3.

The Absconder Apprehension Initiative (AAI)

(U) Absconders are non-citizens who willfully fail to depart the United States after
receiving a final order of deportation from an immigration judge. As such they are
susceptible to federal felony prosecution.1 After September 11, INS Commissioner James
Ziglar proposed the inclusion of the names of 314,000 absconders in the National Crime
Information Center (NCIC) database accessible by State and local law enforcement." To
meet NCIC standards, every absconder entry had to be supported by a set of fingerprints
and a photograph so that the Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC) could
electronically transmit them to the querying law enforcement official within ten
minutes.111 If the absconder's identity was confirmed, then the INS could place a detainer
or arrange for an INS agent to take the individual into custody and proceed with removal.
Finding terrorists was not a focus of the program.lv Attorney General Ashcroft liked the
idea and Commissioner Ziglar announced it on December 5, 2001.v Shortly thereafter,
based on a recommendation from an aide to the Attorney General, the initiative was re-
cast as a counterterrorism program. Deputy Attorney General Thompson on January 25,
2002 provided guidance for the newly named Absconder Apprehension Initiative (AAI).
He explained that the object of the initiative was to deport 314,000 alien fugitives known
as absconders in two phases. The first phase was to focus on several thousand priority
absconders "who come from countries in which there has been al Qaeda terrorist
presence or activity . . . because some of them have information that could assist our
campaign against terrorism." The second phase of the initiative was to locate and deport
the remaining absconders/1

(U) The INS National Security Unit (NSU) took charge of the project/11 There were
approximately 5,200 priority absconder subjects when the project began.vm By the
summer of 2002, the initiative had resulted in the apprehension of approximately 700
fugitives.1X By early 2003, 1,139 of the designated absconders had been apprehended;
immigration authorities had removed from the country 803 of these, and 224 were in
custody and awaiting removal. No absconders who were removed as part of the Phase I
group were deported under a terrorism statute, prosecuted for terrorist related crimes, or
linked in any way to terrorism. The Commission does not know how many of the 5,000
AAI cases were entered into NCIC, but we believe that not all of them were, and that
only a minority may have been entered due to the poor quality of the INS' records. In
addition, the Commission believes the remaining absconders who were not apprehended
in the first phase of the program no longer receive special attention from INS/DHS
enforcement personnel.

8 USC 1253 (failure to depart, imprisonment up to four years, 10 years if a criminal); 8 USC 1324d
(failure to depart, civil fine of $500 a day); 8 USC 1326 (reentry after deportation, imprisonment from two
to 20 years).
" Ziglar MFR.
;ii NCIC 2000, Operating Manual, Section 5.6
iv Ziglar MFR.
v Ziglar MFR.
vlMemorandum from the Deputy Attorney General to Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization
Service, Director Federal Bureau of Investigation, Director, U.S. Marshals Service, US Attorneys, Subject:
Guidance for Absconder Apprehension Initiative, January 25, 2002.
™ Nardi MFR.; see also, Testimony of Joe Green, INS Assistant Commissioner for Investigations, before
the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, June 19, 2002.
vm Nardi MFR; see also, Testimony of Joe Green, INS Assistant Commissioner for Investigations, before
the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, June 19, 2002; The Commission has learned that of the
initial group of approximately 5,000 priority absconders: 24 were confirmed dead, 55 were determined to
be female (and therefore outside the scope of the AAI), 390 had left the U.S. on their own while under a
warrant of deportation, 14 had applied for or been granted political asylum.
Testimony of Joe Green, INS Assistant Commissioner for Investigations, before the House Judiciary
Subcommittee on Immigration, June 19, 2002.
The Absconder Apprehension Initiative

jJnder U.S. immigration law.^ abscgnders are npn-citizens who willfully fail to depart the_ _ _ , - \:
United States after receiving a final order of deportation from an Immigration Judge.
They jnay bejprgsecuted_for federal jelony,,1 After September^11th, INS_Cqrnmis_sio_ner „ _ - \: are amenable to
James Ziglar proposed^^ the na^mes of 314,000 absconders be placed in the National ~ ~ •{ Deleted: prosecution
Crime Information Center (NCIC) database Wanted Persons file accessible by State and ~ ~ ~ -[ Deleted: the inclusion of
local law enforcement.2 To meet NCIC standards, every absconder entry had to be
supported by a set of fingerprints and a photograph so that the INS Law Enforcement
Support Center (LESC) could electronically transmit them to the querying law
enforcement official within ten minutes.3 If the absconder's identity was confirmed, then
the INS could place a federal detainer or arrange for an INS agent to take the individual
into custody and proceed with removal. Finding terrorists was not a focus of the
program.4 Attorney General Ashcroft liked the idea and Commissioner Ziglar announced
it on December 5, 2001.5 Shortly thereafter, based on a recommendation from an aide to
the Attorney General, the initiative was re-cast as a counterterrorism program.6

Deputy Attorney General Thompson on January 25, 2002 provided guidance for the
newly named Absconder Apprehension Initiative (AAI). He explained that the object of
the initiative was to deport 314,000 alien fugitives., known as absconders^ in two phases.
The first phase was to focus on several thousand priority absconders "who come from
countries in which there has been al Qaeda terrorist presence or activity . . . because some
of them have information that could assist our campaign against terrorism." 7 These
"special interest countries" were Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Djibouti,
Egypt, Eritrea, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya,
Malaysia, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan,
Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates,
Uzbekistan, Yemen, Territories of Gaza and the West bank. DAG Thompson said that
the first group to be investigated would be "a group of fewer than a thousand, many of
whom appear to be convicted felons." The second phase of the initiative was to locate
and deport the remaining absconders.8

8 USC 1253 (failure to depart, imprisonment up to four years, 10 years if a criminal); 8 USC 1324d
(failure to depart, civil fine of $500 a day); 8 USC 1326 (reentry after deportation, imprisonment from two
to 20 years).
2 Ziglar MFR 11/24/03 p.22
3 NCIC 2000, Operating Manual, Section 5.6
4 Ziglar MFR p.22
5 Ziglar MFR p. 23
6 Ziglar MFR p.23
7 NSU AAI final report
8 Memorandum from the Deputy Attorney General to Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization
Service, Director Federal Bureau of Investigation, Director, U.S. Marshals Service, US Attorneys, Subject:
Guidance for Absconder Apprehension Initiative, January 25, 2002.
The Deputy Attorney General directed:

• the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF) to remove any names that
were subjects of active terrorist investigations;9
• the INS Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC) to review the paper files to
exclude duplications, find current addresses, and confirm the validity of the
deportation warrant and proper notice; to transmit an "absconder fugitive file" to
the INS field office located in the INS district of the absconder's last known
address; and to enter the data into NCIC;
• the INS and FBI to create "apprehension teams" to locate, apprehend, and
interview each absconder, soliciting extra staffing as needed from the local U.S.
Attorney's Anti-terrorism Task Force (ATTF).
• the INS to take absconders into custody pursuant to civil warrant arrest authority
and the FBI to arrest them based on federal felony authority, to treat them as
criminal suspects, and afforded all standard procedural rights and constitutional
protections, and provided legal incentives (money and "S" Visas under the
Responsible Cooperators Program) to cooperate;
• the investigators to conduct interviews following a standard interview form to be
provided and to provide written results to be entered into a Computerized
Reporting System;
• the FBI to make a timely request to the U.S. Attorney's office if further
counterterrorism inquiries are needed, since once in INS custody, the absconder is
subject to immediate removal;
• the U.S. Attorney's office to consider prosecution if the non-citizen has engaged
in criminal conduct.

At the INS, the National Security Unit (NSU) was tasked with of the project. 10^The __ , - -(Deleted: There were
project was aimed at 5.923 Delected absconderj when die project began.^^ The AAI _ _ _ - - \: absconder subjects
project was a massive undertaking for the NSU. a small unit that was the INS' primary \:
counter terrorism unit. The NSU developed a special project staff of its own agents, INS
intelligence analysts from the Office of Intelligence, and detailed agents from the INS
field offices, as many as 10 at a time, to develop the project. These additional officers
organized the leads, made copies of the documents in the file, created the work file, did
data entry and kept track of the case assignment.12 For each absconder case where a last
known address could be found, the NSU created a work file and sent it to a designated
supervisory special agent POC in the INS field office located in that geographic area. T Deleted: The AAI project was a
massive undertaking for the NSU, a small
The administrative tasks associated with the AAI required the detailing of many officers unit that was the INS" primary counter
terrorism unit.

The Commission believes that the FTTTF did remove some subjects from the list; we have not yet
learned how many and whether these subjects remained of interest to the FBI on terrorism grounds. Nardi
MFRp,
10 Nardi MFR 4/1/04 p. 1; see also, Testimony of Joe Green, INS Assistant Commissioner for
Investigations, before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, June 19, 2002.
11 Nardi MFR p. 1 ; see also, Testimony of Joe Green, INS Assistant Commissioner for Investigations,
before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, June 19, 2002.
12 Ziglar MFR, p. 22
to the NSU.Twhich left fewer special agents available to investigate the AAI cases in the __., ' \: something that
field.13

To meet the terrorist-related reporting requirements imposed by the Department of

Justice, the NSU developed special reporting requirements, to ensure that all encounters
with designated absconders was treated as a "significant incident" and therefore reported
within 24 hours of the incident.14
The directive from the Attorney General did not define what was meant by "from
countries". Under the immigration laws there are two groups that could be included.
Persons who were citizens of the country and persons who were born in one of these
countries.

By Citizenship Country By Birth

134 Afghanistan 135
1 Albania
102 Algeria 101
20 Armenia
1 Australia
1 Austria
Azerbaijan 1
2 Bahrain 2
4 Bangladesh 3
21 Canada 1
1 Denmark
329 Egypt 333
1 Eritrea
1 Ethiopia 4
1 France 1
3 Germany
1 Ghana
1 Iceland
1 India 1
164 Indonesia 166
267 Iran 293
3 Israel 11
319 Jordan 293
33 Kazakhstan 29
1 Kuwait 21

13 NardiMFR, p 1-2
14 In the usual course of immigration enforcement activity, significant incidents are those
that involve death or injury of an officer, significant public and media interest, or an
unusual event, such as the apprehension of large numbers of smuggled aliens.
1 Laos
212 Lebanon 213
7 Libya 10
74 Malaysia 75
Mexico 2
95 Morocco 97
1 Netherlands
Nicaragua 1
1 New Zealand
2,135 Pakistan 2,140
1 Panama
712 Philippines 715
1 Qatar 1
4 Russia 2
27 Saudi Arabia 29
Sierra Leone 2
838 Somalia 841
1 South Africa
Spain 1
7 Stateless 1
102 Sudan 102
2 Sweden
112 Syria 114
1 Tajikistan
63 Thailand 65
3 Turkmenistan 1
1 Ukraine
5 United Arab Emirates 5
1 United Kingdom 1
2 Unknown 1
USSR 9
8 Uzbekistan 9
Vietnam 1
94 Yemen 90

_ -' Deleted: The Commission has learned

that of the initial group of approximately
Breakdown of the Cases Closed15 5,932 priority absconders, NSU was able
to locate or determine the status of 2,261.
This represents 38% of the total.lf
1i

15 Closing report as of 7/10/03 when the AAI Project was transferred from Investigations National Security
Unit to Detention and Removal Office.
Phase 1 of the AAI contained 5.932 cases. The breakdown above, of closed cases, lists a
total of 4.074. The difference of 1.858 would be the remaining open cases still under
investigation or cases for which there was no final report.

Of the 4.074 closed cases. 1.807 could not be located or verified as having left the U.S.
The total number of absconder cases that were actually closed as a result of verifying that
the subject was no loneer an absconder was 2.267 or about 38% of the original number
of 5.932.

AAI Phase 1
5,932 total initial cases
2,267 cases closed after investigation verified departure or immigration status
1,807 cases closed after investigation, unable to locate or verify immigration status
704 absconders located and removed from U.S. during Phase 1
1,858 cases remain open
14 cases referred to FBI for further investigation relating to possible terrorist links
0 cases prosecuted or removed on terrorism grounds

We also have learned that:

• by the summer of 2002. the initiative had resulted in the apprehension of

approximately 700 fugitives.16
• by early 2003.1.139 of the designated absconders had been apprehended.
• immigration authorities had removed from the country 704. and 224 were in
custody and awaiting removal.
• U.S. Attorneys had criminally prosecuted 45 of the absconders. 41 were
prosecuted for criminal immigration violations.17
• No absconders who were removed as part of the Phase I group, were deported
under a terrorism statute, prosecuted for terrorist related crimes, or linked in any
way to terrorism. INS referred 14 cases to the FBI based on possible links to
terrorism.

• Administrative closing 55
• Asylee/Refugee 14
• Board of Immigration Appeals 42
• Convention Against Torture 3

Testimony of Joe Green. INS Assistant Commissioner for Investigations, before the House Judiciary
Subcommittee on Immigration. June 19. 2002.
Testimony of Mike Dougherty. Director of Operations. Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE). Department of Homeland Security, before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on
Immigration. May 8. 2003. A total of 41 were charged with criminal immigration violations.
 • Deceased 24
• Duplicate 12
• Identified as Females18 55
• In State or Federal Custody 45
• In Legal Non-Immigrant Status 11
• LIFE Act Applicant 8
• Legal Permanent Resident 191
• Motion to Reopen Deportation Hearing 64
• No Final Deportation Order 99
• Under Order of Supervision 72
• Other19 56
• Pending Application for Immigration Benefits 47
• Prior Removal 99
• Refused Entry 7
• Released on Bond 122
• Removed from U.S. 704
• Released on Order of Recognizance 25
• Self-deported20 390
• Stay of Deportation or Removal2' 10
• Temporary Protected Status (IPS)22 18
• Unable to Locate or Leads Exhausted 1807
• United States Citizen 80
• Waiver Approved 5
• Withholding 9
Jotal 4.074 Deleted: r
1
We also have learned that: K
1
<#>by the summer of 2002, the initiative
National Crime Information Computer (NCIC) had resulted in the apprehension of
approximately 700 fugitives.23 H
<#>by early 2003, 1,139 of the
NCIC criminal record checks were conducted on all AAI cases. A total of 863 had a designated absconders had been
apprehended.^
criminal history. In many cases the disposition of the cases was not part of the NCIC <#>immigration authorities had removed
record. Case agents determined what action was appropriate in each case. from the country 803, and 224 were in
custody and awaiting removal.^
<#>U.S. Attorneys have criminally
prosecuting 45 of the absconders.24 ^
<#>No absconders who were removed as
18 If the alien was identified as female, the case was removed from the AAI project. part of the Phase I group, were deported
19 Includes juveniles, informants, government sources, for file consolidation, post order custody review, under a terrorism statute, prosecuted for
reconsideration by District Director terrorist related crimes, or linked in any
way to terrorism.1
20 Aliens under a final order of deportation who depart the United States voluntarily, legally deport
<#>14 cases had sufficient terrorism links
themselves that they were referred to the local FBI
21 Deportation is the legal term as expressed in the IN A. At some point INS decided to change the term officel]
"deportation" and use the term "removal" in response to legislative changes.
22 TPS applies to countries designated by the President as areas of war, disturbance, natural disaster, etc.
TPS status can be extended by the President and may continue for years. Aliens must apply for TPS status
and cannot usually be removed from the United States. Absconders in this category were from Lebanon,
Sierra Leone, Somalia and Sudan. When they were located, a determination was made as to whether they
were a threat. If it was determined that they were not, they were removed from the AAI project as they
could not be removed.
NCIC hits resulted in 95 individuals being located25. This was the result of routine record
checks conducted by law enforcement agencies. The LESC confirms all NCIC hits on
immigration absconders in the NCIC Immigration Violators File. The LESC places a
detainer on the alien and refers the case to the local ICE field office for follow-up.

Three absconders were located as a result of the routine interaction between the FBI and
the LESC involving aliens who have been arrested and fingerprinted for criminal activity.

How could aliens under final orders obtain legal permanent residence
or be naturalized?
A total of 191 absconders were found to be legal permanent residents when located.
Another 80 had been naturalized and were United States citizens. This was a total of 271
cases or about 5%.

INS record keeping has always been unreliable. The reasons are many. The INS "A" file
is actually a paper file. The file is created from an alien's name and was not linked to a
biometric identifier. Aliens may use a variety of name variations or they may use aliases
to commit immigration fraud or to avoid deportation. Multiple files are not uncommon
as the alien may apply for various immigration benefits at the same time.26

In some cases the reason can be explained by the fact that the final order of deportation
had been issued years previously. The alien had departed and then legally returned to the
United States. In other cases, it was because the United States had no system to record
departures and therefore the warrant of deportation was issued after the alien had already
departed.

Some files were created when the alien applied for immigration benefits and the original
"A" was no located or known. This resulted in the alien having two immigration tracks.
One file was on the enforcement side of INS and the other was a temporary file on the
service side of INS. With over a million aliens arrested each year and over a million
aliens applying for benefits most years, the INS was overwhelmed.

Not all 5,000 AAI cases were actually entered into NCIC. Immigration records do not
always provide the documents required by NCIC to support entry into the system. The
Commission believes the remaining absconders who were not apprehended in the first
phase of the program, no longer receive special attention from INS/DHS enforcement
personnel. The DHS is working to implement the proposed phase two of the project, and

25 Not all law enforcement agencies arrest immigration absconders even after they have received a "hit"
from NCIC. Some agencies believe that they cannot legally arrest or detain an alien unless a crirninal arrest
warrant has been issued.
26 Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, the blind sheik, who was convicted of terrorism, had two immigration files
at the same time. He did this by changing his name slightly and filing for immigration benefits at New
York City and Newark, New Jersey. Immigration files.
incorporate in the same systematic fashion the remaining 314,000 absconders—or the
current number-into the NCIC database after careful review.

A continuing problem is the failure to have a compatible fingerprint system between the
FBI and the INS/ICE. NCIC records contain a complete set of fingerprints which are
readable by the IAFIS system. INS/ICE continues to use the two index finger prints that
can be matched in the IDENT system. The joining of the two systems has been under
development for many years but is behind schedule.

Lessons Learned

• Despite the commitment of extensive investigative resources, only 38% of the

absconders could be located or their immigration status verified
• The immigration records system is so poor that about 5% of the absconders were
not deportable but had become legal residents or naturalized citizens
• Many of the absconders were found to have left the United States but without a
verifiable entry-exit system their cases remained open
• A biographic identifier must be used to link an individual whenever there is
interaction with the immigration system
• Once someone enters the United States, either legally through a port of entry or
illegally across an unguarded border, it is nearly impossible to locate them
without extraordinary effort or pure luck,
PROTECT AND PREPARE

17. Integrate border security into national security^ Deleted:, while welcoming lawful
visitors and immigrants through
efficient border channels, and
17a. Stopping the movement of terrorists must become a part of the international preventing entry outside them.
strategy against terrorists.TTerrqrists can be intercejyted with better border and Deleted: Border and transportation
transportation security. The higher the risk preelection,, the more difficult ij will security will prevent or hobble plots by
intercepting terrorists.
be for terrorists enter and remain in the United States^
( Deleted: detection
{ Deleted: is
17b. Terrorists use a variety of methods to travel, enter and stay in countries
Deleted: greater the likelihood that
clandestinely. (Altered,and counterfeit passports and visas, specific travel terrorists will cease trying.
methods and routes, and liaisons with corrupt foreign government officials,
~( Deleted: Manipulated
human smugglers, and travel agencies, are examples of common tactics.)
Sophisticated programs specifically designed to detect these mernod^must be Deleted: the concealment methods
themselves
developed. This effort is the primary means by which the United States and its
allies will be able to intercept traveling terrorists, and one way to uncover them if
they succeed in entering.

17c. Form a new partnership between the intelligence and border security
communities to develop and use this "travel intelligence."

— The intelligence community must perform classic, standard intelligence work.

Border officials must collect and analyze information^atabases^interviews, _ - j Deleted:fromtheir working and
inspections, surveillance and criminal investigations. " - reference
| Deleted: and

- Terrorist travel specialists should be trained and placed at consular posts, ports
of entry, and immigratiori^qffices. Current findings and tools should be integrated _ _ , - \; services
into the_Homeland Security'sUS^ISITprogram,Land all otherILS. border „- | Deleted:
security programs. State and local officials also should be involved.

17d. Accelerate the construction of US^yiSIT, which links ail mdividuaFs digital _ , _ - \:
photo and fingerprints to reference databases, like terrorist watchlists. Make this
program the foundation for an integrated US border entry-exit screening system
that begins with visa applications, covers entrances and exits from the country,
and extends through naturalization.

17e. Establish the ability to monitor the Borders of the United States and respond _ „ _ - \: territorial
to unauthorized^entries. Seek to further safeguard the United States by , - \: unknown
developing joint approaches to North American border security with Canada and
Mexico.
' Deleted: , to strengthen the United
17f. Take the lead^ with allies,, in developing an integrated approach to screening -•' {state's own and global border security
individuals worldwide, ^nd support other nations[^efforts to increase use of /_. - -j Deleted: The United states should
biometric identification; improve £crutiny and procedures at each point in the " ^ I drive and
travel system; and use common_standardsLtha1^make it easier to share mjormatipn. _" % 1 Deleted: governments'
x^x ~[ Deleted: the level of
1 Deleted: border and access process
x ^
17g. Homeland Security should use the intelligence described above to develop
proactive enforcement and regulatory programs to target terrorists and their travel
facilitators overseas and in the U.S. It is appropriate to use all laws, including
immigration laws, to stop and prevent attacks. New programs should be evaluated
in light of the lessons learned from actions taken post 9/11v , - -f Deleted: Hastily designed uses of
immigration laws against American
Arabs and Muslims that are not
17h.TThe entry, of students, scholars, businessmen, and tourists is important to our^ * demonsn-abiy effective in preventing
economy and cultural"vitality,"anyejJianc^asVinfluencearound^e world] ~ ~_ ^ KS^Si^c^S,"
Lawful immigration also reflects national interests and ideals. Immigration policy * \ [ and the alienation of these communities.
must find a balance between an open door and a moat. Illegal entry^nd a v^\ Deleted: The
breakdown in the immigration benefits system in the United States, however, \ V (Deleted: of large numbers
make more difficult the task of detecting and deterring terrorists. National \ formatted; indent- Left- o s"
security provides a compelling reason to establish a safe, orderly, rational, and \ Deleted- to—
humane immigration system. w ',. ')
T ' Deleted: When rules to provide security
do not actually prevent terrorist entry, and
instead exclude lawful visitors, they need
to be revised
•1 Deleted:
Deleted: across our borders
Deleted: •!
1
1
1
1
 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE / LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

Pursuant to the Alien Absconder Initiative (AAI) guidance memorandum from the
Deputy Attorney General, dated January 25, 2002, the Foreign Terrorist
Tracking Task Force (FTTTF) compiled a list of alien absconders per the criteria
detailed in the response to question #1. The INS Headquarters National
Security Unit (NSU) was responsible for managing Phase I of the project from
January 25, 2002 through July 2003. After July 2003, the Detention and
Removal Office (DRO) assumed management of the initiative.

1. Who was targeted in the original list of 5,900 aliens?

The total number of alien absconders who were targeted during Phase I of
the Alien Absconder Initiative (AAI) was 5923. The alien absconders were
all males from "countries in which the Intelligence Community indicated Al-
Qaeda terrorist presence or activity." All subjects identified had received
final orders of deportation/removal and had absconded. The Attorney
General and the FTTTF developed the following criteria that was used to
determine whether an individual was included on the list: 1) males; 2)
between ages of 18 - 50; and 3) from "special interest countries."1

2. What was the mechanism for determining who was to be included in the
original list?

Immigration database searches were conducted in the Deportable Alien

Control System (DACS) for male alien absconders between the ages of
18-50 who were from countries referenced in the response to question #1.

3. How many had identifiable terrorist indicators?

During AAI Phase I, none of the subjects had been identified as possible
terrorist threats. The individuals were included in Phase I based on the
criteria as previously described in the response to question #1.

4. How many were from countries identified as supporting terrorism?

The subjects' Alien Registration Files (A-Files) were examined to

determine the subjects' country of birth and country of citizenship based
on the list of "special interest countries." As the term "from" used in the

The following list of countries from a compilation of State Department and other United States
government lists are referenced as "special interest countries:" Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain,
Bangladesh, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Lebanon,
Libya, Malaysia, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan,
Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan,
Yemen, Territories of Gaza & the West Bank

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE / LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE