Conde v Rivera GR No L-21741; January 25, 1924; Malcolm J DOCTRINE: where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures

postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom FACTS:

Petitioner: Aurelia Conde formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena Tayabas Respondents: Pablo Rivera (provincial fiscal of Tayabas); Federico Unson (justice of peace) 5 informations for various crimes filed against Conde. Conde appeared with witness and counsel on eight different occasions only to see the cause postponed. For over a year st from the time when the 1 information was filed SC RULING: All informations ordered dismissed; fiscal shall abstain from further attempts to prosecute pursuant to informations growing out of the facts set forth in previous informations Law expressly guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial. Compelled to dance attendance on courts while investigations and trials are arbitrarily postponed without her consent is palpably and openly unjust to her and a detriment to the public By use of reasonable diligence, prosecution could have settled upon the appropriate information, could have attended to the preliminary investigation and prepared a case without vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays DOCTRINE: where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom Garcia v. Domingo G.R. No. L-30104; July 25, 1973; Fernando, J. Digest prepared by S.J. Lora Doctrine What does right to a public trial signify? -- The trial must be public. It possesses that character when anyone interested in observing the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There is to be no ban on such attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment. No relationship to the parties need be shown. The thought that lies behind this safeguard is the belief that thereby the accused is afforded further protection, that his trial is likely to be conducted with regularity and not tainted with any impropriety. It suffices to satisfy the requirement of a trial being public if the accused could "have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with what offense he may be charged." I. Facts There was an altercation between a certain Lorenzana and two policemen (Calo and Carbonnel) due to the mode of arrest done by the latter, thus resulting in charges and counter-charges with eight criminal cases being tried jointly by city court Judge. All the 14 trial dates except 3 fell on a Saturday. This was arranged by the parties and the Court upon the insistence of respondents Calo and Carbonnel who, as police officers under suspension because of the cases, desired the same to be terminated as soon as possible and as there were many cases scheduled for trial on the usual criminal trial days. Later, Calo and Carbonnel filed a petition for certiorari with the Judge, and he acted on such petition: "declaring that 'the constitutional and statutory rights of the accused' had been violated, adversely affecting their 'right to a free and impartial trial' [noting] 'that the trial of these cases lasting several weeks held exclusively in chambers and not in the court room open the public'" A petition for certiorari was filed contending that the judge had committed grave abuse of discretion when he stigmatized as violative of the right to a public trial the holding of the trial of the other respondents inside the chambers. II. Issues WON the respondents right to a public trial was violated when the trial was held in the judges (air -conditioned) chambers III. Held Petition granted; nullifying, setting aside, and declaring bereft of any legal force or effect the order of respondent Judge Domingo for being issued with grave abuse of discretion

IV. Ratio No, there was no transgression on the right to a public trial. The 1935 Constitution which was in force at the time of the antecedents of this petition, as set forth at the outset, explicitly enumerated the right to a public trial to which an accused was entitled. Jose P. Laurel (Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights): "Trial should also be public in order to offset any danger of conducting it in an illegal and unjust manner." Justice Black detailed the historical lineage of the right to a public trial: "This nation's accepted practice of guaranteeing a public trial to an accused has its roots in [the] English common law heritage...but it likely evolved long before the settlement of the [United States] as an accompaniment of the ancient institution of jury trial. "the guarantee to an accused of the right to a public trial appeared in a state constitution in 1776." Later it was embodied in the Sixth Amendment of the Federal Constitution ratified in 1791. "Today almost without exception every state by constitution, statute, or judicial decision, requires that all criminal trials be open to the public." The crucial question of the meaning to be attached this provision remains: The Constitution guarantees an accused the right to a public trialwhat does it signify? Offhand it does seem fairly obvious that here is an instance where language is to be given a literal application: The trial must be public. It possesses that character when anyone interested in observing the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There is to be no ban on such attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment. No relationship to the parties need be shown. The thought that lies behind this safeguard is the belief that thereby the accused is afforded further protection, that his trial is likely to be conducted with regularity and not tainted with any impropriety. In this case, there is no showing that the public was thereby excluded. It is to be admitted that the size of the room allotted the Judge would reduce the number of those who could be our present. Such a fact though is not indicative of any transgression of this right. Courtrooms are not of uniform dimensions; some are smaller than others. Moreover, as admitted by Justice Black in his masterly In re Oliver opinion, it suffices to satisfy the requirement of a trial being public if the accused could "have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with what offense he may be charged." Reference may also be made to the undisputed fact at least fourteen hearings had been held in chambers of the city court Judge, without objection on the part of respondent policemen . While the judges concern over to assure the reality as ag ainst the mere possibility of a trial being truly public is commended, further reflection ought to have convinced him though that such a fear was unjustified. An objective appraisal of conditions in municipal or city courts would have gone far in dispelling such misgivings . The crowded daily calendar, the nature of the cases handled, civil as well as criminal, the relaxed attitude on procedural rules not being strictly adhered to all make for a less tense atmosphere. As a result the attendance of the general public is much more in evidence; nor is its presence unwelcome.

Flores v. People G.R. No. L-25769; December 10, 1974; Fernando, J. Digest prepared by Laurence A. Mopera I. FACTS 1. Francisco Flores and Francisco Angel were charged with Robbery on December 31, 1951. 2. On November 29, 1955, they were found guilty as charged. They filed a notice of appeal on December 8, 1955. 3. For a period of three years, or until February 10, 1958, the Court of Appeals took no action. On that same day, there was a resolution remanding the case to the lower court for hearing of a testimony of a witness which is deemed material by the prosecution. 4. August 5, 1959, the resolution was amended to set aside the previous decision so that evidence for the defense of certain new facts or matters may be received and that a new decision in lieu of the old one may be rendered in accordance with the new facts found. 5. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the lower court and the old decision was set aside. However, for a year, nothing was done on the case due to the failure of the offended party to appear, notwithstanding the six or seven dates scheduled for hearing. When he finally appeared, the testimony was characterized as fiasco as he could no longer remember the details of the said crime, and he could not even identify the accused anymore.

6. 7. 8.

Instead of rendering a new decision, the lower court merely sent the records to the appellate court. At that stage, five or more years had lapsed without the case being settled. Since their case has been pending for almost a decade (December 8, 1955 May 10, 1965), the accused filed a motion to dismiss, invoking the right to speedy disposition of cases. The Court of Appeals was unresponsive and denied the motion as well as its motion for reconsideration.

II. ISSUES Whether or not the right to speedy disposition of cases was violated [YES] III. HELD The criminal case against the accused was ordered dismissed. IV. RATIO The right to a speedy trial means being free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delay in a case. Through this, an innocent may be spared from anxiety and if culpable, be not kept in suspense of what might happen to him. Should this be violated, the possible remedies are certiorari, prohibition or mandamus. Even before the 1935 Constitution, the doctrine has already been discussed in the case of Conde vs. Rivera, where it was held that under the organic law and the Philippine Organic Act, the trial must be free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. Further it was held that when a prosecuting officer secures postponement without justifiable cause, such postponement must not last beyond a reasonable time. The earliest case after the 1935 Constitution was People vs. Castaneda. In that case, the case has been dragging on for five years and when the trial finally took place, it was filled with irregularity. The court said that the governments must be the last to set example of delay and oppression of the administration of justice. The same thing happened in the case of Esguerra vs. Dela Costa where the case against the accused was dismissed due to his right to speedy trial. In the case of Mercado vs. Santos, the court said that an accused person is entitled to trial at the earliest opportunity. He cannot be oppressed by delaying the commencement of the trial for an unreasonable length of time. If the proceedings pending trial are deferred, the trial itself is necessarily delayed. This rule shall apply whether or not the prosecution is conducted by a fiscal. The right to speedy disposition of cases exists irrespective of the nature of the offense or the manner in which it is authorized to be commenced. Considering that there was already an original decision in this case, petitioners can validly premise their plea for dismissal on this constitutional safeguard. Our decisions on the right to a speedy trial speak too categorically to be misread. This is one of those situations then where, in the apt language of the then Justice, now Chief Justice, Makalintal, "technicalities should give way to the realities of the situation." MARTELINO v. ALEJANDRO G.R. L-30894; March 25, 1970; Castro, J. Digest by Reinerr FACTS: This case is another aspect of the court marital proceedings against the petitioner, Major Eduardo Martelino alias Abdul th Latif Martelino, of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and the officers and men under him, for violation of the 94 and th 97 Articles of War. It was the result of an alleged March 18, 1968 shooting of some Muslim recruits then undergoing commando training in Corregidor. The initial question was with regard to the jurisdiction of the general martial to try the case despite the fact that a complaint for frustrated murder had been filed in the fiscals office of Cavite City. The court ruled in favor of the court-martial. In the instant case, Martelino sought the disqualification of the president of the court-martial, Col. Alejandro, based from the latters admission that he had read newspaper stories of the Corregidor incident: That the case had received so much media publicity and was being exploited for the purposes of the Nov. 11, 1969 presidential elections.

Daily Mirror July 29, 1969 and other news reports to the effect that coffins are being prepared for the President in Jolo,; that, according to Sen. Aquino, massacre victims were given sea burial,; that Sen. Magsaysay, presidential candidate, had gone to Corregidor and found bullet shells. Manila Times Aug. 26, 1969: The Jabidah (code name of the training operations] issue was bound to come up during the presidential campaign. The opposition could not possibly ignore an issue heavily loaded against the administration. That this imperiled his right to a free trial. Martelino also raised peremptory challenges against Alejandro and members of the court-martial Lt. Col. Camagay, Lt. Col. Valones, Lt. Col. Planco and Col. Malig. It was Martelinos and the other petitioners position that for each specification each accused was entitled to one such challenge. They later changed their stand and adopted that of the trial judge advocate that for each specification jointly tried, all of the accused are entitled to only 1 peremptory challenge; and for specifications tried commonly, each of the accused is entitled to 1 peremptory challenge, and that in all, they were entitled to a total of 11 peremptory challenges. Respondents: No proof has been presented showing that the court-martials presidents fairness and impartiality had been impaired. The Supreme Court had no authority to review the proceedings of the court-martial except on issues of jurisdiction and subject-matter, or, if it had jurisdiction, it had exceeded its powers. The petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies in the military justice system.

Issues/Held/ Ratio: (1) Whether the Court has authority to review proceedings of the court-martial. YES. It is true that civil courts as a rule exercise no supervision or correcting power over court-martial proceedings and mere errors in these proceedings are not open to consideration, except as provided by Rule 65, grave abuse of discretion which gives rise to a defect in their jurisdiction. It is thus obvious that no other way is open to the Court by which it may avoid passing upon the constitutional issue thrust upon it; and the argument about non-exhaustion of military justice remedies would not hold considering that the issues raised were questions of law. (2) Whether the right of Martelino to a just and fair trial was impaired. NO. The petitioner cited the cases of Irvin v. Dowd, Rideau v. Louisiana, Estes v. Texas, and Sheppard v. Maxwell: However, the Supreme Court noted that these cases are widely disparate from Martelinos case. In the Irvin case, after the accused was arrested for 6 murders in Indiana, the prosecutor and the police issued press releases stating that the accused had confessed to the 6 murders. A barrage of newspaper headlines, articles and cartoons was unleashed against the accused 7 months before trial. The Court reversed the conviction noting the bitter prejudice against the defendant upon the voir dire examination of the jurors. This case marked the first time that a state conviction was struck down solely on prejudicial publicity. In Shepherd v. Florida, the reversal of the conviction was on the ground of racial discrimination in the selection of the jury, although concurring Justice Jackson (joined by J. Frankfurter) noted that it was hard to imagine a more prejudicial influence than a press release of an officer of the court, conveyed to the jury, stating that the accused had confessed to the charges, unseen, uncrossed, un-examined. In Rideau, the court granted the motion of the lawyers of the accused for a change of venue noting that it was a denial of due process to do so as the accused was given a trial by publicity. A 20 -minute video interview of the accused with the sheriff admitting to the crimes of bank robbery, kidnapping and murder led to his conviction. In Sheppard, plaintiff Sam Sheppard was accused of killing his wife Marilyn. The Court noted the unfair and prejudicial news comment on pending trials. That trial courts must take strong measures to ensure that the balance is never weighed against the accused. Basically, what the Supreme Court noted was the fact that the news cited by the petitioners did not focus on their guilt but rather on the responsibility of the Government for what was claimed to be a massacre of Muslim trainees. If there was a trial by newspaper at all, it was not of the petitioners but of the Government. What lacks here is a showing of failure of the court-martial to protect the accused from massive publicity encouraged by those connected with the conduct of the trial. It cannot be said that the trial of the petitioners was being held under circumstances which did not permit the observance of the imperative decencies of procedure identified with due process. Even granting the existence of massive and prejudicial publicity, since what the petitioners were contending was simply the barrage of publicity and not that the court-martial was unduly influenced , the suspension of the court-martial

proceedings already accomplished the purpose sought by the petitioners challenge for cause, as calmer times had already returned. Re: Peremptory Challenge: Article of War 18: Each side shall be entitled to one peremptory challenge, but the law member of the court shall not be challenged except for cause. SC: Each of the petitioners are entitled to one peremptory challenge as a matter of right; the number of specifications or charges, and whether the trial is joint or common, is of no moment. Each of the 23 petitioners is entitled to one peremptory challenge: (1) A peremptory challenge is afforded to an accused who, whether rightly or wrongly, feels that the member of the court peremptorily challenged by him cannot try him, cannot sit in judgment over him, impartially. It is not enough that objectively the members of the court may be fair and impartial; it is likewise necessary that subjectively the accused must feel that he is being tried by a fair and impartial body of officers. (2) Upon careful examination by the Court of Article of War 18 and the US Military Law cited by the respondents, each accused person is entitled to one peremptory challenge whether in a joint or common trial. (3) Each side from Article of War 18 means each accused person. People v. Orsal GR No. L-47069; March 29, 1982; Per Curiam Doctrine: The test of violation of the right to a speedy trial has always been to begin counting the delay from the time the information is filed not before the filing. In this case, the delay was for a reasonable cause, and is therefore not to be reckoned with in determining whether there has been a denial of the right to a speedy trial. Facts (Not really crucial to the issue though) Vicente Orsal is one of the 4 accused in separate cases of arson and murder 2 of the other accused were gone at large, so only Orsal and a fellow Ramon Gutierrez stood trial On April 13, 1974, the 4 accused killed Crisanto Bejic, Eduarda Bejic, and their grandchildren Atanacia Legazpi and Roberto Bejic. After which, they burned the house of Crisanto Bejic The next day, they then ransacked the house of Jesus Limen, taking his shoes, clothes, paltik revolver, paltic shotguns, and a hand grenade. They then killed Jesus Limen and burned his house. The accused then took Ramon Jimenez, a companion of Jesus Limen, to different places in Zamboanga City as they were repairing the shotguns and hiding. They took turns in watching Jimenez so he wouldnt escape Appellant and Jimenez were eventually captured in Surabay, Zamboanga City. Issues/Holding/Ratio 1. WON the appellant has been denied his right to a speedy trial? NO Appellant argues that his constitutional right was violated because the information was filed only 9 months after his arrest and investigation This is incorrect. The test of violation has always been to begin counting the delay from the time the information is filed not before the filing. In this case, the delay was for a reasonable cause, and is therefore not to be reckoned with in determining whether there has been a denial of the right to a speedy trial. 2. WON there was sufficient evidence to convict him of the crime? YES (Not relevant to lesson) Orsal was identified by Antonio Bejic, the lone survivor in the Bejic household when he heard Orsal shout Hoy prior to the murdering. He recognized the voice because appellant used to sleep in Antonios grandfathers house Antonio also saw appellant stab his cousin Roberto Bejic Andrea Bejic testified that prior to the killing, appellant told her not to prepare supper for them anymore as he would eat supper in her fathers (Crisanto) house The killing of Jesus Limen and the burning of the house followed the same pattern as the first incident. Ramon Jimenez testified that he saw the incidents as he was Jesus companion His testimony is credible as it was very keenly scrutinized Any mistakes with respect to dates of arrest were honest mistakes and not lies

People v Jardin GR No. L-33037; Aug 17, 1983; Gutierrez Jr. Digest prepared by Mara Recto Rights of the accused speedy trial and freedom from double jeopardy Long story short: Jardin (accused) kept postponing. He is deemed to have waived or abandoned his right to a speedy trial by his own acts FACTS

Demetrio Jardin filed a petition to dismiss the criminal cases filed against him (malversation of public funds thru falsification of public documents on 6 counts) because his constitutional right to a speedy trial was allegedly violated Accused moved to postpone the preliminary investigation twice rd th o On the 3 and 4 time PI was reset, the accused and his counsel failed to appear o Despite absence, PI was conducted and 6 informations were filed with the CFI Arraignment was set for May 9, 1967 but was reset for several times (May 9 was reset to June 6 -> June 26 -> Aug 16 ->Sept 5) due to motions for postponement filed by the accused When arraignment was called on Sept 5, counsel of the accused verbally moved for reinvestigation on the ground that accused was not given opportunity to present defense during the PI st o Court granted and 1 reinvestigation was set on Nov 24 On Nov 24, Investigating Fiscal motu proprio postponed reinvestigation due to non-appearance of the accused and his counsel. It was again reset and further postponed On June 27, 1968, accused and his counsel appeared but requested 15 days to file a memorandum Court issued order transferring the 6 cases to the new branch of the CFI at Mauban, Quezon and trial was set to Dec 3, 1968 which was followed by more postponements Mar 31, 1969, accused moved for postponement of arraignment and requested for reinvestigation Reinvestigation was set to May 5, 1969 which was again reset to June 1 Arraignment and trial was again moved for postponement Sept 8, 1970 Jardin pleaded not guilty, requested for trial to be postponed o Again postponed on Sept 29, 1970 and again Oct 12, 1970 No one appeared during the hearing o Counsel for the accused invoked clients right to speedy trial and case was dismissed by the court

W/N Court was correct in dismissing the cases due to the right of the accused to a speedy trial? NO, court committed GAD in dismissing case and basing it on right to speedy trial Right to a speedy trial means that the accused is free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, its salutary objective being to assure that an innocent person may be free from anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatever legitimate defense he may interpose. All delays were caused by the accused himself Constitutional right cannot be invoked as it would make a mockery of the justice system if an accused would be allowed to benefit from his own wrongdoings or tactical maneuvers to frustrate justice W/N accused would be placed in double jeopardy NO, no jeopardy can attach, dismissal of the case was void for having no legal basis so acquittal is also void Requisites for an accused to be protected against double jeopardy a) Valid complaint/information b) Competent court c) Defendant had pleaded to the charge d) Defendant was acquitted, convicted or dismissed or terminated PEOPLE v ANG GIOC 73 PHIL 336; Abad Santos, J.; October 31, 1941 Digested by: Cor Renes SUMMARY: Ang Gioc evaded his arrest for 13 yrs. When he was finally arrested, it was found that the records of the trial were not transcribed and the stenographers were already dead. He petitioned for a new trial in the CA. CA granted. SC ruled that CA had no jurisdiction because Ang Gioc is deemed to have waived his right to appeal when he evaded.

DOCTRINE: The right to appeal, not being a constitutional right but merely statutory, can be waived either expressly or impliedly. FACTS - Ang Gioc, together with Sio Go, Gang Kan, Kee Ya and Chua Chui, was charged with the crime of frustrated murder in the Court of First Instance of Manila. He was released on bail. After a protracted trial, which lasted several months, Ang Gioc and one of his coaccused, Sio Go, were found guilty and sentenced to twelve years and one day of cadena temporal. Ang Gioc and his sureties were duly notified to appear before the court for the reading of the sentence, but the former failed to appear and thereupon the trial judge ordered his arrest and the confiscation of the bond furnished for his temporary release. - All attempts to arrest him proved futile. He was finally arrested after nearly 13 years from the date fixed for the reading of the sentence. He was subsequently brought before the court and the sentence was read to him. - He appealed to the CA where, against the objection of the Solicitor General, he was allowed to file a bond for his temporary release. - In perfecting the record on appeal it was found that the stenographic notes taken during the trial were not transcribed and that the two stenographers who took the notes were already dead. The matter was referred to several stenographers who stated that they could not transcribe the notes because the deceased had used systems known only to themselves. In this situation, Ang Gioc petitioned the CA to remand the cause to the court below for a new trial. - CA remanded for new trial. ISSUE + HELD: WoN the CA acquired jurisdiction of the appeal filed by him? NO. Remanding order must be set aside, and the judgment of the CFI Manila declared final and executory. RATIO: The accused has rights, one of which is the right of appeal; but this is a purely statutory, not a constitutional, right and this is not one of those fundamental rights which cannot be waived. This right is granted solely for the benefit of the accused. He may avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may waive it either expressly or by implication. When the accused flees after the case has been submitted to the court for decision, he will be deemed to have waived his right to appeal from the judgment rendered against him. IN THE CASE AT BAR: Such was the situation with reference to the respondent Ang Gioc. He was duly notified to appear before the trial court for the reading of the sentence, but failed to do so When an order was issued for his arrest, the warrant could not be served on him because he could not be found. Whether or not he escaped to China is immaterial for our present purpose. The fact remains that he succeeded in evading arrest for nearly thirteen years. The record shows that upon his failure to appear for the reading of the sentence, the trial court declared the confiscation of the bond filed by Ang Gioc, and later issued the corresponding order of execution. This action of the court amounted to a judicial declaration that Ang Gioc was a fugitive from justice, and such declaration cannot after the lapse of nearly thirteen years be controverted by proof aliunde. A contrary view would encourage accused persons to trifle with the administration of justice, and provide means for guilty parties to escape punishment. We reject it without the least hesitation by declaring that Ang Gioc had waived his right to appeal from the judgment rendered against him. The law will not allow a person to take advantage of his own wrong. Ang Gioc has waived his right of appeal. Court of Appeals acquired no jurisdiction of the appeal filed by him, except to dismiss it; and that court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it ordered the cause to be remanded to the court of origin for a new trial

Samson v CA L-10364 and L-10376; 31 March 1958; Bautista Angelo J. Digest prepared by Gertrude Gamonnac DOCTRINE One offense shall be considered the same as the other not only when one is identical to the other but also when one necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the other. FACTS Rufino Samson was an army lieutenant. On October 2, 1948, he was approached by his former classmate Amado Cruz asking for his help in getting the checks of the two claimants who were with him. The two claimants were supposedly the only legitimate surviving heirs of Felipe Lascano, a lieutenant of the USAFFE who died during the last World War. Espiridion Lascano was his father and Rosalina Paras was his widow.

Having been assured twice of the identity of the supposed claimants and after examining their residence certificates attached to the claim papers, Samson accompanied them to Camp Murphy and assisted them in processing their claims and encashing the checks. Samson even asked for the help of his friend Lt. Valencia to act as guarantor and Rosario Mallari, a teller. When they encashed the checks, the one who was claiming to be Espiridion Lascano signed his name at the back of his check while the one claiming to be Rosalina placed her thumbmark at the back of her check since she didnt know how to write. Samson signed as a witness on Espiridions check and as a last indorser on Rosalinas check. They then proceeded to the Aristocrat Restaurant where they, together with 11 other people, took their lunch. Amado Cruz gave Samson 300php to be paid to the officers who helped them in securing the checks plus 10php for Samson s taxi fare. Samson learned about the falsification 2 days after the incident when he was informed by one Severino Anda that the checks were delivered to the wrong parties. Samson went to Sorsogon to look for the real claimants. He was able to meet the real Espiridion Lascano, who was too old and weak to leave the house, and Rosalina, a teacher. They told him that they never received any check or money. Samson was charged with estafa through falsification of documents but he was found guilty by the trial court and the CA of estafa through falsification of documents by reckless imprudence.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in convicting him of estafa through falsification of documents by reckless imprudence even if the charge against him was for estafa through falsification of documents NO HELD WHEREFORE the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant RATIO -

The SC looked at the different elements in trying to establish Samsons guilt: PARTICIPATION: There is no question that he cooperated in the commission of the complex offense of estafa through falsification by reckless imprudence. CA is correct in concluding that he had no prior knowledge of the falsification because if he had, he would have asked for a bigger cut instead of merely receiving 310php. However, even if he didnt have any intention or knowledge, the crime would not have been committed without his participation. His acts of endorsing constituted a written representation that the payees had participated in the cashing of the checks even when in fact they had no participation in the proceedings. (Art 171 (2) RPC) NEGLIGENCE: The SC found that Samson was negligent because he did not exercise due diligence in ascertaining the identity of the supposed claimants. The mere assurance of a former classmate as well as the submission of residence certificates is not enough to establish the identity of the persons. Being an army lieutenant and knowing that the amount involved was sizeable (over 12,000php), he should have been intelligent and educated enough to foresee the possibility that the certificates could be forged or stolen. BASIS OF SC: Relied on Sec 4, Rule 116 (NOW Sec 4, Rule 120), Sec 5, Rule 116 (NOW Sec 5, Rule 120) and Sec 9, Rule 113 (NOW Sec 7, Rule 117) *please read ROC 2000 In this case, Samson was charged with WILLFUL falsification but from the evidence submitted by the parties, the CA found that the accused did not act with criminal intent but merely failed to take proper and adequate means to assure himself of the identity of the claimants as an ordinary prudent man would do. All the elements of estafa through falsification is present, except INTENT, hence he is guilty of committing it through RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE. It is also based on the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense. SC gave an example: The crime of theft is included necessarily in that of robbery and therefore a defendant can be convicted of theft, notwithstanding that he was charged with robbery In Sec 5, Rule 116 (now Sec 5, Rule 120) it is not required that all the essential elements of the offense charged in the information be proved, it being sufficient that some of said essential elements are established to constitute the crime proved. SC said their conclusion is strengthened by the provisions of Sec 9, Rule 113 (now Sec 7, Rule 117). Appellant could no longer be prosecuted for estafa by reckless negligence if he is to be acquitted in the case.

DISSENTING OPINION: REYES, JBL PARTICIPATION: He cannot be held as a principal by cooperation (ART 17, RPC) because to cooperate necessarily implies knowledge of the ultimate purpose. IN PROVING HIS GUILT: Does not agree with the majority that under a charge of INTENTIONALLY committing a crime, an accused may be convicted of committing a crime THROUGH NEGLIGENCE or IMPRUDENCE

Intentional crimes are punished according to their results, but in crimes of negligence, what the law punishes is the carelessness itself. Intentional falsification and falsification by negligence are different offenses altogether. An offender who is accused of intentional falsification cannot be held to answer for falsification by negligence, because the essential element of the latter offense, which is negligence or carelessness, is not involved in the elements of the crime charged. Not only is it not included, it is excluded by incompatibility. GREATER CRIME ABSORBS THE LESSER: In this case, accused was charged with Falsification with imprudence under Article 365 instead of Falsification under Article 171 or 172 because it carries a lighter penalty. This is incorrect. Saying that an accused may be convicted of any lesser crime than the one charged means that he may be convicted with a crime with a fewer number of elements than the crime charged and not a crime that carries a lighter penalty. RULES OF COURT where SC based their decision : It has been held that an accused may be found guilty of an offense which has fewer elements than the offense charged provided that these elements are alleged in the information. However it has not been held that a crime is included in the offense charged when not only must one element alleged be discarded but another one, not alleged, must be supplied. In the SCs example: Robbery includes that of theft, bec ause to constitute theft, the element of violence from robbery is simply eliminated. However, in the case at bar the elements of the crime charged are as follows: a) The accused made a false statement (certified that the impostors signatures are the genuine signatures b) That he made a false statement in a commercial paper (check) c) That he knew the signature certified to by him is not that of the payee d) That he acted willfully, unlawfully and feloniously Clearly the crime of falsification through negligence cannot be inferred by eliminating any one of these elements. Also the element of imprudence, the essence of the offense which he is convicted, is missing from those alleged in the information. Lastly, the implication of the decision is that each and every charge of a willful offense (except where malice is indispensable) will necessarily imply an alternative charge of criminal negligence. Hence it violates the ROC that says not more than one offense should be charged.

Galman v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 72670; 12 September 1986; Teehankee, C.J. Digester: Roxas, borrowing substantially from the digest made by Glenn Agbayani This case was discussed previously under Motion to Quash- Double Jeopardy I. Facts Ninoy Aquino was assassinated on the tarmac of the Manila International Airpoprt by an assassin who shot him point blank in the head. After the shooting, the assassin was shot dead by Aquinos military escorts. Military investigators reported that the assassin was Rolando Galman, an NPA, communist-hired assassin. The military later filmed a re-enactment of the scene and showed broadcasted it on national TV as if it were the actual footage. In the 10 day period of national mourning, the public clamoured to for the truth, prompting then President Marcos to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate the murder. The board came out with a minority and a majority decision, both of which found that Galman had no subversive affiliations, that the area, being heavily secured, made it impossible for any unauthorized person to enter the cordoned area; only the soldiers in the staircase with Ninoy could have shot him. The murder was the product of a military conspiracy. The majority decision of the fact finding board listed 26 military soldiers and officials who were involved in the killing (including General Ver) Marcos however disdained and rejected the findings of the board and insisted that the military version, was the correct in finding Galman to be the assassin. Criminal cases were filed in the Sandiganbayan against the 26 defendants. Herein petitioners, the Heirs of Galman, along with various members of the AFP, 5 university presidents and solid members of the public, filed the present action praying that the not be allowed to try the case. They alleged that the Tanodbayan did not represent the the interest of the people and that he was biased and prejudiced against the accused. The supreme court initially granted the TRO prayed for, preventing the Sandiganbayan from trying the case, but later reversed its decision. The case proceeded and the Sandiganbayan acquitted all the accused of the crime charged.

Petitioners filled a (1 ) motion for reconsideration alleging that the Sandiganbayan Justices committed serious irregularities in rendering their decision which amounted to a mistrial. They petitioned to the Supreme Court to declare the st Sandiganbayan decision void for being violative and to reopen the case for new trial. The 1 MR was denied. nd A 2 MR was filed based on a new material fact- the revalation by Deputy Tanodbayan that there was a secret Malacanang meetinging where Marcos ordered the Justices of the Tanodbayan to whitewash the Galman murder case. Respondents argue that since the Sandiganbayan has already rendered a judgment of acquittal, reopening the case for trial would result in double jeopardy.

st

Issue: WON the Sandiganbayan decision is void - YES WON there is double jeopardy - NO Held: SC ordered a retrial of the case. Ratio:
nd

The 2 MR is allowed, being based on a new material fact- the secret Malacanang meeting. The Sandiganbayan decision is void because 15 months after the Marcos was ousted, Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera confessed that the Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case. A prepared resolution was sent to the investigating panel. He claimed that Marcos ordered the Justices that the resolution be revised by categorizing the participation of each respondent into principals, accomplices or accessories and that one Justice Pamaran handle the trial. The Court, having been convinced that Marcos corrupted the Sandiganbayan Justices, declared the decision of the Sandiganbayan void for being violative of due process. Since the acquittal was void, there can be no double jeopardy. A void judgment is in effect no judgment at all. PEOPLE vs. RELOVA G.R. No. L-45129, March 06, 1987; Feliciano. Digest by Ian Facts: This involves an ice plant which have installed wiring and devices, without the necessary authority from the city government, to lower its electrical consumption. Feb. 1, 1975- Equipped with a search warrant, Batangas City Police and personnel of Batangas Electric System searched and examined the premises of Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage. They discovered that electric wiring, devices and contraptions had been installed, without the necessary authority from the city government, and "architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building" in the plant with the purpose of lowering or decreasing the readings of electric current consumption in the electric meter. Nov. 24, 1975 (after more than 9 months), an information was filed by an Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas City before the City Court of Batangas City against the ice plant owner Manuel Opulencia for violation of Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1974, Batangas City which requires that prior authorization should be obtained from the Superintendent of the Batangas City Electrical System or the District Engineer before the installation. Counsel for defendant filed a motion to quash alleging prescription because the offense is a light felony which prescribes in 2 months after discovery and the information was filed only after more than 9 months since the offense was discovered. The motion to quash was granted on April 6, 1975. April 20, 1975- Acting City Fiscal files before CFI of Batangas another information against Opulencia this time for theft of electric power under Art. 308 in relation to 309, par. 1, of the RPC. May 5, 1975- Before he could be arraigned thereon, Manuel Opulencia filed a Motion to Quash, alleging that he had been previously acquitted of the offense charged in the second information and that the filing thereof was violative of his constitutional right against double jeopardy.

Issue: WON there was double jeopardy and such can be pleaded in a motion quash. Held: Yes, there was double jeopardy because the same set of facts is punishable under the RPC and the municipal ordinance and by express provision of the Constitution, this constitutes double jeopardy.

The dismissal on account of prescription is equal to an acquittal by reason of Art. 89 which states that prescription of crimes result to the total extinguishment of criminal liability. Ratio: The 1973 Constitution provides that: "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act." Based on the provision, there are 2 kinds of double jeopardy: 1. 1 Paragraph: Same offense Where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charged: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only where an identity is shown to exist between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged 2. 2 Paragraph: Same act punished under a law and an ordinance. Where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance while the other is penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity of the acts which the accused is said to have committed and which are alleged to have given rise to the two offenses: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so long as the acts which constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a statute. Reason behind the rule: The question may be raised why one rule should exist where two offenses under two different sections of the same statute or under different statutes are charged, and another rule for the situation where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance and another offense under a national statute. If the second sentence of the double jeopardy provision had not been written into the Constitution, conviction or acquittal under a municipal ordinance would never constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act under a national statute. An offense penalized by municipal ordinance is, by definition, different from an offense under a statute. The two offenses would never constitute the same offense having been promulgated by different rulemaking authorities though one be subordinate to the other and the plea of double jeopardy would never lie. The discussions during the 1934-1935 Constitutional Convention show that the second sentence was inserted precisely for the purpose of extending the constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a situation which would not otherwise be covered by the first sentence. In summary: The general rule for double jeopardy is that there is no double jeopardy if the first offense is different from the second nd although they spring from the same set of facts. The exception is provided by the 2 sentence which declares that double jeopardy attaches when the same set of facts is punished under a national statute and an ordinance. In the case at bar, we use the 2 type. So, how do we deal with the question of identity of the acts which have generated liability both under a municipal ordinance and a national statute? When the acts of the accused as set out in the two informations are so related to each other in time and space as to be reasonably regarded as having taken place on the same occasion and where those acts have been moved by one and the same, or a continuing, intent or voluntary design or negligence, such acts may be appropriately characterized as an integral whole capable of giving rise to penal liability simultaneously under different legal enactments (a municipal ordinance and a national statute). Note that the rule limiting the constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense is not to be understood with absolute literalness. The identity of offenses that must be shown need not be absolute identity: the first and second offenses may be regarded as the "same offense" where the second offense necessarily includes the first offense or is necessarily included in such first offense or where the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof. Thus, for the constitutional plea of double jeopardy to be available, not all the technical elements constituting the first offense need be present in the technical definition of the second offense. In the case at bar, the relevant acts took place within the same time frame: from November 1974 to February 1975. During this period, the accused Manuel Opulencia installed or permitted the installation of electrical wiring and devices in his ice plant without obtaining the necessary permit or authorization from the municipal authorities. The accused conceded that he effected or permitted such unauthorized installation for the very purpose of reducing his electric power bill. This corrupt intent was thus present from the very moment that such unauthorized installation began. The immediate physical effect of the unauthorized installation was the inward flow of electric current into Opulencia's ice plant without the corresponding recording thereof in his electric meter. In other words, the "taking" of electric current was integral with the unauthorized installation of electric wiring and devices.
nd nd st

Joel Caes v IAC G.R. No. 7489-90; November 6, 1989; Cruz Digest Prepared by Hans Cedric I. Santos I. Facts Joel Caes was charged in two separate informations with the crimes of illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession of marijuana. The cases were consolidated. He was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Trial was set for October 13, 1982 but was rescheduled a total of eleven times. On November 14, 1983 the prosecution moved to have the case provisionally dismissed. This motion was granted by the trial court in view of the failure of prosecution witnesses Capt. Dacanay and Sgt. Lustado to appear. On January 9, 1984, these witnesses filed a motion to revive the cases alleging that they could not attend the November 1983 hearing due to lack of notice. The judge granted this motion since there had been no opposition filed by the defense or fiscal and the case was only provisionally dismissed. Caes filed a writ of certiorari with the SC which referred it to the IAC. The IAC dismissed the petition. II. Issues-Held WON the motion to revive was invalid for not being filed by the proper party and not serving a copy to Caes: Yes, it was invalid. WON the revival of the case would place Caes under double jeopardy: Yes, it would. III. Ratio The proper party to have filed the motion to revive the case was the public prosecutor. The fact that he did not interpose any objection was not enough to justify the actions of the witnesses. The fact that Caes was not informed made the irregularity even more serious. The court described double jeopardy as res judicata in prison grey prohibiting the prosecution of a person for a crime of which he had been previously acquitted or convicted. The requirements of double jeopardy are: Valid complaint or information Filed before a competent court To which the defendant had pleaded Of which he/she has been previously acquitted or convicted or which was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent The first three requisites are clearly present in this case. Caes alleges that the dismissal was not provisional since he had not expressly consented thereto. The court agreed with him and said that for a dismissal to be provisional, it must have been made on motion of the accused or of the prosecution with the express consent of the accused. The consent of the accused cannot be presumed. Implied consent cannot be enough not may it presumed from presumption of regularity since we are dealing with constitutional rights. Thus, though it was designated as provisional, the dismissal was fina l. The court also enumerated when a dismissal is final even when made upon motion of the accused . The first is when a demurrer to evidence is filed after the prosecution has rested its case . Such a dismissal is in effect a judgment on the merits and operates as an acquittal. The second is when the accused moves to dismiss because of a denial of his right to a speedy trial . This is in effect a failure to prosecute. In this case, the accused had been arraigned but never tried after eleven postponements despite always being present at the hearings. Instead the hearings were rescheduled due to the absence of the witnesses, or of the prosecutor or because the court lacked material time. The court said (though it was never raised by the petitioner) that Caes could have moved to dismiss the case due to denial of his right to speedy trial and such a dismissal would have been final. Because of the denial of the right to speedy trial and because the accused did not expressly consent to the dismissal of the case against him, the accused was entitled to a final dismissal and the trial judge erred in ordering the revival of the cases. The court also expressed disapproval of the conduct of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City in hastily filing the information without insuring the evidence against the accused and in perfunctorily moving for resetting of hearings without exerting effort to secure the attendance of his witnesses. Order of the Trial Court SET ASIDE and dismissal of the criminal cases declared FINAL. Copy of the decision is sent to the Secretary of Justice.