ONLY ONE OFFENSE G.R. No. L-46079 April 17, 1989 ESTEBAN C. MANUEL, petitioner, vs. THE HON.

ERNANI CRUZ PAO as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Br. XVIII, Q.C., ANTONIO A. BARANDA, EDSEL LABAYEN and ROLANDO GATMAITAN, respondents. CRUZ, J.: FACTS: On April 21, 1976 a raid was conducted by the agents of Anti-Smuggling Action Center (ASAC) on 2 rooms in the Tokyo Hotel in Binondo pursuant to a warrant of seizure and detention issued by the Acting Collector of Customs of Manila. The raid resulted in the seizure of several articles allegedly smuggled into the country by their owners, three of whom were tourists from Hongkong. These articles subsequently became the subject of seizure proceedings in the Bureau of Customs but most of them were ordered released upon proof that the customs duties and other charges thereon had been duly paid as evidenced by the corresponding official receipts. While the seizure proceedings were pending, the petitioner, as counsel for the owners of the seized articles, sent a letter to the Chairman of the ASAC in which he complained about the conduct of the raid and demanded that the persons responsible therefore be investigated. Petitioner said the agents subjected Ng Woo Hay to indignities and took her necklace and bracelet and her son's wristwatch plus HK$ 70. The Chairman of the ASAC ordered the investigation as demanded, but the agents charged were all exonerated. Not satisfied with the decision, the petitioner, on behalf of his clients, filed a complaint for robbery against the same agents with the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila. However, this was later withdrawn because petitioner found prosecutors unsympathetic and so he filed a civil action for damages against the agents. After three days, the Bulletin Today published a news item based on petitioner's letter to ASAC. Based on the article, an Information for libel was filed against the petitioner, Lee Kee Ming and Ng Woo Hay in the CFI of Rizal . A reading of the information does not show why the two Chinese were included in the charge; all it said was that they were the clients of the petitioner. As for the petitioner himself, it was alleged that he had committed the crime of libel by writing the letter of 4/29/1976 and by causing the publication of the news item in the Bulletin Today. Petitioner moved to quash the case, contending that: his letter to the ASAC Chairman was not actionable because it was a privileged communication; that the news report in the Bulletin Today was not based on the letter-complaint; and that in any case it was a fair and true report of a judicial proceeding and therefore also privileged. The motion was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in sustaining the information? YES RULING: From the viewpoint of procedural and substantive law, the charge is defective. The information should not have been filed at all and that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash the information on the ground that the allegation petitions therein did not constitute an offense.

PROCEDURAL LAW: There is much to fault about the information. The two Chinese clients who were impleaded with the petitioner were charged with absolutely nothing, prompting the respondent judge to peremptorily dismiss the information as to them. o The information imputed to the remaining accused pertained to two different offenses: writing the allegedly libelous letter and causing the publication of the allegedly libelous news report. o Under 12 of Rule 110, it is not allowed. The rule provides that: a complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses. If libelous the letter and the news report constituted separate offenses that should have been charged in separate informations. (However, not having been raised in the motion to quash, that ground was deemed waived under Rule 15, 8, of the Rules of Court.)

SUBSTANTIVE LAW: The charge is even more defective. Neither the letter nor the news account was libelous. o The applicable provision in the Revised Penal Code reads as follows:

Article 354. Requirement for publicity. Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases: (1) A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and (2) A fair and true report, made in good faith, without comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.

The LETTER COMES UNDER ITEM 1, constituting privileged communication, as it was addressed by the petitioner to the ASAC Chairman to complain against the conduct of his men during the raid. The complaint was addressed to the official who had authority over them and could impose the proper disciplinary sanctions. Significantly, as an index of good faith, the letter was sent privately directly to the addressee, without any fanfare or publicity. The NEWS ITEM COMES UNDER ITEM 2 as it is a true and fair report of a judicial proceeding, made in good faith and without comments or remarks. This is also privileged. It is true that the matters mentioned in Article 354 as exceptions to the general rule are not absolutely privileged and are still actionable. However, since what is presumed is not malice but in fact lack of malice, it is for the prosecution to overcome that presumption by proof that the accused was actually motivated by malice. Absent such proof, the charge must fail. GENERALLY, the information should not be dismissed outright because the prosecution must first be given a chance to introduce evidence to overcome the presumption. HOWEVER, where it appears from the allegations in the information itself that the accused acted in good faith and for justifiable ends in making the allegedly libelous imputations, and in pertinent pleadings, there is no need to prolong the proceedings to the prejudice of the defendant. The Court can and should dismiss the charge without further ado. In People v. Andres: The prosecution claims that the trial court erred in dismissing the case on a mere motion to quash, contending that the trial judge's conclusion on the face of the information that defendant-appellee was prompted only by good motives assumes a fact to be proved, and that the alleged privileged nature of defendant-appellee's publication is a matter of defense and is not a proper ground for dismissal of the complaint for libel When in the information itself it appears that the communication alleged to be libelous is contained in an appropriate pleading in a court proceeding, the privilege becomes at once apparent and defendant need not wait until the trial and produce evidence before he can raise the question of privilege . And if, the questioned imputations appear to be really pertinent and relevant to defendant's plea for reconsideration based on complainant's supposed partiality and abuse of power from which defendant has a right to seek relief in vindication of his client's interest as a litigant in complainant's court, it would become evident that the facts thus alleged in the information would not constitute an offense of libel. As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make alleged defamatory matter privileged, the courts are inclined to be liberal. The matter to which the privilege does not extend must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its irrelevancy and impropriety. Having this in mind, it cannot be said that the trial court committed a reversible error in this case of finding that the allegations in the information itself present a case of an absolutely privileged communication justifying the dismissal of the case.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The orders of the respondent judge dated March 23, 1977, and April 27, 1977, are SET ASIDE and Criminal Case No. Q-7045, in his court, is DISMISSED. PREJUDICIAL QUESTION G.R. No. L-56995 August 30, 1982 DR. RAYMUNDO R. LIBRODO, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE L. COSCOLLUELA, JR., Judge, Branch VII, Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, DEMOCRATA GUANTERO and ZOSIMO GUANTERO, respondents. MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: FACTS: Felipe Rivera died leaving certain properties in San Carlos, Negros Occidental. Among his HEIRS were Rufino Rivera Damandaman, Democrata Guantero and Zosimo Guantero. o The estate was settled in Special Proceedings No. 265 and was terminated on the basis of a Project of Partition. o Lots 559-B, 1906-B, 1910-B, and 1901-B of the San Carlos cadaster (sugar lands) were adjudicated as the share of Rufino Rivera Damandaman. A CONTRACT OF LEASE was entered into between Rufino Rivera Damandaman and Raymundo R. Librodo over the parcels of sugar lands, for 10 agricultural crop years.

Subsequently, Democrata Guantero filed a Motion to Reopen the intestate proceedings. Alleging that the subdivision plan submitted was made in her absence and that the boundaries had not been plotted, the judgment of the Intestate Court had not become final. According to petitioner, on 12/5/1977, the Guanteros feloniously harvested the sugar cane from the lots. Apparently, nothing was done about it, but on August 10, 1978, at petitioner's instance a: o CRIMINAL CASE FOR THEFT was filed against the Guanteros: That at or about 6:30 A.M. of 12/5/1977, the Guanteros feloniously cut, harvested, gathered and carried away all sugar cane planted on Lot No. 559-B-1 under lease and cultivation by petitioner causing damage to the latter in the total sum of P15,120.00 (INFORMATION).

During the pendency of the Criminal Action, petitioner instituted a CIVIL CASE FOR DAMAGES the Guanteros. Petitioner averred that: During the period from 12/5/1977 to 12/11/1977, respondents cut, stole and carried away the sugar cane planted by him as lessee on Lots 559-B, 1906-B-I and 1910-B-1 and at the same time occupied the lots and prevented him from cultivating or taking possession, thereby depriving him of income for 2 years of no less than P78,280.00, in addition to causing him moral and exemplary damages. Respondents asserted that the lots are held in co-ownership among the heirs of the late Felipe Rivera and are the subject of Special Proceedings No. 265 still pending. The Guanteros filed a MOTION TO SUSPEND proceedings in the Criminal Action on the ground of pendency of : (1) the Damages Suit, (2) Special Proceeding and (3) Civil Case for Ejectment instituted by Damandaman against private respondent Democrata Guantero. PRS CONTENTION: The Intestate proceeding, the Ejectment Case and the Damages Suit focused on the issues of possession and ownership of the lots involved. Hence, determinative of their guilt in the Criminal Action and constitutive of a prejudicial question. PETITIONERS CONTENTION: The question of ownership was not involved in the Damages Suit nor in the Criminal Action and that the issue of possession is not a prejudicial question to the Criminal Action. Petitioner further averred that he was not a party in the Intestate Proceeding nor in the Ejectment Case so that the outcome of those cases would not affect his rights as a planter in good faith. On February 28, 1980, respondent Court issued the challenged Order finding that a prejudicial question existed and suspending the criminal proceedings. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issues in the three civil cases, namely, the Intestate Proceedings, the Ejectment Case and the Damages Suit, raise a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the Criminal Action? NO RULING:

A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. For it to suspend the criminal action , it must appear that the case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based and that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. o Generally, it comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In the case at bar, none of the issues raised in the three civil cases invoked by private respondents would constitute a prejudicial question to the Criminal Action. o The INTESTATE PROCEEDING is a suit between co-heirs and involves facts totally unrelated to the Criminal Action. Even if the Intestate Court should annul the project of partition and uphold private respondents' ownership of the lots, that would not be determinative of the criminal responsibility of the Guanteros for theft of the standing sugar crop. The EJECTMENT CASE involves the issue of possession between co-heirs and petitioner is not a party to the case. A decision in favor of the Guanteros would not affect the rights of petitioner, which spring from his lease contract. In the eventuality that private respondents should prevail, they are not without legal remedy against their co-heir Damandaman. As for the DAMAGES SUIT, the suit is actually the civil aspect arising from the criminal offense treated of in the Criminal Action. Based as the two cases are on the same facts, and the entitlement to damages being predicated on the unlawful taking treated of in the Criminal Action, no necessity arises for that civil case to be determined ahead of the Criminal Action.

The issues raised in the civil cases do not involve the pivotal question of who planted the sugar cane and are not determinative of guilt or innocence in the Criminal Action. If as the Guanteros contend, they were the ones who did the planting, that is a matter of defense that may be interposed by them in the Criminal Action. It is not an issue that must be pre-emptively resolved in the civil cases before proceedings in the Criminal Action may be undertaken.

WHEREFORE, the orders of the respondent Judge are hereby SET ASIDE and he is hereby directed to proceed without undue delay with the trial of said criminal action.