Nial vs.

Bayadog 328 SCRA 122 Facts: Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Pepito resulting to her death on April 24, 1985 shot Teodulfa. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 24, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Bayadog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. After Pepitos death on February 19, 1997, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. Issue: What nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code (now Article 34 of the Family Code) to warrant the counting of the 5-year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license. Ruling: The 5-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity-meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity is unbroken. Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void, subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. In this case, at the time Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least 5 years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about 20 months had elapsed. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there is was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as husband and wife. Having determined that the second marriage involve in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.

Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano having been married on May 21, 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish in Caloocan. They had four children. On March 22, 1993, her husband contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. The marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were separated thus, respondent Judge ought to know that the marriage was void and bigamous. He claims that when he officiated the marriage of David and Payao, he knew that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years as manifested in their joint affidavit that they both left their families and had never cohabit or communicated with their spouses due to constant quarrels. ISSUE: Whether the solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who both have an existing marriage can contract marriage if they have been cohabitating for 5 years under Article 34 of Family Code. HELD: Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other. Considering that both parties has a subsisting marriage, as indicated in their marriage contract that they are both separated is an impediment that would make their subsequent marriage null and void. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least 5 years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage Republic of the Philippines vs Jose A. Dayot GR No. 175581 March 28, 2008 Fact of the Case: On November 24, 1986 Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay CityHall. In lieu of a marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit attesting that both ofthem are legally capacitated and that they cohabited for atleast five years when in factthey only barely known each other since February 1986.On 1993, Jose filed a complaintfor Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage contending that their marriagewas sham, as to no ceremony was celebrated between them; that he did not execute thesworn statement that he and Felisa had cohabited for atleast five years; and that hisconsent was secured through fraud. His sister, however, testified as witness that Josevoluntarily gave his consent during their marriage. The complaint was dismissed onRegional Trial Court stating that Jose is deemed estopped from assailing the legality ofhis marriage for lack of marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had livedtogether from 1986 to 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought thedeclaration of nullity; The RTC ruled that Joses action had prescribe. It cited Art 87 ofthe New Civil Code which requires that the action for annulment must be commenced bythe injured party within four years after the discovery of fraud. Jose appealed to the Courtof Appeals which rendered a decision declaring their marriage void ab initio for absenceof marriage license. Felisa sought a petition for review praying that the Court of AppealsAmended decision be reversed and set aside. Issue: (1) Whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the partieshave in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year

Manzano vs. Sanchez AM No. MTJ-001329, March 8, 2001

FACTS:

requirement., effectivelyrenders the marriage voib an initio for lack of marriage. (2) Whether or not the action for nullity prescribes as the case here where Jose filed a complaint after seven years from contracting marriage. Held: (1)Yes.The intendment of law or fact leans towards the validity of marriage, willnot salvage the parties marriage, and extricate them from the effect of a violation of thelaw. The Court protects the fabric of the institution of marriage and at the same time waryof deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in the law. The case cannotfall under irregularity of the marriage license, what happens here is an absence ofmarriage license which makes their marriage void for lack of one of the essentialrequirement of a valid marriage. (2) No. An action for nullity is imprescriptible. Jose and Felisas marriage wascelebrated san a marriage license. The right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe

Carrido, Terrobias & Gacer, Gamay & Belga, Sabater & Nacario were not celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them in the absence of a marriage license and that the marriage of Bocaya & Bismonte was celebrated even without the requisite license due to the insistence of the parties to avoid embarrassment with the guests which he again did not sign the marriage contract.

An illegal solemnization of marriage was charged against the respondents. ISSUE: Whether the marriage solemnized by Judge Palaypayon were valid. HELD: Bocaya & Besmontes marriage was solemnized without a marriage license along with the other couples. The testimonies of Bocay and Pompeo Ariola including the photographs taken showed that it was really Judge Palaypayon who solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared that they were advised by judge to return after 10 days after the solemnization and bring with them their marriage license. They already started living together as husband and wife even without the formal requisite. With respect to the photographs, judge explained that it was a simulated solemnization of marriage and not a real one. However, considering that there were pictures from the start of the wedding ceremony up to the signing of the marriage certificates in front of him. The court held that it is hard to believe that it was simulated On the other hand, Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized marriage between Abellano & Edralin and claimed it was under Article 34 of the Civil Code so the marriage license was dispensed with considering that the contracting parties executed a joint affidavit that they have been living together as husband and wife for almost 6 years already. However, it was shown in the marriage contract that Abellano was only 18 yrs 2months and 7 days old. If he and Edralin had been living together for 6 years already before they got married as what is stated in the joint affidavit, Abellano must have been less than 13 years old when they started living together which is hard to believe. Palaypayon should have been aware, as it is his duty to ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties who might have executed a false joint affidavit in order to avoid the marriage license requirement. Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently provides that in the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio whereas an irregularity in the formal requisite shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally, and administratively liable. De Castro vs Assidao GR 160172 Reinel and Annabelle met and became sweethearts in 1991. They applied for a marriage license in Pasig City in September 1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995

Cosca vs. Palaypayon 237 SCRA 249 FACTS: The following are the complainants: Juvy N. Cosca (Stenographer 1), Edmundo B. Peralta (Interpreter 1), Ramon C. Sambo (Clerk II) and Apollo Villamora (Process Server). Respondents are Judge Lucio Palaypayon Jr., the presiding judge, and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy, clerk of court II. All work in MTC-Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Complainants alleged that Palaypayon solemnized marriages even without the requisite of a marriage license. Hence, the following couples were able to get married just by paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy: Alano P. Abellano & Nelly Edralin; Francisco Selpo & Julieta Carrido; Eddie Terrobias & Maria Gacer; Renato Gamay & Maricris Belga; Arsenio Sabater & Margarita Nacario; Sammy Bocaya & Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, the marriage contracts of the following couples did not reflect any marriage license number. In addition, Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization reasoning out that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which happens usually several days after the marriage ceremony. Palaypayon contends that marriage between Abellano & Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code thus exempted from the marriage license requirement. According to him, he gave strict instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the couple copy of the marriage contract and to file the same with the civil registrar but the latter failed to do so. In order to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently formalized the marriage by securing a marriage license and executing their marriage contract, a copy of which was then filed with the civil registrar. The other five marriages were not illegally solemnized because Palaypayon did not sign their marriage contracts and the date and place of marriage are not included. It was alleged that copies of these marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant Sambo. The alleged marriage of Selpo &

stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife. On 13 Nov 1995, Annabelle gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since the childs birth, the mother has been the one supporting her out of her income as a government dentist and from her private practice. On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City . In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner and that the latter has reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially support her as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child. Reinel denied his marriage with Annabelle claiming that the marriage is void ab initio because the affidavit they jointly executed is a fake. And that he was only forced by Annabelle to marry her to avoid the humiliation that the pregnancy sans marriage may bring her. The trial court ruled that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give her support. The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is presumed to be subsisting until a judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate court declared that the child was born during the subsistence and validity of the parties marriage. In addition, the Court of Appeals frowned upon petitioners refusal to undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity and filiation, as well as his refusal to state with certainty the last time he had carnal knowledge with respondent, saying that petitioners forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to relieve him of his obligation and reward him of his being irresponsible. Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed by petitioner, wherein he voluntarily admitted that he is the legitimate father of the child. The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it was improper for the trial court to declare the marriage of petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very same case. There was no participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it that there is no collusion between the parties, as required by the Family Code in actions for declaration of nullity of a marriage. The burden of proof to show that the marriage is void rests upon petitioner, but it is a matter that can be raised in an action for declaration of nullity, and not in the instant proceedings. ISSUE: Whether or not their marriage is valid. HELD: The SC holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked. Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable. In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together for more than five years. However, respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination. The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the

marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicants name for a marriage license. In the instant case, there was no scandalous cohabitation to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio TENCHAVEZ VS. ESCAO FACTS: In February 1948, Tenchavez and Escao secretly married each other and of course without the knowledge of Escaos parents who were of prominent social status. The marriage was celebrated by a military chaplain. When Escaos parents learned of this, they insisted a church wedding to be held but Escao withdrew from having a recelebration because she heard that Tenchavez was having an affair with another woman. Eventually, their relationship went sour; 2 years later, Escao went to the US where she acquired a decree of absolute divorce and she subsequently became an American citizen and also married an American. In 1955, Tenchavez initiated a case for legal separation and further alleged that Escaos parents dissuaded their daughter to go abroad and causing her to be estranged from him hence hes asking for damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00. The lower court did not grant the legal separation being sought for and at the same time awarded a P45,000.00 worth of counter-claim by the Escaos. ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to either party in the case at bar. Whether or not the divorce and the second marriage of Escao were valid. Whether or not sexual infidelity of Escao may beinvoked by Tenchavez as a ground for legal separation. HELD: Yes. On the part of Tenchavez: His marriage with Escao was a secret one and the failure of said marriage did not result to public humiliation; that they never lived together and he even consented to annulling the marriage earlier (because Escao filed for annulment before she left for the US but the same was dismissed due to her non-appearance in court); that he failed to prove that Escaos parents dissuaded their daughter to leave Tenchavez and as such his P1,000,000.00 claim cannot be awarded. HOWEVER, by reason of the fact that Escao left without the knowledge of Tenchavez and being able to acquire a divorce decree; and Tenchavez being unable to remarry, the SC awarded P25,000.00 only by way of moral damages and attorneys fees to be paid by Escao and not her parents. On the part of Escaos parents:

It is true that the P1,000,000.00 for damages suit by Tenchavez against the Escaos is unfounded and the same must have wounded their feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has been correctly established in the decision of the court below, is that they were not guilty of any improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. The SC reduced the damages awarded from P45,000.00 to P5,000.00 only. The Supreme Court held that the divorce is notvalid, making the second marriage void since marriageties of Escao and Tenchaves is existing.Tenchavez can file a petition for legal separationbecause Escao committed sexual infidelity because ofthe fact that she had children with the American.Sexual infidelity of a spouse is one of thegrounds for legal separation. Republic vs. Orbecido 472 SCRA 114 Facts: On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros Villanueva were married in Lam-an, Ozamis City and were blessed with a son and a daughter. In 1986, Lady Myros left for the U. S. bringing along their son and after a few years she was naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, respondent Orbecido learned from his son who was living with his wife in the States that his wife had remarried after obtaining her divorce decree. Thereafter, he filed a petition for authority to remarry with the trial court invoking par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code. Having no opposition, on May 15, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur granted the petition of the respondent and allowed him to remarry. The Solicitor Generals motion for reconsideration was denied. In view of that, petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court. Herein petitioner raised the issue of the applicability of Art. 26 par. 2 to the instant case. Issue: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26(2). Ruling: Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code only applies to case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U. S. A. Therefore, the 2nd par. of Art. 26 does not apply to the instant case. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

However, since Cipriano was not able to prove as fact his wifes naturalization he is still barred from remarrying. Respondent Orbecido who has the burden of proof, failed to submit competent evidence showing his allegations that his naturalized American wife had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried. Wolfgang Roehr vs. Maria Carmen Rodriguez & Hon. Judge Guevarra-Salonga; GR 142820 Facts: Roehr, German Citizen, and Rodriguez, Filipino, were married in Germany. The same was subsequently ratified in Negros Occidental. They had 2 children. Rodriguez filed a petition for decree of nullity of marriage at the RTC-Makati. Roehr, however, obtained a decree of divorce from the CFI of Hamburg, Germany. Roehr thus fied a motion to dismiss the petition for declation of nullity of marriage on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the same as a divorce decree had already been promulgated. Judge Guevarra-Salonga recognized the divorce decree, however, ordered that its court shall determine still the issue regarding the custody of the 2 children and the settlement of property relations of the parties. Issue: WON the RTC/Phil. Courts has/have jurisdiction to pass upon matters that spring from a divorce decree obtained abroad. Held: Yes. As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still 23 be determined by our courts. Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so. In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with regard to the rights of petitioner to have parental custody of their two children. Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and education mindful of the best interests of the children. With regard to the property relations, given the factual admission by the parties in their pleadings that there is no property to be accounted for, respondent judge has no basis to assert jurisdiction in this case to resolve a matter no longer deemed in controversy. Grace Garcia vs. Rederick Recio; GR 138322 Facts: Rederick, when still a Filipino, married Editha, an Australian citizen. A decree of divorce was purportedly issued by an Australian family court. Later on, Rederick became an Australian citizen. He then married Petitioner Grace, a Filipino. Grace thereafter filed a petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy that Rederick had no legal capacity to marry at the time of their marriage having been still married to Editha. Rederick contended that he had legal capacity and he obtained a divorce

decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia. The RTC declared the first marriage (b/w Rederick and Editha) dissolved based on the divorce decree obtained by Rederick. Issue: WON the divorce decree obtained by Rederick ipso facto capacitated him to remarry. Held: The SC remanded the case to the trial court to receive evidence to show Redericks legal capacity to marry Petitioner Grace. The court said that it cannot conclude that respondent was legally capacitated to marry Petitioner because there is absolutely no evidence that can prove respondents capacity to marry. The Court cannot also grant Petitioners prayer to declare the her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. For after all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. It was thus enunciated in the case this basic legal principle: A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad because of Article 15 and 17 of the Civil Code. ART. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." "ART. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed. Gerbert R. Corpuz vs. Daisylyn Sto. Tomas & SolGen; GR 186571 Facts: Gerbert, a former Filipino Citizen, acquired Canadian Citizenship. He then married a Filipino, Daisilyn. Devastated by the fact that Daisylyn have had an affair, he obtained a divorce decree in Canada. He then wanted to contract a subsequent marriage, thus, registered the Canadian divorce decree on their marriage certificate. However, an officer of NSO informed him that his marriage to Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine Laws, and that to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court. Hence, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law. Issue: WON the benefits of Par. (2), rt. 26, Family Code, can be availed of by an alien. Held: Generally, No.

The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse There is a qualification to this, however i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res 32 judicata between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Rublic vs Molina

This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church 4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated: That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St.Augustine, Manila; That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July 29, 1986; That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years; That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child; That the respondent is not asking for damages; That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife. On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.

In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied 5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that the marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities." Then, it added its own opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that: As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a

broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.

(1)The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.

The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties. The Issue

(2)The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

Whether or not the opposing and conflicting relationship between the couple constitutes a Psychological Incapacity? Whether or not the Court of Appeals in affirming the trial courts judgment is within the standards required by Art. 36 or Psychological Incapacity? And thus CAs affirmation is correct? The Holding No, the Supreme Court granted the petition and the marriage is valid, In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.

Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, 7 Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides: The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.

The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband couldnor get along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Court's Reasoning The Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, 9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code Revision Committee. ,the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensorvinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GINA LAO-TSOI GR NO. 119190 January 16, 1997 FACTS: Ching married Gina on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Intramuros, Manila as evidenced by their marriage contract. After the celebration they had a reception and then proceeded to the house of the Ching Ming Tsois mother. There they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life. Ginas version: that contrary to her expectations that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love that night of their marriage, or having sexual

intercourse, with each other, Ching however just went to bed, slept on one side and then turned his back and went to sleep. There was no sexual intercourse between them that night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights. In an effort to have their honey moon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first week as husband and wife they went to Baguio City. But they did so together with Chings mother, uncle and nephew as they were all invited by her husband. There was no sexual intercourse between them for four days in Baguio since Ching avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 (day of their marriage) until March 15, 1989 (ten months). But during this period there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. Gina claims that she did not even see her husbands private parts nor did he see hers. Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag. Results were that Gina is healthy, normal and still a virgin while Chings examination was kept confidential up to this time. The Gina claims that her husband is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said she had observed him using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. She also said her husband only married her to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man Chings version: he claims that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with Gina. He does not want their marriage annulled for reasons of (1) that he loves her very much (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable (3) since the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and that according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be cured. Ching admitted that since his marriage to Gina there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands. ISSUE: Whether or not Ching is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals in rendering as VOID the marriage entered into by Ching and Gina on May 22, 1988. No costs. RATIO: The Supreme Court held that the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity. If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to procreate children basedon the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage. Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill this marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity. While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observer mutual love, respect and fidelity, the sanction therefore is actually the spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say I

could not have cared less. This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy that brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.

TE Vs TE, G.R. No.161793DIGEST FACTS: In January 1996, Edward Kenneth Ngo-Te and Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te met.March 1996, they eloped to cebu, but as soon as their survival money was depletedthey returned to Manila.April 23, 1996, Rowenas uncle brought both parties to a court to be married. Edwardwas 25 years old and Rowena 20.Sometime in June, Edward returned to his home to live with his parents, because hiswife did not want to live at his parents home and also suggested that they live apart.After almost four years, on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the RTC ofQuezon City for the annulment of his marriage and sited PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.Petition was denied by the lower courts, citing Republic vs. Molina, stating that theevidence fell short of the requirements for it to be considered as PsychologicalIncapacity. ISSUE: Whether PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY can be applied. HELD: YES.EDWARD was considered to have DEPENDENT PERSONALITY DISORDER.Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity,the precipitous marriage which they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared nulland void. WHEREFORE premises considered, the petition for review on Certiorari is GRANTED .TheAugust 5, 2003 Decision and the January 19, 2004 Resolution

People vs Mendoza Arturo Mendoza and Jovita de Asis were married on Aug. 5, 1936 in Marikina. While the marriage was still subsisting, Mendoza got married to Olga Lema in Manila on May 14, 1941. de Asis died on Feb. 2, 1943. Then, Mendoza contracted another marriage with Carmencita Panlilio in Calamba, Laguna on Aug. 19, 1949. He was sued and convicted of bigamy for the second marriage. ISSUE: WON Mendoza is liable for bigamy? HELD: No. Acquitted. RATIO: 1. Sec. 29, Marriage Law Act 3613: Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void unless first marriage has been annulled, dissolved or first spouse has been absent for 7 consecutive years without news if he/she is still alive. Judicial declaration of nullity is only necessary for third case. THUS, HIS MARRIAGE WITH LEMA IS NULL AND VOID WITHOUT NEED FOR JUDICIAL DECLARATION. 2. Third marriage was contracted after the death of the first spouse, thus not bigamous.

Facts: Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Cebu finding Proceso Aragon guilty of bigamy.The accused, under the name of Proceso Rosima , contracted marriage with a certain Maria Gorrea inCebu. While his marriage with Maria Gorrea was subsisting, the accused under the name of ProcesoAragon

, contracted a canonical marriage with Maria Faicol in Iloilo City.After the said marriage, the accused and Maria Faicol established residence in Iloilo. As the accused wasthen a traveling salesman, he commuted between Iloilo where he maintained Maria Faicol, and Cebuwhere he maintained his first wife.Maria Gorrea died in Cebu City. After her death, the accused brought Maria Faicol to Cebu City whereshe worked as a teacher-nurse.The accused and Maria Faicol did not live a happy marital life in Cebu, for it appears that Maria Faicolsuffered injuries to her eyes because of physical maltreatment in the hands of the accused. The accusedsent Maria Faicol to Iloilo, allegedly for the purpose of undergoing treatment of her eyesight. During herabsence, the accused contracted a third marriage with a certain Jesusa C. Maglasang in Sibonga, Cebu. Issue: Whether the accused committed bigamy when he married for the third time. Held: It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon complaint of the second wife, Maria Faicol, whosemarriage with the appellant Proceso Rosima was not renewed after the death of the first wife andbefore the third marriage was entered into. Hence, the last marriage (the marriage of Proceso Rosimawith Maria Gorrea) was a valid one and appellant's prosecution for contracting this marriage cannotprosper

word "solely." xxx. As it is placed, it is meant to qualify "final judgment." Had the provision been stated as follows: "The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage...," the word "solely" will qualify "for purposes of remarriage" and the husband would have been correct. That Art. 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. ATIENZA V. BRILLANTES JR. (Voidable Marriage) Lupo Atienza lived together with Yolanda de Castro with whom he has two children. He purchased a house in Bel-Air, Makati where his family stayed. He stays there too whenever hes in Manila. In Dec., 1991, he was surprised to see Manila Metropolitan Trial Court Judge Francisco Brillantes sleeping on his bed. Their boy informed him that Brillantes had been cohabiting with de Castro. Later on, Brillantes prevented him from visiting his children. He claims that Brillantes is married to Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children. Atienza filed a complaint for Gross Immorality & Appearance of Impropriety against Brillantes. Brillantes claims that his marriage to Ongkiko is not valid because of lack of marriage license. According to him, Ongkiko abandoned him 19 years ago leaving their children with him. He claims that he believed that he was single when he married de Castro because his first marriage was void. ISSUE: WON Brillantes can contract a second marriage without a judicial declaration of nullity? HELD: No. Dismissed from service. RATIO: 1. FC Art. 40: judicial declaration of nullity of previous marriage is needed before one can enter into a second marriage. Rule has retroactive effect thus applicable to Brillantes even if he got married under the Civil Code. 2. Bad faith and sinister motives of Brillantes proven by his marriage to Ongkiko. They underwent two ceremonies however he never got a license. Then, he immorally and illegally cohabited with de Castro. Not fit for the judiciary. Imelda Marbella-Bobis (petitioner), vs. Isagani D. Bobis (respondent) Facts: Respondent was married to the petitioner on January 25, 1996. Unknown to the petitioner, her other half has contracted his first marriage with a Maria Dulce B. Javier on October 21, 1985 and has not been nullified. The respondent once again entered into marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. A case of bigamy was filed against the respondent on the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, consequently he initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a license. Respondent has filed a motion to suspend the trial and has been granted. Petitioner filed for a motion for reconsideration but has been denied. ISSUE: Whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a question to a criminal case for bigamy RULING No, respondents subsequent declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a question to a criminal case for bigamy. During the time when he contracted his second marriage, he was considered already considered as a married man even if it was a marriage without a marriage license. Article 40 of the Family Code, which has already been promulgateSd on his second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage

Weigel vs sempio-dy Lilia Olivia Wiegel got married to Karl Heinz Wiegel on July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church in Makati. Karl, upon learning that Lilia had a subsisting marriage, filed for a declaration of nullity of their marriage. Lilia contracted her first marriage with Eduardo Maxion on June 25, 1972. She claims that the first marriage is not valid because they were forced to enter the union and Maxion was married to someone else at that time. ISSUE: WON Lilias first marriage is void? HELD: No. Its voidable. Petition dismissed. RATIO: 1. Presence of force only makes a marriage voidable, not void. (CC ART. 85) It is valid until annulled and since there was no annulment, marriage is still valid. 2. Even if marriage is void, judicial declaration of nullity is still needed especially for purposes of remarriage.

CASE DIGEST ON DOMINGO V. CA [226 SCRA 572 (1993)] - A spouse may petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage for a purpose other than her remarriage. F: Delia Domingo filed a pet. for decl. of nullity of her marriage w/ Roberto Domingo, on the ground that, unknown to her, he was previously married at the time of their marriage. She prays that their marriage be declared null and void and, as a consequence, to declare that she is the exclusive owner of all properties she acquired during the marriage and to recover them from him. Roberto moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the marriage being void ab initio, the petition for decl. of nullity is unnecessary citing Peo. v. Aragon and Peo. v. Mendoza. Roberto claims that decl of nullity is necessary under Art. 40, FC only for the purpose of remarriage. The lower court denied the motion. CA affirmed the denial. HELD: The Declaration of nullity of a marriage under Art. 40 may be resorted to even for a purpose other than remarriage. Crucial to the proper interpretation of Art. 40 is the position of the

before the respondent could have married for the second time. Whether or not the first marriage was void for lack of a license is a matter of defense because there is still no declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage was contracted. It is not for the parties, especially the accused to determine if his first marriage was null or void, but of a court. The respondents clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage in order to escape the bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is also void due to the absence of judicial declaration of nullity of the first. Thus, the decision in the civil action has been reversed and may proceed with the criminal case.

construe a penal statute in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, Supreme Court held that petitioner has not committed bigamy and that it need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.

VERONICO TENEBRO VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004 Facts: Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by a judge at Lapu-Lapu City. The two lived together continuously and without interruption until the later part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on Nov. 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to the petitioner. Villareyes confirmed in handwritten letter that indeed Tenebro was her husband. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. During trial, Tenebro admitted having married to Villareyes and produced two children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place. He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office in connection with his work as a seaman. The trial court found him guilty of bigamy. Issues: (1) Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of the crime of bigamy. (2) What is the effect of declaration of nullity of the second marriage of the petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity? Held: (1) Yes, petitioner is guilty of the crime of bigamy. Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of bigamy are: (1) that the offender has been legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The prosecution sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, proved the existence of the marriage between petitioner and Villareyes. (2) A second or subsequent marriage contracted during subsistence of petitioners valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioners marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioners psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the RPC criminalizes any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.

Morigo vs. People of the Philippines G. R. No. 145226 February 6, 2004 Facts: Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, for a period of four years. After school year, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other. In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant communication. In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married. Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind. On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for divorce against appellant which was granted by the court. Appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago at Tagbilaran City. Lucio filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. The complaint seeks among others, the declaration of nullity of Lucios marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. Appellant was charged with Bigamy in information filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City, with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. Lucio Morigo moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, Lucio pleaded not guilty to the charge. Issue: Whether or not Lucio Morigo committed bigamy even with his defense of good faith. Ruling: A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as "void." In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which Lucio might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage. The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally

Victoria S. Jarillo vs. People of the Philippines Bigamy; nullity of previous marriage. Petitioners conviction of the crime of bigamymust be affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of petitioners twomarriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous onehaving been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was alreadyconsummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage,petitioners marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and void by acourt of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioners marriage to Uy make any difference.As held in Tenebro, [s]ince a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a validmarriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se anargument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. x x x A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code], therefore, would indicate that the provisionpenalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. Carisso vs Carino In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Carino married Susan Nicdao Carino. He had 2 children withher. In 1992, SPO4 contracted a second marriage, this time with Susan Yee Carino.In 1988, prior to his second marriage, SPO4 is already bedridden and he was underthe care of Yee. In 1992, he died 13 days after his marriage with Yee. Thereafter,the spouses went on to claim the benefits of SPO4. Nicdao was able to claim a totalof P140,000.00 while Yee was able to collect a total of P21,000.00. In 1993, Yee filedan action for collection of sum of money against Nicdao. She wanted to have half of the P140k. Yee admitted that her marriage with SPO4 was solemnized during thesubsistence of the marriage b/n SPO4 and Nicdao but the said marriage betweenNicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to the absence of a valid marriage license ascertified by the local civil registrar. Yee also claimed that she only found out aboutthe previous marriage on SPO4s funeral.ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to claimpresumptive legitimes.HELD: The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the absence of avalid marriage license. The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and voidfor the same has been solemnized without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40 of the FC, the absolutenullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on thebasis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning,where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked forpurposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for saidprojected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring theprevious marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicialaction is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes,such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case forthat matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the deathof the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question thevalidity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to provethe existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute

nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaringsuch previous marriage void. The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a policemanfor their marriage is void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, moneyetc owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions.Wages and salaries earned by each party shall belong to him or her exclusively (Art.148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled to the full benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop even if their marriage is likewise void. This is because the two were capacitated to marryeach other for there were no impediments but their marriage was void due to thelack of a marriage license; in their situation, their property relations is governed byA r t 1 4 7 o f t h e FC which provides that everything they earned d u r i n g t h e i r cohabitation is presumed to have been equally contributed by each party thisincludes salaries and wages earned by each party notwithstanding the fact that theother may not have contributed at all. Republic vs. Nolasco 220 SCRA 20 FACTS: Gregorio Nolasco is a seaman. He met Janet Parker, a British, in bar in England. After that, Janet started living with Nolasco in his ship for six months. It lasted until the contract of Nolasco expired then he brought her to his hometown in Antique. They got married in January 1982. Due to another contract, Nolasco left the province. In 1983, Nolasco received a letter from his mother informing him that his son had been born but 15 days after, Janet left. Nolasco went home and cut short his contract to find Janets whereabouts. He did so by securing another seamans contract going to London. He wrote several letters to the bar where they first met but it was all returned. Gregorio petitioned in 1988 for a declaration of presumptive death of Janet. ISSUE: Whether or not Nolasco had a well-founded belief that his wife, Janet, is already dead? HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that Nolascos efforts to locate Janet were not persistent to show that he has a well-founded belief that his wife was already dead because instead of seeking assistance of local authorities and the British Embassy, he even secured another contract. More so, while he was in London, he did not even try to solicit help of the authorities to find his wife.

ANGELITA VALDEZ, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. DECISION NACHURA, J.: Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Camiling, Tarlac dated November 12, 2007 dismissing petitioner Angelita Valdezs petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband, Sofio Polborosa (Sofio).

The facts of the case are as follows: Petitioner married Sofio on January 11, 1971 in Pateros, Rizal. On December 13, 1971, petitioner gave birth to the spouses only child, Nancy. According to petitioner, she and Sofio argued constantly because the latter was unemployed and did not bring home any money. In March 1972, Sofio left their conjugal dwelling. Petitioner and their child waited for him to return but, finally, in May 1972, petitioner decided to go back to her parents home in Bancay 1st, Camiling, Tarlac. Three years passed without any word from Sofio. In October 1975, Sofio showed up at Bancay 1st. He and petitioner talked for several hours and they agreed to separate. They executed 1 a document to that effect. That was the last time petitioner saw him. After that, petitioner didnt hear any news of Sofio, his 2 whereabouts or even if he was alive or not. Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio 3 Reyes on June 20, 1985. Subsequently, however, Virgilios application for naturalization filed with the United States Department of Homeland Security was denied because petitioners 4 marriage to Sofio was subsisting. Hence, on March 29, 2007, petitioner filed a Petition before the RTC of Camiling, Tarlac seeking the declaration of presumptive death of Sofio. The RTC rendered its Decision on November 12, 2007, dismissing the Petition for lack of merit. The RTC held that Angelita "was not able to prove the well-grounded belief that her husband Sofio Polborosa was already dead." It said that under Article 41 of the Family Code, the present spouse is burdened to prove that her spouse has been absent and that she has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. This belief, the RTC said, must be the result of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse. The RTC found that, by petitioners own admission, she did not try to find her husband anymore in light of their mutual agreement to live separately. Likewise, petitioners daughter testified that her mother prevented her from looking for her father. The RTC also said there is a strong possibility that Sofio is still alive, considering that he would have been only 61 years old by then, and people who have reached their 60s have not become increasingly low in health and spirits, and, even assuming as true petitioners testimony that Sofio was a chain smoker and a drunkard, there is no evidence that he continues to drink and smoke until now. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. She argued that it is the Civil Code that applies in this case and not the Family Code since petitioners marriage to Sofio was celebrated on January 11, 1971, long before the Family Code took effect. Petitioner further argued that she had acquired a vested right under the provisions of the Civil Code and the stricter provisions of the Family Code should not be applied against her because Title XIV of the Civil Code, where Articles 384 and 390 on declaration of absence and presumption of death, respectively, can be found, was not expressly repealed by the Family Code. To apply the stricter provisions of the Family Code will impair the rights petitioner had acquired under the Civil Code. The RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution 7 dated December 10, 2007. Petitioner now comes before this Court seeking the reversal of the RTC Decision and Motion for Reconsideration.
6 5

In its Manifestation and Motion, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) recommended that the Court set aside the assailed RTC Decision and grant the Petition to declare Sofio presumptively dead. The OSG argues that the requirement of "well-founded belief" under Article 41 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case. It said that petitioner could not be expected to comply with this requirement because it was not yet in existence during her marriage to Virgilio Reyes in 1985. The OSG further argues that before the effectivity of the Family Code, petitioner already acquired a vested right as to the validity of her marriage to Virgilio Reyes based on the presumed death of Sofio under the Civil Code. This vested right and the presumption of Sofios death, the OSG posits, could not be 9 affected by the obligations created under the Family Code. Next, the OSG contends that Article 390 of the Civil Code was not 10 repealed by Article 41 of the Family Code. Title XIV of the Civil Code, the OSG said, was not one of those expressly repealed by the Family Code. Moreover, Article 256 of the Family Code provides that its provisions shall not be retroactively applied if they will prejudice 11 or impair vested or acquired rights. The RTC Decision, insofar as it dismissed the Petition, is affirmed. However, we must state that we are denying the Petition on grounds different from those cited in the RTC Decision. Initially, we discuss a procedural issue. Under the Rules of Court, a party may directly appeal to this Court from a decision of the trial court only on pure questions of law. A question of law lies, on one hand, when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts; on the other hand, a question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. Here, the facts are not disputed; the controversy merely relates to the correct application of the law or jurisprudence 12 to the undisputed facts. The RTC erred in applying the provisions of the Family Code and holding that petitioner needed to prove a "well-founded belief" that Sofio was already dead. The RTC applied Article 41 of the Family Code, to wit: Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a wellfounded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient. For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. It is readily apparent, however, that the marriages of petitioner to Sofio and Virgilio on January 11, 1971 and June 20, 1985, respectively, were both celebrated under the auspices of the Civil Code. The pertinent provision of the Civil Code is Article 83:

Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless: (1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or (2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, of if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court. Article 390 of the Civil Code states: Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession. The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened. The Court, on several occasions, had interpreted the above-quoted provision in this wise: For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes 13 at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Further, the Court explained that presumption of death cannot be the subject of court proceedings independent of the settlement of the absentees estate. In re Szatraw is instructive. In that case, petitioner contracted marriage with a Polish national in 1937. They lived together as husband and wife for three years. Sometime in 1940, the husband, on the pretext of visiting some friends, left the conjugal abode with their child and never returned. After inquiring from friends, petitioner found that her husband went to Shanghai, China. However, friends who came from Shanghai told her that the husband was not seen there. In 1948, petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband arguing that since the latter had been absent for more than seven years and she had not heard any news from him and about her child, she believes that he is dead. In deciding the case, the Court said:
14

The petition is not for the settlement of the estate of Nicolai Szatraw, because it does not appear that he possessed property brought to the marriage and because he had acquired no property during his married life with the petitioner. The rule invoked by the latter is merely one of evidence which permits the court to presume that a person is dead after the fact that such person had been unheard from in seven years had been established. This presumption may arise and be invoked and made in a case, either in an action or in a special proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and submitted for decision to, a competent court. Independently of such an action or special proceeding, the presumption of death cannot be invoked, nor can it be made the subject of an action or special proceeding. In this case, there is no right to be enforced nor is there a remedy prayed for by the petitioner against her absent husband. Neither is there a prayer for the final determination of his right or status or for the ascertainment of a particular fact (Hagans v. Wislizenus, 42 Phil. 880), for the petition does not pray for a declaration that the petitioner's husband is dead, but merely asks for a declaration that he be presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven years. If there is any pretense at securing a declaration that the petitioner's husband is dead, such a pretension cannot be granted because it is unauthorized. The petition is for a declaration that the petitioner's husband is presumptively dead. But this declaration, even if judicially made, would not improve the petitioner's situation, because such a presumption is already established by law. A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would still be a prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass. The latter must decide finally the controversy between the parties, or determine finally the right or status of a party or establish finally a particular fact, out of which certain rights and obligations arise or may arise; and once such controversy is decided by a final judgment, or such right or status determined, or such particular fact established, by a final decree, then the judgment on the subject of the controversy, or the decree upon the right or status of a party or upon the existence of a particular fact, becomes res judicata, subject to no collateral attack, except in a few rare instances especially provided by law. It is, therefore, clear that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final. Proof of actual death of the person presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven years, would have to be made in another proceeding to have such particular fact finally determined.1avvphi1 If a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead, because he had not been heard from in seven years, cannot become final and executory even after the lapse of the reglementary period within which an appeal may be taken, for such presumption is still disputable and remains subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is useless, unnecessary, 15 superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner. In Lukban v. Republic, petitioner Lourdes G. Lukban contracted marriage with Francisco Chuidian on December 10, 1933. A few days later, on December 27, Francisco left Lourdes after a violent quarrel. She did not hear from him after that day. Her diligent search, inquiries from his parents and friends, and search in his last known address, proved futile. Believing her husband was already dead since he had been absent for more than twenty years, petitioner filed a petition in 1956 for a declaration that she is a widow of her husband who is presumed to be dead and has no legal impediment to contract a subsequent marriage. On the other hand, the 17 antecedents in Gue v. Republic are similar to Szatraw. On January
16

5, 1946, Angelina Gues husband left Manila where they were residing and went to Shanghai, China. From that day on, he had not been heard of, had not written to her, nor in anyway communicated with her as to his whereabouts. Despite her efforts and diligence, she failed to locate him. After 11 years, she asked the court for a declaration of the presumption of death of Willian Gue, pursuant to the provisions of Article 390 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. In both cases, the Court reiterated its ruling in Szatraw. It held that a petition for judicial declaration that petitioner's husband is presumed to be dead cannot be entertained because it is not 18 authorized by law. From the foregoing, it can be gleaned that, under the Civil Code, the 19 presumption of death is established by law and no court declaration is needed for the presumption to arise. Since death is presumed to have taken place by the seventh year of 20 absence, Sofio is to be presumed dead starting October 1982. Consequently, at the time of petitioners marriage to Virgilio, there existed no impediment to petitioners capacity to marry, and the marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code. Further, considering that it is the Civil Code that applies, proof of "well-founded belief" is not required. Petitioner could not have been expected to comply with this requirement since the Family Code was not yet in effect at the time of her marriage to Virgilio. The enactment of the Family Code in 1988 does not change this conclusion. The Family Code itself states: Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. To retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code requiring petitioner to exhibit "well-founded belief" will, ultimately, result in the invalidation of her second marriage, which was valid at the time it was celebrated. Such a situation would be untenable and would go against the objectives that the Family Code wishes to achieve. In sum, we hold that the Petition must be dismissed since no decree on the presumption of Sofios death can be granted under the Civil Code, the same presumption having arisen by operation of law. However, we declare that petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio at the time their marriage was celebrated in 1985 and, therefore, the said marriage is legal and valid. WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. G.R. No. 167523 June 27, 2008

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the 1 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 76624 2 promulgated on February 16, 2005 which affirmed the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 59 of Toledo City, in Civil Case No. T-799 dated January 2, 2002, declaring the nullity of the marriage of Reynaldo and Nilda Navales on the ground of psychological incapacity. The facts are as follows: Reynaldo Navales (Reynaldo) and Nilda Navales (Nilda) met in 1986 in a local bar where Nilda worked as a waitress. The two became lovers and Nilda quit her job, managed a boarding house owned by her uncle and studied Health Aide financed by Reynaldo. Upon learning that Nilda's uncle was prodding her to marry an American, Reynaldo, not wanting to lose her, asked her to marry him. This, despite his knowledge that Nilda was writing her penpals and was asking money from them and that she had an illegitimate son by a 3 man whose identity she did not reveal to him. The two got married on December 29, 1988, before the Municipal Trial Court Judge of 4 San Fernando, Cebu. Reynaldo claims that during the first year of their marriage, their relationship went well. Problems arose, however, when Nilda started selling RTWs and cosmetics, since she could no longer take 5 care of him and attend to household chores. Things worsened when she started working as an aerobics instructor at the YMCA, where, according to Reynaldo, Nilda's flirtatiousness and promiscuity recurred. She wore tight-fitting outfits, allowed male clients to touch her body, and introduced herself as single. Reynaldo received phone calls from different men looking for Nilda. There was also a time when Nilda chose to ride with another man instead of Reynaldo; and another when Nilda went home late, riding in the car of the man who kissed her. Reynaldo also claims that Nilda refused to have a 6 child with him, as it would destroy her figure. On June 18, 1992, 7 Reynaldo left Nilda and never reconciled with her again. On August 30, 1999, Reynaldo filed a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage and Damages before the RTC, Toledo City, Cebu, docketed as Civil Case No. T-799 claiming that his marriage with Nilda did not cure Nilda's flirtatiousness and sexual promiscuity, and that her behavior indicates her lack of understanding and appreciation of the meaning of marriage, 8 rendering the same void under Article 36 of the Family Code. Reynaldo testified in support of his petition and presented telephone directories showing that Nilda used her maiden name 9 "Bacon" instead of "Navales." Reynaldo also presented Josefino Ramos, who testified that he was with Reynaldo when Reynaldo first met Nilda at the bar called "Appetizer," and that he (Ramos) himself was attracted to Nilda since she was sexy, beautiful, and jolly to talk 10 with. Reynaldo also presented Violeta Abales, his cousin, who testified that she was a vendor at the YMCA where Nilda worked and was known by her maiden name; that she knows Nilda is sexy and wears tight fitting clothes; that her companions are mostly males and she flirts with them; and that there was one time that Reynaldo fetched Nilda at YMCA but Nilda went with another man, 11 which angered Reynaldo. Finally, Reynaldo presented Leticia Vatanagul, a Clinical Psychologist and Social Worker who drafted a Psychological Assessment of 12 Marriage dated March 28, 2001. In said Assessment, Vatanagul concluded that Nilda is a nymphomaniac, who has a borderline

NILDA V. NAVALES, petitioner, vs. * REYNALDO NAVALES, respondent. DECISION AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

personality, a social deviant, an alcoholic, and suffering from antisocial personality disorder, among others, which illnesses are incurable and are the causes of Nildas psychological incapacity to 13 perform her marital role as wife to Reynaldo. Nilda, for her part, claims that Reynaldo knew that she had a child before she met him, yet Reynaldo continued courting her; thus, their 14 eventual marriage. She claims that it was actually Reynaldo who was linked with several women, who went home very late, kept his earnings for himself, and subjected her to physical harm whenever she called his attention to his vices. She worked at the YMCA to cope with the needs of life, and she taught only female students. Reynaldo abandoned her for other women, the latest of whom was Liberty Lim whom she charged, together with Reynaldo, with 15 concubinage. Nilda presented a certification from the YMCA dated October 17, 2001 stating that she was an aerobics instructress for a 16 program that was exclusively for ladies, as well as a statement of accounts from PLDT showing that she used her married name, Nilda 17 B. Navales. On January 2, 2002, the RTC rendered its Decision disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in the above-entitled case declaring defendant Nilda B. Navales as psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her marital obligations with plaintiff Reynaldo V. Navales and further declaring their marriage contracted on December 29, 1988, before the Municipal Judge of 18 the Municipal Trial Court of San Fernando, Cebu, as null and void. The RTC held that: x x x From the testimonies and evidences x x x adduced, it was clearly established that the defendant had no full understanding of [the] effects of marriage and had no appreciation of [the] consequences of marriage as shown by her x x x act of concealing her marital status by using her maiden name "Nilda T. Bacon", augmenting her pretense of being still single through the telephone directories; by her refusal to accompany with [sic] her husband despite of the latter's insistence, but rather opted to ride other man's jeep, whose name her husband did not even know; by her act of allowing a man other than her husband to touch her legs even in her husband's presence; by allowing another man to kiss her even in the full view of her husband; by preferring to loss [sic] her husband rather than losing her job as aerobic instructress and on top of all, by refusing to bear a child fathered by her husband because it will destroy her figure, is a clear indication of the herein defendant's 19 psychological incapacity. Nilda filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the RTC denied on 20 April 10, 2002. The CA dismissed Nildas appeal, ruling that the RTC correctly held that Nilda concealed her marital status, as shown by the telephone listings in which Nilda used her maiden name; that nymphomania, the condition which the expert said Nilda was afflicted with, was a ground for psychological incapacity; and that the RTC correctly gave weight to the four pieces of testimonial evidence presented by 21 Reynaldo vis-a-vis the lone testimony of Nilda. Nilda now comes before the Court alleging that: I

The petitioner is not psychologically incapacitated to comply [with] her marital obligations as a wife. II Psychological incapacity, if ever existing, of the wife is NOT PERMAMENT or INCURABLE and was NEVER EXISTING AT THE TIME OF THE CELEBRATION OF MARRIAGE. III The petitioner is not a nymphomaniac. IV The effort of herein petitioner into the case shows that she is consciously and nobly preserving and continue to believe that marriage is inviolable rather [sic]. V The guidelines of Molina case in the application of Article 36 of the 22 New Family Code has not been strictly complied with. Nilda claims that she did not fail in her duty to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity; that she never had any illicit relationship with any man; that no case for inchastity was initiated by Reynaldo against her, and that it was actually Reynaldo who had a pending 23 case for concubinage. She questions the lower courts finding that she is a nymphomaniac, since she was never interviewed by the expert witness to verify the truth of Reynaldo's allegations. There is also not a single evidence to show that she had sexual intercourse with a man other than her husband while they were still living 24 together. Nilda also avers that the guidelines in Republic of the Phillippines. v. 25 Molina were not complied with. The RTC resolved the doubt on her motive for using her maiden name in the telephone directory in favor of the dissolution of the marriage instead of its preservation. The expert opinion was given weight, even though it was baseless to establish that petitioner had psychological incapacity to comply with her marital obligations as a wife; and that, assuming that such incapacity existed, it was already existing at the time of the marriage; and that such incapacity was incurable and grave enough to bring about the disability of the wife to assume the essential 26 obligations of marriage. Reynaldo, for his part, argues that while the petition is captioned as one under Rule 45, it is actually a petition forcertiorari under Rule 65, since it impleads the CA as respondent and alleges that the CA acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of 27 discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction. Reynaldo also claims that the issues raised by Nilda necessarily require a review of the factual findings of the lower courts, which matters have already been decided and passed upon, and factual findings of the courts a quo are binding on this Court; that only questions of law may be raised before this Court; that the RTC, in reaching its decision, complied with the requirements of Molina; that the Solicitor General was represented by the City Prosecutor of Toledo City; and that Reynaldo discharged the burden of proof to show the nullity of his marriage to Nilda.

Reynaldo further averred that he testified on his behalf; presented corroborating witnesses, one of whom is an expert clinical psychologist, as well as documentary evidence in support of his cause of action; that Molina did not require that the psychologist examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated; that Nilda did not rebut the psychologist's findings and did not present her own expert to disprove the findings of Vatanagul; that Nilda's psychological incapacity, caused by nymphomania, was duly proven to have been existing prior to and at the time of her marriage to Reynaldo and to have become manifest during her marriage, based on the testimonies of Reynaldo and his witnesses; and that such incapacity was proven to be incurable, as shown by 28 the report of Vatanagul. Nilda filed a Reply, and both parties filed their respective 29 memoranda reiterating their arguments. Simply stated, the issue posed before the Court is whether the marriage between Reynaldo and Nilda is null and void on the ground of Nilda's psychological incapacity. The answer, contrary to the findings of the RTC and the CA, is in the negative. Preliminarily, let it be stressed that it is the policy of our Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social 30 institution, and marriage as the foundation of the family. The Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protects it 31 from dissolution at the whim of the parties. The Family Code under 32 Article 48 therefore requires courts to order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned, in cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, to appear on behalf of the State in order to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Indeed, only the active participation of the Public Prosecutor or the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) will ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declarations of nullity of marriage by preventing collusion between 33 the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence. While the guidelines in Molina requiring the OSG to issue a certification on whether or not it is agreeing or objecting to the petition for annulment has been dispensed with by A.M. No. 02-1110-SC or the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void 34 Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, still, Article 48 mandates the appearance and active participation of the State 35 through the fiscal or the prosecuting attorney. In this case, contrary to the assertion of the RTC that the OSG actively participated in the case through the Office of the City Prosecutor, records show that the State's participation consists only of the Report dated November 29, 1999 by Assistant City Prosecutor Gabriel L. Trocio, Jr. stating that no collusion exists between the 36 parties; the OSG's Opposition to the petition for declaration of 37 nullity of marriage dated June 2, 2000; and the cross-examination 38 conducted by Prosecutor Trocio on Reynaldo and his witness 39 Abales. There were no other pleadings, motions, or position papers filed by the Public Prosecutor or OSG; and no controverting evidence presented by them before the judgment was rendered. Considering the interest sought to be protected by the aforestated rules, the Court finds the State's participation in this case to be 40 wanting.

But even on the merits, the Court finds that the totality of evidence presented by Reynaldo, contrary to its appreciation by the RTC and the CA, is insufficient to sustain a finding that Nilda is psychologically incapacitated. Generally, factual findings of trial courts, when affirmed by the CA, are binding on this Court. Such principle however is not absolute, such as when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case; run contrary to the admissions of the parties; fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; or when there is a misappreciation of 41 facts. Such is the case at bar. Psychological incapacity, in order to be a ground for the nullity of 42 marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady that is so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated traits associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intention of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability 43 to give meaning and significance to the marriage. In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical 45 antecedence, and (c) incurability. In Republic of the Philippines v. 46 Molina, the Court further set forth guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, thus: 1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. x x x 2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological --- not physical, although its manifestation and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known that obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principleejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. 3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's". The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. 4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
44

absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. x x x. 5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. 6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. 7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x 47 x x. In this case, Reynaldo and his witnesses sought to establish that Nilda was a flirt before the marriage, which flirtatiousness recurred when she started working as an aerobics instructress. The instances alleged by Reynaldo,i.e., the occasion when Nilda chose to ride home with another man instead of him, that he saw Nilda being kissed by another man while in a car, and that Nilda allowed other men to touch her body, if true, would understandably hurt and embarrass him. Still, these acts by themselves are insufficient to establish a psychological or mental defect that is serious, incurable or grave as contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code. Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take 48 cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations. Mere "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of marital obligations or "ill will" on the part of the spouse is different from "incapacity" rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or 49 illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological illness that is contemplated by said 50 rule. As admitted by Reynaldo, his marriage with Nilda was not all that bad; in fact, it went well in the first year of their marriage. As in other cases, an admission of a good and harmonious relationship during the early part of the marriage weakens the assertion of psychological defect existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage which deprived the party of the ability to assume the 51 essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities. In determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, the same must be read in conjunction with, although to be taken 52 53 54 55 as distinct from, Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 of the Family Code

that would likewise, but for different reasons, render the marriage void ab initio; or Article 45 that would make the marriage merely voidable; or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal 56 separation. These various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the 57 matter. Indeed, Article 36 should not be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual 58 alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. Reynaldo presented telephone directories in which Nilda used her maiden name "Bacon" to prove that Nilda represented herself as single. As noted by the CA, however, the telephone listings 59 presented by Reynaldo were for the years 1993 to 1995, after Reynaldo admittedly left Nilda on June 18, 1992. Apart from Reynaldo and Abalales's testimony, therefore, Reynaldo has no proof that Nilda represented herself as single while they were still living together. The Court cannot agree with the RTC, therefore, that said telephone listings show that Nilda represented herself to be single, which in turn manifests her lack of understanding of the consequences of marriage. Reynaldo also presented Clinical Psychologist Vatanagul to bolster his claim that Nilda is psychologically incapacitated. While it is true that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its 60 understanding of the human personality, and that there is no requirement that the defendant spouse be personally examined by a physician or psychologist before the nullity of marriage based on 61 psychological incapacity may be declared, still, the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological 62 illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained, and said incapacity 63 established by the totality of the evidence presented during trial. The Court finds that the psychological report presented in this case is insufficient to establish Nilda's psychological incapacity. In her report, Vatanagul concluded that Nilda is a nymphomaniac, an emotionally immature individual, has a borderline personality, has strong sexual urges which are incurable, has complete denial of her actual role as a wife, has a very weak conscience or superego, emotionally immature, a social deviant, not a good wife as seen in her infidelity on several occasions, an alcoholic, suffers from antisocial personality disorder, fails to conform to social norms, deceitful, impulsive, irritable and aggresive, irresponsible and 64 vain. She further defined "nymphomia" as a psychiatric disorder that involves a disturbance in motor behavior as shown by her 65 sexual relationship with various men other than her husband. The report failed to specify, however, the names of the men Nilda had sexual relationship with or the circumstances surrounding the same. As pointed out by Nilda, there is not even a single proof that she was ever involved in an illicit relationship with a man other than her husband. Vatanagul claims, during her testimony, that in coming out with the report, she interviewed not only Reynaldo but also Jojo Caballes, Dorothy and Lesley who were Reynaldo's sister-in-law and sister, respectively, a certain Marvin and a certain 66 Susan. Vatanagul however, did not specify the identities of these persons, which information were supplied by whom, and how they came upon their respective informations. Indeed, the conclusions drawn by the report are vague, sweeping and lack sufficient factual bases. As the report lacked specificity, it failed to show the root cause of Nilda's psychological incapacity; and failed to demonstrate that there was a "natal or supervening disabling factor" or an "adverse integral element" in Nilda's character that effectively

incapacitated her from accepting, and thereby complying with, the essential marital obligations, and that her psychological or mental 67 malady existed even before the marriage. Hence, the Court cannot give weight to said assessment. The standards used by the Court in assessing the sufficiency of psychological reports may be deemed very strict, but that is only proper in view of the principle that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of the 68 marital vinculum. Reynaldo also claims that Nilda does not want to get pregnant which allegation was upheld by the trial court. A review of the records shows, however, that apart from the testimony of Reynaldo, no other proof was presented to support such claim. Mere allegation and nothing more is insufficient to support such proposition. As petitioner before the trial court, it devolves upon Reynaldo to discharge the burden of establishing the grounds that would justify 69 the nullification of the marriage. While Reynaldo and Nilda's marriage failed and appears to be without hope of reconciliation, the remedy, however, is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. A marriage, no matter how unsatisfactory, is not a null 70 and void marriage. And this Court, even as the highest one, can only apply the letter and spirit of the law, no matter how harsh it 71 may be. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76624 promulgated on February 16, 2005 and the Decision dated January 2, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59 of Toledo City, in Civil Case No. T-799 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. T-799, is DISMISSED. Costs against respondent.

copies be sent to Lea by registered mail. Alan complied with all the 2 foregoing jurisdictional requirements. On May 28, 2001, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office 3 of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition, which was, however, denied by the court for failure to 4 comply with Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. At the hearing, Alan adduced evidence that he and Lea were married 5 on January 20, 1995 in Catbalogan, Samar. He testified that, on February 6, 1995, Lea arrived home late in the evening and he berated her for being always out of their house. He told her that if she enjoyed the life of a single person, it would be better for her to 6 go back to her parents. Lea did not reply. Alan narrated that, when he reported for work the following day, Lea was still in the house, but when he arrived home later in the day, Lea was nowhere to be 7 found. Alan thought that Lea merely went to her parents house in 8 Bliss, Sto. Nio, Catbalogan, Samar. However, Lea did not return to their house anymore. Alan further testified that, on February 14, 1995, after his work, he went to the house of Leas parents to see if she was there, but he was told that she was not there. He also went to the house of Leas friend, Janeth Bautista, atBarangay Canlapwas, but he was informed by Janettes brother-in-law, Nelson Abaenza, that Janeth had left for 9 Manila. When Alan went back to the house of his parents-in-law, he learned from his father-in-law that Lea had been to their house but 10 that she left without notice. Alan sought the help of Barangay Captain Juan Magat, who promised to help him locate his wife. He also inquired from his friends of Leas whereabouts but 11 to no avail. Sometime in June 1995, he decided to go to Manila to look for Lea, but his mother asked him to leave after the town fiesta of Catbalogan, hoping that Lea may come home for the fiesta. Alan 12 agreed. However, Lea did not show up. Alan then left for Manila on August 27, 1995. He went to a house in Navotas where Janeth, Leas friend, was staying. When asked where Lea was, Janeth told him 13 that she had not seen her. He failed to find out Leas whereabouts despite his repeated talks with Janeth. Alan decided to work as a part-time taxi driver. On his free time, he would look for Lea in the malls but still to no avail. He returned to Catbalogan in 1997 and 14 again looked for his wife but failed. On June 20, 2001, Alan reported Leas disappearance to the local 15 police station. The police authorities issued an Alarm Notice on 16 July 4, 2001. Alan also reported Leas disappearance to the 17 National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on July 9, 2001. Barangay Captain Juan Magat corroborated the testimony of Alan. He declared that on February 14, 1995, at 2:00 p.m., Alan inquired from him if Lea passed by his house and he told Alan that she did not. Alan also told him that Lea had disappeared. He had not seen 18 Lea in the barangay ever since. Leas father, who was his compadreand the owner of Radio DYMS, told him that he did not 19 know where Lea was. After Alan rested his case, neither the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor nor the Solicitor General adduced evidence in opposition to the petition. On January 8, 2002, the court rendered judgment granting the petition. The fallo of the decision reads:

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (TENTH DIVISION), and ALAN B. ALEGRO, Respondents. DECISION CALLEJO, SR., J.: On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 27, for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Rosalia (Lea) A. Julaton. In an Order dated April 16, 2001, the court set the petition for hearing on May 30, 2001 at 8:30 a.m. and directed that a copy of the said order be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in the Samar Reporter, a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Samar, and that a copy be posted in the courts bulletin board for at least three weeks before the next scheduled hearing. The court also directed that copies of the order be served on the Solicitor General, the Provincial Prosecutor of Samar, and Alan, through counsel, and that
1

WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, petitioners absent spouse ROSALIA JULATON is hereby declared PRESUMPTIVELY DEAD for the purpose of the petitioners subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the said absent spouse. SO ORDERED.
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proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of 25 reappearance of the absent spouse. The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon writes that "es menester que su 26 creencia sea firme se funde en motivos racionales." Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act. It may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of life which usually control the conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends to explain or characterize their disappearance or throw light 27 on their intentions, competence evidence on the ultimate question of his death. The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by 28 present spouse. Although testimonial evidence may suffice to prove the wellfounded belief of the present spouse that the absent spouse is 29 already dead, in Republic v. Nolasco, the Court warned against collusion between the parties when they find it impossible to dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal means. It is also the maxim that "men readily believe what they wish to be true." In this case, the respondent failed to present a witness other than Barangay Captain Juan Magat. The respondent even failed to present Janeth Bautista or Nelson Abaenza or any other person from whom he allegedly made inquiries about Lea to corroborate his testimony. On the other hand, the respondent admitted that when he returned to the house of his parents-in-law on February 14, 1995, his father-in-law told him that Lea had just been there but that she left without notice. The respondent declared that Lea left their abode on February 7, 1995 after he chided her for coming home late and for being always out of their house, and told her that it would be better for her to go home to her parents if she enjoyed the life of a single person. Lea, thus, left their conjugal abode and never returned. Neither did she communicate with the respondent after leaving the conjugal abode because of her resentment to the chastisement she received from him barely a month after their marriage. What is so worrisome is that, the respondent failed to make inquiries from his parents-in-law regarding Leas whereabouts before filing his petition in the RTC. It could have enhanced the credibility of the respondent had he made inquiries from his parents-in-law about Leas whereabouts considering that Leas father was the owner of Radio DYMS.

The OSG appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) which rendered judgment on August 4, 2003, affirming the decision of the 21 22 RTC. The CA cited the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Nolasco. The OSG filed a petition for review on certiorari of the CAs decision alleging that respondent Alan B. Alegro failed to prove that he had a 23 well-founded belief that Lea was already dead. It averred that the respondent failed to exercise reasonable and diligent efforts to locate his wife. The respondent even admitted that Leas father told him on February 14, 1995 that Lea had been to their house but left without notice. The OSG pointed out that the respondent reported his wifes disappearance to the local police and also to the NBI only after the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the petition. The petitioner avers that, as gleaned from the evidence, the respondent did not really want to find and locate Lea. Finally, the petitioner averred: In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the Family Code for the declaration of presumptive death of ones spouse, the degree of due diligence set by this Honorable Court in the above-mentioned cases in locating the whereabouts of a missing spouse must be strictly complied with. There have been times when Article 41 of the Family Code had been resorted to by parties wishing to remarry knowing fully well that their alleged missing spouses are alive and well. It is even possible that those who cannot have their marriages x x x declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code resort to Article 41 of the Family Code for relief because of the x x x summary nature of its proceedings. It is the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic social institution. Marriage is the foundation of the family. Since marriage is an inviolable social institution that the 1987 Constitution seeks to protect from dissolution at the whim of the parties. For respondents failure to prove that he had a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead and that he exerted the required amount of diligence in searching for his missing wife, the petition for declaration of presumptive death should have been denied by the trial court and 24 the Honorable Court of Appeals. The petition is meritorious. Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines reads: Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a wellfounded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient. For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary

The respondent did report and seek the help of the local police authorities and the NBI to locate Lea, but it was only an afterthought. He did so only after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition in the RTC. In sum, the Court finds and so holds that the respondent failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief, before he filed his petition in the RTC, that his spouse Rosalia (Lea) Julaton was already dead. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73749 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 27, is ORDERED to DISMISS the respondents petition.