ARTICLE 726 (NATURE OF DONATIONS)

Tan Queto v. CA [G.R. No. L-35648. February 27, 1987.] CASE DIGEST

The Supreme Court set aside its decision promulgated on 16 May 1983, and rendered a new one declaring the questioned lot together with the building thereon, as Tan Quetos exclusive property; without costs. 1. Findings of the lower courts ordinary conclusive upon the Court; exception, if erroneous The findings of the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals were regarded by the Supreme Court as findings of facts and thus ordinarily conclusive upon the Court. Assuming they are factual findings, still if they are erroneous inferences from certain facts, they cannot bind the Court. 2. Land not transferred to Restituta by donation, for it to be paraphernal The oral donation of the lot cannot be a valid donation inter-vivos because it was not executed in a public instrument (Art. 749, Civil Code), nor as a valid donation mortis causa for the formalities of a will were not complied with. The allegation that the transfer was a conveyance to Restituta of her hereditary share in the estate of her mother (or parents) cannot be sustained for the contractual transmission of future inheritance is generally prohibited. 3. Land is conjugal, not paraphernal; Ownership by tradition The land is conjugal, not paraphernal. Ownership was acquired by the spouses by tradition (delivery) as a consequence of the contract of sale (See Art. 712, Civil Code) with P50.00 (then a considerable amount) as the cause or consideration of the transaction. The lot is therefore conjugal, having been acquired by the spouses thru onerous title (the money used being presumably conjugal, there being no proof that Restituta had paraphernal funds of her own). 4. Sale not fictitious nor simulated; Allegation of simulation cannot prejudice a stranger The sale cannot be said to be fictitious or simulated (and therefore void) as there was a valid consideration therefor. Assuming that there had indeed been a simulation, the parties thereto cannot use said simulation to prejudice a stranger to said strategem (like petitioner herein). 5. Tan Queto recognized Restituta as an owner, not the owner Tan Queto admitted Restituta was an owner (not the owner) of the lot in his Answer, and this is true, for she was a co-owner (with Juan, and therefore an owner.) There is no admission of Restitutas exclusive ownership.

En Banc, Paras (J): 10 concur, 1 votes to deny reconsideration, 1 dissents, 2 took no part Facts: Restituta Tagalinar Guangco de Pombuena received the questioned lot (Lot 304-B of the Cadastre Survey of the Municipality of Centro, Misamis Occidental) either as a purported donation or by way of purchase on 11 February 1927 for P50.00 as the alleged consideration thereof. The transaction took place during her mothers lifetime (her father having predeceased the mother) and consummated while Restituta was already married to her husband Juan Pombuena. On 22 January 1935, Juan filed an application of Torrens title over the land for himself and his supposed co-owner Restituta. On 22 November 1938, a decision was promulgated (GLRC 1638, Cadastral Case 12) pronouncing Juan (married to Restituto) as the owner of the land. On 22 September 1949 a contract of lease over the lot was entered into between Pershing Tan Queto and Restituta (with the consent of her husband) for a period of 10 years. Meanwhile, On 27 December 1960 Restituta sued Tan Queto for unlawful detainer (the lease contract having expired) before the Municipal Court of Ozamis City. On 22 April 1962, as a consequence of the cadastral case, an OCT was issued in Juans name. On 10 October 1962, Tan Queto and Juan entered into a barter agreement whereby Tan Queto became the owner of the disputed lot, and the spouses in turn became the owners of a parcel of land with the house constructed thereon previously owned (that is, before the barter) by Tan Queto. Thereafter, Tan Queto constructed on the disputed land a concrete building, without any objection on the part of Restituta. The Municipal court ruled in favor of the spouses in the unlawful detainer case; but on appeal in the CFI, the entire case was dismissed because of an understanding (barter) entered into by Juan and Tan Queto. Restituta sued both Juan and Tan Queto for reconveyance of the title over the registered but disputed lot, for annulment of the barter, and for recovery of the land with damages. The CFI and the Court of Appeals found the disputed lot as paraphernal and that Tan Queto was a builder in bad faith. These findings were regarded by the Supreme Court as findings of facts and thus ordinarily conclusive upon the Court. Tan Queto filed for a motion for reconsideration of the Supreme Court decision dated 16 May 1983.

6. Assuming Tan Queto recognized Restituta as the owner; bad faith of one neutralizes the bad faith of the other Even assuming that despite registration of the lot as conjugal, Tan Queto nursed the belief that the lot was actually Restitutas (making him in bad faith), still Restitutas failure to prohibit him from building despite her knowledge that construction was actually being done, makes her also in bad faith. The net resultant of mutual bad faith would entitle Tan Qyeto to the rights of a builder in good faith (Art. 448, Civil Code), ergo, reimbursement should be given him if Restituta decides to appropriate the building for herself (Art. 448, Civil Code). 7. Tan Queto an owner-possessor Tan Queto having bartered his own lot and small house with the questioned lot with Juan (who has been adverted to by a court decision and by the OCT a conjugal owner) may be said to be the owner-possessor of the lot. Certainly he is not merely a possessor or builder in good faith (this phrase presupposes ownership in another); much less is he a builder in bad faith. He is a builder-possessor (jus possidendi) because he is the owner himself. 8. Jus possessionis, jus possidendi; good faith and bad faith The Chapter on Possession (jus possessionis, not jus possidendi) in the Civil Code refers to a possessor other than the owner. The difference between a builder (or possessor) in good faith and one in bad faith is that the former is not aware of the defect or flaw in his title or mode of acquisition while the latter is aware of such defect or flaw (Art. 526, Civil Code). But in either case there is a flaw or defect. In the present case, there is no such flaw or defect because it is Tan Queto himself (not somebody else) who is the owner of the property. http://ladysilhouette.wordpress.com/2012/07/05/tan-queto-v-ca-g-r-no-l-35648february-27-1987-resolution/

QUILALA vs. ALCANTARA TOPIC: MAKING ANG ACCEPTANCE OF DONATIONG.R No.: 132681 December 3, 2001 FACTS: On February 20, 1981, Catalina Quilala (donor) executed a"Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" in favor of Violeta Quilala (donee) over a parcel of land located in Sta. Cruz, Manila and registered in her name. The "Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" consists of two pages. The first page contains the deed of donation itself, andis signed on the bottom portion by Catalina Quilala and Violeta Quilala, and two instrumental witnesses. The second page contains the Acknowledgment, which states merely that Catalina Quilala personally appeared before the notary publicand acknowledged that the donation was her free and voluntary act and deed. There appear on the left-hand margin of the second page the signatures of Catalina Quilala and one of the witnesses, and on the right-hand margin the signatures of Violeta Quilala and the other witness. On November 7, 1983, Catalina Quilala died. Violeta Quilala likewise died on May 22, 1984. Petitioner Ricky Quilala alleges that he is the surviving son of Violeta Quilala. Meanwhile, respondents Gliceria Alcantara, Leonora Alcantara, Ines Reyes and Juan Reyes, claiming to be Catalina's only surviving relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity instituted an action for the declaration of nullity of the donation inter vivos , and for the cancellation of the TCT in the name of Violeta Quilala. The trial court rendered a decision declaring null and void the deed of donation of real property inter vivos executed byCatalina Quilala in favor of Violeta Quilala. The trial court found that since it was acknowledged before a notary public only by the donor, Catalina, there was no acceptance byVioleta of the donation in a public instrument. The decision was affirmed by the CA. ISSUE: Whether or not the donation executed by Catalina infavor of Violeta is valid HELD: Valid even if the acknowledgment was only signed by the donor Below the terms and stipulations of the donation, the donor, donee and their witnesses affixed their signature. However, the Acknowledgment appearing on the second page mentioned only the donor, Catalina Quilala. Thus, the trial court ruled that for Violeta's failure to acknowledge her acceptance before the notary public, the same was set forth merely on a private instrument, i.e., the first page of the instrument. We disagree. As provided for in Section 112, paragraph 2 of PD No. 1529,the second page of the deed of donation, on which the Acknowledgment appears, was signed by the donor and one witness on the left-hand margin. The donee and the other witness signed on the right hand margin. Surely, the requirement that the contracting parties and their witnesses should sign on the left-hand margin of the instrument is not absolute. The intendment of the law merely is to ensure that each and every page of the instrument is authenticated by the parties. The requirement is designed to avoid the falsification of the contract after the same has

already been duly executed by the parties. Hence, a contracting party affixes his signature on each page of the instrument to certify that he is agreeing to everything that is written thereon at the time of signing. Simply put, the specification of the location of the signature is merely directory. The fact that one of the parties signs on the wrong side of the page does not invalidate the document. In the same vein, the lack of an acknowledgment by the donee before the notary public does not also render the donation null and void. The instrument should be treated in its entirety. It cannot be considered a private document in part and a public document in another part. The fact that it was acknowledged before a notary public converts the deed of donation in its entirety a public instrument. The fact that the donee was not mentioned by the notary public in the acknowledgment is of no moment. To be sure, it is the conveyance that should be acknowledged as a free and voluntary act. In any event, the donee signed on the second page, which contains the Acknowledgment only. Her acceptance, which is explicitly set forth on the first page of the notarized deed of donation, was made in a public instrument. Petition is granted. The appealed decision of the CA is reversed. http://www.scribd.com/doc/68307268/Case-Digest-on-Donation