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Neurocomputing 71 (2008) 3367–3371

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Neurocomputing
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/neucom

Network properties of a model for conscious and unconscious

mental processes$
Roseli S. Wedemann a,, Luı́s Alfredo Vidal de Carvalho b, Raul Donangelo c
a
Instituto de Matemática e Estatı́stica, Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, R. São Francisco Xavier, 524, 20550-013 Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
b
Programa de Eng. Sistemas e Computac- ão - COPPE, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Caixa Postal 68511, 21945-970 Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil
c
Instituto de Fı́sica, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Caixa Postal 68528, 21941-972 Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil

a r t i c l e in fo abstract

Available online 15 July 2008 We have previously described the mental pathology known as neurosis, in terms of its relation to
Keywords: memory function. We proposed neural network mechanisms, whereby neurotic behavior is described as
Consciousness and unconsciousness a brain associative memory process, and the symbolic associativity involved in psychoanalytic working-
Neuroses through can be mapped onto a corresponding network reconfiguration process. Microscopic
Hierarchical memory mechanisms that control synaptic properties self-organize the memory networks to a hierarchical,
Self-organized learning clustered structure. Modules corresponding to sensorial and symbolic memories interact, representing
Complex neural network properties unconscious and conscious mental processes. Here, we review these concepts and illustrate, with
simulations, some of these complex networks’ behaviors and properties.
& 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction able to obtain relief and cure of painful symptoms through a

Although inconclusive, psychodynamic theories [7,9,10,17]
seem to suggest correlations between creativity, associativity,
psychopathology and the unconscious. We explored these com-
monalities and proposed, in a previous paper [22], a schematic
model for some concepts related with neurotic mental processes,
as described by Freud [7,9,10]. Our description is based on the
current view that the brain is a cognitive system composed of
neurons, interconnected by a network of synapses, that cooperate
among themselves to process information in a distributed fashion.
Mental states are thus the result of the global cooperation of the
brain’s distributed neural activity [5,13,14]. The emergence of a
global state of the brain’s neural network generates a bodily
response, which we call an act.
Psychoanalytic research regarding the transference neuroses has
found that traumatic and repressed memories are knowledge
which is present in the subject, but which is symbolically
inaccessible to him. It is therefore considered unconscious knowl-
edge [7,9]. Freud observed that neurotic patients systematically
repeated symptoms in the form of ideas and impulses, and called
this tendency a compulsion to repeat [10]. He related the
compulsion to repeat to repressed or traumatic memory traces,
caused by a mental conflict [9]. Neurotic analysands have been
$
This research was developed with grants from the Brazilian National Research
Council (CNPq), the Rio de Janeiro State Research Foundation (FAPERJ) and the
Brazilian agency which funds graduate studies (CAPES).
 Corresponding author. Tel.: +55 2122382180; fax: +55 2125877212.
E-mail addresses: roseli@ime.uerj.br (R.S. Wedemann), LuisAlfredo@ufrj.br
(L.A.V. de Carvalho), donangel@if.ufrj.br (R. Donangelo).
mechanism called working-through. This procedure aims at
developing knowledge regarding the causes of symptoms by
accessing unconscious memories, and understanding and chan-
ging the analysand’s compulsion to repeat [10]. The technique
involves mainly free associative talking during analytic sessions
and interpretation of dreams, among other processes.
In [22], memory was modeled by a Boltzmann machine (BM)
represented by a complete graph. It is known, however, that brain
neuronal topology is selectively structured. Neurons interact
mainly with spatially close neighbors, having fewer long-range
synaptic connections to more distant neighbors [5,12,14]. We
further developed the memory model by including some known
microscopic mechanisms that control synaptic properties, so that
the network self-organizes to a hierarchical, clustered structure.
We propose an organization, where two hierarchically structured
modules corresponding to sensorial and symbolic memories
interact, producing sensorial and symbolic activity, representing
unconscious and conscious mental processes. In proposing this
organization, we followed Freud’s idea that unconscious mem-
ories are those which we cannot access symbolically, i.e. cannot
talk about [7–10]. In this paper, we represent brain mechanisms
involved in neurosis as a complex system, and analyze them
according to recent methods developed for the study of complex
networks.
A review of recent developments in the scientific under-
standing of consciousness, as well as a model for attention as a
basic function related to conscious activity may be found in [18].
Kinsbourne [15] discusses how Freud’s attempt at proposing a
neural substrate for mental processes [8] can be viewed in light of
modern developments in neuroscience, such as the understanding

0925-2312/$ - see front matter & 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.neucom.2008.02.023
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3368 R.S. Wedemann et al. / Neurocomputing 71 (2008) 3367–3371
of forebrain functioning. Aleksander and Morton review their
Axiomatic Consciousness Theory (ACT) in [1], which addresses
phenomenology in neuroscience (relating symbolic representa-
tion to subjective experience), and apply it to modeling of visual
phenomenology. The Global Workspace Theory [2] is based on the
computational science concept of global workspace, where
material needed to be worked on by a number of processors is
held, and gives an useful view on certain aspects of consciousness.
Our main contribution with respect to current work regarding
machine models of consciousness is to propose a neuronal
mechanism that describes conscious and unconscious memory
activity involved in neurosis. The unconscious compulsion to
repeat is explained as a neural network associative memory
mechanism, where an input stimulus of any kind associates to a
pattern in sensorial memory, which cannot activate symbolic
brain processing areas. Neurotic (unconscious) acts are isolated
from symbolic representation and association (similar to reflexes).
We illustrate by our network model, how Freud’s ideas regarding
the unconscious show that symbolic processing, language and
meaning are essential for consciousness.
We first review our model for neurosis [22] and the algorithm
for generating hierarchically clustered memory modules [20]. We
then present new simulation results and model analysis, with
some important properties of these complex networks. Finally, we
draw conclusions and perspectives for future work.
2. Functional and computational model for the neuroses
We review the model described in previous work [22], where we
proposed that the neuroses manifest themselves as an associative
memory process, a mechanism where the network returns a stored
pattern, when it is shown another input pattern similar to the stored
one [13]. We modeled the compulsion to repeat neurotic symptoms,
by supposing that such a symptom is acted, when the subject is
presented with a stimulus, which resembles a repressed or
traumatic (unconscious) memory trace. The stimulus causes a
stabilization of the neural net onto a minimal energy state,
corresponding to the memory trace that synthesizes the original
repressed experience, which in turn generates a neurotic response
(an act). The neurotic act is not a result of the stimulus as a new
situation but a response to the repressed memory.
We mapped the linguistic, symbolic associative process
involved in psychoanalytic working-through into a corresponding
process of reinforcing synapses among memory traces in the
brain. These connections should involve symbolic memory,
leading to at least partial transformation of repressed memory
to consciousness. This has a relation to the importance of
language in psychoanalysis and the idea that unconscious
memories are those that cannot be expressed symbolically. We
propose that as the analysand symbolically elaborates manifesta-
tions of unconscious material through transference in psycho-
analytic sessions, he is reconfiguring the topology of his neural
net, by creating new connections and reinforcing or inhibiting
older ones. The network topology which results from this
reconfiguration will stabilize onto new energy minima, associated
with new acts. The process of slowly and repeatedly reconfiguring
synaptic connections to elaborate knowledge accounts for the
long durations of psychoanalytic processes, where repetition is
specially important.
Memory functioning is modeled by a BM with N neurons,
where node states take binary values. Pattern retrieval on the net
is achieved by a standard simulated annealing process, in which
the network temperature T is gradually lowered by a factor a. We
refer the reader to Ref. [13] for a description of the BM algorithm
and its properties.
3. Self-organizing hierarchical memory structures
As a first approximation [22], we modeled memory by a BM
represented by a complete graph. In a further refinement, we now
consider that neurons belong to two different subsets, corre-
sponding to sensorial and symbolic memories. Memory traces
stored in sensorial memory represent mental images of stimuli
received by sensory receptors (located in eyes, ears, skin and other
parts of the body) from the environment and the body itself. This
includes information regarding affects and emotion. Sensorial
memory represents brain structures such as the amygdala,
cerebellum, reflex pathways, hippocampus, and prefrontal, limbic
and parieto-occipital-temporal cortices, which synthesize visual,
auditory and somatic information. Symbolic memory stores
representations of traces in sensorial memory, i.e. symbols, and
refers to another level of representation. It represents brain
structures such as areas of the medial temporal lobe, the
hippocampus, Wernicke’s and Broca’s areas and other areas of
the frontal cortex. These latter areas are associated with language
and, because of them, we can associate a word such as ‘‘red’’ to the
sensation of seeing a red object. Attentional mechanisms [18],
which we did not model, select stimuli to sensorial memory and
allow them to become conscious, if associated to a symbolic
memory trace. Sensorial stimuli which cannot associate to
symbolic memory remains unconscious [7,9,14]. We refer to the
subset of memory traces in sensorial memory which can associate
to a symbol as the ‘‘conscious’’ subset. Freud called this the system
conscious and defines it as the set of psychical information which
is capable of becoming conscious (in some of his works he refers
to this set as the preconscious) [7,9].
The neurotic compulsion to repeat [9,10] is explained here as a
bodily response (an act) to an access to sensorial memory, which
does not activate symbolic memory, as in a reflex. This accounts
for the fact that neurotics say they cannot explain their neurotic
acts, such as in ‘‘I don’t know why I was so upset and overreacted
with Mary’’. When a stimulus S 0 which causes the retrieval of a
sensorial memory trace can activate also a pattern in symbolic
memory, it can become conscious, the output is not as in reflexive
behavior and there is another level of processing. This mechanism
is similar to ideas proposed by Edelman [5] and strongly reflects
Freud’s concepts of conscious and unconscious mental processes
and the role of language in psychoanalysis [9,10].
In order to model the organization of the topology of each
memory, we consider the following microscopic biological
mechanisms. Brain cells in many animals have a structure called
on-center/off-surround, in which a neuron is in cooperation,
through excitatory synapses, with other neurons in its immediate
neighborhood, whereas it is in competition with neurons that lay
outside these surroundings. These mechanisms are found stati-
cally hardwired, and also as part of dynamical processes, where
neurons compete for certain chemicals [12,14]. In synaptogenesis,
for example, substances generically called neural growth factors
are released by stimulated neurons and, spreading through
diffusion, reach neighboring cells, promoting synaptic growth.
Cells that receive neural growth factors make synapses and live,
while cells that have no contact with these substances die [14].
A neuron releasing neural growth factor guides the synaptic
formation in its tri-dimensional neighborhood, becoming a center
of synaptic convergence. When neighboring neurons release
different neural growth factors in different amounts, many
synaptic convergence centers are generated and a competition is
established between them, through the surrounding synapses. A
signaling network triggered by environmental stimulation is
established, which controls development and plasticity of neuro-
nal circuits, and this suggests an idea of the way environment
represents itself in the brain. We thus developed the following
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clustering algorithm, to model the self-organizing process which
results in a structured topology of each memory.
Step 1: Neurons are uniformly distributed in a square bi-
dimensional sheet.
Step 2: To avoid the unnecessary and time-consuming
numerical solution of the diffusion equation of the neural growth
factors, we assume a Gaussian solution. Therefore, a synapse is
allocated to connect a neuron ni to a neuron nj according to a
Gaussian probability, given by P ij / expððr~j  r~i Þ2 =2s2 Þ, where r~j
and r~i are the positions of nj and ni , respectively, in the
bi-dimensional sheet and s is the standard deviation of the
distribution, which is considered here a model parameter. If a
synapse is allocated to connect ni and nj , its strength wij is
proportional to Pij . Synaptic weights are symmetrical, wij ¼ wji .
Step 3: We verified in previous work [4,21] that cortical maps
representing different stimuli are formed, such that each stimulus
activates a group of neurons spatially close to each other, and that
these groups are uniformly distributed along the memory sheet.
We thus randomly choose m neurons which will each be a center
of the representation of a stimulus. The value of m is chosen
considering the storage capacity of the BM [13].
Step 4: For each of the m centers chosen in Step 3, reinforce
adjacent synapses according to the following criteria. If ni is a
P
center, define sumni ¼ j jwij j, where wij is the weight of the
synapse connecting nj to ni . For each nj adjacent to ni , increase
jwij j by Dwij, with probability Probnj ¼ jwij j=sumni , where Dwij ¼
Z Probnj and Z 2 R is a model parameter chosen in ½0; 1. After
incrementing jwij j, decrement Dwij from the weights of all the
other neighbors of ni , according to: 8kaj; jwik j ¼ jwik j  Dwik ,
P
where Dwik ¼ ð1  jwik j= kaj jwik jÞDwij .
Step 5: Repeat Step 4 until a clustering criterion is met.
In the above clustering algorithm, Steps 2 and 3 are justified in
the algorithm’s description. Step 4 regulates synaptic intensities
by strengthening synapses within a cluster and reducing synaptic
strength between clusters (disconnects clusters). Neurons that
have received stronger sensorial stimulation, and are therefore
more strongly connected, will stimulate their neighborhoods and
promote still stronger connections.
The growth of long-range synapses is energetically more costly
than short-range synaptic growth, and therefore the former are
less frequent in the brain than the latter. For allocating long-range
synapses which connect clusters, we should consider the basic
learning mechanism proposed by Hebb [5,13,14] based on the fact
that synaptic growth among two neurons is promoted by
simultaneous stimulation of the pair. Neuronal groups whose
states store certain memory traces, which receive simultaneous
stimuli, should enhance synaptic growth among the neuronal
groups representing these traces, allowing association among
traces. Since memory traces represent both sensorial information
and concepts (symbolic memory), we are also representing
association of ideas or symbols by long-range synapses.
This suggests a mechanism through which the external world,
culture and basic language structure may be mapped onto brain
topology. Since we are still not aware of the synaptic distri-
butions that result in such topologies, as a first approximation, we
allocate long-range synapses randomly among clusters. Within
a cluster C, ni is chosen for the connection with probability
P P P
P i ¼ j jwij j= nj 2C k jwjk j. If the synapse connects clusters in
different memories (sensorial and symbolic), its randomly chosen
weight is multiplied by a factor k 2 R in ½0; 1, reflecting the fact
that some sensorial information is weakly accessible to con-
sciousness, i.e. repressed.
Mechanisms of memory storage and retrieval by the BM
function as mentioned in Section 2. Once the network is
initialized, we find the stored patterns by presenting many
random patterns to the BM, with an annealing schedule a that
3369
allows stabilizing onto the many local minima of the network
energy function. These initially stored patterns, associated as they
are to two weakly linked subnetworks, represent neurotic
memory states.
To simulate working-through, we stimulate the net by means
of a state change in a randomly chosen ni belonging to the
‘‘unconscious’’ (sensorial) set of a neurotic pattern. This stimulus
is then presented to the network and, if the BM retrieves a pattern
with symbolic configuration different from that of the neurotic
pattern, we interpret this as a new conscious association, and
enhance all weights from ni to the changed nodes in the symbolic
set. Following Hebbian learning, increment values are propor-
tional to the products of the states of the connected neurons and
the learning parameter b. New knowledge is learned only when
the stimulus from the analyst is not similar to the neurotic
memory trace. This procedure must be repeated for various
reinforcement iterations in an adaptive learning process, and also
each set of reinforcement iterations must be repeated for various
initial temperature values.
4. Simulation illustrations and network behavior
We illustrate the model with a simulation for a network with
N ¼ 50 neurons, such that Nsens ¼ Nsymb ¼ 25 belong to each
memory. In the brain, memory modules are not symmetric and
neurons and synapses function differently in different brain
regions. We concentrate on the interactions between and within
the sensorial and symbolic modules to describe how the
possibility of memory traces to become conscious is sensitive to
the connection intensities, and how they can be reconfigured in a
learning process to enhance or inhibit associativity. Although N is
extremely small, initially, it seems to suffice to illustrate the basic
concepts and mechanisms at a semantic level. The short-range
microscopic mechanisms are scalable and, since our algorithms
are based on microscopic biological mechanisms, we expect that
this level should be amenable to mapping to a biological
substratum. Some simulations of system configurations have
taken a few days on a single processor, even for these small
systems. We plan to parallelize these algorithms, in order to
simulate significantly larger systems.
In our simulations, s ¼ 0:58, b ¼ 0:3, Z ¼ 0:1 and the other
parameters for annealing in the BM are attributed the same values
we have used in [22]. To configure neurotic traces having weak
connections to symbolic processing brain areas, synapses con-
necting different memory modules are multiplied by k ¼ 0:5,
defining the initially stored patterns as neurotic. For smaller
values of k the network has learning difficulties, suggesting a
difficulty in associating unconscious traces among themselves and
with symbolic memory.
In Fig. 1(a), we show one topology generated after executing
only the clustering algorithm and, in Fig. 1(b), the corresponding
topology after long-range synaptic generation. The figures
illustrate the clustered, hierarchical self-organization of the
network. For this initial topology, 42% of the patterns stored
initially were still stored after working-through, which shows that
the network adapts with the reconfiguration, freeing itself from
some of the ‘‘neurotic’’ states. Figs. 2(a) and (b) give a more
quantitative view. We generated 10 000 different neurotic topol-
ogies, for different values of N and spatial dimensions, from the
same initial system parameter values specified above, and
measured the average node degree (k) distributions. In Fig. 2(a)
(in logarithmic scale) the discrete symbols represent the values
found in our simulations. For larger values of N, Fig. 2(a) shows
a power law distribution for large k, with exponent g  4.
This power law behavior is characteristic of many biological
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3370 R.S. Wedemann et al. / Neurocomputing 71 (2008) 3367–3371

7 positions sensorial memory 7 positions sensorial memory

positions declarative memory positions declarative memory
6 clustered synapses in memory 6 synapses connecting memories

5 5

4 4
y

y
3 3

2 2

1 1

0 0

-0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3

x x

Fig. 1. (a) On the left, network topology after clustering for N ¼ 50. (b) On the right, network topology with long-range synapses.

10000 0.5
10**7/x**4.1 Simulation
N = 32 1/x**0.23
Average number of nodes with k links

1000
N = 50
N = 100
Average clustering coefficient

100
N = 282 0.4
10 N = 1000
N = 2000
N = 4000
1
0.3
0.1

0.01
0.2
0.001

0.0001

1e-05 0.1
1 10 100 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
Number of links (k) Total number of neurons (N)

Fig. 2. (a) On the left, node degree distributions in logarithmic scale, for various values of N. (b) On the right, average clustering coefficient for different N values.

systems and indicates scale independence. It is known that through the preferential attachment criterium, for which C / 1=N
random graphs follow the Poisson distribution of node degrees [11]. To illustrate this point, we show as a full line in the graph the
lk expðlÞ=k! [16]. The deviations from Poisson in Fig. 2(a) for function 1=N 0:23 . We notice that, even if it follows the main trend
higher k values may be attributed to the competitive biological of C obtained in our simulations, this function overpredicts the
mechanisms, and confirm that the resulting networks have a drop for large N. The clustering algorithm presented in this work
structure which is not random and may be scale free [16,19]. thus appears to lead to networks, for which the biological
The average clustering coefficient C [16,19] for 10 000 networks mechanisms establish some different topological properties than
of 50 neurons is 0.38. We compare C generated by our clustering the traditional algorithms, studied in complex network theory.
algorithm to that of a real network, where we have considered the
neural network of the well-studied worm C. elegans, which is
composed of 282 neurons. This worm has measured C ¼ 0:28 [16]. 5. Conclusions
We obtained an average C ¼ 0:24 within our model over 10 000
networks, also of 282 neurons. These two values are surprisingly We have further developed a previous memory model [22] to
similar, considering that our algorithm is based on very general include microscopic biological neuronal mechanisms, and verified
microscopic biological mechanisms. This worm’s network would that the memory complex network self-organizes into a hier-
present C ¼ 0:049, if it were a random graph [16], and the higher archical clustered structure. Two hierarchically structured mod-
measured value indicates the existence of network structure. ules corresponding to sensorial and symbolic memories interact,
In Fig. 2(b) crosses depict the calculated average C values, for producing sensorial and symbolic activity, representing uncon-
the initial network configurations, as a function of N. As it is well scious and conscious mental processes. This memory structure
known, C is negligible in the case of an Erdös–Rényi random and functioning, with an adaptive learning process, is used to
network. We also notice that the dependence for larger N is much explain a possible mechanism for neurotic behavior and psycho-
weaker than that for a network in which linkage is performed analytical working-through.
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R.S. Wedemann et al. / Neurocomputing 71 (2008) 3367–3371
The model is in agreement with psychoanalytic experience
that working-through is a slow process, where the individual
slowly elaborates knowledge by re-associating weakly connected
memory traces and new experiences. It thus illustrates a
phenomenological view of mind, with intentionality [3]. Language
is an important process, and is represented by the functioning of
symbolic memory. Repetition is also important, and is illustrated
in the model by the repetitive adaptive reinforcement learning, in
the simulation of working-through. From the simulations, we saw
that the working-through when understood as a network
reconfiguration process, partially frees the analysand from the
original neurotic states and respective acts. The new network
topology which results from this reconfiguration process will
stabilize onto new energy minima, associated with new conscious
or unconscious acts. It is the purpose of the analysand and the
analyst that these new minima are reached and generate acts
which are more pleasant and comfortable to the analysand. The
analysand is rewriting his life history, i.e. his past, through a
process of new significations, and his present and future by
creating new possibilities [6]. This new story is now embedded,
i.e. written, in his biological neural network.
We are proceeding in further model refinement and analysis. It is
necessary to verify more deeply the dependence of model behavior
on parameters such as T, s and k. These parameters represent, at
least partially, the effects of neurosubstances such as neural growth
factors and neuromodulators. Although we do not yet have
experimental indications of their values, tuning their relative values
is fundamental for model stability and functioning. This can give
some insight to basic mechanisms in real neural networks and the
emergence of behavior. We are also interested in trying to map
language structure and processing into network topology and
dynamics, although we are not yet sure whether this is possible.
Although biologically plausible, in accordance with many aspects
described by psychoanalytic clinical experience, and experimentally
based on simulations, the model is very schematic. We do not
sustain or prove that this is the actual mechanism that occurs in the
human brain. It nevertheless seems to be a good metaphorical view
of facets of mental phenomena, for which we seek a neuronal
substratum, and suggests directions of search. Our investigations
strongly indicate the importance of the connection of symbolic
processing, meaning and language for consciousness.
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Roseli S. Wedemann received her undergraduate
degree in Physics in 1985, her Master of Science degree
in Physics in 1988, and her Ph.D. in Systems Engineer-
ing and Computer Science in 1995, at the Federal
University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ). She has been
visiting professor at the Institute of Physics at UFRJ in
1996 and is currently professor at the Computer
Science Department of the Institute of Mathematics
of the State University of Rio de Janeiro (UERJ). She has
been active in the research group in Computational
Neuroscience with Prof. Luı́s Alfredo Vidal de Carvalho
since 2000. She is referee of the Brazilian National
Research Council since 2001 and of the Rio de Janeiro
State Research Foundation since 2002. Her main research interests include
Computational Neuroscience, Neural Networks, Artificial Intelligence, Distributed
Algorithms, Computational Science, Physics of Complex Systems and High
Performance Computing.
Luı́s Alfredo Vidal de Carvalho received his under-
graduate degree in Mechanical Engineering in 1982, his
Master of Science degree in Optimization in 1984, and
his Ph.D. in Systems Engineering and Computer
Science in 1989, at the Federal University of Rio de
Janeiro (UFRJ). He has acted as Chairman of the
Graduate Program of Systems Engineering and Com-
puter Science at UFRJ in 1995–1996 and 2000–2001,
where he is full professor. He is currently Chairman of
the Interdisciplinary Graduate Program of History of
Science and Epistemology at UFRJ, since 2000. He has
received the Latin America Biological Psychiatry Award
in 1998, awarded by The World Biological Psychiatry
Society, The Latin America Biological Psychiatry Society and Lilly - Neuroscience
Pharmaceutical Laboratory, and also the IEEE - New Educational Technologies
Award in 2000. He has lead the main research group in Computational
Neuroscience in UFRJ since 1993. He is member of the New York Academy of
Sciences since 1995, and referee of the Brazilian National Research Council since
1992. His main research interests include Computational Neuroscience, Neural
Networks, Artificial Intelligence, Data Mining and History of Neuroscience and
Epistemology.
Raul J. Donangelo is born in Montevideo, Uruguay in
1947. He graduated as an industrial engineer at the
Universidad de La República, Montevideo, Uruguay, in
1971. He received a Ph.D. in Physics from the University
of California at Berkeley in 1977. He has worked at the
Instituto de Fı́sica da Universidade Federal do Rio de
Janeiro since 1978, and is presently working as a full
professor. His main areas of research are theoretical
nuclear physics and physics of complex systems.