THE

UNSEEN
WAR

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C O R P O R AT I O N

Published in cooperation with the RAND Corporation

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THE

UNSEEN
WAR

Allied Air Power and the

Takedown of Saddam Hussein

Benjamin S. Lambeth

Foreword by Gen. T. Michael Moseley, USAF (Ret.)

Naval Institute Press

Annapolis, Maryland

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Naval Institute Press

291 Wood Road
Annapolis, MD 21402

2013 by RAND Corporation

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by
any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Lambeth, Benjamin S.
The unseen war : allied air power and the takedown of Saddam Hussein / Benjamin S.
Lambeth.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-61251-311-9 (pbk. : alk. paper) ISBN 978-1-61251-312-6 (ebook) 1.
Iraq War, 20032011Aerial operations, American. 2. Iraq War, 20032011Campaigns.
3. United States. Central CommandHistory. 4. Air powerUnited StatesCase
studies. I. Title.
DS79.76.L347 2013
956.7044348dc23
2013017743
Print editions meet the requirements of ANSI/NISO z39.48-1992 (Permanence of
Paper).
Printed in the United States of America.
21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13
First printing

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List of Figures, Maps, and Chartsvii

Forewordix
Prefacexiii
Acknowledgmentsxv
Acronyms and Abbreviationsxxi

Introduction1
1

The Road to War9

CENTCOMs Air Offensive59

The Allies Contribution147

Key Accomplishments178

Problems Encountered242

Toward a New Era of Warfare288

Notes313
Selected Bibliography399
Index423

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FIGURES, MAPS, AND CHARTS

Figures
Figure 1.1

General Franks Lines and Slices Matrix17

Figure 2.1

Common Grid Reference System97

Figure 2.2

Kill-Box Status Change Request Format98

Figure 4.1

Air Tasking Order Processing Cycle208

Maps

Map 1.1

Iraqi Northern and Southern No-Fly Zones10

Map 1.2

General Franks Five-Front Construct27

Map 1.3

CENTAFs Main Operating Bases45

Map 2.1

Iraqi Theater of Operations60

Map 2.2

Iraqi IADS Super MEZ85

Map 2.3

Iraqi Military Airfield Distribution85

Charts

Chart 1.1

CENTAF Aircraft by Category45

Chart 4.1

CENTAF Overall Sorties by Aircraft Category179

Chart 4.2

CENTAF Strike Sorties by Category179

Chart 4.3

CENTAF Strike Sorties by Service180

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FOREWORD

The three-week air offensive that figured centrally in the toppling of

Saddam Hussein was a testament to air powers final maturation for the sort of
high-intensity warfare that the major combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom
represented. In both its independent strategic role and its enabling support to
allied ground troops, that offensive reflected a culmination of all that the United
States and its coalition partners had done by way of steady force improvement, doctrinal refinement, and realistic training since air powers breakthrough
achievement during the first Persian Gulf War more than a decade earlier.
It was my special privilege to command and lead the many fine airmen
who made possible that remarkable air power success story. Notwithstanding
our unmatched combat systems and technology, it is our high-quality professionals at all levels whose devotion to mission and natural adaptability to overcome any challenge have rendered the American air weapon a unique asset to
our nation. Those key shapers of events were backstopped in every way by the
able contributions of the United Kingdom and Australia, whose respective air
contingent commanders, then Air Vice-Marshal Glenn Torpy of the RAF and
then Group Captain Geoff Brown of the RAAF, were my partners from the start
of our planning to the final execution of the campaign. It speaks volumes for the
uncommon reservoir of talent that they brought to the fight that both of these
outstanding airmen later went on to head their respective air forces.
In the years since those eventful three weeks, the United States and its allies
have been consumed by lower-intensity counterinsurgency operations in which
kinetic air attacks have been largely overshadowed by ground combatto a
point where some observers suggest that the sort of cutting-edge applications
of air power that were so pivotal in 2003 have since been superseded by a new
form of warfare in which high-technology weapons have become irrelevant.
That notion could not be further removed from the realities of todays world.
The era of major wars entailing existential threats to the United States and
its closest allies has not ended. Demands for the most lethal and survivable air
capabilities that our nation can muster will arise again. And there is much in our
experience gained from the air war over Iraq in 2003 that offers a preview of
how such capabilities might be best exploited in the future.

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x FOREWORD

This important book, begun under my sponsorship as the commander of

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Air Forces, reconstructs the campaigns
air contribution in impressive depth of detail. Along the way, it weaves a gripping narrative of the air war at multiple levels of analysis, from the perspective of
the coalitions most senior leaders all the way down to individual airmen as they
watched the campaign play out from their cockpits in the heat of combat. One
of the many notable aspects of the air offensive explored in the pages that follow concerns the trust relationships that were first forged within CENTCOM
during Operation Enduring Freedom against Al Qaeda and its Taliban hosts
in Afghanistan in late 2001 and 2002. Those close interpersonal ties were sustained among the same top leaders as we segued into the campaign against Iraqs
Baathist regime the following year. They were indispensable in accounting for
the campaigns all but seamless cross-service harmony.
This assessment also explores the many challenges that those at the center of
preparations for Iraqi Freedom faced, including the possibility of an Iraqi chemical weapons attack on both allied forces and civilian populations in the theater,
our felt need to ensure that the Iraqi air force would not generate a single
combat sortie, our determination to ensure that our air support arrangements
were in closest possible accord with the land components anticipated maneuver
needs, and our resolve to keep Iraqs western desert free of any means for Husseins forces to fire missiles into Israel and Jordan.
The compression of the campaigns phases into a concurrent air-land push
into Iraq compounded those concerns. That last-minute development saddled
CENTCOMs air component with the daunting need to satisfy multiple mission
demands simultaneouslyestablishing airspace control, finding and destroying
hidden Iraqi Scud or other tactical missiles, targeting Iraqs key command and
control centers to impose rapid paralysis on the regime, and supporting the conventional land advance and associated covert activities by allied special operations
forces in both southern and northern Iraq.
Finally, this book spotlights the many unique achievements registered during the three-week air offensive, such as the close integration of our naval and
Marine Corps air assets into the overall campaign plan, meeting the immense
challenges of securing adequate fuel supplies and tanker support, assigning a
senior airman to the land component as my personal representative, and securing for the air component the all-important prerogative of approving the
nomination of enemy targets without my having to defer repeatedly to higher
authority for permission. It also explains the many valuable lessons that were
driven home by the campaign experience, such as the importance of organizing

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FOREWORD xi

the air components elements for maximum effectiveness, training those elements
routinely in peacetime in a way that fully exercises the entire command and
control system, and equipping our forces with the most effective and survivable
aircraft and systems.
Ben Lambeths assessment offers an exhaustive account of the Iraqi Freedom air war in its most essential details. His adept telling of that story is conveyed with a tone of authority that will resonate instantly among the airmen
who were actually there in the fight. Yet at the same time, it is written with a
clarity of expression that will render it equally accessible to a wider circle of
readers. I commend it highly to all who have an interest in air power and its key
role in our nations defense, and most particularly to the successor generation of
military professionals in all services who will gain much of lasting value from its
many informed observations and insights.
T. Michael Buzz Moseley
General, U.S. Air Force (Ret.)
Commander, U.S. Central Command Air Forces (2001
2003) and Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force (20052008)

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PREFACE

Since early 2004, under the sponsorship of U.S. Air Forces Central
(AFCENT), I have pursued an in-depth assessment of the American and allied
air contribution to the three weeks of major combat in Operation Iraqi Freedom that ended the rule of Saddam Hussein. This research followed an earlier AFCENT-sponsored study to assess the war against Al Qaeda and its Taliban hosts in Afghanistan between early October 2001 and late March 2002 in
response to the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11,
2001. That earlier effort is reported in Benjamin S. Lambeth, Air Power against
Terror: Americas Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom.1 The present book offers
a similar treatment of the shorter but more intense air war that occurred over
Iraq a year later when American air assets, aided substantially by the contributions of the British Royal Air Force (RAF) and the Royal Australian Air Force
(RAAF), played a pivotal role in securing the immediate campaign objectives of
U.S. Central Command. This book aims to fill a persistent gap in the literature
on Operation Iraqi Freedom by telling that story as fully and credibly as the
available evidence will allow.

1Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-166-1-CENTAF, 2005. The abbreviation

CENTAF (for U.S. Central Command Air Forces) was changed to AFCENT (for U.S. Air Forces
Central) on March 1, 2009, after the U.S. Air Force leadership redesignated some of the Air Forces
numbered air forces as formal warfighting headquarters. I use the abbreviation CENTAF throughout this book because it was CENTAF that planned and fought the three-week Iraqi Freedom air
war in 2003.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

For the indispensable support he offered toward making this book possible,
I am indebted, first and foremost, to Gen. T. Michael Buzz Moseley, former
U.S. Air Force chief of staff and, before that, commander of U.S. Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) during the planning and conduct of the major
combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. General Moseley consented unhesitatingly to underwrite the research reported here as a sequel to an earlier study
I prepared for CENTAF, also under his sponsorship, on the largely air-centric
war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan in 2001 and 2002. I am also
grateful to Lt. Gen. Robert Elder, then vice commander of CENTAF, who lent
abiding support to me in late 2003 and early 2004 after General Moseley had
moved on to become the Air Force vice chief of staff. My thanks go as well as to
Kathi Jones, CENTAFs command historian, who oversaw this effort throughout its long gestation.
I also am indebted to Vice Adm. David Nichols, deputy air component
commander under General Moseley throughout the major combat phase of
Iraqi Freedom; to Gen. Gene Renuart, director of operations at CENTCOM
during the planning and initial execution of Iraqi Freedom; and to Lt. Gen.
Daniel Darnell, principal director of CENTAFs combined air operations center
(CAOC) at Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia, during the workups to and
initial conduct of Iraqi Freedom, for generously sharing their time and recollections of those aspects of the air war that most bear remembering.
I am additionally indebted to Gen. Gary North, who as CENTAFs commander in 2007 sponsored an extension of this effort so that I could flesh out
my initial draft by incorporating the many reader reactions that I had received
and take advantage of some important additional documentation bearing on
the Iraqi Freedom air war that I had since accumulated. In this regard I owe
particular thanks to Col. Douglas Erlenbusch, at the time CENTAFs director of
operations, and to Maj. Anthony Roberson, then chief of General Norths commanders action group, for commenting in detail on my initial analysis and helping me to refine my plan for this more expanded and enriched final product.
In connection with my treatment of the contribution of the United Kingdoms Royal Air Force (RAF) to the major combat phase of Iraqi Freedom, I

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xvi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

am pleased to acknowledge the generous support that I received from Air Chief
Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, then chief of the air staff. During a four-day visit to
the United Kingdom on October 2629, 2004, I was able to meet virtually
all of the RAF players who were pivotal in the planning and conduct of the
RAFs contribution to the British role in the campaign, code-named Operation
Telic. These included Air Chief Marshal Stirrup and his personal staff officer,
then Group Captain Stuart Atha; Air Commodore Andy Pulford, who commanded the UK Joint Helicopter Command during the air war; Sebastian Cox
and Sebastian Ritchie of the RAFs Air Historical Branch; then Air Marshal
Glenn Torpy, at the time chief of Joint Operations, who had served as the British air contingent commander during Operation Telic; Air Chief Marshal Sir
Brian Burridge, commander in chief of RAF Strike Command and the British national contingent commander up to and throughout the major combat
phase of Iraqi Freedom; Air Vice-Marshal Andy White, air officer commanding
of Strike Commands No. 3 Group; Group Captain Mike Jenkins, station commander at RAF Wittering; Group Captain Chris Coulls, station commander,
and a group of his subordinate unit commanders at RAF Waddington; and Air
Commodore Chris Nickols, commander of the RAFs Air Warfare Centre at
Waddington.
With respect to my similar treatment of the role played by the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), I thank former chief of the air staff Air Marshal Ray
Funnell, RAAF (Ret.), and Alan Stephens, former chief historian of the RAAF,
who brought my initial working draft to the attention of Group Captain Richard Keir, then director of the RAAFs Air Power Development Centre. Group
Captain Keir provided me with copious documentation on the RAAFs role in
the three-week campaign that allowed me to fill in that still-outstanding gap in
my chapter on the allied air effort.
For their valued help in providing me additional documentation, for commenting on all or parts of my earlier draft, and for otherwise helping to enrich
this assessment in various ways, I wish again to thank General Moseley for the
generous amount of time he shared from his busy schedule, first as Air Force
vice chief and then as chief of staff, during three lengthy sessions in which he
offered his reflections on those aspects of the war that mattered most from his
perspective as the air component commander; Gen. John Corley, commander
of Air Combat Command; Lt. Gen. Allen Peck, then commander of the Air
Force Doctrine Center at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, and numerous members of
his staff, particularly Lt. Col. John Hunerwadel and Lt. Col. Robert Poyner; Lt.
Gen. Michael Hamel, then commander of 14th Air Force at Vandenberg AFB,

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xvii

California, and Maj. Mark Main, chief of his commanders action group; Lt.
Gen. Richard Newton, then with AF/A3/5, Headquarters U.S. Air Force; Lt.
Gen. William Rew, CENTAFs director of operations and co-director of the
CAOC during the three-week air war; Maj. Gen. Eric Rosborg, commander
of the 4th Fighter Wings F-15E Strike Eagles during the campaign; Air ViceMarshal Geoff Brown and Group Captain Keir of the RAAF; Dick Anderegg,
director of the Office of Air Force History; Maj. Gen. David Fadok and Col.
Scott Walker, Air Force Studies and Analysis Agency; and Brig. Gen. Mark Barrett, commander, 1st Fighter Wing, and former executive assistant to the USAF
vice chief of staff.
For their helpful comments on various earlier iterations of this study, I thank
Brig. Gen. Michael Longoria, commander of the 484th Air Expeditionary Wing,
who oversaw air-ground integration on the CAOCs behalf during the campaign; Col. David Hathaway and Col. Mason Carpenter, key principals in the
CAOCs strategy division during Iraqi Freedom; Col. Lynn Herndon, director
of the ISR Division in the CAOC during the air campaign; Col. David Belote,
former air liaison officer to the commander of the U.S. Armys III Corps at Fort
Hood, Texas; Brig. Gen. Rob Givens, an F-16CG pilot with the 524th Fighter
Squadron during the three-week air war; Col. Matt Neuenswander, commandant of the USAFs Air-Ground Operations School at Nellis AFB, Nevada, during the campaign; Col. Gregory Fontenot, the principal author of On Point:The
United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Naval Institute Press, 2005); Col.
Thomas Ehrhard; Col. Charles Westenhoff; Lt. Col. Mark Cline, head of the
CAOCs master air attack planning cell during the major combat phase of Iraqi
Freedom; Lt. Col. Chris Crawford, who served with CENTAFs air component
coordinating element to the land component during the campaign; Lt. Col.
John Andreas Olsen of the Royal Norwegian Air Force; Maj. Scott Campbell,
A-10 Division, USAF Weapons School; Robert Jervis, professor of political science, Columbia University; Sebastian Ritchie, deputy director of the RAFs Air
Historical Branch; and Thomas Rehome of the Air Force Historical Research
Agency at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, for his helpful archival research.
For their informed suggestions regarding my treatment of U.S. Navy and
Marine Corps air operations, I extend my thanks to Adm.Tim Keating, CENTCOMs maritime component commander during the major combat phase of
Iraqi Freedom; Adm. John Nathman, then commander, Naval Air Force, U.S.
Pacific Fleet; Vice Adm. Lou Crenshaw, then director, assessments division,
OPNAV N81;Vice Adm. Marty Chanik, then director, programming division,
OPNAV N81; Adm. Mark Fitzgerald and Vice Adm. Tom Kilcline, successive

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xviii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

directors of air warfare, OPNAV N78; Vice Adm. Dick Gallagher, then commander, Carrier Group Four;Vice Adm. Jim Zortman, then commander, Naval
Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet; Adm. Sandy Winnefeld, then executive assistant
to the vice chief of naval operations; Vice Adm. Mark Fox, then commander,
Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center; Capt. Brick Nelson and Capt. Flex Galpin, OPNAV N3/5 (Deep Blue); Capt. Chuck Wright, then director for naval
aviation systems, Office of the Secretary of Defense (Operational Test and
Evaluation); Capt. Calvin Craig, then OPNAV N81; Capt. Ken Neubauer and
Cdr. Nick Dienna, both former Navy executive fellows at RAND; and Capt.
Andy Lewis, then executive assistant to the commander, Naval Air Force, U.S.
Atlantic Fleet.
Although this book is primarily a product of research, it is also informed by
opportunities I was privileged to have in direct support of it to fly in six aircraft
types that took part in Operation Iraqi Freedom. These experiences included a
close air support training sortie in a Block 40 F-16CG with the 510th Fighter
Squadron at Aviano Air Base, Italy, on May 19, 2004; a strike mission orientation
flight in a Tornado GR4 with 617 Squadron out of RAF Lossiemouth on October 27, 2004; a fifteen-hour night combat mission over Afghanistan in an E-3C
AWACS out of Al Dhafra Air Base, United Arab Emirates, with then Lieutenant
General North, CENTAFs commander, in April 2007; three F-16B Topgun
sorties and an F/A-18F Super Hornet sortie with the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center at Naval Air Station (NAS) Fallon, Nevada, on August 46, 2009;
a U-2 high flight to more than 70,000 feet on a surveillance mission orientation sortie with the 1st Reconnaissance Squadron at Beale AFB, California, on
September 3, 2009; and an air combat training sortie in an F/A-18 with No. 2
Operational Conversion Unit at RAAF Base Williamtown, Australia, on March
26, 2010, with an RAAF pilot who took part in the major combat phase of
Operation Iraqi Freedom. For these opportunities to gain firsthand conversancy
with many of the tactics, techniques, and procedures that figured centrally in the
Iraqi Freedom air offensive described in the chapters that follow, I am grateful
to Lt. Gen. Glen Moorhead (Ret.), former commander of 16th Air Force; and
Maj. Gen. Mike Worden (Ret.), then commander of the 31st Fighter Wing, U.S.
Air Forces in Europe; Air Chief Marshal Stirrup; General North; Vice Admiral
Kilcline, then commander, Naval Air Forces; General Corley; and Air Marshal
Mark Binskin, chief of air force, RAAF.
Finally, I thank Barry Watts at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments and my RAND colleagues Nora Bensahel, Paul Davis, James Dobbins, David Johnson, and Karl Mueller for their helpful suggestions regarding

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xix

all or parts of an earlier version of this book. I am additionally indebted to

Harun Dogo, a doctoral candidate at the Pardee RAND Graduate School of
Public Policy, for his outstanding and well-targeted research support. Finally, I
owe a special note of thanks to my able editor, Mindy Conner, for her keen eye
and deft touch in improving my use of words at every chance. As always, any
remaining errors of fact or interpretation, sins of omission, or other failings in
the pages that follow are mine alone.

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