G.R. No. 193484 AUJERO v.

PCSC January 18, 2012

II/ REYES, J. FAISAL CALI FILRO

FACTS: After 34 years of service as accountant, the Aujero applied for early retirement. His application for retirement was approved entitling him to receive retirement benefits at a rate equivalent to one and a half of his monthly salary for every year of service. At that time, the Aujero was Philcomsat's Senior VP with a monthly salary of P274,805.00. Aujero executed a Deed of Release and Quitclaim in Philcomsats favor, following his receipt from the latter of a check in the amount of P9,439,327.91. Almost 3years thereafter, the Aujero filed a complaint for unpaid retirement benefits, claiming that the actual amount of his retirement pay is P14,015,055.00 and the P9,439,327.91 he received from Philcomsat as supposed settlement for all his claims is unconscionable, which is more than enough reason to declare his quitclaim as null and void. Aujero alleges that he had no choice but to accept a lesser amount as he was in dire need thereof and was all set to return to his hometown and he signed the quitclaim despite the considerable deficiency as no single centavo would be released to him if he did not execute a release and waiver in Philcomsat's favor. ISSUE: Is the quitclaim executed by the Aujero in Philcomsats favor is valid; hence foreclosing his right to institute any claim against Philcomsat? LAW: Rule 65 RC is confined to the correction of errors of jurisdiction and will not issue absent a showing of a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Not every error in a proceeding, or every erroneous conclusion of law or of fact, is an act in excess of jurisdiction or an abuse of discretion. Vitiation of Contracts RULING: LA issued a Decision in the petitioners favor, directing Philcomsat to pay him the amount of P4,575,727.09 and P274,805.00. LA found it hard to believe that the petitioner would voluntary waive a significant portion of his retirement pay. On the other hand, NLRC reversed and set aside LA. Accordingly, the petitioner failed to allege, much less, adduce evidence that Philcomsat employed means to vitiate his consent to the quitclaim. The petitioner is welleducated, a licensed accountant and was Philcomsats Senior Vice-President prior to his retirement; he cannot therefore claim that he signed the quitclaim without understanding the consequences and implications thereof. The CA found no merit of the petitioners appeal. The Court ruled that absent any evidence that any of the vices of consent is present and considering the petitioners position and education, the quitclaim executed by the petitioner constitutes a valid and binding agreement. Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking. OPINION:

G.R. No. 172086 CAREER PHILIPPINES v. SERNA December 3, 2012

II/BRION, J FAISAL CALI FILRO

FACTS: Serna had worked for Career Phils. and its foreign principals since 1989, and he had always been hired to board chemical tankers. This was his third consecutive contract with Aeriennemonaco whose tankers transport chemicals such as methanol, phenol, ethanol, benzene, and caustic soda. While on board M/V Hyde Park, Serna experienced weakness and shortness of breath. He lost much weight. On several occasions, he requested for medical attention, but his immediate superior, Captain Jyong, denied his requests since the tanker had a busy schedule. Two days after his contract was finished, he reported to the office of Career Phils. to communicate his physical complaints and to seek medical assistance. He was told that he would be referred to company-designated physicians. While waiting for the referral and with his condition worsening, Serna visited the UPHMC and was diagnosed him to be suffering from toxic goiter. After a month, Serna received instructions to report to the Seamans Hospital for a pre-employment medical examination. The hospitals company-designated physicians diagnosed him with atrial fibrillation and declared him unfit to work. Here now comes to ask for disability benefits. Career claims that Serna failed to submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three (3) working days from his return, contrary to the terms of the POEA-SEC. ISSUE: Can Serna be rightfully awarded disability benefit? LAW: 1996 POEA-SEC RULING: LA gave credence to Sernas version of events. As company-designated physicians did not issue Sernas impediment grade, the LA adopted the grading given by his personal physician. NLRC and CA affirmed. The obligation imposed by the mandatory reporting requirement under Section 20(B)(3) of the 1996 POEA-SEC is not solely on the seafarer. It requires the employer to likewise act on the report, and in this sense partakes of the nature of a reciprocal obligation. Reciprocal obligations are those which arise from the same cause, and where each party is effectively a debtor and a creditor of the other, such that the obligation of one is dependent upon the obligation of the other. While the mandatory reporting requirement obliges the seafarer to be present for the postemployment medical examination, which must be conducted within 3 working days upon the seafarers return, it also poses the employer the implied obligation to conduct a meaningful and timely examination of the seafarer. The petitioners failed to perform their obligation of providing timely medical examination, thus rendering meaningless Sernas compliance with the mandatory reporting requirement. With his July 14, 1999 visit, Serna clearly lived up to his end of the agreement; it was the petitioners who defaulted on theirs. They cannot now be heard to claim that Serna should forfeit the right to claim disability benefits under the POEA-SEC and their CBA. OPNION:

G.R. No. 188659 HEIRS OF RIDAD v. GAUF February 13, 2013

II/ PEREZ, J. FAISAL CALI FILRO

FACTS: Petitioners were former officers and employees of GAUF. It appears that petitioners were retrenched in view of the RRR Program but were re-hired in January 1984. Consequently, GAUF set the reckoning period for the computation of petitioners retirement benefits to January 1984. Petitioners signed individual quitclaims upon receipt of their retirement pay. Claiming that the computation of their retirement benefits should be reckoned from the date of their original hiring, petitioners filed a Complaint before the LA. Petitioners alleged that they were not paid separation benefits during the implementation of the RRR Program. GAUF argue that petitioners were all separated from employment in 1984 and paid their separation benefits in the form of off-setting of their outstanding obligations to GAUF such as tuition fees and the value of the lots in the Gonzales Estate area owned by GAUF and sold to petitioners. The said settlement was embodied in a compromise agreement. GAUF added that petitioners were re-employed on 1 January 1984, hence this date should be the reckoning point for the purpose of computing the separation pay. ISSUE: Did GAUF paid the separation benefits of the Petitioners from original appointment until 1983? LAW: One who pleads payment has the burden of proving it, and even where the employees must allege non-payment, the general rule is that the burden rests on the employer to prove payment, rather than on the employees to prove non-payment. RULING: LA and the NLRC concluded that petitioners were not paid their separation benefits. It found that the records were bereft of any proof that the petitioners were paid their retirement benefits before 1 January 1984. CA overturned the factual findings of these labor tribunals and found that petitioners were duly paid their retirement benefits. The retirement pay of petitioners in 1984 should be reckoned from the date of their hiring and computed in accordance with Section 374, Article CVI of GAUFs Manual of Policies. Moreover, the basic pay of petitioners should be based on the amount of their last pay in 31 December 1983. The correct computation should be: Retirement/Separation Pay = Basic Pay (Percentage depending on the years of service) x Years of Service. The settlement in kind which involved several parcels of lands were not complied with because the titles to said lands were subject of then ongoing litigation and was later on rescinded by the trial court. Therefore, these amounts relating to receivables on parcel of lands cannot be given credit. However, the receivables pertaining to tuition fees remain uncontested. Petitioners never questioned these amounts and in fact, they argued before the LA that the tuition fees of their dependents "have been applied to their money claims, such as wage increases, but which were never paid." Thus, these tuition fee receivables can be offset to the separation pay due to the employees. It is therefore evident that GAUF had granted petitioners their separation pay in amounts more than what they are entitled to receive under the law. Thus, there was full compliance with the RRR Program for the payment of separation pay. OPINION:

G.R. No. 199547 THE NEW PHILIPPINE SKYLANDERS, INC. v. DAKILA September 24, 2012

II/ PERLAS-BERNABE, J. FAISAL CALI FILRO 025

FACTS: Dakila was employed by Skylanders as early as 1987 and terminated for cause in April 1997 when the corporation was sold. In May 1997, he was rehired as consultant by the petitioners under a Contract for Consultancy Services dated April 30, 1997. Thereafter, in a letter dated April 19, 2007,Dakila informed Skylanders of his compulsory retirement effective May 2, 2007 and sought for the payment of his retirement benefits pursuant to the CBA. His request, however, was not acted upon. Instead, he was terminated from service effective May 1, 2007. Consequently, Dakila filed a complaint for constructive illegal dismissal, non-payment of retirement benefits, under/non-payment of wages and other benefits of a regular employee, and damages against petitioners, The New Philippine Skylanders, Inc. and its President and General Manager, Jennifer M. Eano-Bote, before the NLRC. ISSUE: Is Dakila entitled to his retirement benefit? LAW: Article 279 of the Labor Code. RULING: LA found for respondent Dakila to have been illegally dismissed and ordered his reinstatement with full backwages computed from the time of his dismissal on May 1, 2007 until his actual reinstatement as well as the payment of his unpaid benefits under the CBA. He declared respondent Dakila to be a regular employee on the basis of the unrebutted documentary evidence showing that he was under the petitioners' direct control and supervision and performed. NLRC sustained and CA further affirmed LA. The Court ruled that following Article 279 of the Labor Code, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages computed from the time he was illegally dismissed. However, considering that respondent Dakila was terminated on May 1, 2007, or one (1) day prior to his compulsory retirement on May 2, 2007, his reinstatement is no longer feasible. Accordingly, the NLRC correctly held him entitled to the payment of his retirement benefits pursuant to the CBA. On the other hand, his backwages should be computed only for days prior to his compulsory retirement which in this case is only a day. Consequently, the award of reinstatement wages pending appeal must be deleted for lack of basis. OPINION:

GR No. 178735, I/ DEL CASTILLO, J. BPI EMPLOYEES UNION-MANILA and ZENAIDA UY v. BPI September 21, 2011 FILRO 024 FACTS: Uy was a bank teller in BPIs Escolta Branch. However, her service was terminated on grounds of gross disrespect/discourtesy towards an officer, insubordination and absence without leave. Thus, she filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Voluntary Arbitrator ruled in favor of Uy and ordered her reinstatement and to pay her full back wages, including all her other benefits under the CBA. It was affirmed by the CA but instead of reinstatement, it ordered BPI to pay Uy her separation pay. Uy then filed a Motion for Execution and based the amount of her back wages on the current wage level and included all the increases in wages and benefits under the CBA that were granted during the entire period of her illegal dismissal. BPI disputed the computation and claimed that the basis for the computation of back wages should be the employees wage rate at the time of dismissal. BPI further argued that there was no basis for the award of tellers functional allowance, cash conversion of vacation and sick leaves and dental care allowance, which were the wages and benefits included under the CBA. ISSUES: What is the basis in computing the award of back wages? Is Uy entitled to the tellers functional allowance, cash conversion of vacation and sick leaves? LAW: RA 6715. RULING: As to the first issue, the base figure in computing the award of back wages to an illegally dismissed employee is the employees basic salary plus regular allowances and benefits received at the time of dismissal, unqualified by any wage and benefit increases granted in the interim. The full backwages means backwages without any deduction or qualification, including benefits or their monetary equivalent the employee is enjoying at the time of his dismissal. Consequently, any benefit or allowance over and above that allowed and provided by said law is deemed excluded. As regards the second issue, Uy is entitled to the tellers functional allowance but not to the cash conversion of vacation and sick leaves. Uys function as a teller at the time of her dismissal was factually established and was never impugned by the parties during the proceedings held in the main case. Besides, BPI did not present any evidence to substantiate its allegation that Uy was assigned as a low-counter staff at the time of her dismissal. As to the vacation and sick leave cash conversion benefit, the entitlement to the same should be necessarily proved since this privilege is not statutory or mandatory in character but only voluntarily granted. As such, the existence of this benefit as well as the employees entitlement thereto cannot be presumed but should be proved by the employee. In this case, however, the records failed to prove that Uy was receiving this benefit at the time of her dismissal. OPINION: