Republic Planters Bank vs.

Molina 166 SCRA 39 September 28, 1988 Facts: Two civil cases were filed by petitioner Republic Planters Bank against private respondent, for the collection of a sum of money based on a promissory note. The first was dismissed for failure of the petitioner to prosecute its case within a reasonable length of time. The other was filed by petitioner. However, a motion to dismiss was submitted by private respondents on the ground that the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment in the first civil case. Private respondents opined that said order was an adjudication upon the merits. Petitioner opposed the motion to dismiss, claiming that res judicata does not apply because the summons and complaint in in the first civil case were never served upon private respondents and, as such, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over private respondents and, consequently, over the case. Petitioner maintains that the order of dismissal in the first civil case never became final as against private respondents. Issue: Whether or not the cause of action in the second civil case is barred by prior judgment. Ruling: No. For the court to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. If it did not acquire jurisdiction over the private respondents as parties to the first civil case, it cannot render any binding decision, favorable or adverse to them, or dismiss the case with prejudice which, in effect, is adjudication on the merits. The controverted orders in the first civil case disregarded the fundamental principles of remedial law and the meaning and the effect of jurisdiction. A judgment, to be considered res judicata, must be binding, and must be rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. Otherwise, the judgment is a nullity

HERRERA vs. BARRETTO, JOAQUIN G.R. No. 8692 September 10, 1913 FACTS: Petitioner assails the issuance of a mandatory injunction issued by the respondent judge Barretto ordering him to give Joaquin the necessary license to be able to operate his cockpit. Petitioner avers that the CFI doesnt have the jurisdiction to issue such injunction. ISSUE: Whether or not the CFI has jurisdiction to issue a mandatory injunction RULING: YES, it has. Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a causethe right to act in a case. It does not depend either upon the regularity of the exercise of that power or upon the rightfulness of the decisions made. Jurisdiction should therefore be distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction. The authority to decide a cause at all, and not the decision rendered therein, is what makes up jurisdiction. Where there is jurisdiction of the person and subject matter, the decision of all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction.

ASIAVEST LIMITED vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 128803 September 25, 1998

Facts: This case is commenced by the plaintiff seeking that the defendant to be ordered to pay the judgment awarded by the Hong kong Court. The defendant, however, contends that no writ of summons or copy of a statement of claim of was ever served to him; thus, jurisdiction over his person was never acquired. The action filed in Hong Kong against Heras was in personam, since it was based on his personal guarantee of the obligation of the principal debtor. Issue: Whether or not the foreign judgment is enforceable Ruling: No. Jurisdiction was not properly acquired. Notice sent outside the state to a non-resident is unavailing to give jurisdiction in an action against him personally for money recovery. Summons should have been personally served on Heras in Hong Kong. In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendant who does not voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by personal service of summons; and if he cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable time, substituted service may be. If he is temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of service may be resorted to: (1) substituted service, (2) personal service outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also with leave of court, or (4) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.

Pasio vs. Monterroyo G.R. No. 159494 July 31, 2008 FACTS: The Director of Land granted Laureano Pasinos application for homestead patent. The said land was divided by a creek, hence, two portions Lot A and Lot B. OCTs were issued by LMB covering the lands, respectively. Here comes the respondent alleging exclusive and notorious possession of Lot B. He contended that the OCT issued in favor of petitioners over the subject lot was null and void. ISSUE: What is the effect if the homestead patent granted in accordance with law is registered? RULING: Once a homestead patent granted in accordance with law is registered, the certificate of title issued by virtue of the patent has the force and effect of a Torrens title issued under the land registration law. In this case, the issuance of a homestead patent in 1952 in favor of Laureano was not registered. Section 103 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 mandates the registration of patents, and registration is the operative act to convey the land to the patentee, thus: Sec. 103. x x x x. The deed, grant, patent or instrument of conveyance from the Government to the grantee shall not take effect as a conveyance or bind the land but shall operate only as a contract between the Government and the grantee and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration. It is the act of registration that shall be the operative act to affect and convey the land, and in all cases under this Decree, registration shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies. The fees for registration shall be paid by the grantee. After due registration and issuance of the certificate of title, such land shall be deemed to be registered land to all intents and purposes under this Decree.

Victor Benin vs. Mariano Severo Tuason y De La Paz, et al. G.R. No. L -26127 June 28, 1974 Facts: Plaintiffs alleged that the subject parcels of land are under their ownership by way of inheritance and continued possession thereafter. They uniformly alleged that the defendants, with the aid of armed men, force and intimidation, using bulldozers and other demolishing equipment, illegally entered and started demolishing their dwellings. Respondents also worked on obtaining a decree of registration and an OCT. Nevertheless, before granting the registration, the area, boundaries and technical descriptions of the lots were altered and amended which were never published after the publication of the original application. The plaintiffs contended that the Registration Court had no jurisdiction to render the decision for lack of publication; that the decree of registration issued is likewise null and void pursuant to a void decision; and that Original Certificate of Title No. 730 is also null and void pursuant to a void decree of registration. Issue: Whether or not the LRC had jurisdiction to render the decision for the reason that the amendment to the original plan was not published. Ruling: LRC had jurisdiction. The original plan was only amended in order to exclude certain areas that were the subject of opposition, hence not requiring further publishing as provided by the rules. At the same time, there was minimal difference to be of decisive consequence. Further, once a registration court had acquired jurisdiction, it continues attaches to the land. Such registration proceedings and the decree of registration must be declared null and void only in so far as the land not included in the publication is concerned. The registration proceedings, as proceedings in rem, operate as against the whole world and the decree issued therein is conclusive adjudication of the ownership of the lands registered, not only against those parties who appeared in such proceedings but also against parties who were summoned by publication but did not appear.

Macababbad vs. Masirag G.R. No. 161327 January 14, 2009 Facts: Spouses Pedro Masirag (Pedro) and Pantaleona Tulauan (Pantaleona) were the original registered owners of Lot No. 4144 of the Cadastral Survey in Tuguegarao Pedro and Pantaleona had eight (8) children, namely, Valeriano, Domingo, Pablo, Victoria, Vicenta, Inicio, Maxima and Maria. Respondents Fernando, Faustina, Corazon and Leonor Masirag are the children of Valeriano and Alfora Goyagoy, while Leoncio is the son of Vicenta and Braulio Goyagoy. The respondents allegedly did not know of the demise of their respective parents; they only learned of the inheritance due from their parents in the first week of March 1999 when their relative, Pilar Quinto, informed respondent Fernando and his wife Barbara Balisi about it. They immediately hired a lawyer to investigate the matter. In the investigation they learned that spouses Chua falsified document which was the Extra-judicial Settlement with Simultaneous Sale of Portion of Registered Land (Lot 4144). The document had the signature of the respondents. Because of this they were deprived of their respective shares. Issue: Whether or not the extrajudicial settlement with sale of the subject land was valid Ruling: No. There was a mistake in titling the land in question in the name of the registered owner indicated therein, but in the allegations in the body of the allegations in the body of the instant complaint, it clearly appears that the nature of the cause of action of appellants, they wanted to get back their respective shares in the subject inheritance because they did not sell said shares to Macababbad as the signatures purported to be theirs which appeared in the Extrajudicial Settlement with Simultaneous Sale of Portion of Registered Land (Lot 4144) were forged. As appellants represented 2 of the 8 children of the deceased original owners of the land in question who were Pedro Masirag and Pantaleona Talauan, the sale is perfectly valid with respect to the other 6 children, and void with respect to the appellants.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PEDRO O. ENCISO November 11, 2005 G.R. No. 160145 Facts: Encisco filed for the registration of a parcel of land he inherited from his father, Vicente Encisco. The parcel of land was originally owned by Municipality of Mansiloc, Zambales but upon the passage of Resolution No. 70 and 120, the land was given to Honorato Endao, Enciscos uncle. Endao later sold the parcel of land to Vicente Encisco. Encisco alleged that he had been in continuous, peaceful, open, notorious, uninterrupted and adverse possession of the land. Petitioner opposed the registration alleging that the parcel of land is a portion of public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines. Pending the report on the status of the parcel of land, the trial court granted the application of Encisco. Issue: Whether or not Enciscos application should be granted. Ruling: No. Sec. 14 of PD 1529 provides for applicants to prove that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain, and that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same. There is nothing to support the respondents claim that the property was reclassified as residential already segregated from the public domain and assumed the character of private ownership.

Republic vs. Sangalang 159 SCRA 515 April 8, 1988 Facts: The subject property was inherited by the private respondents Kiangs from their father, known as old man Kiang (one name) who in turn inherited the same from his parents Quebec and Cawane, who were in continuous possession of the land since the Spanish times. The Court of First Instance of Benquet, Mountain Province, rendered a decision in Civil Reservation Case No. L- declaring as public lands all lands within the limits of the Baguio Townsite Reservation, with the exception of lands reserved for specific public purposes and those claimed and adjudicated private property. Among those declared public lands were the lands applied for by old man Kiang, which was dismissed by the court in said decision. Issue: Whether or not the court which awarded title to the Kiangs in Land Registration Case No. N-30 had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. Ruling: It is well-settled that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived and can be raised at any time. Jurisdiction of the subject matter is conferred by law and does not depend on the consent or objection or the acts or omissions of the parties or any one of them. The subject matter of Land Registration Case No. N-30 was property already declared public land and part of the Baguio Townsite Reservation by virtue of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Banquet, Mountain Province. The latter case involved the compulsory registration of land within the Baguio Townsite Reservation pursuant to Section 62 of Act No. 926, in relation to Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Act No. 627.

Nocum, et al vs. Lucio Tan G.R. No. 145022 September 23, 2005 FACTS: Lucio Tan filed a complaint against reporter Armand Nocum, Capt. Florendo Umali, ALPAP and Inquirer for the alleged malicious and defamatory imputations contained in a news article. It appeared that the complaint failed to state the residence of the complainant at the time of the alleged commission of the offense and the place where the libelous article was printed and first published. The complaint failed to state the residence of complainant Lucio Tan at the time of the alleged commission of the offense and the place where the libelous article was printed and first published. RTC dismissed the complaint without prejudice on the ground of improper venue but was set aside because of Tans amended complaint. ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court acquire jurisdiction over the civil case upon the filing of the original complaint for damages. RULING: YES. The RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case when the case was filed before it. Respondents cause of action is for damages arising from libel, the jurisdiction of which is vested with the RTC. Jurisdiction and venue are as follows: (a) Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a case; venue is the place where the case is to be heard or tried; (b) Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue, of procedural law; (c) Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the court and the subject matter; venue, a relation between plaintiff and defendant, or petitioner and respondent; and, (d) Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot be conferred by the parties; venue may be conferred by the act or agreement of the parties. Respondents failure to allege that the article and the caricature were printed and first published in Makati City gave the lower court the power to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue was not properly laid.

Acosta et al., vs. Salazar et al. G.R. No. 161034 June 30, 2009 FACTS: On November 19, 1985, respondents Trinidad and Aniceta Salazar filed a petition for the cancellation of the entries annotated at the back of Original Certificate of Title registered in the names of spouses Juan Soriano and Vicenta Macaraeg, who died without issue. RTC Branch 63 of Tarlac resolved to grant the petition and ordered the cancellation of Entry No. 20102. No respondent was impleaded in the said petition. However, Branch 64 of the RTC of Tarlac reversed and declared as null and void the decision of Branch 63. Unsatisfied, the Salazars appealed to the Court of Appeals. Petitioners, on the other hand, contended that the orders of RTC Branch 63 are null and void for lack of proper notice. The CA ratiocinated that the proceeding is a land registration proceeding, which is an action in rem. This being so, personal notice to the owners or claimants of the land sought to be registered is not necessary in order to vest the court with jurisdiction over the res and over the parties. ISSUE: Whether or not the action taken by the Salazars in Branch 63 of the RTC of Tarlac is valid. RULING: No. It is true that the registration of land under the Torrens system is a proceeding in rem and not in personam. Such a proceeding in rem, dealing with a tangible res, may be instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon the claimants within the state or notice by mail to those outside of it. Jurisdiction is acquired by virtue of the power of the court over the res. Such a proceeding would be impossible were this not so, for it would hardly do to make a distinction between constitutional rights of claimants who were known and those who were not known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all.

De la Cruz vs. Court of Appeals 418 SCRA 60 September 30, 2003 FACTS: Esteban, Andrea and Tomasa, all surnamed Cabsag, were siblings and are now all deceased. Esteban is survived by his daughters-herein petitioners Clara C. de la Cruz and Claudia C. Manadong who have since 1972 been residing in Manila, while Andrea is survived by her children. Tomasa, who died in 1963 without issue, was survived by her husband Eugenio Nadonga who later married respondent Rosario Opana. Eugenio Nadonga died in 1973. Upon the death of Tomasa in 1963, her husband Eugenio Nadonga continued to live in Guiuan and occupy the lands in question until his death in 1973 upon which his second wife-herein respondent continued peaceful possession thereof until April 24, 1992 when Estebans daughters-herein petitioners filed a complaint for partition against her before the RTC of Guiuan where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 765, now the subject of the present petition. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is the true, absolute and exclusive owner of the two (2) parcels of land described in the complaint. RULING: Contrary to the assertion of petitioners, since the defendant-herein respondent alleged exclusive ownership, the action for partition, which assumes that the parties are co-owners, had, as correctly held by the trial court, it citing Rodriguez v. Ravilan,[33] become one for recovery of Petitioners harp on Tax Declaration No. 29824 covering the property in Mayana, but the boundaries set forth therein do not jibe with those of the property in Mayana in the possession of and registered in the name of respondent.

Paramount Industries vs. Luna 148 SCRA 564 March 16, 1987 FACTS: Respondent Dr. Doroteo Espiritu filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Paramount Insurance Corporation, as surety and Romeo Hechanova as principal. Petitioner filed its answer with cross-claim. During the pendency of the case, petitioner failed to appear for 3 consecutive times despite due notice. Thus, the court allowed respondent to present his evidence ex parte and subsequently ruled that the cross-examination of plaintiffs witness as waived. Respodent Judge rendered decision in favor of respondent, and became final and executory when petitioners didnt appeal. During the motion for execution, fire broke out, that gutted the entire floor of the City Hall of Manila, and no a single record of the said case was saved. Hence, a motion for reconstitution was filed by plaintiff. The respondent court denied motion for reconstitution and granted the motion for execution of judgment. ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over petitioner considering nonappearance during the trial. RULING: Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is acquired either by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by service of summons. The purpose of summons is to give notice to the defendant or respondent that an action has been commenced against it. The defendant or respondent is thus put on guard as to the demands of the plaintiff or petitioner. In the case at bar, the record indicates beyond doubt that petitioner was adequately given in the case below the necessary notice. It was validly served with summons together with a copy of the complaint. XXX filing of answer with cross claim against Romeo Hechanova is equivalent to voluntary appearance and cured the defect if any, of the summons, (Sec. 23, Rule 15, Rules of Court).

Banco-Espanol Filipino vs. Palanca 37 Phil. 291 March 26, 1918 Facts: Petitioner filed an action to foreclose a mortgage upon various parcels of land owned by respondent who failed to pay his loan. After the execution of the instrument, respondent returned to China, his native country. An order for publication was accordingly obtained from the court and publication was made thru newspaper. The court directed the clerk of court to notify respondent at his last place of residence, i.e., Amoy, China. However, no proof was shown that said order was fulfilled by the clerk of court. After 7 yrs of confirmation of sale, now, administrator of the estate claims that no notice was received by them, thus seeking for annulment. Issue: WON the confirmation of sale be void due to failure to notify respondent Ruling: No. With respect to the provisions of our statute, relative to the sending of notice by mail, the requirement is that the judge shall direct that the notice be deposited in the mail by the clerk of the court, and it is not in terms declared that the notice must be deposited in the mail. We consider this to be some significance; and it seems to us that, having due regard to the principles upon which the giving of such notice is required, the absent owner of the mortgaged property must, so far as the due process of law is concerned, take the risk incident to the possible failure of the clerk to perform his duty, somewhat as he takes the risk that the mail clerk or the mail carrier might possibly lose or destroy the parcel or envelope containing the notice before it should reach its destination and be delivered to him. X X X The observations which have just been made lead to the conclusion that the failure of the clerk to mail the notice, if in fact he did so fail in his duty, is not such as irregularity as amounts to a denial of due process of law; and hence in our opinion that irregularity, if proved, would not avoid the judgment in this case. Notice was given by publication in a newspaper and this is the only form of notice which the law unconditionally requires. X X X

Heirs of Regalado vs. Republic G.R. No. 168155 February 15, 2007 Facts: Marina Regalado filed an application for registration of a parcel of land located at Sitio Balubad, Barrio Nangka, Marikina, Metro Manila before the RTC of Pasig. The application was published in Official Gazette and in a newspaper. However, Marina withdrew the application. Later on, she filed for a re-application but was denied. It was denied on the ground that NHA owned the subject property. Marina also alleged that the Land was assigned to her by Tomas Antero. Issue: Whether or not Marina Regalado was the owner of the property. Ruling: No. It is worth pointing out that the very reason why the previous owner Tomas Antero of the subject lot failed to secure the corresponding Tax Declaration was because of the apparent hesitation of then Municipality of Marikina, Metro Manila to issue the same, contending that it considered the same as part of the public domain. That attitude of the Municipality of Marikina, Metro Manila could be readily gleaned from the very Tax Declaration No. B-0069187 issued to petitioner Marina C. Regalado.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Manna Properties, Inc. G.R. No. 146527 January 31,2005 Facts: Respondent, applicant-appellee filed an Application for the registration of title of two (2) parcels of land, specifically: Lot No. 9515 and Lot No. 1006,located in La Union. Opposition to the application stated, that the applicant is a private corporation disqualified under the Philippine Constitution to hold alienable lands of public domain. Applicant-appellee represented by its president Jose Tanyao testified on the acquisition of the subject property from his predecessors-in-interest. Issue: WHETHER MANNA PROPERTIES FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION? Ruling: YES. Lands that fall under Section 48 of CA 141 are effectively segregated from the public domain by virtue of acquisitive prescription. We have held that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by CA 141 ipso jure converts such land into private land. Judicial confirmation in such cases is only a formality that merely confirms the earlier conversion of the land into private land, the conversion having occurred in law from the moment the required period of possession became complete. Under CA 141, the reckoning point is June 12, 1945. If the predecessors-in-interest of Manna Properties have been in possession of the land in question since this date, or earlier, Manna Properties may rightfully apply for confirmation of title to the land. Following our ruling in Director of Lands v. IAC, Manna Properties, a private corporation, may apply for judicial confirmation of the land without need of a separate confirmation proceeding for its predecessors-in-interest first.

Republic vs. Imperial Credit Corporation 555 SCRA 314 June 25, 2008 FACTS: Respondent purchased from a certain Jose Tajon a parcel of land situated in Barrio Colaique (now Barangay San Roque), Antipolo City, Rizal as evidenced by a Deed of Sale with Mortgage. Upon full payment of the balance through judicial consignation, ownership of the property was consolidated in the name of respondent and the mortgage constituted thereon was then released. The property was thereafter privately surveyed and approved in 2000. Respondent filed before the RTC an application for registration of a parcel of land. The application alleged, among others, that respondent subrogated former owner Jose Tajon, who has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the parcel of land, being a part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945, by virtue of Deed of Sale with Mortgage executed on 07 March 1966. At the hearing, Ricardo Santos, respondents legal researcher and duly authorized attorney-in-fact, testified on the fact of respondents actual possession through its caretaker, Teodisia Palapus, who had been overseeing said property since its acquisition from Jose Tajon. Palapus also corroborated Santos testimony and added that except for some trespassers, no one else had laid possessory claim on the property. Aside from the transfer documents, the other documentary evidence submitted consisted of a 1993 tax declaration, the tracing cloth plan, survey description, a certification from the Land Management Sector in lieu of the geodetic engineers certificate and the report by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office that the property falls within the alienable and disposable zone. RTC rendered judgment granting respondents application for registration. Petitioner seasonably appealed from the RTCs Decision to the Court of Appeals, contending that respondent failed to present incontrovertible evidence that respondent and its predecessor-in-interest have been in open continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier but it was dismissed. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents evidence failed to satisfy the requirement under paragraph (1) of Section 14, P.D. No. 1529, that is, respondents possession and occupation of the property for the length of time and in the manner required by law. RULING: Under the Regalian doctrine, the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. This is premised on the basic doctrine that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Any applicant for confirmation of imperfect title bears the burden of proving that he is qualified to have the land titled in his name. The reckoning date under the Public Land Act for the acquisition of ownership of public lands is June 12, 1945 or earlier, and that evidence of possession from that date or earlier is essential for a grant of an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. While a tax declaration by itself is not sufficient to prove ownership, it may serve as sufficient basis for inferring possession. Thus, petition for review on certiorari granted.

Ong vs. Republic G.R. No. 175746 March 12, 2008 FACTS: Ong, as representative of his brothers, filed an Application for Registration of Title over Lot 15911. They alleged that they are the co-owners of the subject lot which is their exclusive property having acquired the same by purchase from spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil; that the subject lot is presently unoccupied; and that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and peaceful possession of the subject lot in the concept of owners for more than 30 years. The Republic opposed the application, claiming that the applicants failed to adduce any muniment of title to prove their claims. ISSUE: WON Ong, together with his brothers, have registrable ownership over the subject real property RULING: NO. The Bureau of Lands stated that the subject lot is within the alienable and disposable zone as classified under Project 50 L.C. Map No. 698 and released and classified as such on November 21, 1927. This finding is, likewise, embodied in the Report of the DENR-CENRO and the blue print Copy of the plan covering the subject lot. However, petitioner failed to prove that he or his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject lot since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Mistica vs. Republic G.R. No. 165141 September 11, 2009 Facts: On July 23, 1998, petitioner filed with the MTC of Meycauayan, Bulacan, an Application for Registration of Title over a parcel of land located in Malhacan, Meycauayan, Bulacan. In her application, petitioner alleged that she is the owner in fee simple of the land sought to be registered. She claimed that she and her predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject lot since time immemorial. She further averred that she did not know of any lien, mortgage or encumbrance affecting said lot or that any person has any claim or interest therein, legal or equitable, remainder, reversion, or expectancy. Respondent Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed an opposition to the application on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto. During trial, petitioner testified that the previous owner and possessor of the subject lot was her father. She added that her father acquired the property by virtue of a contract of sale but she could not remember the vendors name. Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THAT SHE HAS BEEN IN OPEN, CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION AND OCCUPATION OF AN ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN UNDER BONA FIDE CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP SINCE JUNE 12, 1945 OR EARLIER. Ruling: Yes. Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 states: SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to the land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: (1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Possession alone is not sufficient to acquire title to alienable lands of the public domain because the law requires possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.

Republic vs. San Lorenzo Development Corporation G.R. No. 170724 January 29, 2007 FACTS: San Lorenzo Development Corporation filed with the MTCC of Danao City an application for registration of title to a parcel of land, described as Lot 1 of the Consolidation-Subdivision Plan, being a portion of Lots 3151, 3152, 3158, 3159, 3160 and 3161, Cad. 681-D, in Barangay Maslog, City of Danao,Province of Cebu with an area of 64,909 square meters. The Republic filed its opposition to the application on the same. Respondent, to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land applied for in the concept of an owner peacefully, continuously, adversely and notoriously presented six witnesses who provided testimonies saying that they had been in possession of the land and have sold their parcels to the respondent and their testimonies were supported by tax declarations and deeds of sale. ISSUE: Whether or not deeds of sale and tax declarations/clearances constitute the well-nigh incontrovertible evidence necessary to acquire title through adverse occupation under C.A. No. 141. HELD: As the law now stands, a mere showing of possession for thirty years or more is not sufficient. It must be shown, too, that possession and occupation had started on June 12, 1945 or earlier. The earliest of the tax declarations presented by the respondent was in the year 1948 for Lots 3152, 3159 and 3161; 1963 for Lot 3151; and 1964 for Lots 3150 and 3160. At best, the respondent corporation can only prove possession since said dates. This does not constitute the evidence necessary to acquire title through adverse occupation under CA 141, as amended.

Buenaventura vs. Republic G.R. No. 167261 March 2, 2007 FACTS: Petitioners filed an Application for Registration of Title on 5 June 2000 of the subject property. Petitioners alleged that they and their predecessors have acquired vested right over the subject property by their open, continuous, and exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership for over 50 years completely unmolested by any adverse claim, meaning, their possession of the subject property was in the manner and for the period required by law; and that the subject property was already characterized as alienable and disposable land. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have a registrable title over the subject property RULING: It is well-settled that properties classified as alienable and disposable land may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least 30 years. Such property now falls within the contemplation of "private lands" under Section 14(2), over which title by prescription can be acquired. Hence, because of Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, those who are in possession of alienable and disposable land, and whose possession has been characterized as open, continuous and exclusive for 30 years or more, may have the right to register their title to such land despite the fact that their possession of the land commenced only after 12 June 1945. The aforesaid jurisprudential rule truly demonstrates that, in the present case, while petitioners possession over the subject property can be reckoned only on 3 January 1968, the date when according to evidence, the subject property became alienable and disposable, they can still have the subject property registered in their names by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.