Inf Journal 69

unlbDd
ObB
BriO
I
o
MG George I. Fonythe
Commandont
BG Sidney B. Berry
Assistant Commandant
COL Ea,1 C. AcuH
Deputy Assistant Commandont
ACADEMIC STAFF
COL amy M. Vaughn
Secretory
COL George E. Wear
Director of Instruction
COL William J. Higgins, Jr.
Operations & logistics
LTC Leub H. a ..... her
Doctrine Development,
lit. and Pions
COL William L. Humphrey
Monogement and Budget
COL John I. Wi
Office of the Doto Systems
LTC_hiS. R ...
Staff Su'lleon
DEPARTMENTS
COL Lomar A. Welch
Airborne
COL Robert N. Mackinnon
Brigade and Battalion
Operations
COL John B. McKinney
Communications-Electronics
COL Joh. P. Ge .... i
Company Operations
COL o..ald F. Barraclough
Ground Mobility
COL John D. White
Leadership
COL Y. Y. Phillips, Jr.
Ranger
COL Joel M. Halli,
Weapons
COL Albert N. Ward, Jr.
Non.Resident Instruction
COLn.-W.
CDC Infantry
COL Waiter F.
Infantry
LTC
Humon
THE PROFESSIONAL MAGAZINE
FOR INFANTRYMEN
6
FEATURE ARTICLES
Enlisted Promotion Systelll
. . Centralized. decentralized systems reviewed
in depth
......... ,.w ...
LTC James E. Witek
........ D ,.. ..
2L T David E. Daubel
SpS MII<heII G. Gross
Mrs. Jon Willis
__ D.p._ .. t
2LT Charles F. MOrGschieUo
2L T Thomas K. Christie
Sp.4 David Meek$
PVT Ernest Bryont
__
Mrs. Martha L. Biskup
Mrs. Brenda Tomlin
-
Binninghom Publishing Co.
Birmingham, Akl.
INF ... NTRY. Vol. 59. No.4. J.I-.....
1969. '.bNoh_ lH_tblr .. >be
US Ano, I .... ..., SdoooI. $00_-
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19 Swilll For Your Life
26
32
.. Dramatic combat actian involving Infantry
platoon
As..,ult Fire
. . Four different opinians are presented
Neighborhood War. Neighborhood A .... y
.. Author proposes a different approach to
Vietnam War
42 Square Bullets
52
55
46
49
3
4
22
5B
60
63
. . Unusual weapons once proposed for Army use
Vien Hoo. Po.
. . ROTC summer training program examined
TAERS
. . New look at the equipment maintenance system
COMBAT NOTES
Mechanized Fare .. in Vietnalll
Stay-Behind Alllbush
DEPARTMENTS
Comlllandant's N_
Letten
Forulll: Officer Promotion Systelll
Career N_
Infantry N_
R""i ...
COVER: A different approach ta the Vietnam war as
presented by Majar John M. Little in this issue would
commit decentralized forces against the Viet Cang.
Cover by Christie.
SUISCltIPTION UTES: I _.
$4.75; 2 , ..... $9.00; J , .....
$U.50. For be ......... of 10 or
_ ...... 10,.. ... _
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_ of 1969 .. _ .... 1 _0.
CORRESPONDENCE: AMnoo _, ..
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\Nelcome
General
Forsythe
INFANTRY welcomes Major General George I. Forsythe, the 30th Commandant of the
United States Army Infantry School. General Forsythe has just returned from Vietnam
where he was the Commanding General of the 1 st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).
General Forsythe was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Infantry after completing
ROTC training at Montana University in 1939. He began his military career in August 1940
when he reported for active duty as a platoon leader in the 30th Infantry at the Presidio
of San Francisco, Calif.
At the start of World War II, he was serving with US Forces on Kodiak Island, Alaska.
After completing the Battalion Commander's Course at the Infantry School, he was
assigned to Special Troops, Amphibious Task Force Nine, in the Aleutian Islands which
unit he subsequently commanded in May 1943. After the invasion of Kiska, he joined the
7th Infantry Division and moved with it to Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, and took part
in the invasion of Kawajalein Atoll in the winter of 1943-44.
Promoted to lieutenant colonel in March 1944, he was reassigned to Headquarters,
XIX Corps in England, where he took part in the planning and conduct of the invasion of Europe
in June 1944. He remained with the XIX Corps throughout the War in Europe,
serving principally as Corps G3 Planner.
Immediately after World War II, he served a5 a member of the Gl Division of the
War Department General Staff in Washington, D. C, and later was assigned to the
faculty at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.
He commanded the 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry in Germany in 1951-52. He then returned
to the United States to attend the Armed Forces Staff College and upon graduation in
1953 was assigned to Department of the Army General Staff. For the next three years he
served as Military Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of the Army, as the White House
Liaison Officer for the Chief of Staff of the Army and as a member of the Doctrine Section
of the Coordination Group in the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army. He was
promoted to colonel in 1954.
Upon the reactivation of the 101 st Ai rborne Division to test the Pentamic concept,
he was assigned to Fart Campbell, Ky., where he reactivated and commanded the
S02d Airborne Infantry until 1957 when he was selected to attend the Air War College.
After graduation from the Air War College in 1958, he was assigned to the Military
Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam where he became the first Senior Advisor to the
Field Command of the Vietnamese Army. Upon his return to the United States a year
later, he served as Deputy G3 and later Deputy Chief of Staff, Third US Army, Fort
McPherson, Ga. In November 1960, he again was assigned to the Department of the
Army General Staff for duty as the Chief of the Policy Coordination Division in the
Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army unti I June 1962 when he was appointed Executive
Officer and Senior Aide to the Chief of Staff of the Army. He served in that capacity until
June 1963 when he was reassigned as Assistant Division Commander, 25th Infantry
Division, at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. He was promoted to brigadier general on
1 August 1963.
From Hawaii, General Forsythe returned to Fort Benning where he served as Assistant
Commandant of the I nfantry School from March 1965 to March 1966.
He then was appointed Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, US Army Pacific and was promoted
to major general on 1 April 1966. From June 1967 to August 1968, he served as
Assistant Deputy to Commander, USMACV, for Civilian Operations and Revolutionary
Development Support. In August 1968, he assumed command of the 1st Cavalry Division
(Airmobile) and on 1 June 1969 became Commandant of the US Army Infantry School.
2 INFANTRY July - Aug 1969
COMMANDANT'S NOlES
Infantrymen everywhere, especially those who have been
directly associated with the Infantry School, will understand my
pleasure and pride in returning to Fort Benning as Commandant
of the Infantry School. I am deeply aware of the obligations and
responsibilities to the doughboy that are inherent in this office.
I find that the officers, enlisted men and civilians who will
help me serve you have a deep sense of commitment to the
Infantryman-all over the world. That spirit of IIservice to
the line" is the one unchanging quality of the people who serve
at Benning.
But many changes have taken place at the Infantry School
since my departure as Assistant Commandant in the spring of
1966. The School's physical plant is bigger and better than
ever. The Infantry Noncommissioned Officer Candidate pro-
gram was begun in September 1967 and has produced over
10,000 well-trained graduates since that time. Other courses
of instruction have been expanded to meet the Army's growing
needs and the student load has been increased by almost 50
per cent. The faculty has been increased by over 35 per cent,
but more importantly, over 90 per cent of the instructors have
had combat experience in Vietnam and are well qualified to
impart valuable new battlefield tactics and techniques to all
students. There is a new sense of urgency to innovate, adapt,
and exploit these lessons learned and project the Infantryman
into every conceivable combat environment.
This in keeping with the mission of the Infantry School to
produce the world's finest combat Infantryman, My own service
in Vietnam has convinced me that we have been successful
in accomplishing this mission. The small unit leaders and the
soldiers who follow them are superb. Nevertheless, we will seek
additional ways of training these soldiers and will develop
better and more effective methods of accomplishing our ulti-
mate goal-success in battle with minimum loss of life and limb.
Even though the Infantry School is a complex military educa-
tional institution which is continually adapting to the tech-
nology of our times, we will always regard the individual officer
and soldier as our greatest asset--our main point of focus.
We are here to serve them, and you.
All of us humbly accept this challenge and pledge ourselves
to move forward in the traditional manner and spirit of
the Infantry.
4 <,,- -:3.-;, ;?-
GEORGE I. FORSYTHE
Major General, USA
Commandant
July - Aug 1969 INFANTRY 3
COLD STEEL
I read with interest your
article in the March-April issue,
"Cold Steel." This controversy is
not new and my reason for writing
is to cite another example of the
use of the boyonet.
The event took place just hours
before dawn on 29 January 1951
north of I nchon, Korea. The 1 st
Platoon of Company G, 5th In-
fantry Regiment charged the fog
shrouded hill. The 26-man platoon
got to within 100 yards of the top
before the fog blew away. The
platoon was greeted by hand gren-
cdes and automatic weapons.
Despite this heavy volume of
fire, the platoon moved out with
bayonets fixed and secured the
hill. In my own mind that platoon
moved a lot quicker because of the
bayonet on the end of those M-l 'so
LTC Arthur E. Mahoney (Ret)
959 S Bleckley, Apt. 207
Wichita, Kansas
Another combat example of the
use of "Cold Steel" is described in
the following citation:-Editor.
The President of the United
States of America, authorized
by Act of Congress, March 3,
1863, has awarded in the name
of The Congress the Medal of
Honor to Staff Sergeant Joe
R. Hooper, United States Army,
for conspicous gallantry and
intrepidity in action at the risk
of his life above and beyond
the co II of duty:
Staff Sergeant (then Ser-
geant) Joe R. Hooper, United
States Army, distinguished
himself by conspicuous gallan-
try and intrepidity on 21 Feb-
ruary 1968, while serving as
squad leader with Company D,
2nd Battalion ( Air b 0 r n e) ,
501st Infantry, 10ist Airborne
Division, near Hue, Republ ic
of Vietnam .
Company C was assaulting a
heavi Iy defended enemy posi-
tion along a river bank when
it encountered a withering hail
of fire from rockets, machine
guns and automatic weapons.
Staff Sergeant Hooper rallied
several men and stormed
across the river, overrunning
several bunkers on the opposite
shore. Thus inspired, the rest
of the company moved to the
attack.
With utter disregard for his
own safety, he moved out
under the intense fire again
and pulled back the wounded,
moving them to safety. During
this act Staff Sergeant Hooper
was seriously wounded, but he
refused medical aid and re-
turned to his men. With the re-
lentless enemy fire disrupting
the attock, he singlehandedly
stormed three enemy bunkers,
destroying them with hand
grenades and rifle fire, and
shot two enemy soldiers who
had attacked and wounded the
chaplain.
Leading his men forward in
a sweep of the area, Staff Ser-
geant Hooper destroyed three
buildings housing enemy rifle-
men. At this point he was at-
tacked by a North Vietnamese
officer whom he fatally wound-
ed with his bayonet. Finding
his men under heavy fire from
a house to the front, he pro-
ceeded alone to the building,
killing its occupants with rifle
fire and grenades.
By now his initial body
wound had been compounded
by grenade fragments, yet de-
spite the mu Itip Ie wounds and
loss of blood, he continued to
lead his men against the in-
tense enemy fire. As his squad
reached the final line of
enemy resistance, it received
devastating fire from four
bunkers in line on its left flank.
Staff Sergeant Hooper gather-
ed several hand grenades and
raced down a small trench
which ran the length of the
bunker line, tossing grenades
into each bunker as he passed
by, killing all but two of the
occupants.
With these positions destroy-
ed, he concentrated on the last
bunkers facing his men, de-
stroying the first with an in-
cendiary grenade and neutral-
izing two more by rifle fire.
He then raced across an open
field, still under enemy fire,
to rescue a wounded man who
was trapped in a trench. Upon
reaching the man, he was fac-
ed by an armed enemy soldier
whom he killed with a pistol.
Moving his comrade to safety
and returning to his men, he
neutralized the final pocket of
enemy resistance by fatally
wounding three North Viet-
namese officers with rifle fire.
Staff Sergeant Hooper then
established a final line and re-
organized his men, not accept-
ing treatment until this was
accomplished and not consent-
ing to evacuation until the
following morning. His sup-
reme valor, inspiring leadership
and heroic self-sacrifice were
directly responsible for the
company's success and provid-
ed a lasting example in person-
al courage for every man on
the field. Staff Sergeant Hoop-
er's actions were in keeping
with the highest traditions of
the military service and reflect
great credit upon himself and
the United States Army.
BETTER HEADGEAR
The best argument heard for
the present Army helmet is that ,t
provides a "bucket" for washing.
During the Korean War and in
Vietnam today, patrols avoid using
the helmet whenever possible. Its
tell-tale shape is evident even
when camouflaged. During a run-
ning assault it bonces allover your
head and hangs in front of your
eyes. Look at the action newsreels
from World War /I to Vietnam and
you will almost always see soldiers
using one hand to hold the helmet
on their head. When the soldier
hits the ground it is extremely dif-
ficult to determine the direction of
enemy fi re while under that sound-
richocheting shell.
The present day helmet can
cffer protection against earth and
rocks dispersed by mortar and
artillery explosions. It is seldom
effective against artillery, mortar
and grenade fragments. Therefore,
,t is suggested we adopt the follow-
ing combat headgear. Take a
issued Flop (Bush) hat and imbed
about six snap studs into the cloth
in each of two parallel rows araund
the hat. For fragment protection,
snap a strip of body armor material
with corresponding snap wells, an
to the snap studs on the jungle hat.
We now have a rather unsightly,
but practical, effective protective
device that wi II stay put even on
the run. At the same time this
"armored hat': will permit better
visual observation and less diffi-
culty in detecting the direction of
enemy fi re by sound.
LTC Mark E. Jones
29th Korean I nfantry Regiment
APO San Francisco 96350
For a discussion of new develop-
ments in headgear, please refer to
the Infantry Notes section of this
issue of INFANTRY.-Editor.
LEFT-HANDED SOLDIERS
Many weapons in the Army,
such as the M 14 and the M-60
machinegun, ore not designed for
use by left-handed persons. The
grenade launcher can be used by
either left or righthanded indi-
viduals, hence I would suggest that
platoon leaders could increase the
efficiency of their units by arm-
ing the "south paws" with the
launcher.
The
USAIS,
answer:
2L T John E. Lundy
Fort Devens, Mass.
Weapons Department,
provided the following
"Lieutenant Lundy makes a valid
point in that the majority of In-
fantry weapons are designed to be
fired by a right-handed person.
They either eject the empty cart-
ridges to the right, or must be
operated on the right side of the
body. This can cause some in-
convenience from empty cartridges
ejecting toward rather than away
from the firer. In individual situa-
tions these factors cauld effect a
left-handed person so as to war-
rant assigning a grenade launcher
to him. It is desirable to use an in-
dividual in the position in which he
adds most to the unit's effective-
ness.
It is imperative, however, that
the individual soldier should qual-
ify and be familiar with all weap-
ons used by his unit regardless of
his assigned position. Therefore, a
left-handed individual must still
I ear n to fire "right-handed
ll
weapons. Because of the many fac-
tors involved in assigning person-
nel to specific jobs, this decision
should be made at the unit level,
without any additional require-
ments regarding physical quali-
t:es./f
DEFENDERS OF FREEDOM
One of the'most concise and
lucid comments on the relation of
the military to our society, and to
our way of life, which I have ever
seen is the editorial comment "De-
fenders of Freedom," by First Ser-
geant Charles O'Hara, found in
your March-April issue. At a time
when the military establishment in
America is subject to questioning
from every quarter, and is seeming-
ly under attack, this expression is
particularily meaningful.
Major Karl H. Hutzler, USMC
Marine Barracks
Norfolk Naval Shipyard
Portsmouth, Virginia
ENLISTE
MOTION
Decentralized System
COll1mand Sergeant Major Gerald R. Lewis
"DA announced that 200 promotions can be made in December."
How often have you read an announcement like this-and
wondered just how the promotion system worked and what your
chances were of getting promoted? To most men the promotion
system is a big secret understood only by the First Sergeant or the
people in personnel. But it isn't a secret. All the information about the
enlisted promotion system is in an unclassified regulation titled
"Enlisted Personnel Management System" (AR 600-200) .
I\' ow I don't want everyone beating a path to the orderly room
requesting to read this AR and thus bringing the wrath of the First
Sergeant down on you, so let me give you the basic facts on just how the
promotion system works.
Did you say there are a lot of vacancies for promotion in your
unit-and you wonder why, if we have these vacancies, don't they give
us promotion allocations to fill them? OK, let's find out why we
have promotion quota allocations, where they come from, and how
they finally get down to the unit.
To begin with, we will have to go back to Congress. Here it is
decided what the personnel ceiling of our Armed Forces will be and
how much money they will be given to operate these forces. The
Department of Defense tells the ,\rmy: you can have so many
personnel and so much money. Department of the Army then decides
on the force structure needed to carry out its mission which finally
reached you as a TO&E or TDA. (Table of Organization and
Equipment or Table of Distribution Allowances). These TO&E's
and TDA's show the number of personnel, by pay grade and MOS, that
are authorized for a certain type unit. \Vhen DA decided on its force
structure it naturally was planning on what would be needed in
wartime.
Now we find that our budget won't allow us to maintain our forces
at the strength and grade we would like to have, so we have to make
some cuts in our budget. \Ve do this by setting a ceiling on the
< .
i
','
l
number and pay grade of personnel we can have
throughout the Army.
To insure that we don't exceed the ceiling, a month-
ly report (Enlisted Personnel Eligible for Temporary
Appointment) is sent to The Adjutant General, De-
partment of the Army. This report is prepared by
every unit and is consolidated by each major command
before being sent to The Adjutant General. From this
report The Adjutant General knows how many per-
sonnel can be promoted within the personnel ceiling
established. Promotion quota allocations then are
issued to major commands, on the basis of the number
of vacancies and personnel eligible for promotion as
compared to other commands. This same report and
system is used by the rna jor commands to issue pro-
motion quota allocations to subordinate commands.
You should now have a fairly good layman's know-
ledge of 'why promotions cannot be made against all
vacancies, and how and from where promotion quota
allocations come.
How many times have you heard someone say "you
have to be in a promotable status to be considered for
promotion"-and wondered what they were talking
about? Here's the answer. You are not in a promotable
status and will not be promoted if you are:
Carried as absent without leave, absent or pre-
sent in confinement, absent in desertion, absent
in hands of civil authorities, in arrest, or sick,
not in line of duty on the unit morning report.
Under court-martial charges (until the charges
have been dismissed or withdrawn, or the in-
dividual has been tried and acquitted)_
Serving a court-martial sentence, including for-
feiture or detention of pay, or under suspended
sentence.
Under discharge proceedings which may result
in discharge under other-than-honorable con-
ditions.
The subject o[ f1aggin!( actions under AR 600-
31.
A v\,'ai ting or undergoing reclassification for in-
efficiency or for disciplinary reasons
\Vithin 60 days of voluntary retirement (except
that an individual who has occupied a position
vacancy of a hi!(her pay grade for a period of 90
or more days may be promoted if otherwise
eligible), but not higher than E-6.
Cndergoing any punishment under Article 15,
which precludes [avorable personnel
action-or if such punishment is in a suspended
status.
Ineligible for reenlistment.
You say you are in a promotable status? Good. :\'ow
let's look into the regulation and see how you stack up
for eligibility and selection criteria.
Normal requirements necessary to establish eligibility
for promotion are shown belm,,-. However, a promotion
authority may waive any two of the requirements which
are indicated belmv as waivable for personnel who are
otherwise highly qualified for promotion. This waiver
provision is used only to permit promotion con-
sideration of personnel who demonstrate outstanding
performance.
1. Time in grade and time in service. You must com-
plete the following time in pay grade and time in
service:
Pay Grade
E9
E8
Ei
6
E5
E4
Time in Pay Grade
16 months in -8
14 months in -7
12 months in -6
10 months in -5
H months in -4
6 months in -3
Time in $enice
18 yean.
15 "ears
10 years
5 ,ears
21 months
1 year,
WAIVER: Waiver provisions apply separately for
time in pay grade and time in service. 'Vaiver for one-
half of time in pay grade is permissible; maximum
waiver of time in service is shown below:
Grade
E9
E8
Ei
E6
E5
E4
A.mount of Time in Service \Vaivable
5 years
4 years
3 '; .. ears
2
6 months
5
2. Promotable status. ust be in a promotable status.
WAIVER: Waiver not granted.
3. Recommendation: receive a recommendation
or concurrence of recommendation from the unit com-
mander. If duty is performed under other than the unit
commander to whom you are assigned for administra
tion, the recommendation must be endorsed by the
administrative unit commander.
4. Award of MOSC (MOS Code). Must have been
awarded, or be fully qualified for the award of, the
:\[ OSC in which the promotion is to be made. If the
.'
_ __ II ............................ """'-
....
1\..f05 in '\'hich the promotion is to be made is not your
P:\10S (Primary MOS), it will be awarded as your
P::\IOS at the time of promotion. The commander's
recommendation of an individual for promotion in an
:tvros constitutes his affirmation that the individual is
fully qualified in all aspects of the MOS in which
recommended. If the individual accepts the promotion,
he will be considered as having attested that he regards
himself fully qualified in the :\105 in which promoted.
\VAIVER: \Vai\'er not granted.
5. Promotion qualification score (PQS). The promo
tion qualification score is 110. This means that an in-
dividual must have attained an evaluation score of 110
or higher on his latest P::\.10S evaluation for which re-
sults are available or on the latest evaluation in the
?l.IOS in which promotion is to be made. A.n evaluation
score of 110 or higher may qualify the individual for
promotion consideration in an ..\-lose other than the
one in which evaluated. However, before promoting an
individual in an ::\.105 other than the ::\.'105e for 'which
the PQ5 applies, commanders will insure that the in-
dividual is qualified in all aspects of that 1\105. The
evaluation score must have been established ,dthin the
preceding 30 months.
\VAIVER: \Vaivcr permissible for evaluation score
of 70 or higher.
Personnel in the following category are exempt from
the PQS requirement:
Personnel not eligible for l\fOS evaluation.
Personnel exempt from ..\105 evaluation under
the provisions of paragraph 5-ld(2), AR 600200.
Personnel not evaluated, or whose Evaluation
Data Report has not been received through no
fault of their O\ ... n.
Personnel returning from areas in which n.l05
evaluation has been suspended by Department of
the Army. Personnel in this category will be
exempt from the PQ5 requirement only until
the results of the next regular evaluation of
their ;\[OS have been received in their com-
mand.
Personnel ".ho are to be promoted into an
:\10Se in '-\'hich they have not been evaluated in
the preceding 30 months. Before recommending
an individual for promotion in such an l\'fOSC,
commanders are required to insure that he is
fully qualified in all aspects of the in
which the promotion is to be made.
Personnel who do not have an evaluation score
will be awarded promotion points as outlined in
Item 3E, figure 4.
6. Proper pay grade. :llust be serving in the pa), grade
next below that in which promotion is to be made.
... & .. .. -
Hmvever, an individual occupying a positIOn vacancy
v.;ith an authorized grade t,,;o grades or more higher
than his pay grade may still only be promoted one
grade.
1_ Position vacancy. Personnel may be recommended
for promotion by unit commanden only against author
.ized position vacancies existing or projected for a two
month period within the command, as announced by
the promoting authority.
Cpon promotion to the higher grade, the individual
must be assigned to fill an authorized position vacancy
(:lIOSC) within the command of the promoting author-
ity, except as authorized below. In the event pes limit
ations preclude reassignment, the assignment v.'ill be
made as soon as possible.
::\.lajor commanders awaiting approval of recommend-
ed MTOE/TDA positions from Headquarters, Depart-
ment of the Army. may promote individuals assigned.
or to be assigned, to the proposed positions, but only if
this action will not cause the command to exceed its
authorized position vacancies by pay grade in grades
E..j through E9.
Receipt of notification that assignment instructions
have been issued by Headquarters, Department of the
Army, to provide a replacement for an E7 position win
cancel the vacancy for that position.
8. Physical qualifications. be physically able to
perform all the duties of the MOS and grade to which
promotion is to be made, as determined by observation
of performance of duty by the local commander, and
attainment of a passing score on the applicable Physical
Fitness Test, as outlined in AR 600-9. Personnel with
physical limitations that prohibit effective performance
of duty in the next-higher grade should not be pro-
moted. However, an individual who has a physical pro
file P-3, U-3, L-3, or who is retained on active duty
under the provisions of AR 635-40 and is otherwise
eligible, may with a wai\'er, be considered for pro
motion to the higher grade.
WAIVER: \\'aivable.
9. Education.
Completion of eighth grade, or the GED equivalent,
for promotion to pay grade -5.
Have a high school diploma. or GED equivalent. for
promotion to pay grades above E-5.
WAIVER: Waivable.
10. Security clearance.
Pay grade E-6 and below. 1\'fust have the security
clearance required by the 1\105 in which promotion is
to be made. Promotion may be made on the basis of
an appropriate interim clearance.
Pay grade E-7. n.fust have a favorable National
July .. Aug 1969 INFANTRY 9
_3 ..
L i
;
, __AI
t
Agency Check ()JAC) completed or have a SECRET
security clearance or higher. Interim clearance is aC4
ceptable for promotion provided the individual can
qualify and a request for an NAC has been submitted.
Personnel ''''ithout a clearance may be considered and
selected for promotion by a board, hut may not be pro-
moted until clearance is granted. An individual's name
'will be removed from recommended list if he cannot
qualify for final clearance of the type indicated above.
\VAIVER: \Vaiver not granted.
Additional eligibility and promotion criteria for pn?
motion to pay grade E7.
l. Verification of vacaoC)'. Except as authorized by
Headquarters, Department of the Army, a position
vacancy in pay grade E7 will not be filled by pro-
motion unless a replacement in grade has been re-
quisitioned pursuant to AR 614-202 and notification
has been received by the promotion authority that a
replacement in the appropriate grade will not be
furnished, or unless a request for early cancellation has
been approved.
WAIVER: Waiver not granted_
2. Two-year service obligation upon promotion. Per-
sonnel promoted to pay grade E-7 ,.,rill, upon promotion,
incur a two-year service obligation prior to retirement,
unless they are:
Eligible for earlier retirement by virtue of com-
pletion of 30 or more years of active Federal service.
Already eligible, through prior service, for a high-
er grade at the time of retirement.
Age 55 or older.
Except as indicated above, personnel who are select-
ed (or promotion and who are approaching
eligibility will be informed of this obligation. Pro-
motion orders will include the statement "Promoted
individual automatically incurs a two-year service obli-
gation prior to voluntary, nondisability retirement."
The name of an individual , .. rho declines promotion
under these circumstances in 'writing will be removed
from the recommended list, or, if he declines upon
notification of promotion, the promotion 'will be re-
vokeel. A promoted individual may not subsequently be
reduced for the purpose of terminating the two-year
service obligation described above.
Retired enlisted personnel recalled to active duty
may be eligible for extension of their tour to complete
this service obligation. Authority to extend the term
of service to enable recalled retired enlisted personnel
who are promoted to pay grade E-7 to satisfy the obliga-
tion for two-year service is delegated to the commander
who exercises authority to promote the personnel. This
extension will be requested by the individual and ap-
proved by the promotion authority before issuance of
promotion orders.
3. Position vacancy created by retirement. A position
vacancy in pay grade E-7 which will be created by re-
tirement of the incumbent may be filled by promotion
when the incumbent is within 60 days of the retirement
date, as approved by Headquarters. Department of the
Army. Such promotion will be made in sufficient time
to afford the individual on-the-job training and, except
for the position vacancy, 'NiH be subject to other pr().
visions of AR 600-200, including the requirement of a
promotion quota and a cancelled requisition.
4. Cumulative enlisted service. For promotion to pay
grade E-7, an individual must have at least six years
of cumulative enlisted service creditable in the corn-
putation of his basic pay. Prior service as an officer
is not creditable for this purpose.
You should now know whether you are in a promot-
able status, eligible and meet the selection criteria for
promotion. But don't get out the sewing kit yet in
anticipation of putting on a set of new stripes. Now is
when the competition starts. 'Vhat happens?
Let's assume that your battalion has announced that
a promotion selection board is scheuled to select per-
sonnel for recommendation for promotion. Your com-
pany commander calls a meeting of platoon leaders
and platoon sergeants and informs them he wants re-
commendations for promotions. He also informs them
that an Enlisted Efficiency Report will be submitted
on each person recommended.
If the CO agrees with the recommendations he re-
ceived, he will then fOf\\ard a written recommendation
for promotions, together with the efficiency reports, to
the personnel officer.
The personnel officer uses the recommendations and
efficiency reports to process DA Form ,3354-R, Person-
nel Data Sheet, 'which indicated such matters as your
physical profile, civilian education, military schooling,
decorations, etc.; DA Form 3355-R; and Promotion
Points \Vorksheets, which will be used by the pro-
motion selection board.
]\.[ake out a Promotion Points \Vorksheet and see
hmo, many points you have.
If you haven't done so check your personnel
records. l\fake sure they are up to date and accurate.
This can mean a lot when you are being considered for
promotion. Insure that there is a record o[ all courses
you have attended and extension subcourses completed.
This must be in your records in order for you to be
credited for the course on the Promotion Points \Vork-
sheet.
The big day arrives and you are scheduled to appear
before the promotion selection board. \\Tho ''''ill be
members of the board? The board will consist of both
officer and enlisted personnel. The enlisted personnel
must be senior in pay grade to you. The majority of the
board members be officers. There must be at least
.,
'Ji.;
1
three voting members and not more than seven. A re-
corder "\\'ho does not have a vote will also be on the
board.
Hmv will the board be conducted?
In the past, Army promotion policy and procedures
have differed from command to command. The Army
has now developed a promotion policy that sets Army-
wide standards. '''''ith the introduction of the Standard-
ized Promotion Scoring Form, promotion standards
have been defined in precise, measurable terms. The
intent is to insure that all boards evaluate all persons
using the same Army-wide standards. This provides
equity and equal opportunity to the individual, partic-
ularly when he transfers from one command to an-
other. It also allO\\"s him to concentrate on improve-
ment in those areas l\-'hich could affect his promotion
potential and in which he 'will be evaluated. against
his contemporaries.
The underlying principle of this promotion system
is to promote the best-qualified individual. Demon-
strated ability and potential are the determining fac-
tors.
In awarding board interview points, individual
board members rely primarily on their own judgment
and experience. :\ mathematical formula for break-
down of board is purposely not provided so that
each candidate stands with respect to all other in-
dividuals of the same grade and of which the
board member has knowledge.
Lack of membership in clubs, organizations, whether
military or civilian, cannot be factors in selection for
promotion.
The fact that an enlisted man competed and was
not selected by a prior board is not a reason for rejec-
tion by a future board, Each board must form its own
independent and collective evaluation on the basis of
the individual's performance and potential as com-
pared to all others competing for the higher grade.
In today's active Army the soldier specializing in a
technological field has a role and responsibility equal
to the role of those in other fields. 'Yhen considering
indi\<iduals in this category, board members emphasize
the technical aspects of the and the individual's
capacity to handle assignments in this field and to
progress in it.
Any consideration given to derogatory information
is determined by the collective judgment of the board.
The board considers the significance of the informa-
tion particularly as it relates to the individual's most
recent years of service. Incidents of a disciplinary
nature must be weighed against the individual's over-
all performance. endue consideration is not given to
comments of a derogatory nature which are later
follQ1.."ed by continuous outstanding performance of
duty. On the other hand, serious or repetitive disciplin-
ary action does warrant grave comideration,
The DA guidance does not preclude commanders
who exercise promotion authority from providing selec-
tion boards with additional guidance they may deem
necessary. The only restriction is that such guidance
must not violate the provisions of AR 600-200,
'''''hat will the board use to rate you in comparison
to others that appear before them?
Using DA Form 3356R. Board Members Appraisal
\Vorksheet, the board will rate you on the items indicat-
ed, Board members will also be furnished your En-
listed Efficiency Report, a personal data sheet, a pro-
motion points worksheet, ::\Jilitary Personnel File, and
DA Form 20.
:\o'w let's see what happens after the promotion
selection board has intervie"\\'eu all individuals being
considered for promotion.
The board, after completing their deliberations, will
arrange a li.,t of the personnel who have been recom-
mended for promotion, by name, and order of
merit li.,t poinb< the order of merit list points,
they will select for addition to the promotion list no
more names than the number reyuired to fill authoriz-
ed position vacancies existing or projected for a ("\\'0-
month period. Personnel remaining on the promotion
li:-.t who have not yet been promoted when the new
board is convened will also be placed on the new list,
according to the number of points with which they are
credited, This li,,,t is then presented to the commander
with promotion authority for approval.
Promotions will be made from this list in order of
standing, as promotion quota allocations are received.
For p,ry grade E-7 it is necessary to have a cancelled
requisition for each vacancy before a promotion can be
made. In some in"tances, this will allow an individual
with a lower point .,tanding to be promoted before one
with a higher standing.
What happens if you are transferred to another com-
mand before being promoted?
Personnel in promotion list status who are trans-
ferred to a new command are integrated into the pro-
motion list of their new unit effective on their date of
assignment (EDCSA). Their placement on the pro-
motion list is based on the order of merit promotion
list points they received at the old unit.
Come on, now! You mean to tell me that this guy
transfers into my outfit, has the same 1\.IOS I do but a
lesser number of order or merit promotion list points
than I received when I appeared before our board, and
he goes on our promotion list? The only reason I didn't
make the promotion list is there weren't enough vacan-
cies to cover the number of people who appeared before
the Board.
First of all, a man with promotion list status assign-
ed to your command will not be integrated if he has
fewer order of merit promotion list points than per-
sonnel in the same MOS who have appeared before
your command's selection board but could not be plac-
ed on the promotion list o\""ing to lack of vacancies, He
will be required to appear before the command's next
scheduled board for reevaluation, If, after appearing
before the board, his order of merit promotion list
points are above others who have appeared (or are
appearing) before the board but have not been select-
ed because of lack of position vacancies, he will be
immediately integrated into the command's promotion
list, regardless of position vacancies. If this new order
of merit promotion list points does not place him in the
above category, he will no longer have promotion list
status. The purpose of this procedure is to afford equal
promotion opportunity to all personnel and to insure
that only the best qualified are promoted. 0
Centralized System
Lieutenant Colonel Williatn J. Monyhan
"T HE UNDERLYING CONCEPT of the Army
promotion system is to promote the best qualified in-
dividual." Based on this philosophy, promotions are
made to recognize the oustanding individual who has
the potential for leadership and increased responsibility
at the next higher grade level. Thus, promotions are
not made solely as a reward for a job well done.
The Army now has two separate and distinct enlisted
promotion systems: a decentralized system for pro-
motions to pay grades -3 through E-7, and centralized
system for promotions to pay grades -8 and E-9. Ad-
vancement to grade E-2 is accomplished administra-
tively.
This article contains a few explanatory remarks
about the current decentralized system, but concen-
trates primarily on the new centralized system.
Under the decentralized system of the past, enlisted
promotion policies, procedures, and standards differed
from command to command, creating the impression
that a man must be "at the right place at the right
time" to be promoted. Army-v . .ride standards and pro-
cedures were established with the implementation of
Change 21 to AR 600-200 on I August 1968 in a move
to correct this situation. Although the basic require-
ments for eligibility for temporary promotion remain
12 INFANTRY July-Aug 1969
...
. ;
generally unchanged, promotion standards are defined
in precise and measurable terms with the introduction
of the Standardized Promotion Scoring Form. The new
Form also enables a soldier to determine his qualifica-
tions for promotion and to concentrate on those areas
which require self-improvement.
Promotion authority to pay grades E-3 and E-4 is
still vested in company, troop, battery and separate
detachment commanders. Field grade commanders of
any organization which is authorized a commander in
the grade of Lieutenant Colonel or higher may promote
to pay grades E-5 and E-6. Promotions to pay grade E-7
is vested in commanders of organizations authorized a
commander in the grade of colonel or higher.
Promotions to pay grades E-5 through E-7 require
action by local promotion selection boards convened by
the promotion authority. Eligibility to appear before
local promotion selection boards is based upon recom-
mendations for promotion of eligible personnel by unit
commanders ".hich are submitted through command
channels to the promoting authority for promotion
board consideration. If the recommendation is disap
proved at any intermediate level, it is returned through
channels to the recommending official with the reason
for disapproval stated. The recommending official is
J
responsible for advising the individual of the reason
for disapproval, identifying deficiencies, suggesting
means of self-improvement, and entering the date of
counseling in the individual's personal data sheet.
The data to be made available for use by local
promotion selection boards have also been stanardized
to further assure equitable selection procedures. For
each individual being considered for promotion, the
board is provided the unit commander's recommenda-
tion for promotion, a personal data sheet, a promotion
points " .. orksheet" the military personnel file, and the
D.\ Form 20, Enlisted Qualification Record.
Each individual recommended for promotion appears
personally before the promotion selection board. The
board members are provided a standardized appraisal
'worksheet which indicates the areas to be considered
and the point spread applicable to each area. On the
basis of this appraisal, each member scores the in-
dividual and recommends for or against promotion.
The scores of all board members are a\'eraged and
entered in the promotion points worksheet. The total
of the administrative and board points awarded deter-
mines the order of merit in which selected personnel
are arranged on the local recommended list.
The president of the board presents the record of
board proceedings together v,,'ith the order of merit list
to the promotion authority. The order of merit listing
may not be changed or modified by the promotion
authority but must be either approved or disapproved
in its entirety. An order of merit listing apprO\'ed by
the promotion authority is published as the command
recommended list for promotion. Promotions are made
by :Military Occupational Specialty based on the order
of merit listing as vacancies occur and promotion
quotas are received from higher headquarters. An in-
dividual may not be removed from an approved local
recommended list except for cause and under certain
other specified conditions.
A key feature of the decentralized system is the pro-
vision whereby any individual who has attained recom-
mended list status in his current unit and is reassigned
prior to promotion will be integrated into the recom-
mended list of his ne\." unit of assignment. In the event
the gaining command is not authorized the particular
grade and 1\105, the individual is still placed on the
list and is reported to Department of the Army for
reassignment or promotion consideration on an indi-
vidual basis. Thus. once having attained promotion list
status, an individual retains this status even though he
may be transferred from command to command.
A centralized system for the temporary promotion
of enlisted personnel to pay grades E-8 and E-9 \\'as
approved on 28 June 1968. The basic concept of the
centralized promotion system is to provide eligible per-
sonnel equitable promotion opportunity to these grades
on an Army-wide basis, The new procedure generally
parallels the system used to promote officers to field
grade and is based on the fOllowing objectives:
Provide maximum assurance of an equitable and
uniform procedure for selection and promotion of
personnel to master sergeant and sergeant major.
Insure that only the best qualified individuals are
advanced to the top two enlisted grades within
chosen career fields.
Eliminate the requirement for a position vacancy
to exist in the individual's unit of assignment as
a prerequisite for promotion.
The policies and procedures concerning the first
selections under the centralized promotion system to
grades E-8 and E-9 were announced to the field by De-
partment of the Army in August 1968. This guidance
stated that effective 1 January and 1 :\Iarch 1969 pro-
motion authority to grades E-9 and E-8 respectively
would be assumed by, and reserved to, Headquarters,
Department of the Army.
To initiate the program expeditiously and yet keep
faith with those individuals who held recommended
status, the decision was made that the initial selection
boards would ('onsider only those individuals who held
local recommended list status as of announced cut-off
dates. Local commanders ,vere authorized to continue
promotions to pay grades E-8 and E-9 during the transi-
tion period provided a promotion quota allocation was
available to them. Commanders ' ....ere not permitted to
add to local promotion lists after the announced cut-
off dates except for integration of the names of newly
assigned non-commissioned officers who had promotion
list status in their former units. Commanders were no
longer authorized to maintain local promotion lists
for pay gTades EH and E-9 once centralized promotions
to these grades began.
The first zone of consideration for promotion to
staff sergeant major included those personnel in pay
grade E-8 who held promotion list status as of 31 July
1968. Commanders forwarded to Department of the
Army the names of personnel in their commands who
held such status. These lists were followed by a recom-
mendation "packet" which \""as used to augment De-
partment of the Army records available to a centraliz-
ed board for use in its deliberations. This initial central-
ized selection board convened on 14 October 1968 and
adjourned on 12 November 1968. The board consider-
ed 1,560 records and from this total 915 personnel were
recommended for promotion. This number was reduced
to 734 after administrative deletions resulting from
field promotion, death, separation, or other factors
which occurred prior to I January 1969. The first 132
centralized promotions to staff sergeant major from
those selected by this board were announced in Depart-
ment of the Army Special Orders on 3 January 1969.
The zone of consideration for the first selection board
for promotion to master sergeant included those person-
nel in pay grade E-7 ,\'110 held local recommended list
status as of 30 September 1965. The selection board
convened on 2 December 1968 and adjourned on 20
February 1969. The board considered 4,676 records and
from this total recommended 3,619 for promotion. This
number was reduced to 2,586 after deletions resulting
from field promotion, death, separation, or other ad-
ministrative factors \\'hich occurred prior to I i\larch
1969. Centralized promotions to master sergeant began
on 3 I\Jarch 1969 with the announcement in Depart-
ment of the Army Special Orders of 666 promotions
from the recommended list.
Those personnel selected by the initial centralized
selection boards represented the Army's projcted pro-
motion capability for a six-month period commencing
I January 1969 for E-9 and I March 1969 for E-S. Pro-
motions are announced once monthly as allocations are
determined by Headquarters, Department of the Army.
Personnel considered but not selected for promo-
tion by the (\\'0 initial boards lost their local recom-
mended status; however, they will be considered for
promotion by subsequent boards provided they meet
the established lone of consideration criteria. It also
should be noted that nonselection by these first boards
does not mean that an individual incurs an unfavor-
able stigma for future selection. Eyery noncommission-
ed officer who is within the prescribed zone of considera-
tion for any board will be considered regardless of the
fact that he w a ~ not selected by a pre\ious board.
The zones of consideration for current centralized
selection boards are based on time in grade and time in
senice. The number of selections to be made are based
on the Armys promotion capability to each of these
grades for approximately one year. The specific zone of
consideration criteria is prescribed for each board by
Headquarters, Department of the Army. In addition to
meeting the time in grade and time in service require-
ments, each person mm,t:
Have at least 8 and 10 years cumulative enlisted
service creditable in the computation of his basic
pay for promotion to the grade of -8 and -9,
.. - ...
respectively. Prior service as an officer is not credit-
able for this purpose.
Have a favorable National Agency Check (NAG)
completed or have at least a final SECRET secur-
ity clearance.
Individuals \ .... ithout such qualifications who may be
recommended by a selection board cannot be promoted
until a favorable determination is made. An indi-
vidual's name will be removed from a recommended
list in event a favorable determination cannot be made.
In establishing the zone of consideration, the goal
of quali ty selections is, of course, the paramount con-
sideration. However, additional factors are considered,
all of which generally relate to the size of the zone.
These factors are: the selection rate or percentage of
promotion opportunity afforded those in the primary
zone; the size of the zone and its relationship to subse-
quent zones; and, the need to provide a percentage of
the allocation to a secondary zone in order to allow pro-
motion opportunity to the outstanding individual with
less service and seniority than the majority.
\Vhen established, the zone of consideration is an-
nounced to the field by message. A circular is then
published which lists all personnel identified by De-
partment of the Army records as meeting the primary
zone criteria. The purpose of the circular is to insure
that all eligible personnel are included in the zbne of
consideration, to provide instructions to indhiduals
and commanders in the event an eligible individual
has not been included, and to allow full dissemination
to all interested commands and agencies. A listing of
those meeting the secondary zone criteria is not pub-
lished.
Selection boards convened uncler the centralized en-
listed promotion system meet at Headquarters, De-
partment of the Army. These boards are composed of
at least five members, including a balance of combat,
combat support and combat service support officers, a
"rom en's Army Corps officer appointed as an alternate
E2i
member to serve when enlisted women are being con-
sidered, and both command and staff sergeants major.
The president of selection boards in all cases is a
general officer. The membership of the board is an-
nounced after the board has adjourned as a part of the
circular containing the recommended list. Centralized
selection boards are convened as required; however, it is
planned that one board for each grade "\\'ill be conduct-
ed annually to select personnel to be promoted against
the projected Army-wide vacancies for the forthcoming
year.
Each selection board receives its guidance from and
operates under a specific letter of instruction. These
instructions include the selection criteria to be used,
general criteria and the total number of personnel that
may be selected from both the primary and secondary
zones of consideration. This guidance is pro\'ided the
board in general terms in order to a11m!,T flexibility and
maximum latitude in the overall evaluation of each in-
dividual record; however, the best qualified method of
selection is always used. Under this method, selection
boards recommend a specific number from the zone of
consideration that are considered to be the best qual-
ified to meet the needs of the Army. The numher of
selections to be made is that total projected by the
:\rmy to maintain its authorized by-grade strength for a
given period of time.
\rhen a secondary zone is specified, the letter of in-
will include the maximum as v.Tell as the
minimum number that may be selected from that
zone. The board may not exceed the maximum num-
her specified for the secondary zone. Should the board
determine that the quality of the noncommissioned
officers in the secondary lone will not permit selection
of the minimum number specified, then no selections
may be made from below the zone. For example, if an
-8 selection board is authorized to select a total of
'1.000 noncommissioned officers and the maximum per-
centage of the total that may be selected from the
secondary lone is i.5 percent and the minimum is 5
percent, the board may select not more than 300 but
III list select at least 200 from the secondary zone. If the
hoard determines that the quality of the secondary zone
is not sufficient to warrant selection of .200 personnel,
then no selections 'will be made. In all cases, the total
selection5 from both the primary and secondary zones
will not exceed the total selections authorized or in this
example 4,000,
\Yith regard to selection criteria, centralized selection
boards consider each individual based on his profession-
al qualifications, demonstrated integrity, performance
capability, potential and ability. Each board makes its
selections based on four interrelated criteria:
In determining whether the indi\'idual under con-
sideration is qualified for promotion, the board
members satisfy themselves that the individual is
fully qualified professionally, has demonstrated
integrity, and is capable of performing the duties
expected of personnel in the next higher grade.
I -.,

V
III Illl/ 1;/
Promotion in the Army is based on demonstrated
and potential ability and is not intended as a
reward for performance in the presen t grade and
duty. Therefore, no single factor should be allow-
ed to become overriding in determining '\vhether
an individual should be selected for promotion.
The board consider the entire available
record of each person recommended in order to
determine whether he or she can perform the dut-
ies and exercise the responsibility of the next
higher grade,
Consideration should be accomplished in complete
objectivity with the good of the service of primary
importance.
Centralized selection boards are provided the entire
official personnel record of every indh'idual in the zone
of consideration which is maintained at Department of
the Army. This record consists of the OPO l\lilitary
Personnel File which contains efficiency reports, MOS
evaluation data reports, photograph, citations support-
ina av.'ards and decorations letters of commendation
,
and appreciation, enlisted preference statements, record
of assignment actions and the Enlisted Qualification
Record, DA Form 20. Also provided to selection boards
are records of court martial, plus any record of punish-
ment under Article IS, when the commander
imposing the punishment has directed inclusion of the
record in the OPO :\filitary Personnel File. Records
of punishment imposed under Article 15, UeM] will
automaticallv be withdrawn from the file one year after
the date is imposed and will not be made
available to future selection boards.
As is the practice in the officer system, official COID-
munications which concern recommendations for pro-
4U
motion, commendation or appreciation are authorized
for those personnel in the primary zone of considera-
tion. Such correspondence is provided the selection
board if received not later than ten days after the
board convenes. Letters of recommendation for in-
dividuals in the secondary zone are not made available
to selection boards.
It is policy that an individual may not decline pro-
motion consideration. If recommended for promotion
by a Department of the Army Selection Board and sub-
sequently promoted on a Department of Army Special
Order, an individual is allowed fifteen days from the
date of issuance of the promotion order in which to
submit a written statement of declination. Unless a
promotion is expressly declined by the individual con-
cerned, it is considered to be accepted as of the date
of the announcing order. Commanders of personnel
who decline promotion under the centralized system
must advise Department of the Army by electrical
means, and a signed letter of declination from the non-
commissioned officer concerned must be submitted
, , ~ I
~ ~ . .r
~ ~ ~
\ I II 1\ \ ~
~ \ Q \ \ ~
through channels not later than 15 days after the date
of issuance of the promotion order. A duplicate signed
copy of the letter of declination must be forwarded
by the declining individual's unit commander direct to
the Department of the Army.
\Vhen the board has completed its selections, the
list of names of those recommended is reviewed at the
Office of Personnel Operations to include a routine
security check. The list is then fon"'arded to the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Personnel for approval. After approv-
al, seniority sequence numbers are assigned based on
date of rank in the current grade. The final recommend-
ed list is then published in a Department of the Anny
Circular in the 624 series.
Promotions are announced once each month in De-
partment of the Army Special Orders as the monthly
allocation for each grade is determined. Dates of rank
are distributed uniformly over the ''''orking days of the
month preceding promotion. Pay and allowances are
effective only from the date of the promoting order.
To preclude promotion of personnel who are in-
i
,
!
, '
, \ \
" I
,
j
eligible under AR 600-31 as well as those individuals
whose names appear on a recommended list and sub-
sequently become ineligible for promotion, command-
ers should insure the list is reviewed immediately upon
receipt and on a continuing basis thereafter until the
Jist has been exhausted. Commanders are responsible
for advising Department of the Army, "Tashington,
D. C., of the names, facts and circumstances surround-
ing the case of individuals identified as nonpromotable.
An individual on ''''hom favorable personnel action is
suspended for any reason is not promoted until his case
is resoh'ed. The promotion of individuals in this cate-
gory are "\vithheld v.'ithout delaying the promotion of
personnel to them on the recommended list.
Commanders may recommend the remoyal of a non-
(ommissioned officer's name from a recommended list
at any time; howeyer, such recommendations must be
by written justification in order to provide
data upon ,,,,'hich Department of the Army
can base a decision, In any case in which the com-
mander recommends remo\'al from a list, he must
1l11tlate flagging action immediately under the provi-
sions of AR 600-3\. Removal of flagging action will not
be made until final resolution of the case by Head-
quarters, Department of the Army.
In support of the Centralized Enlisted Promotion
System, a permanent Enlisted Advisory Board has been
appointed at Department of the Army. The member-
ship of this board also includes a general officer as
field grade officers and a command sergeant
major. The mission of the Enlisted Advisory Board is
to reviev\; enlisted promotion cases which fall into three
categories:
Initial Consideration Case-A case in which an
individual meets the established zone of consider-
ation but ' .. 'as not revie,,{ed by a regularly consti-
tuted board.
Reconsideration Case-A case ,,,,'hich involves ad-
ministrative error or an official change in a
record has occurred since review of the record by
a regularly constituted board.
Recommendation for Removal from a Recom-
mended List-A case in which an individual- has
been selected for promotion by a regularly con-
stituted board; however. prior to promotion of
the individual, derogatory information is dis-
closed which might have a bearing on the pro-
motion. The advisory board operates under a
general letter of instruction as v{ell as the appropri-
ate letters of instruction used by the regular
boards.
One major difference bet\\'een the officer promotion
system and the centralized enlisted promotion system is
the so-called "passO\'er" aspect. An officer recommended
for promotion may incur a "passover" whereas current
policy for the centralized enlisted promotion system
provides that no unfavorable stigma is incurred by an
individual not selected for promotion by a Department
of the Army selection board. A noncommissioned
officer not selected by one board is automatically con-
sidered by subsequent selection boards provided he
meets the established zone of consideration criteria.
There are continuing efforts being made at Depart-
ment of the Army to improve individual records so that
they factually and completely represent eyery individual
being considered for promotion under the centralized
system. Currently, a new enlisted efficiency report
system is being developed which will require submission
of reports on a more frequent basis regardless of duty
assignment. In addition, photographs are now required
to be submitted on all senior grade personnel. The re-
cently announced program of centralized management
of career personnel is another major effort by Depart-
ment of the Army to imprO\e all management aspects
of the career soldier, a part of which is the Centralized
Enlisted Promotion System.
The Origin 0/ Taps
Mrs. Julia H. Duncan
Since biblical times trumpet and drum calls have been used by military men as signals. One of
today's most ceremonious and unforgettable of all bugle calls is the American version of Taps.
Composed by Daniel Butterfield, a Union General, in July, 1862, at Harrison's Landing, Va., the
poignant notes of this refrain may be heard at the end of the soldier's day and, in solemn farewell,
at burial rites in American cemeteries around the world.
As a distinguished Army officer and a successful business man General Butterfield easily took his
place in the annals of American history. But in the field of military bugle calls, particularly with
regard to the origin of Taps, honor came belatedly to this unpretentious composer, a gentleman who
had no formal music education.
In August, 1898, just three years before the death of General Butterfield, Century Magazine car-
ried an article on "Trumpet and Bugle Calls" by Gustav Kobbe in which the author stated he had
been unable to trace the origin of the call used for Taps.
The feature attracted the attention of Major O. W. Norton, a member of General Butterfield's old
brigade. Writing from Chicago on August 8, 1898, Major Norton informed the editor of Century
Magazine that he could furnish the clue to the origin of Taps. According to his letter:
"One day, soon after the seven days' battles on the Peninsular, when the Army of the Potomac
was lying in camp at Harrison's Landing, General Daniel Butterfield, then commanding our Brigade,
sent for me, and showing me some notes on a staff written in pencil o.n the back of an envelope,
asked me to sound them on my bugle. I did this several times, playing the music as written. He
changed it somewhat, lengthening some notes and shortening others, but retaining the melody as
he first gave it to me. After getting it to his satisfaction, he directed me to sound that call for Taps
thereafter, in place of the regulation call. The music was beautiful on that still summer night, and
was heard for beyond the limits of our Brigade. "
The editor of Century Magazine immediately contacted General Butterfield at "Cragside", Cold
Spring, N.Y. in August, 1898, for confirmation of Major Norton's statements.
The General, then 67 years of age, replied, "I recall, in dim memory, the substantial truth of the
statement made by Norton .. about bugle calls. His letter gives the impression that I personally
wrote the notes for the call. The facts are, that at that time I could well sound calls on the bugle
as a necessary part of military knowledge and instruction for an officer commanding a regiment
or brigade. I had acquired this as a regimental commander. .. I cannot write a note of music
The calls of Taps did not seem to be as smooth, melodious and musical as it should be, and I
called in some one who could write music, and practiced a change in the call of Taps until I had it
to suit my ear, and then, as Norton writes, got it to my taste without being able to write music or
knowing the technical names of any note, but, simply by ear, arranged it as Norton describes./J
Thus was born today's American version of Taps.
In response to the frequently asked question, "lVhat
can I do to get promoted?", the reply is really quite
simple. Any soldier mmt keep himself among the best
qualified. Under the current promotion system every
eligible individual is competing for promotion 'within
his chosen career field and his record represents him in
this competition under the centralized system. If there
are any items that can be singled out as the most im
portant in a record, they would be the efficiency report
and 1\105 evaluation test scores. Thus, in order to be
judged as "best qualified" among his contemporaries.
a soldier must seek the responsible jobs and see to it
that his job performance will earn for him the desired
efficiency report, and do his very best on the annual
~ 1 0 5 evaluation test. 0
'r
Your Life
Major RaYIDond E. Funderburk
Blood-chilling screams of the charging Viet Cong
broke the early morning silence. In a human wave, the
yelling ve rushed the US position. Startled, the 35-man
Tecon platoar. hugged the mud and returned fire.
Spurting enemy rifles spread a yellow line across the
front of the positions. In each of the five bunkers,
soldiers watched in horror as the screaming mass moved
closer.
"BID'\-' the shouted Sergeant John 'V.
I\Jiller, senior man on the left flank bunker. All along
the line, similar orders ,,,'ere repeated and loud ex-
plosions erupted with a flash and a roar-spraying the
enemy with hot steel fragments. Horrible screams pene-
trated the battle noise but the attack continued.
"Holy Jesus ... look," muttered Sergeant l\filler. His
warning ,vas needless-the four men had seen. A
thicket of slender bamboo, 20 yards from their bunker,
slowly bent towards them. than 30 VC burst from
the bamboo toward l\liller's position.
Firing their i\'I16's on automatic and throwing gren-
ades, :'!iller's group fought savagely. With the VC only
three feet from the sandbags, Miller ordered a with-
drawal. "Get to the canal," he yelled.
Bending low, the four scrambled to the rear and
toward the muddy canal which was the last obstacle
to safety. Across the canal were more US troops and
artillery. 'Vith the recon platoon safely across the water,
the big I05mm hov.;itzers could be lowered and used
to stop the onrushing horde.
As the VC crawled into the bunker, Miller walked
bacbvards, firing from the hip to coyer the ,\Tithdrawal
of his men. Out of the corner of his eye, l\Iiller sa'\'''
one of the men drop. Racing over, he found three VC
standing near the fallen man. In the darkness, the
enemy soldiers hadn't seen l\Iiller approach. He cut
them down with a short burst of fire. On hands and
knees, l\.filler dragged the young soldier in the direction
of the canal.
Straining and heaving. the slender sergeant pulled
the limp form through the mud and brittle swamp
grass. "Don't worry," he whispered to the youngster,
"I'll get you back."
l\filler was still talking softly to the wounded
er when an enemy grenade plopped near his head-.
Miller rolled aside and hugged the soggy ground. A
searing pain came with the blast. Hot, sticky fluid ran
into the sergeant's eyes. Shaking his head, igoring the
wound, cravded beside the injured trooper. He
felt for the pulse-nothing.
The hardened NCO fought back the mixed tears of
grief and anger. Twisting, still on his stomach, he faced
the enemy and fired a full clip in anger. Quickly re-
loading, Miller rolled around and crawled to the canal.
The frontal attack continued. Slowly, steadily, the
human wave pushed nearer. Friendly artillery from
across the canal fired directly into the line of Viet
Cong, thinning and slowing the attack,
After overrunning l\liller's bunker, the VC moved
along the platoon's left flank toward the next position
in line.
In the next bunker, three men lay stunned from the
impact of an enemy grenade. "Anybody hurt?" question-
ed Sergeant Jack 1\1. \"'edge"tood. His two companions
answered that they were all right. "\Vell keep firing, for
Christ sake," implored the vdncing ""'ith
pain. Grenade fragments ,,,'ere embeded in his face
and neck. He crawled back into a firing position and
resumed the fight.
\\Tith their attention fixed to the front, the three
were unaware of the approaching danger to the left.
In the darkness, 'with the confusion and noise of battle,
they had no V.lav of kno\\'ino- that Sergeant
, b
position had been taken by the enemy.
. \'Vedgewood sensed something-a moyement. He
around and looked up-into the face of a glar-
Ing VIet Cong. They both fired at the same time. The
enemy soldier fell. But the VC bullets had taken a
toll. Wedgewood had a gaping hole in his shoulder.
\Vedgewood saw the approaching enemy. \Vith guer-
rillas surging toward the bunker from the front, and
from the left flank, Wedgewood decided to pull back.
"\Vhen I count three, run lIke hell for the canal,"
shouted \\T edgewood, grimacing with pain as he pulled
the pin on a grenade and held it in his hand.
"One ... Two ... Three!" he yelled in quick suc-
cession. He waited until the other two sprang from the
bunker, then dropped the grenade at his feet. He
jumped outside the sandbagged enclosure as the VC
leaped inside. The ear-splitting explosion lifted the
enemy bodies. They fell limply across the sandbags.
The recon platoon leader, Lieutenant Lee B. Alley,
used the third bunker in line as his command post. In
the CP were his two radio operators and an artillery
forward observer. During the initial stages of the at-
tack, one of the radio men ,\'as seriously wounded by
an enemy mortar.
vVith one man ''''ollllded, contact broken with the
rest of the platoon, and the VC charge almost upon
the CP, Alley pondered the feasibility of remaining.
Only when he saw Wedgewood's group pull out did
he order the platoon's withdrawal.
"Pull back ... Pull back:' Alley shouted in both
directions. He didn't know if he could be heard, or if
the bunkers to the left and right were still occupied by
his men. He kept yelling.
To the right of the CP bunker, the men in positions
four and five heard the command and started to with-
dra,,,,'. The enemy pressure had been less critical in their
area so the two groups made it to the canal without

Alley turned to the men in his bunker. "O.K., Dean,
You go first. We'll cover you," Alley said. PFC Thomas
J. Dean, the remaining uninjured radio operator,
crouched and scram bled for the canal. Alley , .. 'atched as
Dean suddenly stopped, jerked and fell.
"He's hit!" yelled Alley. "Cover me, I'm going after
him." The slender lieutenant ran from the bunker,
ignoring the heavy volume of enemy fire. Reaching
Dean's side, he flopped dO\-\'ll and looked at the groan
ing soldier. Realizing that Dean's wound was serious,
Alley grabbed him by the collar and pulled him to the
muddy canal.
At the canal bank, Alley peered along the shoreline.
of his meo ,vere standing ,,'aist deep in the swirl
iog 'water, using the low bank for coyer against the
withering enemy fire.
Alley pushed Dean into the murky, brov{o water and
rolled in. "Here, take Dean and get him across," Alley
said, handing the wounded radio operator to a near-
by soldier. The young officer turned and began ",,'ad-
ing along the canal bank, pushing his men toward open
'water, urging them across. "Take off what you can
and swim. Get across-GO!" he yelled, 'waving his arm
toward the friendly side.
his men ,,,'ere responding, Alley crawled
up the slimy edge of the canal and raced for the CP
bunker. On the way he met the artillery FO dragging
his radio man. Shouting as he passed, Alley urged them
on and added, "Keep his head out of the water."
At the bunker, Aile)' picked up a rifle and began
firing. The VC were less than 10 feet a,,;a),. 'Vith ammo
gone, he groped in the darkness for grenades on the
floor of the bunker, found three and tossed them at the
approaching enemy. \rith nothing left to fight lvith,
he turned and ran to the canal.
Feet first, Alley leaped into the slimy stream. Strok-
ing 'with all his might, he pushed for the other bank.
Spouts of water kicked up near his head as the VC
tried to stop him, 'Vith one last lunge, he made the
safe side and rolled over the eeIge. Only then did he
realize the artillery guns were blasting over his head.
Wet and tired, Alley lay panting beside the troops
lined up along the canal dike, firing into the enemy
on the far bank. Rested, he cra1Nled through the
men counting survivors of the s",:im. His head count
showed three men were missing. He counted again,
then sat and tried to remember 'who was missing.
The guns stopped firing. Gun crews were shouting
and pointing to the far side. Aney peered over the
bank to see his three men slide into the water. "Keep
firing .. , Keep firing." he shouted to the cre, .. 's, telling
them to fire to keep the VC from capturing his men.
Alley found a rubber air mattress, pushed it into the
water and started across. The artilley rounds crashed
overhead as he paddled to the men.
Two of the three were wounded. He put one on the
air mattress, held the other and all four returned to
safety.
"Where the hell have you been?" asked Alley, safe
behind the protective canal dike, gasping for breath.
They told how the VC had attacked between their
location and the platoon, cutting them off from the unit
and the canal. Hiding among the tall reeds, they watch-
ed as VC doctors and nurses, ",.'Omen and children car-
ried the enemy 'wounded and dead from the battlefield.
They related how the enemy eventually pushed to the
canal, leaving an avenue for their escape.
Relieved that his platoon was safe, Alley found a
radio and called the ba ttalion commander. Reporting
the recon platoon's position to the CO, Alley was
ordered to direct the fire of the helicopter gunships
and flareships overhead. \Vith the combined effect of
the gunships and the artillery, the enemy force was
pushed back.
By 0600, everything was quiet. The early morning sun
lighted the battlefield, sending a yellmv warmth across
what was a black hell only two hours before.
Fresh troops were sent across the canal to inspect the
scene. They found enemy rocket launchers, equipment
and grenades-but only five enemy bodies. Looking
deeper into the brush, they found a path of blood, five
yards wide. Viet Cong dead and 'wounded had been
moved along the route to waiting sampans and then
evacuated.
The battalion CO gathered his men and questioned
them, trying to ascertain hm.\' many VC each had seen
killed. A total of 83 enemy had been observed by the
men, either lying dead or being killed by the murder-
ous artillery fire. Tabulation showed more than 300
VC made the attack.
Even with the element of surprise in their favor,
the large VC force , .. 'as unable to penetrate the artillery
position. Lieutenant Alley evacuated 23 wounded and
three dead of his original 35 men. But their efforts pre-
vented an enemy victory. 0
For his actions that early morning. Lieutenant Alley
was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.-Editor
.,:\fajor then sen1ing as Info'rmation
Officer of the 9th Infantry Division in Vietnam}
inter{licwed Lieutenant Alley two days after the
action described irl this mticle.
,\[alor Funderburk graduated from the Infantry
Officer Basic Course in 1958 and the Advanced
Course ill 196f). He has earned the Silver Star}
Legion of Air Army Commendation
Afedal w,icluster and Pllrple Heart w/clllster. He
is currently a graduate student in journalism at
the Unh'ersity of Alabama.
July-Aug 1969 INFANTRY 21
--___ t .. .. .. ....... 2'"Z ... __ ----_ ... ___ ..... _ ... __ .... __ ........ ...... _,, .. j_ ....... ,_. ---... ,--
.. for progressive military thinking through thought-provoking ideas
Officer Pronlotion System
Sfilitary la,,,,' provides that promo-
tions be fair and be made on an
equitable basis, and that selections
must be based on ability and effi-
ciency. The Army utilizes the Offi-
cer Efficiency Report (OER) to
provide data for promotion selec-
tion. In the last decade, the OER
has undergone three major readjust-
ments. The latest report is supposed
to increase the report's objectivity
and oermit greater discrimination.
',ViII the new report accomplish
these missions? It is doubtful. In
lieu of the old 1-5 rating on each
personal quality, where a 5 rating
signified that an officer had an out-
standing degree of the specific qual-
ity, a ne" .. ' 1-5 rating has been sub-
stituted , ...here the 1 signifies that
the rated officer has that degree of
quality that would place him in the
top 20 per cent of officers. l\hny
people consider 75 per cent a pass-
ing score and thus the probability
exists that not many ratings of 2
will be given. A rating of 2 would
signify that the officer posses that
degree of a specific quality which
would put him in the 60-80 per cent
category. At least on the old report
a 4 signified that the individual
possessed the rated quality, but not
to a God-like degree. All I's prob-
ably will be the rule rather than the
exception. Thus, a greater degree
of discrimination between rated of-
ficers does not appear possible.
That portion of the report requir-
ing an officer to rank an individual
within the rated group has already
forced some organizations to restruc-
ture their rating procedures. Re-
alignments have taken place so no
one \""ill rate more than four of five
officers, thus allowing more officers
to be rated number one and the
lowest to receive only a "lout of 5."
In addition, reports can be submit-
ted at different times, thus, permit-
ting more than one "} out of 5."
Application of these loop holes
could be considered intellectual
dishonesty.
Counselling Not Avoilable
Probably the greatest problem
\""ith the new report is the lack of a
requirement for the rating officer
to show the report to the rated offi-
cer. Basic human relations and of-
ficer morale seem to demand tha t a
rater be required to personally face
the rated officer and discuss his re-
port. A pamphlet entitled, "The
:Morale Function of the Executive,"
published by the American "tvIan-
agement Association states:
"The frank personal interview
with the chief executive, \,,",hich
might be considered an obvious re-
course except that too often execu-
tives carryon to the end vdthout
having been given any inkling by
management that their attitudes or
acti\'ities are unsatisfactory."
A study conducted at Fort Knox,
Ky., on a random sample of captains
attending the Armor Advanced
Course sho'wed that officers were
counselled on the average of once
per nine efficiency reports. Coun-
selling was defined as the rater per-
sonally discussing \\'ith the rated of-
ficer his good and bad attributes
and providing recommendations on
how the rated officer could improve
his performance.
Ideally, these counselling sessions
should take place early in a rating
period to provide enough time for
the rated officer to respond to the
suggestions prior to the actual rat-
ing. How can the young officers
progress if the experienced officers
are not willing to share their ex
periences and offer suggestions?
The January 29, 1969, issue of
Army Times carried an article on a
~ I a j o r Lavell :Merritt, who is retir-
ing from the service. Although his

,
j
i
I
situation is controversial, he made
some statements that demand the
full attention of the Army. Major
said that efficiency reports
should be shown to the rated officer
and that the [ated officer should be
permitted to discuss the report with
his rater. He also said: "Let's have
truth and integrity in the system."
Since the efficiency report is the
major document used by the Army
to evaluate an officer, it must be
handled with the utmost integrity.
The officers today, being a product
of the present society, demand full
disclosure, to include the haws and
whys of ratings. They will not set-
tle for a communications gap. Can
an officer today respect his superior
if the superior lacks the moral cour-
age to tell the subordinate just what
he thinks of his performance?
One mission of a rater should be
to develop subordinates. Hmo\' can
this be accomplished ,vithout sin-
cere counselling and full truthful-
ness and disclosure of efficiency re-
ports? Ho",' can we say our system
is fair if it permits a superior officer
to rate an individual and yet not
demand that the rated officer have
full knmvledge of his strengths and
weaknesses? Any officer VdlO does
not care about his manner of per-
ionnance, how others rate his per-
formance, his strong attributes, his
weak qualities, and how he can im-
prove himself, should not be an of-
ficer in the United States Army.
Protecting the Rater
Unfortunately, in the same issue
of Army Times, we find the follmv-
ing headline, "OER Raters Untied."

This article relates that the regula-
tions governing the new efficiency
report have been changed. Now,
the rater never has to show a report
to the rated officer. The article goes
on to say that the change should
ease the decision making among rat-
ers, particularly "good guy" officers
VdlO find it difficult, face to face, to
tell a brother officer that he is be-
low par.
Further, the statement is made
that the rater will be spared the em-
barrassment of a confrontation with
the low-rated officer. ,"Ve worry
about a particular breed of rater,
and we desire to protect him from
meeting his responsibility. \Vhat of
the rights, the desires, and the life
vocation of the rated officer. \Vhat
safeguards are built into the system
to protect the rated officer? It is
not logical to expect an officer sta-
tioned overseas to travel to \Vash-
ington, D. C., to see his report.
:\Iost officers have no reason to sus-
pect that they got a 1m\' rating and
they don't find out until it is too
late to do anything about it.
Requiring a rater to show the rat-
ed officer his report could also elim-
inate many errors on reports. For
example, a captain stated that when
he checked his report he was de-
scribed as having strange religious
ideals. It should have stated that he
possessed strong religious ideals.
Since the rater discussed the report
with the rated officer, this mistake
'was found and immediately correct-
ed. Ho",' many other mistakes have
taken place, will continue to take
place, and will not be corrected?
The new Officer Efficiency Re,
port also requires a rater to confine
his description of the rated officer's
performance to the space provided
on the forms if possible. This re-
quirement places a priority on writ-
ing ability in order to adequately
describe a year's work in 100 words
or less. If a report is not to become
a numbers game, a full listing of
tasks accomplished and manner of
performance should be encouraged.
\\Till ,,,'e ever have an officer
ing system that satisfies all? The
answer is probably no. However,
constant review and studies directed
to the officers themselves must be
conducted. How the new report
will correlate with the old reports
remains to be seen. How the Army
will evaluate each is also unknown.
Secondary Zone Promotion System
The Secondary Zone Promotion
System is a subject that will start an
emotional discussion wherever
rers gather. Hmvever most officers
are ignorant of the system. Army
Regulations concerned 'with officer
promotions are written in abstract
terms. Detailed knowledge of the
selection system is not known and
" .. hat officers think they know re-
sembles a complex mixture of ru-
mor and fantasy. Why should there
be this lack of knowledge on a sub,
ject of such importance to all
eers? It is because selections are
made by a group of officers who are
not required to state why some
cers are selected and others are not.
The criteria used by each board may
be the same or different from all
other boards. The criteria for selec-
tion are not known.
Lieutenant Colonel John O.
-
Childs, formerly assigned to OPO,
writing in the Jan-Feb 1969 issue of
INFANTRY, stated: "Promotions
are one of the most important per-
sonnel actions that affect the indi-
vidual." He also wrote that officers
are not aware of the detailed opera-
tions of the Army system used to
select officers for promotion. 'Vhose
fault is this? Is the information
available? Does the Army have a
program with the responsibility to
insure that all officers are a1"-'are of
the methodology of promotion se-
lection? The ans'wer to the last two
questions is no!
We find experts in the field of
executive leadership who feel this is
wrong. Dr. Joseph L. Krieger in his
book "Principles and Problems of
Executive Leadership" writes that
among the principles of a sound ex-
ecutive promotion program are the
following:
Opportunities for promotion
are clearly outlined in terms of ex-
perience, training, and other quali-
fications needed in higher level jobs.
Promotion policy is disseminat-
ed and understood by all concerned.
Colonel Childs further states that:
"Selection boards do not divulge the
basis of their recommendations;
therefore, no one can tell an officer
specifically why he was not select-
ed." Hm",' can a branch career man-
agement office aid an officer if it
does not have this information? Ob-
viously. such a department can only
surmise at the reason for an officer
not being selected for promotion.
Several officers have stated that no
apparent reason could be given
,..,hen they queried their branches.
Give Branches a Greater Role
An officer normally serves in his
basic branch his entire career. Yet
Colonel Childs points out that
branches are not an active part of
the promotion system. He goes on
to say. however, that the branches
are best qualified to analyze an offi-
cer's records. Thus, the promotion
system appears to depend on other
than the best qualified sources of in-
formation.
Admittedly, the appointed pro-
motion board has an enormously
difficult task. The board must ana-
lyze thousands of records and deter-
mine which officers are to be pro-
moted. Regardless of the board's
diligence, some officers will not
agree with the selections.
Those officers who are selected
and those officers who are not select-
ed should be able to find out the
specific reason for the action. If a
system cannot provide this, then the
system is faulty. Large numbers is
no excuse. Promotion data should
be more discriminating. Initial
screening could be conducted by the
branches and a percentage of eligi-
ble records could go forward to the
board based on the needs of the
Army and the size of the branch.
The board would have fewer re-
cords to screen and could inject a
standard cri terion for final selec-
tion. Each officer in the zone of
consideration whose record was not
sent forward by the branch would
be provided with concrete reasons
for nonselection.
The current system lacks individ-
ual responsiveness and truthfulness.
It is shrouded in secrecy. \Ve owe
every officer the right to know
where he stands and why. Officer
morale demands that facts be made
known. Dr. Krieger 'Hote: "The
value of promotion is its role as a
motivating factor for greater effi-
ciency and improved performance."
Promotions have too great an im-
pact on the Army and the individ-
ual to permit the use of a system
that is unable to provide basic an-
swers and aid in the career manage-
ment function.
Questions About the System
Officers selected for Secondary
Zone Promotion are usually surpris-
ed at their selection. As is the case
'with their fellow officers who are
not selected, no reason for their se-
lection is given. Needless to say,
they are elated, they obtain a halo
effect, and they tend to accept the
system. Also, their probabilities of
future promotions are enhanced.
The officers on the other side of the
coin, hm\'ever, become frustrated,
and finally. since no recourse exists,
resign themselves to the situation.
Some of the questions asked con-
cerning Secondary Zone Promotions
bear further investigation. The fol-
lowing points are usually discussed
at various officer gatherings:
":hy \'\'as so and so selected?
'Vhy "\',,'asn't so and so selected?
'Vhat was the promotion crite-
rion?
,
.". ~ --.--.-
'Vas my record ever seen by the
board?
'Vas so and so selected because
he had worked '\""ith or knew an of-
ficer on the board?
The board has too many re-
cords to check, and the selection is
probably made at random since
there is no time for a detailed ana-
lysis.
Command is recognized by the
officers as the ultimate duty, and
yet, individuals whose duty has been
mostly schooling and teaching are
promoted faster.
Generals' aides have the best
chance since in theory generals only
select the most outstanding officers,
rate high, and their reports carry
more weight with the boards.
\Iany other gripes exist, but these
are illustrative. The first four ques-
tions require full disclosure. The
remainder could be statistically ex-
amined and the results made known
to the oficer corps.
Recommendations
:\ knowledgeable officer corps is
the basis for high morale, efficiency
and moti\ation. The follmving rec-
ommendations could eliminate most
complaints about promotions:
Increase promotion input data.
This could be accomplished by re-
quiring exams. peer ratings. and an
OER that \\'ould discriminate across
20 points, or even 100 points, on
each attribute rather than the cur-
rent five points.
Insert a raters' index into the
rating system. Raters. for various
reasons, do not rate equally. A
raters' index system could be estab-
lished to take this into considera-
tion. A rating of three by one offi-
cer may correspond to a rating of
t"w or one in the eyes of another
rater. Each rater "wuId receive a
numerical index based on all his
pre\'ious ratings. An officer rated
by a low rater. but obtaining high
ratings would have his rating ad-
justed upward. A downward ad-
justment would be made for an offi-
cer rated high by a consistently high
rater. The entire system would be a
simple computer operation.
Begin with the premise that the
vast majority of officers are endO\\'-
ed \",ith integrity and moral cour-
age. Require raters to counsel and
to show the rated their reports. Try
to eliminate the officer who cannot
confront a subordinate rather than
legislate protection for him.
Code OER's prior to going to a
selection board. Social security num-
bers could be used for rated, raters.
endorsers and reviewers. The board
would then select on the basis of the
record and not the name of the in-
diddual or for whom he worked.
Further, it should be a requirement
that a board member would not se-
lect or offer any assistance if he has
any personal knm\l'ledge of an offi-
cer who is in the promotion zone.
These changes would eliminate fa-
yoritism since an officer of equal
ability, but not lucky enough to
know a board mem ber, has no one
to speak for him.
Allow the branches to deter-
mine the initial selection of officers.
As mentioned above, the branch is
best qualified to evaluate perform-
ances and duties l\'ithin its own
branch, and such a procedure ,""ould
materially assist the boards.
Require boards to provide de-
tailed cri teria for promotion selec-
tion and to furnish reasons for non-
selection of officers to the branch
concerned. The officer who knows
the facts has the necessary informa-
tion to act on his deficiencies.
Call upon specialists from the
civilian community and Govern-
ment to constantly review our pro-
motion system.
The above recommendations are
just a beginning in lifting the cloud
of secrecy now associated with pro-
motions. '\Te may never have a per-
fect solution, but we must have a
fair and trustful one.
Major Charles J. Garvey
Hq USARV, G3 FD
The purpose of the Forum is to
allow the readers of INFANTRY to
publicly express thought-provoking
ideas on sub/eels of interest to In-
fantrymen. The opinions expressed
nre those of the authors and do not
reflect official policy of the United
States Army Infantry School or any
other Department of Defense agen-
cy. - EditoT
, ~ - - .
INFANTRY reinstituted the INFANTRY Forum in the January.February 1969 issue to allow
readers to express thought.provoking ideas on subjects of interest to Infantrymen.
The Forum article which appeared in that issue, "Assault Fire" by Colonel Robert W. Jami.
son, apparently did provoke mnch thought and discussion and resulted in a reevaluation of
the techniques of assault fire being tanght at the Infantry School and several Army Training
Centers.
It also resulted in several short articles on assault fire which are presented below. The first
article represents the current Infantry School thinking on the subject and the other three are
personal opinions, both for and against Colonel Jamison's position.-Editor
From
The
Infantry
School
T K\NK YOU, COLONEL Your 11\:-
F.:\l"\TRY Forum article did exactly ,,,hat it should, at
least at the United States Army Infantry School. ,,,re
scattered the dust; 'we studied the problem; and 'we
searched our souls.
You are quite fight; 1VC should not teach impractical
techniques. \Ve certainly agree that fire and rom'e
ment is the normal course of action, especially in a
war like Vietnam, 'where platoons and squads in close
contact seldom have absolute fire superiority. But we
disagree that assault fire is not valid doctrine and "that
'we should teach only one technique .... " \Ve believe
that the appropriate and judiciolls use of assault fire is
valid and that it should be taught along with other
techniques.
Assault fire is the point in question; therefore, let us
analylc it. lNhen assault fire is used by an element, all
its members move and fire theiT weapons at the same
time. This provides the advantage of rapid advance to
the objective. 'Ve do not know of any other technique
that provides for every member of the clement to be
firing and moving at the same time.
Once the assault movement begins, the fires and
movement of the combat element can be more easily
controlled than during fire and movement. In addition,
the sight of an element assaulting in a firm and steady
line has a demoraliling effect on the defender. On the
other hand, since the attacking force using assault fire
does not have cover, it must expect to take casualties if
the defender has the capability of returing effective
fire. Colonel Jamison cited a relevant example. One
defender, in a hunker with a firing device connected
to several Claymore mines, would be able to gain
ahsolute fire superiority over an attacker entering the
killing zone in a line formation. Some military men
claim this vulnerability to enemy fire is so important
that no commander ,viII ever select assault fire as a
course of action.
:Kext let us analyze' fire and movement. This tech
nique does not permit an attacking element to ad-
vance as rapidly as does assault fire. Only part of the
attacking element, whether individuals, fire teams 01
squads, moves at one time while the remaining per-
sonnel provide covering fire. Csing this technique, the
attacking element has less fire power, and movement is
more difficult to controL Fire and movement, however,
provides greater security since at least part of the unit
has some co,-er from enemy fire and ".fell defined tar-
gets are seen by the enemy for only an instant. 'VeIl
executed, it may be as demoralizing to the enemy as
assault fire.
In comparison, assault fire provides speed, fire pmver
and control, but it does not provide security. Fire and
movement is slower, more difficult to control, am}
provides less fire power, but is more secure. Speed,
control and security are the important differences.
There ,vill be instances when a leader will want the
speed and (antral proyided by assault fire instead of
the greater security that may be provided by fire and
mO\'ement. The considerations he must use are the old
stand-bys: mission, enemy situation (effect of enemy
fire), terrain and visibility, and troops available.
Based upon this analysis, we feel there are three
situations ,,;hen a commander might order assault fire.
They are:
(I) The maneuver element has absolute fire super-
iority (the enemy is not delivering effecti\'e fire and
does not have the ability to deliver effective fire, even
temporarily), and the leader has a need for the speed of
movement and control afforded by assault fire.
(2) The maneuver element does not have the fire
superiority described above, but the leader is willing to
accept the casualties that will occur by using assault
fIre in order to accomplish his mission.
(3) The maneuver element does not have the fire
superiority described abm'e but must accept the casual-
ties that will occur by using assault fire because there
is no cover for firing elements and the use of fire and
mo\'ement would cause more casualties than assault
fire.
There are combat examples to illustrate each of these
general conditions but because each case must be
judged on its merits, we will use typical examples
instead. One example of the first situation is an assault
on a specific objective during which the enemy gets up
and flees or withdraws, as in the case of an enemy secur-
ity element. The assaulting unit commander may order
his unit to use assault fire to more quickly follow the
enemy in order to capture or destroy him. Assault fire
also is ideally suited for the successful non-illuminated
night attack where maximum control is required and in
certain Infantry-tank assaults ,,,-here speed is essential.
Examples of the second situation are a counter-
attack, a break-out from a near ambush or any other
mission ,,,-hen speed is essential. In the final situation, if
the enemy employs indirect fires on the attacker dur-
ing the assault, the leader may decide he will take few-
er casualties by using assault fire than he would by the
slov.'er pace of fire and movement.
The Infantry School believes that it places assault
fire training in its proper perspective. ,Ve believe that
there are cases when it will be valid to use it and our
young leaders should be trained to recognize those
cases.
'Ve also believe that an important point from Field
l\Ianual 7-15 was ignored in Colonel Jamison's article.
Paragraph 33 strongly supports the use of fire and
movement during the assault. Perhaps this manual is
not clear enough regarding the considerations necessary
in order to properly select the best method. The
Infantry School will do its utmost to insure that this
point is clarified in the forthcoming revision to FM7-15
so that no doubt will exist that fire and movement is
the normal technique and assault fire is the exception.
\Ve also are very interested in methods of emphasizing
this point during training. 'Ve invite letters from the
field regarding ideas of how to provide the proper
environment so that each method will 'be taught in its
proper perspective.
Hurrah
For
Colonel
Jamison
l\fajor La"wrence K. Tudhope
Company Operations Department
Fort Benning, Georgia
HURRAH FOR COLOC\EL ]A:\IlSOK! After three
wars and numerous unnecessary casualties, someone
finally has exposed the fallacious concept of the up-
right, walking technique of assault fire.
The strongest argument for assault fire has been the
belief that once the assaulting unit stops walking and
hits the ground it is extremely difficult to get the men
moving again. However, experience has proved that
there usually is too much enemy fire not to hit the
ground. It is almost always necessary to build up an
effective rifle fire base and then move in close by short
rushes from the final coordination line.
I believe that assault fire training is the most out-
standing weakness in the training of the US Infantry-
man. One reason for this is that so fev ... officers receive
intensi\'e squad training. I attended the Light and
Heavy "\\Teapons Course as an enlisted man during
World War II. Later I graduated from the US Mili-
tary Academy and also taught ROTC at a civilian uni-
versity. Therefore I believe that I am qualified to say
that other than OCS graduates, officers do not have
enough of the squad phase of training. Also, the offi-
cers prepare the unit training schedules and many
slight squad training because they are not fully aware
of its importance.
: ~
The basic solution to the problem of properly con-
ducting assault fire is practice, , . practice ... practice.
... And this practice must be accomplished with live
ammunition. Blank ammunition just does not create
a realistic atmosphere. Ho\, .. ' else can the individual
soldier develop the automatic reflexes, become ac-
quainted with the noise, smoke and confusion of battle,
know the fallacy of everybody loading his Ml6 at the
same time, and learn to coordinate his rush with the
supporting rifle fire "\',:ithout hours of practice using
live ammunition?
Experience has shown us in Vietnam that a once-a-
year battle drill exercise simply is not enough training
to effectively develop the instantaneous reactions neces-
sary during the assault fire phase of combat. l\.[any
Infantry officers do not know the need for continuous
live fire practice and avoid it like the plague because
of the unpleasant situation resulting from training
casualties. Let's face it. It is dangerous. If the trainees
appropriately camouflage themselves, employ stealth
while moving to the FCL and then rush forward under
the "crack" of supporting rifles just to his rear, the
chances for injuries are much greater than ''''hen using
the safe but totally unrealistic blank ammo exercise or
simply firing from a straight line, shoulder-to-shoulder
formation.
Training should emphasize the proper use of sup-
porting fires during the assault. The soldier also must
be taught that during the assault he seldom will see the
enemy and therefore must fire at every clump of bushes,
small rise in the ground, or fold in the earth that could
possibly hide an opposing rifleman, Pop-up targets are
unrealistic and encourage the trainee to fire only at
obvious targets; a habit he will carry \'.;ith him into
combat.
The comments stated herein may seem obvious to
most readers. That this problem still exists is frustrat-
ing. General Fry's book, "Battle Drill," based on
\Vorld 'Var II and Korean combat experience. com-
pletely discredits the upright, walking technique of
assault fire. Yet this method has. crept back into our
Infantry doctrine and training exercises.
In summary, we can produce a better trained In-
fantryman if we:
Practice fire and moyement exercises at least once
a month.
Use live ammunition in assault training.
Learn to properly use supporting fires.
Teach riflemen to fire at likely enemy hiding
places during the assault and not hold their fire for
an obvious target.
Under
Attack
For
20 Years
LTC "'fark E. Jones
29th Korean Infantry Regiment
C
OLO;\iEL JAMISON'S FINE article on assault fire
in the January-February 1969 issue of INFANTRY
strikes another worthwhile blow against a dangerous
tactical training practice. Undue emphasis upon assault
fire has been under continuing attack for the last 20
years based both upon its unrealistic concept and its
rare use in com bat.
As a result of this campaign, current doctrine in-
cludes the alternative of assault by fire and movement,
although this procedure unfortunately visualizes a final
dosing with the enemy employing assault fire, rather
than by a full speed dash covered by a forward base of
fire of a portion of the assault force. However, based
upon Colonel Jamison's Forum article, the alternative
procedure apparently still receives limited emphasis.
Cse of assault fire against a pmition defended by
mines and other obstacles 'i\"OlIld be disa')terolls, es-
pecially during a limited visibility attack. Even against
a position lacking such defenses, tests have shO\l;'n that
a determined defender posse.,ses hetter than a 10 to one
advantage against a line attack employing assault fire
over a IOO-meter walking advance. Hence, only against
a poor defender who fails to man his position is assault
fire a good gamble.
COL Henrv E. Kelly (Ret.)
USA Infantry Human Research Unit
Fort Benning, Georgia
A Platoon
Leader's
Point
of View
C
OU)XEL CO:\'SlDERED some very good
point-. in his recent article in INFANTRY about
the use of the a'>sault fire technique. However, as a
former rifle platoon leader. I believe that there are
I would use marching fires.
:\Iarching fires dC'icribes the ac t far better than
"as,,>ault fire tClhni(lue." In ,1Il\' case J \\'ill use the term
to mean, "attacking in line formation, firing from the
shoulder or hip at a sustained rate, while closing with
the enemy."
I agree with Colonel Jel1nison that the normal
method for a platoon to c1o'ie with the enemy the la5t
fe-w meters is fire and moyement. Paragraph 33 of Field
7-15 explains the use of fire and movement
all the way to the objective:
"'Vhen supporting fires have not been entirely effec-
tive or sufficient supporting fires are not available to
neutralize the enemy fires, and fire superiority re-
mains in the balance, fire and movement is the only
means by which the attack can proceed ... ," It is one
of the most important paragraphs in the manual and is
difficult to understand for someone who cannot call
upon experience to understand the key words, "fire
superiority."
As Colonel Jamison stated, it may be true that Army
training improperly places emphasis on marching fires
during the assault. The training I received in both
Advanced Individual Training and Officer Candidate
School left me with the impression that I would use
marching fires in m05t assaults. The impression I re-
ceived was that it i ..... a technique of movement that
proyjdes greater speed and firepower. However, when
I ordered marching fires in Vietnam, I learned that the
casualties from effective enemy fire might endanger the
success of nl'y attack. Therefore, fire and movement
across the objective, creeping and cra,ding all the way
if necessary, became the normal method of movement
for my platoon.
However, if the situation should warrant it, my
platoon will use marching fires on my command and
Train me to consider the alternatives. Give
me a miSSIOn. GiYe me the support I request. Expect
me to make the decision. Don't make me simply a radio
telephone operator. I'll accomplish the mission faster,
with fewer casualties and a higher body count.
j
\farching fires still do apply .. \ highl) disorgani/ed
enemy with poor!) trained soldiers lllay ?;in: me
luxury of complete fire superioritr. and aliow me to
u'Se marching fires from the final coordination line
(FeL) across the objective. 1\1y rifle platoon also may
manhing fires in a combined arms team attack.
\1y platoon might even me marching fires against
enemy positions in South Vietnam. Once I make con-
tact with the enemy, I will call for indirect support and
start u,>ing battle drill. As my platoon moyes doser to
the encTll)'s position and taking fragments frOI'n
our supporting fires, I will shilt the fires to the reJr
and flanks of the objective, cutting off an.'nues of
escape. \1'y platoon "will continue to use fire and
movement until I am within hand grenade range. If
we are not recei\-ing effective enemy fire at this time,
I lNill have my platoon <,tand up and move fonvard
shoulder to shoulder placing "iell aimed fire to our
front.
One method of eliminating VC resi<,tance is to use
CS. I found that CS delivered on the objective during
the preparatory fires caused well dug in XVA troops
to cease to resist. ,rith our ma"ks on, we v ..-ere able to
close '\-'jth and capture the enemy marching fires
,,jthout taking casualties.
::\larching fires can be effectively used to give me
the psychological advantage o\'er a withdrawing enemy
Once an enemy is forced to start a retrograde move-
ment we (an exploit our success best by s,vift, violent
action. The Infantry company that aggressively (run-
ning hell for leather and ')houting) attacks the de-
td( hlllenh kit in ton tact or the rear guard of a with-
dLlwillg eneilly. can easily .,tart a rout.
\[y platoon al.;;o will u"e marching fires if the added
momcntuill of the attack (or counter attack) is absolute-
ncce,,:,ary for the of the action. If I cannot
a foothold "'ith the assistance of supporting
fires; or, if J am trying to push back an enemy break-
through, I may be forced by the situation to lead my
men, marthing fire';, through enemy fire to seize
or hold certain terrain. l'\ot a desirable .,ituation by
any means. Howevcr, when speed of action is p3.ra-
moune then it prohahly ,,'ill be the best action.
Colonel Jamison is correct to say I will not use march-
ing fires all the time or eyen most of the time. :\[y
normal method of movement will be fire and move-
ment all the way atross an enemy position, probably
more than 90 per cent of the time. The use of march-
ing fires will be limited, but our leaders and men still
should be taught to use them.
rifle platoon will be proficient in fire and move
ment, but they will also kno,,,' marching fires and be
prepared to use them when the opportunity presents
itself. I am the leader on the ground. I must decide
whether to lIse marching fires or fire and movement.
Leave the decision to me.
ILT ;\icho1as J. Harding
Company Operations Department
L1niteu States Army Infantry School
Fort Benning. Georgia
July - Aug
1969 INFANTRY 31
__ " ________ ______ ____ J ________
NEIGHBORHOOD
WAR
NEIGHBORHOOD
ARMY
"Water shapes its cOllrse according to the
ground over which it flows . .. as water retains
no constant shape, so in warfare there are no
constant conditions. He who can modify his
tactics in )'elation to his OjJ/JOnent can achieve
the victory."
"The Art of War"
Sun Tzu 500 B.C.
MAJOR JOH;''; M. LITTLE
T
here are two 'ways for a military effort to
counter an insurgency in terms of p r i o r i ~ y of
effort. One is to consider insurgent main force
units as the primary threat, and to commit massed
conventional forces toward the objective of destroying
such elemen ls. This a pproach assumes that the 50-
called infrastructure will either fade away or be elimi-
nated later by other efforts, and generally considers
these ragtag guerrillas and local politicians as beneath
the dignity of a "professional." The US operation in
Vietnam to date has emphasized this approach.
A second way is to consider the local guerrilla,iinfra-
structure as paramount in the conflict, and to commit
decentraliLed, unconventional forces to eliminating
them. This approach recognizes that mainforce enemy
elements are vitally dependent on this guerrilla base for
recruits, intelligence, coordination, and logistics and
can be made easy targets for our conventional forces
only by a counterpart deployment at the lowest level.
This is an approach which, though not totally ignored
J
1969 INFANTRY 33
July - Aug
h __
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - Q ~ j .
thus far in Vietnam, has been slighted.
This article is a portion of an intended book, by the
same title, which describes an operational program for
the latter approach. It makes no claims to originality
of thought in proposing "friendly guerrillas" to fight
guerrillas, but it does attempt to offer an operational
plan rather than vague conceptual hypotheses.
:Much of our concern in Vietnam to date has been
with the central highlands, but that is not the ultimate
objective of the communist enemy. The populated area
of Vietnam is the key terrain in this kind of war, and
incl udes the hamlets and villages along the coastal
lowland belts of I, II, and III Corps and the rubber
plantation/delta expanse of Im,ver III Corps and almost
all of IV Corps areas, This article deals ''''ith this
populated area because communist efforts elsewhere
are only di\'ersions to draw our attention away from
the real objective,
Du Kich
The socio-politico-ecological structure of Vietnam is
based on hamlets and villages, and it is at this base
that the primary communist effort is directed. Hamlets
are clusters of 50 to 200 family homes in close proximity
to one another, close-knit neighborhoods in every sense
of the word. Villages are areas, not towns, in \,,;hich
are clustered fi\'e to 15 hamlets within several kilometers
of each other. ("Precinct" or "Rural Countv" would be
more descriptive of 'what a Vietnamese villa'ge is in our
political language.) The communists dominate such a
village area tactically and politically not by bringing in
large armed forces, but with a (tdu kich" enforcer squad
of five to I 0 lightly armed local guerrillas. DIl hich
means far more than simply guerrilla to the rural
peasant. It has all wound up in its short, abrupt
expression things like enforcer, untouchables, goon
squad, assassins, hit-and-run, bushwackers, etc. You
can talk about mainforce battalions to a rural peasant
and he kind of shrugs it off as way beyond his ken, but
''''hen one mentions du kich he up and gets shifty-
eyed because that's life, man, in rural Vietnam.
communist squad keeps on the move, ambushes
a different road or trail or country lane every night,
approaches the hamlets after dark, assassinates
ment supporters by sniping in daylight or house raids
at night, bullies the weak ones into passive submission,
and in other like ways enforces local behavior according
to political obI' ectives. Just as the bia-dtv hoods kno'w
h ,
their "turf", the communist knows its village
area. It kno'ws the strong and weak personalities, safe
and dangerous locations, lighted and dark streets or
alleys, friendly and unfriemlly sounds, and all of the
intimate daily details of life in its neighborhood.
Du Kich Tactics
The communist squad occupies no one location 1',,'ith-
in the village area and cannot be fixed for destruction.
The dl1 hich may prepare fighting positions at several
locations to use as needed, but it builds no mud fort
outpost to which it is tactically and psychologically tied.
]f engaged by a superior force the communists will,
without hesitation, break into two or three man sniper
teams and disperse, drav\"ing the attackers in opposite
directions while inflicting maximum casualties. These
individual enemy teams will withdra' ... completely out
of their village area if pressed, drawing the pursuers
into ambushes of adjacent village du hich or larger
communist forces they know to be in the area. The
guerrillas will infiltrate back to reassemble when pur-
suit is broken off and continue their enforcement duties.
If its village area is occupied for a period of time by a
large opposing force, the dll hich 'will furnish guides
and operational coordinators for communist units large
enough to assemble and attack that force. The guer-
rilla's logistical needs, other than some ordnance, are
supplied either through active local support or enforced
taxation.
This intimate local knowledge and imminent local
threat is the central, most important factor in the
communist enemy's control of the rural people. This is
the "red spectre," embodied in these local enforcer
squads, that haunts every act, every thought, every word
uttered anel gesture made in interpersonal behavior by
the otherwise largely nonpolitical rural peasant. US In-
fantrymen are often pUlZkd, angered, and frustrated by
the lack of spontaneous cooperation from these people.
Consider the 30 Americans in one of our large cities
several years ago who witnessed a young girl being
repeatedly assaulted and finally killed by a man with a
switchblade. and none of them went to her assistance.
You see, they reasoned that if a policeman was not there
to help the girl, how could they be sure one would help
if a killer picked them as a reprisal target, It does not
make the Vietnamese peasant's desire for noninvolve-
ment excusable, perhaps, but a little more undersand-
able at least. The rural peasant knows the guy with the
blade (du hieh) is coming back, but will the US In-
fantry be there then, too? The Infantry, in force,
obviously cannot remain, but a rural constabulary
squad composed of carefully selected US and ARVN
Infantrymen ('ould remain.
Dll Kich Psychological Tactics
To commit conventionally armed, equipped, organ-
ized and trained forces-ARV1'\ or Free \\'orld Alhes-
against such a dispersed guerrilla enemy is something
of a tactical crime in addition to being quite ineffective.
The British military experience in our Revolutionary
'Yar is perfectly analogous lNith what probably ".'ould
ensue. (This is a military analogy, not ideological.)
Tactically, the dll kich , ...ill not stand and fight in the
open, they will not occupy and try to hold fortified posi-
tions in strength, and they ".ill not mass and form a
suitable target for firepower, but they ".;ill exact their
toll in the "war of attrition." Psychologically, they ''''ill
not striYe to create an image of the invincible military
juggernaut, they will not attempt to portray legitimate
gentlemanly authority, and they will not try to build a
schooL but they will conduct a live demonstration for
the underdog causing a "loss of face" by pm ..rerful
foreig'ners. This is the way of the guerrilla, as was so
aptly demonstrated by the American ragtag
militia riflemen in their shameless retreat, sneak\' eya-
sion. humble begging for supplies at settlement;, and
repeated refusal to fight their pursuers-until they
defeated the British at CO"';pens. In another perspective
it is the hometown boy making the big city boxer
look bad in the local ring.
This constant dll kich threat is the gordian knot that
strangles Vietnam's development. Sever this communist
knot and we haye freed the people to participate in
every phase of that development. Hacking away at
other more militarily ob"ious bonds, such as VC('NVA
mainforce units, does not seyer it and may in fact draw
the knot tighter by a reverse psychological effect. This
effect often results when the rural people see the
de\-astating might of material management deliver
repeated massiye blows about them aimed at that main-
force unit, but find that the rIu kich are still there, still
coming in the night, still haunting the people's troubled
life. The psychological effect is futility, despair, and
resignation. 'fe must strive to see it as the people see
it, and it is the guerrilla they see, feel, and fear . . .
not battalions.
The Rural Constabulary
\Vhat is proposed is not that -we shift to an exclusive
reliance on dispersed small units to counter the com-
munist guerrilla. This rural constabulary \I;'ill, rather,
place our consistent effort to counter the enemy's
consistent effort for an equation of tactical and psy-
chological effect, namely, constabulary coverage of the
populated countryside-the key terrain. Certainly, we
must maintain some massed strength, preferably air
mohile, for rapid reserve deployment to locations where
the communists mass for an action, The constabulary
proposed herein does not eliminate the need for such
forces; however, the number needed will be greatly
reduced.
This constabulary will, in fact, greatly compliment
the use of such conyentional forces by providing them
with a network of "eyes and ears" reaching throughout
the populace. Rather than exposing battalions and
brigades of regulars to snipers, ambushes, and booby
rraps in thrashing about the bamboo thickets and
cocon u t QTO\'es the)' ,viII be retained in a high state of
o '
readiness at alert locations. Then, when deployed onto
a communist target of deserving size, they will not be
reacting to a catch-as-catch-can tip, but to hard and hot
intelligence from our rural constabulary_ The con-
stabulary squads will guide them into landing zones,
into assault posItIOns, and provide as detailed and up
to date information on the local terrain, enemy, and
situation as any peasant inhabitant of the area. 'Vith
such a network reaching throughout the populated
areas of South Vietnam, communist mainforce units
'will be like a blind, one-armed welterweight against
our heavyweight battalions and brigades.
This constabulary deployment will be accomplished
v,ith a total personnel strength of 15,000 Americans for
the en tire populated area of Vietnam, as '''''ill be
detailed in a later paragraph.
Friendly Guerrillas
The consistent effort on our part, therefore, will
emphasize constabulary dispersal in small units to
strangle the enemy psychologically and tactically, rather
than massed in battalions and brigades for huge, con-
ventional operations that beat at the air in both re-
spects. Such operations beat at the air because the
enemy intentionally draws our forces, in a chessboard
fashion, to the northern border, then to the western,
back to the northern, into the rural areas, and then
into the urban centers. This communist tactic is clearly
stated by Vo i\guyen Giap in "People's "(,,,rar, People's
Army" (1960) and "Big Victory, Great Task" (1968).
A blanket of tactically dispersed rural constabulary will
give us the psychological mass to neutralize this "react
instead of act" pattern. lVithout such a neutralization,
the continued movement of our tactically massed force
about Vietnam remains contradictory. As will become
apparent in subsequent paragraphs, the rural con-
stabulary base squads will not be the "scattered units"
Giap refers to as falling "easy prey," but an integrally
designed friendly guerrilla force to confront his preda-
tors in the countryside. Neither should this dispersal
be confused with the "checkerboard," "cloverleaf," or
"saturation" patrol techniques of counterguerrilla op-
erations, because unlike any of these, the rural con-
stabulary base squads will stay in their village area
continuously. It does come close to the checkerboard
pattern as applied by at least one US unit, and could be
said to he an expansion of that concept if applied over
all the populated area and on a continuous basis.
Personnel Selection
It is proposed that rather than periodic "overkill"
Infantry commitments with no staying power, we con-
front each du kich squad with a rural constabulary
squad of our own. Our ansv ..'er will be six-man squads
in every village area of the populated, key terrain in
Vietnam. The base squad will consist of three Ameri-
cans and three Vietnamese, each socio.scientifically
selected, with the latter recruited from the peasant
strata Popular Forces in local operational areas. The
Americans will provide disciplined, purposeful stabil-
ity in coordination with other Allied efforts, and
the Vietnamese the necessary liguistic and local
cultural knowledge.
The desirable qualifications for American personnel
are not military expertise alone, but are more heavily
in the area of individual initiative, creativity, and
ingenuity, combined v,."ith the ability to work construc-
tively and crossculturally with others. Such abilities
can be measured and are available among personnel at
training centers, academies, service schools, and in line
units at home or abroad. Selection of personnel is far
more important than an)' training program.
Using a kit of standard subjective test instruments,
recruiting teams will screen the vast human resources of
our semi-mobilized military establishment for such
personnel with minimal investment in time or disrup-
tion of local missions. The rna jori ty of the standard
instruments also have been used cross-culturally in
Vietnam and will be used, 'with minor modification and
translation, for selection of the Vietnamese constab-
ulary personneL Further, these instruments bypass edu
:ational bias and can be given to illiterates as well as col-
.J
A
- - - ~ , ~ - - . . , ... & ..... w ..... ________________________________
lege graduates. There is no danger, therefore, that the
selection will skim the cream from the personnel pool.
Selective Test Instruments
The known desirable subjective inclinations of suc-
cessful guerrillas, and therefore of rural constabulary
personnel to destroy them, are that they be adaptable
group activists, socially empathetic, pragmatic, posi-
tively motivated interpersonal communicators, and self
confident to a high degree. They also must demon-
strate creative ingenuity in expedients and possess
challenge-seeking initiative.
Examples of test instruments for determining the
strength-level of these traits in recruitable personnel are:
Thematic Apperception Test. This consists of a
series of carefully selected or constructed pictures ,,, .. hich
are sh01vn one at a time to a subject. The subject states
his response to three basic questions regarding his
perception - present, past, and future - of the charac-
ters and,/or activities in the picture. From these re-
sponses, repeated for five to seven pictures, a "theme"
will emerge which reveals the subjective psychological
makeup of the respondent.
Self Anchoring Scale. This consists of a picture of
a ladder with 10 numbered rungs. The subject is asked
two basic questions which require him to define a life
goal for self and then for country. After each basic
question, three branch questions cause the subject to
place himself or his perception of self and then country
on rungs of the ladder as to relative achievement of that
self-defined goal, considering the past, present, and
future. Again, a subjective psychological construct
will be revealed to the personnel evaluating or scoring
the responses.
These are only t",m out of a battery of six such
instruments which are available for finite selection of
constabulary personnel. l\Iore over, such instruments
will be assembled in kits, administered, and scored by
personnel presently on active duty. many of them
Infantrymen. There is no requirement for a high-
p01vered chilian research project of two years duration
and at least one million dollars in cost. The US Army
already has trained, accredited, and capable personnel
who would welcome the appropriate utilization of their
talents in this undertaking. The personnel product
of such selection will be constabulary squads of
"friendly guerrillas" against , ... hich the communist
enemy in Vietnam would not stand a chance.
Training
Special training of an)' kind beyond Infantry AIT is
unnecessary and undesirable. A brief period of unit
training, three to four weeks, vdth the VN IUS con-
stabulary units semi-deployed in relatively secure areas
- - - - - ~ ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
very near their operational areas will fill the traInIng
requirement. The problem of language with such inte-
gration will pose no significant difficulty, particularly
".;ith selective criteria as outlined above. In the Korean
war many US units received 25-40 per cent ROK re-
placements in rifle platoons and companies, and despite
no language training nor any careful selective process
the loss of combat effectiveness was not much greater
than with the general mixture of American soldiery.
The interpersonal communications of combat rifle-
men, as most veterans will agree, transcends mere
word symbols.
Training, therefore, in tactics and techniques as well
as language will remain minimal. No man in the
world is more suited, mentally or physically, for guer-
rilla war than properly selected youth of democratic
America. However, once our soldiers are indoctrinated
by "special" courses purporting to teach special tactics
and special techniques, all we offer is the doctrinaire
orthodoxy of the material management philosophy.
American ingenuity is suppressed by such sterile orth-
odoxy, not exploited, just as with conventional tactics
in a guerrilla war environment.
Organization
Organizationally, the figure of five will remain c o n ~
stant: 5-squad (30-man) platoons, 5platoon (150-man)
companies, 5-company (780-man) battalions (one addi-
tional 3D-man platoon as a battalion command force).
Operationally, a constabulary platoon will commit four
squads to individual village areas and the platoon
leader's command squad will move with him between
these four villages, reinforcing, coordinating, and per-
forming all staff functions. A constabulary company
will do the same with four of its platoons, giving the
company commander a 30-man platoon (same 5-squad
organization) as a mobile "built-in reserve." A con-
stabulary battalion will commit all five companies and
the battalion commander will use an additional 30-man
platoon for his mobile command group. Company and
battalion command elements also will move continu-
ously between subordinate units' operational areas,
coordinating, reinforcing, and performing all staff
functions.
The organization does not go above battalion be-
cause of the localized nature of guerrilla warfare, but
an additional 30-man constabulary liaison element will
be formed to coordinate and provide minimal staff
supervision with every five to 15 battalions deployed.
This activity will be conducted in the same logistics-
free manner as the base units' operational mode. Any
tendency tmvard a highly sophisticated and complex
command apparatus must be resisted in order to retain
maximum flexibility at the lowest levels. The con-
stabulary command will report directly to the Execu-
tive Branch of the GVN and the US Ambassador to
simplify any problems of military or political sub
divisions and command.
The figure of H\'e for operational unit organization
is selected because the bulk of human behavioral
research indicates that the optimum span-of-control
centers around four or five subordinates. The absence
of a combat force larger than 30 men is for reasons of
local logistics, cover, movement, and because the con-
stabulary mission is not large scale combat. Conven-
tionally organized, armed, and equipped reaction forces
'will handle any communist force requiring large units
and 'when they do so, they '-\'ill be reacting to accurate
intelligence from our constabulary squads. 'Ve will
have a system of trained "eyes and ears" throughout
populated Vietnam equal or superior to anything the
communist enemy could possibly field.
Constabulary Tactics
It must be made explicitly clear that these squads
will not occupy the hamlets in their areas. They will
live, move, and operate from the surrounding bamboo
thickets or similar places of concealment. They will
never spend tv..-o successive nights or days in the same
location, or otherwise establish a pattern. Their en-
forcement, protection duties will be effected by VIsItS
to the hamlets, not occupation of them. Their basic
tactics will be the ambush, raid, and sniping.
] ust as its counterpart du kich squad cannot be
fixed for destruction by our battalions and brigades,
so also ,viII tbe rural constabulary squad harass but
evade communist mainforce elements. Its tactics in the
face of large enemy forces will be exactly the same as
those of its counterpart. That is, if engaged by a
superior communist force, the rural constabulary squad
will break into two 3-man teams and disperse while
inflicting maximum casualties by sniping and ambush.
Its course of action ,viII be: (1) For platoon/com-
pany size enemy units, call on the rural constabulary
built-in-reserve. (2) For battalions plus, decoy the
communist force into a predetermined killing zone with
assistance from other constabulary elements ,vhile call-
ing in our mainforce, airmobile alert units to destroy
it. In so doing the rural constabulary will be capitaliz-
ing on all the advantages of a guerrilla unit, plus
the quick reaction combat pO'iver of airmobile forces.
This combination 'will be anathema to the communist
"People's "Tar" tactic.
Infrastructure Elimination
The primary target of the rural constabulary will
remain its counterpart du kich element and commun-
ist political contacts that that element reveals. This
-".,," -
. g .
rural constabulary will be better able to destroy both
the du kich and the communist political apparatus than
regular US tactical units.
Since in their tactical mode they ".;ill blend with
the terrain, not the people, the presence of Americans
will pose no problem. US presence will, rather, provide
a positive identification factor when other ARVN or
Free \,Vorld Forces are encountered. The latter is
something that is too frequently and tragically lacking
at present. As a detriment, US personnel ,viII be no
more of a political hindrance than l\'orth Vietnamese

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