People v.

Almuete

Facts of the case: Wenceslao Almuete, Fernando Fronda, Cipriano Fronda, and Fausto Durion were tenants of Margarita Fernando in her riceland and were charged with a violation of section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law. It was alleged in the information that in December 1963, in Muoz, Nueva Ecija. The accused, without notice or without her consent of the owner of the riceland, pre-threshed a portion of their respective harvests. The accused pleaded not guilty. They filed motion for a bill of particulars as to the exact date of the commission of the offense charged. The lower court denied their motion because they had already entered their plea. Nevertheless, they filed a motion to quash the information on that grounds that 1)it does not allege facts sufficient to constitute the crime charged; 2) that there is no law punishing it; and 3) that the court has no jurisdiction over the alleged time The fiscal opposed the motion. The court granted the motion and dismissed the information. The prosecution appealed from the order of dismissal.

Issue: Whether or not a tenant who prereaped or prethreshed palay without the consent of the landlord in violation of the Agricultural Tenancy Act may be held criminally liable therefor?

Held: No. Petition of dismissed. Judgment of lower court affirmed.

Ratio: The Agricultural Land Reform Code superseded the Agricultural Tenancy Law. The Code instituted the leasehold system and abolished share tenancy subject to certain conditions indicated in section 4 thereof. It is significant that section 39 is not reproduced in the Agricultural Land Reform Code. Under the leasehold system, the prohibition against pre-threshing has no more raison d'etre because the lessee is obligated to pay a fixed rental as prescribed in section 34 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code.

StatCon maxim: It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases. This principle is expressed in the maxim, cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex.

Matabuena v. Cervantes

Facts of the case: The owner of the property in question was Felix Matabuena (deceased). He executed a Deed of Donation to Petronila Cervantes over the parcel of land in question. Cervantes accepted the donation which was made during the common law relationship as husband and wife. They later on got married. When Felix died, the Cornelia Matabuena claims the property by reason of being the only sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased by virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962 and had the land declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon. Cornelia, sister of Felix Matabuena maintains that the donation made by Felix to Petronila Cervantes was void because they were living without the benefit of marriage or common law marriage. The lower court declared the donation valid as it was made before Cervantes marriage to the donor. Hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the ban on a donation between the married spouses also applies to commonlaw relationships

Held: Decision of lower court reversed. Ban on donation applies to common-law-relationships too

Ratio: Although Art 133 of the Civil Code says "Every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, we should look into the spirit of the law. The reason for the ban on donations between spouses during the marriage is to prevent the possibility of undue influence and improper pressure being exerted by one spouse on the other, there is no reason why this prohibition shall not apply also to common-law relationships.

StatCon maxim: What is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is written pursuant to which an apparent omission in an interpretation purely literal of the language used may be remedied by adhering to its avowed objective and intent.

Farinas v. Barba

Facts of the case: Carlito B. Domingo was a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. On March 24, 1994, he resigned after going, without leave, to the United States. To fill the vacancy created by his resignation, a recommendation for the appointment of Edward Palafox was made by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas but the recommendation was made to Mayor Barba. The resolution, containing the recommendation, was submitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte purportedly in compliance with Sec. 56 of the Local Government Code. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan, purporting to act under this provision of the Local Government Code, disapproved the resolution for the reason that the authority and power to appoint Sangguniang Bayan members are lodged in the Governor. Accordingly, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan recommended to the Governor the appointment of petitioner Al Nacino. On June 8, 1994, the Governor appointed petitioner Nacino and swore him in office that same day. On the other hand, respondent Mayor Barba appointed respondent Edward Palafox to the same position. On June 14, 1994, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Norte a petition for quo warranto and prohibition. On July 8, 1994 the trial court rendered its decision, upholding the appointment of respondent Palafox by respondent Mayor Barba.

Issue: Whether or not, in case of a permanent vacancy in the Sangguniang Bayan caused by the cessation from office of a member who does not belong to any political party, a governor can appoint its replacement?

Held: Yes. Governor appoints upon recommendation of Sangguniang Bayan. Petitioner Al Nacino nor respondent Edward Palafox was appointed in the manner indicated in the preceding paragraph, neither is entitled to the seat in the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. For while petitioner Al Nacino was appointed by the provincial governor, he was not recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas. On the other hand, respondent Edward Palafox was recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan but it was the mayor and not the provincial governor who appointed him.

Ratio: Sec 45, par c of the Local Government Code states In case the permanent vacancy is caused by a sanggunian member who does not belong to any political party, the local chief executive shall, upon recommendation of the sanggunian concerned, appoint a qualified person to fill the vacancy. The question now is who is referred to as the sanggunian and local chief executive. The court ruled that the sanggunian being referred to is the sanggunian where the vacancy was created. With respect to the local chief executive, the court referred to the old Local Government Code which states, In case of permanent vacancy in the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, sangguniang bayan, or sangguniang barangay, the President of the Philippines, upon recommendation of the Minister of Local Government, shall appoint a qualified person to fill the vacancy in the sangguniang panlalawigan and the sangguniang panlungsod; the governor, in the case of sangguniang bayan members; or the city or municipal mayor, in the case of sangguniang barangay members. Except for the sangguniang barangay, the appointee shall come from the political party of the sanggunian member who caused the vacancy, and shall serve the unexpired term of the vacant office.

Largado v. Masaganda

Facts of the case: On January 7, 1960, Angelo de los Reyes filed a petition before the Justice of the Peace court of Unisan, Quezon, praying that he be appointed guardian of the persons and properties of certain minors. The hearing was set. Aquilina Largado, mother of the minors, because of the failure of her counsel to appear, was declared in default. Two hours later, the counsel appeared and moved for the reconsideration of the order default, but the same was denied. Thereupon, the justice of the peace court issued an order appointing Angelo de los Reyes guardian as prayed for. A month after, Aquilina Largado filed a petition to dismiss on the ground that said justice of the peace court has no jurisdiction to appoint a guardian under Republic Act No. 2613, which was enacted on August 1, 1959. This motion was also denied. Hence, Aquilina Largado filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Court of First Instance of Quezon praying for the nullification of the orders entered by the Justice of the Peace Court of Unisan on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. And acting on it, the court a quo granted ex parte the writ prayed for. In the meantime, respondents gave their answer justifying the appointment by the Justice of the Peace Court of Unisan, and after issues were joined, the court a quo rendered decision holding that the Justice of the Peace Court of Unisan has no jurisdiction to appoint a guardian because the same is prohibited by Republic Act No. 2613. In due time, petitioner took the present appeal.

Issue: Whether or not, a justice of the peace court has jurisdiction to appoint a guardian at the time the present petition was filed before the Justice of the Peace Court of Unisan?

Held: No. Justice of the Peace cannot appoint a guardian.

Ratio: Relying on Section 10 of Republic Act No. 2613, the said section amends Section 88 of Republic Act No. 296, known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, provides that the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace courts shall not extend, among others, to the appointment of guardians. SC held that provisions of said Act are clear.

StatCon maxim: Where the statute is clear and to correct it would be to change the meaning of the law or specific provision will be abrogated. To do so is to rewrite the law and invade the domain of the legislature; it is judicial legislation in the guise of interpretation.

United States v. Paguiguiran

Facts of the case: Paguiguiran was charged for threatening to kill Pascua, Marquez, and Lopez. These men were engaged in transplanting rice upon land which was claimed by the defendant. While they were at work, Paguiguiran appeared, flourished a cane in an excited manner, ordered them to stop their work and leave. Paguiguiran to kill them unless they obeyed. Paguiguiran was convicted under the second part of Article 494 of the Penal Code to one month and one day or arresto mayor and to pay a fine of 325 pesetas.

Issue: Whether or not Paguiguiran should be convicted under Art. 494 of the Penal Code or Art. 589? Held: He should be convicted under Art. 589, subdivision 3.

Ratio: Article 494 refers to formal threats against a private person which would amount to crime. Whereas, Art 589 provides that Those who shall threaten another, by words and in the heat of anger, with an injury that would constitute a crime, and who by their subsequent actions show that they persisted in the intention which they gave utterance to in their threat; provided that, in view of the circumstances of the deed, it should not be included in the Book 2 of this code. The fact that the threat was made in the heat of anger, and that subsequent actions of the party show that he did not seriously intend to carry the threat into execution, reduce the offense from a crime to a misdemeanor. Although Art.589 used the words xxx and whoby their subsequent action showed that THEY PERSISTED in the intention which they gave utterance to in their threat, the SC ruled that a negation should be placed between the words they and persisted and to read it as and who by their subsequent actions showed that THEY DID NOT PERSISTED in the intention which they gave utterance to in their threat.

StatCon maxim: Where a literal adherence to the language of a statute would produce absurd result, unless the appropriate word or words are written or omitted therein, the court has power to supply or omit the words from a statute in order to prevent an absurd result.

People v. Duque

Facts of the case: Sometime in January 1986, at Calamba, Laguna, the accused, Duque, well knowing that he is not licensed nor authorized by the proper government agency (POEA) to engage in recruitment of workers for placement abroad, recruited six people as workers abroad exacted and actually received money from the above-named victims, to their damage and prejudice. During the trial, Duque denied the charges. The court found Duque guilty for violating Section 38 in relation to Section 39 of P.D. No. 442, as amended, known as The Labor Code of the Philippines. Duque raised the question of prescription of the criminal offense for which he was convicted since illegal recruitment is a crime penalized not by Revised Penal Code but by the Local Government Code. Article 290 of the Labor Code provides Offenses penalized under this Code and the rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto shall prescribe in three years. However, the Labor Code does not contain any provisions on the mode of computation of the three-year prescriptive period it established. Hence, the application of RA 3326. Section 2 of RA 3326 shows that there are two rules for determining the beginning of the prescriptive period: 1) on the day of the commission of the violation, if such commission be known; and 2) if the commission of the violation was not known at the time, then from discovery thereof and institution of judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment. Duque contends that the prescriptive period in the case at bar commenced from the time money in consideration of promises for overseas employment was parted with by complainants, it was on January 1986. Duque concludes that the offense of illegal recruitment had accordingly prescribed by May 1990 since it was filed 4 years after. Appellant Duque assails Section 2 of Act No. 3326 as illogical or absurd.

Issue: Whether or not, the prescription of the criminal offense will start from the time appellant was convicted?

Held: No. The applicable prescriptive period in the case at bar began to run from the time the recruitment activities of appellant Duque were ascertained by the complainants and by the POEA to have been carried out without any license or authority from the government.

Ratio: A literal reading of Section 2 appears to suggest that two elements must coincide for the beginning of the running of the prescriptive period: first, the element of discovery of the commission of the violation of the special law; and second, the "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment." It is then argued by appellant that because the co-existence of these two requirements is necessary under Section 2 of Act No. 3326, the relevant prescriptive period would never begin to run. It should be noted, firstly, that the literal reading that appellant suggests, does not benefit appellant, for the prescriptive period in the case at bar had not in any case been exhausted since prosecution of appellant commenced only a few months after the POEA and the complainants had discovered that appellant had no governmental authority to recruit for overseas work and was merely pretending to recruit workers for overseas employment and to receive money therefor, i.e., that appellant did not even attempt to locate employment abroad for complainants. Secondly, we do not think there is any real need for such a literal reading of Section 2.

StatCon maxim: The well-known principles of statutory interpretation are that statutes must be construed in such a way to give effect to the intention of the legislature and so as to give a sensible meaning to the language of the statute and thus avoid nonsensical or absurd results, departing to the extent unavoidable from the literal language of the statute.

Amatan v. Aujero

Facts of the case: On or about the September 14, 1987, Rodrigo Umpad, alias "Meon, killed with deliberate intent Genaro Tagsip, with a revolver inflicting upon the victim fatal gunshot wound on his head which was the direct and immediate cause of his death. Upon arraignment, the parties, with the agreement of the Public Prosecutor and the consent of the offended party, entered into plea bargaining where it was agreed that the accused would plead guilty to the lesser offense of ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE INSTEAD OF HOMICIDE as originally charged in the information, and would incur the penalty of four years, two (2) months and one day of prision correccional as minimum to six year of prision correccional maximum as maximum. Consequently, respondent judge found the accused, Rodrigo Umpad, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the lesser crime of Attempted Homicide and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment in accordance with the plea bargaining agreement. On October 16, 1992, a letter-complaint addressed to the Chief Justice and signed by Pedro S. Amatan, a brother-in-law of the deceased, accused Judge Vicente Aujero of gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct, relative to his disposition of criminal case entitled People v. Rodrigo Umpad alias "Meon." In said letter-complaint, complainant contends that the sentence of respondent judge finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the lesser offense of Attempted Homicide and not Homicide as charged is proof indicative, "on its face, of gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law or gross misconduct. Judge Aujero asserts that he relied on Sec. 2, Rule 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Issue: Whether or not, the respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law?

Held: Respondent judge's erroneous exercise of his judicial prerogative was neither tainted with malice nor bad faith. SC constrained themselves to find the respondent judge GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law for which he is hereby REPRIMANDED na FINED ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS. And this decision appears in respondent's record of service.

Ratio: Section 2, Rule, 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, allows the accused in criminal case to plead guilty "to lesser offense regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged." The fact of death of the victim for which the accused Rodrigo Umpad was criminally liable, cannot by simple logic and plain common sense be reconciled with the plea of guilty to the lower offense of attempted homicide. The crime of homicide as defined in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code necessarily produces death; attempted homicide does not.

Salvacion v. Central Bank

Facts of the case: Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, illegally detained and raped Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old. Policemen and people living nearby rescued Karen. Greg Bartelli was arrested and detained at the Makati Municipal Jail. The policemen recovered from Bartelli the following items: 1.) US Dollar Check 3,903.20; 2.) COCOBANK Peso Bank book; and 3.) Dollar Account China Banking Corp. Makati Investigating Fiscal Edwin G. Condaya filed against Greg Bartelli, Criminal Case for Serious Illegal Detention and four counts of Rape. On the same day, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati Civil Case for damages with preliminary attachment against Greg Bartelli. On the day of a scheduled hearing for Bartelli's petition for bail, he latter escaped from jail. The court granted the civil case of the petitioner. Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of Bartelli with the China Banking Corp. but the latter refused arguing that Section 11 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 exempts foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever. Salvacion filed suit for declaratory relief before the SC.

Issue: Whether or not, Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of R.A. 6426 (Foreign Currency Deposit Act), as amended, be made applicable to a foreign transient?

Held: NO. The provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 (Foreign Currency Deposit Act) are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circumstances.

Ratio: The application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil

Code which provides that in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

StatCon maxim: In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of law, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

Demafiles v. Comelec

Facts of the case: Respondent Galido asked the provincial board, acting as municipal board of canvassers pursuant to section 167 (b) of the Revised Election Code, to disregard, the election return from precinct 7 for the it was obviously manufactured on the ground that the said return shows that 195 voters were registered (of whom 188 voted), when, according to a certificate of the municipal election registrar only 182 had registered in that precinct as of October 30, 1997. At its session on the following day, November 22, the board voted to reject the return from precinct 7 and then proceeded with the canvass of the returns from the other precints. The resulting tally gave Galido 888 votes as against 844 for Demafiles. Accordingly, Galido was proclaimed mayor-elect of the municipality of Sebaste, Antique. On November 24 Demafiles wired the Commission on Elections, protesting the board's action of rejection of the return from precinct 7 and the subsequent proclamation of Galido, and challenging the right of two board members, Julito Moscoso and Quirico Escao, to sit, considering that they were reelectionists. Demafiles filed the present petition for mandamus and certiorari to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the COMELEC, to annul the proclamation of Galido, and to secure an order directing the COMELEC to appoint substitute members of the provincial board and to order a new canvass of the returns, including that from precinct 7.

Issue: Whether or not the election case has become moot already (since Galido is already proclaimed)

Held: No. Resolutions made by COMELEC are set aside. Proclamation of Galido annulled.

Ratio: Respondent Galido argued that the case is moot because he had taken his oath and assumed office on November 22, pursuant to Republic Act 4870. Obviously, the frame of reference is section 2 of the statute which reads: The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the Municipality of Sebaste shall be elected in the next general elections for local officials and shall have qualified. The court, rejected the argument of Galido and stated that the last portion of the provision "and shall have qualified" is devoid of any meaning, is unmitigated jargon in or out of context, and does not necessarily mean that

he assumed office upon proclamation. Accordingly, the general rule that the term of office of municipal officials shall begin on the first day of January following their election, and so the assumption of office by the respondent Galido in no way affected the basic issues in this case, which we need not reach and resolve.

StatCon maxim: Where a word, phrase or clause in a statute is devoid of meaning in relation to the context or intent of the statute, or where it suggests a meaning that nullifies the statute or renders it without sense, the word, phrase or clause may be rejected as surplusage and entirely ignored.

People v. Gutierrez

Facts of the case: In the morning of May 22, 1970, a group of armed persons set fire to various inhabited houses in Barrio Ora Centro, Bantay, Ilocos Sur. In the afternoon of the same day, several residential houses were also burned by the group, resulting in the destruction of various houses and death of an old woman, in Barrio Ora Este,Bantay, Ilocos Sur. These two information were filed in the Court of First Instance (one arson, one arson with homicide), charging 17 respondents together with 82 other unidentified persons for conspiring and helping one another in burning several residential houses, knowing the said houses were occupied. Two of the accused, one is a Crisologo, son of a known politician there, furnished bail and pleaded not guilty. The Secretary of Justice issued administrative order no. 221, authorizing respondent judge of the circuit criminal court of the 2nd judicial district to hold a special term in Ilocos Sur. Three days after, the Secretary of Justice issued AO No. 226 authorizing respondent judge to transfer the criminal case to the circuit criminal court. The prosecution moved the respondent judge for a transfer of said cases to circuit criminal court invoking the said AO, and for security and safety purposes as witnesses. The accused opposed such transfer and respondent judge declined the transfer sought on the ground that the said AO only provided for transfer of cases to circuit criminal court where the interest of justice required it for more expeditious disposal of cases. In these cases, the accused had already pleaded guilty, and if the objective of the transfer was obtain change of venue, it should have been done from the beginning of the case. RA 5179 created criminal circuit courts for the purpose of alleviating the burden of the CFI and to accelerate disposition of criminal cases but it did not indicate intent to permit the transfer of preselected individual cases to the circuit courts. Because the lower court denied the motion to transfer the cases to criminal court, the prosecution resorted to SC for writs of certiorari and mandamus, charging abuse of discretion and praying to set aside the order of denial to transfer and to compel CFI to remand the cases to circuit criminal court.

Issue: Whether or not the CFI committed abuse of discretion in denying transfer cases to circuit criminal court

Held: Respondent Judge, in construing AO No 226 as permissive and not mandatory acted within limits of his discretion and did not violate the law. The SC agrees with the respondent judge that RA 5179 does not confer upon the secretary of justice power to determine what specific cases the court should hear. However, in refusing to consider AO 226 as mandatory, respondent judge failed to act upon the contention of the prosecution that the cases should be transferred because a miscarriage of justice was impending. In view of the prosecution witness to testify in the court where they felt their lives would be endangered. Also, we should take in consideration the fact that the respondent judge was an appointee of the father of one of the accused in this case.

Akbayan v. Comelec

Facts of the case: Petitioners seek to direct the Commission on Elections to conduct a special registration before the May 14, 2001 General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21. According to petitioners, around four million youth failed to register on or before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent COMELEC under Republic Act No. 8189. Because of the petitions, Senator Raul Roco, Chairman of the Committee on Electoral Reforms, Suffrage, and Peoples Participation, sent a letter and invited the COMELEC to a public hearing for the purpose of discussing the extension of the registration of voters to accommodate those who were not able to register before the COMELEC deadline. People from Comelec attended the public hearing. On January 29, 2001, Commissioners Tancangco and Lantion submitted Memorandum No. 2001-027 on the Report on the Request for a Two-day Additional Registration of New Voters Only. On February 8, 2001, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 3584 denying the request to conduct a two-day additional registration of new voters on February 17 and 18, 2001. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the petition for 2-day registration extension.

Held: No. Where time constraint and the surrounding circumstances make it impossible for the COMELEC to conduct special registration of voters, the Commission cannot be faulted for refusing to do so, for the law does not require the impossible to be done; there is no obligation to do the impossible thing.

StatCon maxim: It is well-settled that the law does not require that the impossible be done.