after the canvassing. (Matugas Wing was a faction in the LAKAS-NUCDUMPD party, as well as the Barbers Wing. Each faction has separate candidates for the mayoral post in the Municipality of Malimono , Surigao del Norte.) Respondent Mula (who got Sinica, Jr. disqualified) filed a disqualification case against Emmanuel Sinica before the COMELEC. He alleged that said substitution was invalid because: a) Sinica was not member of the LAKAS party when he was nominated as a substitute; and b) it lacks approval of Sen. Barbers as a joint signatory of the substitution. The COMELEC Second Division dismissed the disqualification case. However, when respondent Mula filed a Motion for Reconsideration, COMELEC en banc set aside the resolution of the Second Division and disqualified EMMANUEL asserting that the substitution violated the provisions of Sec. 77 of the Omnibus Election Code that the substitute must belong to the same political party as the substituted candidate. Emmanuel D. Sinaca was not valid because he was an independent candidate for councilor prior to his nomination as substitute candidate in place of the withdrawing candidate who was a Lakas party member. Therefore, this case before the Supreme Court. Issue: WON the substitution of Emmanuel Sinica was against the provisions of Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code. Decision: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed resolution of 6 October 1998 of the COMELEC en banc is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one rendered declaring EMMANUEL SINACA as having been duly elected mayor of the Municipality of Malimono , Surigao del Norte. Ratio Decidendi: NO. Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code only mandates that a substitute candidate should be a 7

person belonging to and certified by the same political party as the candidate to be replaced. Petitioner Emmanuel Sinaca, an independent candidate, had first withdrawn his certificate of candidacy for Sangguniang Bayan Member before he joined the LAKAS party and nominated by the LAKAS MATUGAS Wing as the substitute candidate. He had filed his certificate of candidacy and his certificate of nomination as LAKAS mayoralty candidate signed by Gov. Matugas with his written acceptance of the party's nomination. Therefore, he is a bona fide LAKAS member. There is nothing in the Constitution or the statute which requires as a condition precedent that a substitute candidate must have been a member of the party concerned for a certain period of time before he can be nominated as such. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS VS. ANG CHO KIO power to recommend

Ang was convicted and was granted conditional pardon. He was never to return to the Philippines. In violation of his pardon, he returned. He was recommitted by order of the Executive Secretary. He filed a petition for habeas corpus. RTC denied. CA also denied it. But the CA made a recommendation that Ang may be allowed to leave the country on the first available transporation abroad. The Solgen assailed this CA decision, claiming that the recommendation by the CA should not be part of the decision, because it gives the decision a political complextion, because courts are not empowered to make such recommendation, nor is it inherent or incidental in the exercise of judicial powers. The Solgen contends that allowing convicted aliens to leave the country is an act of the state exercises solely in the discretion of the Chief Executive. It is urged that the act of sending an undesirable alien out of the country is political in character, and the courts should not interfere with, nor attempt to influence, the political acts of the President.

ISSUE: Whether the CA decision was proper? Can it make recommendations?

in nature. (otherwise it violates separation of powers) 2) deportation of aliens is a political question

SC: NO. The case in the CA was for habeas corpus. The only issue there was whether the RTC correctely denied the petition. The CA was not called upon the review any sentence imposed upon Ang. The sentence against him had long become final and in fact, he was pardoned. The opinion should have been limited to the affirmance of the decision of the RTC, and no more.

3) opinion of judges should be relevant to the question presented for decision.

De La Llana v. Alba

Constitutional Law Political Question if there is no question of law involved BP 129 The recommendatory power of the courts are limited to those expressly provided in the law, such as Art 5 RPC. (when an act is not punishable by law judge should report it to the executive). In 1981, BP 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes, was passed. De la Llana was assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be one of the judges that would be removed because of the reorganization and second, he said such law would contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts, He averred that only the SC can remove judges NOT Congress. ISSUE: Whether or not Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature by such statute (BP 129). HELD: The SC ruled the following way: Moreover, this Court is empowered to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal. Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with 8

The CA was simply called to determine whether Ang was illegally confined or not under the Director of Prisons (for violating the pardon). It was improper for the CA justices to make a recommendation that would suggest a modification or correction of the act of the President. The matter of whether an alien who violated the law may remain or be deported is a political question that should be left entirely to the President, under the principle of separation of powers. It is not within the province of the judiciary to express an opinion, or a suggestion that would reflect on the wisdom or propriety of an action by the President, which are purely political in nature.

After all, courts are not concerned with the wisdom or morality of laws, but only in the interpretation and application of the law. Judges should refrain from expressing irrelevant opinions in their decisions which may only reflect unfavorably upon the competence and the propriety of their judicial actuations.

Summary: 1) Recommendatory powers of the SC under RPC does not include matters which are purely political

accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred. . ECHEGARY VS. SOJ suspension of execution of decision

to enjoin respondents Secretary of Justice and Director of the Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the execution by lethal injection, claiming it as cruel form of punishment, among many others. the Court resolved, without giving due course to the petition, to require the respondents to COMMENT thereon within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from notice, and directed the parties "to MAINTAIN the status quo prevailing at the time of the filing of this petition."

(from poli compendium: The decision sentencing him to death pursuant to RA 7659 became final. Upon motion of the petitioner, the SC issued a TRO restraining his execution on the ground that there is a possibility that Congress might repeal RA 7659. Respondent argued that the TRO was illegal because in effect it granted petitioner a reprieve, which was the exclusive prerogative of the President)

SC: The constitutional provision granting the Presidnet the power to grant reprieves cannot be interpreted as denying the power of the courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. An accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights, and these can be claimed in a proper court. For instance, a convict who becomes insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity. The suspension of death sentence is an exercise of judicial power.

Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the death penalty for the said crime. Petitioner duly filed a Motion for Reconsideration raising for the first time the issue of the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 (the death penalty law) and the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of rape. In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of the death penalty from electrocution to lethal injection, 4 and passed Republic Act No. 8177, Petitioner filed a Petition 8 for Prohibition, Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order 9

Marburry v. Madison Facts On his last day in office, President John Adams named forty-two justices of the peace and sixteen new circuit court justices for the District of Columbia under the Organic Act. The Organic Act was an attempt by the Federalists to take control of the federal judiciary before Thomas Jefferson took office.

The commissions were signed by President Adams and sealed by acting Secretary of State John Marshall (who later became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and author of this opinion), but they were not delivered before the expiration of Adamss term as president. Thomas Jefferson refused to honor the commissions, claiming that they were invalid because they had not been delivered by the end of Adamss term. William Marbury (P) was an intended recipient of an appointment as justice of the peace. Marbury applied directly to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of mandamus to compel Jeffersons Secretary of State, James Madison (D), to deliver the commissions. The Judiciary Act of 1789 had granted the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States. Issues 1. Does Marbury commission? have a right to the

2. Yes. The law grants Marbury a remedy.The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection. Where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, the individual who considers himself injured has a right to resort to the law for a remedy. The President, by signing the commission, appointed Marbury a justice of the peace in the District of Columbia. The seal of the United States, affixed thereto by the Secretary of State, is conclusive testimony of the verity of the signature, and of the completion of the appointment. Having this legal right to the office, he has a consequent right to the commission, a refusal to deliver which is a plain violation of that right for which the laws of the country afford him a remedy. 3. Yes. The Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they are unconstitutional and therefore void. It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret the rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the Court must decide on the operation of each. If courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply. 4. No. Congress cannot expand the scope of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in Article III of the Constitution. The Constitution states that the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction. If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the Legislature to 10

2. Does the law grant Marbury a remedy? 3. Does the Supreme Court have the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they are unconstitutional and therefore void? 4. Can Congress expand the scope of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in Article III of the Constitution? 5. Does the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus? Holding and Rule (Marshall) 1. Yes. Marbury has a right to the commission. The order granting the commission takes effect when the Executives constitutional power of appointment has been exercised, and the power has been exercised when the last act required from the person possessing the power has been performed. The grant of the commission to Marbury became effective when signed by President Adams.

apportion the judicial power between the Supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that body, this section is mere surplusage and is entirely without meaning. If Congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original, and original jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared it shall be appellate, the distribution of jurisdiction made in the Constitution, is form without substance. 5. No. The Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus. To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction. It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that case. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper is, in effect, the same as to sustain an original action for that paper, and is therefore a matter of original jurisdiction.

deprive parents of their natural right and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency; and C.) Their provisions conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards

constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power. Petitioners complain that before opening a school the owner must secure a permit from the Secretary of Education. Petitioners reason out, this section leaves everything to the uncontrolled discretion of the Secretary of Education or his department. The Secretary of Education is given the power to fix the standard. In plain language, the statute turns over to the Secretary of Education the exclusive authority of the legislature to formulate standard . . . Also, the textbooks to be used in the private schools recognized or authorized by the government shall be submitted to the Board (Board of Textbooks) which shall have the power to prohibit the use of any of said textbooks which it may find to be against the law or to offend the dignity and honor of the government and people of the Philippines, or which it may find to be against the general policies of the government, or which it may deem pedagogically unsuitable. HELD: Petitioners do not show how these standards have injured any of them or interfered with their operation. Wherefore, no reason exists for them to assail neither the validity of the power nor the exercise of the power by the Secretary of Education. No justiciable controversy has been presented to us. We are not informed that the Board on Textbooks has prohibited this or that text, or that the petitioners refused or intend to refuse to submit some textbooks, and are in danger of losing substantial privileges or rights for so refusing.

Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities vs Secretary of Education

on December 4, 2011

Political Law Civic Efficiency

The petitioning colleges and universities request that Act No. 2706 as amended Act by Act 180 No. be 3075 and

Commonwealth

No.

declared

unconstitutional, because: A.) They deprive owners of schools and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of law; B.) They

11

Executive Secretary vs. The Court of Appeals [GR 131719, 25 May 2004] Second Division, Callejo Sr. (J): 3 concur, 1 on official leave Facts: Republic Act 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, took effect on 15 July 1995. The Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995 was, thereafter, published in the 7 April 1996 issue of the Manila Bulletin. However, even before the law took effect, the Asian Recruitment Council Philippine Chapter, Inc. (ARCO-Phil.) filed, on 17 July 1995, a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to declare as unconstitutional Section 2, paragraph (g), Section 6, paragraphs (a) to (j), (l) and (m), Section 7, paragraphs (a) and (b), and Sections 9 and 10 of the law, with a plea for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining The Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Labor and Employment, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, OWWA Administrator, and POEA Administrator from enforcing the assailed provisions of the law. In a supplement to its petition, the ARCO-Phil. alleged that RA 8042 was selfexecutory and that no implementing rules were needed. It prayed that the court issue a temporary restraining order to enjoin the enforcement of Section 6, paragraphs (a) to (m) on illegal recruitment, Section 7 on penalties for illegal recruitment, and Section 9 on venue of criminal actions for illegal recruitments. On 1 August 1995, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order effective for a period of only 20 days therefrom. After the Executive Secretary, et al. filed their comment on the petition, the ARCO-Phil. filed an amended petition, the amendments consisting in the inclusion in the caption thereof 11 other corporations which it alleged were its members and which it represented in the suit, and a plea for a temporary restraining order enjoining the Executive Secretary, et al. from enforcing Section 6 subsection (i), Section 6 subsection (k) and paragraphs 15 and 16 thereof, Section 8, Section 10, paragraphs 1 and 2, and Sections 11 and 40 of RA 8042. Arco-Phil averred that the provisions of RA 8042 violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution (i.e. discrimination against unskilled workers, discrimination against licensed and registered recruiters, among others) In their answer to the petition, the Executive Secretary, et al. alleged, inter alia, that (a) Acro-Phil has no cause 12

of action for a declaratory relief; (b) the petition was premature as the rules implementing RA 8042 not having been released as yet; (c) the assailed provisions do not violate any provisions of the Constitution; and, (d) the law was approved by Congress in the exercise of the police power of the State. After the respective counsels of the parties were heard on oral arguments, the trial court issued on 21 August 1995, an order granting Acro-Phils plea for a writ of preliminary injunction upon a bond of P50,000. Acro-Phil posted the requisite bond and on 24 August 1995, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of Section 2, subsections (g) and (i, 2nd par.); Section 6, subsections (a) to (m), and pars. 15 & 16; Section 7, subsections (a) & (b); Section 8; Section 9; Section 10; pars. 1 & 2; Section 11; and Section 40 of RA 8042, pending the termination of the proceedings. The Executive Secretary, et al. filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals assailing the order and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court. They asserted that Acro-Phil is not the real party-in-interest as petitioner in the trial court, as it was inconceivable how a non-stock and non-profit corporation, could sustain direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the law. They argued that if, at all, any damage would result in the implementation of the law, it is the licensed and registered recruitment agencies and/or the unskilled Filipino migrant workers discriminated against who would sustain the said injury or damage, not Acro-Phil. On 5 December 1997, the appellate court came out with a four-page decision dismissing the petition and affirming the assailed order and writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court. The appellate court, likewise, denied the Executive Secretary, et al.s motion for reconsideration of the said decision. They thus filed a petition for review on certiorari. Issue: Whether ACRO-Phil has locus standi. Held: PARTLY YES. ACRO-Phil has locus standi to file the petition in the RTC in representation of the 11 licensed and registered recruitment agencies impleaded in the amended petition. The modern view is that an association has standing to complain of injuries to its members. This view fuses the legal identity of an association with that of its members. An association has standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack of direct interest if its members are affected by the action. An organization has standing to assert the concerns of its constituents. In Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines v.

Commission on Elections, the Court held that standing jus tertii would be recognized only if it can be shown that the party suing has some substantial relation to the third party, or that the right of the third party would be diluted unless the party in court is allowed to espouse the third partys constitutional claims. Herein, ACRO-Phil filed the petition for declaratory relief under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court for and in behalf of its 11 licensed and registered recruitment agencies which are its members, and which approved separate resolutions expressly authorizing ACRO-Phil to file the said suit for and in their behalf. The Court note that, under its Articles of Incorporation, ACRO-Phil was organized for the purposes inter alia of promoting and supporting the growth and development of the manpower recruitment industry, both in the local and international levels; providing, creating and exploring employment opportunities for the exclusive benefit of its general membership; enhancing and promoting the general welfare and protection of Filipino workers; and, to act as the representative of any individual, company, entity or association on matters related to the manpower recruitment industry, and to perform other acts and activities necessary to accomplish the purposes embodied therein. ACRO-Phil is, thus, the appropriate party to assert the rights of its members, because it and its members are in every practical sense identical. ACRO-Phil asserts that the assailed provisions violate the constitutional rights of its members and the officers and employees thereof. ACRO-Phil is but the medium through which its individual members seek to make more effective the expression of their voices and the redress of their grievances. However, ACROPHIL has no locus standi to file the petition for and in behalf of unskilled workers. The Court notes that it even failed to implead any unskilled workers in its petition. Furthermore, in failing to implead, as parties-petitioners, the 11 licensed and registered recruitment agencies it claimed to represent, ACRO-Phil failed to comply with Section 2 of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. Nevertheless, since the eleven licensed and registered recruitment agencies for which ACRO-Phil filed the suit are specifically named in the petition, the amended petition is deemed amended to avoid multiplicity of suits. TAADA VS. TUVERA Case Digest TAADA VS. TUVERA

FACTS:

Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation and administrative orders. Respondents, through the Solicitor General would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that the petitioner are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question. Respondent further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of the law where the law themselves provides for their own effectivity dates. ISSUES:

Whether the presidential decrees in question which contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity? RULING:

Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date, for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the 15th day following its publication, but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The publication of all presidential issuances of a public nature or of general applicability is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose burdens on the people, such as 13

tax revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concern. The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect.

HELD: NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a interest because no constitutional issues were actually involved. LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since the present case is not the same one litigated by theparties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as the law of this case. The parties are the same but the cases are not. RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. An issue actually and directly passed upon and determine in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties involving a different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved. When the second proceeding involves an instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form separable from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding to make an independent examination of the legal matters at issue. Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does not preclude determination of the petitioner's standing. STANDING is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually involved. The more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are REAL PARTIES in INTEREST.

KILOSBAYAN vs. MANUEL L. MORATO

G.R. No. 118910. November 16, 1995.

FACTS: In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC leased online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket or at least P35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts is allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to declare ELA invalid because it is the same as the Contract of Lease Petitioner's Contention: ELA was same to the Contract of Lease.. It is still violative of PCSO's charter. It is violative of the law regarding public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution. Standing can no longer be questioned because it has become the law of the case Respondent's reply: ELA is different from the Contract of Lease. There is no bidding required. The power to determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors of PCSO. PCSO does not have funds. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they were not parties to the contract

Arturo Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance on November 10, 2011 Political Law Origination of Revenue Bills EVAT Amendment by Substitution Tolentino et al is questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done is 14

ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioners have standing?

amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it w/ the text of SB 1630 in that way the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB. Tolentino and co-petitioner Roco [however] even signed the said Senate Bill. ISSUE: Whether or not EVAT originated in the HoR. HELD: By a 9-6 vote, the SC rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that there were several instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.

process of proposing amendments to the Constitution and for lack of thorough debates and consultations. Issue: Whether or not the Congress committed a violation in promulgating the HR1109. Held: No, the House that the Congress ought to convene into a Constituent Assembly and adopt some Rules for proposing changes to the charter. The House has said it would forward H.Res.1109 to the Senate for its approval and adoption and the possible promulgation of a Joint and Concurrent Resolution convening the Congress into a Constituent Assembly. Petitioners have not sufficiently proven any adverse injury or hardship from the act complained of. House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the House of Representatives shall convene at a future time for the purpose of proposing amendments or revisions to the Constitution. No actual convention has yet transpired and no rules of procedure have yet been adopted. No proposal has yet been made, and hence, no usurpation of power or gross abuse of discretion has yet taken place. House Resolution No. 1109 involves a quintessential example of an uncertain contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. The House has not yet performed a positive act that would warrant an intervention from this Court. Judicial review is exercised only to remedy a particular and concrete injury.

ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO and ATTY. EVANGELINE J.LOZANO-ENDRIANO vs. SPEAKER PROSPERO C. NOGRALES, Representative, Majority, House of Representatives Facts: The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their capacities as concerned citizens and taxpayers, prayed for the nullification of House Resolution No. 1109 entitled A Resolution Calling upon the Members of Congress to Convene for the Purpose of Considering Proposals to Amend or Revise the Constitution, Upon a Three-fourths Vote of All the Members of Congress. Both petitions seek to trigger a justiciable controversy that would warrant a definitive interpretation by the Court of Section 1, Article XVII, which provides for the procedure for amending or revising the Constitution. The petitioners alleged that HR 1109 is unconstitutional for deviation from the prescribed procedures to amend the Constitution by excluding the Senate of the Philippines from the complete 15

Galicto vs Aquino Constitutionality; locus standi. Pres. Aquino, on September 8, 2010, issued EO 7 ordering (1) a moratorium on the increases in the salaries and other forms of compensation, except salary adjustments under EO 8011 and EO 900, of all GOCC and GFI employees for an indefinite period to be set by the President, and (2) a suspension of all allowances, bonuses and incentives of members of the Board of Directors/Trustees until December 31, 2010. The petitioner claims that as a PhilHealth

employee, he is affected by the implementation of EO 7, which was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question on standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. This requirement of standing relates to the constitutional mandate that this Court settle only actual cases or controversies. The Supreme Court was not convinced that the petitioner has demonstrated that he has a personal stake or material interest in the outcome of the case because his interest, if any, is speculative and based on a mere expectancy. In this case, the curtailment of future increases in his salaries and other benefits cannot but be characterized as contingent events or expectancies. To be sure, he has no vested rights to salary increases and, therefore, the absence of such right deprives the petitioner of legal standing to assail EO 7. Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the petitioners claim that he is instituting the present petition as a member of the bar in good standing who has an interest in ensuring that laws and orders of the Philippine government are legally and validly issued. This supposed interest has been branded by the Court in Integrated Bar of the Phils. (IBP) v. Hon. Zamora, as too general an interest which is shared by other groups and [by] the whole citizenry. Thus, the Court ruled in IBP that the mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in that case. Jelbert B. Galicto vs. H.E. President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, et al. G.R. No. 193978, February 28, 2012.

And Legal Affairs, Editha U. Barrameda in her capacity as regional Officer And Metrogate Complex Village Homeowners Associations, Inc., Respondents

Facts:

HLURB issued petitioner a license to sell 696 parcels of land within the subdivision.

Petitioners subsidized and adverced the payment for the delivery and maintenance of common facilities including the operation of streetlights and the payment of the corresponding electric bills. In 2000, petitioners stop paying the electric bills for the streetlights and advised respondent association to assume this obligation.

Respondent refused to pay the electric bills. No proof was submitted to execute the requisite verification and certification against non-forum shopping in behalf of a petitioner.

There was a compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of RA 26 and that there was no extrinsic fraud. The petition has no merit.

Issue:

GR No. 149719, June 21, 2007 MOLDEX REALTY, INC,, Petitioner Versus HOUSING and LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD OFFICE OF Appeals, Adjudication 16

Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the petition for reconstitution despite lack of actual notice to petitioners as occupants or persons in possession of the property.

Whether there was extrinsic fraud.

Whether the period to file a petition for annulment of judgment had already prescribed.

Whether the trial court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction when it ordered the reconstitution of the title although there was a discrepancy in the area of the property as indicated in the notice of hearing.

Fabian appealed the case to the SC. She averred that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989)1 [Effective November 17, 1989.] pertinently provides that -In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. ISSUE: Whether or not sec 27 of the Ombudsman Act is valid.

Held:

There was no discrepancy in the identity of the property. The petition denied and affirmed resolution of the CA.

Teresita Fabian vs Honorable Aniano Desierto & Nestor Agustin on November 16, 2011 Political Law Appellate Jurisdiction of the Court Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business w/ Agustin. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineering District (FMED) when he allegedly committed the offenses for which he was administratively charged in the Office in the office of the Ombudsman. Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between the parties and when Fabian tried to terminate their relationship, Agustin refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed the aforementioned administrative case against him. A case ensued which eventually led an appeal to the Ombudsman who inhibited himself later the case led to the deputy Ombudsman. The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the decision is final and executory. 17

HELD: Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and effects, therefore, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition. That constitutional provision was intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court.

DE AGBAYANI VS. PNB effects of constitutionality

**Justice Fernando magulo**

ponente

kaya

wordy

at

Agbayani obtained a loan P450 from PNB secured by a REM, which was to mature 5 years later. 15 years later, PNB sought to foreclose the REM.

Agbayani filed a complaint claiming that it was barred by prescription. She also claims that she obtained an injunction against the sheriff. PNB argued that the claim has not yet prescribed if the period from the time of issuance of EO32 to the time when RA 342 was issued should be deducted. o o E0 32 was issued in 1945 providing for debt moratorium RA 342 was issued in 1948 - extension of the debt moratorium

prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect the awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether a legislative act is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would e to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.

The RA 342 was declared void and since it was an extension of EO 32, EO 32 was likewise nullified. Here, RA 342 (the debt moratorium law) continued EO 32, suspending the payment of debts by war sufferers. However RA 342 could not pass the test of validity. (I think what Justice Fernando was saying is that the law was later declared unconstitutional because it violates the non-impairment of contractual obligations clause in the constitution). PNB claims that this period should be deducted from the prescriptive period since during this time the bank took no legal steps for the recovery of the loan. As such, the action has not yet prescribed.

The past cannot always be erased by judicial declaration. (OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE). The existence of a statute prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal consequences are attached.

During the 8 year period that EO 32 and RA 342 were in force, prescription did not run. Thus, the prescriptive period was tolled in the meantime prior to such adjudication of invalidity. (read orig)..

KILOSBAYAN vs. COMELEC ( G.R. No. 128054, Oct. 16, 1997 )

ISSUE: Has the action prescribed?

Facts: Special Provision No. 1 of the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) under Republic Act No. 7180, allocates a specific amount of government funds for infrastructure and other priority projects and activities. In order to be valid, the use and release of said amount should have the following mandatory requirements: (1) Approval by the President of the Philippines; (2) Release of the amount directly to the appropriate implementing agency; and (3) List of projects and activities. Respondent Cesar Sarino, the then DILG Secretary, requested for authority to negotiate, enter into, sign Memoranda of Agreements with accredited Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in order to utilize them to implement the projects of the CDF provided for under R.A. 18

SC: NO. The general rule is that an unconstitutional act because it suffers from infirmity, cannot be a source of legal rights or duties. When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.

However, prior to the declaration of nullity of such challenged legislative act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Such legislative act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted that

No. 7180. Respondent Franklin Drilon, the then Executive Secretary, granted the abovementioned request of Secretary Sarino. Such an authority was extended to all the Regional Directors of the DILG. Pursuant to the above-described authority granted him, respondent Tiburcio Relucio, on April 24, 1992, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with an accredited NGO known as the Philippine Youth Health and Sports Development Foundation, Inc. (PYHSDFI). COMELEC received from petitioner Kilosbayan a letter informing the former of two serious violations of election laws, among them that the amount of P70 million was released by the Budget Department, shortly before the elections of May 11, 1992, in favor of PYHSDFI a private entity, which had reportedly engaged in dirty election tricks and practices in said elections and requesting that these offenses and malpractices be investigated promptly, thoroughly, impartially, without fear of favor.

Issue: Based on recommendations by the Comelec Law Department, the Commission en banc dismissed the letter-complaint for lack of evidence.

Held: The constitutional and statutory mandate for the Comelec to investigate and prosecute cases of violation of election laws translates, in effect, to the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses for the twin purpose of filing an information in court and helping the Judge determine, in the course of preliminary inquiry, whether or not a warrant of arrest should be issued. Although only a low quantum and quality of evidence is needed to support a finding of probable cause, the same cannot be justified upon hearsay evidence that is never given any evidentiary or probative value in this jurisdiction.

as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. At present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase a representative of Congress. It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory components of Congress, such that the absence of either divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of a representative from Congress, it should mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress. Respondents further argue that petitioner has no real interest in questioning the constitutionality of the JBCs current composition. The respondents also question petitioners belated filing of the petition. Issues: (1) Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been met in this case; and (2) Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution. Held: (1) Yes. The Courts power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; 19

Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012 By LLBe:LawLifeBuzzEtcetera Facts: In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC

and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when these conditions sine qua non are present, especially when the constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch of government is put in issue. The Court disagrees with the respondents contention that petitioner lost his standing to sue because he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a personal stake on the case is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say that only official nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and question the JBC composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and nominates other members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the JBCs duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in the land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all over the country may be affected by the Courts ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy. The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders. (2) Yes. The word Congress used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. The seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting. It is evident that the definition of Congress as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in government to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress non-legislative powers. An interplay between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term Congress must be taken to mean the 20

entire legislative department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified.

League of Cities v. Comelec Action: These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws. Fact: During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the mad rush of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence. After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However,

the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29. During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009. On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the Presidents signature. The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city. Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code. Issue: The petitions raise the following fundamental issues: 1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and 2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause. Held: We grant the petitions. The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional. First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took 21

effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later. Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units. Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction. Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code. Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress. Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. 71 Republic vs. Express Telecommunications Co. Inc. (Extelcom) [GR 147096, 15 January 2002]; also Bayan Telecommunications (Bayantel) Inc., vs. Express Telecommunications Co. [GR 147210] First Division, Ynares-Santiago (J): 4 concur Facts: On 29 December 1992, the International Communications Corporation (now Bayan Telecommunications, Inc. or Bayantel) filed an application with the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) for a Certificate of Public Convenience or Necessity (CPCN, NTC Case 92486) to

install, operate and maintain a digital Cellular Mobile Telephone System/Service (CMTS) with prayer for a Provisional Authority (PA). Shortly thereafter, or on 22 January 1993, the NTC issued Memorandum Circular 4-1-93 directing all interested applicants for nationwide or regional CMTS to file their respective applications before the Commission on or before 15 February 1993, and deferring the acceptance of any application filed after said date until further orders. On 6 May 1993, and prior to the issuance of any notice of hearing by the NTC with respect to Bayantel's original application, Bayantel filed an urgent ex-parte motion to admit an amended application. On 17 May 1993, the notice of hearing issued by the NTC with respect to this amended application was published in the Manila Chronicle. Copies of the application as well as the notice of hearing were mailed to all affected parties. Subsequently, hearings were conducted on the amended application. But before Bayantel could complete the presentation of its evidence, the NTC issued an Order dated 19 December 1993 stating that in view of the recent grant of 2 separate Provisional Authorities in favor of ISLACOM and GMCR, Inc., which resulted in the closing out of all available frequencies for the service being applied for by Bayantel, and in order that the case may not remain pending for an indefinite period of time, the case was ordered archived without prejudice to its reinstatement if and when the requisite frequency becomes available.

On 17 May 1999, Bayantel filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Revive Case, citing the availability of new frequency bands for CMTS operators. On 1 February 2000, the NTC granted BayanTel's motion to revive the latter's application and set the case for hearings on February 9, 10, 15, 17 and 22, 2000. The NTC noted that the application was ordered archived without prejudice to its reinstatement if and when the requisite frequency shall become available. Express Telecommunication Co., Inc. (Extelcom) filed in NTC Case 92-486 an Opposition (With Motion to Dismiss) praying for the dismissal of Bayantel's application; arguing that Bayantel's motion sought the revival of an archived application filed almost 8 years ago, and thus, the documentary evidence and the allegations of Bayantel in said application are all outdated and should no longer be used as basis of the necessity for the proposed CMTS service. On 3 May 2000, the NTC issued an Order granting in favor of Bayantel a provisional authority to operate CMTS service, applying Rule 15, Section 3 of its 1978 Rules of Practice and Procedure. Extelcom filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition (CA-GR SP 58893), seeking the annulment of the Order reviving the application of Bayantel, the Order granting Bayantel a provisional authority to construct, install, operate and maintain a nationwide CMTS, and Memorandum Circular 9-32000 allocating frequency bands to new public telecommunication entities which are authorized to install, operate and maintain CMTS. On 13 September 22

2000, the Court of Appeals granted the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for, annulling and setting aside the NTC orders dated 1 February and 3 May 2000 in NTC Case 92-486, dismissing Bayantel's Amended Application without prejudice to the filing of a new CMTS application. Bayantel and the NTC, the latter being represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration of the above decision. On the other hand, Extelcom filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, praying that NTC Memorandum Circular 9-3-2000 be also declared null and void. On 9 February 2001, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution denying all of the motions for reconsideration of the parties for lack of merit. Hence, the

Issue: Whether the 1978 or 1993 NTC Rules of Practice and Procedure should govern in the approval of Bayantels application. Held: The absence of publication, coupled with the certification by the Commissioner of the NTC stating that the NTC was still governed by the 1978 Rules, clearly indicate that the 1993 Revised Rules have not taken effect at the time of the grant of the provisional authority to Bayantel. The fact that the 1993 Revised Rules were filed with the UP Law Center on February 3, 1993 is of no moment. There is nothing in the Administrative Code of 1987 which implies that the filing of the rules with the UP Law Center is the operative act that gives the rules force and effect. The National Administrative Register is merely a bulletin of codified rules and it is furnished only to the Office of the President, Congress, all appellate courts, the National Library, other public offices or agencies as the Congress may select, and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover publication and mailing or distribution costs. Still, publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is a condition sine qua non before statutes, rules or regulations can take effect. The Rules of Practice and Procedure of the NTC, which implements Section 29 of the Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act 146, as amended), fall squarely within the scope of these laws, as explicitly mentioned in the case Taada v. Tuvera. Administrative rules and regulations must be published if their

NTC and Bayantel filed their petitions for review on certiorari (GR 147096, and GR 147210 respectively). In the present petition, Extelcom contends, among others, that the NTC should have applied the Revised Rules which were filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register on 3 February 1993. These Revised Rules deleted the phrase "on its own initiative;" accordingly, a provisional authority may be issued only upon filing of the proper motion before the Commission. The NTC, on the other hand, issued a certification to the effect that inasmuch as the 1993 Revised Rules have not been published in a newspaper of general circulation, the NTC has been applying the 1978 Rules.

23

purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The only exceptions are interpretative regulations, those merely internal in nature, or those so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. Hence, the 1993 Revised Rules should be published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation before it can take effect. Even the 1993 Revised Rules itself mandates that said Rules shall take effect only after their publication in a newspaper of general circulation. In the absence of such publication, therefore, it is the 1978 Rules that governs.

not as yet become final and executory as to be beyond modification. They further explained that the DARs failure to file their Motion for Reconsideration on time was excusable. ISSUE: Was the OPs modification of the Decision void or a valid exercise of its powers and prerogatives? 1. Whether the DARs late filing of the Motion for Reconsideration is excusable. 2. Whether the respondents have shown a justifiable reason for the relaxation of rules. 3. Whether the issue is a question of technicality. HELD: 1. No. Sec.7 of Administrative Order No. 18, dated February 12, 1987, mandates that decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shallbecome final after the lapse of 15 days from receipt of a copy therof xxx unless a Motion for Reconsideration thereof is filed within such period. The respondents explanation that the DARs office procedure made it impossibleto file its Motion for Reconsideration on time since the said decision had to be referred to its different departments cannot be considered a valid justification. While there is nothing wrong with such referral, the DAR must not disregard the reglementary period fixed by law, rule or regulation. The rules relating to reglementary period should not be made subservient to the internal office procedure of an administrative body. 2. No. The final & executory character of the OP Decision can no longer be disturbed or substantially modified. Res judicata has set in and the adjudicated affair should forever be put to rest. Procedural rules should be treated with utmost respect and due regard since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice. TheConstitution guarantees that all persons shall have a right to the speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies. While a litigation is not a game of technicalities, every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly & speedy administration of justice. The flexibility in the relaxation of rules was 24

Fortich vs Corona 398 SCRA 685 Posted on December 6, 2012 100 298 1998 SCAD SCRA 781 685

The Office of the President modified its decision which had already become final and executory. FACTS: On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President (OP) issued a win-win Resolution which reopened case O.P. Case No. 96-C-6424. The said Resolution substantially modified its March 29, 1996 Decision. The OP had long declared the said Decision final & executory after the DARs Motion for Reconsideration was denied for having been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period. The SC then struck down as void the OPs act, it being in gross disregard of the rules & basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative determinations. The respondents contended in their instant motion that the win-win Resolution of November 7, 1997 is not void since it seeks to correct an erroneous ruling, hence, the March 29, 1996 decisioncould

never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. A liberal interpretation & application of the rules of procedure can only be resorted to in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. 3. No. It is a question of substance & merit. A decision/resolution/order of an administrative body, court or tribunal which is declared void on the ground that the same was rendered Without or in Excess of Jurisdiction, or with Grave Abuse of Discretion, is a mere technicality of law or procedure. Jurisdiction is an essential and mandatory requirement before a case or controversy can be acted on. Moreover, an act is still invalid if done in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. In the instant case, several fatal violations of law were committed. These grave breaches of law, rules & settled jurisprudence are clearly substantial, not of technical nature. When the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was declared final and executory, vested rights were acquired by the petitioners, and all others who should be benefited by the said Decision. In the words of the learned Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in Videogram Regulatory Board vs CA, et al., just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his/her case. Case Digest on FIRESTONE CERAMICS V. CA 2 Sept. 1999 Intervention Facts: The government filed a case to annul the certificate of title of D covering forestland. X wanted to intervene believing that if Ds title would be annulled and after declassification of the forestland to alienable land, then his title over a portion of the property would become valid. Y also wanted to intervene because the cancellation of Ds title would allegedly pave the way for his free patent application. Issue: Whether X and Y should be allowed to intervene. Held: No. Intervention is not a matter of right but may be permitted by the courts when the applicant 25

shows that he is qualified to intervene as provided under Sec. 1 of Rule 19. The legal interest of the intervenor must be of direct and immediate character and not merely contingent or expectant so that he will either gain or lose by the direct operation of the judgment. X and Y merely have a collateral interest in the subject matter of the litigation, thus, allowing intervention would not be justified.