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Landes questions why China fell from its condition of superiority in the rst millennia to trail behind Europe at a lesser state of growth and development, unable to progress from earlier advancements. The answer lay not in the individual minds of the nation, for China had shown signs of certain technological and scientic prowess centuries before that of Europe (Landes, p.5). Landes answer counters the notion that it was the tyranny of Europe which suppressed Chinas development. Landes stresses the role of the market. China lacked the free market and institutionalized property rights (Landes, p.6) which fostered enterprise in Europe. The states totalitarian control effectively stied any possibility of private enterprise and suppressed the knowledge and inventiveness of its people from elevating the nation (Landes, p.8). It was then Chinas sense of superiority and completeness (Landes, p.15) which restricted their progression by an inability and unwillingness to see the reward of learning the advancements of the European visitors. Acemoglu and Robinson (A&R)1 determine that there is both a correlation and causation between economic institutions and economic performance. They identify the relationship of political and economic institutions, together with political power, being the fundamental determinant underlying the differences of economic outcomes across countries. A conict of interests may arise within society over the character of economic institutions as they are what determine the distribution of economic gains (Acemoglu, Robinson. p.6). Although economic institutions are the collective choices of society, it is ultimately decided upon by the distribution and types of political power, together with the nature of political institutions (Acemoglu, Robinson. p.6-7). The distribution of political power can be such that it is used to push for institutions and consequential outcomes favorable to the holders interests, but not the growth and development of the country. To change this, a shift in power and the institutional make-up in the political sphere is required (Acemoglu, Robinson. p.7-9). Both pieces seek to explain the differences in prosperity and development across countries. A&R has a broad, worldwide emphasis and focuses on the role of institutions, using a selection of historical cases. Conversely, Landes specically focuses on China but considers the countrys ideologies and external factors. In both cases it is the nature of the state and political power which has inuenced the economic incentives of its people and the countrys economic outcomes. A&R suggest that holders with the most political power will seek to maintain the same political institutions to retain their power and inuence economic outcomes. Landes piece is similar in that the Europeans were refused trade by the authorities in China wielding most power to achieve similar results, but also to maintain the countrys ideologies. In both pieces, examples illustrate that excessive state control over the population suppressed their enterprise and inuenced performance negatively.
Word Count: (150 + 149 + 149) = 448

References: Acemoglu, Daron, & James A. Robinson. 2008. The Role of Institutions in Growth and Development. The Commission on Growth and Development 10: 1-9. Washington: The World Bank. Landes, David. S. 2006. Why Europe and the West? Why Not China? Journal of Economic Perspectives, (20)2: 3-22.

A&R will denote the authors Acemoglu and Robinson throughout this test.