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PMCs Aff SS Julia Reinitz
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At micIndex............................................................................................................................................................1 1AC..........................................................................................................................................................................2 Topicality Cards.....................................................................................................................................................22 Contractors Work in Combat Zones......................................................................................................................23 Intelligence Contractors Key.................................................................................................................................25 Iraq Key.................................................................................................................................................................26 PMCs are Expensive .............................................................................................................................................28 Kills Political Accountability.................................................................................................................................29 PMCs Are Not Regulated/Held Accountable .......................................................................................................31 Lack of Accountability Lack of Legitimacy.....................................................................................................33 Neolib Extensions..................................................................................................................................................34 Security Privatization Kills Right to Security........................................................................................................37 PMCs Kill Human Rights......................................................................................................................................39 AT: PMCs Help Humanitarian Missions...............................................................................................................40 Security Framing Extensions.................................................................................................................................41 PMCs Remilitarize Security..................................................................................................................................43 Risk Extensions......................................................................................................................................................44 PMCs Unregulated by I-Law................................................................................................................................45 AT: Regulate CP Generic...................................................................................................................................46 AT: Regulate with International Law CP..............................................................................................................47 AT: MEJA..............................................................................................................................................................48 AT: UCMJ.............................................................................................................................................................49 AT: PMCs K/2 Readiness......................................................................................................................................51 Hurts Military Efficacy - Generic..........................................................................................................................52 Hurts Military Efficacy Hurts Nation Building..................................................................................................53 Hurts Military Efficacy - Iraq................................................................................................................................54 Hurts Military Efficacy - Afghanistan...................................................................................................................58 PMCs Make War Possible (AT: K/2 Public Support)...........................................................................................59 PMCs Violence.................................................................................................................................................62 Kills International Peacekeeping Efforts...............................................................................................................63 Neg MEJA CP.....................................................................................................................................................64 Neg PMCs Good.................................................................................................................................................65
Voil! In view, a humble vaudevillian veteran, cast vicariously as both victim and villain by the vicissitudes of fate
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Contention One is Inherency Funding shortages and lack of DNI power are forcing use of private contractors for intelligence gathering HEATHER SOMERVILLE, staff writer @ UPI, UPI 7/21 10, Intel hearing focuses on contractors
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2010/07/21/Intel-hearing-focuses-on-contractors/UPI-10611279714367/ National security spending has risen to such levels that U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates recently called it a "gusher," but funding is guaranteed only one year at a time, which makes hiring full-time government employees difficult, Clapper said. There is a demand for more people to move more top-secret information but not enough long-term
funding. "So the obvious outlet for that has been the growth of contractors," Clapper said. private contractors are hired for every conceivable job in intelligence and occupy almost 30 percent of the intelligence workforce and almost half the total personnel budget. Senate Committee on Intelligence chairwoman Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif., called for a 10 percent reduction in one year in private contractors for the director of national intelligence, although she acknowledged, "I don't know that that's quite achievable."
The Post investigation, revealed in a front-page series that ran Monday-Wednesday, claims The Senate committee issued a report last year that called for the reduction in contractors, based on a 2008 case study by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence that found contractors were being used in jobs that could be successfully done by government employees for less money. Clapper he supported a reduction in private contractors for intelligence work but declined to set a specific goal. Clapper spent six years as a private contractor for government intelligence after he retired from the Air Force. Senate committee members were to have a closed session Wednesday to finish questioning but indicated they would easily approve Clapper's nomination, which will then go to the full Senate for confirmation. As director of national intelligence, Clapper would oversee the office in charge of coordinating 16 different intelligence agencies. Clapper will need more authority than allowed previous directors to get the job done, senators said. "We need someone who can throw elbows," Bond said. Clapper, who serves as undersecretary of defense for intelligence, would be the fourth director of intelligence since the position was created five years ago. Former intelligence director retired U.S. Navy Adm. Dennis Blair reportedly resigned because of frustrations over a lack of authority to coordinate intelligence activities across several departments. The national intelligence director "is operating at the 50,000-foot level, making sure everyone has the resources needed," said Mark Lowenthal, president of the Intelligence and Security Academy in Washington and a former intelligence analyst for the State Department and CIA. "The problem is that the DNI has very little enforcement mechanism." The director of national intelligence has limited authority over to coordinate the activities of other intelligence agencies, said Tim Shorrock, an author and expert on government outsourcing and contracts. The law that created the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in 2004 included, at the behest of Vice President Dick Cheney, a last-minute provision that designates much of the intelligence authority to the Department of Defense. The Pentagon commands much of the nation's intelligence activity and the intelligence director has limited influence over issues like contracting, Shorrock said.
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These companies are concentrated in Iraq with minimal supervision George R. Lucas, Jr, professor of philosophy at the U.S. Naval Academy, 9, "Article: "This Is Not Your Father's War" Confronting the Moral Challenges of "Unconventional" War", 3 J. Nat'l Security L. & Pol'y 329, lexis law
There are now over 900 private firms operating in Iraq alone, employing between 190,000 and 210,000 personnel, surpassing considerably the number of combat troops presently stationed there. n7 The private
firms' functions encompass everything from preparing and serving food to maintaining barracks, showers, and latrines, providing troop transport and supply convoys, maintaining shipyards and motor pools, as well as (in some cases) providing security for diplomats, political officials, and embassy personnel. All the non-combat activities that used to fall to Sergeant Bilko, or Beetle Bailey and his comic-strip friends - as well as, in real life, to military police, shore patrols, and Marine guards - are now "outsourced" to civilian contractors, quite often "third-country nationals" hired on subcontracts by the civilian firms who win competitive bids from their own governments to provide these services. A colleague, a mid-career officer in the U.S. Air Force, traveled to Baghdad in 2005 to assist in conducting an investigation of the Iraqi Police Force training program. He was assigned a personal bodyguard, a Gurkha from Nepal, armed with an AK47. As the two chatted, the major discovered to his horror that his Nepalese friend had initially been hired to work as a dishwasher, but, upon arrival in Iraq, was handed a rifle and reassigned as a security guard without prior training or experience. That is not an unusual story. Private firms initially responsible only for logistical support may be left on their own to provide security for their personnel, workplace, or the operations they supervise. They do what any private company would do, and "outsource" these additional tasks. The result is a patchwork quilt of contractors and subcontractors performing logistical and security operations with little in the way of internal controls, supervision, training, or accountability . n8 These developments present an extraordinary challenge for maintaining effective integration, coordination, and command and control of the diverse forces and personnel in zones of [*332] combat, not to mention contract acquisition, accountability, and oversight of these private entities themselves. n9 The depth of the acquisition and accountability dilemma, in turn, was suggested in a recent monograph on strategic military leadership by the recently retired Dean of the U.S. Army War College, Col. Jeffrey D. McCausland. n10 The number of private contracts and contractors, he reports, more than doubled over the six-year period from 2000 to 2006, while the number of federal officials responsible for acquisition and oversight has remained the same or has been reduced. n11 An audit of these practices by the Special Inspector General for Iraq in 2007 revealed that two federal
contracting officers were overseeing over 700 personnel and contracts for the U.S. State Department in excess of one billion dollars. n12 Not surprisingly, more recent U.S. Government Accountability Office audit reports
consistently report tens of billions of dollars misspent or unaccounted for, while former members of the Iraqi Commission on Public Integrity report similar accounts of bribery and corruption totaling in excess of $ 13 billion in U.S. funds. n13
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Contention Two is Privatized War. Outsourcing of intelligence outsources the ability to construct threats private contractors determine policymaking through selective discourses of security Anna Leander, Assoc. Prof. of Poli. Sci. and Public Management U. of Southern Denmark, 5 (Millennium 33.3, The Power to
Construct International Security) Most PMCs do not provide direct military combat services but non- essential consultancy and logistics services. This is often used to underline that outsourcing allows the military to concentrate on the (important) hard functions while the PMCs take over the insignificant ones including cooking, cleaning and building latrines. However, this is a misleading picture both of what non-core functions involve and of what PMCs involvement in consultancy and logistics entails for their power. In fact, consultancies, logistics and especially intelligence are essential for the epistemic power of PMCs. The private intelligence sub-sector is at the initial stage of a huge boom. For many nations and political groups, most of their intelligence analysis and operations are gradually being outsourced to private firms.35 Former CIA director James Woolsey estimates that about 95 percent of all intelligence comes from open sources and much of this is from private firms.36 The trend to privatise intelligence also extends to military operations. AirScan was the spy in the sky for the US in Bosnia and now provides surveillance of pipelines in Iraq. The US air force outsourced part of its high resolution photography to Space Imaging and Digital Globe in Afghanistan. During Operation Desert Storm, civilian contractors provided surveillance data during operational missions.37The trend to privatise intelligence is visible not least in the current trend of mergers and takeovers involving firms specialising in information technology and PMCs. By way of example, MPRI has become part of L-3 Communications and DynCorp of Computer Sciences Unit. Private firms not only provide, but also analyse intelligence. Private translators, analysts and interrogators are hired, as illustrated by the involvement of Titan and CACI in Abu Ghraib . Even more directly, private firms are hired in to assess threats and risks and suggest what to do about them. This involves constructing a security picture as done for example, by Diligence LLC and SAIC, two firms specialised in intelligence gathering and analysis.38 It also involves suggesting security enhancing measures. It will come as no surprise that firms often consider their own services appropriate . DynCorp is a prime example of a firm which provides a package deal. It has for example held contracts on the national, provincial and municipal levels in Iraq to assess threats, train Iraqi police and military personnel and give advice on the reorganisation of the Iraqi justice system. This privatisation of intelligence has direct consequences for the relation between PMCs and security discourses. It places the firms in a position where they are directly involved in producing these discourses. They provide a
growing share of the information that forms the basis of decisions on whether or not something is a security concern. The information is structured and selected by the firm that provides it. Through this firms may have a significant impact on the routine boxing of information which is in itself a way of creating threats and security concerns that might not previously have existed.39 For example grouping and collecting intelligence on the illegal activities of immigrants, on Muslim networks, or on terrorist organisations constitutes these groups as security concerns. The practical knowledge most actors
have of the importance of these practices is well illustrated by the resistance they put up against being lumped into a specific group and being integrated into the intelligence system.40 Thus, we have made the first step in the kind of wider power analysis proposed here, namely looking at the particularly epistemic power of PMCs to affect security discourses and related decisions. When private firms gather, select
and analyse intelligence, they are producing security understandings in the most concrete and tangible way possible. This is an important component of PMC power usually overlooked. The exact extent of this
power is however not easy to establish, since it is most probable that public and private agencies collaborate in the process. Hence, it varies with the actual independent capacity of PMCs to define categories and routine practices in intelligence analysis, which tends to be case specific.
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Having said this, there is clear evidence that this direct production of security understandings shapes actions in the field of security. The extreme illustration of this is when, in military operations, a private firm is the sole provider of the information on the basis of which a commander makes decisions. One example is of such a situation is the case where two American employees working for AirScan and flying a surveillance plane directed the Columbian air force to drop a cluster bomb. The bomb was dropped on a village and killed 18 civilians.41 Another example is when, in March 2001, a CIAsurveillance plane flown by private employees of Aviation Development Corporation mistakenly identified a civilian plane as carrying drug traffickers. On the basis of this information a Peruvian military plane shot it down, killing an American missionary and her infant.42Both examples are well known because things went wrong and mediatised court cases ensued. The point to underline here is that even if a public actor (a soldier) has the ultimate power to decide on when to use what kind of force (to drop the bomb or to shoot down the plane), that may not indicate the de facto locus of power if private actors control the information which sets the action in motion. The private firm decides what is told (and what is left out). It provides the foundation of indeed, given the standard operating procedures, it mobilises the decisions to be taken.
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This is where threat construction meets neoliberal economic calculation private security firms emphasize preemptive violence in the name of managing potential risks Conor OReilly and Graham Ellison, Instittue of Criminology @ Queens University Belfast School of Law, 6 [British Journal
of Criminology 46, Eye Spy Private High: Re-Conceptualizing High Policing Theory, p. 654-6] It is important to note that high policing actorsboth public and privateoperate within a risk-oriented approach to policing provision. Their role has always been defined by the application of pro-active preventative methodologies as opposed to retrospective emphasis upon the application of retributive punishment (Johnston and Shearing 2002). In establishing this theoretical distinction, Johnston and Shearing were not specifically concerned with high policing activities, though their application of this risk mentality to corporate security providers did reflect specific services which fell within the remit of private high policing (2002: see in particular Chapter 5). Security consultancy exemplifies this approach, its principal objective being to mitigate, manage, manipulate and consequently govern clients security risks. Acknowledging the recent trend within policing/ security discourse towards risk-oriented approaches, the significance of risk within the high policing context has been somewhat neglected. As Lustgarten sets out: Long before it was discovered and developed by social scientists as a supposedly distinguishing characteristic of contemporary society, the work of security institutions was centred upon risk. (Lustgarten 2003: 328)
The concept of risk is therefore central to contemporary private high policing actors in both the corporate sense of profit maximization through rational economic calculation (Johnston and Shearing 2002: 76) as well as the high policing sense through constant pre-emptive threat assessment (Lustgarten 2003: 328). This duality is reflected in the trend towards closer working relationships and merging of the security consultancy and insurance industries.7
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Private companies construct unrealistic apocalyptic scenarios to enhance private management and quash politics under the catch-all guise of security Conor OReilly and Graham Ellison, Instittue of Criminology @ Queens University Belfast School of Law, 6 [British Journal
of Criminology 46, Eye Spy Private High: Re-Conceptualizing High Policing Theory, p. 654-6]
Private high policing embodies the dominant trend within late capitalist states towards the mutual reenforcement of state and corporate interests (Whyte 2003: 582).18 While its role in facilitating this state-business
amalgamation (Goldstein 1978: 5) has been evident since the anti-labour activities of Pinkertonism, this status has been re-invigorated by the advent of transnational capitalism. The dual policing and economic functions of security consultancy firmsthe contemporary manifestation of private high policinghave proved an efficient vehicle for the pursuit of common objectives across the state/corporate nexus as well as across borders. This process has been further accelerated by the increased outsourcing of security responsibilities in theatres of conflict and subsequent reconstruction efforts, incorporating the tendency to obfuscate responsibility already discussed. A comparison of such activities with the overlapping genre of PMCs (Whyte 2003) and more general trends within transnational commercial security (Johnston 2000a) may prove instructive. Whyte (2003), for instance, argues that the degree to which we are witnessing a one-dimensional and unproblematic usurpation of state authority by private actors (the sovereignty erosion thesis) is at best empirically naive and has mis- represented developments more appropriately theorized as the reconfiguration of state-ordered power (Whyte 2003: 580). Essentially, the notion that there is a negative- sum game being played out between state and corporate interests is misconstrued. If anything, we are in fact witnessing the mutually beneficial application of game theory to achieve proximate objectives (Whyte 2003: 579). A significant factor within security consultancys facilitation of state/corporate symbio- sis is the so-called revolving door of high policing, whereby there is increased movement of security operatives from the public to the private sector. The security consultancy industry has extensive ties not only with the military and security establishment but also the political establishmenta fact which is often reflected in the composition of the boardroom. For example, whilst the corporate management team of ArmorGroup includes a CEO who served with the US Air Force and the CIA and a chief operating officer who served with the British and New Zealand Special Air Services, its non-executive chairman is Sir Malcolm Rifkind, former British Secretary for Defence and Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. Similar trends are even more evident in the United States, where firms such as Diligence LLC, the Steele Foundation and CACI all have senior directors with high-level experience or influence with current or former US and British governments (Isenberg 2004). The old boys club networks created by such public/private interaction inevitably provide significant scope for the pursuit of mutually advantageous associations. Insofar as high policing actorswhether public or privatepossess similar back- grounds, they also possess a similar mentalite in the face of global security threats. Bigos concept of a security continuum ... of threats arbitrarily defined and unified in global discourse of disorder (2000: 93) whilst originating in the context of European policing is equally applicable to wider analysis of high policing at the transnational level. As Bigo highlights, we should be sceptical of this (in)security discourse
of the security field as such knowledge comes precisely from the very people whose habitus is structured by the systematic search for the capacity to manage any threat or risk (2000: 93). Rever- berating loudly with high policing methods and tactics, it is increasingly apparent that both public and private actors engage in mutual reinforcement of such (in)security discourse to preserve and augment dominant state/corporate arrangements. The aforementioned relationships also impact upon proposed regulatory models for PMCs/PSCs, with the locus of regulation being shifted away from the realm of international human rights law and into the realm of the state/market nexus (Whyte 2003: 593). This is re-iterated by both governmental emphasis on industry consultation19 as well as industry perception that regulation is achieved through a process of negotiation. Indeed, at a recent industry conference, one senior security consultant spoke of his firms willingness to negotiate with government for the right type of regulation.20 Much has been made of
President Eisenhowers prescient observations regarding the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military- industrial complex21 with speculation about similar developments in the commercial security
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field (Johnston 1999: 186; Lilley and Knepper 1992). Concern about the ramifications of the private use of secret agents (Hougan 1978: 463) and the emergence of a policeindustrial complex(OToole 1978) have existed since the late 1970s. How- ever, it is only in the contemporary context of outsourced security services in Iraq and Afghanistan that a sufficient degree of state dependency on private contractors has emerged to justify the terminology of a securityindustrial complex.22 Whilst it would be something of an overstatement to theorize such developments solely around private high policing actors, transnational security consultancy firms will nevertheless emerge as key players within any evolving securityindustrial complex. Not only do they contribute to foreign and security policy formulation through lobbying and increased consultation mechanisms,23 but they are also part of the immense private security presence in Iraq, safeguarding the interests and objectives of coalition governments as well as private contractors engaged in the reconstruction process. Potentially the most serious consequence of the aforementioned developments is the risk that instances of high policing may now materialize in the form of state-corporate crime, whereby the criminally constituent components of each become blurred and ultimately indistinguishable from each other. The tendency for high policing actors to engage in illegal actions to preserve and augment the current distribution of power has already been detailed in this paper. However, the increased intersection of public/private high policing forms and state/corporate agendas greatly increases the possibility of mutual reinforcement through illegal practice. Umbilical linkage to the state ensures that these new criminogenic opportunities are also less likely to be criminal- ized and punished (Whyte 2003: 582). As set out above, there is ample scope for the secrecy complex to be extended and the corporate veil to be cynically knitted into the blanket shield of national security.
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Private framing of security is not neutral rather, it is crafted for the sake of profit at all costs Marc von Boemcken, senior researcher at the Bonn International Center for Conversion, Private Military and Security Companies. Chances, Problems, Pitfalls and Prospects , ed by Thomas Jger and Gerhard Kmmel, February 7, Liaisons Dangereuses: The
Cooperation between Private Security Companies and Humanitarian Aid Agencies p 268-9 It has been suggested that the notion of 'security' is not an ontologically fixed condition independent of subjective practices of interpretation. In fact whether something is represented as a 'threat' or not rather depends upon an authoritative set of discursive mechanisms, which may differ over time and place (see, e.g., Buzan et al. 1997). Given this observation, it is important to note the potential self-interest of private security companies to shape the particular security concerns of their prospective clients. PSCs are corporate enterprises seeking to maximize their profit. For this purpose, they rely on two things: First, on widespread feelings of insecurity among their client base; and second, on a particular understanding of security as a condition, which may be exclusively purchased via strategies of protection and deterrence. Regarding their wider stakes in local areas of operation, PSCs thus cannot be expected to promote or engage in peacebuilding activities, which might foster the acceptance of external relief efforts. Instead, they have a commercial interest to actively sustain an overall sense of insecurity, in turn guaranteeing a continual demand for their protective and deterrent services. At the most extreme, PSCs might want to utilize possible political affiliations so as to secretly facilitate the reproduction of local conflict dynamics by way of inciting hatred and violence between the armed factions _at the same time that they are offering expensive security services to external aid organizations. However, it appears far more likely that especially the larger, international PSCs will avoid the severe reputational risks attached to such a direct involvement in local politics. Instead, they can be expected to create the necessary demand by reverting to a range of marketing strategies aimed at influencing the particular way that humanitarian organizations perceive of, interpret and react to different security issues (see Leander 2004: 16). Of course, the most obvious method of doing this is by not only offering physical security provision, but also security consulting and training to humanitarians. For example, the training courses of Centurion and ArmorGroup include modules on conflict analysis, threat assessment, security management and contingency planning. Alongside the provision of armed protection teams, the British PSC Control Risks undertakes comprehensive security reviews of a "client's security structures, procedures and policies" (http;// www.crg.com). Assuming that any apprehension of security is never an objective 'given', but always a matter of subjective perception and predisposition, such services may well excite a profound impact on humanitarian decision-making processes. In other words, there is a danger that training and consulting activities promote a
specific understanding of security, which is likely to serve corporate rather than humanitarian interests by favoring a protective-deterrence approach and thus neglecting alternative strategies of security management not covered by the specific range of PSC products.
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PMCs drive for profit results in global neo-imperialist war, internal conflict, and mass genocide Xavier Renou, Prof. @ Universit Patheon-Assas, 5 [Oxford Development Studies 33.1, Private Military Compaies Against
Development, 108-110] Globalization is a process of deepening of world markets through the internationaliza- tion, interdependence and concentration of international capital. It derives both from a natural trend in capitalism and from a set of political and economic choices aimed at solving the world crisis of investment profitability in the early 1970s (Dume nil & Le vy, 2003). Such choices include the extension of spaces where capital can organise its property rights and the dismantling of welfare states throughout the world (Serfati, 2003). They set the frame for the domination of financial capital, which imposes upon industries the requirement of high levels of profitability in the short term. In the area of international affairs, globalization results in the emergence of a more violent world and the gradual privatization of warfare. This increase in violence can be related to the collapse of weak states, which lost their status of protected proxies after the end of the cold war. On the contrary, they found themselves the main target of a renewal of the traditional competition for the world resources: the need to restore profitability makes competition for scarce and cheap resources tougher. There are old resources that were redistributed after soviet domination ceased and new resources (biotechnology, coltan, etc.) for which demand is on the increase. Competition for resources revolves around neo- imperialist competition between Europe (notably France) and the USA, which, in some respects, is comparable with the former cold war.1 Together with the demand by financial capital for high returns on investments in the short run, these phenomena have produced a new form of imperialism,2 clearly dominated by the USA.3 A result of this renewed scramble for natural resources is the eruption of more violence. This has taken the form of an increase in the number of low-intensity wars and also inter- state ones, and a high degree of violence within and between societies, including the recurrent use of extermination strategies, or genocide and mass rape. Moreover, more violence may also be necessary to impose neo-liberal policies on to weak states and hostile populations;4 and warfare, a traditional way of increasing economic and political benefits, has fallen under the principles of financial management: it has to become cheaper and more profitable, to generate high profits. Hence the growing privatization of warfare. The same process is taking place in the warfare sector. Over the past 10 years, mercenarism has turned into a 100-billion-dollar industry with approximately 100 PMCs playing an essential role in the provision of security, strategy, training and even direct military action in more than 100 different countries.5 The downsizing of national armies such as those of the USA, UK or Russia, due to the end of the cold war and the neo-liberal commandment to reduce public spending, provided the cheap and/or qualified labour required for the industry to grow. Analysis What are the benefits of the partial privatization of violence and warfare for financial capital and the governments who tolerate, authorize, use or promote it? One of the New Areas Identified to Restore the Profitability of Investments The states monopoly of coercion was dedicated to the creation and defence of a market- friendly environment protecting goods, investments and people. It has now turned into a market itself. According to Singer (2003), from 1994 to 2002 the US Defence Department entered into over 3000 contracts with US-based military firms, estimated at a value of more than US$300 billion; and the war in Iraq, with a massive appeal to PMCs, must have increased these figures tremendously. Each time, the return on investment is huge. The investors initial cost is limited to that of the provision of casual labour, an address, a list of names immediately available and already trained, and some advertising. Profits are potentially enormous: a PMC is in a position to demand a huge payment to endangered states which have no choice but to pay, occasionally in mining concessions or shares in local businesses that amount to life annuities. In the process, the PMCs extend and diversify their activities, getting involved in arms sales (Sandline), privatizations, financial investments, mining or the selling of raw materials (Executive Outcomes (EO) in Sierra Leone and Angola), oil extraction (Israeli PMC Levdan in the Republic of Congo), or the provision of services from medical assistance to transport, telecommunications (Geolink), assistance to
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rebuild industrial and agricultural sectors (EO) or to develop tourism (Denards SOGECOM), etc. PMCs are
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likely to give priority to countries and factions who can guarantee that economic gains will be maximized. To Increase the Profitability of Wars As war and violence become not only more likely but also more necessary, they have to be made less expensive and, as far as possible, more profitable, by the following measures. In the post-cold war area, the cost of war can be externalized if a client state is footing the bill for the foreign intervention necessary to rescue it, as in the case of Kuwait during the first Gulf War. It is also possible to rent its military capacity, as in the case of states willing to provide the UN with troops in exchange for quick money or bribes. War can be waged in a way compatible with post-war economic goals: in the recent war against Yugoslavia, NATOs aircraft seemed to target sites liable to be rebuilt by US industries after the war. Such a scenario seems to have materialized when the private rebuilding of Afghanistan and Iraq, both also invaded by US troops, appeared to have been distributed at a priceto US TNCs a long time before the beginning of the military campaigns themselves, making the latter much less expensive. The privatization of war-making is one of many ways to enrich decision-makers with stakes in the companies,6 willing to be hired by the same companies after a term in office7, or ready to take bribes:8 costs are socialized, while profits remain private. At the same time, TNCs, which possess the abundant money and influence generally needed for successful political careers, play a determining role in the selection of candidates for the highest levels.9 Obviously, it is much less expensive to hire a private company temporarily than to mobilize and train a standing army that may never operate in its entire capacity and that needs to be maintained in between two conflicts. The efficiency of the South African PMC EO in Angola, at a minimal cost of US$60 million, must be compared with the years of unsuccessful battles led by a larger and much more expensive Angolan army. In the process, war is made more likely and more affordable to smaller states. A Convenient Tool to Pursue (Neo-)imperialist Objectives In the second half of the 20th Century, mercenaries have been repeatedly used as auxiliaries to neo-imperialist objectives. They were employed in order to take back the newly won independence in the case of Comoros, to maintain control over strategic regions (Katanga, Biaffra) and to destabilize countries regarded as belonging to the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union (Benin, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Cuba . . .), etc. Today, they serve neo-imperialist objectives, with an extra dimension that is decisive in the case of neo-imperialism: short-term profitability. PMCs allow governments to provide military assistance or run military operations with no official acknowledgement; no possibility for parliamentary or judicial control or oversight; and no political cost if the action is illegitimate or turns nasty. In case of scandal, none of the parties have to disclose information regarding contracted operations as it relates to proprietary information. Thus, plausible deniability and commercial secrecy make military intervention and influence, and support to client states in lowintensity conflicts, easier, faster and less risky politically speaking, something very important at times when statesmen and their armies can be prosecuted before the international criminal court in cases of human right violations. Corporate mercenaries enable legitimate governments to behave in illegitimate ways, to break international laws, violate human rights or resort to unconventional ways of waging wars. Examples of such ways include illegal US involvement in the Great Lakes war in 1995 through the PMC Ronco, the breaking of UN arms embargoes in Sierra Leone (1995) and Kosovo (1994 95 and 1999 2001) through PMCs Sandline and MPRI (Military Professional Resources Incorporated), the waging of coups in the Republic of Congo (1997) by the French PMC Groupe Onze and others, the weakening or destabilization of countries like Croatia and Bosnia (1991 92) with MPRI, the use of torture and ethnic cleansing as strategies of war (in 1996 Zaire, in 1991 Croatia), etc.
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Privatization has remilitarized security designation of experts legitimizes militarized modes of security production while shielding so-called experts from public accountability Anna Leander, Assoc. Prof. of Poli. Sci. and Public Management U. of Southern Denmark, 5 (Millennium 33.3, The Power to
Construct International Security) So far, this article has expanded the concept of power mainly on the agent level, by including the epistemic power of PMCs in affecting security understandings and discourses. This last section will add the consideration of another facet of PMCs power. This power is not related to PMCs intentional agency. It is the structural power revealed through a Bourdieu-inspired analysis of the (intended or unintended) role of PMCs in the reproduction of the field of security expertise. Of particular importance here is the extent to which the rise of PMCs signals changes in how, and by whom, legitimate security knowledge is produced. Such a power analysis looks at how the activities of PMCs shape the field and self-understanding of security experts (part of their habitus) and, in return, how this field authorises certain voices rather than others. I claim that PMCs are part of a general process in which security expertise is increasingly defined in technical and military ways. Whereas the end of the Vietnam War in the US and dtente policies in Europe saw the rise of non-military understandings of security, 55as security was too important to be left to the generals, now the so-called privatisation of security helps to re-mobilise a re-militarisation of its understanding. It contributes to increase the legitimacy of technical, military, managerial security discourses. It depoliticises security, moving it out of the public realm . It thereby disempowers not so much the state or the public as such, but rather the civil component of the state and civil society advocates of non-military security approaches. Scholars working on the PMC debate have made the point that privatisation and the increasing reliance on contracting moves the security debate out of the public realm, away from Congress in the US case.56 The reason is a combination of the fact that rules for the oversight of contractors are generally underdeveloped and ineffective and, relatedly, contractors are often used precisely because of the limited transparency surrounding their operations. In the US context, for example, PMCs have many ways to circumvent the (weak) public oversight imposed by International Traffic in Arms Regulations Law (ITAR), which is supposed to regulate the sale of military services abroad.57Similarly, in Europe the insufficiency, and in some cases inexistence, of public oversight of private military service export has been central for the emerging rethinking of national regulatory frameworks.58This point is usually made to underline the detrimental effect of PMCs on democracy or on the balance between different public institutions.59However, for the purpose of this article the core concern is its implications for where discourses about security are produced and by whom. The significant point for the argument here is that security debates is moving out of the public realm into a
restricted sphere where the executive, the military, the secret services and PMCs can decide how issues should be defined and handled. Correspondingly, it diminishes the presence of governmental (legislative assemblies, diplomats and foreign affairs/state departments) and civil society (media, NGOs, think tanks) voices that would be expected to contest the consequent militarization of the security issues.
This direct, institutional, impact on who can make their voice heard in the politics of protection reflects and reinforces a more diffuse change in the relative weight of public and private voices. With privatisation a new caste of private security experts emerged; and the expert is of course privileged in the production of legitimate knowledge. The esteem of private experts is visible in the many security practices where they occupy a central position. Even sensitive military related affairs are placed in private hands. In the US, the running of the Los Alamos National Laboratory (the nuclear weapons lab) has been privatised.60In the UK the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA) has been privatised to 75 percent61
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Specifically, intelligence and consultation outsourcing masks government sponsored violence this is proven by abuses at Abu Ghraib Conor OReilly and Graham Ellison, Instittue of Criminology @ Queens University Belfast School of Law, 6 [British Journal
of Criminology 46, Eye Spy Private High: Re-Conceptualizing High Policing Theory, p. 654-6] Insofar as private high policing is concerned, transnational security consultants now provide a variety of state-securityrelated services both to supplement Western11 governmental objectives at home and abroad, as well as compensating for the inadequate security infrastructures of weaker foreign states. For example, the contracting out of security
services to the private sector has been a key feature of both conflict and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. In Afghanistan, the protection of President Mohammed Karzai has been contracted out to the American firm, DynCorp. Whilst in Iraq, security consultancy firms provide a wide range of services including
close protection for government officials12 and contractors as well as training Iraqs fledgling policing and security infrastructure.13 Outside the conflict/reconstruction process, security consultancy firms have a history of providing specialist security and intelligence services to weaker nations with relatively underdeveloped state security resources. The provision of training and consultancy services enables these states to ameliorate their security infrastructure and stem the capability gap regarding core security responsibilities. Fur- thermore, in the absence of appropriate intelligence networks, security consultants are employed to conduct investigations abroad on behalf of client governments. A typical case in point is the Haitian governments contracting of Kroll risk consultants to locate hundreds of millions of dollars appropriated by former dictator, Jean-Claude Baby-Doc Duvalier, in 1986.14 However, while governments may extol the virtues of neo-liberal outsourcing, such an emphasis masks the more cynical deployment of private actors to fulfil state objectives. Persuasive economic arguments for outsourcing in terms of cost-effectiveness and efficiency suppress the less evident legal and political benefits of obfuscating state responsibility as well as dissipating negative public response to unpopular policy (Jamieson and McEvoy 2005). Within this context, there has been an undoubted emphasis upon the activities of mercenaries and private military companies (Nossal 2001; Muthien and Taylor 2002; Serewicz 2002; Singer 2003; Whyte 2003) which has overshadowed similar developments within the fields of security and intelligence. What is more, the relationship of obfuscation which exists between state and corporate actors is more complex than the stereotypical, one-dimensional representations of the proxy debate. Benefits exist for both states and corporate actors in establishing a critical distance between their actions and their responsibilities. Through the use of private contractors, statesparticularly the United Statesstymie accountability through absorbing the corporate veil, commercial confidentiality and the inapplicability of Freedom of Information legislation into their security activities (Tombs and Whyte 2003: 220). Conversely, states conspire to create an ambiguous legal status for private contractors in theatres of conflict/reconstruction such as Iraq (Jamieson and McEvoy 2005). Contractors then further obscure reality through a constant process of reinvention and re-branding as well as hiding behind the web-like complexities of corporate structures and contractual arrangements. The implication of employees from US contractor, CACI International, in the Abu Ghraib prisoner-abuse scandal highlights many of the aforementioned negative characteristics of outsourcing intelligence functions (Chaffin 2004). Not only was there initial difficulty identifying which unit oversaw this contract, but the contract itselfthrough which CACI provided interrogation services was originally intended for the purchase of IT services and was derived from a blanket purchase agreement 15 previously granted to Premier Technology Group, acquired by CACI in 1998. In fact, CACI itselfas with other US conglomerates engaged in outsourced security contractsconveys the impression that its specialization lies within IT and network communications rather than any intelligence or security functions. However, a visit to the website, www.intelligencecareers.com (a central database for intelligence related jobs arising from US government contracts), clearly demonstrates the extent of its role in outsourced intelligence processing. In this context, it is not just services but risks that are outsourced and the
consequent obfuscation of culpability preserves both the reputation and status of those in dominant posi- tions whose agendas are being pursued.
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Accountability is exchanged for capital this profit driven security forms an incentive for conflict, ensuring global war Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Prof. of Sociology @ Univ. of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, 4 [Theory, Culture & Society 21.3, Neoliberal
Empire, p. 124-5]
The politics of privatization is that dismantling government means dismantling accountability ; the politics of neoliberalism treats politics as a business proposition , or money politics, making it as unaccountable
as business itself. The Bush II administration takes privatization to new heights. G.W. Bush, the only MBA to occupy the Oval Office, is described as the GOPs CEO with the mentality of a successful CEO (Dumbrell, 2002: 281; see also Begala, 2002). The CEO approach to governance involves reorganizing government itself, as in Silvio Berlusconis CEO government in Italy. The campaign to roll back government is conducted by government, so bypassing government bureaucracies in education, the environment, judicial process, fiscal policy, government contracts, intelligence gathering, warfare and so on comes naturally to this kind of administration. The No Child Left Behind education policy sets standards that schools must meet to receive accreditation and funding so high that failure rates are in the order of 20 percent (and may be as high as 70 percent); which means that students are no longer obligated to attend the schools in their district and can opt for private schools, which will then receive government funding. In effect this introduces the controversial system of school vouchers via the back door and erodes the public education system. Logging and drilling for oil in nature reserves such as the Arctic National Wildlife Reserve also occur by bypassing existing regulations and institutions. The nations shift to combat mode in the wake of 9/11 facilitated the authoritarian
concentration of power, silenced criticism and widened the umbrella of security. Neoliberal practices of outsourcing (to focus on core business) now extend to security and war. Business conglomerates built during the neoliberal regime cash in on empire, such as the Carlyle Group in defence contracts
and Halliburton and Bechtels contracts for building US bases and the reconstruction of Iraq (Shorrock, 2002, 2003). Under the security umbrella, government contracts for rebuilding Iraq were allocated without public accountability, or accountability was outsourced to the companies themselves (Baum, 2003). Bypassing the CIA, FBI and Defense Intelligence Agency, circles within the administration set up their own intelligence units such as Team B and the Office of Special Plans in the Pentagon. Passing on the blame for intelligence failures regarding 9/11 and Iraq to the agencies which had just been bypassed weakens the agencies and maximizes executive privilege. The pervasive practice of cooking the books, Enron-style, now extends to policy in intelligence, security, the economy and the environment. Fudging data and deception become standard operating procedure. The judicial process in relation to suspected terrorists is politicized by reference to security. Terrorism Information Awareness means unlimited surveillance and limited accountability. Security voids the Freedom of Information Act. Security operations are increasingly outsourced to private military contractors such as DynCorp and MPRI, some of which are subsidiaries of Fortune 500 firms. The global market in private military contracts is estimated at $100 billion. These services include training foreign troops, low- intensity conflict overseas, security for President Karzai in Afghanistan, airport security and military recruitment. While these mercenary forces are paid for by American taxpayers,
they dont operate under military rules, are unaccountable and allow the administration to carry out foreign policy goals in low-level skirmishes around the globe without attracting media attention (Wayne, 2002; cf. Singer, 2003). This turns overseas conflict into another business proposition just as prisons in the US have been privatized and turned into a prison-industrial complex (Dyer, 1999). Thus neoliberal empire extends profitable domestic practices overseas.
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1AC Plan Text

Thus the plan: The United States federal Government should terminate its contracts with all private military contractors engaged in intelligence operations in Iraq.
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Contention Three is Solvency. Terminating contracts politicizes and problematizes PMCs catalyzing national public demand for accountability and reduced use Ulrich Beck, Professor for Sociology at the University of Munich, British Journal of Sociology Professor at the London School of Economics and Sciences, 92 (Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, p. 76-77) Where modernization risks have been 'recognized' and there is a lot involved in that, not just knowledge, but collective knowledge of them, belief in them, and the political illumination of the associated chains of cause and effect where this happens the risks develop an incredible political dynamic. They forfeit everything, their latency, their pacifying 'side effect structure', their inevitability. Suddenly the problems are simply there, without justification, as pure, explosive challenges to action. People emerge from behind the conditions and objective constraints. Causes turn into causators and issue statements. 'Side effects' speak up, organize, go to court, assert themselves, refuse to be diverted any longer. As was said, the world has changed. These are the dynamics of reflexive politicization producing risk consciousness and conflict. This does not automatically help to counteract danger, but it opens up previously closed areas and opportunities for action. It produces the sudden melting point of the industrial order, where the unthinkable and unmakeable become possibilities for a short period. What begins to happen here, is of course supposed to be prevented through resisting recognition. This once again throws characteristic light on what is really at stake in the process of recognition for modernization risks. The decisive factor here is not, or at least not only, the health consequences, the consequences for the life of plants, animals and people, but the social, economic and political side effects of these side effects : market
collapses, devaluation of capital, creeping expropriation, new responsibilities, market shifts, political pressures, checks on plant decisions, recognition of compensation claims, gigantic costs, legal proceedings, and loss of face. The ecological and health consequences may be as hypothetical, as justified, as minimized, or as dramatized as they wish. Where they are believed they have the social, economic, political and legal consequences just mentioned. To put it in the well known sociological sentence: if people experience risks as real, they are real as a consequence. If they are real in this sense, however, they completely mix up the structure of social, political and economic (ir)responsibility. Thus, a political explosive accumulates with the recognition of modernization risks. Things that were still possible yesterday suddenly face limits today. Anyone who still trivializes the exportation of chemical factories and possibly military technologies to Iraq after the Gulf War must obviously be prepared to be accused publicly of cynicism. 'Acceptable exposures' turn into
'intolerable sources of hazards'. What was recently still beyond the possibilities of human intervention, now becomes part of the scope of political influence . The relativity of acceptable levels and of variables inaccessible to policy-making becomes manifest. The checks and balances of the political and the non-political, the necessary and the possible, the given and the changeable are redetermined . Solid techno-economic 'constants' the emission of pollutants, for instance, the 'indispensability' of nuclear energy, or the gap between civilian and military production are recast into politically malleable variables. Here we are no longer concerned only with the established repertoire of politics controlling the market through economic policy, redistributions of income, social security measures but rather with the non-political: the elimination of the causes of hazards in the modernization process itself becomes political. Questions
that fall within the sovereignty of industrial management, such as details of product planning, production processes, types of energy and disposal of wastes are no longer just questions for plant management. They become instead hot potatoes for governmental policy-making, which can even compete with the problems of unemployment in voters' opinions. As the threat grows, the old priorities melt away, and parallel to that the interventionist policy of the state of emergency grows, drawing its expanded authorities and possibilities for intervention from the threatening condition. Where danger becomes normalcy, it assumes permanent institutional form. In that respect, modernization risks prepare the field for a partial redistribution of power partially retaining the old formal responsibilities, partially expressly altering them.
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Attempts at regulation inevitably fail because of lobbying and conflicting interests terminating contracts is key Anna Leander, Assoc. Prof. of Poli. Sci. and Public Management U. of Southern Denmark, 5 (Millennium 33.3, The Power to
Construct International Security)
PMCs are not mere arms of government policy, but also private and corporate; they have to follow a market logic. The industry, its advocates, the scholars studying it and legislators trying to regulate it (including
For one, the former UN rapporteur on mercenaries17) have insisted on the label private military company not only to avoid the tainted label mercenaries, but also to emphasise that PMCs are firms operating as companies on the basis of profit motives. A private market for force18 is developing, and even if states play an important role in it, it is not
clear that governments (even the strongest) can control its workings. Nor is it obvious that they can keep the firms (even those they are closest to) harnessed so that they only engage in activities the government approves of. For example, DynCorp International FZ-LLC is a firm with close ties to the US government
and numerous government contracts; including recent contracts to protect President Karzai and to train the police in Iraq.19 However DynCorp is also infamous for a sex-ring organised by senior figures in its Bosnian operations, as well as its dealings with right wing paramilitaries in Colombia.20 For two, even if formal decision making power remains with governments PMCs are becoming significant actors because their closeness to governments works not only to give governments a say over the firms, but also the other way around.
PMCs often have highly placed members of the political establishment on their boards as epitomised by Dick Cheneys close ties to Halliburton . These boardmembers have loyalties to their firms and lobby their case.21 This may grant PMCs a say, even if it is only indirect, over the formal decisions to use force. Exactly because the relationship between the public authorities and the private company is so intertwined , it is not self evident that PMCs are powerless and insignificant even if power is reduced to mean the formal
capacity to decide over the use force.
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PMCs cannot be governed by international law they are neither counted as mercenaries nor operating in prohibited situations Adam Ebrahim, JD Candidate @ B.U. Law, 28 B.U. Int'l L.J. 181 spring 10, Note: Go-ing to war with the army you can afford:
The U.S., International Law, and the private military industry l/n
international law on mercenaries - namely Protocol I, the UN Resolutions, the OAU Convention, and the UN Mercenary Convention - deals with defining mercenary status and banning mercenaries in certain situations. n208 Contrary to popular belief, there exists no ban on mercenaries in international law, even taking the UN Mercenary Convention into consideration . n209 Rather, international law has crafted a narrow definition of mercenaries and has endeavored to condemn and ban their conduct in a limited set of circumstances. PMCs, in their present form, do not fit this definition, nor do they act in prohibited areas. As it forms the basis of later agreements and has widespread interna-tional support, the Protocol I definition remains the best classification of a mercenary in international law. n210 By using a sixelement definition of mercenaries in Article 47, Protocol I simultaneously offers six defenses to the claim that PMCs should be considered mercenaries. n211 While not every private contractor will be able to employ every defense, what is important is that at least one defense can readily be made by most members of the modern private military industry. n212 [*211] The first two definitional elements, that a mercenary be "specially recruited ... to fight in an armed con-flict" and that they in fact "take a direct part in the hostilities," do not apply to military support firms, military consultant firms, and security provider firms who by their contracts are not directly involved in hostilities. n213
Much of the Next, and perhaps most vague, Protocol I attaches a motivational requirement (mercenaries must be "("motivated to take part in hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain") that is both difficult to prove and easily rebuttable by personal testimony as to one's motivations. n214 The remaining three elements of the Protocol I definition work as exceptions based on nationality. A mercenary "is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a Party to the con-flict," meaning, for example, all American, British, and Iraqi contractors in Iraq would immediately be exempt . n215 The final two definitional criteria exempt members of the armed forces of both parties to the conflict and nonparties sending soldiers on official duty. n216 PMCs operate in the private sphere and thus do not appear to be members of the armed forces. At the same time, the nature of their work and the willingness of the United States to court martial PMC em-ployees create at least some doubt as to whether private military contractors fit either of these two exceptions. In sum, the diverse services provided by the private military industry do not fit neatly into the Protocol I mercenary definition, and the industry therefore operates outside the legally defined mercenary regime. n217
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Must terminate contracts no regulatory measures can make private corporations comparably accountable to national armed forces Fred Schreier, consultant with the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and Marina Caparini is Senior Fellow at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 5 (Privatising Security: Law, Practice and Governance of
Private Military and Security Companies, http://www.dcaf.ch/_docs/op06_privatising-security.pdf)
Contractors are not only complicating traditional norms of military command and control, they are challenging the basic norms of accountability that are supposed to govern the governments control of violence. Accountability is being answerable or liable for ones conduct or actions.207 The lack of accountability is one of the major
problems associated with the private military and security industry. Few states have statutes that even recognize that PMCs exist. For those states in which PMCs typically operate, the legal structures and political environments are often too weak to challenge PMC usage and practices. In particular, there is not enough oversight and control of private military and security firms that sell services directly to foreign countries. With the exception of the US and a few other countries, PMCs are not truly subject to governmental control or scrutiny, partly because they are not beholden to government, and because, as with transnational companies in general, they do not confine their activities within the borders of any single state. If a nation puts too much pressure on a firm, it can simply shop around for alternative, more permissive environment in which to base itself. In fact, all the mechanisms typically used by multinationals to avoid taxation or labour and environmental regulations are available to PMCs to avoid oversight. Despite national legislation, state capacity
and willingness to monitor and enforce anti-mercenary laws often remain lacking, sometimes due to national interests, resource constraints, or conflicting priorities. It is the duty of government to maintain disciplined armed forces. National armed forces are accountable domestically through the political process. Soldiers who commit war crimes, together with their
military commanders and political superiors who bear responsibility, can be prosecuted in national courts and the International Criminal Court. However, the same levels of accountability do not apply to the private sector. The principal difference with regard to legal status is that PMC employees are subject to the terms of their contract, but they are not subject to the military legal code of service discipline, are not commanded by a military commander, and are not trained to conduct operations in accordance with the Laws of Armed Conflict. 208 A combatant is defined as an individual who is commanded by a person with responsibility, wears a fixed distinctive sign such as a uniform, carries arms openly, and conducts operations in accordance with the Laws of War. 209 This definition is critical because contractors have the right to carry arms for self-protection, operate in areas of conflict, and can wear company uniforms, which brings their status into question. With PMCs, command and control structures are all too often unclear.
A parallel key issue for accountability of PMCs is transparency. In national armed forces, command and control structures are known, hence there is transparency. This is not the case with PMCs. The military and security industrys standard policy of confidentiality precludes transparency . Moreover, when PMCs operate
in a conflict zone it will always be difficult to know what they are doing. This is why some propose the establishment of a monitoring system. The defunct Sandline International has proposed monitoring,210 which they argue should be paid for by the international community. Many others have also argued for this.211 However, it is not clear whether this would be a practical proposition in a war zone.212 Thus, the inadequacy of measures to hold PMCs and their employees to account for their actions is making the objective of ensuring transparency and accountability central to any prospective legislation.
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It is a fact that PMCs have been involved in human rights violations and that they present a challenge for the protection of human rights. PMC personnel are individually liable under international humanitarian law, the UN or the EU Declaration of Human Rights, as well as aspects of international criminal law. But in many cases, this is a highly theoretical proposition. Not only does the prosecution and extradition of those who have committed crimes presuppose an adequate or correspondingly prescriptive domestic legislation in the country in which the offence has occurred: this country must also be able to enforce its legislation. However, a weak government which is dependent for its security on a PMC may be in a poor position to do that in order to hold PMCs and their personnel accountable. Moreover, the companies, as opposed to the individuals working for them, do not fall within many aspects of international law and would not, for instance, come within the Statute of the International Criminal Law. Moreover, human rights laws are binding only on states, which reduce the formal legal responsibilities of PMCs, as they are often hired by other private firms, not by states. In practice, therefore, the real extent of accountability of PMCs may depend upon who is employing them.213 PMCs are different from freelance mercenaries since they have continuing corporate existences and wish to maintain reputations as respectable organizations. While this may be true in particular for PMCs who work for Western governments, others, far from having a continuing existence, show a tendency to mutate: unlike states, they can be quickly dissolved or disbanded and may be reconstituted in more accommodating environments, and, as a consequence, their personnel become difficult to trace. The former Yugoslavia clearly demonstrates the difficulties inherent in bringing war criminals to account. Thus, the fact remains that the incentive to uphold internationally agreed human rights standards in conflict situations is weaker for personnel if they are employed by a PMC rather than a state. One conclusion from this is that at least two options must exist for regulation: either the law of the state in which the operation is taking place must be enforceable; or the law of the state in which the firm is based must be applicable. Since the collapse of the rule of law is what tends to create the conditions for hiring PMCs in the first place, the first alternative is hardly an option. Consequently, legislation of the state in which the PMC is based should have an extra-territorial provision in view of the potential inadequacies of laws in countries where crimes may be committed.214 However, the transnational nature of the industry makes the second option of home-state regulation difficult as well. Any time a firm finds the regulation too onerous, it can simply move to more friendly environments. Moreover, even among the firms that stay based in the few countries with the ability and will to enforce the law, jurisdiction is still problematic. For example, US criminal law does not apply outside of US territorial and special maritime jurisdictions, so that if an employee of a US-based PMC commits an offence abroad, the likelihood of prosecution is very low. Consequently, other than nonrenewal of contract, there are no real checks and balances on PMCs that will ensure full accountability. The private military and security industry provides new possibilities for seeking public policy ends through private military means. Employing PMCs reduces the need to involve both parliament and the public in foreign policy and allows governments to carry out actions that would not gain legislative or public approval. While this can be an advantage in meeting unrecognized or unsupported strategic needs, it can also be dangerous for the health of a democracy. The increased American use of contractors in the anti-narcotics war in Columbia illustrates the trend on the covert operations side. The public division over the Iraq engagement shows that it can also be worrisome for overt, discretionary operations, particularly because the use of PMCs in Iraq appears to be less driven by any supposed financial savings than by political cost savings. In lieu of the mass use of contractors in Iraq, the executive would have had to either expand the regular forces deployed, call up more National Guard and Reserve troops, or make political compromises with allies or the UN all tough decisions which would have incurred political costs, particularly in a presidential campaign season. But already in the past PMCs have provided the US executive a means to evade congressional limits on troop strength. In Bosnia, where a cap of 20,000 troops was imposed by Congress, the addition of 2,000 contractors helped skirt that restriction.215 Similarly, during the Vietnam War, President Johnson avoided congressionally mandated troop ceilings by employing over 80,000 contractors during the most intense phase of the war.216 Public participation including public consideration of the risks and benefits of military operations is fundamental to democracy. Thus, avoiding public disclosure and debate by contracting private military and security companies is likely to have long-term political costs.
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Topicality Cards
PMCs are not military combatants Jennifer Elsea, Legislative Attorney (American Law Division), Moshe Schwartz, analyst in defense acquisition policy for Foreign Affairs, and Kennan Nakamura, foreign affairs analyst @ Foreign Affairs, Congressional Research Service 8/25 8, Private
Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32419.pdf Can Contractors Be Combatants? A critical question appears to be whether the duties of contractors amount to taking an active part in hostilities. In an international armed conflict or occupation,58 only members of regular armed forces and paramilitary groups that come under military command and meet certain criteria (carry their
weapons openly, distinguish themselves from civilians, and generally obey the laws of war) qualify as combatants.59 Because contract employees fall outside the military chain of command ,60 even those who appear to meet the criteria as combatants could be at risk of losing their right to be treated as POWs if captured by the enemy. PMCs outnumber uniformed presence Peter W. Singer, Director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative @ the Brookings Institute, Brookings Institute 10/7 7, Sure, Hes
Got Guns For Hire. But Theyre Just Not Worth It http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2007/1007militarycontractors.aspx?p=1 By your own department's count, more than 160,000 for-hire personnel are working in Iraq today, which, amazingly, is greater than the number of uniformed military personnel there. These private forces perform all sorts of key functions, such as moving fuel, ammunition and food, as well as protecting top U.S. officials and guarding bases and convoys. Handing those tasks over to U.S. troops would further overstretch a military that you've warned is already dangerously overstretched. Hence the allure of outsourcing the jobs to private firms. But while we can't go to war without 'em, we also can't win with 'em. Our military outsourcing has become an addiction, and we're headed straight for a crash.
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Contractors Work in Combat Zones

The mission doesnt matter noncombat missions can cause violence in hostile environments Marc von Boemcken, senior researcher at the Bonn International Center for Conversion, Private Military and Security Companies. Chances, Problems, Pitfalls and Prospects , ed by Thomas Jger and Gerhard Kmmel, February 7, Liaisons Dangereuses: The
Cooperation between Private Security Companies and Humanitarian Aid Agencies p 270-1
The observation that security companies are usually hired for defensive instead of offensive services is unlikely to make much difference in this regard, since the distinction between the 'active' and 'passive' use of force does usually not remain static in war situations. Indeed, armed PSC personnel working in conflict zones might easily become involved in pro-active combat engagement. An employee of CARE USA recounts
the following experience whilst conducting relief operations in Somalia: "On a convoy assigned to a Somali contractor for the transport of relief supplies, one of the guards accidentally fired an RPG round at a check point. Before we knew it, 29 guards on this convoy died in the ensuing firefight." (cited in Nakano/Seiple 2003: 26) Humanitarian organizations working with armed guards in potentially hostile environments might contribute toward stimulating spirals of violent escalation. In other words, deterrence strategies involving arms and weapons could simply fail to deter and cause a
bloodbath instead. Ultimately, war would thereby come to be perceived of as an irremediable state of affairs (devouring and incapacitating any alternative means of peaceful engagement). Contractors are used for combat missions** Jeremy Scahill, author of Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army , The Nation 6/28 10, Blackwater's
New Sugar Daddy: The Obama Administration http://www.thenation.com/blog/36756/blackwaters-new-sugar-daddy-obamaadministration Panetta said that the CIA had reviewed Blackwater's work for the Agency "to ensure that first and foremost, that we have no contract in which they are engaged in any CIA operations ," adding, "We're doing our own operations. That's important, that we not contract that out to anybody." This is simply a blatantly misleading statement. I have talked with many US military and Blackwater sources who have told me point-blank that while Blackwater technically is hired for "security," they regularly are pulled into operations . The Blackwater guys are not dime store rent-a-cops. Many of them are former Navy SEALs or other US
special forces veterans--precisely the type of men recruited by the CIA's paramilitary division for operations. The idea that the Blackwater guys are just standing around Afghanistan or any other war zone (declared or not) smoking cigarettes and admiring their tattoos while their colleagues who happen to officially work for the CIA chase the bad guys is simply not true. Blackwater forces have been a major part of sensitive US operations almost from the moment the US went into Afghanistan in 2001.
As we know, Blackwater and Prince individually trained and ran private CIA assassination teams at various points since 911. Panetta told Congress he put an end to those teams. Maybe he did, maybe he didn't. But saying that Blackwater is just doing security while on CIA contract is a dubious claim. Take the example of the deadly suicide bombing at the CIA outpost at Forward Operating Base Chapman in Khost Afghanistan last December 30. T op CIA officials in the country were meeting with Humam Khalil Muhammed Abu Mulal al-Balawi, who claimed to have recently met with Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri. It was arguably considered one of the most important
intelligence contacts made since 9-11 for the Agency. When al-Balawi blew himself up, two Blackwater operatives were killed. The point is that this company's operatives are involved with the most sensitive, secret US missions.
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Contractors Work in Combat Zones

Contractors serve in combat zones Joel Skousen, political scientist and publisher of World Affairs Brief, Insurance News Congressional Documents and Publications 6/25 10, Private Contractors in Warzones: The Good, the Bad and the Question http://insurancenewsnet.com/article.aspx?
id=202141
When serving within the combat zone, particularly during a counterinsurgency, contractors create a number of significant problems from the tactical to the strategic level. Three primary characteristics of contractors,
particularly armed contractors, create problems for the government. First, the government does not control the quality of the personnel the contractor hires. Second, unless it provides a government officer or NCO for each convoy, personal security detail or facilities protection unit, it does not control their daily interactions with the local population. Finally, the population holds the government responsible for everything the contractors do or fail to do. Since insurgency is essentially a competition for legitimacy between the government and insurgents, this factor elevates the issue of quality and tactical control to the strategic level.
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Intelligence Contractors Key

Neoliberal calls for government downsizing and deregulation fuel the growth of private intelligcence contracting Winston P. Nagan, prof of law at the University of Florida, and Craig Hammer, World Bank D.C. employee, 8 "Article and
Essay: THE RISE OF OUTSOURCING IN MODERN WARFARE: SOVEREIGN POWER, PRIVATE MILITARY ACTORS, AND THE CONSTITUTIVE PROCESS", 60 Me. L. Rev. 429, lexis law Private military actors and mercenary forces have been a fixture in warfare from long before the nation-state was acknowledged to be the principal political construction. n10 Currently, the United States, the United Kingdom, South Africa, and [*434] Israel are home to most of the world's PMC market . n11 The continuing growth of PMCs is the ostensible result of aggressive development efforts of neoliberal economics in the 1980s, which capitalized on a major ideological component lurking in the interstices of the perceived imperatives of the global political economy and development. In response to the notion that states can be inefficient market actors, or otherwise serve as a depressant on global economic enterprise, an ideological direction emerged during the administrations of U.S. President Ronald Reagan and U.K. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher that sought to free economic enterprise from the constraints of both national and international interventions that were conceived to be uneconomic. n12 At the time this ideological position was developing, there was a powerful incentive at the level of the global political economy to promote deregulation from the regional to the global level. n13 A further implication of the deregulation and privatization of the global political economy involved the specific and controversial question about how far the process could extend without compromising the normal and, by some accounts, essential public functions of the nation-state. n14 It was the position of the Reagan Administration that far more of government expenditures on [*435] defense should be allocated to the private sector . n15 Reagan's Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, seemed to endorse the notion that any governmental function that could be privatized should be privatized. n16 Two critical sectors of the U.S. national landscape, security functions and intelligence collection and analysis, went underthe microscope for possible privatization. n17 Because expenditures in these two areas accounted for a vast percentage of the federal budget, it was thought that a quantum leap in the direction of privatization would be quite a revolutionary change in the nature of the state and the constitutional foundations upon which it was built. n18 The ensuing wave of government downsizing generated various economic opportunities that the private sector seized upon. n19 Following the end of the Cold War, the administrations of George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton sought to continue this reform; various military and intelligence functions which had long been executed by [*436] the Pentagon were outsourced to private industry . n20 This downsizing has indeed proven lucrative for former government authorities, as well as for former officers in the U.S. military machine. n21 It has likewise proven to be lucrative for certain elected officials, who have benefited from funds raised by the PMC and PSC lobbies. n22 As a result, the PMC and PSC industries have experienced explosive growth in recent years . n23 The
privatization trend will, in all probability, continue to enjoy strong growth, which is a chilling notion because the long term world order implications of the use of PMCs -both the on-the- ground results in any given military conflict, as well as the effect on the larger decision and constitutive processes- are inescapably problematic.
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Iraq Key
PMCs especially are problematic in the context of Iraq empirical incidents and sheer numbers Winston P. Nagan, law prof @ U of Florida, and Marcio Santos, Director, Institute for Human Rights, Peace and Development @ University of Florida , Spring 0 8, "ARTICLE: Globalism from an African Perspective: The Training of Lawyers for a New and
Challenging Reality*", 17 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 413, lexis law
PMCs represent the second largest contingent of actors inside Iraq today. n150 The United States and the United Kingdom are the most developed in this area and have captured some 70 percent of the global market.
South Africans and Israelis also figure prominently in some situations. The modern growth of PMCs directly was tied to the aggressive development of the neo-liberal economics by Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom and Ronald Reagan in the United States. By downsizing government, economic opportunities were generated for the private sector to fill in the gap created by deregulation. n151 At the end of the Cold War, the mantra of reform of the military, at least in the United States, resulted in a significant downsizing of the Pentagon. Whatever could be allocated to the private sector, within the law, would be allocated to the private sector. [*460] Those with connections and influence with the military-industrial elite benefited. Downsizing thus became a significant allocation of public funds to well-connected private sector interests. Most recently, by creating a vast homeland security budget, the United States also has created an enormous pork barrel for the private sector. In response, governmental officials who crafted the national security rules have been leaving the government in droves to set up private security consultancies or to join pre-existing private security corporations. n152 The nature of the business does not lend itself to levels of transparencies that approximate the levels of normal corporate actors. n153 To provide one illustration of the problem, former contractors and survivors of a failed PMC operation in Iraq have sued Blackwater USA, a PMC engaged in transportation security work. Properlytrained military decision-makers [*461] should have known of the danger. The company's transportation operatives were sent on a dangerous route in Fallujah. Moreover, the company's personnel were sent into a danger zone without adequate military equipment for protection. Several transport workers were killed, triggering the first battle of Fallujah. n154
One of the victims wrote home about the company's incompetence and malfeasance. It is alleged that his death is attributable to the corporation's ineptitude. n155 One must inquire about the PMCs' competence to
train people to defend themselves, while avoiding harm to others. However, PMCs now represent a type of organization within the twilight zone of international regulation. It is not clear what national rules of engagement apply to them in terms of different arenas of involvement or engagement of conflict. According to various watch facilities, at least ninety companies provide services that normally would be provided by the state military establishment. They function in approximately 110 countries, but the level of public accountability for their conduct, either nationally or
internationally, is unclear. It is possible that the only constraint on their activity is either what their market will bear or what they will get away with.
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Iraq Key
Huge numbers of contractors operate in Iraq in combat situations with little or no supervision George R. Lucas, Jr, professor of philosophy at the U.S. Naval Academy, 9, "Article: "This Is Not Your Father's War" Confronting the Moral Challenges of "Unconventional" War", 3 J. Nat'l Security L. & Pol'y 329, lexis law
There are now over 900 private firms operating in Iraq alone, employing between 190,000 and 210,000 personnel, surpassing considerably the number of combat troops presently stationed there. n7 The private
firms' functions encompass everything from preparing and serving food to maintaining barracks, showers, and latrines, providing troop transport and supply convoys, maintaining shipyards and motor pools, as well as (in some cases) providing security for diplomats, political officials, and embassy personnel. All the non-combat activities that used to fall to Sergeant Bilko, or Beetle Bailey and his comic-strip friends - as well as, in real life, to military police, shore patrols, and Marine guards - are now "outsourced" to civilian contractors, quite often "third-country nationals" hired on subcontracts by the civilian firms who win competitive bids from their own governments to provide these services. A colleague, a mid-career officer in the U.S. Air Force, traveled to Baghdad in 2005 to assist in conducting an investigation of the Iraqi Police Force training program. He was assigned a personal bodyguard, a Gurkha from Nepal, armed with an AK47. As the two chatted, the major discovered to his horror that his Nepalese friend had initially been hired to work as a dishwasher, but, upon arrival in Iraq, was handed a rifle and reassigned as a security guard without prior training or experience. That is not an unusual story. Private firms initially responsible only for logistical support may be left on their own to provide security for their personnel, workplace, or the operations they supervise. They do what any private company would do, and "outsource" these additional tasks. The result is a patchwork quilt of contractors and subcontractors performing logistical and security operations with little in the way of internal controls, supervision, training, or accountability . n8 These developments present an extraordinary challenge for maintaining effective integration, coordination, and command and control of the diverse forces and personnel in zones of [*332] combat, not to mention contract acquisition, accountability, and oversight of these private entities themselves. n9 The depth of the acquisition and accountability dilemma, in turn, was suggested in a recent monograph on strategic military leadership by the recently retired Dean of the U.S. Army War College, Col. Jeffrey D. McCausland. n10 The number of private contracts and contractors, he reports, more than doubled over the six-year period from 2000 to 2006, while the number of federal officials responsible for acquisition and oversight has remained the same or has been reduced. n11 An audit of these practices by the Special Inspector General for Iraq in 2007 revealed that two federal
contracting officers were overseeing over 700 personnel and contracts for the U.S. State Department in excess of one billion dollars. n12 Not surprisingly, more recent U.S. Government Accountability Office audit reports
consistently report tens of billions of dollars misspent or unaccounted for, while former members of the Iraqi Commission on Public Integrity report similar accounts of bribery and corruption totaling in excess of $ 13 billion in U.S. funds. n13
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PMCs are Expensive

Contractors engage in massive war profiteering costing huge sums of money Peter W. Singer, Director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative @ the Brookings Institute, Brookings Institute 6/5 8, Outsourcing
the Fight http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0605_military_contractors_singer.aspx Handing over control to contractors has also led to allegations of war-profiteering . Almost all of today's logistics firms are operating under "cost-plus" contracts--a structure that is ripe for abuse. Examples in Iraq range from billing for soldiers' meals that were never cooked or served to convoys shipping "sailboat fuel" (as HalliburtonKBR truck drivers laughingly termed charging the government for moving empty pallets from site to site).
According to testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government and Reform, the Defense Contract Audit Agency has identified more than $10 billion in unsupported or questionable costs
from battlefield contractors--and it has barely scratched the surface. Such losses don't just represent misspent funds; they represent lost opportunities to actually support our diplomatic and military goals. The situation has gotten so bad that the special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction dubbed
corruption as the "second insurgency" in Iraq. PMCs are expensive they have a monopoly Peter W. Singer, Director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative @ the Brookings Institute, Brookings Institute 6/5 8, Outsourcing
the Fight http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0605_military_contractors_singer.aspx The Pentagon also has to do a much better job of being a smart client. Far too few contracts get any true competition to drive down prices. Instead, they tend to be bundled together into massive structures, where a few prime contractors (just three in the new version of LOGCAP) are the ones that dole out sub-contracts . Add in the largely cost-plus contract structure, and savings tend not to accrue. There also aren't enough eyes and ears working on behalf of the government client to monitor contractor performance. In 1998, there was one financial auditor for every $642 million in Pentagon contracts. Today, there is one
auditor for every $2.03 billion in contracts.

These auditors aren't just required to catch false billings and cost overruns, but also to ensure quality. That soldier's electrocution didn't happen because of malice; it happened, as an internal Pentagon e-mail revealed, because KBR's inspections were never reviewed by a "qualified government employee," and the Army wasn't aware of "the extent of the severity of the electrical problems." Finally, the Pentagon needs to use its massive buying power to shape and sanction the market , much like Wal-Mart does to wring out efficiencies and send warnings to any vendors that think to cross it. For example, the new LOGCAP contract, potentially worth up to $150 billion, went to KBR, DynCorp and Fluor. Yet, as the Project on Government Oversight found, these same three companies have been cited for 29 cases of serious misconduct in the last decade--a category of allegations that includes false claims against the government, violations of the Anti-Kickback Act, fraud and conspiracy to launder money.
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Kills Political Accountability

PMCs let policymakers avoid public oversight tripwires destroys accountability Peter W. Singer, Director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative @ the Brookings Institute, Harpers Magazine 9/30 7, Can't Win
with 'Em, Can't Go to War Without 'Em: http://harpers.org/archive/2007/09/hbc-90001311 Six Questions for P.W. Singer, interviewed by Scott Horton.
1. One of your first conclusions is that by using military contractors, policymakers dodge key decisions that carry political costs, thus leading to operational choices that might not reflect the public interest. Moving away from the operations in Iraq which are more immediately topical, security contractors have been pushed as surrogates for uniformed military as peacekeepers in Darfur, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and a variety of other circumstances. A Marine general recently told me that he was concerned that the heavy reliance on contractors might allow policymakers to ease into a foreign conflict in a way that avoided Congressional scrutiny and oversight. Do you agree that this is a realistic concern? Yes, and I wouldnt use the word might, as if it were a future scenario. Contractors have already been used in all sorts of operations, in both an overt (Iraq, Balkans) and covert (Colombia, Sudan), manner to get around certain political consequences or congressional restrictions. When the U.S. military shifted to an all-volunteer , professional force in the wake of the Vietnam War, military leaders set up a series of organization tripwires to preserve the tie between the nations foreign policy decisions and local communities. Led by then-Army Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams (1972-74), they
wanted to ensure that the military would not go to war without the sufficient backing and involvement of the nation. Much like a call center moved to India, this Abrams Doctrine has been outsourced.
Instead, contractors offer the means for choices to be dodged at the onset of deployment, and for scrutiny and public concern to be lessened after deployment. Your home-front does not get as involved when its contractors are being called up and deployed, nor do the people there ask key questions when contractors are lost. Over 1,000 have been killed in Iraq and 13,000 wounded, but they are not counted on official D epartment of Defense reports. In turn, if you want to go to a non-Iraq example, where is the concern over the three American contractors still held captive by the FARC in Colombia today? Imagine if we had three soldiers as POWs instead. In addition, your media also becomes less likely to cover the story when contractors are involved. One quarter of one percent of all news stories out of Iraq mention contractors. This new option is obviously greatly appealing to executive branch policymakers, but the underlying premise of the Abrams Doctrine was that, if a military operation could not garner public support of the level needed to involve the full nation, then maybe it shouldnt happen in the first place.
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Kills Political Accountability

Allows politicians to avoid accountability lack of monitoring regulations prove James Cockayne, associate at the International Peace Academy, Conference on Private Military Contractors in Latin America JanFeb 8, Taming the Dogs of War: The Strategic Logic of the Professionalization of Private Military and Security Companies
http://www.havenscenter.org/privatemilitaryconference2008 State regulators explain the absence of monitoring and effective sanctions on the basis of cost and difficulty, pointing out numerous technical and administrative barriers to effective investigation and prosecution. These include the challenges of securing evidence in a war-zone, and the lack of bureaucratic incentives for domestic prosecutors to focus on such lowconviction-rate, high-risk cases. As valid as these points are, they also overlook the fact that states have barely tried to overcome them. Few attempts have been made to impose the administrative costs of monitoring on the
suppliers, through licensing fees, by imposing annual reporting requirements, or by instituting spotchecks or self-reporting requirements. Nor have states taken concerted steps to extend the jurisdiction of domestic
courts to the extra-territorial activities of commercial suppliers. There is evidence of a trend by executives reluctantly to fill these holes - but very large gaps remains. And little attention has been paid to the intergovernmental
discussions and arrangements needed to ensure that unilateral acts and omissions by government do not effectively immunize PMSCs from effective oversight and accountability. All of this tends to suggest that national executives may in fact see other benefits in PMSC extra-territorial conduct being little-known at home. They may, in particular, see benefits in relying on the outsourcing of military tasks to private agents to reduce the control that other stakeholders including affected communities and their home electorates have over them. This is the strategic logic of the current approach to regulation; and it
is a logic that deliberately exploits the technologies of globalization to reduce domestic democratic control of armed forces. Changing that will require concerted social action, regulating PMSCs not only through state-based law, but also through market incentives and social controls, to build a new, transnational democratic control of these forces.
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PMCs Are Not Regulated/Held Accountable

PMCs are not held accountable like military personnel James Cockayne, associate at the International Peace Academy, Conference on Private Military Contractors in Latin America JanFeb 8, Taming the Dogs of War: The Strategic Logic of the Professionalization of Private Military and Security Companies
http://www.havenscenter.org/privatemilitaryconference2008 Nor is this merely a question of PMSCs being, like national militaries serving overseas, accountable to home rather than host publics. Often, PMSCs are employed by the host state , so here their protection from bearing the true costs of harm in effect means that the host state is also shielded from dealing with the costs its citizenry bear. And even where PMSCs are contracted by foreign states, they are often less accountable than the militaries of those foreign states . It is particularly striking that not one foreign PMSC operative in Iraq
contracted to the U.S. Government has been held accountable for any serious crime, though many U.S. military personnel have. (Human Rights First 2008) The difference is particularly stark where the two groups have participated, side by side, in the same crimes, for example at Abu Ghraib. (Karp 2004) Either private military
personnel in Iraq commit no violations of the law, or when they do, it goes unsanctioned. The reduced political costs for employers are clear.
PMCs operate outside parliamentary control Jos L. Gmez del Prado, Chairperson of the UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, Conference on Private Military Contractors in Latin America Jan-Feb 8, Private Military and Security Companies and Challenges to the UN Working Group on the
Use of Mercenaries http://www.havenscenter.org/privatemilitaryconference2008 Private military and security companies are at present rarely held accountable by effective oversight mechanisms at parliamentary procedures, whether in the States contracting them or in the countries where they operate. It also appears that these companies determine and influence the demand for security services. As regards their involvement in institution building in post conflict situations their services raise questions regarding sustainability and their actual contribution in ending low intensity conflicts. Outsourcing military and security functions has an inherent danger in losing
the State control over the use of force .

As pointed out by Hans von Sponeck, Former UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq the outsourcing of security and military-related issues to non-state agents is a source of great concern which has caught many governments unprepared. The most troubling aspect is that these military forces operate outside any parliamentary control. These
private security guards come from all over the world, from countries whose governments may not even be aware that they have been recruited as a private army into a war zone, and are not answerable to anyone . Within this context, it is interesting to note that when the issue of adopting measures which would include the
use of force against Saddam Hussein was discussed at the UN Security Council, Chile which was at the time a member of the Council opposed to such action. Since 2004, however, Chileans ex militaries have been recruited as independent contractors or private guards by US transnational security companies to be sent to Iraq without any authorization by Chilean authorities who were informed of the situation by the media .
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PMCs Are Not Regulated/Held Accountable

Contractors are never held accountable tons of empirics prove Peter W. Singer, Director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative @ the Brookings Institute, Brookings Institute 10/2 7, The Dark
Truth About Blackwater http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2007/1002militarycontractors.aspx?p=1 And these are standard occurrences that go on in the regular course of contractor operations, where no one is actually harmed. Unfortunately, however, contractors have also been involved in a pattern of abuses that go far beyond the recent Blackwater incident. For example, a reported 100 percent of the translators and up to 50 percent of the interrogators at the Abu Ghraib prison were private contractors from the Titan and CACI firms, respectively. The U.S. Army found that contractors were involved in 36 percent of the proven abuse incidents from 2003-04 and identified six particular employees as being culpable in the abuses. However, while the enlisted U.S. Army soldiers involved in the Abu Ghraib abuse were properly court-martialed for their crimes, three years later not one of the private contractors named in the U.S. Army investigation reports has been charged, prosecuted or punished. In another incident in 2005, armed contractors from the Zapata firm were detained by U.S. forces, who claimed they saw the private soldiers indiscriminately firing not only at Iraqi civilians, but also at U.S. Marines. Again, they were not charged, as the legal issues remained murky. Other cases in 2006 included the Aegis company's "trophy video," in which contractors set video of them shooting at civilians to Elvis' song "Runaway Train," and put it on the Internet, and the alleged joyride shootings of Iraqi civilians by a Triple Canopy supervisor (which became the subject of a lawsuit after the two employees, who claim to have witnessed the shootings, lost their jobs). Blackwater is thus not the only company to be accused of incidents that negatively impact the battle to win hearts and minds. But Blackwater has earned a special reputation among Iraqis. Much of this stems from the highly visible role it has played in escorting U.S. officials. Iraqi government officials claim that t here have been at least seven incidents of civilian harm in which the company has been involved. The most notable that has been reported in the press was on Christmas Eve 2006, when a Blackwater employee allegedly got drunk while inside the Green Zone in Baghdad and got in an argument with a guard of the Iraqi vice president . He then shot the Iraqi dead. The employee was quickly flown out of the country. Nine months later, he has not been charged with any crime. Imagine the same thing happening in the U.S. -- an Iraqi embassy guard, drunk at a Christmas party in D.C., shooting a Secret Service agent guarding Vice President Cheney -- and you can see some potential for how Blackwater's Christmas tidings were not happy ones for U.S. efforts at winning hearts and minds. In May 2007, there were two more reported shootings of Iraqi civilians by Blackwater contractors, including an Interior Ministry employee, which led to an armed standoff between the firm and Iraqi police. Thus, many felt the great tension between the firm and the locals would soon erupt. In the weeks before the September killings, Matthew Degn, a senior American civilian advisor to the Interior Ministry's intelligence directorate, described Blackwater as giving rise to "a powder keg" of anger. U.S. military officers frequently express their frustrations with sharing the battlefield with such private forces operating under their own rules and agendas, and worry about the consequences for their own operations. As far back as 2005, for example, Brig. Gen. Karl Horst, deputy commander of the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division (responsible for security in the Baghdad area at the time), tried to keep track of contractor shootings in his sector. Over the course of two months, he found 12 shootings that resulted in at least six Iraqi civilian deaths and three more wounded. As Horst tellingly put it, "These guys run loose in this country and do stupid stuff. There's no authority over them, so you can't come down on them hard when they escalate force. They shoot people, and someone else has to deal with the aftermath." Several weeks before the most recent Blackwater incident, an Iraqi official explained how the contractors' actions were reverberating against the wider U.S. effort in Iraq and beyond. " They are part of the reason for all the hatred that
is directed at Americans, because people don't know them as Blackwater, they know them only as Americans. They are planting hatred, because of these irresponsible acts."
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Lack of Accountability Lack of Legitimacy

Kills government legitimacy lack of accountability Joel Skousen, political scientist and publisher of World Affairs Brief, Insurance News Congressional Documents and Publications 6/25 10, Private Contractors in Warzones: The Good, the Bad and the Question http://insurancenewsnet.com/article.aspx?
id=202141
the United States is held responsible for everything the contractors do or fail to do. Despite the fact the United States has no effective quality or operational control over the contractors, the local population rightly holds it responsible for all
The lack of quality and tactical control greatly increase the impact of the third major problem contractor failures. Numerous personal conversations with Iraqis revealed a deep disgust with the actions of armed contractors. They noted we gave them authority to use deadly weapons in our name. While Iraqis were not confident American forces would be punished for killing Iraqis, they believed it was at least a possibility. However, the Iraqis were
convinced that contractors were simply above any law. These perceptions serious undercut the legitimacy of the government. A key measure of the legitimacy of a government is a monopoly on the use of force within its boundaries. The very act of hiring armed contractors dilutes that monopoly. Legitimate governments are also responsible for the actions of their agents particularly those actions taken against their own populations. Yet, despite efforts to increase the accountability of contractors, the widespread perception is that armed contractors who commit crimes against host nation people are outside the law of both the host country and the United States . While we have laws criminalizing certain activities, the cost and difficulty of trying a contractor for crimes that occurred overseas in a conflict zone has so far deterred U.S. prosecutors. In over seven years of activity in Iraq, no contractor has been convicted of a crime against Iraqi citizens. Either contractors are a remarkably law abiding group or the system does not work. The fact that an insurgency is essentially a competition for legitimacy in the eyes of the people elevates the presence of armed contractors to a strategic issue.
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Neolib Extensions
Privatizing security destroys traditional notions of sovereignty and fuels globalization, legitimizing violence Winston P. Nagan, prof of law at the University of Florida, and Craig Hammer, World Bank D.C. employee, 8 "Article and
Essay: THE RISE OF OUTSOURCING IN MODERN WARFARE: SOVEREIGN POWER, PRIVATE MILITARY ACTORS, AND THE CONSTITUTIVE PROCESS", 60 Me. L. Rev. 429, lexis law However, PMCs and PSCs are not supported by traditional, appropriate sources of authority , even though national sovereigns are a key part of the process of assigning sovereign power to them. n73 In the case of PMCs and PSCs, the national constitutive [*449] [*450] process of authoritative decision-making is thus not identical to
the world constitutive process of authoritative decision-making. Here, the mapping process can provide a more precise and comprehensive
set of conceptual markers. It allows an observer to pinpoint with greater accuracy the complex, dynamic interrelationships of the processes of both effective power and constituting authority throughout the various levels of social organization. In this map, outsourcing state power is a critically important element of this complex process. A central insight into the language of power in international law is that terms such as "internal" affairs, "domestic" jurisdiction, or "international concern," do not provide adequate conceptual markers to clearly signal the core interdependence of internal and external conditions that tie local phenomena to global concerns and vice versa. n74
outsourcing of military conflict-arguably a particularly destructive consequence of globalization-can be viewed as an affront to sovereign power. n75 It is commonly held that the conditions that support "globalism," such as technological advances, the communications revolution, advances in business organization, political activism, terrorism, organized crime, and now heavily armed mercenary corporations, conspire to undermine territorial boundaries and permit the exchange of culture, political economy, and the growth of beneficent and malevolent global civil society. n76 However, this does not mean the demise of sovereign power; it means change. Sovereignty may indeed be strengthened as it changes to meet new needs and opportunities. In other ways, sovereignty may be limited in its capacity to deny international responsibilities and domestic obligations . Contextual
The mapping should [*451] help account for these complexities; it is a technique to more adequately improve our understanding of the conditions, consequences, and challenges of sovereign power in the world constitutive process.
An analysis of the world constitutive process will reveal the vast number of participants and institutions that comprise the global community. n77 Among these are state sovereigns, international and regional organizations, political parties, business groups, pressure groups, NGOs, non-state actors, and individuals in various roles relevant to social relations within and across state and national lines. n78 Among the important outcomes of the world constitutive process is the relatively specialized process of effective power, which involves connecting linkages between interaction and interdetermination operating in micro-social institutions; larger-scale social groups organized around common goals such as profit or influencing policy; broad-scale social formations such as the state; even larger aggregates of states; and a still larger and more complex world process of effective power. Again, a description of this process would focus on every feature of social organization that conditions, or is conditioned by, power. n79 This is illustrated by mapping the context of social process to the context of effective power. n80
The process of sovereign power, which in this Article refers to representative government, is characterized by patterns of communication concerning conflict and potential collaboration, which may function concurrently or
sequentially among political contestants for power. As state power brokers engage in contestations for power, they generate understandings that recurrently involve communication that focuses on the limits and uses of sovereign power, either for collaboration and mutual interest or the facilitation of conflict and destruction . A fundamental aspect of constitutional law is that it institutionalizes expectations concerning the management of power in institutionsof authoritative and controlling decision-making. Thus, outcomes of the social process itself include the development of mechanisms of social, [*452] cultural, and economic decision-making. n81 Other particularly important outcomes of the social process are the decision-making capabilities created by and specialized for contestations for power. Examples of specialized outcomes of the power process are the interrelated phenomena of war and peace (or more generally, conflict and the management of conflict in the common interest). n82 T he understandings that emerge from these processes reflect the development, however imperfect, of cultural forms that seek to constrain excessive, destructive conflicts, to structure conflicts synergistically, and to innovatively create the capacity to improve law, culture, and political economy. However, from a practical point of view, the privatization of any aspect
of combat operations is tantamount to the usurpation of conflict management and collaboration-critical roles of the sovereign- and circumscribes the basic political and juridical institutions of effective and authoritative decision-making.
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Neolib Extensions
PMCs are tools of the state used to advance a neoliberal agenda Xavier Renou, Prof. @ Universit Patheon-Assas, 5 [Oxford Development Studies 33.1, Private Military Compaies Against
Development, 108-110] In the second half of the 20th Century, mercenaries have been repeatedly used as auxiliaries to neoimperialist objectives. They were employed in order to take back the newly won independence in the case of Comoros, to maintain control over strategic regions (Katanga, Biaffra) and to destabilize countries regarded as belonging to the sphere of inuence of the Soviet Union (Benin, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Cuba . . .), etc. Today, they serve neo-imperialist objectives, with an extra dimension that is decisive in the case of neo-imperialism: short-term protability. PMCs allow governments to provide military assistance or run military operations with no ofcial acknowledgement; no possibility for parliamentary or judicial control or oversight; and no political cost if the action is illegitimate or turns nasty. In case of scandal, none of the parties have to disclose information regarding contracted operations as it relates to proprietary information. Thus, plausible deniability and commercial secrecy make military intervention and inuence, and support to client states in low- intensity conicts, easier, faster and less risky politically speaking, something very important at times when statesmen and their armies can be prosecuted before the international criminal court in cases of human right violations. C orporate mercenaries enable
legitimate governments to behave in illegitimate ways, to break international laws, violate human rights or resort to unconventional ways of waging wars. Examples of such ways include illegal US involvement
in the Great Lakes war in 1995 through the PMC Ronco, the breaking of UN arms embargoes in Sierra Leone (1995) and Kosovo (1994 95 and 1999 2001) through PMCs Sandline and MPRI (Military Professional Resources Incorporated), the waging of coups in the Republic of Congo (1997) by the French PMC Groupe Onze and others, the weakening or destabilization of countries like Croatia and Bosnia (1991 92) with MPRI, the use of torture and ethnic cleansing as strategies of war (in 1996 Zaire, in 1991 Croatia), etc.
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Neolib Extensions
PMCs are neoliberal Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Prof. of Sociology @ Univ. of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, 4 [Theory, Culture & Society 21.3, Neoliberal
Empire, p. 124-5] The nations shift to combat mode in the wake of 9/11 facilitated the authoritarian concentration of power, silenced criticism and widened the umbrella of security. Neoliberal practices of outsourcing (to focus on core business) now extend to security and war. Business conglomerates built during the neoliberal regime cash in on empire, such as the Carlyle Group in defence contracts and Halliburton and Bechtels contracts for building US bases and the reconstruction of Iraq (Shorrock, 2002, 2003). Under the security umbrella, government contracts for rebuilding
Iraq were allocated without public accountability, or accountability was outsourced to the companies themselves (Baum, 2003). Bypassing the CIA, FBI and Defense Intelligence Agency, circles within the administration set up their own intelligence units such as Team B and the Ofce of Special Plans in the Pentagon. Passing on the blame for intelligence failures regarding 9/11 and Iraq to the agencies which had just been bypassed weakens the agencies and maximizes executive privilege. The pervasive practice of cooking the books, Enron-style, now extends to policy in intelligence, security, the economy and the environment. Fudging data and deception become standard operating procedure. The judicial process in relation to suspected terrorists is politicized by reference to security. Terrorism Information Awareness means unlimited surveillance and limited accountability. Security voids the Freedom of Information Act.
Security operations are increasingly outsourced to private military contractors such as DynCorp and MPRI, some of which are subsidiaries of Fortune 500 rms. The global market in private military contracts is estimated at $100 billion. These services include training foreign troops, low- intensity conict overseas, security for President Karzai in Afghanistan, airport security and military recruitment. While these mercenary forces are paid for by American taxpayers,
they dont operate under military rules, are unaccountable and allow the administration to carry out foreign policy goals in low-level skirmishes around the globe without attracting media attention
(Wayne, 2002; cf. Singer, 2003). This turns overseas conict into another business proposition just as prisons in the US have been privatized and turned into a prison-industrial complex (Dyer, 1999). Thus neoliberal empire extends
protable domestic practices overseas.
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Security Privatization Kills Right to Security

PMCs stratify security by class as the wealthy choose private policing, funds are withdrawn from public security institutions CLIFFORD J. ROSKY, Law Clerk to the Honorable Robert D. Sack, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Spring 04, "ARTICLE: Force, Inc.: The Privatization of Punishment, Policing, and Military Force in Liberal States", 36 Conn. L. Rev. 879,
lexis law
private markets provide the greatest security to the highest bidders rather than protecting all citizens equally. n194 This distributive argument appears most frequently in criticisms of private
[*931] First, critics object that policing and military markets. It comes in two forms: static and dynamic. Both versions proceed from the presumption that policing and military security are the kinds of things that every individual and organization wants and deserves. n195 In the static version, critics note that private policing and military corporations sell security, whereas public policing and military institutions ration it. Thus, private security ends up in the hands of the wealthiest customers, while public security is more evenly shared. n196 There is an obvious rejoinder to this argument: Private security markets most often function as supplements, rather than substitutes, for public security networks. Customers only purchase the services of private policing and military corporations when governments cannot or will not provide them. This response works especially well in the private military markets, in which poor states typically hire PMCs because rich states refuse to help them. n197 This suggests that in the real world, the only alternative to PMCs is not public armies, but no armies. This response provokes the subtler, dynamic version of the distributive [*932] argument: Critics claim that our
increasing reliance on private policing and military markets encourages wealthy individuals, corporations, and governments to "exit" from public security networks, n198 leaving poor communities and states undefended. This argument appears chiefly in criticisms of private policing markets. n199 As we have
already seen, wealthy individuals, associations, and corporations have purchased more private policing over the last thirty years. n200 Yet these same customers pay some of our highest tax bills. Critics worry that eventually, wealthy
customers will become fed up with "paying twice for security--once to the government, and once to hired private firms." n201 They will relocate to privately-owned, low-crime, low-tax, enclaves in which public policing levels are low. They will lobby for cutbacks in public policing institutions and demand tax vouchers for private security expenses. n202 They will withdraw their resources from public police forces and reinvest them in private policing markets. As this trend evolves, governments will find themselves increasingly unable to sustain or improve public police protection in impoverished precincts. n203
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Security Privatization Kills Right to Security

Privatization destroys a right to security and enables abuse of power by elites James Cockayne, associate at the International Peace Academy, Conference on Private Military Contractors in Latin America JanFeb 8, Taming the Dogs of War: The Strategic Logic of the Professionalization of Private Military and Security Companies
http://www.havenscenter.org/privatemilitaryconference2008 The potential costs to local populations of PMSC activity are not only those of direct abuse: other costs include the discounted prices on national assets sometimes offered by governing elites to PMSC business partners to achieve short-term security goals; over-charging by military contractors, the costs falling on the taxpayers of client governments, as in Iraq; crowding out of investment in public institutions; and the reduction of public security expectations to the minimum required to facilitate resource extraction and other core economic activities. (Holmqvist 2005; International Peace Academy 2001) Beyond these costs for the affected community, there may also be significant long-term systemic costs, including reduced public access to security; impacts on statebuilding; the militarization of certain social groups, particularly young men; and geostrategic impacts. If not appropriately regulated, PMSCs, operating through trans-national networks of financial, governmental, social, legal and military power risk rendering security a commodity available only to those with sufficient financial, social or political power. The danger here is that access to security may cease to be a matter of right flowing from ones humanity (or ones national citizenship), at least nominally guaranteed by states, and instead become a matter of financial, social and political power. Unless the incentives of PMSCs to responsibly provide public security are increased, in many places in the world the involvement of PMSCs in the provision of security risks turning security into a commodity and not a public good. This is nowhere more apparent than in the impacts of reliance on PMSCs in the numerous state-building projects now underway around the world. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, the reliance on outside contractors to provide protection for governing elites has provided those elites with an alternative to developing grassroots political support. Foreign PMSCs have provided ready-made sources of coercion, allowing local elites to
circumvent the traditional state-building trajectory that would require them to develop a local constituency (or at least access to local sources of coercion) as a basis for their rule. Economic interests that rely on
protection by PMSCs in Latin America can similarly avoid investing in developing support and cooperative relations with local communities. In this sense, the presence of PMSCs may risk stifling or even turning back the statebuilding processes, by deferring the date at which governing elites must make the compromises needed to develop sustainable public support. Moreover, the privatized political economy of violence that PMSCs feed may even serve, over time, to dissolve irreversibly the social compact within a national community. In Iraq, for the example, the balkanizing impact of the policy of reliance on PMSCs is particularly clear. PMSCs in Iraq often rely on local commercial partners for both
intelligence and manpower. This has led to the development of massive indigenous PMSC industries in Iraq, and to a lesser extent, Afghanistan, as local implementation partners for the international PMSC industry even as it has stimulated the feeder industry in Latin America, Asia and elsewhere. But in many cases, the indigenous PMSCs in Iraq and Afghanistan are fronts for other interests insurgents, organized crime and even terrorist groups.
These illicit armed groups are thus somewhat staggeringly using PMSC sub-contracts as a finance mechanism to receive Coalition funding for their fight against Coalition forces! The result may well be that the international communitys reliance on and funding of PMSCs has accelerated the privatization of local, public security provision, fuelling balkanization. Although I use the word balkanization, the best model to look to may actually be Somalia where the international communitys policy of reliance on local private security providers in the early 1990s seems to have played a key role in the disintegration of the public security structures and the fragile statehood of that country. (Cockayne 2006a)
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PMCs Kill Human Rights

PMCs operate outside of the law and enable human rights abuses Jos L. Gmez del Prado, Chairperson of the UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, Conference on Private Military Contractors in Latin America Jan-Feb 8, Private Military and Security Companies and Challenges to the UN Working Group on the
Use of Mercenaries http://www.havenscenter.org/privatemilitaryconference2008 This same trend is also becoming a widespread practice in developing countries coming out from authoritarian regimes such as Honduras, Ecuador and Peru. In Honduras, according to a UN report the number of people employed by private security companies as private guards and vigilantes would range between 20,000 at a minimum and 70,000 at most. In contrast, the Honduran National Police numbers only 12,000, of whom 7,300 belong to the uniformed Preventive Police. There seems to be no authority with any control over these companies actions, which pose a serious threat to the general public and to law and order. These illegal companies reportedly have thousands of banned weapons acquired on the black market, such as AK-47 and M-16 assault rifles and Uzi submachine guns . In the city of Guayaquil, Ecuador, the municipal authorities had subcontracted private security firms as a temporary measure until sufficient numbers of national police officials had been recruited and trained to meet law enforcement requirements . In Peru there would be some 50,000 private guards and probably some other 50,000 in the informal sector. Many of the informal companies would be providing security to the municipalities. Only a few of the private security companies would be registered . The globalization of the world economy and the shifting from centralized governments to diffused governance or ungovernance together with the downsizing of regular armed forces of States, which have had important reductions in the public sector both in developed and developing countries are some of the causes behind the rapid development of the privatization of violence . In many of todays failed states, the globalization of the economy together with the bottom-up privatization of violence, in which non-state actors such as paramilitaries and warlords control natural resources, has had destructive effects because of the attempts from foreign actors to link their wealth (oil, gas, diamonds, timber and precious metals) into the world market and to control their national economy . Classical inter-state wars with clear front lines have almost disappeared. Instead, we witness low intensity armed conflicts; a widespread use of light weapons; and the privatization of military functions and asymmetry of the parties in the conflict The outsourcing of a number of basic functions which traditionally were carried out by the army or the police, known as the top-down privatization, has blurred the borderlines between the public services of the State and the private commercial sector creating a dangerous grey zone. In situations of armed conflict the employees of transnational private military and security companies, contracted as civilians but armed as military personnel, operate in these grey zones with uncertainties as to whether their status is that of a combatant or of a civilian from the perspective of international humanitarian law. As has been synthesized by one analyst, the development of private military and security companies has produced a new type of security guards and private soldiers who operate in war zones and high-risk insecurity areas under murky legal restraints . These new modalities have replaced to a certain extent the use of traditional individual mercenaries.
Private military and security companies fill the vacuum mainly left in three types of unstable situations: (i) in zones of low-intensity armed conflict (the new asymmetrical wars) where the armies are not fully deployed or in post conflict situations with a high level of insecurity; (ii) in armed conflicts when international organizations do not intervene; and (iii) in troubled areas in developing countries where there is no presence of the State and extractive transnational corporations operate. In the privatization of warfare and the utilization of private military and security companies to protect multinational extractive corporations one can find elements of bygone historical periods involving the use of force by non-state actors , such as the Bay Hudson Company in Canada or the East Indian Company in the 18th century.
An emergent trend in Latin America but also in other regions of the world indicates situations of private security companies protecting transnational extractive corporations whose employees are often involved in
suppressing the legitimate social protest of communities, human rights and environmental organizations in the areas where these corporations operate. Furthermore, in exchange for providing security services to
some African governments, private military and security companies have in some cases received concessions for the exploitation of natural resources . One of the most notable examples is the operation conducted, in 1995, by Executive Outcomes (EO), a private military company, in Sierra Leone against the rebels. Once the capital, Freetownn, had been liberated the mercenaries of EO took the control of the gold mines of Kono and Sierra Rutile. The then government of V. Strasser unable to pay EO one million dollars a month, agreed to give the exploitation of the gold mines conquered by EO to a firm affiliated with a holding connected with EO .
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AT: PMCs Help Humanitarian Missions

Use of private security in humanitarian missions stratifies security, turning it into a commodity available only to the highest bidder this inevitably reproduces violence Marc von Boemcken, senior researcher at the Bonn International Center for Conversion, Private Military and Security Companies. Chances, Problems, Pitfalls and Prospects , ed by Thomas Jger and Gerhard Kmmel, February 7, Liaisons Dangereuses: The
Cooperation between Private Security Companies and Humanitarian Aid Agencies p 269-70 Humanitarian and development actors operating in zones of war and instability influence local attitudes, norms and power relations in many different ways. Much has been written on the unwitting affect of aid delivery on, for example, the dynamics of violent conflict (Bryer/Cairns ] 997; Anderson 1999). Similarly, cooperation between humanitarians
and PSCs may not only impact upon the independence and decision-making of aid workers, but also upon the society in which they operate as a whole. When hiring deterrent security services from the commercial sector, aid agencies partake in a wider social process of security privatization characteristic for a number of weak or failing states in Sub-Saharan Africa. Herein, the provision of security from physical harm no longer presents itself as a public good' available to each and every citizen, but as an expensive commodity, a luxury even, that only few are able to afford (Lock 1998). The consequence is a phenomenon known as "crime displacement": As poor segments of society become more vulnerable to attack than others, they simultaneously attract a disproportionate amount of criminal activity. Referring to the example of aid agencies in Northern Pakistan , which hired former British and Indian army Gurkhas to protect their offices and warehouses Michael von Tangen Page observes that " while the western aid workers were protected, the houses and properties of their local neighbours were put at greater risk "
(Tangen Page 2004: 10). Similar effects may be witnessed in cities such as Kinshasa, Luanda and Bogota where humanitarians "secure small islands of peace for themselves" at the expense of diverting external threats to the poor and unprotected communities by which they are surrounded (Vaux 2002: 13). It would seem that increasing reliance on private deterrence significantly exacerbates social and economic stratification by creating sharply differentiated spaces of relative in/security. In fact, such inequality may
in itself become a source of future conflicts, eventually leaving even those who can pay for security services less safe than before. As for humanitarian organizations, the use of PSCs thus entails the danger of alienating local partners by generating grievances in recipient communities who do not enjoy comparable levels of protection.
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Security Framing Extensions

PMCs control how society frames security they determine what problems become securitized Anna Leander, Assoc. Prof. of Poli. Sci. and Public Management U. of Southern Denmark, 5 (Millennium 33.3, The Power to
Construct International Security) This article orginiated out of the concern that the significance of Private Military Companies (PMCs) for international security is underes- timated. This is not only true among the many international security observers who take no interest whatsoever in PMCs, it is also true of the rapidly increasing numbers who do study PMCs1 but who often fail to see the extent to which they shape security policies (as opposed to just implementing them). The basic thrust of this article is that observers reach this conclusion more because of the limited conception of power with which they work, than because PMCs are insignificant. The present article argues that if we apply a more comprehensive power analysis PMCs appear
to have gained considerable power over security understandings and discourses. They increasingly shape which issues and problems are securitised turned into existential threats2 and which kind of (re-)action is to be considered most appropriate. They are part of a general process in which security is not only privatisedbut also re-militarised. Private military corporations are not mere tools of the state rather, they are economically driven actors who exert power over the very governments that employ them Anna Leander, Assoc. Prof. of Poli. Sci. and Public Management U. of Southern Denmark, 5 (Millennium 33.3, The Power to
Construct International Security) The notion of power underlying this argument is narrow; it refers only to the formal capacity to decide over the use of force. It states that as long as this formal power remains with states (and state based international institutions), PMCs will remain insignificant. Yet, even accepting this narrow notion of power, the argument may be less persuasive than its proponents suggest. For one, PMCs are not mere arms of government policy, but also private and corporate; they have to follow a market logic. T he industry, its advocates, the scholars studying it and legislators trying to regulate it (including the former UN rapporteur on mercenaries17) have insisted on the label private military company not only to avoid the tainted label mercenaries, but also to emphasise that PMCs are firms operating as companies on the basis of profit motives . Aprivate market for force18is developing, and even if states play an important role in it, it is not clear that governments (even the strongest) can control its workings. Nor is it obvious that they can keep the firms (even those they are closest to) harnessed so that they onlyengage in activities the government approves of. For example, DynCorp International FZ-LLC is a firm with close ties to the US government and numerous government contracts; including recent contracts to protect President Karzai and to train the police in Iraq.19 However DynCorp is also infamous for a sex-ring organised by senior figures in its Bosnian operations, as well as its dealings with right wing paramilitaries in Colombia .20 For two, even if formal decision making power remains with governments PMCs are becoming significant actors because their
closeness to governments works not only to give governments a say over the firms, but also the other way around. PMCs often have highly placed members of the political establishment on their boards as epitomised by Dick Cheneys close ties to Halliburton. These boardmembers have loyalties to their firms and lobby their case.21 This may grant PMCs a say , even if it is only indirect, over the formal decisions to use force. Exactly because the relationship between the public authorities and the private company is so intertwined, it is not
self- evident that PMCs are powerless and insignificant even if power is reduced to mean the formal capacity to decide over the use force.
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Security Framing Extensions

Lobbying efforts enable private corporations shape security discourses and government decisions Anna Leander, Assoc. Prof. of Poli. Sci. and Public Management U. of Southern Denmark, 5 (Millennium 33.3, The Power to
Construct International Security)
PMCs lobbying shape security discourses. PMCs lobby decisionmakers at different levels, trying to get them to adopt an interpretation of facts which corresponds to the interests of the firms . In some cases,
this has very obvious implications for security discourses; i.e., for how national interests are understood and acted upon. For example, after intense lobbying, MPRI managed to convince the US government to allow it to take on a contract offered by Equatorial Guinea within the frame of the USs National Security Enhancement Plan. The contract was for the formation and training of a costal defence. Allowing this entailed a considerable redefinition of US national security interests since the US has a long standing policy of not supporting Equatorial Guineas military regime with its close ties to Cuba and North Korea. The winning argument was that if the MPRI did not get the contract some other non- US firm (a French one in this case) would.43 Stated otherwise, MPRI effectively convinced the US government to shift its understanding of its national interests and its policy towards Equatorial Guinea. However, most of the time the link between PMC lobbying and security discourses is less direct. Lobbying has a
propensity to turn around questions about what kind of contract should be granted what firm on what condition. Thus there are innumerable allegations and quite a few investigations about the link between firms and politics. The most widely known is that linking Halliburton and former Secretary of Defense and now VicePresident Dick Cheney.44 But there are many others. For example, the ascendance of Vinnell is usually linked to the political contacts of the firm. Frank Carlucci (Secretary of Defence under Reagan) was the head of BDM when the firm bought Vinnell. The firm has also had key republican personalities (such as James Baker and George W.H. Bush) on its payroll.45 Diligence LLC similarly relies on an impressive list of politically connected personalities. Joe Allbauh, campaign-manager for President Bush, is co-chairman; and the firm was founded by William Webster, who has headed both the FBI and the CIA.46 The list could go on. There is already extensive debate and awareness about lobbying. However, the importance of lobbying is mainly evoked for other (very valid) reasons than it is here. The important (economic) costs of lobbing, its negative effect on political accountability and its immorality have been core concerns. The reason lobbying is discussed here is that it shapes security discourses. It alters the way interests, threats and adequate reactions to threats are understood. It does so through a necessary side-effect: even
if administrators and/or policy-makers grant contracts for purely pecuniary reasons, the consequence will be to sediment specific security practices and the security discourses they come with, as policy makers become caught by the logic of their past choices and forced to justify them publicly But more significantly, even if lobbying is mainly about contracts and their terms not about altering security discourses another side effect is that lobbying defines security discourses and practices. The bottom line is that firms have to sell their products. For this, they need to convince policy-makers that the product/service they sell is important for security and that it is more important than the alternative products/services sold by competitors. This pushes firms to try to shape the security understandings of their costumers. The liberalisation of the sector and the resulting increase in the competition for market share has made this kind of competition absolutely essential. Hence, an observer of the arms industry concludes
that the key to corporate survival resides increasingly in a political or even a cultural capacity; the ability to influence future customers and suppliers.47 This conclusion certainly applies with variation also to other parts of the PMC sector. At a more general level the importance of shaping security understandings to secure contracts is visible in the effort of lobby groups (including for example the main US group BENS Business Executives for National Security48) to promote a general understanding of security which reserves a prominent place for private firms.
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PMCs Remilitarize Security

Assertion of expertise by PMCs remilitarizes security Anna Leander, Assoc. Prof. of Poli. Sci. and Public Management U. of Southern Denmark, 5 (Millennium 33.3, The Power to
Construct International Security) The increasing
weight of the technical and managerial in discussions about security in the public sphere is the most tangible consequence of the shifting weight of public and private security discourses. This shift,
in turn, reinforces a re-militarisation of security. Beyond bolstering their image by contrasting it to that of the public,
private actors are also prone to frame security issues as questions of managerial efficiency and technical competence. This is logical since the firms ground their claim to expertise in their capacity to offer technologically effective and economically interesting solutions to existing problems. When a problem is not a security problem or would be better responded to by way of diplomacy or economic aid or a reregulation of markets, the services of PMCs are not needed. It is therefore not surprising that the firms tend more often than not to treat issues as security problems and then proceed on the assumption that what is called for is a technico-managerial solution.
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Risk Extensions
Privatized policing privatizes conception of risk Conor OReilly and Graham Ellison, Instittue of Criminology @ Queens University Belfast School of Law, 6 [British Journal
of Criminology 46, Eye Spy Private High: Re-Conceptualizing High Policing Theory, p. 654-6] Our discussion of private high policing also has a resonance in wider debates about risk (Beck 1992) and insecurity (Loader 2000; Sheptycki 1998) that for reasons of space can only be discussed in outline form here. The idea of risk exploits the vulnerabilities and sense of panickyness (Sparks 1992) that lie at the heart of late modern society and embraces the notion that such risks (real or imagined) can be controlled, managed or assuaged. Indeed, for Beck (1992), risk may be defined as a systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernization itself (1992: 21). While one does not necessarily have to embrace the extremes of Becks thesis (Leiss 1996), risk and insecurity are deeply intertwined . Even before the mass casualty terrorist attacks of 9/11, the marketization of insecurity was something noted by commentators (Loader 2000; Loader and Walker 2001; Sheptycki 1998) and given credence in the prolific expansion of private security in recent years (De Waard 1999; Johnston 1999; 2000a). Private actors now not only provide security for the minu- tiae of everyday existence from patrolling shopping malls, to car parks and other forms of communal space (Von Hirsch and Shearing 2000), but are increasingly geared up to manage and respond to global threats and are entering the
realm of high policing and foreign and security policy to become key players in the international system (Johnston 2000a: 305). It is to these questions that we now turn.
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PMCs Unregulated by I-Law

PMCs are unregulated by international law easily avoidable definition Michael Scheimer, JD Candidate @ American University Washington College of Law, 24 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 609 9, Comment:
Separating Private Military Companies From Illegal Mercenaries in International Law: Proposing an In-ternational Convention for Legitimate Military and Security Support That Reflects Customary International Law l/n The international community has already attempted to define "mercenaries" with both Article 47 of the 1977 Proto-col I Additional to the Geneva Conventions ("Article 47") n7 and the 1989 U.N. Convention on Mercenaries ("U.N. Convention"). n8 However, it is not clear that the terms of Article 47 and the U.N. Convention can capture PMCs as "mercenaries, therefore PMCs continue to go unregulated." n9 The list of criteria under both
international definitions is so long that one commentator has stated "any mercenary who cannot exclude himself from this definition deserves to be shot - and his lawyer with him." n10 Furthermore, while the
use of PMCs is widespread and accepted in the international community, PMCs are only regulated, if at all, by domestic laws. n11 Thus, there is a pressing need for a new interna-tional convention focusing on private military and security assistance in order to truly address the global problem with private military firms.
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AT: Regulate CP Generic

Cant regulate agency jurisdiction overlap and lack of transparency Craig S. Jordan, student at the New England School of Law, Winter 09, "Note: Who Will Guard the Guards? The Accountability of
Private Military Contractors in Areas of Armed Conflict", 35 N.E. J. on Crim. & Civ. Con. 309, lexis law
One of the primary problems with enforcing the laws in regard to PMCs is determining which agency employs the PMC company. n133 A general lack of transparency in the contracting process n134 has created a situation in which agencies do not know what companies are directly under their control . n135
Because different agencies employ (or should employ) different methods of investigation, n136 the lack of clarity regarding who works for whom has been a major obstacle in the investigation and prosecution of individual PMCs who may have committed crimes. n137
Cant regulate lack of field oversight and prosecution problems Craig S. Jordan, student at the New England School of Law, Winter 09, "Note: Who Will Guard the Guards? The Accountability of
Private Military Contractors in Areas of Armed Conflict", 35 N.E. J. on Crim. & Civ. Con. 309, lexis law
lack of oversight in the field . n147 This has been attributed to several factors, from "a lack of contracting officer's representatives ," n148 who are supposed to be supervising the contracted work, to contractor immunity from local Iraqi law under Order 17.
Another major problem in enforcing the laws governing PMCs is the n149 Furthermore, the fact that military commanders have no authority over contractors, and Order 17 n150 sets out [*326] no clear guidelines for contractor oversight, there is virtually no one other than the contractors (except civilian Iraqis) to report instances of misconduct in the field. n151 Though some scholars have argued that selfregulation and internal controls can help establish accountability, n152 these are not sufficient controls given the very nature of the industry. n153 Because PMCs operate in areas of armed conflict and derive their profits from the services they provide in such times, it is prudent to allow an outside body to provide oversight. Finally, investigation and
oversight functions are often difficult to perform as many PMC operations involve guarding and protecting individuals and assets. n154 There are also problems with the techniques that have been used in the few investigations that have actually taken place . It has been the practice for PMCs to fire the contractor for misconduct and send the individual back to the United States. n155 In some instances, the individual is transferred to another area, such as Afghanistan or Kuwait. n156 Though the Justice Department has offices in Iraq, they do not have sufficient resources to conduct meaningful investigations into allegations of misconduct. n157 A study by the Department of Defense
found that more than half of the Iraq contracts were not adequately monitored. n158
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AT: Regulate with International Law CP

The U.S. neither ratified the Additional Protocol nor signed the U.N. convention proves the CPs impossible Michael Scheimer, JD Candidate @ American University Washington College of Law, 24 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 609 9, Comment:
Separating Private Military Companies From Illegal Mercenaries in International Law: Proposing an In-ternational Convention for Legitimate Military and Security Support That Reflects Customary International Law l/n
Customary Law Has Greater Weight Because Article 47 and The U.N. Convention on Mercenaries are not Accepted International Law A nation that is a Party to the Geneva Conventions, but has not ratified the Additional Protocol, is not bound by the definition of mercenary in Article 47. n103 While the international community has agreed to the
1. The original Geneva Conventions, not all nations have agreed to these Additional Protocols, despite their publication over thirty years ago. n104 For example, the United States protested the Article 47 provisions on mercenaries, refusing to recognize the definition, or accept the Additional Protocols . n105 Therefore Article 47 is not a strong reflection of customary international law, because even after thirty years, not all of the parties to the Geneva Convention have approved the Additional Protocol that contains Article 47. [*633] The search for customary international law now turns to international support for the U.N. Convention. Only those countries that sign the U.N. Convention are bound by it, so tha t definition only directly applies to activities in the signatory countries. n106 However, the U.N. Convention has garnered even less support than Article 47: it has taken decades to come into effect, and far fewer states have signed the Convention than ratified Article 47. n107 The lack of world wide support for Article 47 and the U.N. Convention demonstrates that they do not reflect the customary international law of nations. n108 Therefore, it is misleading to claim PMCs are not "mercenaries" simply because they do not fall under the Article 47 and U.N. Convention definitions, when those definitions are not even accepted by all nations as international law. n109 Such an argument simultaneously claims that these [*634] definitions are the only international law on mercenaries and consequently, since PMCs do not meet those specific definitions, then there is no international law that applies to PMCs. n110 But this argument ignores centuries of precedent, where a mercenary was simply someone who received payment for military service and was a legitimate actor. n111 Under the simpler, traditional definition of "mercenary" that predates Article 47 and the U.N. Convention, many of these firms are acting as mercenaries. n112
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AT: MEJA
Abu Ghraib and Nisour Square incidents prove MEJA fails Adam Ebrahim, JD Candidate @ B.U. Law, 28 B.U. Int'l L.J. 181 spring 10, Note: Go-ing to war with the army you can afford:
The U.S., International Law, and the private military industry l/n Second, the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act ("MEJA") creates a status-based source of jurisdiction for PMC activity, although, unlike the SMTJ Statue, it does not extend jurisdiction beyond traditional territorial limits. n78 Rather, the MEJA creates criminal jurisdiction over certain offenses committed by members of the Armed Forces and by civil-ians (i.e. PMCs) employed by or accompanying the armed forces. n79 To fall under the statute, an offense must ordinar-ily be punishable by imprisonment of more than one year. n80 Increased PMC use in Iraq has challenged both the relevance and applicability of the MEJA in two ways. The Abu Ghraib incident first revealed a gap in the statute, as it only applied to civilian contractors accompanying or employed by the D epartment of Defense and not other departments that contract PMCs such as the State Department . n81 Next, the 2007 Nisour Square incident - in [*194] which Blackwater n82 personnel unloaded munitions on an unarmed Iraqi vehicle, leaving 17 dead and 24 wounded - revealed an additional drafting inadequacy, as the MEJA applied only to civilian activity "supporting the mission of the [Department of De-fense]." n83 Such language meant that the act did not apply to private contractors acting alone or apart from the formal auspices of the military . n84 An additional criticism lobbied at the MEJA relates to selective and insufficient prosecution, which the Department of Justice has blamed often on a lack of legal precedent. n85
Lack of set investigatory procedures means MEJA fails Craig S. Jordan, student at the New England School of Law, Winter 09, "Note: Who Will Guard the Guards? The Accountability of
Private Military Contractors in Areas of Armed Conflict", 35 N.E. J. on Crim. & Civ. Con. 309, lexis law In December 2005, the Department of Defense issued regulations for [*325] implementing MEJA. n138 Under these regulations, the Department of Defense Inspector General must inform the Attorney General if there is "suspicion that a federal crime has been committed" by a contractor working abroad. n139 The Inspector General is also responsible for "implementing investigative policies" that conform to the statute. n140 The Department of Justice's Criminal Division is supposed to act as a liaison between the Department of Defense and other federal agencies, as well as to designate a U.S. Attorney to prosecute the case. n141 A major problem with MEJA's regulatory policies is that they are not technically "in effect ;" therefore, while they serve as guidelines, there are no binding requirements on the Inspector General regarding investigatory procedures and policies . n142 Without set procedures, it is difficult to conduct adequate investigations into alleged instances of misconduct. n143 Furthermore, as the number of PMCs operating in Iraq and Afghanistan has increased, the contracting agencies have failed to increase staffing to perform oversight functions. n144 The failure of MEJA to establish set procedures for the investigation and prosecution of PMC misconduct highlights the broader problem: There are simply no Justice Department regulations governing the investigation into possible instances of criminal activity by PMCs in war zones or contingency operations. n145 The failure to investigate a number of reported offenses is evidence of this fact. n146
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AT: UCMJ
UCMJs unsustainable will inevitably overruled on constitutional grounds Adam Ebrahim, JD Candidate @ B.U. Law, 28 B.U. Int'l L.J. 181 spring 10, Note: Go-ing to war with the army you can afford:
The U.S., International Law, and the private military industry l/n As important as the recent Nisour Square charges may be, political will, legal ambiguity, judicial resources, and evidentiary problems make criminal prosecution of PMCs difficult. n94 The third source of U.S. jurisdiction, the courts martial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ"), seeks to address these shortcomings. Even before the Revolutionary War, military law and jurisdiction was routinely applied to civilians accompanying armed forces into the field. n95 This practice became [*196] almost invisible in recent years, however, following United States v. Averette, a 1970 United States Court of Military Appeals decision which narrowly construed Article 2(a)(10) of 10 U.S.C. 802. n96 In a short opinion, the Averette court determined that military jurisdiction over accompanying civilians "in time of war" meant a "war formally declared by Congress." n97 Without relying directly on any binding precedent, the majority found "guidance in this area" from a string of cases in which the Supreme Court limited the applicability of military jurisdic-tion over civilians in various circumstances. n98 As Congress has not formally declared war since World War II, the Averette decision appeared to be the end of the civilian court-martial. n99 In October 2006, the Graham Amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 made a minor change to the statutory language of 10 U.S.C. 802 with potentially major implications for the private military industry. n100 Amidst the hundreds of pages comprising the Act (which essentially sets the Pentagon's budget), Congress eliminated the "in time of war" restriction on jurisdiction over civilians and replaced it with a broader grant of
military jurisdiction "in time of declared war or a contingency operation [over] persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field." n101 The new law reflects a more realistic understanding of the private military industry and the na-ture and scope of their activities in Iraq and other modern battlefields, as it
provides military officers with a direct re-course for any crimes they witness and avoids some of the logistical problems associated with international prosecution under civilian law. n102 At the same time, the modification appears ripe for a constitutional challenge on due process, vagueness, and over-inclusiveness grounds. n103 [*197] Reid v. Covert, the 1957 decision which
restricted the civilian court-martial for capi-tal offenses during times of peace, specifically endorsed the "in time of war" language in section 802(10) as "the maxi-mum historically recognized extent of military jurisdiction over civilians ... ." n104 A future Court may be charged with determining whether "declared war or a contingency operation" fits within or exceeds this historical maximum. Con-versely, a
case involving a private military employee might warrant a functional classification of the individual as member of the armed forces and not as a civilian, depending on the particular nature of their activities. This would in turn apply the entire UCMJ to the contractor. Considering the ramifications of such a classification, that decision should emanate from Congress and not a court.
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UCMJ cant solve only applies if Congress has declared war Kristen Fricchione, JD candidate @ U of Wisconsin Law, Fall 05, "NOTE AND COMMENT: CASUALTIES IN EVOLVING
WARFARE: IMPACT OF PRIVATE MILITARY FIRMS' PROLIFERATION ON THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY", 23 Wis. Int'l L.J. 731, lexis law Military commanders are instructed that they have control over PMCs, but if there is no enforceability provision written into the contract, there is no recourse for order violations under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (hereinafter "UCMJ") except in a declared war. n198 Even PMCs who are providing emergency essential services, and potentially in close proximity to combat, do not fall under the UCMJ if Congress does not declare war. n199 Such a formal declaration is not only rare, but has been conspicuously absent since World War II . Implications for this lack of military jurisdiction include increased probability of PMCs abandoning their posts and lack of legal recourse for illegal actions . This enforceability problem is magnified as PMCs move closer to actual combat and as U.S. policy moves closer to accepting the role of the PMC as a combatant. In fact, the 2003 Army Field Manual Contractors on the Battlefield contains some ambiguous (and therefore troubling) language that appears to promote PMC use of force: [*759] [Contractor support] is more than just logistics; it spans the spectrum of combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) functions. Contracted support often includes traditional goods and services support, but may include interpreter, communications, infrastructure, and other non-logistic-related support. It also has applicability to the full range of Army operations, to include offense, defense, stability, and support within all types of military actions from small-scale contingencies to major theater of wars. n200
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AT: PMCs K/2 Readiness

Quality control issues means contractors are ineffective Joel Skousen, political scientist and publisher of World Affairs Brief, Insurance News Congressional Documents and Publications 6/25 10, Private Contractors in Warzones: The Good, the Bad and the Question http://insurancenewsnet.com/article.aspx?
id=202141
reports of substandard construction, fraud and theft highlight the problems associated with unarmed contractors . As noted above, these incidents are being
Quality control is a well publicized issue. The repeated investigated. In addition, the USG is working hard to refine contracting and oversight procedures to reduce these types of problems. Unfortunately, the problem is just as prevalent with armed contractors . While high-end personal security details generally are well trained, less visible armed contractors display less quality. When suicide
bombers began striking Iraqi Armed Forces recruiting stations, the contractor responsible for recruiting the Iraqi forces subcontracted for a security force. The contractor was promised former Gurkhas. What showed up in Iraq a couple of weeks later were untrained, under-equipped Nepalese villagers. n10 Not only did
these contractors provide inadequate security, the U.S. government passed the authority to use deadly force in the name of the United States to these untrained foreign nationals. Since the government neither recruits nor trains individual armed contractors, it essentially has to trust the contractor to provide quality personnel. In this case, the subcontractor took shortcuts despite the obvious risk to the personnel manning the recruiting stations. Even if we hire enough contracting officers to effectively supervise the contracts, how exactly does a contracting officer determine the military qualifications of an individual much less a group such as a Personal or Site Security Detail? The U.S. military dedicates large facilities, major exercises,
expensive simulations and combat experienced staffs to determine if U.S. units are properly trained. Contractors don't. We need to acknowledge that contracting officers have no truly effective control over the quality of the personnel the contractors hire. In fact, we have to accept that we will be unable to determine their
actual effectiveness until they begin to operate in theater. And then, only if a member of the U.S. government is in position to observe the contractors as they operate.
Contractors create operational vulnerability Joel Skousen, political scientist and publisher of World Affairs Brief, Insurance News Congressional Documents and Publications 6/25 10, Private Contractors in Warzones: The Good, the Bad and the Question http://insurancenewsnet.com/article.aspx?
id=202141 Contractors, both armed and unarmed, also represent a serious military vulnerability. In the uprising in the spring of 2004 when both Sunni and Shia factions conducted major operations against Coalition forces, the insurgents effectively cut Allied supply lines from Kuwait. U.S. forces faced significant logistics challenges as a result. Despite the crisis, U.S. officials could not morally order contract logistics providers to "fight through." The contractors lacked the training, equipment and legal status to do so. Had the supply line been run by military forces, it would have been both moral and possible to order them to fight through. Despite this demonstrated
operational vulnerability, the fact that unarmed contractors are specifically not obligated to fight through has not been emphasized as a significant risk in employing contractors rather than military logistics
organizations.
The substitution of contractors for soldiers and Marines creates yet another vulnerability - lack of an emergency reserve. In the past, support troops have been repeatedly employed in critical situations to provide reinforcements for overwhelmed combat troops. Contractors are simply unable to fulfill this emergency role. This limitation, as well as the contractor's inability to fight through, are even more significant in
conventional conflicts than in irregular war.
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Hurts Military Efficacy - Generic

PMCs kill mission efficacy they can choose not to do tasks Peter W. Singer, Director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative @ the Brookings Institute, Brookings Institute 6/5 8, Outsourcing
the Fight http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0605_military_contractors_singer.aspx It is important to remember that private contractors are not bound by the same codes, structures and obligations as those in public service. As Tom Crum, then the chief operating officer for KBR's logistics operations, wrote in an internal memo, "We cannot allow the Army to push us to put our people in harm's way. ... If we in management
believe the Army is asking us to put our KBR employees in danger that we are not willing to accept, then we will refuse to go."
As civilians, this choice is their right to make. But as retired Army Major Gen. Barry McCaffery testified to Congress in 2007, the consequence of turning over so much of the supply system to private civilian firms, which have
this right to decide when and where they deploy, makes our logistics system "a house of cards."
In the same way that companies such as Cisco were forced to reconsider their outsourcing policies in the late 1990s, after they lost the ability to deliver on core functions, the military (with a push from Congress) needs to reevaluate what is appropriate to outsource and what is not. If a task is critical to the mission's ultimate success or failure, then perhaps it should be kept in-house. In other words: Feel free to outsource the Burger Kings, laundries and base construction, but maybe we ought to keep roles like military interrogators, armed troops and movement of critical supplies (all now outsourced) inside the system.
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Hurts Military Efficacy Hurts Nation Building

PMCs undermine nation building efforts Peter W. Singer, Director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative @ the Brookings Institute, Brookings Institute 10/2 7, The Dark
Truth About Blackwater http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2007/1002militarycontractors.aspx?p=1 The point here is not that all contractors are "cowboys," "unprofessional" or "killers," as Blackwater and other contractors are often described. Most are highly talented ex-soldiers. However, their private mission is different from the overall public operation. Those, for example, doing escort duty are going to be judged by their corporate bosses solely on
whether they get their client from point A to B, not whether they win Iraqi hearts and minds along the way. Ann Exline Starr, a former Coalition Provisional Authority advisor, described the difference between
when she traveled with a U.S. military escort and with guards from Blackwater and another State Department-contracted security firm, DynCorp. While the uniformed soldiers kept her safe, they also did such things as playing cards and drinking tea with local Iraqis. The private contractors had a different focus. "What they told me was, 'Our mission is to protect the principal at all costs. If that means pissing off the Iraqis, too bad.'" This "protection first and last" mentality has led to many common operating practices that clearly enrage locals. In an effort to keep potential threats away, c ontractors drive convoys up the wrong side of the road, ram civilian vehicles, toss smoke bombs, and fire weaponry as warnings, all as standard practices. After a month spent embedded with Blackwater contractors in Baghdad, journalist Robert Young Pelton said, "They're famous for being very aggressive. They use their machine guns like car horns." As far back as 2005, U.S. officers in Iraq such as Col. Hammes were worried that while contractors may have been fulfilling their contract, they were also "making enemies each time they went out." U.S. Army Col. Peter Mansoor, one of the leading experts on counterinsurgency, similarly noted in January 2007, that "if they push traffic off the roads or if they shoot up a car that looks suspicious , whatever it may be, they may be operating within their contract -- to the detriment of the mission , which is to bring the people over to your side. I would much rather see basically all armed entities in a counter-insurgency operation fall under a military chain of command."
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Hurts Military Efficacy - Iraq

Contractors kill counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq provide poor quality services and abuse Iraqis Peter W. Singer, Director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative @ the Brookings Institute, Brookings Institute 10/7 7, Sure, Hes
Got Guns For Hire. But Theyre Just Not Worth It http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2007/1007militarycontractors.aspx?p=1 Lets policymakers dodge tough, politically costly decisions, which makes for bad operational choices. Since the end of the Vietnam War, the United States has sought to ensure that there's a link between the public and the costs of war, so that good decisions would be made and an ethos of responsibility fostered. With about half our operation in Iraq in private hands, that link has been jeopardized. Encourages a "bigger is better" approach to operations, contrary to the best lessons of U.S. military strategy. Turning logistics and operations into a for-profit endeavor helped feed the "Green Zone mentality" of having Americans huddle inside sprawling bases in Iraq. Bigger bases may yield bigger profits for the private firms, but they also entail an isolation that runs counter to everything your field commander, Gen. David H. Petraeus, told us we need to win a counterinsurgency campaign in the new Army-Marine Corps manual he helped write. Inflames popular opinion about the U.S. mission. Even when no one gets hurt, the standard tactics used by Blackwater and other private military firms ignore the fundamental lessons of counterinsurgency warfare. Of course, not all contractors are "cowboys" or "mercenaries," as they are often described; many are talented ex-soldiers (for whose training we are now being doubled-billed, but that's another memo). But their "job," as Prince put it at the hearings, is quite different from the broader mission. Focused only on their contract, the private firms' standard practices
include driving their convoys up the wrong side of the road, ramming civilian vehicles, tossing smoke bombs and opening fire with machine guns as warnings. As one contractor hired to guard U.S. officials put it,
"Our mission is to protect the principal at all costs. If that means pissing off the Iraqis, too bad." Produces a series of abuses that undermine efforts to win Iraqi hearts and minds. The pattern of contractors hurting or killing civilians extends back to 2003, involving everything from prisoner abuse and "joyride" shootings to an alleged incident in which a drunken Blackwater contractor shot dead the bodyguard of Iraq's vice president after the two got into an argument inside the Green Zone on Christmas Eve 2006. Hurts American efforts in the "war of ideas," in Iraq and beyond. As one Iraqi official explained, even before the recent shootings: "They are part of the reason for all the hatred that is directed at Americans because people don't know them as Blackwater, they know them only as Americans. They are planting hatred because of these irresponsible acts." The recent shootings were covered extensively across the wider Muslim world, yet again hammering U.S. attempts at public diplomacy. Undermines efforts to build up Iraqi civilian institutions, the very things we need to get our troops out. Iraqi officials say that recent incidents have "embarrassed the government," making it seem as if the contractors were above the law. As one Iraqi soldier said of Blackwater: "They are more powerful than the government. No one can try them. Where is the government in this?" Creates huge vulnerabilities that undermine the overall mission. When the insurgency flared dramatically in 2004, contractor convoys suspended operations, leading one retired U.S. Army general to describe our military supply system as a "house of cards." When the Iraqis recently banned Blackwater, it wasn't just the firm that stopped
operations for five days; so, in effect, did all U.S. diplomatic and intelligence efforts in Iraq, because they were completely reliant on Blackwater guards to leave the Green Zone. Forces policymakers to jettison
promising counterinsurgency strategies before they even have a chance to succeed. The success or failure of the troop "surge" hinges on senior U.S. officials' ability to pressure the Iraqi government to share power more effectively and reach other political benchmarks. Instead of doing so, you and President Bush are now having to ask for Iraqi help and understanding to clean up the aftermath of the Blackwater fiasco. Those vested in the system will try to persuade you to ignore this cycle, to pass off an obvious pattern as mere anomalies. At the hearings, the owner of a private firm, outside the chain of command, oddly described his company as somehow being "part of our nation's total force." Then State Department officials claimed that they had no choice but to outsource security tasks to Blackwater, rather than admit that they had preferred not to make choices that carried political costs. These are the denials of enablers, pushers and addicts. The blunt truth is that while contractors are carrying out valuable roles, their overall effect has been to undermine the Iraq mission and the wider fight against terrorism. Worst of all, we have outsourced the most important core function of our government: to fight and win the nation's wars.
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PMCs destroy efforts in Iraq by hurting U.S. image with Iraqis Peter W. Singer, Director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative @ the Brookings Institute, Brookings Institute 10/2 7, The Dark
Truth About Blackwater http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2007/1002militarycontractors.aspx?p=1 For example, the same week that the Blackwater shooting incident occurred, radical Shia leader Muqtada al-Sadr was planning the withdrawal of his coalition from the government. Instead of having to justify the act, which potentially could collapse the government and plunge the nation into civil war, he was able instead to focus his propaganda and recruiting efforts on the Blackwater episode, describing it as "a cowardly attack committed by the so-called security company against our people without any justification." As with others, he was clear to blame not merely the firm, but the wider American policy, describing how the firm had been allowed to recruit "criminals and those who have left American jails." That this part is not truthful misses the point; the episode gave the other side a factual point on which to leverage their wider propaganda operations. The effort in Iraq is just one theater within a larger effort against extremist forces, in which the "war of ideas" is the critical battleground. The global war on terrorism is not a traditional military conflict made up of setpiece battles, but rather made up of a series of small wars and insurgencies in places ranging from Iraq and Afghanistan to Pakistan and Egypt, where the U.S. must sway a broader population from hostility to support if it ever wants to oust terror cells and shut down recruiting pipelines. As the newly revised foreword to the famous U.S. Marine Corps Small Wars manual notes, "Small wars are battles of ideas and battles for the perceptions and attitudes of target populations." Within these wars, it is non-kinetic tools (as opposed to fielded weaponry) that make up "the fire and maneuvers of small wars. They frequently are the main effort simply because of the criticality of the functions they perform." Unfortunately, here again contractors have proven to be a drag on efforts to explain and justify the already highly unpopular U.S. effort in Iraq. The Blackwater episode resonated negatively not merely inside Iraq, but throughout the Muslim world. Every single media source led with the episode in the days that followed, focusing on how the U.S. could hire such "arrogant trigger-happy guns for hire, mercenaries by any other name," as UAE-based Gulf News put it. The Al-Jazeera satellite news channel reported on the U.S. hired contractors as "An army that seeks fame, fortune, and thrill, away from all considerations and ethics of military honour ... The employees are known for their roughness. They are famous for shooting indiscriminately at vehicles or pedestrians who get close to their convoys." In the leading newspaper Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, Fahmy Howeydi, one of the most influential commentators in the entire Arab world, compared Blackwater "mercenaries" to al-Qaida, coming to Iraq's chaos to seek their fortunes. Even the Daily Star, which is a regional English-language newspaper considered the most moderate voice in the region, wrote how "At least irregular formations like the Mehdi Army [Sadr's militia] can plausibly claim to be defending their communities. No foreign mercenary can plead similar motivation, so all of them should go." What is telling about this episode is not merely the reaction in the press, but also how the contractor responded after the news broke. At a time when America's image was getting pummeled because of its employees' actions, Blackwater shut down its Web site and declined all interviews. Then a spokesperson in North Carolina issued a two-paragraph statement via e-mail, only targeted at a U.S. audience. It claimed that "The 'civilians' reportedly fired upon by Blackwater professionals were in fact armed enemies." The firm then brought its Web site back online, without even this new statement posted, as if nothing had happened. It continued to not to take any press calls. You could, however, continue to buy Blackwater apparel on the Web site, ranging from baseball caps to baby clothes.
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PMCs kill successful Iraq strategy qualified research Peter W. Singer, Director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative @ the Brookings Institute, Brookings Institute 10/2 7, The Dark
Truth About Blackwater http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2007/1002militarycontractors.aspx?p=1
I've done a decade's worth of research and writing on the military's use of private contractors, including hundreds of interviews and discussions with everyone from employees of private military firms to active and retired soldiers, ranging from four-star generals down to line infantry. I have reported my findings to audiences including the U.S. military, the CIA and the State Department . Although I've been approached
with multiple offers (as well as varied threats) from those in the private military industry, I am not paid either to lobby for the industry or to attack it, and the findings in this report are my own. When we evaluate the facts, the use of private military contractors appears to have harmed , rather than helped, the counterinsurgency efforts of the U.S. mission in Iraq, going against our best doctrine and undermining critical efforts of our troops. Even worse, the government can no longer carry out one of its most basic core missions: to fight and win the nation's wars. Instead, the massive outsourcing of military operations has created a dependency on private firms like Blackwater that has given rise to dangerous vulnerabilities.
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Private advisors for the Iraqi military causes violence and kills U.S. Iraq relations Peter W. Singer, Director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative @ the Brookings Institute, Brookings Institute 5/12 8, Lessons
Not Learned: Contracting Out Iraqi Army Advising http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0512_iraq_singer.aspx This one is a doozy of lessons not learned. First off, outsourcing training of the Iraqi military has been tried before and is actually one of the many, many factors into why we have had such a hard time. In June 2003, Vinnell won a $48 million contract (sub-contracted out to firms like SAIC and MPRI) to train up new Iraq Army battalions (the old ones never should have been dissolved in the first place, but that is a subject for another day). Twelve months later, the U.S. military had little to show for its contract. Half the troops in the first Iraqi infantry battalion trained up deserted and the other half couldnt carry out such perfunctory tasks as march in place or answer radio calls properly, let alone go into battle. As Army Maj. Gen. Paul Eaton complained in June 2004, the training "hasn't gone well. We've had almost one year of no progress." John Pike, who heads Global Security, weighed in, "It's not that the contractors failed to train the Iraqis. It's that they haven't even attempted it seriously. Whatever training has been done has been pretty perfunctory." And so a critical window of opportunity was lost and U.S. forces had no trained Iraqi counterparts to work with. It was at this stage that the training was taken back over by the U.S. military, and soon headed up by a certain general by the name of Petraeus. Second, to turn over the task of advising the Iraqis now, at such a critical stage in the war effort as we try to translate the limited tactical success of the surge into something more permanent, is not just horrible timing. In the words of one U.S. Army officer, it is definitely not a job that rational USG policy-makers should want in the hands of U.S./western contractors anytime soon. The explanation by this officer (whose experience on the topic stems from work in strategic planning and work with contractors during three deployments to CENTCOM countries) goes back to the concerns the force has experienced with contracting time and again in Iraq and Afghanistan, from issues of legal accountability and questions of control when contractors operate in the field to the concerns that contracting out important tasks has repeatedly led to unexpected and unwanted side effects, such as the still unprosecuted Blackwater shootings in Nissour Square. As he explains, There are many more things that can go wrong with this contracting approach to manning MiTTs than will go right. I fear that it is far too early for any of this field unit advisory work to pass from the hands of a credible, accountable and policy-responsive U.S./Coalition military force into the hands of a non-sovereign entity that will become a nightmare of management for USMIL & Iraqis very quickly thereafter. The potential for social and political damage appears extensive compared to any gains from reduced use of U.S. military manpower . Thirdly, the resultant messaging and long-term effects have to be a cause for concern. General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker testified a few weeks ago to Congress that building up Iraqi capabilities was the priority in the year ahead. Contrast this with the message that this contract sends to Congress, the American public, and most importantly, our Iraqi counterparts. When it comes to the actual deed, as opposed to descriptor, of the task, we really care only enough to hire contractors to do the job. But, fourth, advising a partner military is not just about building up their military skillset. It is also about passing on values and building long-term relationships . When you contract out military advisors, the values of civilmilitary relations and professionalism are supplanted by the evident commoditization of military skills , not always the best message in a developing democracy. In turn, the relations are not built between officers
advancing up the ranks between the two forces, but with a company and its ever-changing staff of employees. A signature moment is U.S.-Indonesian relations, for example, was a decade ago, when U.S. intelligence picked up word that a senior Indonesian general was contemplating a coup. Because he and one of our Joint Chiefs of Staff had actually trained together years earlier, the U.S. government was able to use the back channel of their personal friendship to persuade him not to act and preserve stability in a nascent democracy. Ideally, we would want similar such personal links to develop between the U.S. and
Iraqi military, which we can leverage for policy purposes years into the future. Instead, we are contracting this potential relationship out, where it wont be accessible, at least not unless we want to pay.
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Hurts Military Efficacy - Afghanistan

PMCs hurt the Afghanistan war effort abuse of citizens and increased tensions between locals and the military Peter W. Singer, Director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative @ the Brookings Institute, Harpers Magazine 9/30 7, Can't Win
with 'Em, Can't Go to War Without 'Em: http://harpers.org/archive/2007/09/hbc-90001311 Six Questions for P.W. Singer, interviewed by Scott Horton.
3. Afghanistan is also the scene of a major counterinsurgency operation, targeting the resurgent Taliban. Your report is largely focused on Iraq. Do you consider the role of private security forces to have played a similar negative role in Afghanistan? And can you cite any particular incidents? It is not as extreme, but there have been reported abuses in Afghanistan . One CIA contractor beat a detainee to death with a flashlight, while another freelance contractor (who reportedly told everyone he was working for the Pentagon, but this didnt seem to be the case) was jailed for running his own private prison. There have also been numerous reports of tensions even inside Kabul between local civilians and contractors working on the Karzai contract. Another interesting incident in Afghanistan was when a contractor and two U.S. Air Force officers had an armed standoff after the contractor was claimed (by the officers) to have tried to run them off the road in his SUV.
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PMCs Make War Possible (AT: K/2 Public Support)

This is what makes war possible private contractors give government a tool to dodge accountability and coerce public opinion. Iraq is a prime example our invasion was only politically feasible because of the hidden role of private contractors. Peter W. Singer, Director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative @ the Brookings Institute, Brookings Institute 10/2 7, The Dark
Truth About Blackwater http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2007/1002militarycontractors.aspx?p=1 As it has been planned and conducted to date, the war in Iraq would not be possible without private military contractors. Contrary to conspiracy theories, the private military industry is not the so-called decider, plotting out wars behind the scenes like Manchurian Global. But it has become the ultimate enabler, allowing operations to happen that might otherwise be politically impossible. The private military industry has given a new option that allows the executive branch to decide, and the legislative branch to authorize and fund, military commitments that bypass the Abrams Doctrine. It is sometimes easier to understand this concept by looking at the issue in reverse. If a core problem that U.S. forces faced in the operation in Iraq has been an insufficient number of troops, it is not that the U.S. had no other choices other than using contractors. Rather, it is that each of them was considered politically
undesirable.
One answer to the problem of insufficient forces would have been for the executive branch to send more regular forces, beyond the original 135,000 planned. However, this would have involved publicly admitting that those involved in the planning -- particularly then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld -- were wrong in their slam of critics like Army Gen. Eric Shinseki, who warned that an occupation would require far more troops . Plus, such an expanded force would have been onerous on the overall force, creating even more tradeoffs with the war in Afghanistan, as well as broader global commitments. Another option would have been a full-scale call-up of the National Guard and Reserves , as originally envisioned for such major wars in the Abrams Doctrine. However, to do so would have prompted massive outcry among the public (as now the war's effect would have been felt deeper at home) -- the last thing leaders in the executive branch or Congress wanted as they headed into what was a tight 2004 election season. Some proposed persuading other allies to send their troops in to help spread the burden, much as NATO allies and other interested members of the U.N. had sent troops to Bosnia and Kosovo. However, this would have involved tough compromises, such as granting U.N. or NATO command of the forces in Iraq or delaying the invasion, options i n which the administration simply had no interest. This was the war that "was going to pay for itself," as leaders like then Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz infamously described in the run-up to the invasion, and to share in the operation was to share in the spoils. Plus, much of the world was vehemently opposed to the war, so it was unlikely that NATO allies or the U.N. would agree to send the needed number of troops. The private military industry was an answer to these political problems that had not existed in the past. It offered the potential backstop of additional forces, but with no one having to lose any political capital. Plus, the generals could avoid the career risk of asking for more troops. That is, there was no outcry whenever contractors were called up and deployed, or even killed. If the gradual death toll among American troops threatened to slowly wear down public support, contractor casualties were not counted in official death tolls and had no impact on these ratings. By one count, as of July 2007, more than 1,000 contractors have been killed in Iraq, and another 13,000 wounded. (Again, the data is patchy here, with the only reliable source being insurance claims made by contractors' employers and then reported to the U.S. Department of Labor.) Since the troop "surge" started in January 2007, these numbers have accelerated -contractors have been killed at a rate of nine per week . These figures mean that the private military industry has suffered more losses in Iraq than the rest of the coalition of allied nations combined. The losses are also far more than any single U.S. Army division has experienced.
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Hence, while private losses were just the "cost of doing business" for a firm in Iraq, they actually had an undisguised advantage to policymakers. The public usually didn't even hear about contractor losses, and when they did, they had far less blowback on our government. For all the discussion of contractors as a "private market solution," the true
costs that they hope to save are almost always political in nature.
And when we weigh the devastating consequences that the Iraq war has had on America's broader security and standing in the world, this enabling effect of the private military industry may be its ultimate cost . The underlying
premise of the Abrams Doctrine was that, if a military operation could not garner public support of the level needed to involve the full nation, then maybe it shouldn't happen in the first place.
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PMCs make violence possible by preventing domestic war discourse Joel Skousen, political scientist and publisher of World Affairs Brief, Insurance News Congressional Documents and Publications 6/25 10, Private Contractors in Warzones: The Good, the Bad and the Question http://insurancenewsnet.com/article.aspx?
id=202141 First, what is the impact of contractors on the initial decision to go to war as well as the will to sustain the conflict? Both proponents and opponents admit the U.S. would have required much greater mobilization to support a force
of 320,000 in Iraq (the combined troop and contractor count) or a force of over 210,000 in Afghanistan. The use of contractors allowed us to conduct both wars with much less domestic political discourse. But is this a good idea? Should we seek methods that make it easier to take the nation to war? That does not
seem to be the intent of the Constitution nor does it seem like a good idea when entering protracted conflicts. Insurgents understand that political will is the critical vulnerability of the U nited States in irregular warfare. They have discussed this factor openly in their online strategic forums for almost a decade. n20 Insuring the American public
understands the difficulty of the impending conflict and is firmly behind the effort should be an essential elemin committing forces to such a conflict. Thus while the use of contractors lessons the extent of
mobilization needed, it may well hurt the effort in the long term.
PMCs enable war let politicians escape domestic scrutiny James Cockayne, associate at the International Peace Academy, Conference on Private Military Contractors in Latin America JanFeb 8, Taming the Dogs of War: The Strategic Logic of the Professionalization of Private Military and Security Companies
http://www.havenscenter.org/privatemilitaryconference2008 We might also consider how reliance on PMSCs may affect attitudes within democracies towards reliance on coercive force to solve foreign disputes. The corrosive effects of reliance on contractors on sending states democracies have been much discussed in recent years. (Verkuil 2007; Avant 2005) Relying on contractors allows national executives to
escape domestic scrutiny, because it often offers a way around legislative-branch troop caps, mandatory reporting requirements and media scrutiny. As a result, it reduces the visibility of war and foreign
entanglements. In the U.S., figures suggest that there are somewhere between and 1/3 as many contractors killed and wounded as regular enlisted personnel. That could be taken to mean that the U.S. public may be underestimating
the numbers of Coalition-supporting personnel that are killed and wounded by between 25 and 33 per cent. This might imply that democratic states that rely on PMSCs may have a greater propensity to engage in and continue to support foreign military interventions than they otherwise would, where PMSCs
are engaged. This may increase their propensity to rely on coercive force in solving foreign disputes, contributing to greater geostrategic instability.
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PMCs Violence
PMCs increase violence trained warriors have no other outlet when employers leave James Cockayne, associate at the International Peace Academy, Conference on Private Military Contractors in Latin America JanFeb 8, Taming the Dogs of War: The Strategic Logic of the Professionalization of Private Military and Security Companies
http://www.havenscenter.org/privatemilitaryconference2008
investment, through PMSCs, that has been poured into the creation of a professional warrior-class of young men, particularly in the Middle East, schooled in the violence in Iraq. While their services are paid for by responsible PMSCs, this may pose little problem; but as those employers leave, what outlet will there be for these young mens military and security skills and identities in the depressed economies and conflict-ridden polities of the Middle East? There is every danger that their skills will be turned in another direction, fuelling criminal and political violence that upset the delicate social and military
This balkanization is likely to be exacerbated by the balances in the region. We have not begun to grapple with the long-term strategic, balance of power implications of introducing a fungible source of real military power such as PMSCs into the international system, without real and effective state controls. The risks for strategic spillover in a region characterized by the energy, cultural and other strategic interdependencies such as those of the Middle East are truly staggering, and pose immense challenges for the U.Ns Middle East peacemakers. Similar questions, highlighted by the U.N. Working Group, arise regarding the effects of the exposure of personnel from Latin America and Asia to the traumas of Iraq. The Working Groups report on Fiji draws attention to the challenges of reintegrating Fijian security personnel who have served with PMSCs in Iraq (United Nations 2007; Maclellan 2007), and the Group has also pointed to some similar issues involved in recruiting PMSC personnel in Latin America. It is thus not only the downstream local communities that host PMSCs during their operations, but also the upstream communities from which PMSC personnel are drawn and to which they must return that have to bear the externalized costs of PMSC violence suit brought by the families of four PMSC subcontractors slain in Fallujah in 2004 makes all too clear that these concerns are by no means limited to communities in the global South families and local communities in the United States also know these costs. Grief does not respect national boundaries.
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Kills International Peacekeeping Efforts

Growth of PMCs destroys the labor base for international peacekeeping operations James Cockayne, associate at the International Peace Academy, Conference on Private Military Contractors in Latin America JanFeb 8, Taming the Dogs of War: The Strategic Logic of the Professionalization of Private Military and Security Companies
http://www.havenscenter.org/privatemilitaryconference2008 Finally, we must consider the potential systemic costs of over-reliance on PMSCs costs which we might all bear, in the long-run. The U.N. Working Groups Fiji Report (UN 2007b) also highlights that the growth of the PMSC industry in Iraq has attracted numerous personnel from developing countries away from service in national militaries and international peacekeeping operations. This suggests not only a worldwide demobilization and reintegration challenge flowing from Iraq, but also a potential disruption to the traditional supply of peace operations personnel from developing countries created by the emergence of an alternative, competitor, better-financed source of demand for their labour PMSCs directly recruiting in their countries of origin. If we see this phenomenon at play in Fiji, Chile and Central America, what is to stop it emerging in those countries that have recently supplied the bulk of U.N. peacekeeping personnel, such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Jordan? May this, in turn, mean international
organizations will be forced to turn to PMSCs to participate in peace operations? And it is fair to question whether the UN (and other international organizations such as the EU and AU) have the administrative capacity and the political consensus within their memberships that would be needed to use PMSC personnel responsibly in such peace operations.
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MEJA solves new amendment Adam Ebrahim, JD Candidate @ B.U. Law, 28 B.U. Int'l L.J. 181 spring 10, Note: Go-ing to war with the army you can afford:
The U.S., International Law, and the private military industry l/n Despite these shortcomings, recent history suggests that the MEJA might prove a viable option to prosecute PMC offenses in the future. After Abu Ghraib, Congress modified the statutory definition of an "employee" to include indi-viduals contracted by the Department of Defense or " any other Federal agency, or any provisional authority, to the ex-tent such employment relates to supporting the mission of the D epartment of Defense overseas." n86 Congress took fur-ther steps to clarify the statute in the weeks following Nisour Square, as the House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed a resolution that would apply the act to contractors "where the work ... is carried out in an area, or in close prox-imity to an area (as designated by the Department of Defense), where the Armed Forces is conducting a contingency operation." n87 The House believed the modified legislation would close the gap in the existing law that enabled contrac-tors to escape liability because they were not deemed to be supporting a Department of Defense mission at the [*195] time of their criminal conduct. n88 Questions remain regarding potential ambiguities in the language, and the Senate has yet to act on the bill. n89 In December 2008, the Department of Justice brought charges in the Washington, D.C. District Court against five Blackwater employees and subcontractors for their role in the Nisour Square shootings. n90 The thirty-five count indict-ment - for voluntary manslaughter, attempt to commit manslaughter, aiding and abetting, and using a firearm in during the commission of a violent crime - was brought against the State Department contractors under 18 U.S.C. 3267(1), the 2004 amendment to the MEJA. n91 A sixth Blackwater employee pled guilty to similar charges and offered a detailed proffer in support of the alleged criminal conduct, depicting a hectic scene in which the contractors, without warning, fired machine guns at civilian vehicles who posed no discernable threat. n92 The charges represent a significant develop-ment in PMC regulation, given both the international fury surrounding the incident and the expanded use of the MEJA to prosecute non-Department of Defense contractors. n93
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Neg PMCs Good

PMCs are necessary for humanitarian intervention Adam Ebrahim, JD Candidate @ B.U. Law, 28 B.U. Int'l L.J. 181 spring 10, Note: Go-ing to war with the army you can afford:
The U.S., International Law, and the private military industry l/n Rather than speculate on how international law might attempt to regulate or govern the private military industry, a more pressing question is how the United States and other military powers will expand their use of industry. Such a scenario appears likely if recent history is any indication. Peter W. Singer, the preeminent authority on the private mili-tary industry, hypothesized a scenario in which PMCs would provide peacekeeping [*215] services in areas where the UN or a foreign state lacks the capability, motivation, or will to intervene. n237 Singer's model envisions three possi-ble roles played by PMCs: as private security providers for international aid organizations, as "rapid reaction forces" that could quickly intervene whenever tensions flared, and as an outsourced means of humanitarian intervention . n238 The third model is the most controversial and would undoubtedly draw accusations of mercenarism, because it would in-volve a state or the U.N. hiring a PMC, which would then deploy troops, defeat local opposition, and stabilize a region faced with genocide or other humanitarian crises. n239 Yet for the same reasons that a wholly outsourced private intervention force would create controversy and garner human rights criticism, the concept represents a window through which to consider the continued legal uses of PMCs. Humanitarian intervention n240 has existed since at least the early 1800s, but has gained a new vitality since the end of the Cold War. n241 Immediately after the Cold War, the UN Security Council appeared ready to reach a consensus on the ends and means of humanitarian intervention, but tensions in the former Yugoslavia disrupted this brief harmony. n242 The 1999 NATO air strikes in response to Serbian aggression and atrocities in Kosovo, commenced without express Security Council authorization, demonstrated the dilemma of humanitarian intervention. n243 On the one hand, a regional organization used force without a UN mandate; on the other, not doing so would have allowed grave humanitarian violations to continue unchecked. n244 Much has been written on the legality of the NATO campaign, specifically as to whether an emerging customary norm supports humanitarian intervention. n245 If such a norm does in fact develop, or if the United States, NATO, or another actor seeks to intervene in a future humanitarian [*216] conflict, the private military industry could potentially handle the operation. Putting aside the extensive legal debate, two obstacles stand in the way
of humanitarian interven-tion: political will and financial cost. PMCs appear well-suited to meet each of these challenges. First, when faced with a purely humanitarian situation (in which the intervening state has limited strategic interests), a domestic population would likely favor sending a private army rather than putting "the troops" in harm's way in an unessential war . Second, recent usage suggests that PMCs can provide humanitarian intervention at a lower cost than the public sector. In 1994, the PMC Executive Outcomes considered contracting with the United Nations to intervene in Rwanda to stop the genocide, restore order, and provide safe-haven for refugees. n246 The company estimated that a wholly privatized six-month intervention at the outset of the genocide would cost $ 600,000 per day, compared to the eventual UN intervention which cost roughly $ 3 million per day and did not commence until the genocide and fighting had spiraled out of con-trol. n247 In addition to the accountability and jurisdictional dilemmas previously discussed, private humanitarian interven-tion raises additional concerns of incentives and control. n248 Moreover, the post-intervention transition from private mili-tary to public governance might pose logistical concerns. n249 Despite these uncertainties - and a basic assumption that private intervention would work as second-best option to state military intervention - private humanitarian intervention represents a potentially beneficial use of the private military industry. For instance, if faced with a new humanitarian crisis akin to Kosovo, the Security Council could
identify the threat to the peace under Article 39 and authorize military intervention under Article 42. n250 From there, Article 43 requires "special agreements" to govern state-provided assis-tance and armed forces, but does not speak to the issue of the Security Council directly contracting with private compa-nies. n251 Thus, such a contract appears permissible provided [*217] that it meets the basic threshold of being consistent with the Security Council's mandate to maintain peace and security. n252
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auditor for every $2.03 billion in contracts.

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Kills Political Accountability

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the State control over the use of force .

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protable domestic practices overseas.

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Security Privatization Kills Right to Security

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AT: PMCs Help Humanitarian Missions

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Security Framing Extensions

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PMCs Remilitarize Security