S/ES 200403732

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 23, 2004

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR DANIEL MARCUS

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE
UNITED STATES

SUBJECT: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United

States Request for Information

Attached is the supplementary information regarding alleged malfeasance by some

translators during the visa interview process and the U.S. Department of State's
awareness of this problem that was requested by Commissioner Ben-Veniste of
Assistant Maura Harty at the Commission's January 26 hearing. The attached consists
of one unclassified document.

We hope this information is useful to you. As always, please do not hesitate to

contact us if you have further questions.

Karl Hermann
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated.

UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED
2

Drafted: CA/P - Paula A. Williams 02/17/04 X74744

Clearances:
CA:DBSmith, Acting
CA/P:WStaeben (ok)
L/LM:JARomano (ok)
L/LM:JBorek (ok)
P:BBrink (ok)
M:AFeeley (ok)
D:SBeecroft
S/ES:Ssarkis (ok)

UNCLASSIFIED
 9/11 Commission Question for the Record on Malfeasance by
Interpreters

Whenever the Department of State becomes aware of allegations of

malfeasance by locally hired consular employees (or FSNs ~ Foreign

Service Nationals), the allegations are immediately referred to the

appropriate office for review and possible investigation. The Department

takes such allegations very seriously. A number of such cases are on-

going and are in various stages of investigation. We are unaware of any

specific allegations or patterns of allegations regarding willful

manipulation of the translation process, the provision of inaccurate or

incomplete translation in return for money or other favors, or other such

malfeasant translation/interpretation activity. We do not believe such

activity to be a pervasive problem, although any such allegations are

promptly and thoroughly investigated.

The Department is aware of a recent allegation made earlier this year,

which may be the specific case of concern to a member of the

commission. As we understand it, the allegation was unrelated to

translation or interpretation activities, though the word "interpreter" was

used, apparently in reference to local employees in general. Diplomatic

Security has opened an investigation in the case. Since it is an open

investigation, the Department cannot provide any further details at this

time.

It should be noted that the vast majority of consular officers receive

language training appropriate to the level of the assignment and are

expected to conduct visa interviews without the use of interpreters. FSN

personnel may be used as interpreters in certain instances involving

difficult languages, countries where a variety of languages are used, or

for the small percentage of American personnel without language

training or with sufficient training in a difficult language to understand

the gist of a conversation only. However, in basic consular training,

consular officers are instructed to rotate interpreters (i.e., not to use the

same one all the time), take advantage of language training opportunities

at post, pay attention to body language and other non-verbal indicators,

and, if they have some basic training in the language being spoken, to

listen to the conversation between the interpreter and the applicant in an

effort to gauge the accuracy of the exchange. Consular interviews also

generally take place in an open environment within hearing of other

officers and FSNs, which also serves to mitigate the risk of malfeasance.
Drafted: CA/FPP - Julie Kavanagh and CA/VO - Tony Edson
Cleared: DS - Jeff Culver
CA/P - Derwood Staeben
CA:ASimkin ok
CA - MHarty ok
Thomas H. Kean February 4, 2004
CHAIR

Lee H. Hamilton
VICE CHAIR The Honorable Maura Harty
Richard Ben-Veniste Assistant Secretary
Bureau of Consular Affairs
Fred F. Fielding U.S. Department of State
Jamie S. Gorelick
Washington, DC 20520

Slade Gorton Dear Ambassador Harty:

Bob Kerrey
Thank you for testifying at the January 26, 2004 hearing of the National
John F. Lehman Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. We appreciate your
taking the time to appear before the Commission to discuss the current visa
Timothy]. Roemer process and the state of terrorist watchlisting today. We particularly
James R. Thompson appreciated the obvious effort you had put into preparing for our hearing, and
your comprehensive discussion of State Department policy demonstrated
during the question and answer session.
Philip D. Zelikow
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
The Commission will study your testimony and will benefit from the advice
and guidance you have given us. We welcome your comments and
suggestions to the Commission, and we will want to keep in touch with you in
the months ahead. Please do not hesitate to contact us if you have further
recommendations for the Commission.

With best wishes,

Thomas H. Kean Lee H. Hamilton

Chair Vice Chair

301 7th Street SW, Room 5125 26 Federal Plaza

Washington, DC 20407 Suite 13400
T 202.331.4060 F 202.296.5545 New York, NY 10278
www.9-1 lcommission.gov T 212.264.1505 F 212.264.1595
 WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

Series: Team 5 Files

Folder: Harty, Maura

Date: 12/31/2003

Pages: 27

Description: State Department records

Reason for withdrawal: National security classified

Box 2

Withdrawn by: kw, 12/23/2008

 BORDERS, TRANSPORTATION, AND MANAGING

HEARING

When: Monday, January 26, 2004 H

Where: /Q Washington, D.C.

Time: Ryan - 9:30 a.m.- (2- p

Harty-l:30-3:30p.m.

Format:
Staff Statement, probably by Executive Director Zelikow

Panels - Written testimony of witnesses submitted, of any length

• Oral testimony - of ten minutes in length
• Questions from the Commissioners

Goal: To have all the above as scripted as possible. Ideally, we would

give you the questions in advance, and you would provide us, informally, with drafts
of testimony in advance.

Other deadlines: Draft written testimony by 1/12 (Monday)

Draft questions to panelists by 1/12 (Monday)

Harty

Materials we need from MH prior to hearing:

V/ Running list of accomplishments described in our interview.

v Proposed future improvements. She must have a list.

\J Currrent statistics on Condor - What countries involved, how many done, how many
delayed in limbo, how many visas denied based on FBI or other recommendations. Also
what amount of resources are being devoted to Condor, personnel and busget.

i/ Passport fraud study or studies - complete material showing methodology as well as

results - discussed in Frank Moss passport briefing.

V Actions taken and planned with Canada to implement HSDD-2

{/ Actions taken and planned with Mexico to implement HSDD-2.

 List of countries with which CA has information sharing^ arrangements,
x*^ g^
formal —
or
informal, to supplement U.S. information on visa applicants -(e.g law enforcement,
intelligence services.

List of issues being discussed with the EU and with .France, jSpain, En
(friends with large MdslVn populations)

9 Current working papers on the Western Hemishpere Project.

Main points in written testimony

Describe focus of CA post 9-11. Describe focus of AS/CA in terms of amount of effort
put towards major ones related to:
(1) personnel, (2) interview policy, (3) coordination with DHS personnel, (4) fraud
detection/prevention; (5) Amcit warning, (6) visas and watchlists, (7) passport
issues, etc.

[What did we miss?]

Harty has an ambitious agenda to accomplish the following: 3 - 4 four main areas of
focus.

Number of business, tourist and student visas issued annually and trends. Include
discussion of the recent Public Diplomacy report findings/conclusions on importance of
admitting students and other foreign individuals - foreign policy counterterrorism
perspective.

Current backlog or delay factor added by DHS role and other post 9-11 programs.

Current levels of TIPOFF data, with description of where increase came from.

Answer the question: Are we safer today than we were before 9-11? If so, why?

Main points of questioning

INFORMATION v ^^__^-
• Has she ever been briefed by FBI or CTAorftheir lookback findings with respect
to the Sept 11 plotters?

• How does she and her officers acquire information about the level of threat from a
particular country at a particular time?

ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES
• What value added is DHS? Why DS or other ees could not do what DHS does?
• What measures should be in place so we can tell what benefit DHS is after a year?
 • If she could have 50 people to increase security what would they do? (DHS
proposing 50 FTE for fy 2005 for visa function)
• TTIC/TSC - any changes in service? Benefits? Problems?

VISA WAIVER —
• Is visa waiver sustainable in current form? If we had pre-clearance procedures,
couldn't we have avoided code orange in December 2003?
• If cargo can be pre-cleared, why not people? What are the differences?
• What steps and structures are needed to gain more information from foreign govts
in order to ensure security of VW travelers?

BIOMETRICS

• What are the steps to get to an international single biometrics regime?

What is the current status of the collection, use, and sharing with DHS (for
US VISIT) of biometrics by State?

LEVEL OF SECURITY
• Are we safer today and why?
• What is the most effective tool in keeping terrorists out?

COST-BENEFIT
• Condor,. Does Condor make any sense based on an examination of the resources
expended, and the number of terrorists interdicted?
• Interviews.. What is the right way to approach interviews? Does it make any
sense to be interviewing all S. Koreans, e.g.? Should interview policy be more
intelligence driven?
 • Her strategy for tightening security in the visa process post 9-11.
• The number and percentage increases in TIPOFF data following 9/11 for the first
six months, by agency. \ The fact that FBI declined to provide NCIC data

terrorist data from VGTOF \n Points of questioning;

Lookback projects of FBI/CIA

Did she receive briefings from FBI or CIA on findings w/ respect to visa and passports'!1

Visa policy, including interviews

What was visa policy for Saudi Arabia, and how was it formed? How much discretion
was vested in consular officials at posts such as Riyadh? Were Saudis given special
treatment? Who approved Visa Express? Was Visa Express consistent with State's
mandates and beliefs about the intelligence?

What is your view on the value of interviews? Interviewing for terrorists is difficult and
not something CO's had been trained to do. An interview can provide useful
information, but interviewing everyone creates a great drain on resources, and may not be
the best way to manage risk and balance commerce and security. Interviewing everyone
was not an option for CA prior to 9-11.

Technical Issues
The computer system was not designed to check the truth of assertions on visa
applications. Why not?

Student Tracking
State was responsive and helpful in developing pilot student tracking program, but in the
end the INS pulled the plug.

Visa Waiver
Visa waiver was helpful to State, and, although it posed risks, State believed they were
addressed adequately.

-^
Thomas H Kean December 30, 2003
CHAIR

Lee H. Hamilton
VICE CHAIR

Richard Ben-Veniste
The Honorable Maura Harty
Fred F. Fielding Assistant Secretary
Jamie S. Gorelick Bureau of Consular Affairs
Department of State
Slade Gorton Washington, DC 20520
Bob Kerrey
Dear Ms. Harty:
John F. Lehman

Timothy J. Roemer The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (better
known as the 9-11 Commission) will hold a public hearing on January 26-27,
James R. Thompson
2004, in Washington, DC, on Borders, Transportation, and Managing Risk.
You are invited to testify at these proceedings on the third panel—Visas and
Philip D. Zelikow
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR Watchlisting Today—at 1:00 - 3:00 p.m. on January 26.

This session will be the first in the Commission's 2004 investigative hearing
schedule, which will collectively advance the Commission's efforts to produce
an authoritative account of the facts and circumstances surrounding the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. At this hearing, the Commission will
address current policies to prevent terrorist entry to the United States,
including procedural changes relating to visas, interviews, watchlisting, and
name checks implemented in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks.

We ask that you submit comprehensive written testimony and provide your
statement via e-mail to Ms. Joanne Accolla at jaccolla@9-l lcommission.gov
by 9:00 a.m. on January 16. Your full statement will be made part of the
record and carefully studied by the Commission. We would also ask that you
limit your oral remarks to 10 minutes, so that we may highlight what we
expect will be a highly fruitful interchange with you and other members of
your panel. All witnesses at this and future Commission hearings will be
asked to testify under oath.

TEL (202) 331-4060

FAX (202) 296-5545
www.9-11 rommission.pov
The Honorable Maura Harty
December 30, 2003
Page 2

Please contact Thomas Eldridge at (202) 401-1686 with any questions you may have. We
look forward to your participation in this important public forum.

With best regards,

Thomas H. Kean Lee H. Hamilton

Chair Vice Chair

cc: Daniel Levin, Department of Justice

Karl Hofinann, Department of State
Thomas H. Kean
October 30, 2003
CHAIR
The Honorable Maura Harty
Lee H. Hamilton
VICE CHAIR Assistant Secretary
Bureau of Consular Affairs
Richard Ben-Veniste Department of State
Max Cleland Washington, DC 20520

Fred F. Fielding Dear Ms. Harty:

Jamie S. Gorelick
As you know, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
Slade Gorton States (better known as the 9-11 Commission) is directed by statute to prepare a
full and complete account of the circumstances surrounding the September 11,
John F. Lehman
2001 terrorist attacks, including the nation's preparedness for, and immediate
Timothy J. Roemer response to, the attacks. The Commission is also chartered to identify and
evaluate lessons learned and provide recommendations to prevent future acts of
James R. Thompson
terrorism upon our nation.

Philip D. Zelikow Public Law 107-306 authorizes the Commission to secure needed information
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
directly from any agency. Thus far, with the strong support of you and your
department, the Commission has compiled an extensive written record numbering
more than 2 million pages. Building on this record, meetings with senior
policymakers are essential to developing an authoritative narrative of the
September 11, 2001 attacks. Your perspective is vital to the Commission's
understanding of 9-11 and its immediate aftermath, and we are therefore writing
to request an interview with you during the week of November 10, 2003.

The Commission wishes to discuss a wide range of topics with you, including (but
not limited to) your description, analysis, and assessment of:

• The role of the Bureau of Consular Affairs in U.S. Government

counterterrorism efforts;
• The ways in which intelligence on terrorist activities and movements
flowed into and out of the Bureau of Consular Affairs;
• The nature and extent to which the Bureau of Consular Affairs received
cooperation from other government agencies in fulfilling its
counterterrorism obligations, statutory or otherwise, including terrorist
watchlisting;
• Visa policy and procedures in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates,
and Germany;
• Policies and programs adopted since September 11, 2001 to improve
security, including the Condor namecheck program, and the sharing of
visa policy responsibilities with the Department of Homeland Security;
501 7' 1 ' Street SW, Suite 5 1 2 5 26 Federal Plaza
W a x l n n y r i . n , I X . ' 20407 Suite 13-100
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V . V . •.'. ' I ! ', •!, -. ,. . • 12.264.15^)5
The Honorable Maura Harty
October 30, 2003
Page 2

• Your recommendations on how best to use government resources to

improve U.S. security interests, consistent with other U.S. principles and
interests.

You may wish to review notes and other documents to refresh your recollection of
these matters prior to the interview.

We are, of course, interested in any other issues you deem relevant to the
Commission's understanding of 9-11 specifically and the Department of State's
actions generally, as well as your thoughts on policy recommendations for the
future. Members of the Commission may attend, but the interview will be
conducted by Commission staff. It is the general policy of the Commission to
record interviews.

This proposed interview is separate from your requested participation in a public

hearing to be held in Washington, DC, on January 26-27, 2004. You will receive
a separate invitation to testify in the coming weeks, and we hope that you will
agree to appear before the Commission for this important public forum.

Please have a member of your staff contact Thomas R. Eldridge at 202 401-1686
to indicate your availability for such an interview and to relay any questions you
or your staff may have. Thank you in advance for your time and cooperation with
the Commission and its staff in this important matter.

Sincerely,

Philip Zelikow
Executive Director

cc: Daniel Levin, U.S. Department of Justice

Karl Hofmann, U.S. Department of State
Maura Harty Interview

CA and border security post 9-11

Memo from Armitage to Cheney outlines the following:
• Enhanced information sharing - NCICLJ1
Exploring facial recognition in visa screening
Review of visa waiver program
Examination of Australia-style electronic namecheck for airline
passengers \t ofu more
| secure NIV \n of State Department FD
fM

Enhanced coop with Canada to improve border safeguards

1998 Border Vision Initiative
Full-time senior consular officer (Lannon and Bellows?) assigned
seek improved coordination of VISA and ASYLUM policy, and
STEPPED-UP ENFORCERMENT EFFORTS

from Mary Ryan on "Consular Issues Post 9-11"

"Moratorium, on visa issuance" proposal on the Hill
Tipoff information quadrupled
Improved file backup systems - real time update
Lost or stolen ppts input from posts
Augmenting "lookouts with global electronic access to
and photos now kept at individual posts."
New more tamper-resistant NIV
Emerging facial recognition
INS access to CCD data within three months
VWP program reviews of individual countries
Foreign students - SEVIS - State may "play a greater role in the -'
handling of these forms than we have in the past."
^jHktrn
Lannon coordinating Canada-Mexico efforts. - Western
Hempshpere project
"detailed plans" for Mexican temporary worker program and
undocumented Mexican immigrant pop. "temporarily deferred" fch^

;o the State OIG w

Waiver of personal appearance
TARP ~~L
Consolidated guidance to the field, SOPs, Cons. Access to classified data
Executive oversight of visa issuance at small posts
Staffing - changing rotation of junior officers, changes in CA and FSN
roles - security-driven changes
Training
CLASS and Visa Viper - intelligence sharing

Does that reflect landscape CA's activities since 9-1 if No Condor/NSEERS

 -U
If not, wl were the initiatives?
Where are e today on these initiatives?

X/^rHow h,as vis^

VISE policy changed since 9-11?
:<i ^
o*V \ Whati has been the effect of the Patriot Act, jEnhanced Border Sgcurity Act, and
Homeland Security Act?
Tn|e£YJew poltfy ^- waivern)Tp^rsOTiaTappearance^~wHat is different abouf
it today? Powell cable says interview everyone? What's really
happening? - - s \ -\- /~JJ3 c'

What changes in staffing and workload of C A?

In your 12-11-02 memo, you state you agree with changing having junior
officers in the consular rotation. Is this being changed? Consular Cone
anges warranted?"*^ £ on*** }fat> w&tfk' /v»« <j£flt? ft"* JT*~~[ Tyfykitf ^o
What changes in the us£)of ESNs? Noaceess to namecheck (feature.
* VIM-
What* changes
u •in *uthe useywv££ i^^^--
oi \Jonsular 1 + •^'i^'^^cr^Jj&F*
Asfoc/atesT ^
Non-atijudicatory role.

- A giant new drain on resources to what end?

•l^, 20-day hold was first. Terminated 10-18-02 - What was precise overlap with.
Cn
Program for universal screening of all males 16-45 from 26 countries as
the initial program — implemented when?
Then refined to 16-45 from 26 countries with 10 additional criteria
implemented per MR cable 1 -26-02?.
In your July 11, 2003 memo to US Grossman, you say that the "original
criteria are overbroad, but still in effect." You lament last-minute NSC
raise last-minute objections. What happened, and where are we on
Condor? - Seven new criteria proposed.
In your view, what should be changed about it? List of countriesxafid
Education criteria - both have 1C support for State's positL
How many Condor checks has State been involved withal ^^ (
• How many individuals denied a yi^sa^beca.u; ^Y\
• When did CIA pull out?
• Is Condor hurting the U.S. economy and forest
ti\J\<SJ
)In your December 11,2002 cable, you say your goal is to have t and
(T^ transparent visa process" — Are we there yet? / , <
k/t/^4 ^~/^7l ts^y ttfTfrrrt' r#d ^/TV*?

Intelligence access at consular posts

What is your vision of CO availability to classified information.
What happens after she is briefed in the morning to information on terro:
mobility, not specific to an individual?
Cachets -
Documentary
r
TIPOFF and the new watchlist setup - how does she see it working?
 M^2^
J^L 1 J-*~4J*<3C&
•L* ^M
v/TWfi/

More strategic traud and intelligence analysis

What did Armitage/Lannon mean by a new FDL for CA, and is this in the works
at all?

V\sa waiver _,.

What kind of review has been done of its vulnerabilities, versus reviews of individual 1t
countries —• ^

Biometrics
Where are we?
U.S.?
Visa waiver countries machine readable travel document programs?
U.S. Visit?

Information benefits and costs, eg South Korea

Pre-clearance/pre-inspection
• Requires consideration of many issues such as immunity from prosecution,
ability to arrest on foreign soil, close coordination with foreign LE.Intel
• Lots of work done with Canada - serve as a model?

9/11 Closed by Statute

House of Representatives Page 1 of 6

House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims
Judiciary Committee
"The Department of State's Border Security Program—Investing in America's
Security"
Testimony of Daniel B. Smith
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs
February 25, 2004

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, Members of the Committee:

Thank you for inviting me to testify before you today on the Department of
State's Border Security Program. I am pleased to explain both the strategy employed by
the Department of State in its Border Security Program and then how that strategy is
implemented in the day-to-day operations of the Bureau of Consular Affairs.

The Border Security Program at the Department of State is a complex mission

involving the activities of a number of bureaus and offices. Funded largely through the
Department's limited fee retention authorities for consular services, the Border Security
Program exists to strengthen the security of the United States by "pushing outward" our
borders. The Department has followed a consistent and multi year strategy that focuses
on:

• Providing accurate and timely information to all personnel responsible for

processing passports, adjudicating visas and providing other consular services.
• Ensuring that all personnel responsible for Border Security services have the
business quality hardware and software they need to fulfill their responsibilities.
• Connecting all overseas and domestic operations responsible for Border Security
together through high-speed networks, which make possible such powerful tools as
the CLASS namecheck system and the Consolidated Consular Database (CCD).
• Investing in our people to ensure that they have the training needed to provide
quality Border Security Services. Covering the operating costs of many
Department of State personnel who provide Border Security services.
• Ensuring the integrity of our people, processes and products.

The Department's Border Security Program is much larger than just the Bureau of
Consular Affairs (CA). CA's main partners in implementing this program include the
Bureaus of Diplomatic Security, Information Management, Human Resources,
Intelligence and Research, and Resource Management as well as the geographic bureaus.
The Administration is seeking some $836 million in the FY-05 budget to help fund these
activities.

http://www.house.gov/judiciary/smith022504.htm 3/3/2004
House of Representatives Page 2 of 6

In terms of Consular Affairs, our mission is to help Americans abroad, facilitate

legitimate international travel, and prevent the travel to the United States of foreigners
who are likely to engage in activities harmful to our country. We have no higher
responsibility than the protection of our citizens and safeguarding our country's borders
through the Border Security Program, and we are determined to carry out this
responsibility in the best and most effective manner possible.

In FY 2005, the priorities of CA are:

• protecting our homeland by strengthening the visa process as a tool to identify

potential terrorists and others who should not receive visas and preventing those
people from entering the United States;
• protecting Americans by ensuring that they have the consular information, services,
and assistance they need to reside, conduct business, or travel abroad;
• providing Americans with timely and effective passport services and a secure travel
document; and
• providing consular personnel worldwide with the tools and training they need to carry
out these responsibilities.

Visa Services

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 highlighted as never before the crucial role the Bureau
of Consular Affairs plays in U.S. border security through the visa process. The Consular
Officers of the Foreign Service at the 212 visa adjudicating embassies and consulates
abroad are truly our first line of defense. In FY-05, we will continue our efforts to ensure
that the visa process is as secure as possible and that it supports our overall homeland
security efforts so that - with the immigration check at the port of entry and the enhanced
capabilities of the Department of Homeland Security - it will form a coordinated and
interlocking network of border security in which the American people can have
confidence.

One of the most important tools we can provide our consular officers abroad is
information that will help them identify and deny a visa to a terrorist, criminal or other
ineligible alien. Our goal is to push the borders of the United States out as far from our
shores as possible to stop a problematic or questionable traveler overseas. To this end,
our coordinated efforts with law enforcement and intelligence agencies have more than
doubled the names of known or suspected terrorists and other ineligible aliens in our
databases. We will continue to seek opportunities for data sharing with federal agencies
that have a role in the visa process or interact with visa recipients. In fact, the majority of
the data in our consular lookout system now derives from other agencies, especially those
in the law enforcement and intelligence communities.

I am particularly proud that an activity funded through the Department's Border

Security Program - the TIPOFF program - is a key building block for the Terrorist

http://www.house.gov/judiciary/smith022504.htm 3/3/2004
House of Representatives Page 3 of 6

Threat Integration Center (TTIC), which will maintain the principal database on known
and suspected terrorists in a highly classified form. The TIPOFF database with its
approximately 120,000 records was transferred to TTIC on November 17, 2003. TTIC,
together with the separate Terrorist Screening Center, will eliminate the stovepiping of
terrorist data and provide a more systematic approach to posting lookouts on potential
and known terrorists.

We are also currently engaged with DHS in implementing a biometrics program to

track the entry and exit of foreign visitors by using electronically scanned fingerprints
and photographs. This new system, which begins with consular officers collecting
electronically scanned fingerprints at consular sections abroad and continues with DHS's
US-VISIT program at ports of entry and departure, will create a coordinated and
interlocking network of border security. We began our new Biometric Visa Program in
September 2003, and it is now operational at more than 70 visa-adjudicating posts. With
our aggressive rollout schedule, the program will be in effect at all visa-adjudicating
posts by the congressionally mandated deadline of October 26, 2004. The inclusion of
additional biometrics, in addition to the photograph that has always been collected, in
international travel documents is an important step in continuing to improve our ability to
verify the identity of prospective travelers to the United States. In the process of
screening visas and passports domestically and abroad, additional biometrics can serve as
a useful adjunct to existing screening processes that identify individuals who might be
terrorists, criminals, or other aliens who might represent a security risk to the United
States.

Other visa-related initiatives that will be funded through the on-going Border
Security Program include:

• Re-engineer the interagency visa clearance process to allow stronger accountability

and quicker processing.
• Improve the capacity of CLASS to handle additional information such as Interpol and
deportation lookout information, and lost and stolen passport data.
• Continue to work with countries that are eligible for the Visa Waiver Program (VWP)
and with ICAO to meet the requirement that those countries incorporate biometric
identifiers in their passports by October 2004, as congressionally mandated.
• Review facial recognition results from initial test deployment at visa posts to
determine how it may benefit screening in the operational environment.
• Introduce new, tamper-resistant and machine-readable immigrant visa foil. This new
machine-readable immigrant visa process will include digitized photo and
fingerprints.
• Eliminate crew-list visas and require all seafarers to obtain individual visas.

American Citizens:

The Bureau of Consular Affairs works to promote the safety and security of the

http://www.house.gov/judiciary/smith022504.htm 3/3/2004
House of Representatives Page 4 of 6

3.2 million Americans who reside abroad and those U.S. residents who make about 60
million trips outside the U.S. each year. This complements our overall homeland security
efforts on the visa side of the house, extending to all Americans our strongest and best
efforts to ensure their safety wherever they might be. We provide current information on
travel conditions and security through our Consular Affairs home page at
http://travel.state.gov. which received nearly 198.5 million inquiries in FY 2003, and the
Overseas Citizens Services (OCS) Call Center, which received approximately 70,000
calls.

International tensions and security concerns, especially incidents of international

parental child abduction, have prompted more parents to take preventive action to
monitor or limit their children's travel abroad. This has resulted in a growing number of
requests for passport lookouts, and increased inquiries concerning preventive measures to
avoid international parental child abductions, in particular. The Office of Children's
Issues (CA/OCS/CI) has also worked with the OCS Call Center to respond to routine
inquiries concerning preventive measures, while maintaining responsibility for passport
lookouts. We hosted a meeting with left-behind parents in 2003 and plan similar meetings
through FY 2005.

Our priorities for American citizens in FY 2005 include implementation of the

Hague Inter-country Adoption Convention, which will require CA, as the Central
Authority for the Convention, to take on responsibilities never before performed on the
federal level; enhanced services for victims of crime abroad and tracking of statistics on
such crimes; enhanced emergency "fly-away" teams; efficient administration of overseas
civilian participation in the 2004 general election; expanded use of CA's web site and the
Overseas Citizens Services Call Center to provide the most current information on travel
conditions and security; continuation of the re-engineering of the American Citizens
Services software; and outreach around the United States to educate the public and
stakeholder groups about our programs and the assistance that consular officers abroad
can provide. Topics to be addressed will include: travel safety overseas, especially for
students; crisis preparedness; international parental child abduction, including prevention
measures; intercountry adoption; the passport application process; and consular
notification and access in arrest cases. These initiatives are overwhelmingly funded as
part of the Border Security program.

Passport Services:

Just as we are committed to the most secure adjudication process and

documentation to support the visa process, the same is true in terms of what we
consider to be the world's most valuable document—the U.S. passport. In FY-03,
Passport Services issued over seven million passports. We recently completed the
system-wide introduction of photodigitization technology to support passport printing.
That effort has been so successful that we have, in turn, moved the production of
passports issued abroad to our U.S. domestic production facilities so that we can take

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advantage of the significant security improvements embodied in the photodigitization

process. But, we also have many other initiatives underway. We will proceed with our
efforts to enhance biometrics in U.S. passports and bring our passport into compliance
with international standards established in May 2003. The inclusion of a "smart" chip
in the passport, on which we will write the bearer's biographic information and
photograph, will increase the security of the document. This initiative is consistent
with U.S. legislation that requires our Visa Waiver Program participants to take such a
step, but it is not required. We are nonetheless pursuing the initiative because it
supports U.S. national security. This new passport will further strengthen our ability to
reliably link the authorized bearer of a passport to its user.

We are completely redesigning the U.S. passport and its security features. And,
since the passport process is only as strong as the underlying adjudication process, we
are strengthening our datasharing efforts with agencies in order to help confirm the
identity of applicants. We will enhance our computer systems and provide for expected
upgrades to accommodate the production of passports. To protect the over 60 million
passport records stored on-line and provide redundant systems to support other agencies
that require access to these vital records, new storage and server systems will be
procured in FY 2004 and FY 2005. Again, these activities are funded as part of the
Border Security Program.

Management and Organizational Excellence:

We continue to strengthen homeland security by ensuring that the consular

function has appropriate facilities and is staffed at sufficient levels by consular officers
who are trained to screen out terrorists. As part of the Border Security Program, the
Department is establishing 93 new consular positions — 1 3 domestic and 80 overseas in
FY-04 and is requesting 60 additional positions in FY-05-- 15 domestic and 45 overseas.
In addition, the Department plans to establish 68 new positions overseas in FY-04 and is
requesting 63 in FY-05 as part of the Consular Associate replacement program. These
additional positions will give us the ground troops necessary to staff our first line of
defense.

We place a high priority on maintaining efficient and state-of-the-art systems and

leveraging technology to the extent feasible because of the global nature of consular
operations and the necessity for interagency data-sharing. We will continue to replace IT
equipment for consular sections abroad as well as Consular Affairs domestic operations
on a 3 to 4 year cycle, provide updated remote and computer-based training on consular
systems to supplement hands-on training by visiting experts at least once every 12 to 18
months, and maintain Support Desks to provide key links between employees and the
development and support elements in the Consular Systems Division.

Good management requires effective internal controls. We continue to strengthen

management controls via the issuance of standard operating procedures (SOPs),

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conducting Management Assessment and Internal Control Reviews at passport agencies,

certifications that management controls are in place at consular offices, and sending
Consular Management Assistance Teams (CMATs) to work collaboratively with posts
toward our common goal of protecting homeland security and our borders. In FY 2005,
the CMATs will maintain a robust schedule of visits to assess the integrity of
management controls, effective resource utilization and space allocation, and the extent
to which Department-mandated SOPs have been understood and implemented. CMATs
serve as a resource in identifying and helping to resolve post needs, as well as providing
guidance and counseling as appropriate. CA uses its new Vulnerability Assessment Unit,
a joint initiative with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, to analyze consular data,
systems, and processes to detect anomalies in visa and passport processing, thus reducing
CA's vulnerability to system manipulation.

The Department's Border Security Program is a critical element in the Department

State's goal to protect American citizens and safeguard the nation's borders. By focusing
sharing information, providing sufficient infrastructure and human resources, increasing
connectivity, and enhancing the integrity of our processes and documents, the Department
State is ensuring that we have a Border Security Program in which the American people c;
place their trust and confidence.

Thank you and I welcome your questions.

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 Maura Harty
Assistant Secretary
Bureau of Consular Affairs

Maura Harty became the Assistant Secretary of Consular Affairs on November 21, 2002.
Immediately prior to assuming the position in Consular Affairs, she served as the
Executive Secretary of the Department of State.

Ambassador Harty entered the Foreign Service in 1981, after receiving a bachelor's
degree from the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. Following an initial
assignment to the American Embassy in Mexico City, Ambassador Harty returned to
Washington and immediately participated in the United States' rescue mission to
Grenada, by searching the Island for endangered American students and retirees. She
later served as a Watch Officer in the State Department's Operations Center and was
promoted to Senior Watch Officer during that assignment. In 1987-1988, Harty was a
Special Assistant to then Secretary of State George P. Shultz.

Harty returned overseas in 1988 as Chief of the non-immigrant visa section in Bogota,
Colombia. Ambassador Harty subsequently served as Consul at the American Embassy
in Madrid. During that time she also assisted in the opening of the American Embassy in
Vilnius, Lithuania.

In 1994, Harty served as the Managing Director of the Directorate of Overseas Citizens
Services, where she created the office of Children's Issues. The establishment of that
office focused attention and resources for the first time on the tragic problem of
international parental child abduction.

Harty was selected as a Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department in 1995 and
subsequently served as Executive Assistant to Secretary of State Warren Christopher.
Following that assignment, she became the U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Paraguay
where she and her Embassy team worked as strong advocates for democracy and the rule
of law.