Negative Illusions: Conceptual Clarification and Psychological Evidence concerning False Consciousness Author(s): John T.

Jost Reviewed work(s): Source: Political Psychology, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Jun., 1995), pp. 397-424 Published by: International Society of Political Psychology Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3791837 . Accessed: 15/09/2012 14:03
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Vol. 16, No. 2, 1995 PoliticalPsychology,

and Clarification Illusions: Conceptual Negative False Evidence Concerning Psychological Consciousness
JohnT. Jost ofPsychology Department Yale University New Haven, CT 06520-8205 a historical and is reviewed Theconcept from perspective offalseconsciousness in and inlight theoretical advances socialist recent discussed feminist political of as theholding that are is defined False consciousness offalsebeliefs philosophy. to thedisadvanand which contribute to one's social interest thereby contrary It is arguedthat considerable psychologioftheselfor thegroup. taged position and a exists that consciousness cal evidence of thorough understanding forfalse on theproblem severallinesofresearch thephenomenon ofpolitical integrates areproposed: (1) Failureto offalseconsciousness acquiescence.Six basic types and disadvantage, (2) Fatalism,(3) Justification perceiveinjustice of social with and theoppressor, roles,(4) False attribution of blame,(5) Identification is to consciousness to change.Because theconcept (6) Resistance false likely of severaltheoretical and metharousesuspicion because of itsMarxianorigins, tothescientific consciousness are raisedand study offalse odologicalobjections addressed.
false KEY WORDS: ideology, consciousness, system justification, political psychology, political Marxism feminism, analytical acquiescence, consciousness-raising, group

when I attribute illusions tofeatures both Is there notan inconsistency ofthe situation and to the cognitive apparatusof the subject?In theMarxist is central, butincognitive classposition the ofideologies theory psychology stressis laid on theinternal mechanism psychic of thesubject,and so it seemstrange to seek in thelatter micro-foundations for the might former. is an artificial For illusions to occurboththe This,however, opposition. must situation and theinternal comeinto external processing play. -J. Elster(1982, p. 137)
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0162-895X? 1995 International Societyof Political Psychology MA 02142, USA, and 108 CowleyRoad, Oxford, Published 238 Main Street, OX4 IJF,UK. Cambridge, by BlackwellPublishers,

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The purpose ofthis theconcept offalseconsciousness and paperis todefine to review somepsychological foritsoperation. evidence The evidence is orgaofa preliminary for offalseconsciousness. nizedin terms thestudy It taxonomy is a neglected is suggested thatfalse consciousness but potentially important unrelated drawing together topicforsocial andpolitical psychology, previously linesof work on theproblem ofpolitical MostMarxian contribuacquiescence. of psychology tionsto the study have tended to be negative in form, thatis, ofparadigmatic critical sciencewithout datafor offering psychological empirical an alternative theoretical (Billig, 1982; Brown,1974; Plon, 1974; perspective Sampson, 1983; Wexler,1983), and the same can be said of mostfeminist ofmainstream & Marecek,1988; (Fine, 1992;Hare-Mustin critiques psychology contributions are quiteuseful,my Riger,1992). Whilemanyof thesecritical of falseconsciousness seeksalso to highlight thepositive contributions analysis canmake when itis informed that an empirical andfeminist psychology byMarxian 'Marxian'social theory is defined as thatwhichis influenced social theory. by themethod and content of Marx's workand theworkof his followers without tothetheory orpractice oforthodox itreflects, in Marxism; necessarily adhering to Marxism" other words,"a non-dogmatic 1986, (Roemer, 2). approach p. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT OF FALSE CONSCIOUSNESS WhileMarxandEngels(1846) wrote abouttheproblem offalse informally consciousness in their work on did not do much to early ideology, they developit The was used to describe the effects of 1982; Wood, 1988). (Lewy, concept domination. It was that institutional control over ideological suggested through andeconomic dominant in media,culture, education, religion, systems, groups of were ideas which serve to of society capable spreading justify inequalities status andpower a recent A consequence of (see Carragee, discussion). 1993,for this is that those ideas which favor dominant tend to in hypothesis groups prevail Marx and wrote that "The class which has the Thus, society. Engels (1846) meansofmaterial atitsdisposal, hascontrol atthesametime overthe production meansof mental on this is view, alwayssubject production" (p. 64). Cognition, to large-scale and political forces suchas thedomination of social, economic, some groups others The consciousness of disad(cf. Shaw, 1989). by political tobe "false"tosomedegree, that of is, reflective vantaged peopleswas theorized thedominant interests rather than their own interests. Marx and group's Engels made up forthemselves false arguedthatin history people "have constantly aboutthemselves, aboutwhatthey areand whatthey to be," conceptions ought and thecall was soundedto "liberate themfrom thechimeras, the ideas, the the under the of which are dogmas, imaginary beings yoke they pining away" (1846, p. 37). At thesametime, Marx'slater viewsmayhavebeentoooptimishowever,

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ofoppressed andtakeaction ticabouttheabilities the peopletorecognize against that subordinate sourcesof their in By predicting oppression. groups society would soon recognizethe illegitimacy of theirsubordination and rise up to Marxmayhaveunderestimated theextent towhich overthrow thesystem, socialmechanisms allow to to which people adapt politicalsystems psychological the of thwart their owninterests. "false consciousness" was develThus, concept scholars to explain, in part, oped morefully onlylater by socialist seeking why was notforthcoming revolution 1971;Lukaics, 1971; (see Gabel, 1975;Gramsci, Marcuse,1964; Meyerson, 1991). offalseconsciousness In recent thestudy has beenrevitalized years, bythe fruits of conceptual and feminist suchas analysis theory. Analytic philosophers Cohen (1978), Eagleton(1991), Elster(1985), Miller(1984), Roemer(1986), Wood (1988), and manyothers have appliedtheir to theconconceptual rigor of which had beencriticized fortheir lackofprecision formerly cepts Marxism, andunfalsifiability Marxian ofideology accounts and (Lewy,1982).As a result, falseconsciousness have attained new standards of clarity and utility in recent work (Cunningham, 1987; Eagleton, 1991; Meyerson,1991; philosophical also makesexplicit connections to socioWood, 1988). The analytical approach such as biased or heuristical logical and psychological phenomena thinking, defection in theprisoner's dilemma and theexpression of "class consituation, sciousness"(see Elster,1982, 1985; Levine,Sober,& Wright, 1992; Wright, a philosophical basisfor thesocial-psychological offalse 1985),providing study consciousness. It is argued that "Marxism without subshould, embarrassment, to theconventional standards of social scienceand analytical ject itself philosoof "analytical Marxphy"(Levineet al., 1992,p. 5). The guiding assumptions derivedfrom Marx's method shouldbe subjectedto ism," thatpropositions confrontation andthat should makereference to empirical complete explanations of individual states actors the 1985;Roemer, (Elster, 1986),bring psychological workof Marxcloserto contemporary social and political than ever psychology before. Feminist scholars haveinvoked falseconsciousness in order to understand theoretical and practical thepsychological effects of rape, problems concerning domestic andpornography. In particular, have to incest, violence, they attempted for victims ofsexualandphysical abusetoterminate explain whyitis so difficult abusiverelationships and to avoidblaming fortheabuse (Collins, themselves as a group seemrelatively 1991;Fine, 1992;MacKinnon, 1989)andwhywomen unaware of their status as an oppressed 1982; Dworkin, 1983; group(Crosby, are socializedto reject their Gurin,1985). The waysin which girlsand women own "natural" to events sexism and inequality and to adopt responses involving instead thenorms of a patriarchal havebecomeresearch society topicsforfeministsocial science(Brown& Gilligan,1992). A primary of goal feminist politics,therefore, is to awaken(or reawaken) a senseof self-respect andan awareness of injustice, harmful beliefslearnedthrough sexist thereby overriding

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It has evenbeenargued socialization that feminist theory distinguishes practices. from Marxism a on itself by placing higher premium theroleof consciousnesshavebeen identiissuesof consciousness (MacKinnon,1989),although raising to Western Marxist since at least World WarI (Gottlieb, fiedas central theory and of recent socialist feminist In has 1992). any case, merging viewpoints in renewed to thesocial-psychological of resulted attention aspects oppression mostespecially theways in whichvictims and domination, can be made "to in their invest own unhappiness" (Eagleton,1991,p. xiii). harks backto earlier In someways,thisendeavor literatures psychological withtheaggressor" on "identification 1960; Freud,1946), "self(Bettelheim, of oppressed hatred" amongmembers groups(Allport,1954a; Lewin, 1941; Sarnoff, Frenkel-Brunswik, 1951),and the"authoritarian (Adorno, personality" of psychoanalytic & Sanford, influence Levinson, 1950). Because of thestrong in the 1940s and 1950s (McGuire,1993), thesephenomena wereoften theory in terms of deep-seated and motivational conflicts, conceptualized personality social and cognitive rather than"normal" to material and ideological responses domination & Banaji, 1994). As a result, thestudy of falseconscious(see Jost nessrarely went theapplication ofFreudian suchas represmechanisms, beyond to social and political situations sion, denial,and projection, (Pochoda, 1978). FALSE CONSCIOUSNESS DEFINED of falseconsciousness The concept in thepresent context helpsto identify inaccurate beliefs ofsubordinates which serve toperpetuate their social,economic, or sexual domination 1987; Eagleton,1991; Elster,1982; (Cunningham, is "false" when it servesto perpetuate MacKinnon,1989). A consciousness of a subordinate inequality by leadingmembers groupto believethat theyare oftheir orincapable oftaking action thecauses inferior, deserving plight, against oftheir subordination. Atthemost refers tothe level,falseconsciousness general of falsebeliefsthatsustain one's own oppression" "harbouring (Cunningham, as we shallsee, might includedenying that 1987, p. 255). Specificexamples, or disadvantage thatsocial changeis impossible or occurs,believing injustice falseattributions about thecausesofpolitical and undesirable, making suffering, thenorms ofone's oppressor. The clearest cases offalseconsciousness adopting mustsatisfy, two independent criteria observation, through (Cunempirical must first ofall be "false"inthe 1987;Meyerson, 1991):(i) The belief ningham, senseofbeingcontrary to fact.(ii) Secondly, it must be "false" epistemological in thesense of failing to reflect social interests. thetwo one's genuine Taking we define falseconsciousness as theholding together, components offalse or inaccuratebeliefsthatare contrary to one's own social interest and which tothemaintenance contribute thereby ofthedisadvantaged position oftheselfor thegroup.

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of epistemological and (in)conOf course,thetwodimensions (in)validity are in principle It is possible, with social interest objective orthogonal. gruence are helpful in terms of one's forexample,forone to possess falsebeliefsthat social function some other & Brown, mental healthor by serving (see Taylor thesehavebeendubbed"positive illusions" 1988,fora review); 1989), (Taylor, with thesocially andpolitically harmful beliefs andthey areto be contrasted we toholdtrue itis at leastlogically beliefs review here.Likewise, (butsee possible as misrepresentation), of knowledge" and McGuire,1989, fora "tragic theory to one's bestinterests, theholding as in of thesebeliefs contrary maybe either realism"(Alloy & Abramson, the case of "depressive 1979), or, undermore in accord withone's personaland social interests. fortunate circumstances, of truebeliefsthatare congruent to theholding with Lukaics (1971) referred consciousness" of thelowerclass, and he as the"ascribed objectiveinterests consciousness to the whole of societyit becomes arguedthat:"By relating andfeelings which menwouldhavein a particular thethoughts possibleto infer situation if theywereable to assess bothit and theinterests from it" arising (p. 51). with falseconsciousness Beliefsassociated ofas socialand maybe thought Like the cognitive heuristics documented politicalheuristics. by Kahneman. and Ross (1980), they Slovic, and Tversky (1982) and Nisbett maybe basedon orprinciples, areoften useful extended contexts of yetthey beyond assumptions andresult injudgments orbehaviors which arecostly totheindividual and utility to society. This is notto say that all instances of falseconsciousness originate from of truth," a "kernel "normal" onlythat cognitive processes maybe implicatedin the ofoppressive socialrelations & Banaji, 1994). (see Jost justification for It has beenargued, that "theeffective dissemination ofideasis only example, that[they]...do havea sufficient of possible...totheextent degree effectiveness bothin rendering social reality in and it for within intelligible guiding practice them to be apparently In the case of socio1972, 12). acceptable" (Mepham, p. heuristics associated with falseconsciousness, thecostsare notnecespolitical measured outcomes such as rationality sarily (Nisbett against positive cognitive & Ross, 1980;cf. Abelson,1976),although be (Elster, 1982, 1985), they might but againstpositivesocial and political outcomes like theachievement of life of opportunity, freedom from of satisfaction, equality oppression, recognition and in social False consciousness, injustice, participation progressive change. by leads to thedevelopment of "needswhich contrast, toil,aggressiveperpetuate and injustice" ness, misery, (Marcuse,1964,p. 5). The central thesisof thispaperis that there existsa considerable already amountof scientific evidenceforthe proposition thatpeople will hold false beliefswhichjustify theirown subordination, thisevidenceis not although as of a false consciousness With ordinarily recognized supportive approach. very fewexceptions Jost & (Billig, 1976, 1982;Fine, 1979; Banaji, 1994;Kluegel& & McGraw,1986), social and political have Smith,1986; Tyler psychologists

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havenotshiedaway thephenomenon they altogether, although certainly ignored of from the neighboring alia, Allport, 1954b; Kinder& (inter topic ideology Sniderman & TetMcGuire, 1993; 1988; Sears, 1985; Lane, 1962; Rosenberg, of The lock, 1986a). (cf. Edelman,1960) also acquiescence concept political in Marxian accounts of andfalseconsciousness role a ideology plays significant insofar as the failure to participate in & McGraw, 1986), (Billig, 1982; Tyler in socialcognition. It is hopedthat to errors actionmaybe linked collective by offalseconsciousness, itwillbe possible theconcept to andextending clarifying and to tothesocialandcognitive basesofpolitical attend acquiescence developa of falsebeliefsystems account of thecauses and consequences that theoretical sustain social oppression. A PRELIMINARY TAXONOMY FOR THE STUDY OF FALSE CONSCIOUSNESS There are manyways in whichone might to classifydifferent attempt No rigorous or consensual of falseconsciousness. varieties exists for taxonomy forfalseconsciousness, thetypesof beliefswhichqualify and writings on the andincomplete. havetended to be rather (1987) piecemeal Cunningham subject offalseconsciousness, twomaintypes andthe fatalism false identificasuggests tion of blame. While theseseem to satisfy the definitional criteria forfalse A morecomplete consciousness, theyare notlikelyto be exhaustive. picture offailureto perceiveinjustice and emerges by addingto thesethecategories of social roles and statuses; withthe justification disadvantage; identification and resistance to change. Beliefsof thesetypes,it is argued,are oppressor; for their harmful insofar as they increase thepossibility of adherents, politically to otherwise conditions or circumstances. Of course, acquiescence unacceptable these tobe mutually arenotmeant inpractice. exclusive types Peopleoften deny thatan injustice occurs,and thismaymakethemmorelikelyto blamethemselvesorto believethat is undesirable, andso on. Nevertheless, itis useprotest fultodistinguish between thedifferent ofillusory beliefs that arecapableof types constructive nowto a brief review ofthepsychostifling change.I turn political foreach type. logicalevidence Failureto perceiveinjusticeand disadvantage Failuretoperceiveinjustice. A growing on beliefs about bodyof research distributive andprocedural that justiceleadsto theconclusion peoplefrequently situations tobe fair orjust,evenwhen there aregoodreasons tosuppose perceive that suchsituations arenot(Crosby, 1982;Deutsch,1985;Fine, 1979;Jennings, 1991; Lerner,1980; Lind & Tyler,1988; Major, 1994; Martin,1986; Tyler, citeseemto support Elster's that 1990). The dataresearchers (1982) hypothesis

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is "a tendency oftheoppressed andexploited classesin a society there to believe in thejusticeof thesocial order that them" oppresses (p. 131). Almostsurely, beliefs of thistype andgroup interests wouldviolate to personal bycontributing evenin thefaceof widespread injustice. political acquiescence Much of theevidence that has been colinjustice peopleavoidperceiving is a motivation lectedby Lerner that there to believe (1980), who hypothesizes thattheworldis a just place, since it is onlyin such a worldthatone's own control. outcomes aresafeor under to maintain If, indeed, peoplearemotivated the illusionthattheworldis just, thenit is an illusion whichcomes at some and thegroup.For instance, cost to theindividual thebeliefin a just political worldmaylead victims of injustice to minimize theextent of thevictimization and to blamethemselves forit (Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Miller& Porter, 1983). People who score highon the "just worldscale" have been foundto protect social institutions and politicalleaders(believing, forexample,that existing Nixonwas less guilty of theWatergate crimes thandid control groups)and to ofunderprivileged members (Rubin& Peplau,1975).The belief derogate groups in a justworld has beenfound tocorrelate with negatively subjects' self-reported in socialandpolitical activism andwith ofsocial participation globalself-ratings and political involvement (Rubin& Peplau,1973).Furnham (1985) has reported that whites in SouthAfrica are more to believein a justworldthan white likely inGreat that of Britain, equivalents are, suggesting perhaps perceptions injustice under somecircumstances, "false"in thesenseof beingunresponsive to reality: of a societythatis just worldbeliefswere higherthanusual in the context infamous foritsracialinjustice. andcolleagues havesought tounderstand Tyler why peoplemaintain loyalty to legalandpolitical institutions evenwhen suchinstitutions unfavorable produce outcomes for them & McGraw, 1988;Tyler, (Lind& Tyler, 1990;Tyler 1986).It has been found that are satisfied with as repeatedly people procedural systems as are with an to in the even long they provided opportunityparticipate process, if their has no effect overrelevant outcomes and even if theoutparticipation comes are negative on the (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1990). A vastliterature "illusionof control" to a similar conclusion: random outcomes points maybe as chosen or so as the individual feels that he or she controlled, experienced long some in the & (however irrelevant) played part determining process(see Taylor in and of itself is not harmful to Brown,1988). Of course,institutional loyalty theindividual or thesocialgroup; theeffective (and improvement) organization of social andpolitical lifemayrequire somedegree of allegiance to theexisting a sense of mistrust has beenidenti1990). Nevertheless, system (Tyler, political fiedas essential to group and the achievement ofprogresconsciousness-raising sive socialchange(Gurin, Piven & 1985; Cloward,1977;Shingles, 1981).Tyler andMcGraw(1986) argue that thetendency tofocus on procedural convincingly rather than outcome issuesmaybe seenas a type offalseconsciousness because itleadstopolitical eveninthefaceofinjustice. that: acquiescence Theyconclude

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Jost In particular, citizens focus justiceare dysfunctional. ...people's viewsaboutprocedural to present evidencewhen to whichtheyhave an opportunity heavilyupon the extent totheextent towhich haveactually attention butthey authorities, they paylittle evaluating situation are led tofocusuponaspectsoftheir influenced decisions...the disadvantaged a sense of injustice in inducing thatare ineffective and, hence,lead to politicalquiescence. (p. 126, emphasis added)

ifthey outcomes can It seems,therefore, that peoplemayacceptunsatisfactory used to determine them that theprocedure is be madeto believe(evenfalsely) ofpaydifferentials between menand In assessing thefairness fair or legitimate. women attend more tothelegitimacy ithasbeenfound that for women, example, thanto the legitimacy of the payment of procedures thatdetermine payment outcomes themselves (Major, 1994). of injustice their One way in whichvictims mayfailto perceive present of even greater as unjustis by comparing themto past situations situations rather than or intergroup that is, bymaking interpersonal injustice, intrapersonal thatwomen (Major, 1994). It has also been demonstrated justicecomparisons tend their women andavoidcomparing to compare them wagesto thoseofother withthe wages of men (Crosby,1982; Major, 1994). The result of failing to ofone's circumstances is a depressed theinjustice senseofentitlement. perceive in theabsenceof information and Gagnon(1984) found that Major,McFarlin, topaythemselves aboutwhat others werebeing tended 61% ofwhat paidwomen of work.In a follow-up forthesameamount menpaid themselves experiment, menand womenwereoffered and askedto workforas longas equal payment womenworked morethana third theydeemedappropriate; longerand made fewer mistakes. concludes from these results and others (1994, 309) Major p. that of is it an "important social that is often as consequence inequality appraised is and therefore to be Jost & (cf. legitimate" likely perpetuated Banaji, 1994). Failuretoperceive Just as peoplesometimes failto perceive disadvantage. are materially comthey mayalso failto realizethatthey injustices, deprived to some absolute or relative standard Guimond & Dube1982; pared (Crosby, Simard,1983;Gurin,1985;Janoff-Bulman, 1992;Kluegel& Smith, 1986; Ma& & LaSmith, 1994; 1994; jor, Spears, Oyen, Taylor, Wright, Moghaddam, that exists breed a sort of contentment londe,1990). Denying disadvantage may with circumstances that otherwise seemintolerable. Thisphenomenon has might beentermed contentment" It has been 1982;Major,1994). "paradoxical (Crosby, forexample, that whilemostwivesadmit to performing farmorehousefound, workandchildcare than their husbands when both hold ofthe (even jobs outside satisfaction with the & home),they (Biernat Wortprofess unequalarrangement has that women's tolerance of inthe man,1991).Major(1994) argued inequality division of laborstemsfrom a diminished senseof personal entitlement and a of norms societal women's status. (partial)acceptance justifying disadvantaged considerable evidence forthenotion Crosbyand colleagueshaveobtained that evenwhenpeopleperceive their tobe a target ofdiscrimination, group they

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themselves aredisadvantaged stilldenythat Pufall, 1982; Crosby, (Crosby, they hasbeenshown tohold O'Connell,& Whalen,1989).Thisphenomenon Snyder, et active lesbians intheworkplace for women 1982),politically (Crosby (Crosby, in Quebec (Guimond& Dubd-Simard, 1983), and al., 1989), Francophones et al. et al., 1990). Crosby Haitianand SouthAsian womenin Canada (Taylor (1989) concludethat:
theneed forsocial reform ...we mustnotmeasure by how upsetpeoplefeelwiththeir those whoare in life.KarlMarxwas right about situations false consciousness: personal sense of their owndisadvanhave a well-developed or disadvantaged rarely oppressed added) tage. (p. 94, emphasis

of motivational or cogniis a function thedenialof disadvantage Whether for effective et al., 1990),ithasthepotential tivebiasesorboth(Taylor delaying then thatthey are disadvantaged, If people do notrecognize politicalprotest. aimedat eliminating to engagein political activities areextremely unlikely they et al., 1989; Major, 1994). thedisadvantage (Crosby that themselves aredisadvantaged, will Even ifpeoplerecognize they they unlessthey thesource of their that nottakeactionagainst disadvantage perceive of relative & Dubetheir entire social groupis in a state (Guimond deprivation & Mann,1987).In a particularly dramatic demonstration, Simard,1983;Walker in Australia were of group workers amongunemployed deprivation perceptions found withan orientation to engagein social protest, to correlate significantly to correlate whileperceptions of individual werefound deprivation onlywith & Mann,1987).Therearemany stress reasons, (Walker self-reported symptoms status of their however, whypeople woulddenythedisadvantaged group.Acforexample, to social identity low-status often theory, cording groups compensocial identity or reinterpreting sate foran inferior status by ignoring objective differences and ignore "fabricate 1986),just as individuals (Tajfel& Turner, socialreality" in order a positive topreserve (Goethals, 1986). While self-image or such assessments individual collective self-esteem in theshort mayprotect couldbe sociallyor politically in thelongrunifthey disastrous stifle run,they at or It be social for that the use attempts personal change. may argued, example, of "downward social comparison" et results in al., 1983) (Taylor principles a constant mechanism for all but the most political by providing complacency to avoidperceiving themselves as disadvantaged. severely deprived Fatalism Protest is futile.The beliefthateffective social organization is futile or amounts to a of the current impossible resigned acceptance politicalsystem Parkin that "accommodation 1987). For example, (1971) writes (Cunningham, to material or deprivation betokens a kindof fatalistic insecurity pessimism"

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ofwhich is almost undoubtedly acquiescence. consequence (p. 90), thepolitical ifonebelieves that is impossible. It one willnotattempt change change Certainly socialgroups that aremost is greatest that hasbeenshown among apathy political & Scheepers, 1991). Bagseverely (Shingles,1981; Van Snippenburg deprived amongunemployed politicalfatalism guley(1992) has arguedthatincreasing in Britain in the 1980s was relatedto historical workers changessuch as a to socialprotest anda lessening of decreasein thegovernment's responsiveness movement within theworkers' resources and cultural (see also organizational data reported Piven & Cloward,1977). Survey by Kluegel and Smith(1986) now perceivequalitative social of U.S. respondents indicatethata majority impossible. changeto be virtually of "fatalistic to thephenomenon have referred pessimism" Psychologists as "learned from helplessness" (Seligman,1975),although resulting deprivation has usuallybeen seen as a purely the latter mechanism, cognitive-biological it is to its social or politicalcontext.Nevertheless, without much attention of apathy, modelto feelings helplessness passivity, possibleto applythelearned of sexualandphysical assault(Peterson victims & Seligman, andfutility among that beliefs about 1983;Strube, 1988).To theextent helplessness maybe seenas of victimization, a kindof false a cause as well as an effect they mayrepresent in order to the abuse and winhis or to the victim consciousness taught prolong herresignation. Protest is embarrassing. The phenomenon ofpluralistic (Miller ignorance & McFarland,1991; Miller& Prentice, 1994; Noelle-Neumann, 1984) may be thought ofas a kindoffalseconsciousness, becauseitinvolves an reasonably illusionwhichmay proveto be politically harmful. to Miller and According McFarland are important cases of pluralistic whichare (1991), there ignorance New Clothes: likethestory of theEmperor's each individual doubts suppresses situation he or she has aboutthepresent and simultaneously others' interprets silenceas genuine satisfaction. an undesirable ofaffairs state Consequently, may is embarrassed be perpetuated becauseeach group member or afraid to voicehis or herown dissatisfaction, it is actually eventhough shared by thegroupas a whole. It has been shownthat inaccurate of social norms haveled perceptions entire for to the use of to communities, example, prohibit alcohol, engagein racial segregation, excessivealcohol use, to endorse and to expressreligious devotion thesebehaviors werefavored of the longafter privately by a majority residents Miller & for a Pluralistic Prentice, 1994, (see review). ignorance of as a form of false consciousness; because of a distorted may be thought of socialreality, dissatisfied members arerendered understanding group incapable of collectiveorganization, and politicalacquiescenceresults.Miller and McFarland (1991) write:
norms. People will tolerate unjust social conditions, acquiesce to flawed decisions, and

At thegroup can lead to theperpetuation of unpopular social level,pluralistic ignorance

of False Consciousness Psychology neededreforms all becausethey assumethemajority oftheir desist peers advocating from withthem and believethat other than couldbe gained embarrassment, nothing, disagree true beliefs.(pp. 304-305, emphasis their added). by revealing

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forovercoming ignorance pluralistic theyadvocateone strategy Interestingly, andfeminist scholars haveoffered for falseconsciousMarxian that overcoming of their ness in general:"providing people withevidenceof thecommonness the of silence and 307). raising group breaking conspiracy By (p. problems" it maybe possibletoeliminate thefalsebelief that socialchange consciousness, becauseit is counternormative. is impossible intheir of PivenandCloward is exhausting. Protest (1977) havenoted study of 20th-century U.S.A. thateven themost movements thefourmajorprotest of the strain to the status successful collapse from quo eventually challenges achieve once some the The authors that success, suggest organizations protest. tendsto subside,leavingthe whichdrovethe movement mass mobilization to continue to for press social change.The organizaorganization's leadership in tends to itself with once tional preoccupy self-preservation, leadership, place, for to traditional elite institutions and support, while funding eventually turning and Piven Cloward that the movement's argue political acquiblunting militancy. tothose is so costly andwhatever escenceis therulebecausedissenting involved, False consciousness do occurare alwaysshort-lived. disruptions playsa promirolein their write that whose in nent They story. "People onlypossiblerecourse is beliefs and rituals laid their to the down rulers do by ordinarily struggle defy that not"(p. 2). The belief sustained socialprotest is impossible counts as surely a case of falseconsciousness, as it clearly servestheinterests of thedominant and thwarts theinterests of thedominated. of social roles Justification one ofthemainforms that of socialconsciousness (1978) writes McMurtry to which be use involves the that "Whatever rank is may put ideological premise heldbyindividuals inthesocialorder their intrinsic worth." Beliefs of represents thistypeserveto justify of inequality and to convince systems disadvantaged and individuals that are either oftheir of groups they deserving placeorincapable other rank Jost & 1987; any (Cunningham, occupying Banaji, 1994). At the levelof analysis, thismeansthat willform interpersonal perceivers impressions aboutothers which areconsonant with thepositions orrolesthey occupy;social interaction therefore tends toreflect andreproduce & existing inequalities (Athay At the will developto Darley,1985). grouplevel, thismeansthatstereotypes and perpetuate status andpowerdifferences between social explain,legitimate, In either one the false that case, groups. develops impression peoplesucceedor failsolelybecauseof inherent characteristics aboutthemselves. The established to favor which internal attributes tendency psychological explanations emphasize

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for of socialactors their external has been than, (rather circumstances) example, calledthe"norm of internality," and ithas beenimplicated in practices of social and themaintenance of the status evaluation quo (Beauvois& Dubois, 1988; & Ross, 1980). Ichheiser, 1970; Nisbett Person as justification. A number of studies havedemonstrated perception that abouttheattributes oftheselfandothers on the peoplewilldrawinferences basis of information aboutstatus or wealth & Bayless,1986;Darley (Cherulnik & Gross, 1983; Dittmar, 1992). For example,Darleyand Gross(1983) found thatpeople judged a child's intellectual abilitiesto be higher whenshe was in a middle-class environment thanwhen she was portrayed in a portrayed and thisdifference was magnified environment, working-class by presenting withadditional whichsubjects information, nondiagnostic subjects presumably used to justify theirbiased impressions (cf. Yzerbyt, Schadron,Leyens, & Dittmar that individuals were Rocher,1994). Similarly, (1992) reported wealthy to be moreintelligent than andthiswas found to be perceived poorindividuals, trueforpoorperceivers as well as wealthy The evidence was interperceivers. as supporting a "dominant modelof impression-formation as preted ideology" a "similarity-based" to accept seemed model,becausethepoorer against subjects social beliefs thematerial successof others. justifying Just as status andwealth areoften usedas cues inperson so too perception, are socialrolesthat Forinstance, and Steinmetz Ross, Amabile, targets occupy. that to subjects ran(1977) found greater knowledge peopleattributed assigned to theroleof "Questioner" than to subjects to the role of "Condomly assigned testant" in a mockgameof "Jeopardy." Thiswas due to thefact that contestants butnotquestioners, becauseoftherequirements oftheir socialroles,wereforced to expressthelimitations of their in response to difficult knowledge questions taketheir to indicate a "social-perception posed to them.The authors findings conclude that theextent towhich bias,"andthey people"areapttounderestimate of the attributes reflect the of seemingly positive powerful simply advantages social control" attributes on the basis of status or 494). (p. Inferring personal social roleis likely to engender of theexisting socialorder, whether acceptance or notthat order is worth The belief that certain roles preserving. peopleoccupy in society because theyare naturally suitedforthemcontributes a misleading senseof legitimacy and inevitability to thesystem & Pratto, (cf. Sidanius 1993). as and Jost reviewed theresearch Stereotyping justification. Banaji (1994) literature on stereotyping from a falseconsciousness andfound conperspective siderable for the notion that and subsupport advantaged disadvantaged groups scribeto stereotypic beliefs aboutthemselves in sucha way that their status or role seemsjustifiable or appropriate. This approach to helps explain,among other thesame gender as men things, whywomenpossesslargely stereotypes and 1986) to similarracial stereotypes as do (Basow, whyblacks subscribe whites mechanisms ofsocialinfluence (Dovidio& Gaertner, 1986).The specific

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dominant cometobe shared which bytherest groups serving stereotypes through future research. for of society opportunities represent as social rationalization, of stereotyping demonstration In an experimental of "child thata fictional and Hurst(1990) reported Hoffman groupcomprised a group than of raisers" was judgedto be morepatient, kind,andunderstanding self-confident and forceful. The authors to be who were workers," judged "city ofjustifying thestatus functions serveideological arguedthatsuchstereotypes in an to rationalin that and "originate attempt particular stereotypes quo gender deemednecesto each sex those of laborbyattributing ize thedivision qualities functions" that oftheassigned for (pp. 206-207). To theextent sary performance and in role-consistent then others themselves they may ways, peoplestereotype forms of inequality andexploitation believefalsely that arejustifiable particular Jost & 1994). (see Banaji, of blame False attribution of falseblame,identified The analysis (1987) as a case of by Cunningham well-suited forsocial psychological is particularly false consciousness, study, thecauses of events, in other because it deals withhowpeopleidentify words, in their socialandphysical makeattributions foroccurrences environhowthey ment.The attribution of blameand responsibility has beena particularly active the link to false area of psychological consciousness has not research, although thereare severalways in whichfalse blame can been made. Nevertheless, of oppression If thevictims can be madeto blamethemoppression. perpetuate will then never think to challenge thesystem. selves fortheir misfortune, they from ofthedominant, is that The next bestthing, thestandpoint thesubordinated or someoneelse and therefore failto attach any groupswill blameeach other the most. Piven and Cloward(1977) writethat blame to thosewho benefit whenpeople suffer...hardships, "Ordinarily, theyblame God, or theyblame In is themselves" either it that and case, unlikely (p. 12). disadvantaged groups will engagein activities to eliminate thesourcesof their disadvanindividuals tage. As we have seen, Lerner (1980) arguesthat Self-blame. people are motito a "beliefin a just world"in whichpeople"getwhatthey vatedto subscribe over deserve,"for it is only in such a worldthatpeople can have control The theory has beenappliedto thephenomenon of self-blame outcomes. among victims ofviolence that 1983).Research (Miller& Porter, suggests peoplewould to acceptresponsibility fortrauma rather thanacknowledge thatsome prefer eventsare beyond their control 1992; Lerner,1980; (Janoff-Bulman, personal Miller& Porter, of sexualandphysical assaultdo not 1983).Even whenvictims attribute the self-blame," engagein general"characterological theyfrequently

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ownspecific behaviors to theevent or events victimization to their (Janoffprior workers has also Bulman,1992). Evidenceof self-blame amongunemployed been documented (Breakwell,1986; Guimond,Begin, & Palmer,1989). In self-blame tohavevery as well maybe expected negative psychological general, foroppressed and individuals. as political consequences groups can be madetoblamethewrong False other blame.Ifdisadvantaged groups source oftheir then themost useful misfortune, they mayfailtoidentify political solutions availableto them. Forinstance, racist or sexist attributions amongthe classes mayserveto distract themfrom collective action working meaningful 1987; Lipset,1960; Okami,1992; Willhelm, 1980). Social psy(Cunningham, tothis as "scape-goating" havereferred 1954a). chologists phenomenon (Allport, that "Male workers think that women's incur(1987, p. 254) writes Cunningham sion intotraditionally male-dominated workis therootcause ofjob insecurity. offalseconsciousness insofar as thebelief This,too,is an instance helpstokeep thelabour force divided." Consistent with thepossibility offalseconsciousness, and field evidencethatlow-status Tajfel (1978) has collectedexperimental tocompete with aremore oneanother than with groups likely high-status groups. abouttherelationship between theEnglishand Long ago, Marx (1869) wrote Irishworking classes that:
The average worker hates theIrish as a competitor wholowers hiswagesandlevel English and religious towards him.He appearsto himin ofliving.He feelsnational antagonism much thesamelight as theblackslavesappear tothepoorwhites intheSouthern States of North America. This antagonism between theproletarians ofEngland is artificially cultivatedand maintained It knowsthatin thisantagonism lies thereal by thebourgeoisie. itspower.(p. 196) secret ofmaintaining

The conspiratorial of remarks such as thesehave oftensounded implications who to social scientists doubt the existence of a "rulingclass." implausible it is important to realizethat thespreading of falseblameand other However, offalseconsciousness neednotbe a conscious ordeliberate on the types strategy of dominant or individuals It 1991; Elster, 1982). may part groups (Eagleton, rather theusualavenues of socialinfluence each happen unintentionally through timepowerful sourcesexpresstheinterests, and abilities that are perceptions, derived from their socialroles(cf. Ross, Amabile, & Steinmetz, Gramsci 1977). of the"'spontaneous' consent (1971), forexample,writes givenby thegreat massesof thepopulation to thegeneral direction on social lifeby the imposed dominant fundamental and that "this consent is 'historically' group" proposes caused by theprestige which the dominant (and consequent confidence) group sources are paid moreattention than enjoys"(p. 12). Because powerful powerless sources(Fiske, 1993),becausethey are moreskilled at manipulating social interactions & and because are more in (Athay Darley,1985), they persuasive it should not too be that ideas the (McGuire,1985), general surprising reflecting

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and groupsare widespread, individuals even amongthe of powerful interests powerless. withthe oppressor Identification that deMason (1971) suggests Psychological dependence. "psychological the relations of domination and subordination. from pendence"oftenresults and anthropological Based upona reviewof thehistorical data,Mason argues others to protect them from internal convince thatdominant groupsfrequently Thisis achieved threats totheir andexternal byfostering supremacy. dependence theexistence ofrulers a sensethat society requires creating amongsubordinates, to protect and theruled;in thisway,subjects maybe led unwittingly systems whichplace themat a disadvantage (cf. Sidanius,1993). Mason (1971) even willnot"feelsecure subordinates unless aregrouped claimsthat in they together whichthey have a recognized to clans or castesor guilds,within part play,a known in the and to fulfil" known hierarchy obligations (p. 10). Thus, position for come to their rulers and direction (cf. dependupon purpose people may Bettelheim, 1960; Lifton, 1961; Schein,1956). A further of social andpolitical is provided stepin theprocess dependence a dissonance of the effect of initiation on rites commitment by cognitive analysis It is theorized that tojustify (see Cialdini,1988, fora review). peopleattempt in or their activities rather than by increasing participation painful humiliating their commitment to the or institution. most the horrific Thus, decreasing group thehighest of loyalty anddependence (Brickman, systems mayproduce degrees has been appliedto victims of abusiverelationships in an 1987). This analysis effort to understand their continued commitment to their abusers (Strube, 1988). self-commitment on thebasisofabusemaybe one among several Thus,inferring of falsebeliefs in thedecision involved to stayin an abusiverelationship. types the to wisdomin thefieldof for Preference outgroup. According received members are motivated to maintain theevaluative relations, intergroup group of the similar others and superiority ingroup by favoring discriminating against dissimilar others there havebeen numerous 1986). However, (Tajfel& Turner, overtheyears ofoutgroup memreports preferences among disadvantaged group bers (inter Clark & Fine & alia, Allport,1954a; Clark, 1947; Bowers, 1984; Giles & Powesland,1975; Vaughan, evidence of outgroup 1978). Experimental favoritism of low status or has been (Sachdev& amonggroups power growing see Hinkle & for a Bourhis,1985, 1987; Brown,1990, review).It has been that favoritism serves to memargued outgroup perpetuate byleading inequality bersof subordinate of their groupsto believethattheyare inferior, deserving or incapableof taking actionagainstthecauses of their subordination plight,

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(Jost& Banaji, 1994; Sidanius,1993; Sidanius& Pratto,1993). D6pretand Fiske (1993) have found that members of powerless are aptto identify groups with theoutgroup unlessthere arereasons to suspect that a conspiracy is under& Blaine, 1993, on therole of Broadnax,Luhtanen, way (see also Crocker, theories in group As Eagleton has written in conspiracy consciousness-raising). his recent of ideologyand falseconsciousness, "themostefficient study opis theone whopersuades hisunderlings to love,desireandidentify with pressor his power"(p. xiii).

Resistance to change
conservatism. Researchers have long notedthetendency to asCognitive sumea preexisting stateof affairs and makeminor to it rather than adjustments wholesale has beenreferred toas "anchorchange.The phenomenon introducing et al., 1982). Whilemostof thisresearch has had little to do ing" (Kahneman with Azzi andJost in a study of people'sprefer(1994) found political systems, ences forprocedural werestrongly anchored justicethat subjects by theexperimental status choiceto implement of quo. Whengivena free anytype virtually werestrongly constrained decision-making procedure, subjects' responses bythe to whichthey condition wererandomly experimental assigned.Relatedto this decision-makers exhibit a clearpreference maybe a "status quo effect," whereby for theexisting state ofaffairs newoptions wouldbring about outcomes although that are better thanor thesame as old ones (Quattrone & Tversky, 1988; Samuelson& Zeckhauser, 1987). Greenwald theterm conservatism" to refer to (1980) introduced "cognitive thetendency to adhereto thoughts or beliefswhichare no longeradaptive or functional. In thedomain ofpolitical this couldcontribute cognition, propensity to thepreservation of undesirable ideas and circumstances becausethey simply no changeto attitudes or beliefs require (see also Janoff-Bulman, 1992). Cognitiveconservatism is similar to fatalism in itsconsequences, butit involves the beliefthat is aversive, notjust difficult to achieve. change,in itself, Behavioralconservatism. In a fashion to theproblem of cognianalogous tiveconservatism, stick with peoplemay disproportionately pastpractices simply becausethey are familiar or habitual. Hackman and Oldham(1980), forexamthewaysin which tend toreproduce inefficient ple, havedocumented employees workarrangements to Undoubtsimply preserve pastorganizational practices. about substantial social or would consideredly, bringing political change require able revision of one's behavior, and thismaybe costlyor difficult under some circumstances. that that behavior is best which the However, believing requires leastamount of changecan result in a spiraling of disadvantage, similar to the of"sunk costs"(cf. Strube, toengageinharmful problem 1988).Ifonecontinues

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thenone may out of habitor in orderto justify either behaviors, pastefforts, a system or relationship to thedetriment of theselfor thegroup (cf. perpetuate 1987; Janoff-Bulman, 1992). Brickman, FALSE CONSCIOUSNESS AS A TOPIC FOR POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY their haveurged fieldto "socialize" as social psychologists Just frequently their alia, Carlson,1984; Israel& Tajfel,1972; Pepitone, (inter subjectmatter that itis time to "politicize" 1981; Steiner, 1974),I propose empirical psycholoof domination and subordination context which thepolitical gy by addressing in thesocial world.The phenomeandbehaving mostofourthinking surrounds Affective and non of false consciousness just such an opportunity. provides are nowwell understood; no attention, error bases of human virtually cognitive circumstances has been givento social and political (such as status, however, and abuse) thatfoster illuinjustice, negative exploitation, power,inequality, sions. has been a favorite Unlikefalseconsciousness, ideology topicof political from the moment theirfieldwas founded (Lane, 1962; Sears, psychologists to occupy constructs of 1969). It continues prideofplace as one of thedefining & Tetlock,1986a). In the the discipline(Kinder& Sears, 1985; Sniderman as we have seen, theconcepts of ideologyand falseconMarxiantradition, sciousness areintertwined Hill, & Turner, 1980;Eagleton, 1991; (Abercrombie, class ideology Gabel, 1975; Gramsci, 1971;Mepham,1972). Becauseofruling of ideas or beliefsthat as a system servethedominant (defined group'ssocial interests attheexpense ofother Marxists have that groups), argued most people's of social and are and false distorted, inverted, understandings reality political mainstream social scihowever, (Eagleton,1991; Wood, 1988). Significantly, evaluation associated withideological ence came to dropthenegative thinking becamenota 1954b;Mannheim, 1936), and thesearchforideology (Allport, searchforfalse or distorted of the politicalworld(the effects of conceptions but the search for consistent belief on the coherent, ideology), systems partof motivated individuals a (Bell, 1960; Converse,1964). By urging politically return to the evaluative of that to the of false is, conception ideology, study I am notsimply a preference fortheterminology of consciousness, expressing MarxoverBell, Converse, andothers. I haveargued that there is considerable, butneglected, evidence fortheempirical that to proposition people'sresponses social andpolitical are often inaccurate and for them. systems very maladaptive Of course,thequestion of whether some (or most)people do indeedpossess and integrated of political beliefsis a valid and highly sophisticated systems useful & Sears, 1985; (Bell, 1960; Converse,1964; Kinder empirical question

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the also to recognize theopposite, McGuire,1985),butit is important namely to accurate insocialcognition serve as an impediment and errors towhich degree of thepolitical world. useful representation POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF FALSE CONSCIOUSNESS is one whichis boundto be metwith of falseconsciousness The concept social scientists, Western on the partof contemporary resistance substantial of communist a with doctrine, goodreason.It maybe seenas a vestige perhaps is widely assumed to havebeendisproven that byhistorical political philosophy of thispaperis notto advancea doctrinaire The purpose concept developments. butto salvagean important, evidence to thecontrary, to despite to be adhered thaterrors in forpolitical even essential, namely psychology, insight perhaps thatmaybe harmful to the cognition producelevelsof politicalacquiescence it seemsworthwhile to raise and thesociety. thegroup, Therefore, individual, to the studyof false and defendagainstsome of the mostlikelyobjections in thephilosophical see Cunningdefenses consciousness literature, (forother will be 1969). Six mainobjections ham, 1987; Meyerson,1991; Runciman, is too evaluative;(b) it considered here: (a) the term"false consciousness" accounts of their own situations; discounts (c) itblamesthe people'ssubjective it internalization where it is unfalsifiable; victim; (e) (d) postulates compliance will do; and (f) it is too political. offalseconsciousness is tooevaluative in its theconcept that The objection to some of dismissed is fairly connotation easily byappealing examples psycholand social studied For example,cognitive phenomena. ogy's mostcommonly of or "biases" or "illusions" "errors" in have thinking psychologists longspoken without undueworry thattheterms are excessively A or perceiving negative. of articles search indexed reveals that byPsycINFO computerized psychological more than as a keyword theyears "illusion" theterm 2,200 times during appears haveregarded falseconsciousness as a type oferror 1967-1993. Some Marxists and Marx himself drew in information-processing anal1982, 1985), (see Elster, and false illusions consciousness between (Wood, 1988). As a ogies perceptual have not been afraid to use evaluative labels such as the rule,psychologists and attribution fundamental bias, error, ignorance. correspondence pluralistic to be themost haveusedwhatis likely objectionable aspect Manypsychologists theword"false,"as in discussions of oftheterm "falseconsciousness," namely & consensus" (Goethals, 1986), (Marks Miller,1987),"falseuniqueness" "false and thedoublyevaluative 1994). "falsefamebias" (Banaji & Greenwald, of employing follows as a consequence A secondobjection evaluative lan"true"and "false"consciousness to people, one guage. It is thatin ascribing

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overothers somesocialorpolitical encounters theriskofprivileging viewpoints ofdiscrimination evenrepeating byignorpastpractices (Lewy,1982),possibly oftheir ownexperiences accounts members' (Riger,1992). ingoppressed group feminism: "How can MacKinnon(1989, p. 39), forexample,asks of critical that tovalidate all thinks be calledfalseina theory purports anywoman anything does inIn general, thefalseconsciousness women'sexperience?" perspective of their circumstances that deed suggest maybe untrustpeople'sownaccounts Marcuse(1964) resolved thisproblem in the under somecircumstances. worthy that: following way.He wrote
be answered In thelastanalysis, thequestion ofwhat aretrue andfalseneedsmust bythe that arefree to butonlyin thelastanalysis; individuals themselves, is, ifand whenthey ofbeing As longas they arekept as longas ownanswer. autonomous, incapable givetheir andmanipulated their answer to this are indoctrinated instincts), (downto their very they be taken as their own. (p. 6) cannot question

of social psychology since at Indeed,it is a noncontroversial assumption least Nisbettand Wilson (1977) thatit will not do to simplytake people's abouttheir beliefs anddesires at facevalue.Motivational biases,cogniopinions haveall beenshown tivelimitations, and informational to produce complexities of themselves in people'sperceptions and of thesocial world(inter distortions et al., 1982; Kunda, 1990; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Kahneman alia, Greenwald, The of & false consciousness 1980;Quattrone Tversky, 1988). concept highlights contributors to theinaccuracy of first-person politicalas well as psychological accounts. of theclaimthatpeople's accounts Thereis a methodological version of own situations their shouldbe trusted. Such an objection wouldhold that it is to determine the accuracy or inaccuracy of beyondthe meansof psychology and so different accounts should not be Social accounts, first-person disputed. often havebeenunwilling to decidewhich ofthebeliefs scientists are they study trueand whichare false. Bergerand Luckmann for decline (1967), example, to make "assertions abouttheontological status of thephenomena analyzed" haveargued that theattribution ofpolitical (p. 20). Even political psychologists motives andinterests arebeyond themethodological ofthediscipline capabilities & Marx and criticized theunwilling(Sniderman Tetlock, 1986b). Engels(1846) nessofhistorians andsocialscientists ofhisage todo what every ordinary person does regularly, to distinguish between trueand false: namely,
Whilstin ordinary lifeeveryshopkeeper is verywell able to distinguish between what to be andwhat he really havenotyetwoneventhis is, ourhistorians somebody professes trivial insight. (p. 23)

To giveup thepossibility oflocating beliefs on dimensions ofevaluation suchas and so on is to the self-interestedness, accuracy, adaptiveness, relinquish claim ofpsychology to be a science.Thereareseveral reasons must whypsychologists makesuchevaluations, butchief is that otherwise wouldlack amongthem they

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of alternative of their criteria for data; their interpretations judgingthevalidity abouttheevidence couldnotclaimto be moreaccurate conclusions or beliefs or A pointof experimental is to rule of laypersons. control usefulthanthebeliefs or inaccurate. out an alternative Thus, Nisbett possibleaccountas incomplete that about and Wilson(1977) wereable to conclude beliefs their own subjects' not were did not the "real" strategies accurate-people identify decision-making or "true" own preferences. basis fortheir to the study of false consciousness A third is thatit objection potential fortheir that it is own blamesvictims their weakness or by implying oppression of of the situation Victims false that creates consciousness ignorance oppression. or foolhardy forharboring beliefs whichare contrary to maybe seen as stupid Whileworries suchas theseshouldbe taken their own interests. veryseriously of falseconsciousness, it is certainly notthepurpose of suchan by thestudent locate or blame within the victim. As the to analysis responsibility poet Yevtushenko wrote,"No one blames an old nail slidinginto a wall, it's being withthe buttof an axe." This is not to implythatmembers hammered of of subordinate are the dominant Indeed, groups incapable rejecting ideology.. and "freedom of thewill" play important rolesin some consciousness-raising versions ofMarxian socialtheory, thoseassociated with of thework particularly aim of Gramsci the false beliefs that (1971). Nevertheless, identifying perpetuate is not to faultvictims butto empower them(Collins, 1991; Cunoppression 1987; MacKinnon, 1989). ningham, A fourth criticism offalseconsciousness is that itis usedbyMarxists as an hatch" to save their from the of evidence theory "escape weight disconfirming falseconsciousness was invoked (Lewy, 1982). Thus, it has beenclaimedthat to rationalize the failure of Marx's of unfairly apparent prediction a worldwide revolution. is a danger of making Marxism irrefutable Indeed,there by always inthephenomenon offalse consciousness, refuge seeking explaining awaypeople's aversion to revolution and communism. For thisreason,false consciousness needsto be subjected to rigorous confrontation with clearcriteria for empirical disconfirmation. one of theMarxist scholars mostassociLukaics, Interestingly, atedwith theconcept offalseconsciousness, madethis anditmay point directly, havecontributed tohisexilebytheStalinist wrote: (Gabel, 1975).Lukaics regime
The dialecticalmethod does not permit us simplyto proclaim the 'falseness'of this andpersist in an inflexible consciousness confrontation oftrue andfalse.On thecontrary, it requires us to investigate this'falseconsciousness' (1971, p. 58) concretely....

A central of thispaperis that contention thescientific of falseconsciousstudy nessis a psychological as wellas a sociological, endeavor, economic, political, andphilosophical one. Thecontrol afforded historical, bythepsychology experiment theclearest concrete evidence for andagainst theoperation of mayprovide social and political as researchers found with to cognitive and illusions, regard illusions. perceptual A fifth is tobe found in thework ofScott(1990), whoargues that objection

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to authority, tolerance of injuswhatlooks like falseconsciousness (deference is a that differs of abuse, tice,acceptance etc.) really publicdisplay considerably from that and individuals thepolitical resistance disadvantaged groups express on ingratiation tosupport hiscontenresearch Scott citespsychological privately. do notinternalize thebeliefs of their tionthat but oppressors oppressed groups I not it on in to avoid While would rather thick" order that punishment. "lay deny with thewishesof thepowerful to comply playa significant pressures publicly rolein theactions of thepowerless, thestory does notendthere. (ifnotbeliefs) In mostoftheexperimental situations discussed were above,subjects' responses and under conditions that collected guaranteed anonymity privately (Crosbyet Hoffman et & 1992; Hurst,1990; Major al., 1984; Ross et al., 1989; Dittmar, & Sachdev there Bourhis, al., 1977; 1985, 1987;Vaughan, 1978).Nevertheless, was considerable for thefailure to perceive evidence the disadvantage, justificationof unequalsocial roles,outgroup and other varieties of false favoritism, consciousness. A sixth andfinal tothepsychological offalseconsciousness objection study is that it is too "political," that it a nonnormative scientific meaning implicates in of the for social if making prescriptions discipline change.However, it were foundthatwidespread falsebeliefssuch as thosepostulated by thefalseconhad deleterious on sciousness effects itcomproperspective people(for example, misedtheir limited their in or reduced their selfopportunities, aspirations life, then we should that social scientists wouldseekto underesteem), fully expect mine theseself-defeating false beliefs.The notionthatharmful or irrational beliefs andchanged is a familiar ofboth socialand maybe identified assumption clinicalpsychology. For example, Nisbett's workon thedeficiencies of human & Ross, 1980)led himandhiscollaborators toinvestigate the (Nisbett reasoning of educating possibilities people to make better typesof decisions(Nisbett, & Fong, 1982). Similarly, Steele'sresearch on highly-achieving Krantz, Jepson, female andminority students whohadnegative that wouldfail expectations they in schoolresulted ina successful intervention suchfalsebeliefs program whereby werechallenged and supplanted ofclinical (Steele, 1992). In thefield psycholoas diverse as thoseadvocated and gy,therapeutic approaches bypsychodynamic theories sharetheassumption that individuals holdbeliefs cognitive-behavioral whichare fundamentally forthem, and that involves unhealthy partof therapy the elimination of such beliefs.Thereis no a priori reasonwhypsychology shouldaimto be anyless useful to socialandpolitical lifethan to other areasof human existence (Dewey,1900; Miller,1969). CONCLUSION It has been arguedthatthe problem of falseconsciousness a represents but neglected fieldof studyforsocial, cognitive, and potentially important

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In general, falseconsciousness refers to the psychologists. especially political sustain one's owndisadvantage. Itwas suggested offalsebeliefs that that holding of falseconsciousness and that there existsat are at leastsix maintypes there evidenceforeach of thesetypes.After a selective least some psychological to thestudy of theavailableevidence, somepotential of false review objections theoretical andempirical consciousness wereraisedand addressed. By focusing in theproblem of political attention on theroleof falseconsciousness acquiesa moresophisticated of socialandpolitical cence,it is hopedthat understanding will emerge. reality ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I thank Robert P. Abelson, R. Banaji,Jennifer Mahzarin SusanT. Crocker, G. Greenwald, William J.McGuire, Dale Fiske,DonaldPhilipGreen, Anthony fortheir T. Miller,and TomR. Tyler comments on an earlier of draft generous thismanuscript. I am indebted also to TheresaClaire,Curtis and LawHardin, renceJost fortheir contributions to thedevelopment of theseideas. This many in part workwas supported a Graduate from Yale University and by Fellowship NIMH Grant to William J. McGuire. #5R01-MH32588

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