Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Pelaez v. Auditor General Facts: Pursuant to Sec 68 of the RAC, the President issued EOs 93121, 124, and 126-129 which created 33 provinces. Pelaez instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain
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Vilas v. City of Manila (supra, see p.3) Padilla v. COMELEC Facts: A plebiscite in the matter of the creation of the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa was held in the municipality of Labo pursuant to RA 7155 and the Constitution. Only 2890 favored its creation while 339 voted against it. The Plebiscite Board of Canvassers declared the rejection and disapproval of the independent Municipality of TNL. Gov. Padilla seeks to set aside the plebiscite and prays that a new plebiscite be undertaken because the previous one was a complete failure and the results obtained were invalid and illegal because the plebiscite should have been conducted only in the political units affected, i.e., the 12 barangays comprising TNL, to the exclusion of the remaining areas of the mother unit. Issue: WON the plebiscite conducted is valid. YES. Padillas contention that the Tan ruling has been superseded by the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, hence reinstating the Paredes ruling is untenable. Old law: political unit or units New law: political units The deletion of the words unit or does not affect the Tan ruling. Concom debates: Davide asked for deletion of unit or because the plebiscite is to be conducted in all units affected.
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Binay v. Domingo Facts: Resolution 60 confirming the ongoing burial assistance program initiated by the mayors office. Under this program, bereaved families whose gross family income does not exceed 2k/month will receive a 500php cash relief to be taken out of unappropriated available funds existing in the municipal treasury. The Metro Manila Commission approved Resolution 60. Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a disbursement of P400,000 for the implementation of the Burial Assistance Program. R 60 was referred to the Commission on Audit for its expected allowance in audit. Based on its preliminary findings, COA disapproved R 60 and disallowed in audit the disbursement of funds for the
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fishermen? NO. Since the Constitution does not specifically provide a definition of the terms "subsistence" or "marginal" fishermen, they should be construed in their general and ordinary sense. A marginal fisherman is an individual engaged in fishing whose margin of return or reward in his harvest of fish as measured by existing price levels is barely sufficient to yield a profit or cover the cost of gathering the fish, while a subsistence fisherman is one whose catch yields but the irreducible minimum for his livelihood. Section 131(p) of the LGC (R.A. No. 7160) defines a marginal farmer or fisherman as "an individual engaged in subsistence farming or fishing which shall be limited to the sale, barter or exchange of agricultural or marine products produced by himself and his immediate family." It bears repeating that nothing in the record supports a finding that any petitioner falls within these definitions. Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nation's marine wealth. What the provision merely recognizes is that the State may allow, by law, cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays and lagoons. Anent Section 7 of Article XIII, it speaks not only of the use of communal marine and fishing resources, but of their protection, development and conservation. As hereafter shown, the ordinances in question are meant precisely to protect and conserve our marine resources to the end that
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Sangalang v. IAC Facts: Studies were made by Mayor Yabut et al, on the feasibility of opening streets in Bel-Air calculated to alleviate traffic congestion along the public streets adjacent to Bel-Air. Based on the studies, it was deemed necessary, in the interest of the general public to open to traffic Amapola, Mercedes, Zodia, Jupiter, Neptune, Orbit, and Paseo de Roxas streets. According to Bel-Air they own the streets and as such, should not be deprived of them without just compensation. Issue: WON the mayor acted arbitrarily in opening up Jupiter and Orbit streets. NO.
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Moday v. CA Facts: The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in Agusan del Sur passed R 43-89, "Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition for Expropriation of a One (1) Hectare Portion of Lot No. 6138-Pls-4 Along the National Highway Owned by Percival Moday for the Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and Other Government Sports Facilities." R 43-89 was approved by then Municipal Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo and transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for its approval. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved said Resolution and returned it with the comment that "expropriation is unnecessary considering that there are still available lots in Bunawan for the establishment of the government center." Bunawan filed a petition for Eminent Domain against petitioner Percival Moday, as well as his parents before the
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Mabelle O. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, was promulgated
pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337, the LGC, which provides: A LGU may, through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian exercise the right of eminent domain and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose. Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that local government, units must first secure the approval of the Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use, before they can institute the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is no provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expressly subjects the expropriation of agricultural lands by LGUs to the control of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The closest provision of law that the CA could cite to justify the intervention of the Department of Agrarian Reform in expropriation matters is Section 65 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, which reads: Sec. 65. Conversion of Lands. After the lapse of five (5) years from its award, when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for, agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes, the DAR, upon application of the beneficiary or the landowner, with due notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may authorize the reclassification or conversion of the land and its disposition: Provided, That the beneficiary shall have fully paid his obligation. The opening, adverbial phrase of the provision sends signals that it applies to lands previously placed under the agrarian reform program as it speaks of "the lapse of five (5) years from its award." The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in Section 4 (k) and 5 (1) of Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987, cannot be the source of the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to determine the suitability of a parcel of agricultural land for the purpose to which it would be devoted by the expropriating authority. While those rules vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversions of agricultural lands for residential, commercial or industrial uses, such authority is limited to the applications for reclassification submitted by the land owners or tenant beneficiaries. Statutes conferring the power of eminent domain to political subdivisions cannot be broadened or constricted by implication. To sustain the CA would mean that the LGUs can no longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc, without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use. Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the LGU that shall determine whether the use of the property sought to be expropriated shall be public, the same being an expression of legislative policy. The courts defer to such legislative determination and will intervene only when a particular undertaking has no real or substantial relation to the public use. There is also an ancient rule that restrictive statutes, no matter how broad their terms are, do not embrace the sovereign unless the sovereign is specially mentioned as subject thereto. The Republic of the Philippines, as sovereign, or its political subdivisions, as holders of delegated sovereign powers, cannot be bound by provisions of law couched in general term.
Meycauayan v. IAC Facts: The Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation filed with the Office of the Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, an application for a permit to fence a parcel of land. The fencing of said property was allegedly to enable the storage of the respondent's heavy equipment and various finished products such as large diameter steel pipes, pontoon pipes for ports, wharves, and harbors, bridge components, pre-stressed girders and piles, large diameter concrete pipes, and parts for low cost housing. In the same year, the Municipal Council of Meycauayan, headed by then Mayor Celso R. Legaspi, passed Resolution No. 258, Series of 1975, manifesting the intention to expropriate the respondent's
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Napocor v. Jocson Facts: The NPC filed for the acquisition of a right-of-way easement over portions of the parcels of land described in the complaints for its Negros-Panay Interconnection Project, particularly the BacolodTomonton Transmission Line. Provisional values were fixed on the basis of the market value and the daily opportunity profit petitioner may derive. Respondents sought a re-evaluation. Judge increased value without hearing and directing the defendants to manifest within twenty-four (24) hours whether or not they are accepting
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City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila Facts: The City of Manila alleged that for the purpose of constructing the extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila , it is necessary for it to acquire ownership of certain parcels of land situated in Binondo, some of which were owned and used by the Chinese Community of Manila for cemetery purposes. The Chinese Community of Manila denied that it was necessary or expedient that the said parcels be expropriated for street purposes; that if the construction of the street or road should be considered a public necessity, other routes were available, which would fully satisfy the plaintiff's purposes, at much less expense and without disturbing the resting places of the dead; that it had a Torrens title for the lands in question; that the lands in question had been used by the defendant for cemetery purposes; that a great number of Chinese were buried in said cemetery; that if said expropriation be carried into effect, it would disturb the resting places of the dead, would require the expenditure of a large sum of money in the transfer or removal of the bodies to some other place or site and in the purchase of such new sites, would involve the destruction of existing monuments and the erection of new monuments in their stead, and would create irreparable loss and injury to the defendant and to all those persons owning and interested in the graves and monuments which would have to be destroyed; that the plaintiff was without right or authority to expropriate said cemetery or any part or portion thereof for street purposes; and that the expropriation, in fact, was not necessary as a public improvement. The theory of the plaintiff is, that once it has established the fact, under the law, that it has authority to expropriate land, it may expropriate any land it may desire; that the only function of the court in such proceedings is to ascertain the value of the land in question; that neither the court nor the owners of the land can inquire into the advisible purpose of purpose of the expropriation or ask any questions concerning the necessities therefor; that the courts are mere appraisers of the land involved in expropriation
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Issue: WON the courts may inquire into, and hear proof upon, the necessity of the expropriation? YES. It cannot be denied, if the legislature under proper authority should grant the expropriation of a certain or particular parcel of land for some specified public purpose, that the courts would be without jurisdiction to inquire into the purpose of that legislation. If, upon the other hand, however, the legislature should grant general authority to a municipal corporation to expropriate private land for public purposes, the courts have ample authority in this jurisdiction, under the provisions above quoted, to make inquiry and to hear proof, upon an issue properly presented, concerning whether or not the lands were private and whether the purpose was, in fact, public. The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon it. When the courts come to determine the question, they must not only find (a) that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. In the present case there are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of Manila : First, the land must be private; and, second, the purpose must be public. The legislative department of the government was rarely undertakes to designate the precise property which should be taken for public use. It has generally, like in the present case, merely conferred general authority to take land for public use when a necessity exists therefor. We believe that it can be confidently asserted that, under such statute, the allegation of the necessity for the appropriation is an issuable allegation which it is competent for the courts to decide. "It is erroneous to suppose that the legislature is beyond the control of the courts in exercising the power of eminent domain, either as to the nature of the use or the necessity to the use of any particular property. For if the use be not public or no necessity for the taking exists, the legislature
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Estanislao v. Costales Facts: The Sangguniang Panglunsod of Zamboanga City passed Ordinance No. 44 which imposes a P0.01 tax per liter of softdrinks produced, manufactured, and/or bottled within the city. The Minister of Finance sent a letter to the Sanggunian suspending the effectivity of the Ordinance on the ground that it contravenes Sec 19 (a) of the Local Tax Code. Zamboanga appealed the suspension in the RTC. RTC: the tax imposed by the Ordinance is not among those that the Sanggunian may impose under the Local Tax Code, but upheld its validity saying that the Finance Minister did not act on it w/in 120 days from receipt of the petition. Finance Secretary appealed. Issue: WON Ordinance 44 is valid. NO.
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Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof; Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.
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Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos Facts: MCIAA was created by RA 6958 which provided that it be exempted from payment of realty taxes. The Office of the Treasurer of Cebu City demanded payment for realty taxes on several parcels of land belonging to MCIAA. MCIAA objected, claiming that it is exempt from payment of reality taxes. It also said that as it is an instrumentality of the government performing governmental functions, it is exempted as provided for by Sec. 133 of the LGC. The City insisted that MCIAA is not tax exempt as its exemption had been withdrawn by Sections 193 and 234 of the
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Benguet Corporation v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals Facts: BC seeks to annul and set aside the Decision of the CBAA of May 28, 1991, as well as the Resolution of July 1, 1991, denying its motion for reconsideration, which affirmed the decision of respondent Local Board of Assessment Appeals of the Province of Benguet declaring as valid the tax assessments made by the Municipal Assessor of Itogon, Benguet, on the bunkhouses of petitioner occupied as dwelling by its rank and file employees based on Tax Declarations Nos. 8471 and 10454. The Provincial Assessor of Benguet, through the Municipal Assessor of Itogon, assessed real property tax on the bunkhouses of petitioner Benguet Corporation occupied for residential purposes by its rank and file employees under Tax Declarations Nos. 8471 (effective 1985) and 10454 (effective 1986). According to the Provincial Assessor, the tax exemption of bunkhouses under Sec. 3 (a), P.D. 7452 (Liberalizing the Financing and Credit Terms for Low Cost Housing Projects of Domestic Corporations and Partnerships) , was withdrawn by P.D. 19553 (Withdrawing, Subject to Certain Conditions, the Duty and Tax Privileges Granted to Private Business Enterprises and/or Persons Engaged in Any Economic Activity, and Other Purposes). Petitioner appealed the assessment on Tax
"Section 3. Pursuant to the above incentive, such domestic corporations and partnerships shall enjoy tax exemption on: (a) real estate taxes on the improvements which will be used exclusively for housing their employees and workers . . ."
"Section 1. The provisions of any special or general law to the contrary notwithstanding, all exemptions from or any preferential treatment in the payment of duties, taxes, fees, imposts and other charges heretofore granted to private business enterprises and/or persons engaged in any economic activity are hereby withdrawn, except those enjoyed by the following: . . . (e) Those that will be approved by the President of the Philippines upon the recommendation of the Minister of Finance,"
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Mabelle O. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Invocation of this ruling is completely inapposite. The
doctrine therein laid down is based on the principle of separation of powers and cheeks and balances and is not applicable to local governments. Moreover, executives at the local or municipal level are vested with both legislative and sometimes judicial functions, in addition to their purely executive duties. By explicit statutory command, courts are given authority to determine the validity of municipal proceedings. It is not disputed that the present proceeding for prohibition has for its objective to prevent the petitioner from "participating in the election of Secretary of the Board, chairmanship of different committees and in voting in other legislative matters, proposals and proceedings, other than to break a tie." It is our view that the petitioner, in insisting to exercise the right to vote twice in the municipal board, acted without jurisdiction and power to do so, and may be validly prevented and restrained by a writ of prohibition. In reply to the petitioner's assertion that the acts sought to be restrained are mere "probable individual actuations" beyond the reach of a prohibitory writ, suffice it to state that prohibition is essentially a "preventive remedy" and is "not intended to provide for a remedy for acts already accomplished." Withal, petitioner's threat of voting twice in the municipal board was not an empty or meaningless gesture, for the record shows that on March 5, 1968, soon after the writ complained of was lifted by the Court of Appeals through the latter's restraining order of February 20, 1968, the petitioner proceeded to act by voting twice for the approval of an alleged amendment to the rules of procedure of the municipal board. Homeowners Association of the Philippines v. Municipal Board of Manila Facts: The City of Manila passed Municipal Ordinance No. 4841 which regulates rentals of lots and buildings for residential purposes. The Homeowners' Association of the Philippines, Inc. and its President sought to nullify the ordinance. CFI: ordinance is ultra vires, unconstitutional, illegal and void ab initio. LC: struck down the questioned ordinance upon the ground that the power to "declare a state of emergency ... exclusively pertains to Congress"; that "there is no longer any state of emergency" which may justify the regulation of house rentals; that said ordinance constitutes an unreasonable and unjustified limitation on the use of private properties and arbitrarily encroaches on the constitutional rights of property owners"; that the power of the City of Manila to "regulate the business of ... letting or subletting of lands and buildings" does not include the authority to prohibit what is forbidden in said ordinance; and that the same cannot be deemed sanctioned by the general welfare clause in the City Charter. Issue: WON the Ordinance is valid. NO. The authority of municipal corporations to regulate is essentially police power. Inasmuch as the same generally entails a curtailment of the liberty, the rights and/or the property of persons, which are protected and even guaranteed by the Constitution, the exercise of police power is necessarily subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the regard, the respect and the obedience due to the prescriptions of the fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Constitution of Liberty, otherwise known as the Bill of Rights the police power measure must be "reasonable". In other words, individual rights may be adversely affected by the exercise of police power to the extent only and only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. If such demands are brought about by a state of emergency, the interference upon individual rights, resulting from the regulations adopted to meet the situation, must be, by and large, co-extensive, co-equal or coterminous with the existence thereof. And, since an emergency is by nature temporary in character, so must the regulations promulgated therefor be. In the language of Justice Holmes,"circumstances may so change in time or differ in space as to clothe with such an interest what at other times or in other places would be a matter of purely private concern." As a consequence a law or ordinance affecting the rights of individuals, as a means to tide over a critical condition, to be valid and legal, must be for a
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Morata v. Go Facts: Victor and Flora Go filed a complaint with the CFI against Julius and Ma. Luisa Morata for recovery of a sum of money plus damages. The parties are all residents of Cebu City. The Moratas filed a motion to dismiss, citing as grounds the failure of the complaint to allege prior availment by the Gos of the barangay conciliation process required by P.D. 1508, as well as the absence of a certification by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary that no conciliation or settlement had been reached by the parties. The motion was opposed. MTD denied. MR denied. Issue: WON the Katarungang Pambarangay law apply to cases heard by the Regional Trial Courts. YES. SECTION 6. No complaint, petition, action for proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in court or any other government office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been repudiated. However, the parties may go directly to court in the following cases: [1] Where the accused is under detention; [2] Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas corpus proceedings; [3]
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Bonifacio Law Office v. Bellosillo Facts: In a letter-complaint dated August 28, 1997, Atty. Ricardo M. Salomon Jr. of the Bonifacio Law Office charged then acting Judge Reynaldo B. Bellosillo of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 34, with ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion, and obvious partiality. Salomon assails the Order dated April 2, 1996 referring the said ejectment case back to the barangay for conciliation proceedings despite the fact that it was alleged in the verified complaint, that the matter had already been referred to the barangay and that a copy of the Certification to File Motion was attached [to] the verified complaint as ANNEX E thereof. Bewildered with such Order, he tried to talk with respondent judge but was prevented to do so because of the strict and extremely tight cordon sanitaire of the latter. He then inquired from the respondents branch clerk of court the reason
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Mabelle O. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Second. The Voluntary Arbitrator held, however, that the
election for members of the SK cannot be considered a local election as the election for Governors , Vice Governors, Mayors and Vice Mayors and the various local legislative assemblies (sanggunians) because the SK election is participated in only by the youth who are between the ages of 15 and 21 and for this reason the day is not a nonworking holiday. To begin with, it is not true that December 4, 1992 was not a nonworking holiday. It was a nonworking holiday and this was announced in the media. 7 In Proclamation No. 118 dated December 2, 1992 President Ramos declared the day as "a special day through the country on the occasion of the Sangguniang Kabataan Elections" and enjoined all "local government units through their respective Chief Local Executives [to] extend all possible assistance and support to ensure the smooth conduct of the general elections." A "special day" is a "special day", as provided by the Administrative Code of 1987. 8 On the other hand, the term "general elections" means, in the context of SK elections, the regular elections for members of the SK, as distinguished from the special elections for such officers. 9 Moreover, the fact that only those between 15 and 21 take part in the election for members of the SK does not make such election any less a regular local election. The Constitution provides, for example, for the sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives of, among others, women and youth. 10 Only voters belonging to the relevant sectors can take part in the election of their representatives. Yet it cannot be denied that such election is a regular national election and the day set for its holding, a holiday. Third. Indeed, the CBA provision in question merely reiterates the provision on paid holidays. Whether in the context of the CBA or the Labor Code, December 4, 1992 was a holiday for which holiday pay should be paid by respondent employer. Mercado v. Board of Election Supervisors Facts: Jose M. Mercado was proclaimed winner in the 4 December 1992 election for chairman of the SK of Barangay Mabalor, Ibaan, Batangas. The proclamation was made by the Board of Election Tellers (BET) acting as the Board of Canvassers, on the basis of its tally which showed Mercado winning by one vote over his rival, private respondent Crisanto P. Pangilinan. Mercado' s victory was, however, short-lived. Immediately after Mercado's proclamation as the winner by the BET, Pangilinan filed a formal protest questioning the results of the election. He alleged that the BET Chairman, drinking gin and Coke during the counting, had invalidated some votes without consulting the other board members. The BES ordered .the reopening of the ballot box and the recount of the votes for SK Chairman. The recount reversed the earlier tally to 51 to 49 in favor of Pangilinan, who was thereupon proclaimed the duly elected SK Chairman by the BES, which issued for that purpose its own Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation. Mercado then filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas City a petition for certiorari and mandamus praying for the annulment of Pangilinan's proclamation by the BES, and for the issuance of an order to compel the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) to recognize him as the duly elected SK Chairman of Barangay Mabalor and to allow him to take his oath of office and discharge his duties as such. In his petition docketed as Civil Case No. 3565, Mercado assailed the jurisdiction of the BES to act on the protest filed by Pangilinan as the ground cited therein was allegedly in the nature of an election protest properly cognizable by the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court in accordance with Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code. He further claimed that, assuming that the BES has jurisdiction over the protest, the grounds raised therein were deemed waived by Pangilinan's failure to invoke them at the level of the BET, and that the BES acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the petitioner of due process when it ordered the reopening of the ballot box and the recounting of the votes without affording him the opportunity to be heard. In its Order dated 13 January 1993, the RTC dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, The trial court stated that it was not aware of any law by which it could act on the matters raised in Mercado's petition since Resolution No. 2499 of the COMELEC did not vest in the RTC jurisdiction over controversies affecting Sangguniang Kabataan elections; constituting instead the BES, which is under COMELEC jurisdiction , as the final arbiter of all election controversies within its level. Mercado moved for a reconsideration of the dismissal order. He argued that the RTC was competent to act on his petition because (a) one mode of seeking judicial review
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Ordillo v. COMELEC Facts: The people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to RA 6766. The COMELEC results showed that the creation of the Region was approved only by a majority of 5,899 votes in only the Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces and city abovementioned. Sec of Justice: considering the proviso that only the provinces and city voting favorably shall be included in the CAR, the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably legally constitutes the CAR. As a result of this, Congress enacted RA 6861 which set the elections in the CAR. Ordillo et al then filed a petition with the COMELEC to declare the non-ratification of the Organic Act for the Region. The president issued AO 160 declaring that the Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly and other offices created under EO220 are abolished in view of the ratification of the Organic Act. The petitioners maintain that there can be no valid CAR as the
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2. WON the MMDA is vested with police power. NO. Metro Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village
Association, Inc., we categorically stated that Rep. Act No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA with police power, let alone legislative power, and that all its functions are administrative in nature. Tracing the legislative history of RA 7924 creating the MMDA, we concluded that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed
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League of Cities v. COMELEC Facts: 11th Congress: 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities were enacted. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. 12th Congress: RA 9009 which amended Sec. 450 of the LGC by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million was enacted. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Sen. Pimentel, the mad rush of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence. After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29. 13th Congress: JR 29 was re-adopted as JR 1 and was forwarded to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Sen.Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009. On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law without the Presidents signature. The Cityhood Laws direct
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Mabelle O. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Furthermore, limiting the exemption only to the 16
municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the LGC, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. Reyes dissent: 1. The cityhood laws do not violate Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. Sec 10 mandatory. The use of the word "shall" in a constitutional provision is generally considered as a mandatory command, though the word "shall" may receive a permissive interpretation when necessary to carry out the true intent of the provision where the word is found. Thus, it is not always the case that the use of the word "shall" is conclusive. However, a reading of Section 10, Article X cannot be construed as anything else but mandatory. The intent of R.A. No. 9009, which amended Section 450 of the LGC, is to exempt respondent municipalities from the income requirement of P100,000,000.00. Thus, the cityhood laws, which merely carry out the intent of R.A. No. 9009, are in accordance with the "criteria established in the LGC," pursuant to Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. The cityhood laws contain a uniformly worded exemption clause, which states: "Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. The city of [___] shall be exempt from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009." What Congress had in mind is not at all times accurately reflected in the language of the statute. Thus, the literal interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless; and lead to absurdity, injustice, or contradiction.105 When this happens, and following the rule that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be had to the principle that the spirit of the law controls its letter. Not to the letter that killeth, but to the spirit that vivifieth. Hindi ang letra na pumapatay, kung hindi ang diwa na nagbibigay buhay.
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Caasi v. CA Facts: Merito Miguel won in the 1988 mayoral elections in Bolinao, Pangasinan. Petitions were filed seeking to disqualify him on the ground that he holds a green card issued to him by the US Immigration Service which would mean that he his a permanent resident of the United States, and not of Bolinao. COMELEC dismissed the petitions on the ground that possession of a green card by Miguel does not sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines. On the contrary, despite his green card, he has sufficiently indicated his intention to continuously reside in Bolinao as shown by his having voted in successive elections in said municipality. Commissioner Badoys dissent: A green card holder being a permanent resident of or an immigrant of a foreign country and respondent having admitted that he is a green card holder, it is incumbent upon him, under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, to prove that he "has waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant" to be qualified to run for elected office. This respondent has not done. Miguels opponent, Caasi also filed a petition for quo warranto. Miguel filed an MTD which was denied by the RTC. CA ordered the RTC to dismiss and desist from further proceeding in the quo warranto case on the ground that the COMELEC has already ruled on his qualifications. Issues: 1. WON a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the United States Consti: Article XI, Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all times, and
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Galido v. COMELEC
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Mabelle O. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Article X, 8 of the Constitution provides: The term of office
of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. This provision is restated in 43(b) of the LGC (R.A. No. 7160): No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected. Two ideas thus emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission. The first is the notion of service of term, derived from the concern about the accumulation of power as a result of a prolonged stay in office. The second is the idea of election, derived from the concern that the right of the people to choose those whom they wish to govern them be preserved. In discussing term limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so on the assumption that the officials concerned were serving by reason of reelection. Indeed, a fundamental tenet of representative democracy is that the people should be allowed to choose whom they please to govern them. To bar the election of a local official because he has already served three terms, although the first as a result of succession by operation of law rather than election, would therefore be to violate this principle. Second, not only historical examination but textual analysis as well supports the ruling of the COMELEC that Art. X, 8 contemplates service by local officials for three consecutive terms as a result of election. The first sentence speaks of the term of office of elective local officials and bars such official[s] from serving for more than three consecutive terms. The second sentence, in explaining when an elective local official may be deemed to have served his full term of office, states that voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. The term served must therefore be one for which [the official concerned] was elected. The purpose of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an elective official may serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully served the term now withstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its expiration. There is a difference between the case of a vice-mayor and that of a member of the House of Representatives who succeeds another who dies, resigns, becomes incapacitated, or is removed from office. The vice-mayor succeeds to the mayorship by operation of law. On the other hand, the Representative is elected to fill the vacancy. In a real sense, therefore, such Representative serves a term for which he was elected. As the purpose of the constitutional provision is to limit the right ot be elected and to serve in Congress, his service of the unexpired term is rightly counted as his first term. Rather than refute what we believe to be the intendment of Art. X, 8 with regard to elective local officials, the case of a Representative who succeeds another confirms the theory. Petitioner also cites Art. VII, 4 of the Constitution which provides for succession of the Vice-President to the Presidency in case of vacancy in that office. After stating that The President shall not be eligible for any reelection, this provision says that No person who has succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time. Petitioner contends that, by analogy, the vice-mayor should likewise be considered to have served a full term as mayor if he succeeds to the latters office and serves for the remainder of the term. The framers of the Constitution included such a provision because, without it, the Vice-President, who simply steps into the Presidency by succession would be qualified to run for President even if he has occupied that office for more than four years. The absence of a similar provision in Art. X, 8 on elective local officials throws in bold relief the difference between the two cases. It underscores the constitutional intent to cover only the terms of office to which one may have been elected for purpose of the three-
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Mabelle O. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Hagedorn was elected for three consecutive terms in the
1992, 1995 and 1998 elections and served in full his three consecutive terms as mayor of Puerto Princesa. Under the Constitution and the LGC, Hagedorn could no longer run for mayor in the 2001 elections. The Constitution and the LGC disqualified Hagedorn, who had reached the maximum three-term limit, from running for a fourth consecutive term as mayor. Thus, Hagedorn did not run for mayor in the 2001 elections. Socrates ran and won as mayor of Puerto Princesa in the 2001 elections. After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he became a private citizen until the recall election of September 24, 2002 when he won by 3,018 votes over his closest opponent, Socrates. From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto Princesa was Socrates. During the same period, Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. This period is clearly an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorns service as mayor, not because of his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal prohibition. Hagedorns three consecutive terms ended on June 30, 2001. Hagedorns new recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 is not a seamless continuation of his previous three consecutive terms as mayor. One cannot stitch together Hagedorns previous three-terms with his new recall term to make the recall term a fourth consecutive term because factually it is not. An involuntary interruption occurred from June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 which broke the continuity or consecutive character of Hagedorns service as mayor. Lonzanida Case: Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected. The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the peoples choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three-term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. In Hagedorns case, the nearly 15-month period he was out of office, although short of a full term of three years, constituted an interruption in the continuity of his service as mayor. The Constitution does not require the interruption or hiatus to be a full term of three years. The clear intent is that interruption for any length of time, as long as the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break an elective local officials continuity of service. Adormeo Case: an interruption consisting of a portion of a term of office breaks the continuity of service of an elective local official. The issue in Adormeo was whether Talagas recall term was a continuation of his previous two terms so that he was deemed to have already served three consecutive terms as mayor. The Court ruled that Talaga was qualified to run in the 2001 elections, stating that the period from June 30, 1998 to May 12, 2000 when Talaga was out of office interrupted the continuity of his service as mayor. Talagas recall term as mayor was not consecutive to his previous two terms because of this interruption, there having been a break of almost two years during which time Tagarao was the mayor. In the instant case, we likewise hold that the nearly 15 months Hagedorn was out of office interrupted his continuity of service and prevents his recall term from being stitched together as a seamless continuation of his previous three consecutive terms. The only difference between Adormeo and the instant case is the time of the interruption. In Adormeo, the interruption occurred after the first two consecutive terms. In the instant case, the interruption happened after the first three consecutive terms. In both cases, the respondents were seeking election for a fourth term. The period of time prior to the recall term, when another elective official holds office, constitutes an interruption in continuity of service. Clearly, Adormeo established the rule that the winner in the recall election cannot be charged or credited with the full term of three years for purposes of counting the consecutiveness of an elective officials terms in office. Hagedorns recall term does not retroact to include the tenure in office of Socrates. Hagedorn can only be disqualified to run in the September 24, 2002 recall election if the recall term is made to retroact to June 30, 2001, for
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Municipality of Pililia v. CA Facts: On March 17, 1989, the RTC of Tanay, Rizal, Branch 80, rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 057-T in favor of the Municipality of Pililla against PPC ordering it to pay business taxes as well as storage, mayors permit, and sanitary inspection fees. The SC affirmed with modification (1991 Pililia Case). This judgment became final and executory on July 13, 1991 and the records were remanded to the trial court for execution. On October 14, 1991, in connection with the execution of said judgment, Atty. Mendiola filed a motion in behalf of plaintiff municipality for the examination of defendant corporation's gross sales for the years 1976 to 1978
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2. WON the petitioners may be held in estoppels Petitioners cannot be held in estoppel for questioning the
legality of the appearance of Atty. Romanillos, notwithstanding that they questioned the witnesses of respondent municipality during the hearing of its motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction. Municipality of Pililla, Rizal vs. Court of Appeals held that the legality of the representation of an unauthorized counsel may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. This Court stated that: The legality of his representation can be questioned at any stage of the proceedings. In the cases hereinbefore cited, the issue of lack of authority of private counsel to represent a municipality was only raised for the first time in the proceedings for the collection of attorney's fees for services rendered in the particular case, after the decision in that case had become final and executory and/or had been duly executed. Elementary fairness dictates that parties unaware of the unauthorized representation should not be held in estoppel just because they did not question on the spot the authority of the counsel for the municipality. The rule on appearances of a lawyer is that until the contrary is clearly shown, an attorney is presumed to be acting under authority of the
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Mabelle O. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Sec. 481 of the LGC (RA. No. 7160) requires the
appointment of a legal officer for the province whose functions include the following: Represent the local government unit in all civil actions and special proceedings wherein the local government unit or any official thereof, in his official capacity is a party; Provided, That, in actions or proceeding where a component city or municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to another component city or municipality, a special legal officer may be employed to represent the adverse party. Municipality of Bocaue, et al. v. Manotok: LGUs cannot be represented by private lawyers and it is solely the Provincial Fiscal who can rightfully represent them. Under the law, the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan and his assistants are charged with the duty to represent the province and any municipality thereof in all civil actions. This ruling applies squarely to the case at hand because Sec. 481 of the LGC is based on Sec. 1681 of the Revised Administrative Code which was the subject of interpretation in the abovecited case. In hiring private lawyers to represent the Province of Albay, respondents exceeded their authority and violated the abovequoted section of the LGC and the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court. Moreover, the entire transaction was attended by irregularities. First, the disbursements to the lawyers amounting to P7,380,410.31 were disallowed by the Provincial Auditor on the ground that these were made without the prior written conformity of the Solicitor General and the written concurrence of the Commission on Audit (COA) as required by COA Circular No. 86-255 dated 2 April 1986. The respondents attempted to dispute this finding by presenting the Solicitor General's conformity dated 15 July 3993. This conformity was, however obtained after the disbursements were already made in 1990 and 1992. What is required by COA Circular No. 85-255 is a prior written conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General. Another irregularity in the transaction concerns the lawyers. Resolution No. 01-90 authorized the respondent Governor to sign and confirm a retainer contract for legal services with the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm at 202 E. Rodriguez Sr. Blvd., Quezon City. The retainer contract signed by respondent Governor was, however, not only with the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm but also with Atty. Jesus R. Cornago of Jamecca Building, 280 Tomas Morato Avenue, Quezon City. In entering into a retainer agreement not only with the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm but also with Atty. Jose R. Cornago, respondent Governor exceeded his authority under Resolution No. 01-90. Complicating further the web of deception surrounding the transaction is the fact that it was only Atty. Cornago who appeared as collaborating counsel of record of the Province in the Supreme Court case (G R. No. 87479). Even the Solicitor General, in his letter to respondent Governor dated 15 July 1993, noted that the Province is represented in the Supreme Court by Attys. Ricafort Cornago and Glenn Manahan but not by the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm. Furthermore, the memorandum with the Supreme Court filed for the Province was signed by Atty. Cornago and not by the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm. Consequently, the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm was not counsel of record of the Province in G.R. No. 87479. And yet, six of the ten checks paid by the Province and amounting to more than P3.6 million were issued in favor of the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm through Atty. Antonio Jose Cortes. In other words, respondents disbursed money to the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm although the latter did not appear as counsel for the Province in the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 87479. Finally, the attorney's fees agreed upon by respondent Salalima and confirmed by the other respondents are not only unreasonable but also unconscionable. The contingent fee of 18% of the "P214 million" claim of the Province against NPC amounts to P38.5 million. The word "unconscionable", as applied to attorney's fee, "means nothing more than that the fee contracted for, standing alone and unexplained would be sufficient to show that an unfair advantage had been taken of the client, or that a legal fraud had been taken of the client, or that a legal fraud had been perpetrated on him." The Province has a legal officer, Atty. Ricafort, who had already filed a comment on NPC's petition against the Province. The comment filed by Atty. Ricafort already covers the basic issues raised in the petition. When Atty. Cornago
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Ganzon v. CA (August 1991, supra, see p. 9) Ganzon v. CA (November 1991) Facts: Sometime in 1988, a series of 10 administrative complaints were filed by various city officials, against petitioner Ganzon, the
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Reyes v. COMELEC Facts: Reyes was the incumbent mayor of the municipality of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro, having been elected to that office on
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Mabelle O. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Moreover, the power of the DILG to investigate
administrative complaints is based on the alter-ego principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency. Thus: Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive." This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President.The power of control is provided in the Constitution, thus: "Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed." Control is said to be the very heart of the power of the presidency. As head of the Executive Department, the President, however, may delegate some of his powers to the Cabinet members except when he is required by the Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he acts personally. The members of Cabinet may act for and in behalf of the President in certain matters because the President cannot be expected to exercise his control (and supervisory) powers personally all the time. Each head of a department is, and must be, the President's alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required by law to exercise authority. When an administrative complaint is therefore filed, the Disciplining Authority shall issue an order requiring the respondent to submit his verified answer within fifteen (15) days from notice. Upon filing of the answer, the Disciplining Authority shall refer the case to the Investigating Authority for investigation. In the case at bar, petitioner claims that the DILG Secretary usurped the power of the President when he required petitioner to answer the complaint. Undisputably, the lettercomplaint was filed with the Office of the President but it was the DILG Secretary who ordered petitioner to answer. Strictly applying the rules, the Office of the President did not comply with the provisions of A.O. No. 23. The Office should have first required petitioner to file his answer. Thereafter, the complaint and the answer should have been referred to the Investigating Authority for further proceedings. Be that as it may, this procedural lapse is not fatal. The filing of the answer is necessary merely to enable the President to make a preliminary assessment of the case.[62] The President found the complaint sufficient in form and substance to warrant its further investigation. The judgment of the President on the matter is entitled to respect in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. WON the DILG erred in declaring him in default for filing a motion to dismiss. It is true that a motion to dismiss is not a pleading prohibited under the LGC of 1991 nor in A.O. No. 23. Petitioner, however, was instructed not to file a motion to dismiss in the order to file answer. Thrice, he requested for extension of time to file his answer citing as reasons the search for competent counsel and the demands of his official duties. And thrice, his requests were granted. Even the order of default was reconsidered and petitioner was given additional time to file answer. After all the requests and seven months later, he filed a motion to dismiss. Petitioner should know that the formal investigation of the case is required by law to be finished within one hundred twenty (120) days from the time of formal notice to the respondent. The extensions petitioner requested consumed fifty-five (55) days of this period.[63] Petitioner, in fact, filed his answer nine (9) months after the first notice. Indeed, this was more than sufficient time for petitioner to comply with the order to file answer. The speedy disposition of administrative complaints is required by public service. The efficiency of officials under investigation is impaired when a case hangs over their heads. Officials deserve to be cleared expeditiously if they are innocent, also expeditiously if guilty, so that the business of government will not be prejudiced.
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Evardone v. COMELEC Facts: Evardone is the mayor of the Municipality of Sulat, Eastern Samar, having been elected to the position during the 1988 local elections. He assumed office immediately after proclamation. On 14 February 1990, Apelado, Aclan and Nival filed a petition for the recall of Evardone with the Office of the Local Election Registrar, Municipality of Sulat. COMELEC issued a resolution approving the recommendation to hold on 14 July 1990 the signing of the petition for recall against incumbent Mayor Evardone of the said Municipality. Evardone filed before this Court a petition for prohibition with urgent prayer for immediate issuance of restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. SC issued TRO ordering the respondents to cease and desist from holding the signing of the petition for recall. Central Office got it on the same day, but field agent got it 3 days later, a day after the completion of the signing process sought to be temporarily stopped by the TRO. COMELEC nullified the signing process held in Sulat, Eastern Samar for being violative of the TRO. Apelado, et al., filed MR, denied. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari. Issues: 1. WON COMELEC Resolution 2272 is constitutional. YES. Evardone: Article X, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution repealed Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 in favor of one to be enacted by Congress. Since there was, during the period material to this case, no LGC enacted by Congress after the
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Mabelle O. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Whether or not the electorate of the Municipality of Sulat
has lost confidence in the incumbent mayor is a political question. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. "Loss of confidence is the formal withdrawal by an electorate of their trust in a person's ability to discharge his office previously bestowed on him by the same electorate. The constituents have made a judgment and their will to recall the incumbent mayor has already been ascertained and must be afforded the highest respect. Thus, the signing process held last 14 July 1990 in Sulat, Eastern Samar, for the recall of Mayor Felipe P. Evardone of said municipality is valid and has legal effect. However, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation provided in Sec. 55 (2) of B.P. Blg, 337, which states: Sec. 55. Who May Be Recalled; Ground for Recall; When Recall May not be Held. (2) No recall shall take place within two years from the date of the official's assumption of office or one year immediately preceding a regular local election. The Constitution has mandated a synchronized national and local election prior to 30 June 1992, or more specifically, as provided for in Article XVIII, Sec. 5 on the second Monday of May, 1992. 11 Thus, to hold an election on recall approximately seven (7) months before the regular local election will be violative of the above provisions of the applicable LGC (B.P. Blg. 337) Garcia v. COMELEC Facts: Garcia was elected governor of the province of Bataan in the May 11, 1992 elections. In the early evening of July 1993, some mayors, vice-mayors and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the twelve (12) municipalities of the province met at the National Power Corporation compound in Bagac, Bataan. At about 12:30 A.M of the following day, July 2, 1993, they proceeded to the Bagac town plaza where they constituted themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall election of petitioner Garcia. The PRA promulgated Resolution 1 for the recall of the incumbent provincial governor Garcia for loss of confidence. Petitioners filed with the COMELEC a petition to deny due course to said Resolution on the ground that the PRAC failed to comply with the "substantive and procedural requirement" laid down in Section 70 of the LGC. The COMELEC dismissed the petition and scheduled the recall elections for the position of Governor of Bataan. Petitioners then filed with the SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction to annul the said Resolution of the respondent COMELEC. Issues: 1. WON section 70 of R.A. 7160 insofar as it allows a preparatory recall assembly initiate the recall of local elective officials is constitutional Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the end of his term of office. The people's prerogative to remove a public officer is an incident of their sovereign power and in the absence of constitutional restraint, the power is implied in all governmental operations. Such power has been held to be indispensable for the proper administration of public affairs. Not undeservedly, it is frequently described as a fundamental right of the people in a representative democracy. P: the right to recall does not extend merely to the prerogative of the electorate to reconfirm or withdraw their confidence on the official sought to be recalled at a special election. Such prerogative necessarily includes the sole and exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceedings or not. There is nothing in the Constitution that will remotely suggest that the people have the "sole and exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding." The Constitution did not provide for any mode, let alone a single mode, of initiating recall elections. Neither did it prohibit the adoption of multiple modes of initiating recall elections. The mandate given by section 3 of Article X of the Constitution is for Congress to "enact a LGC which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum . . ." By this constitutional mandate, Congress was clearly given the power to choose the effective mechanisms of recall as its discernment dictates. The power given was to select which among the means and methods of initiating recall elections are effective to carry out the judgment of the electorate. Congress was not straightjacketed to one particular mechanism of initiating recall elections. What the
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Garcia v. COMELEC (supra, see p.93) Paras v. COMELEC Facts: Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. Acting on the petition for recall, COMELEC resolved to approve the petition, scheduled the petition signing on October 14, 1995, and set the recall election on November 13, 1995. At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed. The COMELEC, however, deferred the recall election in view of petitioners opposition. On December 6, 1995, the COMELEC set anew the recall election, this time on December 16, 1995. To
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Adormeo v. COMELEC (supra, see p. 179) Socrates v. COMELEC (supra, see p. 180) Mendez v. Civil Service Commission Facts: On June 7, 1984, then Acting Register of Deeds of Quezon City Coloyan filed an administrative complaint against Mendez, a
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Mabelle O. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Pursuant to Section 37 paragraph (b) of P.D. 807, the city
mayor, as head of the city government, is empowered to enforce judgment with finality on lesser penalties like suspension from work for one month and forfeiture of salary equivalent to one month against erring employees. By inference or implication, the remedy of appeal may be availed of only in a case where the respondent is found guilty of the charges filed against him. But when the respondent is exonerated of said charges, as in this case, there is no occasion for appeal. Macalingcag and Carlos v. Chang Facts: On October 6, 1989, Carlos signed a formal administrative charge approved by Macalincag for dishonesty, neglect of duty and acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service. It was alleged that Chang disbursed funds inviolation of the Omnibus Election Code, incurred cash overdrafts in violation of Sections 41 and 44 of PD 477 and Section 4(3) of PD 1445, transferred the amount of P1,977,492.00 from the Treasurer/Cashier's safe to the Realty Tax Division's safe, thus subjecting said municipal funds to possible loss; and that she continually failed to remit to the Bureau of Treasury the national collection. The basis of the formal charge by petitioner Carlos was the preliminary evaluation of the COA Report dated January 18, 1989 and the affidavit-complaints of Councilor Roberto Brillante dated April 27, 1989 and May 23, 1989. On the same date, October 5, 1989, petitioner Macalincag issued an Order of Preventive Suspension against Chang. Also on October 6, 1989, petitioner Macalincag sent a letter to the "Governor, Metro Manila Commission Attn: the Officer-in-Charge MMC Finance Office," seeking the implementation of the Order of Preventive Suspension dated October 6, 1989 and recommending that an Officer-inCharge be immediately designated from the ranks of qualified Municipal Treasurers and Assistant Municipal Treasurers in Metro Manila. By virtue of the said letter, the Officer-in-Charge, MMC Finance Office furnished respondent Chang, by ordinary mail, with a copy of the Order of Preventive Suspension also dated October 6, 1989. On November 10, 1989, respondent Chang filed a petition for prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati against petitioners Macalincag and Carlos. TRO on preventive suspension granted. TC: denied Chang application for a writ of preliminary injunction, and sustained the power of the Secretary of Finance to issue the Order of Preventive Suspension. MR: Chang raised a new argument by invoking Section 8 Executive Order No. 392 entitled "Constituting the Metropolitan Manila Authority, providing for its powers and functions and for other purposes.", application for a writ of preliminary injunction granted. TC: respondents permanently desist from enforcing the Order of Preventive Suspension. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.Second Division of this Court: denied the petition for having been filed out of time but the same was reinstated in a resolution dated April 15, 1991. In the resolution dated July 10, 1991, the Second Division of this Court gave due course to the petition and required both parties to file their simultaneous memoranda. Issue: 1. WON the Secretary of Finance has jurisdiction to issue an Order of Preventive Suspension against the acting municipal treasurer of Makati, Metro Manila. P: the Order of Preventive Suspension became effective upon receipt thereof by respondent Chang and not upon the designation of an officer-in-charge to replace him; that the Order of Preventive Suspension dated October 6, 1989 became effective before the issuance of Executive Order No. 392 and, therefore, can no longer be enjoined by reason of the alleged transfer of the power to suspend from the Secretary of Finance to the President of the Republic of the Philippines and that the power to suspend and remove municipal officials is not an incident of the power to appoint. R: a government officer is not suspended until someone has assumed the post and the officer subject of the suspension order has ceased performing his official function; that the implementation of the questioned suspension order was overtaken by the issuance of Executive Order No. 392 creating the Metropolitan Manila Authority and that the power to discipline is vested solely on the person who has the power to appoint. Preventive Suspension is governed by Sec. 41 of P.D. 807 or the Civil Service Law which provides: Sec. 41. Preventive Suspension. The proper disciplining authority may preventively suspend any subordinate officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the
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Mabelle O. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the LGC of 1991
and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution is completely off tangent. Neither the statute nor the circular trenches upon the Supreme Court's power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law. The LGC and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge of their public duties and the private practice of their profession, in those instances where the law allows it. Section 90 of the LGC does not discriminate against lawyers and doctors. It applies to all provincial and municipal officials in the professions or engaged in any occupation. Section 90 explicitly provides that sanggunian members "may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools expect during session hours." If there are some prohibitions that apply particularly to lawyers, it is because of all the professions, the practice of law is more likely than others to relate to, or affect, the area of public service. Superintendent of Iriga City, as Schools Division Superintendent without any specific division. Thus, respondent performed the functions of Schools Division Superintendent in Iriga City. Subsequently, on November 3, 1997, Secretary Gloria designated respondent as Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur, and petitioner as Schools Division Superintendent of Iriga City. In dismissing petitioner's protest, the Civil Service Commission held that Section 99 of the LGC of 1991 contemplates a situation where the Department of Education, Culture and Sports issues the appointments, whereas respondent's appointment was made by no less than the President, in the exercise of his appointing power. Moreover, the designation of respondent as Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur and of petitioner as Schools Division Superintendent of Iriga City were in the nature of reassignments, in which case consultation with the local school board was unnecessary. MR: denied. CA: dismissed. Issues: 1. WON Sec 99 of the LGC is applicable. Clearly, the afore-quoted portion of Section 99 of the LGCof 1991 applies to appointments made by the DECS. This is because at the time of the enactment of the LGC, schools division superintendents were appointed by the DECS to specific division or location. In 1994, the Career Executive Service Board issued Memorandum Circular No. 21, Series of 1994, placing the positions of schools division superintendent and assistant schools division superintendent within the career executive service. Consequently, the power to appoint persons to career executive service positions was transferred from the DECS to the President. The appointment may not be specific as to location. The prerogative to designate the appointees to their particular stations was vested in the DECS Secretary, pursuant to the exigencies of the service, as provided in DECS Order No. 75, Series of 1996. In the case at bar, the appointment issued by President Ramos in favor of respondent to the Schools Division Superintendent position on September 3, 1996 did not specify her station. It was Secretary Gloria who, in a Memorandum dated November 3, 1997, assigned and designated respondent to the Division of Camarines Sur, and petitioner to the Division of Iriga City.
Osea v. Malaya Facts: On November 20, 1997, petitioner filed a Protest Case with the Civil Service Commission. She averred that she was appointed as Officer-in-Charge, Assistant Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur, by then Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, upon the endorsement of the Provincial School Board of Camarines Sur; that despite the recommendation of Secretary Gloria, President Fidel V. Ramos appointed respondent to the position of Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur; that respondent's appointment was made without prior consultation with the Provincial School Board, in violation of Section 99 of the LGC of 1991. Hence, petitioner prayed that respondent's appointment be recalled and set aside for being null and void. On March 31, 1998, the Civil Service Commission issued Resolution No. 980699, dismissing petitioner's protest-complaint. The Civil Service Commission found that on September 13, 1996, President Ramos appointed respondent, who was then Officer-in-Charge Schools Division
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Mabelle O. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Under the circumstances, the designation of respondent as
Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur was not a case of appointment. Her designation partook of the nature of a reassignment from Iriga City, where she previously exercised her functions as Officer-in-Charge-Schools Division Superintendent, to Camarines Sur. Clearly, therefore, the requirement in Section 99 of the LGC of 1991 of prior consultation with the local school board, does not apply. It only refers to appointments made by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports. Such is the plain meaning of the said law. The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is thus applicable in this case. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. Appointment should be distinguished from reassignment. An appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office. On the other hand, a reassignment is merely a movement of an employee from one organizational unit to another in the same department or agency which does not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary and does not require the issuance of an appointment. In the same vein, a designation connotes merely the imposition of additional duties on an incumbent official. WON Petitioner has a vested right to the position of Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur, in view of her endorsement by the Provincial School Board. Her qualification to the office, however, lacks one essential ingredient, i.e., her appointment thereto. While she was recommended by Secretary Gloria to President Ramos for appointment to the position of Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur, the recommendation was not acted upon by the President. Petitioner's designation as Officer-in-Charge, Assistant Schools Division Superintendent, was expressly made subject to further advice from the Department of Education, Culture and Sports.16 Thus, her designation was temporary. In fact, there was a need to recommend her to the President for appointment in a permanent capacity. Inasmuch as she occupied her position only temporarily, petitioner can be transferred or reassigned to other positions without violating her right to security of tenure. Indeed, petitioner has no vested right to the position of Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur.
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Mabelle O. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is
empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the LGC. It is expressly vested with the police power under what is known as the General Welfare Clause. In addition, Section 458 of the said Code specifically declares that the Sangguniang Panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants. This section also authorizes the LGUs to regulate properties and businesses within their territorial limits in the interest of the general welfare. P: the Sangguniang Panlungsod may prohibit the operation of casinos because they involve games of chance, which are detrimental to the people. Gambling is not allowed by general law and even by the Constitution itself. The legislative power conferred upon local government units may be exercised over all kinds of gambling and not only over "illegal gambling" as the respondents erroneously argue. Even if the operation of casinos may have been permitted under P.D. 1869, the government of Cagayan de Oro City has the authority to prohibit them within its territory pursuant to the authority entrusted to it by the LGC. Such interpretation is consonant with the policy of local autonomy as mandated in Article II, Section 25, and Article X of the Constitution, as well as various other provisions therein seeking to strengthen the character of the nation. In giving the LGUs the power to prevent or suppress gambling and other social problems, the LGC has recognized the competence of such communities to determine and adopt the measures best expected to promote the general welfare of their inhabitants in line with the policies of the State. Valid Ordinance: 1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute. 2) It must not be unfair or oppressive. 3) It must not be partial or discriminatory. 4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade. 5) It must be general and consistent with public policy. 6) It must not be unreasonable. Under Sec. 458 of the LGC, LGUs are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. The petitioners are less than accurate in claiming that the Code could have excluded such games of chance but did not. In fact it does. The language of the section is clear and unmistakable. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should be interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of, words with which it is associated. Accordingly, we conclude that since the word "gambling" is associated with "and other prohibited games of chance," the word should be read as referring to only illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited games of chance, must be prevented or suppressed. The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 1869 and the public policy embodied therein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from exercising the power conferred on it to operate a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. The petitioners have an ingenious answer to this misgiving. They deny that it is the ordinances that have changed P.D. 1869 for an ordinance admittedly cannot prevail against a statute. Their theory is that the change has been made by the LGC itself, which was also enacted by the national lawmaking authority. In their view, the decree has been, not really repealed by the Code, but merely "modified pro tanto" in the sense that PAGCOR cannot now operate a casino over the objection of the local government unit concerned. This modification of P.D. 1869 by the LGC is permissible because one law can change or repeal another law. It seems to us that the petitioners are playing with words. While insisting that the decree has only been "modified pro tanto," they are actually arguing that it is already dead, repealed and useless for all intents and purposes because the Code has shorn PAGCOR of all power to centralize and regulate casinos. Strictly speaking, its operations may now be not only prohibited by the local government unit; in fact, the prohibition is not only discretionary but mandated by Section 458 of the Code if the word "shall" as used therein is to be given its accepted meaning. Local government units have now no choice but to prevent and suppress gambling, which in the petitioners' view includes both legal and illegal gambling. Under this construction, PAGCOR will have no more games of chance to regulate or centralize as they must all be prohibited by the local government units pursuant to the mandatory duty imposed upon them by the Code. In this situation, PAGCOR cannot continue to exist
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Ganzon v. Kayanan Facts: On August 25, 1956, Rosales lodged a verified complaint against Ganzon for taking advantage of his public position. On September 13, 1956, the Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, designated Kayanan to conduct the investigation of said complaint pursuant to the provisions of Section 64(c) of the RAC granting Kayanan all the powers given to an investigating officer by Sections 71 and 580 of the same Code. On September 18, 1956, respondent served a copy of the complaint on petitioner and set the investigation of the charges on September 20, 1956. Petitioner, having filed a motion for postponement, respondent definitely set the investigation for September 25 and 26, 1956. On September 24, 1956, Ganzon instituted in the CFI an action for prohibition with preliminary injunction questioning the authority of the President to order his investigation and praying that respondent be enjoined to suspend and desist from proceeding with the investigation and that, pending decision of the case on the merits, a preliminary injunction be issued against respondent. On September 26, 1956,
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Mabelle O. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Having in mind the foregoing principles, we rule that
Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 of the DILG insofar as it authorizes the filing a Petition for Review of the decision of the BES with the regular courts in a post proclamation electoral protest is of doubtful constitutionality. We agree with both the petitioner and the Solicitor General that in authorizing the filing of the petition for review of the decision of the BES with the regular courts, the DILG Secretary in effect amended and modified the GUIDELINES promulgated by the National Liga Board and adopted by the LIGA which provides that the decision of the BES shall be subject to review by the National Liga Board. The amendment of the GUIDELINES is more than an exercise of the power of supervision but is an exercise of the power of control, which the President does not have over the LIGA. Although the DILG is given the power to prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances, the Administrative Code limits its authority to merely "monitoring compliance" by local government units of such issuances.27 To monitor means "to watch, observe or check" and is compatible with the power of supervision of the DILG Secretary over local governments, which is limited to checking whether the local government unit concerned or the officers thereof perform their duties as per statutory enactments. Besides, any doubt as to the power of the DILG Secretary to interfere with local affairs should be resolved in favor of the greater autonomy of the local government. National Liga ng mga Barangay v. Paredes Facts: On 11 June 1997, Rayos, Punong Barangay of Barangay 52, District II, Zone 5, District II, Caloocan City, filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order and damages before the RTC of Caloocan, alleging that David, Punong Barangay of Barangay 77, Zone 7, Caloocan City and then president of the Liga Chapter of Caloocan City and of the Liga ng mga Barangay National Chapter, committed certain irregularities in the notice, venue and conduct of the proposed synchronized Liga ng mga Barangay elections in 1997. On 13 June 1997, the Executive Judge issued a temporary restraining order (TRO), effective for seventy-two (72) hours, enjoining the holding of the general membership and election meeting of Liga Chapter of Caloocan City on 14 June 1975. However, the TRO was allegedly not properly served on herein petitioner David, and so the election for the officers of the LigaCaloocan was held as scheduled. Petitioner David was proclaimed President of the Liga-Caloocan, and thereafter took his oath and assumed the position of ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan. On 17 July 1997, respondent Rayos filed a second petition, this time for quo warranto, mandamus and prohibition, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order and damages, against David, Nancy Quimpo, Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan City, and Secretary Barbers.7 Rayos alleged that he was elected President of the Liga Caloocan Chapter in the elections held on 14 June 1997 by the members of the Caloocan Chapter pursuant to their Resolution/Petition No. 001-97.8 On 18 July 1997, the presiding judge granted the TRO, enjoining therein respondents David, Quimpo and Secretary Barbers from proceeding with the synchronized elections for the Provincial and Metropolitan Chapters of the Liga scheduled on 19 July 1997, but only for the purpose of maintaining the status quo and effective for a period not exceeding seventy-two (72) hours. Eventually, on 18 July 1997, at petitioner Davids instance, Special Civil Action (SCA) No. C-512 pending before Branch 126 was consolidated with SCA No. C-508 pending before Branch 124. Before the consolidation of the cases, on 25 July 1997, the DILG through respondent Secretary Barbers, filed in SCA No. C-512 an Urgent Motion, invoking the Presidents power of general supervision over all local government units and seeking that the DILG pursuant to its delegated power of general supervision, be appointed as the Interim Caretaker to manage and administer the affairs of the Liga, until such time that the new set of National Liga Officers shall have been duly elected and assumed office. Issue: WON the Liga ng mga Barangay is subject to DILG supervision. Bito-Onon v. Fernandez: Court ruled that the Presidents power of the general supervision, as exercised therein by the DILG Secretary as his alter ego, extends to the Liga ng mga Barangay. Does the Presidents power of general supervision extend to the liga ng mga barangay, which is not a local government
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Mabelle O. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Furthermore, the DILG assumed control when it appointed
respondent Rayos as president of the Liga-Caloocan Chapter prior to the newly scheduled general Liga elections, although petitioner Davids term had not yet expired. The DILG substituted its choice, who was Rayos, over the choice of majority of the punong barangay of Caloocan, who was the incumbent President, petitioner David. The latter was elected and had in fact been sitting as an ex-officio member of the sangguniang panlungsod in accordance with the Liga Constitution and By-Laws. Yet, the DILG extended the appointment to respondent Rayos although it was aware that the position was the subject of a quo warranto proceeding instituted by Rayos himself, thereby preempting the outcome of that case. It was bad enough that the DILG assumed the power of control, it was worse when it made use of the power with evident bias and partiality. As the entity exercising supervision over the Liga ng mga Barangay, the DILGs authority over the Liga is limited to seeing to it that the rules are followed, but it cannot lay down such rules itself, nor does it have the discretion to modify or replace them. In this particular case, the most that the DILG could do was review the acts of the incumbent officers of the Liga in the conduct of the elections to determine if they committed any violation of the Ligas Constitution and By-laws and its implementing rules. If the National Liga Board and its officers had violated Liga rules, the DILG should have ordered the Liga to conduct another election in accordance with the Ligas own rules, but not in obeisance to DILG-dictated guidelines. Neither had the DILG the authority to remove the incumbent officers of the Liga and replace them, even temporarily, with unelected Liga officers. Like the local government units, the Liga ng mga Barangay is not subject to control by the Chief Executive or his alter ego. In the Bito-Onon94 case, this Court held that DILG Memorandum Circular No. 97-193, insofar as it authorized the filing of a petition for review of the decision of the Board of Election Supervisors (BES) with the regular courts in a post-proclamation electoral protest, involved the exercise of control as it in effect amended the guidelines already promulgated by the Liga. Officers in control, lay down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, it is discretionary on his part to order the act undone or redone by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. Supervising officers merely see to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done to conform for to the prescribed rules. He cannot prescribe his own manner the doing of the act. The amendment of the GUIDELINES is more than an exercise of the power of supervision but is an exercise of the power of control, which the President does not have over the LIGA. Although the DILG is given the power to prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances, the Administrative Code limits its authority to merely "monitoring compliance by local government units of such issuances. To monitor means to "watch, observe or check" and is compatible with the power of supervision of the DILG Secretary over local governments, which is limited to checking whether the local government unit concerned or the officers thereof perform their duties as per statutory enactments. Besides, any doubt as to the power of the DILG Secretary to interfere with local affairs should be resolved in favor of the greater autonomy of the local government. In Taule,96 the Court ruled that the Secretary of Local Government had no authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of the election of officers of katipunan ng mga barangay or barangay councils. In that case, a protest was lodged before the Secretary of Local Government regarding several irregularities in, and seeking the nullification of, the election of officers of the Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes. Then Local Government Secretary Luis Santos issued a resolution nullifying the election of officers and ordered a new one to be conducted. The Court ruled: Construing the constitutional limitation on the power of general supervision of the President over local governments, We hold that respondent Secretary has no authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of the officers of the katipunan. To allow respondent Secretary to do so will give him more power than the law or the Constitution grants. It will in effect give him control over local government officials for it will permit him to interfere in a purely democratic and non-partisan
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San Diego v. Municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro Facts: The municipality of Naujan issued Resolution 46 awarding the concession of the Butas River and the Naujan Lake to San Diego. Contract: 5 years, from January 1, 1948 to December 31, 1952, lease of "the exclusive privilege of erecting fish corrals along the Butas River beginning from its junction with the San Agustin River up to the Naujan Lake itself," for annual rental of P26,300.00. Upon petition by the lessee, however, the said council reduced the annual rental by 20% by virtue of Resolution 59, series of 1949. On September 5, 1950, the lessee requested for a five-year extension of the original lease period. The request was, for some time, left pending before the municipal council, but on December 1, 1951, after the lessee had reiterated his petition for extension, for the reason that the typhoon "Wanda", which took place that month, destroyed most of his fish corrals, the council adopted Resolution 222, series of 1951 extending the lease for another five (5) years beginning January 1, 1952, with the express condition that the plaintiff would waive the privilege to seek for reduction of the amount of rent which was to be based on the original contract. After the resolution had been approved by the Provincial Board of Oriental Mindoro, the lessor and the lessee, on December 23, 1951, contracted for the extension of the period of the lease. The contract was approved and confirmed on December 29, 1951 by Resolution 229, series of 1951, of the municipal council of Naujan whose term was then about to expire. Pursuant to the said contract, the lessee filed a surety bond of P52,000.00 and then reconstructed his fish corrals and stocked the Naujan Lake with bagus fingerlings.
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Mabelle O. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Holding of the town fiesta in 1959 by the municipality of
Malasiqui Pangasinan, was an exercise of a private or proprietary function of the municipality. Chapter on Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative Code provides: Section 2282. Celebration of fiesta. A fiesta may be held in each municipality not oftener than once a year upon a date fixed by the municipal council. A fiesta shall not be held upon any other date than that lawfully fixed therefor, except when, for weighty reasons, such as typhoons, inundations, earthquakes, epidemics, or other public calamities, the fiesta cannot be held in the date fixed, in which case it may be held at a later date in the same year, by resolution of the council." This provision simply gives authority to the municipality to accelebrate a yearly fiesta but it does not impose upon it a duty to observe one. Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is to commemorate a religious or historical event of the town is in essence an act for the special benefit of the community and not for the general welfare of the public performed in pursuance of a policy of the state. The mere fact that the celebration, as claimed, was not to secure profit or gain but merely to provide entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a conclusive test. For instance, the maintenance of parks is not a source of income for the town, nonetheless it is private undertaking as distinguished from the maintenance of public schools, jails, and the like which are for public service. There can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of determining the true nature of an undertaking or function of a municipality; the surrounding circumstances of a particular case are to be considered and will be decisive. The basic element, however beneficial to the public the undertaking may be, is that it is governmental in essence, otherwise, the function becomes private or proprietary in character. Easily, no governmental or public policy of the state is involved in the celebration of a town fiesta. WON under the doctrine of respondent superior, petitionermunicipality is to be held liable for damages for the death of Vicente Fontanilla if that was attributable to the negligence of the municipality's officers, employees, or agents. YES. "Art. 2176, Civil Code: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. . . ." "Art. 2180. Civil Code: The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omission, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible . . ." On this point, the Court of Appeals found and held that there was negligence. The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Angel Novado, a witness of the defendants (now petitioners), that a member of the "extravaganza troupe" removed two principal braces located on the front portion of the stage and used them to hang the screen or "telon", and that when many people went up the stage the latter collapsed. This testimony was not believed however by respondent appellate court, and rightly so. According to said defendants, those two braces were "mother" or "principal" braces located semi-diagonally from the front ends of the stage to the front posts of the ticket booth located at the rear of the stage and were fastened with a bamboo twine. That being the case, it becomes incredible that any person in his right mind would remove those principal braces and leave the front portion of the stage practically unsupported. Moreover, if that did happen, there was indeed negligence as there was lack of supervision over the use of the stage to prevent such an occurrence. At any rate, the guitarist who was pointed to by Novado as the person who removed the two bamboo braces denied having done so. The Court of Appeals said. "Amor by himself alone could not have removed the two braces which must be about ten meters long and fastened them on top of the stage for the curtain. The stage was only five and a half meters wide Surely, it would be impractical and unwieldy to use a ten meter bamboo pole, much more two poles, for the stage curtain." The appellate court also found that the stage was not strong enough considering that only P100.00 was appropriate for the construction of two stages and while the floor of the "zarzuela" stage was of wooden planks, the posts and braces used were of bamboo material. We likewise observe that although the stage was described by the petitioners as being supported by "24" posts, nevertheless there were only 4 in front, 4 at the rear, and 5 on each side. Where were the rest? The Court of Appeals thus concluded: "The court a quo itself attributed the collapse of the stage to the great number of
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Mabelle O. Nebres | Local Governments Case Digests Having established that the compromise agreement was
final and immediately executory, and in fact as already enforced, the respondent court was in error where it still entertained the supplemental complaint filed by the respondent-appellee for by then the respondent Court had no more jurisdiction over the subject matter. When a decision has become final and executory, the court no longer has the power and jurisdiction to alter, amend or revoke, and its only power thereof is to order its execution. After the perfection of an appeal, the trial court loses jurisdiction over its judgment and cannot vacate the same. WE find no error in the order of the respondent Court dated July 23, 1969. From the reading of the premises and provisions of the contract and agreement which was "formally confirmed and officially approved by the parties" in the compromise agreement later entered into by the same parties, subject only to the enumerated changes and/or modifications, it is obvious that the contracting parties envisioned a stage by stage construction (on the part of the respondent-appellee) and payment (on the part of the defendant-appellant). Sub-paragraph B of paragraph 1 of the Compromise Agreement, to wit: "B. That immediately upon final approval hereof by this Honorable Court, the plaintiff contractor will submit and file in favor of Pasay City Government a new performance bond in the amount required by pertinent law, rules and regulations, in proportion to the remaining value or cost of the unfinished work of the construction as per approved plans and specifications . . ." Read together with the stage-by-stage construction and payment approach, would inevitably lead to the conclusion that the parties to the compromise contemplated a divisible obligation necessitating therefore a performance bond "in proportion to" the uncompleted work. What is crucial in sub-paragraph B of paragraph 1 of the compromise agreement are the words "in proportion." If the parties really intended the legal rate of 20% performance bond to refer to the whole unfinished work, then the provision should have required the plaintiff contractor to submit and file a new performance bond to cover the remaining value/cost of the unfinished work of the construction. Using the words in proportion then significantly changed the meaning of the paragraph to ultimately mean a performance bond equal to 20% of the next stage of work to be done. And, We note that in the Contract and Agreement, the respondent-appellee was allowed to file a performance bond of P222,250.00 which is but 5% of the total bid of P4,914,500.80. A security bond was likewise filed with an amount of P97,290.00. The sum total of bond then filed was P320,540.00 which is just 6.5% of the total bid. It is rather curious why all of a sudden the petitioners-appellants are insisting on a 20% performance bond of the entire unfinished work when they were quite content with a bond just 5% of the entire work. For Us to allow the petitionersappellants to adamantly stick to the 20% performance bond would be tantamount to allowing them to evade their obligation in the compromise agreement. This cannot be allowed. The bond of a contractor for a public work should not be extended beyond the reasonable intent as gathered from the purpose and language of the instrument construed in connection with the proposals, plans and specifications, and contract. The premium of the bond will be sizeable and will eat up the profit of the contractor, who is faced with the fluctuation of prices of materials due to inflation and devaluation. Right now, many contractors cannot proceed with the implementation of their contracts because of the extraordinary rise in cost of materials and labor. No contractor would be willing to bid for public works contracts under the oppressive interpretation by petitionersappellants. Again, the respondent Court was correct in ruling that the submission of the bond was not a condition precedent to the payment of P613,096.00 to the plaintiff. Nowhere in the Contact and Agreement nor in the Compromise Agreement could be found the fact that payment by the petitionerappellants of the amount of P613,096.00 was dependent upon the submission by the respondent-appellee of the performance bond. It cannot be argued that reciprocal obligation was created in the Compromise Agreement, for the obligation to pay on the part of the petitionersappellants was established several years ago when the
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