Arms Race/Rivalry: The Case of India and Pakistan Arms race, by definition, is the competitive, resource-constrained, dynamic process

of interaction between two states or coalitions of states in their acquisition of weapons (Brito and Intriligator, 1995). After the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Unions arms race no longer dominate the whole world politics and regional antagonisms become the focus. For example, arms races exist between Greece and Turkey, Iran and Iraq, North and South Korean, India and Pakistan. In the case of the arms race between India and Pakistan, it is well known that India and Pakistans rivalry relationship began at the same time as their creation as separate states in August 1947. Now more than 60 years after their independence, India and Pakistan have made significant economic, social and political developments. But they have been in conflict with each other constantly and have had at least four major wars and many small scale armed conflicts. We believe the conflicts which mainly due to internal religious differences and the ongoing external political hostility led to an arms race, although both governments deny that. So the question of the existence of an arms race between India and Pakistan which might hinder the economic development of both countries is still important and worrying This chapter aims to find out whether or not there is an arms race between India and Pakistan.

The Meaning of Rivalry

This research begins by examining the meaning and importance of the "rivalry" concept. At the most basic level, the concept of "rivalry" denotes a longstanding, competitive relationship between two or more actors. More precise conceptualizations offered by scholars who have studied rivalry or related concepts such as "enmity" or "protracted conflict" highlight three central elements in rivalry: competition between the same set of adversaries, the perception of threat and hostility by each side, and a temporal dimension reflecting the impact of past interactions and the expectation of future interactions (e.g., Finlay, et al. 1967; Feste 1982; Azar, et al. 1978; Brecher 1984; Bennett 1993; Vasquez 1993; Goertz and Diehl 1993; Wayman 1996). A full-fledged "enduring rivalry" thus requires (1) that two adversaries engage in a competitive relationship over one or more stakes that they view as important, (2) that each perceives that the other has hostile intentions and poses a significant security threat, and (3) that the competitive relationship has lasted for a substantial period of time and is expected to last into the foreseeable future. Most political science applications of "rivalry" and related concepts have focused on what might be termed "enduring, militarized, interstate rivalries," or rivalries between two nationstates that involve frequent militarized confrontations and that last for long periods of time. Yet the rivalry concept has a much broader range of potential applications than this one very specific usage. Economic rivalries between states can easily be seen as involving competition over economic policies or markets, generating perceptions of severe hostility and threats to each side's (economic) security, and lasting for substantial periods of time with the

expectation of continued competition in the future. The United States and Japan appear to have fit this description during the 1970s and 1980s, although with little expectation that this economic rivalry would spill over into the military arena. Political, economic, or military rivalries can also be seen between non-state actors, as in relationships between Hutu and Tutsi in Central Africa or between Serb, Croat, Muslim, and Albanian in BosniaHerzegovina, Croatia, or Kosovo. Such relationships involve competition over stakes ranging from economic success or\ political autonomy to survival, can generate severe perceptions of hostility and threats to security, and may last for many decades or longer with the expectation of continued rivalry into the future. Less severe or advanced forms of rivalry are also possible between the extremes of completely peaceful, uncompetitive relations and enduring rivalry; these lesser forms of rivalry would be lacking in one or more of the dimensions listed above. In such cases, it is always possible that the relationship between the adversaries may change along one of these dimensions, potentially producing movement toward or away from full rivalry. For example, two adversaries that do not perceive much competition, threat, or hostility from each other could begin to approach rivalry if later events should produce more competitive or hostile relations or greater feelings of threat perception. Many enduring, militarized rivalries were not always hostile or competitive, with their protracted military competition being preceded by a period of peaceful or even cooperative relations. For example, Bolivia and Paraguay had both been independent for decades before their latent territorial claims to the Chaco Boreal region led to the onset of militarized competition in the 1880s, and eventually to full-fledged enduring rivalry. Along the same lines, two relatively new adversaries that begin to qualify as rivals based on the competitiveness and threat perception dimensions -- perhaps on the basis of an especially bitter war or several recent crises -- could approach enduring rivalry if this adversarial relationship were to last for a longer period of time. It should be noted, though, that movement toward rivalry is not necessarily predetermined or irreversible, and later events may lead actors toward peaceful relations rather than rivalry. If two adversaries are able to resolve some of their disputed issues peacefully or if at least one of them is unwilling to risk militarized conflict, then any threat perception or competitiveness between them may decrease, moving them closer to peaceful relations and thus farther from enduring rivalry. The Importance of Rivalry Empirically, the phenomenon of interstate rivalry appears to account for most militarized interstate conflict. The majority of all militarized interstate disputes, violent territorial changes, and interstate wars have been found to occur in the context of either protorivalries or enduring rivalries, including ten of the twelve most severe international wars in recent history. Confrontations between rivals also appear to be more severe and escalatory than other, non rivalry confrontations, and enduring rivalries are much more likely than non-rival adversaries to experience war at some point (e.g., Brecher 1984; Brecher and James 1988; Goertz and Diehl 1992; Bennett 1993). On the basis of these observations, enduring rivalry is an important topic to study if we are to understand interstate conflict. If we can understand the processes and dynamics of rivalry, then we should be able to account for most militarized conflict in the modern era, including much of the most dangerous or escalatory conflict. Additionally, many scholars have argued that the context of rivalry differs substantially from non-rivalry contexts (e.g., Vasquez 1993, Thompson 1995; Goertz and Diehl 1993, 1995b), with very different implications for relations between states. Empirical analyses support this contention, suggesting that repeated crises between the same adversaries are more escalatory and more dangerous than isolated crises (Leng 1983; Huth 1988; Goertz and Diehl 1992). It appears that the history of past relations between two adversaries may affect their subsequent

relationship, in which case the historical context may be central to understanding the dynamics that lead to enduring rivalry and the differences between rivalries and other relationships. As Goertz and Diehl (1993, 1995b) suggest, there may be important temporal interdependence between events in rivalries, and traditional studies of conflict behavior that ignore these connections may be deeply flawed. Beyond their own intrinsic importance, interstate rivalries are seen as possessing characteristics that make them valuable for use in testing other propositions about interstate conflict. In particular, enduring rivalries have frequently been used as a case selection mechanism because of the existence of a conflict of interest between the adversaries and their fairly frequent resort to militarized means to resolve their differences. If an hypothesized factor is to have an important influence on conflict behavior, then that effect should be most pronounced in such a competitive and militarized setting. Conversely, a factor that does not lead to conflict in such a setting would appear unlikely to have much impact on conflict behaviour in larger populations of cases including adversaries that may not have noteworthy conflicts of interest or that do not have a history of turning to militarized means over their past disagreements. Examples of research using rivalry as a case selection mechanism include studies of arms races (Diehl 1985), power transitions (Geller 1993, Wayman 1996), and general deterrence (Huth and Russett 1993). Past research on rivalry, while it has already produced many useful contributions, could be improved through careful study of the origins and evolution of rivalry. Rather than simply noting that rivalries account for a large fraction of all conflict or using rivalries to study additional topics, we could benefit from trying to understanding how these situations come into being. An understanding of the origins of rivalry could prove to be valuable from a policy perspective, as well as from an empirical or theoretical perspective. Throughout the Cold Warand its aftermath, academics and policy-makers have offered numerous prescriptions for how to manage or end interstate rivalry, and the Cold War superpowers reached a number of agreements on arms control and confidence-building measures for this purpose. Managing or ending rivalry is undoubtedly an important topic, but it would also be desirable to understand how to prevent rivalry before it begins. Given the high costs -military, economic, political, and social of interstate rivalries, successfully managing or ending the rivalry should be seen as a second-best solution, behind avoidance or prevention of rivalry in the first place.2 Studying the origins of rivalry thus offers the hope that policy-makers would be able to learn from the lessons of previous rivalries -- as well as the lessons of previous disagreements that did not lead to outright rivalry -- in managing their own disagreements short of rivalry, thereby avoiding the tremendous costs and risks involved in rivalrous interstate relationships. PREVIOUS APPROACHES TO STUDYING RIVALRY Much rivalry-related writing since World War II has involved historical studies of individual rivalries, typically with little effort to generalize beyond the domain of that single case (e.g., Safran 1969; Ulam 1971). Even the more systematic efforts to generalize about rivalries have tended to overlook the origins of rivalry, generally treating rivalry as an independent variable or a case selection mechanism to be used in studying other phenomena. Studies treating rivalry as a dependent variable -- where the goal is to understand the outbreak or termination of rivalry itself -- have been rare, with the notable exceptions of Bennett's (e.g., 1993, 1998) research on rivalry termination and Goertz and Diehl's (1995a) research on political shocks. Goertz and Diehl (1995a; see also Goertz and Diehl 1998) offer the only previous study of the origins of rivalry, centered around their "basic rivalry level" or "punctuated equilibrium" model. They suggest that each pair of adversary nation-states has a basic rivalry level or BRL around which their relations fluctuate. According to the

punctuated equilibrium model, rivalries primarily begin because of the influence of exogenous factors, which determine the BRL for the dyad in question. Goertz and Diehl (1995a) identify political shocks as an important source of rivalry, noting that the dramatic changes represented by shocks can fundamentally alter the processes, relationships, and expectations driving interactions between states. Political shocks thus set the stage for rapid change in interstate relationships, perhaps leading to the outbreak of new rivalries or the termination of ongoing rivalries. Goertz and Diehl focus on shocks at both the nation-state and systemic levels such as national independence and world wars, and find that most rivalries begin within ten years of one or more such shocks. Consistent with this lack of interest in the origins of rivalry, past definitions and measures of rivalry have generally assumed that the context of rivalry is static, with no noticeable change from the initial outbreak of rivalry to its termination.3 Many such approaches (e.g., Gochman and Maoz 1984; Diehl 1985; Wayman 1996) offer a dichotomous categorization of adversaries as either enduring rivals (adversaries that engage in a certain number of militarized confrontations over a specified length of time) or non-rivals (all other cases);Goertz and Diehl (1992) add the intermediate category of proto-rivalry between "isolated conflict" and fullfledged enduring rivalry. In each case, the entire period of rivalry is treated as equivalent for the purposes of analysis, ignoring the possibility of change in two actors' relationship between the beginning of a new rivalry, the middle of an ongoing rivalry, or the conclusion of the rivalry.4 Thus, while Goertz and Diehl (1992) find that the majority of wars of the past two centuries have occurred in the context of rivalry, it is unclear whether most of these wars occur early in the rivalry (and thus contribute to later events in the rivalry), or whether most of them occur after decades of disagreement and frequent confrontations (and thus result from earlier events in the rivalry). A static approach to rivalry simply assumes that there is no difference in context over the course of a rivalry, without testing empirically whether such differences might exist, so the timing of wars in rivalries is seen as irrelevant. Yet the implications for both theory and policy may be very different if the high levels of conflict that appear to characterize rivalry begin immediately, or if these high levels of conflict are only reached after years or decades of confrontation as rivalry develops. Another shortcoming of static, post hoc identification of rivalries becomes apparent upon considering how to treat adversarial relationships that are ongoing at the time they are being studied. Because such approaches identify rivalries based on the eventual length and severity of their conflictual relationship, the scholar must wait until a number of years and confrontations have passed (the most common definitions require at least six confrontations and twenty years) before two adversaries can be classified as enduring rivals. Then, once this classification is made, all of the earlier relations between those adversaries must be reclassified as having occurred in a context of rivalry instead of a non-rivalrous context -which has the potential to alter or reverse previous findings from research conducted before the reclassification. Current examples include the budding potential rivalries between Serbia and Croatia or between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which would currently be classified as "isolated conflict" or "proto-rivalries" because of the recency of their conflict. It is difficult to tell now whether such adversaries will eventually reach the confrontation and duration thresholds to qualify as enduring rivals, and any analyses or prescriptions offered before that classification can be made with certainty run the risk of being changed due to future events.5 Further difficulties with existing approaches to the study of rivalry are highlighted by examining the origins of individual rivalries. For example, the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union might be explained by the post hoc approach as the inevitable result of competition between the system's two leading powers or as the result of the political shock of World War II. Goertz and Diehl (1995a) treat the Cold War as an enduring rivalry

beginning in 1946, reflecting the beginning of the first militarized dispute between the two superpowers. There is evidence, though, that decision-makers in 1945 or 1946 neither expected nor intended for events to unfold as they did. At the close of World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union had just defeated the Axis powers and were beginning to show signs of disagreement over the post-war order in Europe. Yet there appears to have been little expectation that relations between the superpowers would evolve into a rivalry that engulfed much of the globe for over\ four decades, and many policy makers (at least in the United States) seemed to expect that the superpowers would be able to work out their differences peacefully. Although some individuals had seen the United States and the Soviet Union as fundamental rivals a decade or more before the war even began, they remained a minority in government for some time after the war, as others tried to resolve or minimize the conflicts of interest between the two states. Consensus on the fundamental and protracted nature of their rivalry was not reached until after the superpowers had engaged in a series of diplomatic and military confrontations over Iran, Turkey, Berlin, and similar issues (e.g., Gaddis 1978; Larson 1995; Leffler and Painter 1994).6 If the above characterization of the early Cold War is accurate, then a post hoc approach to rivalry would be inadequate as a research strategy. Treating two adversaries as enduring rivals from the date of their earliest confrontation -- when they do not yet know that they will eventually become frequent adversaries, they may expect a resolution of their differences soon, and they most likely do not yet view each other as primary security threats -- seems likely to produce more misleading research results than a more dynamic approach. A more appropriate strategy, corresponding more closely to the empirical realities, would have to be able to account for the development over time of each rivalry, incorporating uncertainty and fluctuations in the intensity of rivalry as it evolves. In short, what is needed is an evolutionary approach to rivalry. THE EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH TO INTERSTATE RIVALRY Evolution in its most general sense can be described as an unfolding process of change over time. Evolutionary theory in the natural sciences treats systems or populations as changing over time, reaching their particular state at any given point in time through a series of historical changes. The study of evolution, then, focuses on the series of events and processes that lead up to a given state -- whether this state refers to the incremental adaptation of a species through the development of new features, the development of entirely new species, or changes in the balance of species in an environment or of genotypes in a population. Evolutionary trends or processes are not guided by pre-determined outcomes, and may culminate in a wide range of possible end states; outcomes of evolution are thus knowable only in retrospect (Hensel 1998b elaborates on natural science evolutionary concepts and their relevance to militarized conflict and rivalry). Most research on evolutionary processes comes from such fields as biology, geology, and anthropology, but many of the same concepts are also relevant to the study of interstate conflict and rivalry. Much like the characteristics of species can change over time (either changing the species incrementally or producing entirely new species), relations between nation-state adversaries can be seen as changing over time, reaching their particular state at any given point in time through a series of historical interactions. A variety of possible outcomes exist, ranging from intense interstate rivalry to entirely cooperative and peaceful relations, and the path to the eventual outcome that results is not pre-determined. An evolutionary approach to interstate\ rivalry, then, is based on the premise that rivalry -- rather than being inevitable or predetermined by structural conditions -- is a dynamic phenomenon

and changes over time. The eventual end results of conflictual relationships (whether or not two states become enduring rivals, as well as specific details of their interactions such as the duration or severity of their conflictual relationship) are influenced heavily by interactions along the way, and cannot be known with certainty at the start of the process or at any point during the process. Such an approach requires studying the dynamic processes through which adversaries' relations unfold and develop over time, identifying factors that may push the adversaries toward rivalry as well as factors that may help them resolve their differences far short of militarized rivalry. This evolutionary approach offers important advantages over more traditional approaches to rivalry. Rather than simply treating a lengthy time span of relations between two states as an enduring rivalry, a proto-rivalry, or a non-rivalry -- and reclassifying earlier events each time anew threshold is crossed -- the evolutionary researcher studies the way in which events unfold and relationships evolve over time. Such a strategy can focus on the specific context of relations between two adversaries at any given point in time based on what has already happened between them, rather than classifying adversaries based on the eventual outcome of their relations at some undetermined point in the future. Rather than waiting several decades to see what the future holds for relations between Serbia and Croatia or Armenia and Azerbaijan, then, an evolutionary approach allows scholars (or policy makers) to ascertain where the adversaries are on the continuum of rivalry at any given point in time. Additionally, there is no risk of having to revise conclusions if later events should lead to the reclassification of a given dispute as having occurred in enduring rivalry; as noted earlier, as many as dozens of potential rivalries and hundreds of militarized disputes may need to be reclassified based on events in the mid- or late 1990s. Instead, the evolutionary approach can offer analyses or prescriptions based on the situation as it stands at any given point in time, along with projections about how it may develop in the future. This is an important advantage of the evolutionary approach, because it allows scholars to understand how rivalry comes about and by implication, how conflictual relationships can be managed short of rivalry, something that more traditional approaches are unable to address. _____________________________________________________________ REFERENCES Azar, Edward E., Paul Jureidini, and Ronald McLaurin (1978). "Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Practice in the Middle East." Journal of Palestine Studies 8, 1: 41-60 Bennett, D. Scott, (1993), Security, Economy, and the End of Interstate Rivalry, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan Bennett, D. Scott (1998). Integrating and Testing Models of Rivalry Duration. American Journal of Political Science 42: 1200-1232. Brecher, Michael (1984). "International Crises, Protracted Conflicts." International Interactions 11, 3-4: 237-298. Brecher, Michael, and Patrick James (1988). "Patterns of Crisis Management." Journal of Conflict Resolution 32: 426-456. Diehl, Paul F. (1985). "Arms Races to War: Testing Some Empirical Linkages." Sociological Quarterly 26, 3: 331-349. Diehl, Paul F. (1992). "What Are They Fighting For? The Importance of Issues in International Conflict Research." Journal of Peace Research 29, 3 (August): 333-344. Feste, Karen (1982). "International Enemies: A Review." Paper presented at the Annual

Meeting of the International Studies Association, Cincinnati. Finlay, David J., Ole R. Holsti, and Richard R. Fagen (1967). Enemies in Politics. Chicago: Rand-McNally. Gaddis, John Lewis (1978). Russia, The Soviet Union, and the United States: An Interpretive History. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Geller, Daniel (1993). "Power Differentials and War in Rival Dyads." International Studies Quarterly 37, 2 (June): 173-194. Gochman, Charles S., and Russell J. Leng (1983). "Realpolitik and the Road to War: An Analysis of Attributes and Behavior." International Studies Quarterly 27, 1 (March): 97-120. Gochman, Charles S., and Zeev Maoz (1984). "Militarized Interstate Disputes 1816-1976". Journal of Conflict Resolution 28, 4 (December): 585-616. Goertz, Gary, and Paul F. Diehl (1992). "The Empirical Importance of Enduring Rivalries." International Interactions 18, 2: 151-163. Goertz, Gary, and Paul F. Diehl (1993). "Enduring Rivalries: Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Patterns." International Studies Quarterly 37, 2 (June): 147-171. Goertz, Gary, and Paul F. Diehl (1995a). "The Initiation and Termination of Enduring Rivalries: The Impact of Political Shocks." American Journal of Political Science 39, 1 (February): 3052. Goertz, Gary, and Paul F. Diehl (1995b). "Taking Enduring Out of Enduring Rivalry: The Rivalry Approach to War and Peace." International Interactions 21, 3: 291-308. Goertz, Gary, and Paul F. Diehl (1998). "The 'Volcano Model' and Other Patterns in the Evolution of Enduring Rivalries." In P. F. Diehl, ed., The Dynamics of Enduring Rivalries. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, pp. 98-125. Hensel, Paul R. (1994). "One Thing Leads to Another: Recurrent Militarized Disputes in Latin America, 1816-1986." Journal of Peace Research 31, 3 (August 1994): 281-298. Hensel, Paul R. (1996). The Evolution of Interstate Rivalry. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Hensel, Paul R. (1998a). "Domestic Politics and Interstate Conflict." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston. Hensel, Paul R. (1998b). "Evolutionary Perspectives on Recurrent Conflict and Rivalry." Paper presented at the Conference on Evolutionary Perspectives on International Relations, Bloomington, IN, December 1998. Hensel, Paul R. (1999). Contentious Issues and World Politics: Territorial Claims in the Americas, 1816-1996. Manuscript, Florida State University. Hensel, Paul R. and Sara McLaughlin. (1996). Power Transitions and Dispute Escalation in Evolving Interstate Rivalries Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco. Hensel, Paul R. and Thomas Sowers. (1998). Territorial Claims, Major Power Competition, and the Origins of Enduring Rivalry. Paper presented at the joint meeting of the International

Studies Association and the European Standing Group on International Relations, Vienna. Huth, Paul K. (1988). Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War. New Haven: Yale University Press. Huth, Paul K., and Bruce Russett (1993). "General Deterrence between Enduring Rivals: Testing Three Competing Models." American Political Science Review 87, 1 (March): 61-73. Jervis, Robert (1976). Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Jones, Daniel, Stuart Bremer, and J. David Singer. (1996). Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns. Conflict Management and Peace Science 15: 163-213. Kugler, Jacek, and Douglas Lemke (1996). Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of The War Ledger. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Larson, Deborah Welch (1995). Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Leffler, Melvyn P., and David S. Painter, eds. (1994). Origins of the Cold War: An International History. London: Routledge. Leng, Russell J. (1983). "When Will They Ever Learn? Coercive Bargaining in Recurrent Crises." Journal of Conflict Resolution 27, 3 (September): 379-419. Levy, Jack S., and T. Clifton Morgan (1984). "The Frequency and Seriousness of War." Journal of Conflict Resolution 28, 4 (December): 731-749. Maoz, Zeev (1984). "Peace By Empire? Conflict Outcomes and International Stability, 18161976." Journal of Peace Research 21, 3 (September): 227-241. Maoz, Zeev, and Nasrin Abdolali (1989). "Regime Types and International Conflict, 18161976." Journal of Conflict Resolution 33: 3-35. Morgan, Patrick M. (1983). Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis, rev. ed.. Berkeley: Sage. Russett, Bruce (1993). Grasping the Democratic Peace. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Safran, Nadav (1969). From War to War: The Arab-Israeli Conflict. New York: Pegasus. Sowers, Thomas E., and Paul R. Hensel (1997). Parity, Disputed Issues, and the Evolution of Interstate Rivalry. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Peace Science Society (International), Indianapolis. Thompson, William R. (1995). Principal Rivalries. Journal of Conflict Resolution 39, 2 (June): 195-223. Ulam, Adam (1971). The Rivals: America and Russia since World War II. New York: Penguin. Vasquez, John (1993). The War Puzzle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wayman, Frank W. (1996). "Power Shifts and the Onset of War." In Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke, eds., Parity and War. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 145-162.

Pakistan and India: Race to the End

http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/pakistan-nuclear-weapons-battlefield-indiaarms-race-energy-cold-war accessed on 08/092013

Published September 5, 2012 TOM HUNDLEY One of the more tenacious conspiracy theories that have taken root in the hothouse of Pakistan's capital is that Osama bin Laden was not killed in the May 2, 2011, Navy SEAL raid on his compound in Abbottabad -- that, in fact, he had already been dead for years, killed in the caves of Tora Bora. According to this theory, the CIA had been keeping bin Laden's corpse on ice, literally, ready to be resurrected at a moment when his "death" could better serve U.S. interests. That moment came when the SEALs decided to conduct a dry run of their long-planned operation to snatch Pakistan's nuclear weapons. Bin Laden's thawing corpse was brought along as cover in case the exercise blew up -- and as a devious bit of political theater to besmirch Pakistan's reputation if all went well. What keep conspiracy theories like this alive are bits and pieces of half-baked evidence that could be construed to support a deeply held belief. In this case, it is the belief -- accepted across the board in Pakistan, from the top brass of its military down to the dusty gaggle of taxi drivers who awaited me each morning outside my Islamabad hotel -- that the United States has a not-so-secret plan to snatch Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. The United States, which is duly concerned that Pakistan's nukes could fall into the wrong hands, almost certainly does have a plan to neutralize those weapons in the event of a coup or total state collapse. When the question was put to Condoleezza Rice during her 2005 confirmation hearings to become secretary of state, she replied, "We have noted this problem, and we are prepared to try to deal with it." "Try" is the key word. Military experts -- American, Pakistani, and Indian -- agree that grabbing or disarming all of Pakistan's nukes at this stage would be something close to mission impossible. As one senior Pakistani general told me, "We look at the stories in the U.S. media about taking away our nuclear weapons and this definitely concerns us, so countermeasures have been developed accordingly." Such steps have included building more warheads and spreading them out over a larger number of heavily guarded locations. This, of course, also makes the logistics of securing them against theft by home-grown terrorists that much more complicated. Fears of that terrifying possibility were heightened in August, when a group of militants assaulted a Pakistani base that some believe houses nuclear weapons components. Nine militants and one soldier were killed in a two-hour fire fight at the Kamra air force base. The local media immediately floated the theory that this, too, was part of the American plot to steal Pakistan's nukes. But more disturbing than any conspiracy theory is the reality that this was the fourth attack in five years on the Kamra base, just 20 miles from the capital. At least five other sensitive military installations have also come under attack by militants since 2007. Yet, though the danger of a loose Pakistani nuke certainly deserves scrupulous attention, it may not be the severest nuclear threat emanating from South Asia, as I came to realize after interviewing more than a dozen experts in Pakistan, India, and the United States this summer.

Since the 9/11 attacks, preventing the world's most dangerous weapons from falling into the hands of the world's most dangerous actors -- whether al Qaeda terrorists or Iranian mullahs -- has understandably been America's stated priority. Yet the gravest danger -- not only for the region, but for the United States itself -- may be the South Asian incarnation of a Cold War phenomenon: a nuclear arms race. Pakistan, with an estimated 90 to 120 warheads, is now believed to be churning out more plutonium than any other country on the planet -- thanks to two Chinese-built reactors that are now online, a third that is undergoing trials, and a fourth that is scheduled to become operational by 2016. It has already passed India in total number of warheads and is on course to overtake Britain as the world's No. 5 nuclear power. Pakistan could end up in third place, behind Russia and the United States, within a decade. This April, Pakistan tested a short-range ballistic missile, the Hatf IX, a so-called "shoot and scoot" battlefield nuclear weapon aimed at deterring an invasion by India's conventional forces. This development carries two disturbing implications. First, Pakistan now has the know-how to build nuclear warheads compact enough to fit on the tip of a small missile or inside a suitcase (handy for terrorists). Second, Pakistan has adopted a war-fighting doctrine that does not preclude nuking its own territory in the event of an Indian incursion -- a dubious first in the annals of deterrence theory. India, meanwhile, has just tested its first long-range ballistic missile, the Agni-V, with a range of 3,100 miles. In April, the Indian Navy added a new Russian-made nuclear-powered submarine to its fleet and is now building its own nuclear subs. One has already been launched and will enter service next year, and India is determined to add submarine-launched ballistic missiles to its arsenal. This puts India on the verge of joining the elite nuclear "triad" club -- states with the ability to survive a first strike by an adversary and deliver a retaliatory strike by land, sea, or air. India has also said that it has successfully tested an anti-ballistic missile shield that could be deployed "in a short time" to protect New Delhi and Mumbai. The downside of this defensive measure -- putting aside the question of effectiveness -- is that it invites an adversary to build many more warheads in the hope that a few will be able to slip through the shield. India claims that it is not really engaged in an arms race -- or that, if it is, its opponent is not Pakistan, but China, a nuclear-armed superpower and economic rival with which it shares a disputed border. The Agni-V was dubbed the "China-killer" in some overheated Indian headlines. China's nuclear ambitions are geared toward deterring the United States and Russia, but it obligingly stirs the pot in South Asia by providing Pakistan with plutonium reactors -- in flagrant violation of its obligations as a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Meanwhile, through a 2008 deal negotiated by George W. Bush's administration, the United States has given India access to nuclear fuel on the international market. In the past, India had been barred from such trade because the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty does not consider its nuclear weapons program legitimate, and its limited supplies of domestic uranium forced it to choose between powering its reactors and building more nuclear weapons. "Power production was the priority; now they can have both," explained Toby Dalton, deputy director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. With both sides armed to the teeth, it is easy to exaggerate the fears and much harder to pinpoint where the real dangers lie. For the United States, the nightmare scenario is that some

of Pakistan's warheads or its fissile material falls into the hands of the Taliban or al Qaeda -or, worse, that the whole country falls into the hands of the Taliban. For example, Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, a former CIA officer now at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, has warned of the "lethal proximity between terrorists, extremists, and nuclear weapons insiders" in Pakistan. This is a reality, but on the whole, Pakistan's nuclear arsenal appears to be reasonably secure against internal threats, according to those who know the country best. To outsiders, Pakistan appears to be permanently teetering on the brink of collapse. The fact that large swaths of the country are literally beyond the control of the central government is not reassuring. But a weak state does not mean a weak society, and powerful internal dynamics based largely on kinship and tribe make it highly unlikely that Pakistan would ever fall under the control of an outfit like the Taliban. During the country's intermittent bouts of democracy, its civilian leaders have been consistently incompetent and corrupt, but even in the worst of times, the military has maintained a high standard of professionalism. And there is nothing that matters more to the Pakistani military than keeping the nuclear arsenal -- its crown jewels -- out of the hands of India, the United States, and homegrown extremists. "Pakistan struggled to acquire these weapons against the wishes of the world. Our nuclear capability comes as a result of great sacrifice. It is our most precious and powerful weapon -for our defense, our security, and our political prestige," Talat Masood, a retired Pakistani lieutenant general, told me. "We keep them safe." Pakistan's nuclear security is in the responsibility of the Strategic Plans Division, which appears to function pretty much as a separate branch of the military. It has its own training facility and an elaborate set of controls and screening procedures to keep track of all warheads and fissile material and to monitor any blips in the behaviour patterns of its personnel. The 15 or so sites where weapons are stored are the mostly heavily guarded in the country. Even if some group managed to steal or commandeer a weapon, it is highly unlikely the group would be able to use it. The greater danger is the theft of fissile material, which could be used to make a crude bomb. "With 70 to 80 kilos of highly enriched uranium, it would be fairly easy to make one in the basement of a building in the city of your choice," said Pervez Hoodbhoy, a distinguished nuclear physicist at Islamabad's Quaid-i-Azam University. At the moment, Pakistan has a stockpile of about 2.75 tons -- or some 30 bombs' worth -- of highly enriched uranium. It does not tell Americans where it is stored. "All nuclear countries are conscious of the risks, nuclear weapons states especially so," said Gen. Ehsan ul-Haq, who speaks with the been-there-done-that authority of a man who has served as both chairman of Pakistan's Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and head of the ISI, its controversial spy agency. "Of course there are concerns. Some are genuine, but much of what you read in the U.S. media is irrational and reflective of paranoia. Rising radicalism in Pakistan? Yes, this is true, and the military is very conscious of this." Perhaps the most credible endorsement of Pakistan's nuclear security regime comes from its most steadfast enemy. The consensus among India's top generals and defense experts is that Pakistan's nukes are pretty secure. "No one can be 100 percent secure, but I think they are more than 99 percent secure," said Shashindra Tyagi, a former chief of staff of the Indian Air Force. "They keep a very close watch on personnel. All of the steps that could be taken have been taken. This business of the Taliban taking over -- it can't be ruled out, but I think it's

unlikely. The Pakistani military understands the threats they face better than anyone, and they are smart enough to take care it." Yogesh Joshi, an analyst at the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, agrees: "Different states have different perceptions of risk. The U.S. has contingency plans [to secure Pakistan's nukes] because its nightmare scenario is that Pakistan's weapons fall into terrorist hands. The view from India over the years is that Pakistan, probably more than any other nuclear weapons state, has taken measures to secure its weapons. At the political level here, there's a lot of confidence that Pakistan's nuclear weapons are secure." The greater concern -- not only for India and Pakistan, but for the United States and everyone else -- may be the direct competition between the two South Asian states. True, in terms of numbers and destructive capacity, the arms buildup in South Asia does not come close to what was going on during the Cold War, when the United States and the Soviet Union built enough bombs to destroy the planet many times over. India and Pakistan have enough to destroy it only once, perhaps twice. But in many ways, the arms race in South Asia is more dangerous. The United States and the Soviet Union were rival superpowers jockeying for influence and advantage on the global stage, but these were also two countries that had never gone to war with each other, that had a vast physical and psychological separation between them, that generally steered clear of direct provocations, and that eventually had mechanisms in place (like the famous hotline between Moscow and Washington) to make sure little misunderstandings didn't grow into monstrous miscalculations. By contrast, the India-Pakistan rivalry comes with all the venom and vindictiveness of a messy divorce, which, of course, it is. The two countries have officially fought three wars against each other since their breakup in 1947 and have had numerous skirmishes and close calls since then. They have a festering territorial dispute in Kashmir. The 1999 Kargil conflict, waged a year after both countries went overtly nuclear, may have come closer to the nuclear brink than even the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. At the height of the showdown, there was credible intelligence that both sides were readying their nuclear arsenals for deployment. Pakistan lost all three of these wars. Its very large army is still only half the size of India's, whose military budget is more than seven times larger than Pakistan's. Pakistan's generals are well aware that in any all-out conventional confrontation with India, they're toast. The guiding ideology of Pakistan's Army -- from the generals on down to their drivers -- is that India represents a permanent existential threat. This is why Pakistan clings to its nukes and attempts to maintain at least the illusion of what its generals call "bilateral balance." This conventional asymmetry increases the danger of the nuclear arms race -- it feeds India's hubris and Pakistan's sense of failure. Here are two countries headed in opposite directions. India's $1.7 trillion economy is eight times the size of Pakistan's and has grown at an enviable 8.2 percent annually over the last three years, compared to just 3.3 percent for Pakistan. India is in the forefront of the digital revolution, and while the country's leaders were embarrassed by this summer's massive two-day blackout, Pakistan's broken-down infrastructure struggles to provide citizens with more than a few hours of electricity each day. India, the world's largest democracy, is on the cusp of becoming a global power; Pakistan, with its on-and-off military dictatorships (off at the moment), ranks 13th on Foreign Policy's most recent Failed States Index.

More significant than these statistics is the mindset behind them. India is brimming with confidence. Pakistan is hobbled by fear, paranoia, and a deep sense of inferiority. India's major cities, New Delhi and Mumbai, are modernizing global metropolises. Checking into the Marriott in Pakistan's capital is like checking into a maximum-security prison -- high walls topped with razor wire, armed guards in watchtowers. Islamabad today looks and feels like a city under siege where there could be a coup at any moment. Soldiers and checkpoints are everywhere. It felt this way the first time I visited, in 1985. This economic and cultural lopsidedness is strikingly reflected in the countries' nuclear competition. In perhaps no other major power is the military quite so submissive to civilian authority as it is in India. "The civilian side lords it over the military in a manner that often borders on humiliation -- and there is no pushback from the military," said Ashley Tellis, an India expert with the Carnegie Endowment. The reasons for this are rooted in India's long struggle for independence against a colonial master that filled the ranks of its police and army with natives. "The military was seen as a force that served a colonial occupier," said Tellis. With the Indian officer corps' fondness for whiskey, mustaches, and other Briticisms, "the nationalist leadership looked at them as aliens" and took extreme measures to make sure there would be no coups. From a nuclear standpoint, the result of this dynamic is a command-and-control system that is firmly in the hands of the civilian political leadership, a clearly stated "no first use" policy, and a view that nukes are political weapons -- a way to project global power and prestige -not viable war-fighting tools. In theory, Pakistan's nuclear trigger is also in civilian hands. A body called the National Command Authority, headed by the prime minister, is supposed to be the ultimate decider of whether to initiate a nuclear attack. In reality, however, it is the military that controls the process from top to bottom. Pakistan has never formally stated its nuclear doctrine, preferring to keep the Indians guessing as to when and where it might use nukes. But now it appears to be contemplating the idea of actually using tactical nuclear weapons in a confrontation with India. The problem with this delicate state of affairs is not simply the two countries' history of war, but Pakistan's tactic of hiding behind its nuclear shield while allowing terrorist groups to launch proxy attacks against India. The 2001 attack on India's Parliament building and the 2008 Mumbai attack are the most egregious examples. Both were carried out by Lashkar-eTaiba militants based in Pakistan with well-established links to the ISI and were far more provocative than anything the Americans or Russians dished out to each other during the four decades of the Cold War. (More than 160 people were killed in the attack that held India's largest city hostage for 60 hours.) Terrorism is the classic underdog tactic, but Pakistan is certainly the world's first nuclear-armed underdog to successfully apply the tactic against a nuclear rival. India has been struggling to respond. "For 15 years this country is bleeding from attack after attack, and there is nothing we can do," said Raja Mohan of the Observer Research Foundation, a New Delhi think tank. "The attacks correlate directly to Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear weapons. From the moment they got nukes, they saw it as an opportunity they could exploit. And India has no instruments to punish Pakistan or change its behavior."

There are encouraging signs that Pakistan may be rethinking this tactic, realizing that over the long run the Taliban and others of its ilk pose a far greater danger to Pakistan than to India. The relentless succession of suicide bombings and attacks on police and military bases and a costly war to wrest control of the Swat Valley from the Taliban seem to have finally convinced Pakistan's military that, in the words of one general, "the threat today is internal, and if it is not pushed back and neutralized, it will continue to expand its influence and we will have an Afghanistan situation inside our own country." But even if the ISI is sincere about ending its relationship with jihadi proxies, India's military planners are still searching for an appropriate weapon with which to punish Pakistan in the event of "another Mumbai." The problem for India is that even though it holds a huge advantage in conventional forces, its mobilization process is ponderously slow. This shortcoming was humiliatingly exposed after the 2001 attack on the Parliament building, when it took the Indian Army about three weeks to deploy for a retaliatory strike -- enough time for the United States to step in and cool tempers on both sides. A potential nuclear crisis had been averted, but in 2004, India, still smarting from its inability to retaliate, announced a new war-fighting doctrine dubbed "Cold Start," which called for the capability to conduct a series of cross-border lightning strikes within 72 hours. The idea was not to hold territory or threaten the existence of the Pakistani state, but to use overwhelming firepower to deliver a punishing blow that would fall short of provoking a nuclear response. Pakistan's reaction -- or overreaction -- was to double down on developing its short-range battlefield nuclear weapon, the Hatf IX. Any incursion from India would be met with a nuclear response even if it meant Pakistan had to nuke its own territory. "What one fears is that with the testing of these short-range nuclear missiles -- five in the last couple of months -- this seems to indicate a seriousness about using theater nuclear weapons," said Hoodbhoy, the physicist. While strategists on both sides debate whether the Hatf IX, with a range of 60 kilometers and a mobile multi-barrel launch system, would be enough to stop an advancing column of Indian tanks -- Hoodbhoy argues that "smaller, sub-kiloton-size weapons are not really effective militarily" -- they do agree that it would take more than one missile to do the job, instantly escalating the crisis beyond anyone's control. The last nuclear weapon state to seriously consider the use of battlefield nuclear weapons was the United States during the first decades of the Cold War, when NATO was faced with the overwhelming superiority of Soviet conventional forces. But by the early 1970s, U.S. strategists no longer believed these weapons had any military utility, and by 1991 most had been withdrawn from European territory. Pakistan, however, seems to have embraced this discarded strategy and is now, in effect, challenging India to a game of nuclear chicken -- which seems to have made India tread carefully. Tellingly, in 2008, when Lashkar terrorists attacked Mumbai, Cold Start was not implemented. These days, Indian officials seem to be backing away from the idea. "There is no Cold Start doctrine. No such thing. It was an off-the-cuff remark from a former chief of staff. I have been defense minister of the country. I should know," veteran Indian politician Jaswant Singh assured me. In a Wiki Leaked classified document dated Feb. 16, 2010, Tim Roemer, then U.S. ambassador to India, described Cold Start as "a mixture of myth and reality" that, if implemented, "would likely encounter very mixed results."

Pakistani military planners, however, continue to be obsessed with the idea of Cold Start. It comes up in every conversation about security, and it is the driving force behind the country's program to develop tactical battlefield nukes. For now, the focus is on missile delivery systems, but according to Maria Sultan, director of the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute, an Islamabad think tank, there is growing interest in using nukes in other ways -such as to create an electromagnetic pulse that would fry the enemy's electronics. "In short, we will look for full-spectrum response options," she said. The arms race could make a loose nuke more likely. After all, Pakistan's assurances that its nuclear arsenal is safe and secure rest heavily on the argument that its warheads and their delivery systems have been uncoupled and stored separately in heavily guarded facilities. It would be very difficult for a group of mutinous officers to assemble the necessary protocols for a launch and well nigh impossible for a band of terrorists to do so. But that calculus changes with the deployment of mobile battlefield weapons. The weapons themselves, no longer stored in heavily guarded bunkers, would be far more exposed. Nevertheless, military analysts from both countries still say that a nuclear exchange triggered by miscalculation, miscommunication, or panic is far more likely than terrorists stealing a weapon -- and, significantly, that the odds of such an exchange increase with the deployment of battlefield nukes. As these ready-to-use weapons are maneuvered closer to enemy lines, the chain of command and control would be stretched and more authority necessarily delegated to field officers. And, if they have weapons designed to repel a conventional attack, there is obviously a reasonable chance they will use them for that purpose. "It lowers the threshold," said Hoodbhoy. "The idea that tactical nukes could be used against Indian tanks on Pakistan's territory creates the kind of atmosphere that greatly shortens the distance to apocalypse." Both sides speak of the possibility of a limited nuclear war. But even those who speak in these terms seem to understand that this is fantasy -- that once started, a nuclear exchange would be almost impossible to limit or contain. "The only move that you have control over is your first move; you have no control over the nth move in a nuclear exchange," said Carnegie's Tellis. The first launch would create hysteria; communication lines would break down, and events would rapidly cascade out of control. Some of the world's most densely populated cities could find themselves under nuclear attack, and an estimated 20 million people could die almost immediately. What's more, the resulting firestorms would put 5 million to 7 million metric tons of smoke into the upper atmosphere, according to a new model developed by climate scientists at Rutgers University and the University of Colorado. Within weeks, skies around the world would be permanently overcast, and the condition vividly described by Carl Sagan as "nuclear winter" would be upon us. The darkness would likely last about a decade. The Earth's temperature would drop, agriculture around the globe would collapse, and a billion or more humans who already live on the margins of subsistence could starve. This is the real nuclear threat that is festering in South Asia. It is a threat to all countries, including the United States, not just India and Pakistan. Both sides acknowledge it, but neither seems able to slow their dangerous race to annihilation. Pakistan and India: The Real Nuclear Challenge

http://pulitzercenter.org/projects/india-pakistan-nuclear-arms-race-china-powerreactors accessed pm 08/09/2013

A full-throttle nuclear arms race is underway in a region where terrorism, ethnic violence, and border disputes are endemic. But the flashpoint isn't Iran. It's Pakistan and India. Launched July 11, 2012 While most of the medias attention has been focused on Iran and its nuclear ambitions, a full-throttle nuclear arms race is now underway in another part of the world where terrorism, ethnic violence, religious extremism, border disputes and political instability are endemic. In the last year, Pakistan has test fired a short-range ballistic missile and a surface-to-surface battlefield missile, both systems with nuclear capabilityindicating an alarming willingness on Pakistans part to actually nuke its own territory in the event of an incursion by India. Pakistan has also ramped up its production of fissile material. With the help of China, it has begun construction of a fourth plutonium reactor, greatly increasing its ability to turn out smaller, more efficientand easier to stealweapons. Latest estimates now put the number of warheads on Pakistani territory at 90 to 110, up from about 70 or so just two years ago. Pakistan has already passed its rival and main nemesis, India, and is now on track to overtake Britain as the worlds No. 5 nuclear power. If things continue unchecked, Pakistan could become the worlds No. 3 nuclear powerbehind U.S. and Russiabefore the end of the decade. Meanwhile India, with an eye on its burgeoning rivalry with China, has just added a new Russian-made nuclear submarine to its navy and is now building its own fleet of nuclear subs. One has already been launched and will enter service next year. Also in April, India test-fired its first long-range ballistic missile, dubiously dubbed the China Killer by the Indian press. But to really match the Chinese, India needs more warheads. A controversial 2008 agreement with the U.S. on civilian nuclear power now allows India to buy uranium on international markets, meaning India can build more reactorsand theoretically produce more weaponsgrade fissile material. India says it wont tolerate another Mumbaithe audacious 2008 terror attack on the city by militants with links to Pakistanwhile Pakistan has done little to assure the international community that it has curbed the terror groups based on its territory. For two countries that have gone to war with each other three times since 1948, and have had several close calls in recent years, the risk of a catastrophic miscalculation is considerable. Pulitzer Center Senior Editor Tom Hundley travels to both countries to speak with officials and top experts about the factorsreal and imaginedthat are driving this dangerous new nuclear arms race.

Did Pakistan Join the Wrong Nuclear Club?

http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/pakistan-india-nuclear-arms-race-energyreactors accessed on 08/09/2013

Published July 11, 2012 TOM HUNDLEY, FOR THE PULITZER CENTER, NEW DELHI, INDIA With an estimated 90 to 110 nuclear warheads, and enough fissile material stockpiled to build another 40 to 100 bombs, Pakistan is already the worlds No. 6 nuclear military power. It has passed its main nemesis, India, and if things continue unchecked, it could move into third place, behind the US and Russia, by the end of the decade. But Pakistans bomb-making prowess stands in embarrassing contrast to its failure to develop a meaningful non-military nuclear power infrastructure. Pakistan is a poor country desperate for energy. This summer, as temperatures routinely soar past 110 degrees, an acute shortage of electricity has resulted in planned daily power outages across the country that now last up to 18 hours a day. Citizens seethe as they swelter. Riots and gunfire have broken out in several cities. And despite promises from politicians, there is no relief in sight. Pakistans new prime minister, Raja Pervaiz Ashraf, held the water and power portfolio before taking over for former Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani, who was ousted by the judiciary in June, so he bears no small part of the responsibility for the current mess. Ashraf has vowed to restore electricity to all citizens of Pakistanapparently starting with himself. According to the outraged local press, one of Ashrafs first acts upon taking over the premiership was to have his villa on the outskirts of Islamabad provided with round-the-clock power. And a heliport to beat the morning rush hour traffic. Pakistans power producing capacity of about 20,000 MW falls about 4,500 to 7,500 MW short of what it needs, according to various official estimates. Nuclear power from two reactors contributes only about 725 MW to the total. It wasnt supposed to be this way. Back in the 1950s, when President Dwight Eisenhower announced the Atoms for Peace program, Pakistan, India and Iran were the poster children of the American initiative to promote peaceful applications of nuclear power in developing countries. But in the mid-1960s, when India began to show signs of developing a nuclear weapons program, former Pakistan president and prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was then foreign minister, pledged that Pakistan would also build a bombeven if it meant the Pakistani people had to eat grass or leaves, or go hungry to do so. India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974. Since then, both countries have been locked in an expensive arms racefar more expensive, relatively speaking, for Pakistan because its stagnant economy is only one-eighth the size of Indias. After both countries tested weapons in 1998, India has proven much better than its rival in finessing the international opprobrium that comes with being an uninvited member of the nuclear weapons club. In 2008, New Delhi achieved a major breakthrough when it negotiated a very favourable deal with the Bush administration that ended a decades-long embargo on the transfer of civil nuclear technology. Under current international nuclear policy Pakistan is not eligible for nuclear trade because of its nuclear weapons program, said Toby Dalton, deputy director of the Nuclear Policy

Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. India received an exemption to these policies in 2008, allowing it to purchase uranium and nuclear technology on the international market. Indias deal with the U.S., which remains controversial within the global nuclear community, has only heightened anxieties in Pakistan, whose sole nuclear supplier is China. Although Pakistans leaders continue to tout nuclear energy as the solution to the countrys energy problems, this appears to be highly unrealistic. Given Pakistans constant state of political turmoil, its strained relations with the U.S., its reputation for harboring terrorists and the A.Q. Khan networks dealings with Libya and North Korea, the U.S. government and the rest of the nuclear community (except China) will not be inclined to give Pakistan the kind of concessions that were given to India. And also, as Dalton explained, nuclear reactors are very expensive and take a long time to build. My argument isnt that nuclear power doesnt make sense for a country like Pakistan that has significant baseload need, but with a highly unstable grid and moribund economy, there are cheaper and faster ways for Pakistan to improve its energy situation than using nuclear, said Dalton, who previously headed the Department of Energys office at the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan. But unless Pakistans leaders change course, it appears the people of Pakistan will continue to eat grass, endure 18 hours a day of blackouts and take their comfort in the dubious prestige that comes with being a member of the select club that holds the power of nuclear annihilation. Editor's note: This story has been corrected to reflect Pakistan's status as the world's No. 6 nuclear military power.

South Asian Missile Rivalry Continues

July 7, 2008 - 8:13 PM

By T.C. Malhotra Subscribe to T.C. Malhotra RSS

http://cnsnews.com/news/article/south-asian-missile-rivalry-continues accessed on 08/09/2013

New Delhi (CNSNews.com) - At a time when the world is watching Iraq, South Asia's nuclear rivals are preparing to test-fire missiles of their own, in a move likely to keep regional tensions simmering. India is developing the Agni-III, a surface-to-surface missile with a range of more than 3,000 kilometers, capable of carrying a nuclear warhead deep into Pakistan or China. Pakistan, meanwhile, is said to be working on the Ghauri III or Abdali, (2,500 km range); the Tipu (4,000 km); and the Ghaznavi (range undetermined). India and Pakistan are among a small group of countries that possess missiles with ranges of more than 1,000 km, as well as Space Launch Vehicles (SLVs). The international community has long warned that a small disagreement between the longstanding enemies could quickly escalate and eventually spark a nuclear war. Already the two countries possess missiles that can reach anywhere inside their neighbor's

territory, Indian security expert Ajai Sahni noted on Monday. They are the Indian Agni I and II, and Pakistan's Ghauri II. As such, the contest to develop even longer-range rocks is now "of little more than academic interest as far as the Indo-Pak confrontation is concerned," he said. "The issue, really, is mass production and deployment of these systems, and both countries apparently remain committed not to move in this direction." Raghu Chandra, a researcher at Nehru University in New Delhi, said it would take less than five minutes for a missile fired from one country to strike its target in the other, allowing just minutes for the targeted country to respond. Chandra said Pakistan wasn't India's only concern when it came to nuclear weapons. "China's possession of an estimated 300-600 nuclear warheads is a major factor," he added. India's chief defense scientist V.K. Atre said at a recent international air show in Bangalore that he hoped the Agni-III could be tested by the end of this year. Confirming the move, Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes said on Sunday test-firing of the Agni III was "overdue and we feel the need for that long-range missile as part of our policy of deterrence." "The date has not been firmed up," he said. "The effort is to see that it is test-fired this year." Indian defense analyst M.K. Laul said the Agni missile program has been in development since 1979 by the Indian Defense Research and Development Laboratory. "Over the past 15 years, the Indian government has reportedly spent $1 billion on several missile systems, and plans to spend another $1 billion upgrading the Agni series," he said. Sahni said the timing of Fernandes' announcement may be related to the rhetoric of confrontation between India and Pakistan, but added that the development of India's missile capabilities is essentially following an independent long-term course. "Pakistan, similarly, is committed to maximize objectives in this direction, though it is not clear that it will be able to keep up in the competition in terms of range - given its limited technological capabilities and the increasing restrictions on access to technologies from its traditional partners, North Korea and China," he said. India and Pakistan became the world's newest declared nuclear powers in 1998. Neither has disclosed how many nuclear warheads they have, although sources quoted in published reports have put the figure at around 65 for India and 40 for Pakistan. - See more at: http://cnsnews.com/news/article/south-asian-missile-rivalrycontinues#sthash.aqGBAhiz.dpuf _______________________________________________________________

Indian Missile Test Sparks Fears of Asian Arms Race July 7, 2008 - 8:09 PM Ramachandran RSS By Suryamurthy Ramachandran Subscribe to Suryamurthy

New Delhi (CNSNews.com) - India's test firing of an intermediate range ballistic missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead up to 2,500 kilometers may escalate an arms race in Asia, analysts said on Friday. The testing of Agni-II missile, which could reach targets deep inside China, was carried out a few hours before China's second most powerful leader, Li Peng, ended an official tour of India on Wednesday.

China is believed to collaborate with India's arch-rival, Pakistan, in its nonconventional weapons program. "The Agni test signals India's determination to build strategic autonomy and deter China," said Brahma Chellaney, a defense analyst with the Center for Policy Research. "As Beijing further modernizes and develops cruise missiles, it will have continuing incentive to sell its older technologies to Pakistan so as to checkmate India and earn extra funding for research and development." Chellaney said President Clinton's decision to forgive China for its past missile exports was bound to embolden Beijing to continue playing its "proliferation card" against India. Islamabad-based security expert, Riffat Hussain of Quaid-e-Azam University, said the tests would have an adverse impact on the regional climate and did "not augur well for the international concerns between India and Pakistan." "The Agni-II testing is a precursor to the ultimate goal of acquiring ICMB capability," he said. In its annual publication on proliferation, released last week, the Pentagon reports that: "New Delhi's ballistic missile program is extensive and indigenous, while Islamabad, driven by its perceived need to counter India's conventional superiority and nuclear capability, receives aid from abroad. "During the last several years, Pakistan has received assistance in the production of nuclear weapons and missiles from both China and North Korea, which will help it attain goal of selfsufficiency." The report said both India and China were expected to continue improving their nuclear and missile forces. "In effect, the slow-speed Indo-Pak nuclear and missile arms race is underway, with consequences that are difficult to predict and potential for spill over beyond the sub-continent." While both India and Pakistan maintain that they want to avoid war, the report said, "they could easily stumble into conflict by misinterpreting intentions or military postures along the international border" or because of military exchanges across the border between the two countries' territories in divided Kashmir. Pakistan's foreign ministry said the test was part of India's "ambitious nuclear and missile program, which poses a direct threat to Islamabad's security and has been a matter of concern for the international community." India's Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, said the missile test was aimed at ensuring national security and not targeted at any country. "There is no threat to any country. Whatever steps we have taken, we have taken in self-defense. We have no aggressive designs," he told reporters. Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes claimed the successful test-firing would not escalate the regional arms race in the region. "We see it as an effort to acquire a credible minimum deterrent needed for India's security." India and Pakistan became the world's newest declared nuclear powers with tit-for-tat test detonations in 1998. Both sides have refused to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, saying they need a "minimum deterrence" given the ongoing military dispute over Kashmir, a Himalayan territory divided between them in 1947 but still claimed by both. India and Pakistan had three times since independence gone to war, twice over Kashmir. Secretary of State designate Colin Powell has told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the U.S. needs to "engage more broadly with India. "We have to do what we can do to constrain their nuclear program

at this time. We have to work harder and more consistently to assist India, while not neglecting our friends in Pakistan." India's draft nuclear doctrine says the country needs to develop land, air and sea-based nuclear deliver platforms. The Agni-II, launched from a mobile launcher, forms part of the land-based nuclear deterrent. The air force has multi-role fighters such as the Sukhoi-30 and Mirage-2000, capable of fulfilling an air-based nuclear role. The Indian Navy is currently negotiating with Russia for the purchase of four Tu-22 long-range aircraft, known for their nuclear capabilities. - See more at: http://cnsnews.com/news/article/indian-missile-test-sparks-fears-asian-armsrace#sthash.zmweupEP.dpuf Monday, April 12, 1999 - Page updated at 12:00 AM http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19990412&slug=2954764 accessed on 08/09/2013
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India Missile Test Could Provoke One By Pakistan -- Rivalry Gains Global Importance
By Dexter Filkins Los Angeles Times

NEW DELHI - India's test of a missile capable of delivering a nuclear warhead has drawn an ominous response from Pakistan's leaders, raising the spectre of a new South Asian arms race. Pakistani Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz said the missile launch was a matter of "deep concern," and hinted his country would soon respond with a missile test of its own. India said it had test-fired a ballistic missile with a range of 1,250 miles - making it capable of reaching targets in not only Pakistan but China as well. India and Pakistan have fought three wars since they broke with the British Empire in 1947, and their rivalry has taken on global importance since each tested nuclear weapons last spring. The Indian Agni II missile was designed to complete the nuclear program begun last May, when the Indian government exploded five underground atomic devices. India's leaders had been hinting for months that they intended to test a new missile, but they were under intense international pressure to restrain themselves. "It is necessary that the government should respond immediately, so that they can boost the morale of the people," said deputy chief of Pakistan's main Islamist Jamaat-i-Islami party, Liaqat Baluch. There was no immediate indication that Pakistan would carry out a tit-for-tat test-firing of its own Ghauri or Shaheen missiles, but Aziz siad yesterday the response would be "befitting." Last month Pakistan displayed its longest-range (937-mile) ballistic Ghauri missile, which can carry a nuclear warhead and a payload of 1,540 pounds, at a national day parade. It was tested in April 1998. Shaheen-I is reported to have a range of 469 miles and a payload of 2,200 pounds.

Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee signed an agreement to work for regional peace and avoid escalating military tension during a historic visit to Lahore, Pakistan, in February. India appeared to have followed the letter of the Lahore Declaration by informing Pakistan two days in advance of its test. The two countries, among the most impoverished on Earth, regularly shell each other along a 450-mile disputed border. The Pakistani government backs an insurgency in the Indian state of Kashmir. India's ruling Bharatiya Janata Party, or BJP, came to power 13 months ago on a promise to boost India's national pride and give the country a greater voice in international affairs. The Agni missile test came as the BJP's minority coalition is on the verge of collapse. A key coalition partner has threatened to withdraw from the ruling alliance, and many speculate the BJP-led government will fall within days. Experts said India may have relied heavily on Russian technology to complete the Agni missile. The U.S. and other Western nations imposed limited sanctions on India when it conducted its underground nuclear tests last year but has relaxed them in the expectation that the Indian government will sign the global Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Copyright (c) 1999 Seattle Times Company, All Rights Reserved.

GLOBAL SECURITY NEWSWIRE

DAILY NEWS ON NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL & CHEMICAL WEAPONS, TERRORISM AND RELATED ISSUES Produced by

June 6, 2013

By Rachel Oswald
Global Security Newswire

http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/work-s-asia-tactical-missiles-threatens-dangerousmiscalculation-intelligence-official/ accessed on 08/09/2013

WASHINGTON -- India and Pakistan see their pursuit of better precision-strike tactical missiles as protecting them from coercion by the other side, but in reality they are creating more possibilities for dangerous strategic miscalculation, a U.S. intelligence official said on Wednesday. A strategic stability that attempts to close off options is really not all that stable, said Rob Williams, national intelligence officer for South Asia with the National Intelligence Directors Office. It appears more to be seeking advantage and possibly pursuit of compellence" -- the effort to force an opponent to undertake a certain action through the application of punishment.

Pakistan says its 37-mile-range Hatf 9 ballistic missile is capable of carrying out low-yield nuclear strikes and evading enemy defense systems. The weapon is aimed at deterring New Delhi from carrying out a fast-moving, limited conventional invasion of Pakistani territory -the so-called Cold Start doctrine. Meanwhile, India is increasingly focused on its supersonic 180-mile-range Brahmos cruise missile as the key new weapon that will give it a strategic advantage over its neighbor and longtime rival. The nuclear-capable missiles superfast speeds mean it potentially could be used to carry out prompt strikes on extremist camps inside Pakistan. While Pakistan may feel confident that it has checked Cold Start proliferation of more accurate systems opens the door to precision strike scenarios below the nuclear threshold, Williams told an audience at a Stimson Center event. Pakistan arguably may be able to now deter a major conventional (assault) but the increased accuracy of these systems opens the door for precision strikes (by India) on the assessed sources of terrorism. The development of such weapons as the Hatf 9 and Brahmos show that Pakistani and Indian military planners are trying to carve out arenas in which tactical missiles could be used in limited ways without inviting retaliatory escalation. However, Williams argued that these weapons regardless of size, delivery system or yield carry strategic implications no matter the concept of employment." Islamabad is understood to believe it can use the Hatf 9 to compel India to call off a land invasion without causing a broader nuclear exchange because of the relatively low yield of the missiles warhead. India signaled in late April that it would not allow itself to be held to such nuclear blackmail. "India will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, but if it is attacked with such weapons, it would engage in nuclear retaliation which will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage on its adversary, said former Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, now head of the National Security Advisory Board. The label on a nuclear weapon used for attacking India, strategic or tactical, is irrelevant from the Indian perspective. Last month, the Pakistani Foreign Ministry said if Sarans statement did in fact represent the posture of the Indian government, it would have serious implications. A ministry spokesman said Pakistan's development of short-range missiles address three major concerns emanating from India: One, the rising conventional asymmetry in view of ever escalating defense budgets by India; Two, offensive doctrines postulated by India in the nuclear overhang; and Three, development of ballistic missile defense. Pakistan's Nasr (Hatf 9) missile as well as pursuit of cruise missiles should be seen in this context. Stimson Center co-founder Michael Krepon suggested that were the United States to sell India missile defense technology, it would only speed up the arms race in South Asia. Though there is not yet any formal U.S.-Indian agreement authorizing antimissile collaboration, senior Pentagon officials last year spoke favorably about the possibility and the Indian technical establishment is on the case, according to Krepon.

DSA COMMENT http://idsa.in/idsacomments/BallisticMissileProliferationImplicationsforIndia_vkapur_19121 2 accessed on 03/09/2013 Ballistic Missile Proliferation: Implications for India Share on facebookShare on twitterShare on emailMore Sharing Services Vivek Kapur December 19, 2012 In the face of international opposition, North Korea launched a rocket on 12 December 2012 to place a satellite in orbit.1 Its earlier four attempts had all failed; the first of these was in 1998 and the most recent failure was in April 2012.2 The successful launch on 12 December 2012 places North Korea among the few nations (United States, Russia, China, Japan, Europe, India, Pakistan and possibly Iran) that possess the ability to build long range ballistic missiles. What has added to international concerns about North Koreas missile programme is its transfer of missiles banned by multilateral treaties and conventions to countries such as Pakistan and Iran as well as its support for international terrorist groups.3 India has no direct dispute with North Korea and the distance separating the two countries serves to further reduce threat perceptions. Indias interest in North Koreas nuclear and missile programmes comes from the reported clandestine co-operation between North Korea, Pakistan and Iran in this regard. There have been persistent reports that North Korea has assisted Pakistans missile programme in return for Pakistani assistance with its nuclear weaponisation programme. The current Pakistani ballistic missile capability extends to a reported range capability of about 1500 to 2500 km, which is equivalent to that of the North Korean Taepodong-I missile and its further developments. The test conducted on 12 December 2012 by the Unha-3 rocket gives North Korea a range capability of 5500+km or the equivalent of the Taepodong-II missile.4 Indias Agni-V missile was claimed to have a range of 5500 km and falling into the classification of an ICBM. This is a range capability not currently possessed by Pakistan and one, if inducted by Pakistan from North Korea, would be detrimental for Indian security. Iran has also been suspected of being a recipient of North Korean ballistic missile technology.5 Irans acquisition of long range ballistic missile capability from North Korea would further complicate Indias security situation. Beyond this direct impact of North Korean missile proliferation, India, as a responsible member of the international community, has no choice but to support international action and restrictions on countries that act and behave in a manner that is found unacceptable by the rest of the world. India has ballistic missile armed countries on its Northern as well as Western borders. Further, territorial disputes exist with both of these neighbours. The steady spread of ballistic missile technology to ever more states continues unabated. Although the likelihood is remote presently, there is no guarantee that in the near to medium term future such technology will not be available with more of Indias neighbours. There is also the alarming, but above zero, possibility of ballistic missiles falling into the hands of terrorist groups especially in failing or failed states such as Pakistan whose military includes several sympathisers of terrorist groups. (Two terrorist organisations, Hamas and Hezbollah, have already demonstrated the

ability to obtain and use such weapons Fajr-5 missiles with ranges of 75 km against Israel).6 Such developments in its neighbourhood have adverse implications for India. No country is in a position to be able to control the proliferation of ballistic missile technology all by itself, India included. Even missiles with non-nuclear payloads could be a major threat to Indias security and economy. Hence, if unable to avoid the proliferation of ballistic missiles in South Asia, India would have no choice but to work towards countering this threat. Nuclear armed ballistic missile attacks would be countered by Indias declared Nuclear Doctrine and executed by the Indian strategic forces. The challenge here would lie in dealing with situations where the country responsible for the launch of a nuclear attack cannot be easily identified, as in the case of missiles launched from sea. There are two possible solutions to countering the conventional payload ballistic missile threat. The first would be to harden all population centres and other vital facilities against such attacks. Given the very large number of these and the ever increasing range and accuracy of ballistic missiles available with an ever increasing group of countries, this is unlikely to be feasible or even prove sufficient. The second option would be to develop a viable Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system. Indias Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is already working on a only terminal stage intercept BMD system, which has achieved several notable successes during its trials to intercept target ballistic missiles in the exo-atmospheric and endo-atmospheric stages. Ballistic missile proliferation in Indias neighbourhood requires the development of a more capable BMD system. While the DRDOs BMD project is reportedly proceeding well and should be available for initial deployment in the near future, it is only a terminal phase system as of now. There is a need to extend the current capability towards the ability to engage ballistic missiles during their mid-course and boost stages as well as during the terminal stage of their flight. DRDO may need to explore air-based, Directed Energy Weapon (DEW) and Electromagnetic (EM) gun based solutions in addition to its current land based anti-missile missile BMD system to achieve a more robust and capable BMD system or a system of systems capable of reliable boost phase, mid-course phase and terminal phase ballistic missile intercept and destruction. The proliferation of ballistic missile technology has continued despite international efforts to curtail it. This proliferation poses threats to Indias security. India may face a conventional as well as nuclear ballistic missile threat in the near to medium term future. The possible spread of these ballistic missile capabilities has the potential to further complicate Indias security situation. India is preparing to deal with the nuclear ballistic missile threat from its potential adversaries through its nuclear doctrine and nuclear forces. However, the increasing ballistic missile threat would require a combination of developing a full spectrum (boost phase, midcourse phase and terminal phase) BMD capability. The current DRDO BMD programme needs to be extended to attain such a capability. 1. 1.UN condemns North Korea over rocket launch, http://www.dw.de/un-condemnsnorth-korea-over-rocket-launch/a-16450004, accessed on 17 Dec 2012. 2.UN Security Council condemns North Korea rocket launch, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-20697922, accessed on 13 Dec 2012.

2.

3. 4.

3.See, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/missile/overview.html and http://www.fas. org/nuke/guide/pakistan/missile/hatf-5.htm accessed on 17 Dec 2012. 4.Markus Schiller, Characterizing the North Korean Nuclear Missile Threat,http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2012/RAND_T R..., Pp 11, accessed on 13 Dec 2012. 5.N. Korea rocket launch draws more worry than Iran's, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/46988250/ns/world_news-asia_pacific/t/nkore..., accessed on 13 Dec 2012. 6.Iran supplied Hamas with Fajr-5 missile technology, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/nov/21/iran-supplied-hamasmissile-..., accessed on 17 Dec 2012.

5.

6.

Impactof Pakistan'sTNWs
ByMaj Gen PK Chakravorty IssueCourtesy: CLAWS| Date : 02 Apr , 2013 http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/impact-of-pakistans-tnws/ accessed on 08/09/2013
Hatf Missile

Pakistans nuclear programme is Indo centric and is based on offensive usage of nuclear weapons. On 19 April 2011, Pakistan successfully tested the Hatf IX, named NASR a solid fuelled battlefield range ballistic missile. The missile has been developed by Pakistani National Development Complex and carries a sub kiloton nuclear war head. The engine comprises of a single stage rocket motor and has an operational range of 60 km. The launch platform is a Transport Erect Launcher (TEL) and is a multi tube ballistic system. Two Hatf IX Nasr Ballistic Missiles can be carried by a single TEL. NASR is a quick response system which has shoot and scoot nuclear delivery capability. A quick response system with regard to nuclear weapons is definitely destabilising as supposedly nuclear weapons ought to be used in the gravest circumstances. Pakistan undertook nuclear tests in May 1998 and thereby emerged as an overt nuclear power, but it is yet to formally adopt a nuclear use doctrine. Pakistani rationale The obvious question was why did Pakistan test the NASR. The Pakistani establishment has provided its rationale which does not appear coherent. The first is the acquisition of miniaturisation technology. This technology would assist Pakistan in miniaturising their Cruise Missiles Babur and Raad for submarine launches thereby moving on to second strike capability. The second is the TNW being a counter to Indias limited war doctrine. The adoption of a doctrine which envisages rapid attacks by Indias mechanised spearheads resulting in capture of sensitive shallow objectives would be effectively deterred by NASR. Pakistan proposes to use the TNW on Indian territory possibly at the areas of commencement of operations of Indian forces. This appears to be difficult as it entails usage of nuclear weapons prior to engagement by conventional forces. Pakistan undertook nuclear tests in May 1998 and thereby emerged as an overt nuclear power, but it is yet to formally adopt a nuclear use doctrine. Accordingly one has to study the

statements of Pakistani leaders as also its declaratory and operational postures to deduce the possible mode of usage of nuclear weapons. Mr Rao Sikandar, a previous Pakistan Defence Minister stated, The countrys ultimate security lies in the use of atom bomb. Broadly Pakistan wishes to maintain a credible nuclear deterrence vis a vis India. Pakistan sees the success of Indias Ballistic Missile Defence Programme and the Indo-US nuclear deal as issues which have compelled the authorities to enhance the number of war heads as also develop Cruise Missiles and TNWs which would not be intercepted by the Indian Ballistic Missile Defence. The second aspect is of Strategic Restraint. Pakistan has viewed this issue under the areas of reciprocal agreements with India on nuclear weaponisation. Primarily these fall under five areas, the first is not to deploy ballistic missiles, the second not to operationally weaponise nuclear capable missile systems, the third to provide prior and adequate notification of flight tests of missile and fourth to declare a moratorium on the development, acquisition or deployment of Agni as it can destabilise minimum credible deterrence, The third aspect is not to quantify minimum credible deterrence but to upgrade its capability based on Indian response. The fourth aspect is to pursue arms control and disarmament at the global and regional levels while maintaining minimum deterrence. due to close proximity of Indian and Pakistani forces casualties would occur on both sides and the weapons would be used on Pakistani soil causing radiation hazards which would continue for a long time apart from inviting retaliation. In either case the overall result does not favour Pakistan. Logical Application The Pakistani views expressed above are emotional and lack logical application. There are two issues which emerge on the application of NASR, targeting Indian mechanised spear heads attacking Pakistan. At the strategic level it is using a nuclear weapon and as Air Chief Marshal (Retired) P V Naik has stated Tactical or Strategic, it is a nuclear weapon. Our response would be absolutely violent, if it is used as per our existing policy. Accordingly it is not a game changer. The second aspect to be considered is the modus operandi by which Pakistan can dissuade our forces from under taking proactive operations. Pakistan must give up its covert sub conventional operations against India by dismantling the terrorist infrastructure that exists in the form of terrorist camps across the Line of Control (LOC). This would definitely send a positive signal resulting in lowering of tensions on both sides. It is of interest to note the timing when this weapon will be used. In case the weapon is to be used in non Pakistan territory it would imply usage of TNW on our forces while they are commencing the offensive. The targets in such case would be the areas where troops are concentrated or assembling in their process of under taking proactive operations. In such an eventuality usage of NASR frees India from the No First Use and gives us the liberty to use nuclear weapons. This option is unlikely due to the advantages it accrues to India. The next option is to use NASR once our forces are on the verge of capturing shallow objectives. In such an eventuality, due to close proximity of Indian and Pakistani forces casualties would occur on both sides and the weapons would be used on Pakistani soil causing radiation hazards which would continue for a long time apart from inviting retaliation. In either case the overall result does not favour Pakistan. Implications The introduction of NASR has certainly added a new dimension to the usage of nuclear weapons by Pakistan. In a way Pakistan is possibly imitating the NATO route during the Cold War. The concept was to use TNWs from the commencement of operations to block the Warsaw Pact offensive. The thought process had to be changed as it was prudent to reply with nuclear weapons instead of TNWs as they did not prevent escalation and it led to use of more destructive weapons as a matter of course. Similarly use of Nasr would lead to punitive

retaliation which would be detrimental to Pakistani interests. It would be naive to presume that there would be no retaliation to usage of TNW. The response of India to the usage of NASR should be clear to all authorities. In consonance with our stated policy of No First Use usage of NASR should be treated as use of a nuclear weapon and suitable response undertaken. As regards our land strike elements, they should be prepared for a TNW attack and be trained in undertaking protective measures while undertaking offensive operations. Rate this Article0

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Implications of India's Long-Range Missile Capabilities

http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publications/south-west-asia/37-south-a-west-asia-swa/503implications-of-indias-long-range-missile-capabilities.html accessed on 08/09/2013

Background - See more at: http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publications/south-west-asia/37-south-awest-asia-swa/503-implications-of-indias-long-range-missilecapabilities.html#sthash.ehY1zKco.dpuf

Background As the latest addition to Indias expanding arsenal, the launch of the Agni-5 longrange missile on 19 April is another step forward in the diversification of Indias nuclear strike capabilities. While India celebrates its technological achievement, the development of a nuclear-capable intermediate-range ballistic missile, with an estimated range of 5,000 kilometres or 3,100 miles, is likely to intensify strategic competition between Pakistan and China, which have viewed these developments with reservation. Comment Although senior Indian officials publicly say that the Agni-5 is for deterrence purposes only, India has a clear rationale behind the missiles development, which is to: demonstrate its expanding strategic strike capabilities, impress the worlds major powers that possess intercontinental missiles and deliver a strong message to Pakistan and China. As a nation that has reportedly doubled the size of its nuclear arsenal within the last ten years, the Agni-5 is the latest addition to Indias nuclear-capable weapon systems, adding to its existing missile and aircraft-deliver systems. Among Indian strategic planners there is an influential school of thought, who firmly believe, that India must develop world-class military strike capabilities and project the symbolism of a major world power. This, they believe, will provide

greater international recognition and further strengthen India's case to obtain a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. Senior Indian officials are also wary of Chinas power and influence and its ability to thwart Indias regional ambitions, especially in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region. However remote, Indian strategic planners also appear to be increasingly concerned about the possibility of a two-front war with Pakistan and China, which has provided added impetus to developing sophisticated military capabilities. Although the Indian Government has tried to downplay the Agni-5 and portray it as a defensive weapon, Indian defence analysts and the media pointed out the weapons significance is to give India strategic parity against China. The fact India deliberately chose not to inform China of its intention to launch the new missile, is indeed revealing given that all other permanent members of the UNs Security Council were reportedly told. Officially, Chinas response has been reserved and tempered. China and India are both emerging powers. We are not rivals but co-operative partners. We should cherish the hard earned momentum of co-operation, stated Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Liu Weimin. Chinese state media, however, has adopted a different tone accusing India of downplaying the missiles capabilities, claiming it has an actual range of up to 8,000 km. Similarly, as reported in BBC News, the editor of the Chinese Military Magazine, asserted that: Without an adequate tank corps and a heavy-duty land force with adequate heavy weapons, it [India] can hardly become a so-called China killer by relying solely on nuclear weapons. More disparagingly, quoting Gao Zugui of the Institute of International Strategic Studies, the South China Morning Post, reported: ...if it [India] really wants to become a great nation, each of its families should have a toilet first. Furthermore, Pakistans response to the launch of the Agni-5 was immediate and forthright. Within days after India launched the Agni-5, Pakistan test-fired the Hatf IV Shaheen-1A, its latest nuclear-capable intermediate-range ballistic missile. Although the range of the new missile was not announced, it is speculated to be around 2,000 km or 1,240 miles. As emphasised by Lt. Gen. Khalid Ahmed Kidwai, the Pakistani commander overseeing the nations nuclear command, Pakistan legitimised the launch, claiming: The improved version of Shaheen-1A will further consolidate and strengthen Pakistan's deterrence abilities. Although China has not responded with gestures of hostility, it may choose to respond more subtly as it continues to pursue ways and means to counterbalance India, including the development of its own military capabilities. At this stage, what impact the Agni-5 may have on Chinas strategic and defence policies is difficult to interpret, but it is likely that China will look to strengthen further its strategic ties with Pakistan and other Indian Ocean countries that surround Indias immediate neighbourhood. But the sentiment provided by an article in the Pakistan Observer, on 30 April, is perhaps more illustrative of how either Pakistan or China may choose to respond in the long-term. Neither Beijing nor Islamabad will stand idly by as India arms

itself. It could lead to an Asian arms race similar to that witnessed during the Cold War. Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe Manager South and West Asia Programme sdesilva@futuredirections.org.au See more at: http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publications/south-west-asia/37-south-a-west-asiaswa/503-implications-of-indias-long-range-missile-capabilities.html#sthash.ehY1zKco.dpuf https://www.fas.org/irp/threat/prolif96/south_asia.html accessed on 08/09/2013

SOUTH ASIA

GOALS AND INTERESTS

The United States has important security interests in South Asia, including preventing another Indo-Pakistani war and enhancing regional stability. Our nonproliferation goal is to

persuade India and Pakistan to first cap, then reduce, and eventually eliminate their capabilities to produce nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. This approach supports our global objective to reduce and ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons. The consequences of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan would be catastrophic, both in terms of the loss of life and for potentially lowering the threshold for nuclear use in other parts of the world, particularly the adjacent Middle East/North Africa region. Deployment of ballistic missiles would pose especially troubling security risks given the relatively short distances between major population centers in South Asia and the brief time required for missiles to travel such distances. This factor will compress decisionmaking cycles for national leaders and battlefield commanders, reducing stability during times of crisis. In addition to the immediate risks to regional security, the development of NBC weapons in South Asia has the potential to undercut broader U.S. and international nonproliferation objectives. Both India and Pakistan, for different reasons, have refused to sign the NPT. Their nuclear programs, outside of this widely accepted international norm, serve as dangerous examples for nations in other regions. The NBC weapons and missile infrastructures in South Asia also pose potential proliferation threats, as possible sources of supply. India and Pakistan's slowness to adopt export controls consistent with established international control regimes is reason for concern. As each nation continues its programs, the danger of transferring technology to states outside the region remains possible. THE PROLIFERATION CHALLENGE: INTENTIONS, AND TRENDS REGIONAL CAPABILITIES,

India and Pakistan The bitter rivalry between India and Pakistan, which dates to the partitioning of the subcontinent in 1947, remains the impetus behind the proliferation of NBC weapons and missiles in the region. The security dynamics of the region are complicated further by India's perception of China as a threat. Pakistan's efforts to develop NBC weapons and missile systems are intended primarily to counter India's substantial conventional military advantage and its perception of India's nuclear threat. India and Pakistan continue to cloak their NBC weapons programs in secrecy or deliberate ambiguity. Both continue to deny possessing nuclear weapons, while periodically issuing veiled threats alluding to their capability to employ these weapons if necessary. India and Pakistan deny possessing chemical and biological weapons, but point with pride to the progress of their indigenous missile development programs. India's pursuit of nuclear weapons was first spurred by a 1962 border clash with China and by Beijing's 1964 nuclear test. New Delhi continues to view its northern neighbor as a long-term threat despite recently improved relations. It sees Pakistan's NBC weapons and missile capabilities as a more immediate threat. Nuclear rhetoric from Pakistani leaders and Islamabad's pursuit of a mobile SRBM capability reinforce India's perception that New Delhi continues to need a nuclear capability.

Pakistani leaders believe that a nuclear capability is essential to deter war with India, or failing that, to ensure the survival of the nation. Its nuclear program has widespread political and popular support. Missile procurement and development, initially to counter the Indian missile program which began in the mid-1980s, are driven by a desire to augment limited offensive air capabilities against India (which holds almost a 3:1 advantage in combat aircraft) and to field a more effective delivery system. NUCLEAR PROGRAMS India's very active nuclear energy development program has enabled it to obtain all of the essential materials and facilities for producing nuclear explosives. It has not signed the NPT, but is a member of the IAEA, and several Indian nuclear reactors are subject to IAEA safeguards. India's program, older and larger than Pakistan's, included a nuclear detonation in 1974, described by India as a "peaceful nuclear explosion." India is currently capable of conducting another test within a short time of deciding to do so. It has an advanced nuclear program, with facilities to support the complete nuclear fuel cycle. India produced its stock of weapons-grade plutonium in reactors at the Bhabha Atomic Research Center near Bombay, which are not subject to IAEA safeguards.

As additional indigenously-built nuclear power reactors become operational, India's capability to produce plutonium without safeguards will increase. India has the resources for producing and reprocessing plutonium and for enriching uranium. It also has the ability to conduct nuclear tests, which would support attempts to produce more advanced weapons. However, New Delhi's willingness to refrain from conducting additional nuclear tests could inhibit the development of such weapons. India is believed to have a stockpile of fissile material sufficient for fabricating several nuclear weapons and could probably assemble at least some of these weapons within a short time of deciding to do so. Pakistan began its nuclear weapons program in response to losing the 1971 war with India and accelerated it following India's 1974 nuclear test. Pakistan has not signed the NPT, but it has taken the public position that it would do so if India were to sign it also. Like India, not all of Pakistan's nuclear facilities are under IAEA safeguards.

Relying heavily on foreign assistance, Pakistan has developed a diverse, clandestine procurement network to support its weapons development effort. Although it has become increasingly self-sufficient in producing highly enriched uranium and in engineering and fabrication technologies, Pakistan will remain dependent on foreign suppliers for sophisticated materials and technical assistance necessary to improve and expand its nuclear program. China remains an important supplier of nuclear technologies to Pakistan. In addition, Pakistan has acquired or attempted to acquire various materials and technology for nuclear weapons and peaceful applications from firms in the United States and Western Europe. Most of Pakistan's nuclear research and development is conducted by its Atomic Energy Commission, which operates over a half-dozen facilities throughout the country. Three of Pakistan's operating nuclear reactors -- the KANUPP power reactor in Karachi and the PARR I and PARR II research reactors near Islamabad -- are under IAEA safeguards. The Chashma nuclear power plant, also near Islamabad, is under construction and also will be covered by IAEA safeguards. Pakistan possesses all the components necessary for producing a nuclear device, and it probably has sufficient fissile material now to assemble a few nuclear weapons. In addition, Pakistan is building an unsafeguarded nuclear reactor that will provide it with a substantial capability to produce weapons-grade plutonium. It is expected to become operational in the late 1990s. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL PROGRAMS India and Pakistan are capable of developing chemical weapons. India, a signatory of the CWC, has never admitted to having an offensive chemical warfare program. India's large chemical industry produces many dual-use chemicals that could be used as precursors, and could support a chemical warfare program of considerable size. Like India, Pakistan has signed the CWC, and can produce chemical agents and munitions. It has procured dual-use chemical precursors from foreign sources and hopes to achieve selfsufficiency in producing precursors. While India possesses the infrastructure necessary to support an offensive biological warfare program, including highly qualified scientific personnel and industrial production facilities, it apparently has given priority to research and development applicable only to biological warfare defensive measures. Pakistan has the resources and capabilities appropriate to conducting research and development relating to biological warfare. Both countries have signed the Biological Weapons Convention. BALLISTIC MISSILES India has one of the more self-sufficient ballistic missile programs in the developing world. It can design and produce missiles with little foreign assistance. However, New Delhi is

working to become self-sufficient in all areas of production by the end of the decade. India has two ballistic missile programs -- the Prithvi SRBM and the Agni MRBM. The Indians heavily used technological assistance and parts from Western firms in developing these missiles. The Prithvi is a single-stage, liquid-fueled missile using propulsion technology from the Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missile, and is designed to be deployed with a payload of 1,000 kilograms to a range of 150 kilometers (or 250 kilometers with a 500-kilogram payload). The Indian Army has completed user trials with the Prithvi. The missile could quickly enter series production if a deployment decision were taken. In 1994, India successfully tested the two-stage Agni; the missile achieved a range of 1,000 kilometers, about half its intended range. Publicly, the Indians call the missile a "technology demonstrator," although it could be used in developing a follow-on, longer range MRBM that could reach China. Additionally, India has had an ambitious space launch vehicle (SLV) program since the mid1970s. The program includes three SLVs, which have payload capacities ranging from 150 to 3,000 kg. India could convert these SLVs into IRBMs or ICBMs quite easily but has shown no indications of doing so. It has already built guidance sets and warheads, key components needed to convert an SLV into a ballistic missile. The Indian space program shares research, development, and production facilities with the ballistic missile program. Therefore, New Delhi could apply the SLV technology it has obtained from the former Soviet Union and the West to its ballistic missile programs. Pakistan has an SRBM industry that includes a large solid rocket motor production complex and a ballistic missile test facility. However, Pakistan's missile production capability is not as extensive as India's. So far, it has produced only a few Hatf-I SRBMs, which have a range of 80 kilometers and are regarded as inaccurate.

China remains Pakistan's most important supplier of missile-related technologies. The United States imposed Category II sanctions against entities in both countries in August 1993 for transferring M-11 related components and technology to Islamabad. In 1994, the sanctions against Beijing were lifted when China reaffirmed its bilateral commitment to the United States to adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime and made a number of new, related commitments.

CRUISE MISSILES AND OTHER MEANS OF DELIVERY India has Russian and British ship- and air-launched anti-ship missiles, while Pakistan has Chinese and U.S. ship- and submarine-launched and French air-launched anti-ship missiles. Because India is still developing ballistic missiles, combat aircraft currently are its most viable delivery vehicles for nuclear or chemical weapons. The most likely platforms are the Mirage 2000, MiG-27, MiG-29, and Jaguar. Similarly, combat aircraft are Pakistan's most viable delivery means for NBC weapons, with the most likely platforms being F-16 and Mirage III fighters.

INDIA AND PAKISTAN: STATUS OF PROGRAMS Nuclear Weapons Chemical Weapons * Both possess fissile material. * India, with its large industrial base, can produce precursors for chemical warfare agents. * Pakistan must obtain precursors for chemical agent production. * Pakistan is conducting research and development with potential biological warfare applications. * India's efforts are geared towards defense. * Both have aircraft capable of delivering nuclear and chemical weapons. * Both are developing missiles. Delivery Systems ** India: Has two missile programs: - Prithvi - short range (150-250 km) - Agni - intended range (2,000 km) ** Pakistan: Has two missile programs: - Hatf I - short range (80 km) - Mobile SRBM - approximately 300 km range https://www.fas.org/irp/threat/prolif96/south_asia.html accessed on 08/09/2013

Biological Weapons

RedLines, Deadlines,and Thinkingthe Unthinkable:India, Pakistan,Iran, NorthKorea,and China

By Anthony H. Cordesman APR 16, 2013

http://csis.org/publication/red-lines-deadlines-and-thinking-unthinkable-indiapakistan-iran-north-korea-and-china accessed on 08/09/2013

Early in the thermonuclear age, Herman Kahn warned the world that it had to think about the unthinkable: The consequences of an actual nuclear war, and consider which side if any might win. While the story may be apocryphal, Kahn is also said to have told Curtis Lemay then head of the Strategic Air Command that Lemay did not have a war plan because he focused too heavily on strikes and inflicting maximum damage, while ignoring the consequences of nuclear weapons. Kahn is said to have told Lemay that he lacked a war plan and all he had was a wargasm. The end of the Cold War seemed to put an end to the need for such thinking, but recent developments in North Korea and Iran make it all too clear that there is still a need for such horrifying yet realist analysis. Of course, calmer heads may prevail. Reason, deterrence, and arms control may still curtail nuclear proliferation, and are the most probable result of

todays nuclear arms races. But, that probability is declining. Four different nuclear arms races are now interacting to change the need for strategic calculus and demand a strategy that looks beyond arms control and considers a much grimmer future. India and Pakistan: Suicide with Minor Grand Strategic Consequences Any war between India and Pakistan would be a pointless human tragedy, and a serious nuclear exchange would bring about the worst possible outcome. Of the current potential nuclear arms races, a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan risks the most damaging consequences in terms of human deaths, as well as the costs and time necessary to recover. Ground burst strikes on Indian and Pakistani cities countervalue strikes would produce extremely high immediate and long-term deaths. Neither country has the medical and security facilities necessary to deal with such casualty burdens; no emergency aid agency is equipped and trained to deal with such events; nor is it clear significant outside aid could come or would come in time to be effective. At present, both countries continue to build up their nuclear-armed missile forces and stockpiles of nuclear weapons. While unclassified estimates are very uncertain and differ greatly in detail, an Open Briefing report on Indian nuclear forces drawing on material published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists noted that India continued to improve the nuclear strike capabilities of its combat aircraft and develop sea-based ballistic and cruise missiles, and that its nuclear weapons stocks and missiles could be summarized as follows: India is estimated to have produced approximately 520 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium (IPFM, 2011), sufficient for 100130 nuclear warheads; however, not all of the material has been converted into warheads. Based on available information about its nuclear-capable delivery vehicles, we estimate that India has produced 80100 nuclear warheads. It will need more warheads to arm the new missiles it is currently developing. In addition to the Dhruva plutonium production reactor near Mumbai, India plans to construct a second reactor near Visakhapatnam, on the east coast. India is building an unsafeguarded prototype fast-breeder reactor at the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research near Kalpakkam (about 1,000 kilometers or 620 miles south of Visakhapatnam), which will significantly increase Indias plutonium production capacity once it becomes operational. India has three types of land-based missiles that may be operational: the short-range Prithvi I, the short-range Agni I, and the medium-range Agni II. The Prithvi I has been deployed for almost 15 years, but the Agni I and II, despite being declared operational, both have reliability issues that have delayed their full operational service. India has been busy growing its missile program, with four more Agni versions in progress: an Agni II+ was test-launched in 2010 but failed; the longer-range Agni III, after at least four flight-tests, remains under development; and the Agni IV may be a technology bridge to the newest type, the long-range Agni V, which had its first testlaunch in April. Some of these Agni programs may serve as technology-development platforms for longer-range versions. The bulk of the Indian ballistic missile force is comprised of three versions of Prithvi missiles, but only one of these versions, the armys Prithvi I, has a nuclear role. Given its small size (9 meters long and 1 meter in diameter), the Prithvi I is difficult to spot on satellite images, and therefore little is known about its deployment locations. The Prithvi

I is a short-range missile (up to 150 kilometers or 93 miles) and is the mainstay of the Strategic Forces Command, Indias designated nuclear weapons service. In December 2011, India successfully test-launched its two-stage Agni I missile, which has a range of 700 kilometers (435 miles), for the eighth timesuggesting that the missile might finally have become fully operational. But a ninth test-launch scheduled for early May 2012 was postponed due to a technical glitch. The road- or rail-launched Agni II, an improvement on the Agni I, can fly up to 2,000 kilometers (1,243 miles) and can carry a 1,000-kilogram payload, and it takes just 15 minutes for the missile to be readied for firing. The missile has been test-fired eight times with several failures, but more recent test-flights, on May 19, 2010 and September 30, 2011, were successful, demonstrating some progress toward making the Agni II fully operational. A 2010 test-launch of an extended-range Agni II, known as the Agni II+, failed. Still under development is Indias rail-mobile Agni III, a two-stage, solid-fuel missile with a range of more than 3,000 kilometers (1,864 miles). India took a significant step forward with the successful test-launch of the Agni V ballistic missile on April 19, 2012. With a range reportedly greater than 5,000 kilometers (3,107 miles), the Agni V can reach any target in China; however, the missile needs more testing and is still several years away from operational deployment. A slightly more dated article in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists describes Pakistans nuclear program as including its F-16 fighters and the following nuclear and missile capabilities: Pakistan is building two new plutonium production reactors and a new reprocessing facility with which it will be able to fabricate more nuclear weapons fuel. It is also developing new delivery systems. Enhancements to Pakistans nuclear forces include a new nuclear-capable medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), the development of two new nuclear-capable short-range ballistic missiles, and the development of two new nuclear-capable cruise missiles. We estimate that Pakistan has a nuclear weapons stockpile of 90110 nuclear warheads, an increase from the estimated 7090 warheads in 2009 (Norris and Kristensen, 2009). The US Defense Intelligence Agency projected in 1999 that by 2020 Pakistan would have 6080 warheads (Defense Intelligence Agency, 1999); Pakistan appears to have reached that level in 2006 or 2007 (Norris and Kristensen, 2007), more than a decade ahead of predictions. In January 2011, our estimate (DeYoung, 2011) of Pakistans stockpile was confirmed in the New York Times by officials and outsiders familiar with the American assessment, who said that the official US estimate for deployed weapons ranged from the mid-90s to more than 110 (Sanger and Schmitt, 2011).1 With four new delivery systems and two plutonium production reactors under development, however, the rate of Pakistans stockpile growth may even increase over the next 10 years. The Pakistani government has not defined the number and type of nuclear weapons that its minimum deterrent requires. But Pakistans pace of nuclear modernizationand its development of several short-range delivery systemsindicates that its nuclear posture has entered an important new phase and that a public explanation is overdue.

Pakistan has three operational nuclear-capable ballistic missiles: the short-range Ghaznavi (Hatf-3) and Shaheen-1 (Hatf-4) and the medium-range Ghauri (Hatf-5). It has at least three other nuclear-capable ballistic missiles under development: the mediumrange Shaheen-2 (Hatf-6), which may soon be operational, and the short-range Abdali (Haft-2) and Nasr (Haft-9) systems. Pakistan is developing two new cruise missiles, the Babur (Hatf-7) and Raad (Hatf8), and it uses similar language to describe both missiles. According to the ISPR, the Babur and Raad both have stealth capabilities and pinpoint accuracy, and each is described as a low-altitude, terrain-hugging missile with high manoeuvrability One has to assume that there should be a high level of rational restraint and deterrence, but both states have a history of overreaction, nationalism, and failure to demonstrate stability and restraint in arms control. More broadly, historical precedent, particularly over the 20th century, does not make a strong case for behaviour based on rational bargaining. It is unclear that either has really thought out the consequences of a nuclear exchange beyond the Duke Nukem school of planning: who can kill more of the enemy. Rhetoric asides, the military buildup by both sides suggests a competition aimed at creating the largest possible nuclear wargasm. The bad news is that this ongoing nuclear arms race receives little real attention in terms of what would happen if both sides actually went to war. The good news, from a ruthlessly realist viewpoint, is that such a human tragedy does not necessarily have serious grand strategic consequences for other states, and might well have benefits. Some fallout perhaps, but not that much in terms of serious radiation exposure in terms of exposure measured in rads. The loss of India and Pakistan might create some short term economic issues for importers of goods and services. However, the net effect would shift benefits to other suppliers without any clear problems in substitutions or costs. Some outside aid costs may be incurred, although one has to question whether outside states have any moral obligation to help the truly self-destructive, and how much outside aid could really be useful. In this sense, assistance would be a matter of sentiment rather than imperative. This is not a reason for outside powers to give up on seeking some form of arms control agreements, confidence building measures, and restraint. It is, however, a cause for Indian and Pakistan strategic analysis to start realistically modeling where they are headed if a nuclear war occurs now, or 5 or 10 years in the future. Unlike conventional weapons, this is not a matter of toys for the boys. It may also be a reason for outside actors like the US and the International Atomic Energy Agency to start assessing these consequences independently, and to force transparency in terms of nuclear stockpiles, delivery capabilities and the results of given types of exchange. It might also be a time for nations, NGOs, and the UN to make it clear there will be no aid to either country in the event a nuclear exchange does occur. These two options, in conjunction with arms control efforts, seem to be the only options where the outside world can really make a difference.

The Pakistani Wild Cards

If there are wild cards in the India-Pakistani nuclear arms race, they lie in two aspects of the Pakistani nuclear and missile program. First, is the issue of proliferation beyond Pakistan. Pakistan seems to be heading towards over-capacity in nuclear fissile material production and it is developing reliable missiles it can export to third countries that probably do not require a covert presence of the kind China provides in Saudi Arabia. The end result is the potential to export nuclear armed missiles to a country that Pakistan is convinced would never share nuclear weapons or lose control over them, such as Saudi Arabia. Such a transfer could produce a massive cash transfer and create a new nuclear power opposing Iran not a serious threat to Pakistan but a regional nuclear rival on its borders. An abundant stockpile also provides Pakistan the potential to sell nuclear weapons design and test data, as well as missile designs and components. In short, no one can totally decouple Pakistan from future cases of proliferation, nor can one be certain Pakistan would not create new threats through such transfers. Second, there is the marginal risk that Pakistani nuclear weapons might fall into extremist hands or Pakistan might become an extremist state. Either scenario would leave little hope of rational behaviour. Rambo-like fantasies of US Special Forces securing Pakistani nuclear forces aside, these are possibilities that both broaden the scope of possible Pakistani-related nuclear strikes, and significantly decrease the impact of deterrence and restraint in terms of rational bargaining. The good news is that neither option seems particularly probable in the near term. The bad news is that it is becoming far more difficult to assign such probabilities in the near term, and there is little the US and outside powers can really do to affect the situation. Preventive strikes do not seem any more credible than the Rambo option, threatening retaliation risks triggering further escalation and strikes, and Pakistani nationalism is hostile enough already. Negotiating safety measures, maintaining foreign aid, and pushing for arms control can all have some benefits, but they seem likely to be marginal or useless if internal developments within Pakistan continue to radicalize certain elements. Iran: Red Lines versus Rhetoric Iran has already managed to trigger a nuclear arms race without even having a nuclear weapon. Israel long ago extended the range of its nuclear-armed land-based missiles, probably now targets Iran with thermonuclear weapons, and is examining options for sea launched cruise missiles. The US has offered the Gulf states and the region extended deterrence although without specifying whether this would be nuclear or conventional and is deploying ballistic missile defense ships and selling THAAD, PAC 3, and radars. It is cooperating with Israel in improving the Arrow and shorter-range missile defenses. A credible Saudi voice like Prince Turki has stated that Saudi Arabia is examining nuclear options. The de facto failure of the latest 5+1 talks with Iran, and the failure of the regime to react to sanctions at least to date does not mean that negotiations have failed. Iran has scarcely been forthcoming and has long used negotiations as a cover for continued nuclear programs, but the option of negotiations is still available. Moreover, sanctions are limiting Irans military import, and it can take several years for the damaging and most recent rounds of sanctions to have their most severe political and economic impact. There is also the possibility that the coming Iranian election may signal that Iran is willing to accept some

level of reform and added compromise; although it is just as likely that elections signal the oppositethat the Supreme Leader is in total control and will tolerate no real challenge. At the same time, Irans red lines have shifted to the point where they now are at the nuclear breakout and IRBM stage of development, and where Iran can now move towards the following new red lines: fissile grade enrichment, cold or passive nuclear weapons testing, creation of new dispersed or sheltered facilities with more advance centrifuges, testing an actual nuclear device, and arming its missiles with an untested nuclear warhead a risk that sounds extreme until one remembers the reliability and accuracy of US nuclear-armed systems like Jupiter and the M-4/MGM-18 LaCrosse. There is no reliable way to predict such events in advance. They are only likely to become red lines when they are actually crossed and have been detected. There also is no unclassified way to know how much design and test data Iran has received from the outside, and how well it can hide its efforts and leap frog to some form of weapons deployment. Equally important, there is no way to know exactly how the US would react and how much international support it would get. Gulf leaders, for example, talk privately about such support but are remarkably silent when the subject of supporting and basing US preventive strikes is raised in any open forum that even hints at public commitment. Moreover, there is no way to know how Israel would react. At this point, its nuclear efforts are so tightly concealed that there is no public debate over its nuclear weapons holding, missile forces, and possible addition of sea or air-launched systems. The US has made it clear that it does not want Israeli preventive strikes, but has never publically said it would ride out any Israel effort and let Israel take the consequences. Israel may or may not be able to hit at all of Irans current major publically known nuclear enrichment facilities. The hardening of Natanz and Fordow raise questions for a force of fighter-bombers using conventional earth penetrators (although nuclear-armed penetrators would be a very different story). As for the US, it has steadily refined its military strike options and kept them very real. The US can hit at the full mix of suspect sites including research and centrifuge production, take out much of Irans defenses and missile capabilities, and has access to Gulf bases. And it can restrike if Iran tries to recreate its facilities. These are all capabilities Israel probably lacks -although several factors may have eased its may have eased its penetration and refueling problems, including Israels quasi-rapprochement with Turkey, Syrias civil war, and Iraqs problems in getting advanced fighters and weapons from the US. The US has also said that an Iranian nuclear force is unacceptable. Like the word no, however, unacceptable is far more difficult to define in practice than in the dictionary. Preventive strikes by either the US or Israel can trigger a far more intensive Iranian nuclear effort, withdrawal from the NNPT with claim the act is defensive, and a wide range of low level military acts in the Gulf or effort to use proxies and surrogates in Lebanon, Iraq, and the Gaza. Sustaining even a major US strike requires sustain support from the Arab Gulf states for restrikes, as well as willingness to counter Iranian asymmetric and even missile strikes. US rhetoric about refusing to rely on containment is inherently absurd since the US would have to rely on containment after preventive strikes and has no credible options to invade Iran or force Iranian regime change on its own. The question then arises as to whether the US can create a serious form of the extended deterrence, which Secretary Clinton offered the Arab Gulf states and region, with or without preventive strikes since any reliance on missile

defense alone would be credible or sufficient. It is whether the US meant nuclear or just precision conventional extended deterrence, and how that guarantee would evolve if Iran deployed nuclear armed missiles and forces. In balance, bad as the risks and uncertainties are, the US might have to carry out preventive strikes if Iran crossed two of the potential red lines listed earlier: testing an actual nuclear device, and arming its missiles with an untested nuclear warhead. The other options: fissile grade enrichment, cold or passive nuclear weapons testing, and creation of new dispersed or sheltered facilities with more advance centrifuges, are now too close to what has already happened and would present massive problems in terms of US credibility given the US false alarms in Iraq. The US cannot afford to be seen as over-reacting and neither can its allies. At the same time, the US cannot under react as well. If some argue that Iran should learn from Libya, the US should definitely learn from North Korea. Brazil, South Africa and Argentina are not the models for dealing with Iran. Once Iran has become an active military power, it is likely to move forward toward more and more nuclear weapons, boosted and thermonuclear weapons designs, and combinations of launch on warning, launch under attack and then dispersed and shelter forces. Pressure from Israel, Saudi (and possibly Turkish) nuclear and missile forces will add to the resulting arms race, as will the US need to constantly upgrade any forces for extended deterrence. The most quiet or discrete extended deterrence option would be nuclear armed, submarine or surface launched cruise missiles backed with the deployment of conventionally armed cruise or ballistic missiles with terminal guidance systems capable of point attacks on Irans most valuable civil and military assets. The most decisive extended deterrence options would be the equivalent of the combination of Pershing II and GLCMs that were land based, had US operating crews both deep inside the Arab Gulf and other regional states and in or near key major cities, and had both nuclear and precision conventional warheads. Iran would be faced with the inability to strike at key Arab population centers without striking at US forces and still see mobile US nuclear armed forces in reserve. It also could not use conventional warheads without facing a more accurate and reliable US strike force in return. The US could work with key Arab allies and the GCC to create the same kind of layered defenses against missiles and rockets being developed in Israel, and as is suggested later -- use the South Korean model to help create layered defenses in the gulf, allowing an indirect form of cooperation between Israel and the Gulf states without overt ties or relations. As is the case with India and Pakistan, it also is important to think the unthinkable in terms of what a nuclear war in the region might become. Even today, it is possible to think of some Iranian covert nuclear attack on Israel or a Gulf state using a gun device hidden in a ship or less credibly given to a proxy like the Hezbollah. The end result of an attack on Israel might well be nuclear ground bursts on Iranian cities a far great existential threat to Iran than the kind of attack Iran could launch again Israel during the first years of its nuclear forces. And, the situation is scarcely likely to get better as all of the current and potential nuclear powers affecting the nuclear balance steadily increase their capabilities over the years and decades ahead.

Israel would have no reason to limit the scale of its retaliation, and outside states would have no strategic reason to urge such restraint. The outside world may need Iranian oil although that is now questionable given developments in shale oil and gas and other sources of energy and liquid fuels. No one needs Iranians and no one needs an Iranian regime with any chance of recovering nuclear capability. Horrible as a nuclear exchange of any kind could be in humanitarian terms, the grim logic of strategic realism does not place any restraints on Israeli retaliatory attacks on Iran. As for Saudi Arabia and extended deterrence, the US has to consider the tradeoff between all of the risks and costs of preventive strikes and the costs and risks of nuclear exchanges or the use of extended deterrence if the US does not act. Arms control negotiations, sanctions, clearly defined redlines and public analysis of the cost to Iran of a nuclear exchange are all interim steps that might eliminate the need for preventive strikes, but some red lines are deadlines and make it time to act. North Korea: Shutting the Nuclear Barn Door North Korea presents a very different set of problems: a case in which a country has already proliferated in limited terms by conducting three nuclear tests, is rebuilding its reactors in ways that will give it more plutonium, and has openly displayed a major centrifuge facility for obtaining fissile material for uranium weapons. The official view of the US intelligence community is that North Korea has not yet been successful in getting high yields from its fission devices. Its initial tests produced only very low yields. The third test on February 12, 2013 seems to have produces a yield of only several kilotons to 6-7 kilotons, versus 12-20 kilotons for the first US weapons. This would present serious problems for the regime in terms of targeting anything but city-sized targets at long missile ranges, given the combined uncertainties surrounding the reliability of both the warhead and North Korean missiles, and the reliability and accuracy of North Korean systems overall. North Korea may not have the ability to build small warheads and bombs although this seems to be a subject of dispute within the US intelligence community and outside exports; for instance, ISIS estimates that, it should not come as a surprise to the international community that North Korea may now have the capability to explode a miniaturized nuclear device. ISIS (and key members of the U.S. intelligence community) have assessed for some time that North Korea likely has the capability to miniaturize a nuclear weapon for its 800 mile range Nodong missile. Although more information is needed to make a sound assessment, this test could, as North Korea has stated, demonstrate this capability. ISIS has also assessed that North Korea still lacks the ability to deploy a warhead on an ICBM, although it shows progress at this effort. North Korea would need to conduct missile flight tests with a re-entry vehicle and mock warhead, increase the explosive yield of the warhead, possibly requiring its further miniaturization, and improve the operational reliability of the warhead and missile. It seems clear that it does not have boosted or thermonuclear weapons production capabilities, but there is no way to predict when or if it might acquire these. Again, ISIS estimates that, North Korea does not appear to have detonated a more sophisticated nuclear device, such as a thermonuclear device. Before the test, concern was expressed by some analysts that North Korea could test a more advanced nuclear weapon.

The data from this test so far indicate that this is not the case. One important question is whether the nuclear test used only plutonium or involved highly enriched uranium either alone or in combination with plutonium. There is no clear way to estimate North Koreas stocks of Plutonium. ISIS has estimated that, North Korea had produced a total plutonium stockpile of between 46 and 64 kilograms, of which 28-50 kilograms could be in separated form and usable in nuclear weapons. It estimated in 2007 that North Korea would have the following stocks after its first nuclear test. There have since been two other tests, illustrating the difficulty in making such estimates. Current estimates may or may not take account of North Koreas third test but give enough Plutonium to make up to six weapons: Suspected Military Stocks of Fissile Material, end of 2003 Unirradiated Plutonium: 15-40 kg Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU): Unknown Number of Weapons: 2-9 North Korea has publically stated that it is refueling its 5 MWe reactor at Yongbyon and is building a new 50-100 MWe there, as well as a 200 MWe reactor at Taechon. It displayed a large centrifuge facility at Yongbyon in 2010 that could give it uranium fissile material for its weapons as well as fuel its reactors to make more plutonium. However, experts indicate the capacity of this facility is still limited: North Korea announced on April 2 that it would restart its nuclear facilities, including its 5megawatt nuclear reactor in Yongbyon, north of the capital, which had been disabled and mothballed since an agreement in October 2007.North Korea's nuclear arsenal is severely limited by a lack of fissile materials plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU) to fuel its bombs. Despite its recent threats, North Korea does not yet have much of a nuclear arsenal because it lacks fissile materials and has limited nuclear testing experience. In the long term, it's important to keep it that way; otherwise North Korea will pose a much more serious threat. So, it is important that they don't produce more fissile materials and don't conduct more nuclear tests. The Kim Jong-un regime has already threatened to conduct more tests, and with this announcement they are telling the world that they are going to make more bomb fuel They also need more bomb fuel to conduct more nuclear tests. North Korea has deployed its own version of the Scud B with a nominal range of 186 miles and Scud C with a range of 310 miles. It has four longer range systems in development that include the Nodong (620 miles?), Taepodong-1 (900+ miles), Musudan (1,680-2,100 miles), and Taepodong-2 (2,500-3,700 miles). A recent CRS analysis notes that, A DNI report to Congress says that North Korea has short and medium range missiles that could be fitted with nuclear weapons, but we do not know whether it has in fact done so. North Korea has several hundred short-range Scud-class and medium-range No-Dong-class ballistic missiles, and is developing an intermediate range ballistic missile. The Taepo-Dong-2 that was tested unsuccessfully in July 2006 would be able to reach the continental United States if it becomes operational. DNI assessed in 2008 that the Taepo-Dong-2 has the potential capability to deliver a nuclear-weapon-sized payload to the United States, but that absent successful testing

the likelihood of this is low. A launch of a Taepo-Dong-2 missile as part of a failed satellite launch in April 2009 traveled further than earlier unsuccessful launches but still did not achieve a complete test. An April 2012 launch of a Taepo-Dong-2 (called the Unha-3 by North Korea) also failed in the first stage. The December 2012 launch of a Taepo-Dong-2 (Unha-3) was North Koreas first successful launch of a satellite into space. However, putting a satellite into orbit, while moving North Korea technically to its goal, does not translate into a reliable missile. Further testing would be required. Where Iran officially denies that it has a nuclear weapons program, North Korea has talked about nuclear strikes on the US long before it even has a credible capability to launch them and makes no secret of the threat it poses to its neighbors. It also clearly is set on a course where it will steadily deploy nuclear-armed missiles and aircraft with progressively longer ranges, higher yields, and more accuracy and reliability over time. It will exploit any failure to match these forces, and there is no clear way to estimate how a mature and survivable nuclear force would affect North Korean uses of force at lower levels or its perceptions of risk. Once again, it is important to think about the consequences of North Korea going from a token or no serious nuclear force to even a limited capability to strike the US matched by a serious capability to strike at South Korea or Japan and develop enough weapons for a serious tactical or theater nuclear strike capability. There is no way to calculate North Koreas willingness to take nuclear risks and the fact its threats and strategic rhetoric are extreme does not mean its actions will be. The fact remains, however, that it is the only power that openly threatens nuclear war and whose strategic leadership is openly uncertain enough to raise serious questions about its judgment and restraint. US options are limited by the fact that North Korea has a powerful if cautious and sometimes restraining protector in China. It is far harder for the United States to talk about preventive strikes after the fact and in the face of Chinese desire to keep a buffer state between it and the US. US options are also affected by the fact that any deployment of US nuclear forces or extended deterrence that focuses on North Korea will be seen by China as a potential threat. At the same time, the US faces the reality that the risks of a growing North Korean nuclear force coupled to a large stock of chemically armed bombs and missiles and possible biological weapons mean it cannot simply let a key ally like South Korea bear a one-sided threat or leave Japan in the position where it, too, has no balancing force. While arms control options are not impossible, it is also all too clear that that they offer even less chance of success than negotiations with Iran. This leaves the US with a number of alternatives, none of which offer the prospect of lasting stability, but all of which are very similar to the options the US might use against Iran and would put pressure on both North Korea and China: Turn to China for reasons analyzed in more depth in the following sections and say the US will offer extended nuclear deterrence to Japan and South Korea unless China can persuade North Korea to halt and roll back its nuclear programs. It could confront China and aid South Korea with two major options:

The most quiet or discrete extended deterrence option would be nuclear armed submarine- or surface-launched cruise missiles backed with the deployment of conventionally armed cruise or ballistic missiles with terminal guidance systems capable of point attacks on North Koreas most valuable civil and military assets. The most decisive extended deterrence options would be the equivalent of the combination of Pershing II and GLCMs that were land based, had US operating crews both deep inside South Korea and in or near its major cities, and had both nuclear and precision conventional warheads. North Korea would be faced with the inability to strike at key South Korean population centers without striking at US forces and still see mobile US nuclear armed forces in reserve. It also could not use conventional warheads without facing a more accurate and reliable US strike force in return. The US could work with South Korea to create the same kind of layered defenses against missiles and rockets being developed in Israel, and use the South Korean model to help create layered defenses in the Gulf, allowing an indirect form of cooperation between Israel and the Gulf states without overt ties or relations. As is the case in the Gulf, the US does not have to support proliferation by either South Korea or Japan. Experts may argue the timing, but none argue over South Korean and Japanese capability in building long range missiles and nuclear weapons, and doing so with minimal if any testing. In fact, South Korea would already have nuclear weapons if the US had not pressed South Korea to not go ahead and reached an agreement with South Korea back in 1975.

As for missiles, South Korea announced in October 2012 that it was extending the range of its missile systems in response to North Koreas efforts. As a report by the Arms Control Association noted, South Korea announced on Oct. 7 (2012) it had reached an agreement with the United States that will allow Seoul to extend the range of its ballistic missiles to 800 kilometers with a 500-kilogram payload, an increase the governments of both countries say is necessary to counter the growing threat posed by North Koreas ballistic missiles. Under a 2001 agreement with the United States, South Korea was limited to developing ballistic missiles with ranges of no more than 300 kilometers with a 500-kilogram payload. That agreement increased South Koreas ballistic missile range from the 180kilometer restriction that the two parties had negotiated in 1979. Under the new guidelines, South Korea will be able to target any site in North Korea from anywhere in its own territory. in an Oct. 7 press briefing, White House spokesman Jay Carney described the extension as a prudent, proportional, and specific response that is designed to improve South Koreas ability to defend against North Koreas ballistic missiles In the Oct. 18 e-mail, the State Department official dismissed the possibility that the new South Korean missile guidelines would have an adverse effect on the MTCR, saying that the extension will have no implications for other countries missile-related export behavior and that it does not impact the export control commitments to which South Korea agreed when it joined the MTCR.

The North Korean Foreign Ministry responded to Seouls announcement in an Oct. 10 statement saying that the United States discarded its mask of deterring missile proliferation by supporting South Koreas increased missile ranges and killed efforts to restrain the development of long-range missile launches on the Korean peninsula. The US can put pressure on both North Korea and China in ways that would allow several years for negotiation while not seriously opposing South Korea in any way that would bind or sanction its ally. While Japan is far less likely to take a decision to go nuclear, particularly in the near-term, the US could decide that the Missile Technology Control Regime had essentially outlived its usefulness binding the US without binding China and encourage Japan to create precision strike conventional missiles as well as missile defenses. This would confront both North Korea and China with the reality that once such a Japanese force was created, Japan could quickly arm them with nuclear weapons if it came under increasing North Korean or Chinese pressure. Such options would give the US, South Korea, and Japan growing leverage to pressure China to restrain North Korea as well as deter and contain the expansion of Chinese nuclear forces. In fact, one way to put pressure on China would be to start a dialogue that could be either official or think tank, including discussions of both missile defense and extended deterrence, and encourage South Korea and Japan to surface the nuclear option. If this succeeded in pushing China into far more decisive pressure on North Korea, there would be no need for either extended deterrence or South Korean or Japanese nuclear forces. Moreover, such options could be used to lever Chinese restraint in transferring missile technology to Iran. There also is no reason that the US, South Korea and Japan could not offer quid pro quos in terms of incentives for a North Korean roll back, including some formal agreement on all sides for a local weapons of mass destruction free zone and economic incentives to a more open North Korea. At the same time, for all the reasons discussed below, the US may have to tacitly encourage South Korean and Japanese creation of at least precision guided conventional missile forces and possibly nuclear forces as a local regional counterbalance to the Chinese nuclear effort. This is scarcely a desirable option, or one that can easily be kept stable, but North Korea is only part of the problem and the US should not passively allow itself to be trapped into a Chinese-US nuclear relationship. It should be clear to China that it faces other potential nuclear powers if Chinas nuclear forces grow too much and are even indirectly linked to Chinese pressure on maritime and island disputes in the Pacific. China: The Ghost in the Zero Option Finally, it is time to take a much harder look at the broader interaction between Chinas nuclear and missile programs and the overall balance of nuclear forces. Quite frankly, it is both incompetent and intellectually dishonest to decouple Chinas expanding nuclear and missile forces from the US and Russian strategic and theater nuclear balance and to pretend that cuts in US nuclear forces are not connected to the future mix of Chinese and North Korean nuclear forces and how they interact with the forces (or non-forces) of South Korea and Japan. Edition after edition of the Department of Defense report on Chinese military power has described the changes in Chinese missile forces. The 2012 edition notes,

"The PLA Second Artillery Corps is modernizing its short range ballistic missile force by fielding advanced variants with improved ranges and payloads. It is also acquiring and fielding greater numbers of conventional medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) to increase the range at which it can conduct precision strikes against land targets and naval ships, including aircraft carriers, operating far from Chinas shores beyond the First island chain. Similarly, China continues to produce large numbers of advanced ground launched cruise missiles capable of standoff, precision strikes. By 2015, China will also field additional road-mobile DF-31A (CSS-10 Mod 2) intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and enhanced, silo-based DF-5 (CSS-4) ICBMs. China continues investments in its land-based ballistic and cruise missile programs. It is developing several variants of offensive missiles, upgrading older systems, forming additional units, and developing methods to counter ballistic missile defenses. The PLA is acquiring large numbers of highly accurate, domestically built cruise missiles, and has previously acquired large numbers of Russian ones. These include the domestically produced, ground-launched CJ-10 land-attack cruise missile (LACM); the domestically produced ground- and ship-launched YJ-62 anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM); the Russian SS-N-22/SUNBURN supersonic ASCM, which is fitted on Chinas SOVREMENNY-class guided missile destroyers; and the Russian SS-N-27B/SIZZLER supersonic ASCM on Chinas Russian-built KILO-class diesel-powered attack submarines. By October 2011, the PLA had deployed between 1,000 and 1,200 SRBM to units opposite Taiwan. In the past year, China has fielded new SRBM systems, added additional missile brigades in southeastern China, and upgraded the lethality of its existing SRBM force by introducing variants with improved ranges, accuracies, and payloads. During comments to the media in 2011, China confirmed it is developing an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), based on a variant of the DF-21 (CSS-5) medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM). Known as the DF-21D (CSS-5 Mod 5), this missile is intended to provide the PLA the capability to attack large ships, particularly aircraft carriers, in the western Pacific Ocean. The assessed range of the DF-21D exceeds 1,500 km, and the missile is armed with a maneuverable warhead. No similar unclassified discussion has taken place of the growing expert debate over the size and nature of the Chinese nuclear weapons stockpile raised in studies by Phillip Karber and others. Estimates ranged from 80 to 2,000 weapons in 2005, and some now put the total at 300-400 while others claim levels of 1,800 to over 3,000. There are also debates over delivery systems, some crediting China with a major cruise missile as well as a ballistic missile force. This debate takes on a very different meaning when there is talk of reducing US and Russian stockpiles to zero and the US has already reduced its nuclear weapons holds from a reported peak of 31,255 to less than 5,000, and under 2,500 strategic warheads. The Arms Control Association, for example, provided the following estimate in late 2012: China: About 240 total warheads. France: Fewer than 300 operational warheads.

Russia: Approximately 1,499 deployed strategic warheads The Federation of American Scientists estimates Russia has another 1,022 nondeployed strategic warheads and approximately 2,000 tactical nuclear warheads. Additional thousands are awaiting dismantlement. United Kingdom: Fewer than 160 deployed strategic warheads, total stockpile of up to 225. United States: Approximately 5,113 nuclear warheads including tactical, strategic, and nondeployed weapons. According to the latest official New START declaration, the United States deploys 1,722 strategic nuclear warheads on 806 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers The Federation of American Scientists estimates that the United States' nondeployed strategic arsenal is approximately 2,800 warheads and the U.S. tactical nuclear arsenal numbers 500 warheads. Additional warheads are retired and await dismantlement. The practical problem for the US as has been discussed earlier is not only to assess the overall nuclear balance in strategic terms and how Chinas development affect its strategic forces, but the overall balance in Asia, and particularly involving the Koreas, Japan, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia. The US should not overreact to Chinas actions. China is becoming a major global power and its nuclear forces will expand. The US should not, however, underreact, fail to assess Chinese nuclear weapons developments as openly and transparently as it assesses its other military actions, or somehow talk about zero options as if the nuclear arms race in Asia was not now more important in terms of deterrence and warfighting risks than the nuclear balance with Russia and in Europe. To do so is not simply intellectually dishonest, it is intellectually absurd: a clear case of unthinking about the thinkable. Programs

BURKE CHAIR IN STRATEGY Topics DEFENSE AND SECURITY Regions ASIA, CHINA, INDIA, IRAN, PAKISTAN, SOUTH ASIA

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Anthony H. Cordesman utside Publications by CNS Staff INDIA AND PAKISTAN MISSILE RACE SURGES ON Copyright WMD Insights. All rights reserved. October 2007 Issue By Sharad Joshi This is the fourth article in an on-going series by WMD Insights on the intensifying competition between India and Pakistan in the development of increasingly advanced, nuclear-capable ballistic and cruise missiles. See " India Successfully Tests Agni-III: A Stepping Stone to an ICBM?" WMD Insights, May 2007, "Pakistan's Missile Tests Highlight Growing South Asia Nuclear Arms Race, Despite New Confidence Building Measures," WMD Insights, April 2007, and "India's Missile Program: Diverging Trajectories," WMD Insights, February 2007. With both states conducting tests of new systems, while continuing to announce the launch of programs to develop still others, it is important to return to this subject in order to keep readers current on the latest developments . In recent months, India and Pakistan have announced important advances in their respective missile programs. Key developments in India are the announcement that it will not seek to develop an intercontinental-range missile, but that it will extend the range of the Agni-III ballistic missile from 3,500 to 5,000 kilometers (km); the disclosure that it is developing a short-range submarine-launched ballistic missile; the entry into service of a land-attack version of India's BrahMos supersonic cruise missile; and the announcement of plans to develop the Nirbhay, a new long-range land-attack cruise missile. India's planned missile advances have not appeared to damage relations with the United States, which reached an understanding with India during this period on the text of an agreement for nuclear cooperation. For its part, Pakistan was reported to have deployed its longest-range ballistic missile, the 2,000-km-range Shaheen II; conducted a further test of its Hatf-VII/Babur cruise missile; and also test fired a short-range air-launched cruise missile, the Hatf-VIII, or Ra'ad. India's Ballistic Missile Program "Agni-III*" Not an Intercontinental Missile In April 2007, India successfully tested the Agni-III missile, which has a range of 3,0003,500 km. [1] After this test, reports surfaced that India would begin efforts to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with a range in excess of 5,500 km. [2] However, in June 2007, the Indian government reportedly ordered a cap on extending the range of its ballistic missile systems, with the result that the Agni missile will be developed to a maximum range of only 5,000 km. [3]

Currently, India's Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), which designed the Agni-III, is working on a 5,000-km extended range Agni missile, referred to as the Agni-III* ("Agni Three Star") or in some reports as the Agni-IV. [4] Sources within the DRDO stated that this system will be the longest range missile the country is planning to develop. [5] Some reports noted that the Agni-III* will have counter-measures to defeat missile defenses, as well as enhancements to improve its thrust-to-weight ratio. [6] This missile, expected to require three years to produce, will be constructed with the addition of a third stage to the Agni-III; all three stages will use solid propellant. [7] Reasons for Limiting Agni's Range News stories indicate that India decided not to develop an ICBM to avoid creating tension with the international community, particularly while the U.S.-India nuclear trade deal is still pending. [8] Shortly before news reports of the range cap, then Indian President A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, a key figure in the country's missile development program, revealed that after the Agni-III test in April, several unnamed countries had refused to export polyacrylonitrile (PAN) fiber to India. [9] This material is an essential precursor in the manufacture of carbon fiber, used for missile bodies and components. Given the high re-entry speeds of ICBM warheads, carbon-fiber-based ablative materials would be needed for the heat shields of ICBM reentry vehicles. Kalam may have had this use in mind when he referred to PAN as "critical" for the ICBM program to proceed. [10] While there is no other public information on the denial of this item, whose export is regulated under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), it is possible that this was an indication of potential pressures on India not to pursue an intercontinental-range system. By capping India's missile program, New Delhi apparently hopes to demonstrate to the international community that its strategic interests and threat perceptions are restricted to Asia and do not impact any Western power. [11] Indeed, a June 18, 2007, news report quoted unidentified Indian government officials as stating that New Delhi has decided not to develop missiles with ranges over 5,000 km as a "goodwill gesture" specifically towards Washington. [12] Whether such a gesture was needed, however, is not clear: Washington responded mildly to the Agni-III test and did not publicly press India to limit the range of its missiles. State Department spokesperson Sean McCormack declared only that states in the region should not take any measures that would risk stability in the area, while also noting that India had shown "a certain level of responsibility with respect to preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction technology." [13] There is no direct evidence that the U.S.-India negotiation on their pending nuclear agreement was affected by the Agni-III test -- or by India's decision to defer possible development of an ICBM. [See Text Box, "Agni-III Test and the U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement Negotiations."] Within India, there has been only limited public debate on the range cap issue. One conservative commentator criticized reports of the range restriction, stating that by taking this step, New Delhi would not be able to compete with European firms in the international market for satellite launches. [14] At the same time, other proponents of the ICBM program in New Delhi have stated that for a growing power like India, an ICBM would be a natural next step. [15] Importance of a 5,000-km Range India may be seeking a missile with a 5,000-km-range so it can credibly target major cities in China without the constraint of having to base its strategic missiles in eastern India, near the

Chinese border. If based in central or southern India, an Agni-III missile with a range of 3,500 km would not be able to reach northern and eastern China, where major cities, such as Beijing, Nanjing, and Shanghai, are located. [16] A 5,000-km Indian missile could reach these targets from such bases, however, offering New Delhi considerably greater strategic depth and enabling India to keep its retaliatory forces beyond the range of all but China's most capable missiles. It has also been suggested that Indian missile designers seek more powerful missiles not to increase the range of these systems, but to increase their payload capacities, in order to accommodate India's "heavier proven warheads." [17] Both the 3,500km-range Agni-III and the 5,000-km-range Agni-III*/Agni-IV would allow India to strike targets in Pakistan from bases beyond the range of Pakistan's most capable missile systems. Nonetheless, despite the apparent support for the Agni-III*/Agni-IV, some Indian specialists believe that the Agni-III provides a sufficient deterrent vis--vis China. [18] The Surya For several years, there have been periodic reports that an ICBM named Surya has been under development by the Indian government. [19] After the April 2007 Agni-III test, there was speculation that the Surya ICBM was in development, but the recent reports on the extension of the Agni-III (into the Agni-III* or Agni-IV) do not mention the Surya. [20] As characterized in the past, the Surya was to have a range of 9,000-10,000 km or possibly more. [21] India's recent announcement of the missile-range cap suggests that this project is no longer being actively pursued. The Sagarika Apart from developments related to the extension of the Agni missile's range, news reports in July 2007 hinted that the Indian government might officially reveal information on the Sagarika (Oceanic) missile program. For several years, Indian defense scientists have been working on the Sagarika submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) (which has also been described elsewhere as a cruise missile). [22] The Sagarika, a key future component of India's nuclear triad, is a two-stage missile with a reported range of 800 km. [23] The missile will be installed on India's indigenous nuclear submarine (the Advanced Technology Vessel), which is scheduled for sea trials in 2008. [24]

AGNI-III TEST AND THE U.S.-INDIA NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS After the April 2007 Agni-III test, DRDO head M. Natarajan stated that, while India could develop an ICBM, the country's political leadership would have to make the decision to do so. [1] A key objective for New Delhi in considering this matter has been to avoid derailing the pending U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement, a prime Indian foreign policy objective. [2] Negotiations between India and the U.S. on the nuclear agreement (known as a "Section 123 Agreement" after the provision of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act authorizing such arrangements) remained unresolved throughout the first six months of 2007, despite several rounds of talks that took place both before and after the April Agni-III test. However, reports

on disagreements with respect to the Section 123 Agreement did not mention the missile issue as a hurdle. Rather, throughout the several rounds of negotiations, the main points of dispute centered around: India's right to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel created in U.S.supplied nuclear reactors (reprocessing rights); India's desire for guaranteed supplies of nuclear reactor fuel; the U.S. demand for a stipulation that, should India violate the agreement, the United States would have the right to repatriate all U.S.-origin nuclear materials and equipment; and provisions in U.S. law providing for the termination of all U.S. cooperation in the event of a future Indian nuclear test. Indeed, two weeks after the missile test, U.S. Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns wrote a highly positive review of Indo-U.S. ties and of the nuclear agreement in particular. [3] At the same time, despite disagreements over the Section 123 Agreement, there was no break in negotiations between the two sides. Less than three weeks after the April 12 Agni-III test, Indian Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon held another round of talks with his U.S. counterparts, and subsequently, officials from both sides stated in early May that the agreement could be finalized within a month. [4] There were further negotiations in the first week of June between delegations led by Undersecretary Burns and Foreign Secretary Menon. [5] Reports of the Indian decision to cap the range of its missiles appeared in the Indian media in the third week of June, roughly a month before the text of the Section 123 Agreement was finalized on July 27. [6] There is no indication that the missile cap had any impact on the negotiations. Indeed, according to some news reports, one of the stated reasons for the breakthrough in negotiations was the Indian offer of a separate facility for reprocessing spent fuel, rather than any commitment by India to cap the Agni's capabilities. [7] While terms of the Section 123 Agreement have been negotiated, there are several other steps that have to be taken before it can come into force, including: changes in the rules of the 45member Nuclear Suppliers Group to allow nuclear transfers to India by member states; conclusion of a safeguards agreement between India and the International Atomic Energy Agency covering U.S. nuclear exports; and finally, approval of the Section 123 Agreement by the U.S. Congress. SOURCES AND NOTES [1] Girija Shankar Kaura, "5,000 km is Not Far Off: DRDO Chief," Tribune, April 14, 2007, http://www.tribuneindia.com/2007/20070414/nation.htm#7. [View Article] [2] Josy Joseph, "Govt Scales Down Missile Range, Aims Closer Home," Daily News and Analysis, June 18, 2007 [http://www.dna.india.com/report.asp2newsid:1103986]; see also "Thinking Cap," Daily News & Analysis, June 18, 2007, http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?NewsID=1104221&CatID=19. [View Article] [3] See Nicholas Burns, "Heady Times' for India and the U.S.," Washington Post, April 29, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/04/27/AR2007042702014.html. [View Article] [4] The Indian foreign secretary is the highest ranking career diplomat in the government, while the external affairs minister, a political appointee, is the head of the ministry. "Nuke Deal Back on Track," Hindustan Times, May 2, 2007, Lexis-Nexis; "U.S. Officials Say Deal

with India Could be Settled This Month," International Herald Tribune, May 1, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/05/01/america/NA-GEN-US-India-Nuclear.php. [View Article] [5] "India, U.S. Conclude 4th Round of Nuclear Talks Without Breakthrough,' " BBC Monitoring South Asia, June 3, 2007, Lexis-Nexis. [6] Foster Klug, "U.S., India Settle Talks on Nuclear Deal," Washington Post, July 27, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/07/27/AR2007072700834.html?hpid=sec-world.[View Article] [7] "India makes New Proposal to End Impasse in Nuclear Talks," Press Trust of India, June 8, 2007, http://www.deccanherald.com/Content/Jun92007/national200706096502.asp? section=updatenews. [View Article]

In July 2007, DRDO chief M. Natarajan stated that a "special purpose missile" for the Indian Navy had been developed, and some officials stated that this program would soon be revealed publicly. [25] Natarajan also declared that the new missile would be ready in the next two to three years. [26] Defense Ministry sources stated that Natarajan was referring to the Sagarika or the "PJ 02" SLBM project. [27] Senior defense scientists, who were involved in the missile's development, also hinted that the missile would be formally announced soon. [28] India's Cruise Missile Program The BrahMos In June 2007, the Indian Army inducted the land-attack version of the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile (the product of an IndianRussian joint venture) into its arsenal, ahead of its scheduled July 2008 delivery date. [29] This variant of the BrahMos has a range of 290 km, a speed of Mach 2.8, and can be launched vertically and then made to travel horizontally. [30] It can carry a conventional payload of 300 kilograms. [31] The BrahMos land-attack cruise missile (LACM) will give the Army increased flexibility and accuracy in striking potential targets, such as terrorist camps across the border in what India refers to as Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. [32] According to DRDO officials, this variant had demonstrated pinpoint accuracy, having a circular error probability during tests of zero (50 percent of missiles strike precisely on target). [33] Furthermore, the missile can be prepared for launch within two minutes, in contrast to the 20 minutes or more required to fire

India's short-range Prithvi ballistic missile. [34] Indian Army sources have stated that the missile will be deployed against high value targets in Pakistan near the Indo-Pakistani border. [35] As of August 2007, the Indian government has approved three BrahMos regiments for the Army, with the first regiment comprising three missile batteries, each of which would consist of four mobile launchers. [36] However, given the scale and diversity of the missiles now under the Indian Army, it is possible that the Army could establish an entire missile division. [37] The Navy is also proceeding toward testing the submarine version of the BrahMos, and in September 2007, Defense Minister A.K. Antony announced that this variant was ready, although the platforms on which it will be based have yet to be selected. [38] Experts have stated that the German HDW and the Russian Kilo-class submarines in the Indian Navy are not configured to operate the missile and therefore, New Delhi has requested Moscow to loan it submarines on which underwater trials of the BrahMos can be conducted. [39] Some Indian Defense Ministry sources have stated that such a test will be carried out later in 2007 on an unnamed Russian submarine. [40] Meanwhile, the ship-borne version of the missile has already been inducted, and the Indian Air Force variant is under development. [41] The Air Force variant will be deployed on Sukhoi fighters and on the Indian Navy's long-range IL-38 maritime patrol aircraft. [42] BrahMos officials have stated that the next major step in the missile's evolution would be development of a hypersonic (Mach 5 and above) version of the missile, to be completed in the next 5-6 years. [43] The Nirbhay Indian defense scientists and military planners are now considering development of cruise missile options, in addition to the BrahMos. [44] On July 20, senior defense scientists announced the proposed development of a new multi-platform, terrain-hugging, subsonic cruise missile, titled Nirbhay (Fearless). The system would have a range of 1,000 km, putting it in the same class as the U.S. Tomahawk. [45] According to the plan, a technology demonstrator for the Nirbhay will be ready by early 2009. [46] With its longer range, the missile will be able to strike targets at greater distances than the 290-km range BrahMos. [47] Indian defense scientists point out that the range of the proposed Nirbhay would be significantly greater than that of Pakistan's 500- to 700-km range Babur. [48] They have also stated that the Nirbhay's low-altitude flight path will enhance its ability to evade enemy radars. [49] Finally, there have been reports that in a bid to counter Pakistan's growing cruise missile strength, New Delhi has concluded an initial agreement with Israeli Aircraft Industries for development of a cruise missile interceptor that is based on a "naval point defense system," in which the interceptor missile is launched vertically and subsequently leans and moves toward

its target. [50] According to some reports, the system, based on Israel's Barak-8 missile, will be meant for the Navy as well as the Air Force. [51] Other reports spoke of the proposed system in the context of defense against Pakistan's land attack capabilities. [52] Pakistan's Ballistic and Cruise Missile Programs Shaheen-II A report in the May/June 2007 issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists stated that Pakistan is in the process of deploying its most powerful ballistic missile, the Shaheen-II/ Hatf-VI, which has a range of 2,000-2,500 km. [53] Satellite imagery from June 2005 made available to the Federation of Atomic Scientists for this report revealed 15 Transporter Erector Launchers at Pakistan's National Defense Complex that were in different phases of being combined with their missiles. [54] The Pakistani government dismissed the report as "part fact and part fiction." [55] The Shaheen-II, which is said to be a response to India's proposed deployment of the Agni-II (range 2,000 km), can potentially strike targets in most of India. [56] It was last tested in February 2007. [57] (See "Pakistan's Missile Tests Highlight Growing South Asia Nuclear Arms Race, Despite New Confidence Building Measures," WMD Insights, April 2007.) Hatf-VII/Babur Apart from ballistic missile modernization, Pakistan has taken further steps to augment its cruise missile arsenal. On July 26, 2007, Pakistan successfully tested the Hatf-VII/Babur cruise missile, which was test-fired last in March. This subsonic missile, which can carry a nuclear warhead, can be launched from Pakistan's Agosta submarine and from its F-16 and JF-17 Thunder aircraft. [58] The mating with the Agosta is key to Islamabad's quest for a second-strike capability. [59] According to the Pakistani military, the missile has "near stealth" capabilities. Since the last test, Pakistani engineers have extended the range of the missile from 500 to 700 km, increasing its ability to reach targets in India, including the capital, New Delhi, with ground-launched or air-launched versions of the system. [60] One Indian official linked the Babur test to the on-going negotiations between India and the United State on a formal nuclear cooperation agreement, whose successful completion was

announced on July 27, 2007. According to one senior official in New Delhi, "the timing may be more than incidental.... They [the Pakistanis] want to remind us about their nuclear capability." [61] Indeed, within days of the test, as well as the conclusion of the 123 Agreement, Pakistan's National Command Authority (NCA), which is headed by President Pervez Musharraf and includes top military leaders and nuclear scientists, criticized the IndoU.S. agreement. In a statement, the NCA warned that the agreement would cause an arms race in the Subcontinent, and that the United States should have considered a package deal that also included Pakistan. [62] While there was no official reaction by the Indian government to the Babur test, the opposition Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party condemned the launch, stating that this was a violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) because of allegations that China had transferred cruise missile technology to Pakistan. [63] The charge was denounced in Islamabad, where officials stated that the country's cruise missile program was indigenous. [64] (The Indian BrahMos cruise missile, it may be noted, is a joint India-Russia venture, and Pakistan has alleged in the past that this cooperation between India and Russia is in violation of the MTCR.) [65] The Hatf-VIII or Ra'ad On August 25, 2007, Pakistan successfully tested its latest cruise missile, the Hatf-VIII, or Ra'ad ("Thunder" in Arabic), a nuclear-capable air-launched cruise missile (ALCM). [66] According to the Pakistan military, the Hatf-VIII provides the Air Force with a "strategic standoff capability." [67] The officially announced range of the missile is 350 kilometers. [68] The Pakistan military further stated that the Hatf-VIII/Ra'ad has a "low detection probability due to stealth design and materials used in its manufacturing." [69] One analyst has stated that the Hatf-VIII is likely to be deployed on Pakistan's F-16A fighter aircraft or its planned fleet of F-16C warplanes. [70] He further noted that the relatively short range of the missile suggests it is a new design that relies on assistance from an external actor that does not want to violate range and payload limits set by the Missile Technology Control Regime. [71] The regime restricts the transfer of technology by member states for ballistic and cruise missiles that can carry a payload of 500 kilograms to a distance of 300 km or more. Were the Hatf-VIII/Ra'ad based on the Hatf-VII/Babur, the analyst suggested, it would have had a range closer to that of the latter missile. This implied that the Hatf-VIII/Ra'ad was a new system, which was likely built with outside assistance, given Pakistan's limited indigenous cruise missile design capabilities. [72] At present there is no indication of the deployment schedule for the Hatf-VIII/Ra'ad. Conclusion Recent missile developments in India and Pakistan indicate that a missile arms race is well under way in South Asia. This competition is exacerbated by India's need to address potential strategic adversaries on two fronts. Nonetheless, India's decision to refrain from building missiles able to strike targets at intercontinental distances is an important sign of restraint, which seems to reflect India's official doctrine of pursuing only a "credible minimum

deterrent." [73] Pakistan's missile objectives are more straightforward, and demonstrate a continuing attempt to match India's missile improvements and, perhaps, to signal its unease with growing ties between New Delhi and Washington. Sharad Joshi -- Monterey Institute James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies http://cns.miis.edu/other/wmdi071008d.htm accessed on 08/09/2013 SOURCES AND NOTES [1] "Agni III Test-Fired Successfully," Business Line , April 13, 2007, http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2007/04/13/stories/2007041304811000.htm. [View Article] [2] Sharad Joshi and Peter Crail, "India Successfully Tests Agni-III: A Stepping Stone to an ICBM?" WMD Insights , May 2007. [3] Vishal Thapar, "Missile Capped: Govt Under Fire," CNN-IBN, June 19, 2007, http://www.ibnlive.com/news/india-softens-missile-power-for-us/43179-11.html. [View Article] [4] Y. Mallikarjun, "DRDO Begins Work on Agni-IV Missile," Hindu , August 9, 2007, http://www.hindu.com/2007/08/09/stories/2007080961571300.htm. [View Article] [5] Josy Joseph, "Missile Programmes Disappoint Scientists," Daily News & Analysis, June 19, 2007, http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?newsid=1104296. [View Article] [6] Mallikarjun, "DRDO Begins Work on Agni-IV Missile," see source in [4]. [7] Joseph, "Missile Programmes Disappoint Scientists," see source in [5]; Josy Joseph, "Govt Scales Down Missile Range, Aims Closer Home," Daily News & Analysis, June 18, 2007, http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?newsid=1103986; [View Article] "New Models for India's Missile Family," Aviation and Aerospace , July 9, 2007, http://www.domainb.com/aero/july/2007/20070709_models.htm. [View Article] [8] Thapar, "Missile Capped: Govt Under Fire," see source in [3]; Joseph, "Govt Scales Down Missile Range, Aims Closer Home," see source in [7]. [9] "India Denied Access to Critical Component after Agni III Launch," NewKerala.com, June 8, 2007, http://www.newkerala.com/news.php?action=fullnews&id=37482. [View Article] [10] Ibid.; Carbon Fiber Forum website, http://www.madehow.com/Volume-4/CarbonFiber.html; [View Article] U.S. Department of Defense, "Polyacrylonitrile (PAN) Carbon Fibers, Industrial Capability Assessment, OUSD(AT&L) Industrial Policy, Report to Congress," October 2005, http://www.acq.osd.mil/ip/docs/pan_carbon_fiber_report_to_congress_10-2005.pdf. [View Article] [11] "India Toes U.S. Line, Caps Missile Plan," Yahoo News India, June 18, 2007, http://in.tech.yahoo.com/070618/211/6h44x.html.[View Article] [12] "Report: India to Limit Missile Program to Aid U.S. Nuclear Deal," Yahoo News India, June 18, 2007, http://in.news.yahoo.com/070618/210/6h403.html. [View Article] [13] "U.S. Reacts Cautiously to Agni III Missile Test," Hindu , April 14, 2007, http://www.hindu.com/2007/04/14/stories/2007041400891300.htm. [View Article] [14] Varghese George, "Sonia Vs Kalam," Indian Express , June 28, 2007, http://www.indianexpress.com/story/203047.html. [View Article] [15] Joseph, "Govt Scales Down Missile Range, Aims Closer Home," see source in [7]. [16] Ashley J. Tellis, "India's Emerging Nuclear Posture," RAND, 2001, pages 563-564, see also maps on pages. 562, 563, and 566.

[17] Rajeev Sharma, "Agni-III Being Seen as India's ICBM," Tribune , April 14, 2007, http://www.tribuneindia.com/2007/20070414/nation.htm#6. [View Article] [18] "After Testing China-Specific Missile, India Eyes ICBMs," DefenseNews.com, April 16, 2007, http://defensenews.com/story.php?F=2687888&C=asiapac. [View Article] [19] See "India's Nuclear Forces, 2005," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , September/October 2005, p. 74, http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/147052n7g76v4733/fulltext.pdf; [View Article] "India's Nuclear Forces, 2002," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , September/October 2002, page 72. Interestingly, while the 2002 and 2005 reports on India's nuclear forces in the Bulletin mention the Surya, the most recent report, in the July/August 2007 issue, does not. See "India's Nuclear Forces, 2007," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , July/August 2007, p. 76, http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/hm378jxpm12u4342/fulltext.pdf; [View Article] Richard Speier, "India's ICBM: On a Glide-Path to Trouble?" Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, February 7, 2007, http://www.npecweb.org/Essays/060207SpeierICBM.pdf. [View Article] [20] See "Going Ballistic Makes Sense," Hindustan Times , April 13, 2007, in Lexis-Nexis; "After Testing China-Specific Missile, India Eyes ICBMs," DefenseNews.com, April 16, 2007. [21] See, for example, "After Testing China-Specific Missile, India Eyes ICBMs," see source in [20]; "Agni-III Test-Fired Off Orissa Coast," Indian Express , July 10, 2006, http://www.indianexpress.com/story/8201.html. [View Article] [22] See, for example, Anupam Srivastava, "India's Growing Missile Ambitions," Asian Survey , March/April 2000, 40:2, Vol. XL, No. 2, p. 32; Joshi and Crail, "India Successfully Tests Agni-III: A Stepping Stone to an ICBM?" see source in [2]; Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, "India and Pakistan: Nuclear Related Programs and Aspirations at Sea," in Lowell Dittmer (ed.) South Asia's Nuclear Security Dilemma , Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2005, pp. 8990. [23] "DRDO Chief Confirms Submarine Ballistic Missile Ready," Indian Express , July 8, 2007, http://www.indianexpress.com/story/204164.html. [View Article] [24] Ibid. [25] Ibid. [26] "New Models for India's Missile Family," Aviation and Aerospace , July 9, 2007. [27] Ibid. [28] Ibid; Vishal Thapar, "India Gets Submarine Missile Power," IBNLive.com, July 7, 2007, http://www.ibnlive.com/news/india-gets-submarine-missile-power/44268-3.html. [View Article] [29] For background on the BrahMos program, see Sharad Joshi, "India's Missile Program: Diverging Trajectories," WMD Insights , February 2007, http://www.wmdinsights.com/I12/I12_SA1_IndiaMissileProgram.htm. [View Article] [30] T.S. Subramanian, "Cruising Along," Frontline , June 30-July 13, 2007, Vol. 24, Issue 3, http://www.flonnet.com/fl2413/stories/20070713003202800.htm; [View Article] Rahul Singh, "Indian Army Gets BrahMos Power,"Hindustan Times , June 22, 2007, http://www.hindustantimes.com/storypage/storypage.aspx?id=efec61d3-d145-4e23-a7231e111d30f33&Match ID1=4502&TeamID1=2&TeamID2=6&MatchType1=1&SeriesID1=1122&PrimaryID=4502 & Headline=Indian +Army+gets+BrahMos+power.[View Article] [31] T.S. Subramanian, "Army Acquires BrahMos Missile," Hindu , June 22, 2007, http://www.hindu.com/2007/06/22/stories/2007062250541300.htm. [View Article] [32] Vishal Thapar, "Indian Army Gets BrahMos Power," IBNLive, June 22, 2007,

http://www.ibnlive.com/news/indian-army-gets-brahmos-power/43380-11-16.html. [View Article] [33] "Army to Induct BrahMos Ahead of Schedule," Times of India, May 13, 2007, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/Army_to_induct_Brahmos_ahead_of_schedule/articl eshow/2039984.cms. [View Article] [34] Ibid. [35] Sandeep Dikshit, "BrahMos to be Used in Plains," Hindu, June 22, 2007, http://www.hindu.com/2007/06/22/stories/2007062250611300.htm. [View Article] [36] Rahul Singh, "Indian Army Gets BrahMos Power," see source in [30]. [37] "Army to Induct BrahMos Ahead of Schedule," see source in [33]. [38] "India Develops Submarine Version of BrahMos Missile," Rediff.com, September 5, 2007, http://www.rediff.com/news/2007/sep/05brahmos.htm. [View Article] [39] Ibid. [40] Vivek Raghuvanshi, "India to Launch BrahMos from Russian Sub," Defense News, September 6, 2007, http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=3017909&C=asiapac. [View Article] [41] Vivek Raghuvanshi, "India Retains BrahMos Chief for Missile's Upgrade," Defense News, July 31, 2007, http://www.defensenews.com/story.php? F=2936399&C=asiapac. [View Article] [42] Josy Joseph, "Navy Wants BrahMos in Submarines," Daily News & Analysis, June 21, 2007, http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?NewsID=1104880. [View Article] [43] "BrahMos to Develop First Hypersonic Cruise Missile in 5 Years," Pravda , July 10, 2007, http://www.inteldaily.com/?c=166&a=2687.[View Article] [44] "India Plans to Test New Medium-Range Missile in 2009," Daily News & Analysis , July 24, 2007, http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?newsid=1111569. [View Article] [45] Sujan Dutta, "Fearless Tomahawk-Type Missile on Radar," Telegraph , July 20, 2007, http://www.telegraphindia.com/1070720/asp/nation/story_8080771.asp; [View Article] "India Plans to Test New Medium-Range Missile in 2009," Daily News & Analysis, July 24, 2007. [46] Ibid. [47] Josy Joseph, "Nirbhay to Beef up Missile Muscle," Daily News & Analysis , July 22, 2007, http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?NewsID=1111269. [View Article] [48] Neelam Mathews, "Plans to Test New Missile by End of '09," Asian Age , July 25, 2007. [49] Mallikarjun, "DRDO Begins Work on Agni-IV Missile," see source in [4]. [50] "Israel Likely to Devise Missiles for India," United Press International, July 27, 2007, http://www.upi.com/International_Intelligence/Briefing/2007/07/27/israel_likely_to_devise_ missiles_for_india/8477/. [View Article] [51] "IAI Signs $2.5 Billion Deal with India," YNetnews.com, July 15, 2007, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3425400,00.html. [View Article] [52] "Israel Likely to Devise Missiles for India," see source in [50]. [53] "Pakistan's Nuclear Forces, 2007," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , May/June 2007, pp. 72-73 [http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/k4q43h2104032426/fulltext.pdf]; "Pakistan to Deploy New Nuclear Missile as Counter to India's Nuke Build-up," SpaceWar.com, May 11, 2007, http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Pakistan_To_Deploy_New_Nuclear_Missile_As_Counter_ To_India_Nuke_ Build_Up_999.html. [View Article]

[54] Ibid. [55] Qudssia Akhlaque, "FO Rejects Foreign Role," Dawn , May 11, 2007, http://www.dawn.com/2007/05/11/top16.htm. [View Article] [56] "India's Nuke Build-up' Gives Pak the heebie-jeebies," Times of India , May 10, 2007, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Indias_nuke_build-up_gives_Pak_the_heebiejeebies/articleshow/2024928.cms. [View Article] [57] For a discussion of the deployment of the Agni-I and the Agni-II, see "India's Nuclear Forces, 2007," see source in [19]. [58] "Pakistan Test Fires Nuclear-Capable Missile," CNN.com, July 26, 2007, http://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/asiapcf/07/26/pakistan.missile.test.reut/index.html; [Vi ew Article] "Pakistan Successfully Test-Fires Hataf-VII Missile," PakTribune , July 26, 2007, http://www.paktribune.com/news/print.php?id=185117. [View Article] [59] S.M. Hali, "Second Strike Capability," Nation, August 16, 2006, http://www.nation.com.pk/daily/august-2006/16/columns5.php.[View Article] [60] Bruce Loudon, "New Delhi Suspicious of Test," The Australian , July 27, 2007, http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,22139886-2703,00.html; [View Article] "Pakistan Tests Cruise Missile," United Press International, July 26, 2007, http://www.upi.com/NewsTrack/Top_News/2007/07/26/pakistan_tests_cruise_missile/4066/; [View Article] "Pakistan Tests Nuclear-Capable Missile," Guardian , July 26, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0,,-6806390,00.html; [View Article] "Pakistan Nuclear-Capable Missile Test Successful,"Moscow News , July 26, 2007, http://www.mnweekly.ru/world/20070726/55263972.html; [View Article] Neelam Mathews, "Plans to Test New Missile by End of '09," Asian Age , July 25, 2007 (article accessed 07/24/2007; no longer available online). [61] Loudon, "New Delhi Suspicious of Test," see source in [60]. [62] Jo Johnson and Edward Luce, "Pakistan Warns US of Asia Arms Race," Financial Times , August 2, 2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/287d8882-4121-11dc-8f370000779fd2ac.html. [View Article] [63] "BJP Condemns Pak's Missile Test," Chennai Online, August 4, 2007 [http://www.chennaionline.com/colnews/newsitem.asp?NEWSID=%7B7C88D27D-065F4A12-A3B8-5BE746643630%7D&CATEGORYNAME=NATL]. [64] Muhammad Saleh Zaafir, "Pakistan Rejects BJP Contention Against Missile Programme," The News , August 5, 2007, http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp? Id=9428. [View Article] [65] See for example, Shaukat Piracha, "BrahMos Missile Test Violates MTCR," Daily Times , April 30, 2002, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_30-42002_pg7_1. [View Article] [66] "Pakistan Military Test-Fires Nuclear Capable Cruise Missile," International Herald Tribune , August 25, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/08/25/asia/AS-GENPakistan-Missile-Test.php. [View Article] [67] Ibid [68] "Pakistan Test Fires Cruise Missile," CNN.com, August 26, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/asiapcf/08/25/pakistan.missile/index.html? iref=newssearch. [View Article] [69] Ibid. [70] Doug Richardson, "Pakistan Tests Hatf 8 Air-launched Cruise Missile," Jane's Missiles & Rockets , September 1, 2007. [71] Ibid. [72] Ibid.

[73] Rajesh M. Basrur, "India's Escalation-Resistant Nuclear Posture," in Michael Krepon, Rodney Jones, and Ziad Haider (eds.),Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South Asia , Henry L. Stimson Center, 2004, pp. 56-67, http://www.stimson.org/southasia/pdf/ESCCONTROLCHAPTER3.pdf. [View Article] http://www.npolicy.org/article_file/Managing-Nuclear-MissileCompetition_260111_1824.pdf accessed on 08/09/2013 Implications of Indias long-range missile capabilities May 4, 2012 Posted by nishankmotwani in : DeSilva-Ranasinghe, Serge, Future Directions International, India , trackback
http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/blogs/southasiamasala/2012/05/04/implications-ofindias-long-range-missile-capabilities/ accessed on 08/09/2013

Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe This post first appeared on Future Directions International on 2 May 2012. Background As the latest addition to Indias expanding arsenal, the launch of the Agni-5 long-range missile on 19 April is another step forward in the diversification of Indias nuclear strike capabilities. While India celebrates its technological achievement, the development of a nuclear-capable intermediate-range ballistic missile, with an estimated range of 5,000 kilometres or 3,100 miles, is likely to intensify strategic competition between Pakistan and China, which have viewed these developments with reservation. Home / NUCLEAR AND MISSILE THREATS TO INDIA: China-Pakistan nexus in South Asia NUCLEAR AND MISSILE THREATS TO INDIA: China-Pakistan nexus in South Asia Paper 296 17.08.2001
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/paper296 accessed on 08/09/2013

by Dr. Rajesh Kumar Mishra Despite the international condemnation China has relentlessly supported and assisted the Pakistani nuclear and missile programmes. On August 6,2001, The Washington Times reported that a US spy satellite detected the latest shipment as it arrived by truck at the mountainous China-Pakistani border on May1. Quoting the US intelligence agencies the report stated that the China National Machinery and Equipment Import and Export Corp. (CMEC) supplied the missile components for Pakistans Shaheen-1 and Shaheen-2 missile programmes. And, it was one of 12 missile component transfers sent by ships and trucks detected by US intelligence agencies since the beginning of the year. It is known by now that Pakistans nuclear test in 1998 was not reactive but selfperceived in true sense. The chronology of events that led to Pakistani missile and nuclear

tests suggest that Islamabads efforts and stockpile of non-conventional weapons are the result of a sustained war strategy against India. It is ineluctable that though the idea of having bomb was indigenous, evidence negates the originality of in-house technological capability to what Pakistan claims for. The key acquisitions and development of non-conventional weaponry have been imported from outside. And, against all international norms China still remains the leading exporter to Pakistan to provide with a whole range of related technologies right from development to deployment of nuclear weapons. The Chinese destructive engagement with Pakistan has been the main stumbling block toward confidence building in South Asia in general and it directly threatens the Indian peace and security in particular. In reality, Chinas continued technology and weapon transfers to Pakistan are intended to provoke conflict between India and Pakistan. Beijing seeks to increase the capabilities of Pakistan in the hope that Pakistan might deliver a disturbing threat to India. Since long, India has been facing a threatening nexus between China and Pakistan. These regional adversaries jointly act against India. Pakistan also has been acting and responding to Chinas meticulous designs quite swiftly. In fact, Pakistans acquisition is far in excess of its strategic defence needs and requirements. Through this anti-India collaboration, Chinas actions have been an irritant to Indian initiatives and it undermines the Indian concept of defence deterrence. By diverting New Delhis concern towards checking Islamabads undue aspirations against India, Beijing tries to wear down Indias time and resource that could otherwise be utilised by New Delhi to build a minimum credible deterrence. This minimum credible deterrence as the Indian nuclear doctrine has often come in the way between India-US relations and impacts on the American policy towards the issues of non-proliferation. However, American non-determination against the failed pledges of China has also contributed to continued Chinese supply of missile and nuclear technologies to Pakistan. Beijing, being articulative, thinks it otherwise. It has been reported that during negotiations with the United States, China has described Pakistan as its Israel. And, China links the M-11 transfers to Pakistan with the US sale of F16s to Taiwan. Intentionally, to oppose the US policies Beijing draws a reciprocal route to proliferate regionally and internationally. In any case, it is not clear why the Indian sub continent should face the impact of differences between China and US. , Indian peace and security is thus threatened indirectly also by contending postures of China and US. This dimension of Indian insecurity is in addition to Chinese belligerent attitude toward India in tri-lateral (China, India, Pakistan) and bilateral (Sino-Indian) regional relations. These configurations relating to US-China and China-Pakistan relations do pose serious security challenges to India especially, pertaining to Indian missile and nuclear programmes. And New Delhi must take note of the Chinese reaction to Bush administrations determination to go ahead with the missile defence programmes-TMD and NMD. Expressing its vehement opposition to American perceptions on missile defence and ABM Treaty, the Chinese white Paper on National Defence 2000 has threatened a new round of arms race. Sharing similar views, while reacting over the US moves, Parvez Musharraff has been quoted saying it will lead to a resumption of the nuclear and missile race.

The situation may turn dangerous to Indian security if one reads through the minds of Pakistani President Parvez Musharraf. On February 7, 2000 the BBC News agency had reported Musharraffs nuclear warning to India. Further, Islamabads non-commitment to no-first-use of nuclear weapons and its abetment to subversive activities in India in the name of jehad, together makes the Indian security more vulnerable. Speaking at the Pakistan Air Forces Somniani firing range, Musharraff desired to build on the ability to threaten enemys such vulnerable targets which go beyond their tolerance threshold. And, during his visit to the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), Nilore, Musharraff stressed the need for carrying forward the work done by predecessors and that the nuclear programme of the country would be consolidated with renewed vigour. The Pakistani nuclear development programme that had started since the establishment of PAEC in 1955 has undergone considerable notional surgical changes. The process of changing the course towards non conventional weaponry was kicked off from the secret meeting in Multan called by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1972, attended by scientists and nuclear experts. Bhutto had, also, exhorted-we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own. In 1986, Pakistan signed a nuclear agreement with China and the same year Zia-ul-Haq had said-it is our right to obtain technology. And when we acquire this technology the Islamic world will posses it with us. And, the journey thus started, China still recklessly assists Pakistan with nuclear and missile technologies. The imperatives of Islamisation of bomb may adversely affect the security concerns of India. In the recent past, the chief architect of Pakistans nuclear programme, Abdul Qadeer Khan at one Shahbuddin Ghauri (after whom the Pakistani missile has been named) conference eulogised that Ghauri had laid the foundation for the Pakistani movement by launching a jehad against Hindus in India. The blending of Pakistani aspirations, to catch up with Indias non-conventional forces and to carry on support to so called jehad in India, causes serious military and security threats to New Delhi. The Director of the Asian Studies Centre of Heritage Foundation, Larry M. Wortzel has remarked that Indias concern about Chinas potential threat cannot be simply dismissed. China is Pakistans principal source of nuclear weapons and missiles. China believes Pakistan has the needed influence to defuse Islamic separatist movements inside Chinas borders, while it views India as a strategic rival. With regard to nuclear relations in South Asia, the observation of Neil Jock, an analyst at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, is worth looking into. He mentioned that Indias concerns with China tend to receive less international attention internationally, and indeed within India as well. But, it can not be forgotten that a war was fought in 1962 over border disputes that remain unresolved. Further, taking into account the Pakistans first-strike option, Stephen P. Cohen of Brookings Institution has opined that Pakistan would use an option-enhancing policy for a possible use of nuclear weapons. Conclusion: A strategic rethinking is necessary while China maintains close nuclear and military ties with Pakistan. Beijings clandestine illegal supply of nuclear and missile technologies still continues even despite Chinas persistent denial of such activities before the US. Though

having adequate information through intelligence agencies, intelligentsia reports and satellite imageries, the American government fails to assure itself of convincing or concrete evidence to act against China. There may not an incentive to look for such evidence that may be positively related to US national interest but could not necessarily be complemented with Indian security concerns As far as Indian response to hostile China-Pakistan nexus is concerned, New Delhi has not yet been able to put forth any effective opposition to Chinese support to Pakistans anti-India centric nuclear and missile programmes. Neither New Delhi has so far mobilised the international community to ask China to stop its proliferation activities. Curiously the Washington Times report on latest Chinese supply to Pakistan has drawn very little attention or condemnation from Indian media, institutions and analysts. Till date, the voices raised by and in India have fallen on Chinese deaf ears. If New Delhi charts out a counteractive route to persuade China to take into account Indias concerns, the future of security of Asia would become more complex and uncertain. (for comments e-mail: rajeshkrmishra@hotmail.com)

Comment Although senior Indian officials publicly say that the Agni-5 is for deterrence purposes only, India has a clear rationale behind the missiles development, which is to: demonstrate its

expanding strategic strike capabilities, impress the worlds major powers that possess intercontinental missiles and deliver a strong message to Pakistan and China. As a nation that has reportedly doubled the size of its nuclear arsenal within the last ten years, the Agni-5 is the latest addition to Indias nuclear-capable weapon systems, adding to its existing missile and aircraft-deliver systems. Among Indian strategic planners there is an influential school of thought, who firmly believe, that India must develop world-class military strike capabilities and project the symbolism of a major world power. This, they believe, will provide greater international recognition and further strengthen Indias case to obtain a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. Senior Indian officials are also wary of Chinas power and influence and its ability to thwart Indias regional ambitions, especially in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region. However remote, Indian strategic planners also appear to be increasingly concerned about the possibility of a two-front war with Pakistan and China, which has provided added impetus to developing sophisticated military capabilities. Although the Indian Government has tried to downplay the Agni-5 and portray it as a defensive weapon, Indian defence analysts and the media pointed out the weapons significance is to give India strategic parity against China. The fact India deliberately chose not to inform China of its intention to launch the new missile, is indeed revealing given that all other permanent members of the UNs Security Council were reportedly told. Officially, Chinas response has been reserved and tempered. China and India are both emerging powers. We are not rivals but co-operative partners. We should cherish the hard earned momentum of co-operation, stated Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Liu Weimin. Chinese state media, however, has adopted a different tone accusing India of downplaying the missiles capabilities, claiming it has an actual range of up to 8,000 km. Similarly, as reported in BBC News , the editor of the Chinese Military Magazine , asserted that: Without an adequate tank corps and a heavy-duty land force with adequate heavy weapons, it [India] can hardly become a so-called China killer by relying solely on nuclear weapons. More disparagingly, quoting Gao Zugui of the Institute of International Strategic Studies, the South China Morning Post , reported: if it [India] really wants to become a great nation, each of its families should have a toilet first. Furthermore, Pakistans response to the launch of the Agni-5 was immediate and forthright. Within days after India launched the Agni-5, Pakistan test-fired the Hatf IV Shaheen-1A, its latest nuclear-capable intermediate-range ballistic missile. Although the range of the new missile was not announced, it is speculated to be around 2,000 km or 1,240 miles. As

emphasised by Lt. Gen. Khalid Ahmed Kidwai, the Pakistani commander overseeing the nations nuclear command, Pakistan legitimised the launch, claiming: The improved version of Shaheen-1A will further consolidate and strengthen Pakistans deterrence abilities. Although China has not responded with gestures of hostility, it may choose to respond more subtly as it continues to pursue ways and means to counterbalance India, including the development of its own military capabilities. At this stage, what impact the Agni-5 may have on Chinas strategic and defence policies is difficult to interpret, but it is likely that China will look to strengthen further its strategic ties with Pakistan and other Indian Ocean countries that surround Indias immediate neighbourhood. But the sentiment provided by an article in the Pakistan Observer , on 30 April, is perhaps more illustrative of how either Pakistan or China may choose to respond in the long-term. Neither Beijing nor Islamabad will stand idly by as India arms itself. It could lead to an Asian arms race similar to that witnessed during the Cold War.

The Consequences of Nuclear Conflict between India and Pakistan

http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/southasia.asp accessed 08/09/2013

The months-long military standoff between India and Pakistan intensified several weeks ago when suspected Islamic militants killed more than 30 people at an Indian base in the disputed territory of Kashmir. As U.S. diplomatic pressure to avert war intensifies, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is going to India and Pakistan this week to discuss with his South Asian counterparts the results of a classified Pentagon study that concludes that a nuclear war between these countries could result in 12 million deaths. NRDC (Natural Resources Defense Council) has conducted its own analysis of the consequences of nuclear war in South Asia. Prior to this most recent crisis we calculated two nuclear scenarios. The first assumes 10 Hiroshima-sized explosions with no fallout; the second assumes 24 nuclear explosions with significant radioactive fallout. Below is a discussion of the two scenarios in detail and an exploration of several additional issues regarding nuclear war in South Asia. Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Forces It is difficult to determine the actual size and composition of India's and Pakistan's nuclear arsenals, but NRDC estimates that both countries have a total of 50 to 75 weapons. Contrary

to the conventional wisdom, we believe India has about 30 to 35 nuclear warheads, slightly fewer than Pakistan, which may have as many as 48. Both countries have fission weapons, similar to the early designs developed by the United States in the late 1940s and early 1950s. NRDC estimates their explosive yields are 5 to 25 kilotons (1 kiloton is equivalent to 1,000 tons of TNT). By comparison, the yield of the weapon the United States exploded over Hiroshima was 15 kilotons, while the bomb exploded over Nagasaki was 21 kilotons. According to a recent NRDC discussion with a senior Pakistani military official, Pakistan's main nuclear weapons are mounted on missiles. India's nuclear weapons are reportedly gravity bombs deployed on fighter aircraft. NRDC's Nuclear Program initially developed the software used to calculate the consequences of a South Asian nuclear war to examine and analyze the U.S. nuclear war planning process. We combined Department of Energy and Department of Defense computer codes with meteorological and demographic data to model what would happen in various kinds of attacks using different types of weapons. Our June 2001 report, "The U.S. Nuclear War Plan: A Time for Change," is available at http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/warplan/index.asp. Scenario: 10 Bombs on 10 South Asian Cities For our first scenario we used casualty data from the Hiroshima bomb to estimate what would happen if bombs exploded over 10 large South Asian cities: five in India and five in Pakistan. (The results were published in "The Risks and Consequences of Nuclear War in South Asia," by NRDC physicist Matthew McKinzie and Princeton scientists Zia Mian, A. H. Nayyar and M. V. Ramana, a chapter in Smitu Kothari and Zia Mian (editors), "Out of the Nuclear Shadow" (Dehli: Lokayan and Rainbow Publishers, 2001).) The 15-kiloton yield of the Hiroshima weapon is approximately the size of the weapons now in the Indian and Pakistani nuclear arsenals. The deaths and severe injuries experienced at Hiroshima were mainly a function of how far people were from ground zero. Other factors included whether people were in buildings or outdoors, the structural characteristics of the buildings themselves, and the age and health of the victims at the time of the attack. The closer to ground zero, the higher fatality rate. Further away there were fewer fatalities and larger numbers of injuries. The table below summarizes the first nuclear war scenario by superimposing the Hiroshima data onto five Indian and five Pakistan cities with densely concentrated populations.

Estimated nuclear casualties for attacks on 10 large Indian and Pakistani cities City Name Total Population Number Within 5 Persons Kilometers of Killed Ground Zero India Bangalore Bombay Calcutta Madras New Delhi Total India 3,077,937 3,143,284 3,520,344 3,252,628 1,638,744 14,632,937 314,978 477,713 357,202 364,291 176,518 1,690,702 Pakistan Faisalabad Islamabad Karachi Lahore Rawalpindi Total Pakistan 2,376,478 798,583 1,962,458 2,682,092 1,589,828 9,409,439 336,239 154,067 239,643 258,139 183,791 1,171,879 174,351 66,744 126,810 149,649 96,846 614,400 373,967 129,935 283,290 354,095 220,585 1,361,872 175,136 228,648 198,218 196,226 94,231 892,459 411,336 476,633 466,336 448,948 217,853 2,021,106 of Number Persons Severely Injured of Number Persons Slightly Injured of

India and Pakistan Total 24,042,376 2,862,581 1,506,859 3,382,978

As in the case of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in this scenario the 10 bombs over Indian and Pakistani cities would be exploded in the air, which maximized blast damage and fire but creates no fallout. On August 6,

1945, the United States exploded an untested uranium-235 gun-assembly bomb, nicknamed "Little Boy," 1,900 feet above Hiroshima. The city was home to an estimated 350,000 people; about 140,000 died by the end of the year. Three days later, at 11:02 am, the United States exploded a plutonium implosion bomb nicknamed "Fat Man" 1,650 feet above Nagasaki. About 70,000 of the estimated 270,000 residents died by the end of the year. Ten Hiroshima-size explosions over 10 major cities in India and Pakistan would kill as many as three to four times more people per bomb than in Japan because of the higher urban densities in Indian and Pakistani cities. Scenario: 24 Ground Bursts In January, NRDC calculated the consequences of a much more severe nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan. It first appeared as a sidebar in the January 14, 2002, issue of Newsweek ("A Face-Off with Nuclear Stakes"). This scenario calculated the consequences of 24 nuclear explosions detonated on the ground -- unlike the Hiroshima airburst -- resulting in significant amounts of lethal radioactive fallout. Exploding a nuclear bomb above the ground does not produce fallout. For example, the United States detonated "Little Boy" weapon above Hiroshima at an altitude of 1,900 feet. At this height, the radioactive particles produced in the explosion were small and light enough to rise into the upper atmosphere, where they were carried by the prevailing winds. Days to weeks later, after the radioactive bomb debris became less "hot," these tiny particles descended to earth as a measurable radioactive residue, but not at levels of contamination that would cause immediate radiation sickness or death. Unfortunately, it is easier to fuse a nuclear weapon to detonate on impact than it is to detonate it in the air -- and that means fallout. If the nuclear explosion takes place at or near the surface of the earth, the nuclear fireball would gouge out material and mix it with the radioactive bomb debris, producing heavier radioactive particles. These heavier particles would begin to drift back to earth within minutes or hours after the explosion, producing potentially lethal levels of nuclear fallout out to tens or hundreds of kilometers from the ground zero. The precise levels depend on the explosive yield of the weapon and the prevailing winds.

For the second scenario, we calculated the fallout patterns and casualties for a hypothetical nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan in which each country targeted major cities. We chose target cities throughout Pakistan and in northwestern India to take into account the limited range of Pakistani missiles or aircraft. The target cities, listed in the table below, include the capitals of Islamabad and New Dehli, and large cities, such as Karachi and Bombay. In this scenario, we assumed that a dozen, 25-kiloton warheads would be detonated as ground bursts in Pakistan and another dozen in India, producing substantial fallout. The devastation that would result from fallout would exceed that of blast and fire. NRDC's second scenario would produce far more horrific results than the first scenario because there would be more weapons, higher yields, and extensive fallout. In some large cities, we assumed more than one bomb would be used.

15 Indian and Pakistani cities attacked with 24 nuclear warheads Country City City Population Number Bombs of Attacking

Pakistan Islamabad (national capital) 100-250 thousand Pakistan Karachi (provincial capital) > 5 million Pakistan Lahore (provincial capital) 1-5 million Pakistan Peshawar capital) (provincial 0.5-1 million

1 3 2 1

Pakistan Quetta (provincial capital) Pakistan Faisalabad Pakistan Hyderabad Pakistan Rawalpindi India India India India India India India

250-500 thousand 1-5 million 0.5-1 million 0.5-1 million

1 2 1 1 1 3 3 2 1 1 1

New Dehli (national capital) 250-500 thousand Bombay (provincial capital) > 5 million Delhi (provincial capital) Jaipur (provincial capital) > 5 million 1-5 million

Bhopal (provincial capital) 1-5 million Ahmadabad Pune 1-5 million 1-5 million

NRDC calculated that 22.1 million people in India and Pakistan would be exposed to lethal radiation doses of 600 rem or more in the first two days after the attack. Another 8 million people would receive a radiation dose of 100 to 600 rem, causing severe radiation sickness and potentially death, especially for the very young, old or infirm. NRDC calculates that as many as 30 million people would be threatened by the fallout from the attack, roughly divided between the two countries. Besides fallout, blast and fire would cause substantial destruction within roughly a mile-anda-half of the bomb craters. NRDC estimates that 8.1 million people live within this radius of destruction. Most Indians (99 percent of the population) and Pakistanis (93 percent of the population) would survive the second scenario. Their respective military forces would be still be intact to continue and even escalate the conflict. Thinking the Unthinkable

After India and Pakistan held nuclear tests in 1998, experts have debated whether their nuclear weapons contribute to stability in South Asia. Experts who argue that the nuclear standoff promotes stability have pointed to the U.S.-Soviet Union Cold War as an example of how deterrence ensures military restraint. NRDC disagrees. There are major differences between the Cold War and the current South Asian crisis. Unlike the U.S.-Soviet experience, these two countries have a deep-seated hatred of one another and have fought three wars since both countries became independent. At least part of the current crisis may be seen as Hindu nationalism versus Muslim fundamentalism. A second difference is India and Pakistan's nuclear arsenals are much smaller than those of the United States and Russia. The U.S. and Russian arsenals truly represent the capability to destroy each other's society beyond recovery. While the two South Asia scenarios we have described produce unimaginable loss of life and destruction, they do not reach the level of "mutual assured destruction" that stood as the ultimate deterrent during the Cold War. The two South Asian scenarios assume nuclear attacks against cities. During the early Cold War period this was the deterrent strategy of the United States and the Soviet Union. But as both countries introduced technological improvements into their arsenals, they pursued other strategies, targeting each other's nuclear forces, conventional military forces, industry and leadership. India and Pakistan may include these types of targets in their current military planning. For example, attacking large dams with nuclear weapons could result in massive disruption, economic consequences and casualties. Concentrations of military forces and facilities may provide tempting targets as well. RELATED NRDC WEBPAGES: The U.S. Nuclear War Plan: A Time for Change The Bush-Putin Treaty last revised 6/5/2002

INDIAN BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE and its Consequences Posted on 01 October 2012 by admin

http://defencesecurityindia.com/indian-ballistic-missile-defence-and-itsconsequences/ accessed on 08/09/2013

Indias proven Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) network is ready for a roll-out in at least two metropolises New Delhi and Mumbai. While limited in scope, its breakthrough technology showcased the capabilities of the countrys scientists and technologists. Introduction The first successful launch of PAD (Prithvi Air Defence) anti-missile was conducted on November 2006 in which PAD missile successfully intercepted a modified Prithvi-II Missile at an altitude of 50 km. The Prithvi-II Ballistic Missile was modified successfully to mimic the trajectory of Chinese M-11 missiles. Recently validating its Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) capability, India successfully launched an interceptor missile to destroy an incoming target missile in a direct hit over the Bay of Bengal on 10 February 2012. The interceptor, called Advanced Air Defence (AAD-05), launched from a mobile launcher on Wheeler Island, off the Odisha coast, and destroyed it in mid-flight at an altitude of 15 km over the Bay of Bengal. The AAD-05 used a longer range seeker to inch close to the intruder and kill it in a direct hit. The target missile mimicked an incoming enemy missile with a range of more than 2,000 km. This was the seventh interceptor mission and the fifth endo-atmospheric interception. Six of the tests to date have been successful, including the first three in a row. While the country is elated, there is a strategic unease in the region. This paper aims to discuss salience of Indias developing anti-missile capabilities and its accretion to Indias strategic configuration of power (SCP). Voids in Air Defence Forces The existing shortcomings of current air defence cover are summarized as follows; At present, surface to air missile (SAM) defences are confined to relatively short-range defence of point targets. Area defence is exclusively the preserve of manned interceptors. Many of the principal long-range 3-D (detecting range, bearing and height of airborne object) surveillance and ground control interception radars (GCI) are ageing. Most of the systems are of 1980s vintage and, despite being upgraded, would provide inadequate detection capabilities against stealthy cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. The AD surveillance, reporting and defence network is not fully extended nation- wide. Defences are concentrated at targets within aircraft range from Pakistan and China. These are ineffective around increased number of strategically and economically vital targets deep within Indias heartland and in the South. Indias surface to air missiles (SAMs) and also manned interceptor aircrafts lack meaningful capabilities against ballistic and cruise missiles, unarmed aerial vehicles (UAVs) and attack helicopters. Pakistans Missile Capability With a reported total stockpile of 100 plus nuclear warheads, Pakistan is likely to be able to arm a significant proportion of its missile inventory with such weapons. The ranges of Pakistans missiles in service and under development would put almost all of India within range. Pakistans missiles are all land-based. Hence, their points of launch and trajectories are relatively easy to predict. However, because of the close proximity of launch sites to India, the warning time in the event of an attack could be as little as 5 minutes. This would demand an extremely rapid detection, tracking and engagement system. Pakistan has developed cruise missile Babur (Hatf-7), that may be nuclear-capable

Chinas Missile Capability With over 600 ballistic missiles and approximately 240 reported nuclear warheads, China is a most formidable nuclear power with ambitions extending beyond South Asia. China also possesses a substantial inventory of air and sea launch cruise missiles, some capable of carrying nuclear warheads. Chinas air force is also undergoing modernization with increased capability of launching air to surface munitions including nuclear weapons. The trends are; Strengthen AD, Air superiority and power projection capability. 4th Generation MRCA (SU 30 MK 2, SU 27, JF-10, JF-17), advanced avionics and PGMS beyond visual range air to air missiles (BVRAAM), anti air raid defence. Satellite based C4 I2SR and Battle Management System. Air Defence Capability based on concept of AWACS (IL 76 and Y 8). Acquire S-400 and theater missile defence (TMD) systems (already possess 8 regiments of S300 or equivalent systems) Air to Air Refueling. Cruise Missiles It is believed that Chinas nuclear-capable DH-10 land-attack cruise missile is now operational and China deploys 50250 of the missiles a range that reveals significant uncertainty about the status of the weapon system. The DH-10, which can fly farther than 2,000 kilometers, apparently exists in both ground- and air-launched nuclear-capable versions that improve the survivability, flexibility, and effectiveness of Chinas nuclear forces. How many of the new cruise missiles might be nuclear-capable is unclear. Evidently, Chinas forces are truly formidable in the South Asian context. However, set against this must be the fact that Chinas ICBMs are intended primarily to deter the United States while some of its IRBMs might be diverted against Taiwan. In the ( as yet unlikely ) event that China chooses to enter into a confrontation with India, Chinas India-specific nuclear weapons would centre around its IRBM/ MRBM forces of over 100 DF-3A, DF-4 and DF-21 missiles. Added to these would be M-11/-9/-18 missiles aimed at targets closer to the Sino-Indian frontier. Moreover, Chinas submarine launch ballistic missiles (SLBMs) lend a completely new dimension to the potential threat to India. Capable of being launched from a wide variety of locations, it makes defensive preparations even more difficult. With a mix of elderly H-6 bombers and more modern strike aircraft, China could conceivably equip these with cruise missiles for deep strikes into Indian Territory. It is not impossible indeed it is likely for China to eventually modify some of its C-601/-611/-801K air-launch cruise missiles for nuclear warhead delivery. Therefore, India will have to contend with a Chinese nuclear threat encompassing several delivery methods. This further complicates defensive plans for India. Air/ Missile Threat Summary Though India will continue to face threat of attacks by aircrafts, the principal menace can come from short, medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles capability of Pakistan and China. In times to come, there will be greater threat from stealthy cruise missiles and India will not be immune to attack no matter how far the border or assailant is. India today faces following threat from airborne objects; Aircraft strikes from long ranges. Short range rockets and missiles from 30 to 300 km range. These could also be employed by non state actors/ terrorists as was demonstrated by Hizbullah Mujahideen against Israel in 2006, using Iranian Zalzala rockets with 200 km range. There could be some other innovative

ideas. In August 2003, there were reports of Indian custom agents in Kandla port having intercepted North Korean freighter bound for Libya, with hidden assembly line of ballistic missiles in progress, on board. Thus a missile could be launched from a merchant liner by a non- state actor duly sponsored by a rogue/ hostile nation state under cover of denial. Short range ballistic missile threat from 300 to 1000 km. Cruise missile (CM) threat (airborne, land attack and sea based). Intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) threat from 1000 to 3000 km range. Medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) threat from 3000 to 5000 km. Inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability of China. Indias air/ missile capabilities in contemporary times need to provide assurance against coercion/ deterrence/ protection not only against threat of attack on homeland but should also facilitate securing if interests. Complexity of BMD System BMD concept is very complex. Thus having PAD and AAD does not equal to the interception of entire range of BMs in the inventory. Range of a BM determines its speed of travel, altitude, trajectory and the technological sophistication. Hence a broadly used classification is as follows; ICBM Above 5000 km range, speed 12 to 22 mach. IRBM From 3000 to 5000 km range and speed 8 to 12 mach. MRBM From 1000 to 2000 km range and speed 5 to 8 mach. SRBM From 300 to 1000 km range and speed 3 to 6 mach. Tactical Missiles (TMs)/ Rockets/ Aircraft and Aircraft Launched Weapons Less than 100 km range and speed usually not more than 2 mach, mostly around 0.8 to 1.5 mach. Cruise Missiles (CM) From 300 to 2000 km range, flying at low trajectory much less than 0.5 km from the surface, hence very difficult to detect. Speed mostly less than 1 mach. New missiles are flying at speeds up to 2 mach. Ballistic missile/air defence system for each of the above class of missiles will require different range of increasingly complex and hyper levels of technologies to enable desired interceptor missile speeds, altitude, maneuvering ( against gravity- g loads), navigation and homing systems, and type of warheads. Also required will be equally real time and reliable command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities from satellites, airborne early warning, UAVs to series of ground based stations and also battle management command posts (BMCPs). Indias successful Moon Mission would imply that it has access to all type of technologies which are required to develop various types of ballistic missiles and also BMDs along with associated support systems. A missile defence system has three main components; Interceptor system to include; interceptor missile, fire control radar, support launcher and indigenous BMCP. Early warning sensor system. BMCP / C4ISR network. An oncoming missile can be intercepted during boost phase (30 to 300 seconds depending on range of missile), mid course (3 to 10 minutes) and terminal phase (10 to 20seconds). Boost phase interception is very difficult as it needs space/ airborne/ sea based platform and an early warning system to detect and engage the threat missile. Mid course interception usually takes place outside the earths atmosphere (above 30 km termed as exo-atmospheric interception). Terminal phase interception takes place after the threat missiles re-entry in to earths atmosphere (called endo-atmospheric interception). Interception of MRBMs with more than 3500 km range is termed upper layer interception (generally above 80 km altitude).

In order to get an acceptable level of kill probability, BMD system attempts to engage incoming threat missile with minimum of two missiles at different ranges and altitudes. This determines scale and pattern of deployment with early warning imperatives of a BMD system. Project Air Defence It is a two tiered system consisting of two interceptor missiles, namely Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) missile for high altitude interception, and the Advanced Air Defence (AAD) Missile for low altitude interception. Development of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) System began in 1999. Around 40 public and private Companies were involved in the development of ABM System. Description The System consists of the PAD, which will intercept missiles at exo-atmospheric altitudes of 50-80 km; and AAD Missile for interception at endo-atmospheric altitudes of up to 30 km. The deployed system would consist of many launch vehicles, radars; launch control centers (LCC) and Mission Control Center (MCC). All these are geographically distributed and connected by a secure communication network. MCC is the software intensive system of the Ballistic Missile Defence. It receives information from various sources like Radars, Satellites etc which is then processed by ten computers running simultaneously. MCC is connected to all other elements of the system through a wide area network (WAN). MCC performs target classification, target assignment and kill assessment. It acts as a decision support system for the commander. It can also decide the number of interceptors required for the target for an assured kill probability. MCC after performing all the functions assigns the target to Launch Control Center (LCC) of a battery. Launch Control Center (LCC) starts computing the time to launch interceptor, based upon information received from the Radar. This is decided on the basis of data received from radar, on the speed, altitude and flight path of the target. LCC prepares the missile for launch in real time, carries out ground guidance computation. After the interceptor is launched, it is provided target information from the radar through a data link. When the Interceptors close on to the target ballistic missile, it activates the active radar seeker to search for target missile and guides itself to intercept the target. Multiple PAD and AAD interceptors can be launched against a target for high kill probability. Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) is an anti-ballistic missile developed to intercept incoming ballistic missiles outside atmosphere (exo-atmospheric). Based on the Prithvi missile, PAD is a two stage missile with a maximum interception altitude of 80 km. The first stage is a liquid fuelled motor that uses two propellants and oxidizers while second stage is solid fuelled. It diverts thrusters which can generate a lateral acceleration to more than 5 Gs at 50 km altitude. Guidance is provided by inertial navigation system, mid-course updates from long range tracking radar (LRTR) and active radar homing in the terminal phase. PAD has capability to engage 300 to 2,000 km range class of ballistic missiles at a speed of Mach 5. Long Range Tracking Radar (LRTR) is the target acquisition and fire control Radar for PAD Missile. It is an active phased array radar having capability to track 200 targets at a range of 600 km. It is Israeli Green Pine radar. Advanced Air Defence (AAD) Advanced Air Defence (AAD) is an anti-ballistic missile designed to intercept incoming ballistic missiles in endo-atmosphere at an altitude of 30 km. AAD is single staged, solid

fuelled missile. Guidance is similar to that of PAD; inertial navigation system, midcourse updates from ground based radar and active radar homing in terminal phase. It is 7.5 meters tall, weighs around 1.2 tones and a diameter of less than 0.5 meters. It is claimed by DRDO that PAD and AAD missiles will work in tandem to ensure a hit probability of 99.8 percent. Induction of the system into service is expected to be in 2013. Capability Accretion The latest success means that India can destroy in mid-flight Hatf and Ghauri ballistic missiles coming from Pakistan. India felt the requirement for a BMD shield in the late 1990s when Pakistan test-fired Ghauri missiles with ranges far enough to threaten Indian cities. It can also intercept Chinese DF-21 deployed in Tibet and Yunan province. AD-1 and AD- 2 Systems. Two more new anti ballistic missiles that can intercept IRBM/ICBMs are being developed. These high speed missiles (AD-1 and AD-2) are being developed to intercept ballistic missiles with the range of 5000 km. Feasibility of Long Range SAM. The current technology incorporated in PAD, had intercepted target at the range of 120 km. It is feasible to develop another long range SAM up to ranges of 100 to 200 km, thus providing an integrated air defence system with medium range Akash, long range SAM and BMD system against entire range of missiles, cruise missiles and aircraft. This capability will be indigenous. India India justifies its acquisition of BMD by stating that the country has a no first use (NFU) policy, therefore, it needs BMD to absorb the first strike, ensure its second strike capability and retaliate. This would add value to its deterrent capability. Indian BMD is theatre missile defence which cannot protect the entire Indian soil but can only give protection to its some land-based strategic locations. It has a nuclear powered submarine INS Arihant in development, which will be inducted in Indian Navy soon, and will protect the seas. Pakistan for long has been using their first use policy as a deterrent against Indias massive conventional superiority to protect itself after indulgence in state sponsored terrorism. Indias inability to strike back on the event of Parliament attack and the 26/11 Mumbai attacks is an eye opener about how desperately India needs an effective BMD system deployed to blunt the nuclear threat and state sponsored terrorist activities of the neighbour. India perceives that its space assets are not secure and are threatened from China, as China possesses Anti-Satellite weapons. Therefore, it has all the right to acquire ASAT which will ultimately enhance its security in space. Moreover, before a legal framework prohibiting the acquisition of Anti-Satellite weapons comes into being, India wants to be the part of the club of ASAT haves rather than have-nots. Deterrence credibility is no longer sufficient on punishment through massive retaliation. U.S. sales pitch may have built indigenous constituency within India. Chinese developments likely reinforce Indian desire. India likely receives external assistance from Russia, France, and/or Israel. Challenges of satellite coverage for tracking of target missile and also navigation of own interceptor missile and interoperable C4ISR footprint over areas of interest are yet to be overcome. This area requires immediate attention. Enabled capability and potential to indigenously develop integrated air defence system for the country are yet to be fielded. Current capability can only take care of Pakistani challenge, as and when operated. Pakistan and China

The Indian pursuit of BMD and its goal to accommodate ASAT will have regional implications. It has also provoked China to take required steps to have counter measures to overcome Indian BMD. As a result, China conducted successful BMD test in 2010 and is on the road to acquire effective BMD program in near future. While Pakistans economy does not support it to acquire BMD program, it would feel insecure with its insufficient counter measure strike capability and it does not possess any assured second strike capability. It would ultimately engage in acquiring additional missiles and launchers to devise a much larger attacking force in hope of eluding the Indian interceptors, leading to triangular security dilemma in the region. Moreover, Pakistan would have to improve its nuclear arsenal qualitatively and quantitatively to instill a plausible nuclear threat in the theatre, as it considers the nuclear weapons an integral part of its defence system. Indias Prithvi Air Defence System (PAD) in synergy with Arrow, PAC 3 and S- 300 and Green Pine radar system can intercept Pakistani missile at boost stage into the exo atmospheric level. Indias Advanced Air Defence Missile (AAD) may intercept short range at re- entry at endoatmospheric stage (re-entry intercept at 20 miles). Feeling safe from de-capacitating, India would be emboldened to launch pre- emptive strikes at Pakistani deployment sites. Indias offensive military doctrines (Cold Start and the like) will be more likely/ feasible. Pakistan will increase fissile and missile production, and engage in countervailing strategies. 1. Indian PAD system of the Ballistic Missile Defence on a launch-pad 2. In this handout photograph released by the Indian Defence Public Relations (DPR), an AGNI-I ballistic missile is launched from Wheeler island off the coast of the eastern India state of Odisha 3. Anti-Ballistic Missile, AAD, being test launched from the Integrated Test Range in Odisha 4. Chinas military shows off their latest missiles during the National Day in Beijing 5. This handout photograph released by Pakistans Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) office shows a Hatf IX short-range nuclear-capable ballistic missile launched from an undisclosed location in Pakistan on May 29, 2012. 6. Combination of Pakistans new medium range surface-to-surface ballistic missile Hatf-V (Ghauri) test from an undisclosed location in northwestern part of the country

http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/aug/22spec.htm accessed on 08/09/2013

The Rediff Special/ Philip Saunders and Jing-dong Yuan with Gaurav Kampani

If you thought that China had become a serious missile nonproliferation convert, then think again. New evidence produced by US intelligence agencies suggests that Chinese ballistic missile-related technology transfers to Pakistan remain a serious proliferation concern. Between 1988-1994, China sold approximately 34 complete M-11 ballistic missiles to Pakistan; in this period China also allegedly built a turnkey missile plant for Pakistan at Tarwanah, a suburb of Rawalpindi. During the 1990s, the United States used a combination of sanctions and incentives to persuade China to halt missile exports and related technology transfers to Pakistan. For a while it appeared the US had succeeded in achieving the above goals. However, it is now clear that China, despite assurances to the US government to the contrary, has resumed missile-related technology assistance to Pakistan. To be fair to China, there is no international law or treaty that bans the trade in missiles or missile-related technologies between sovereign countries. The only restrictions that exist are the consequence of the US-led Missile Technology Control Regime, MTCR, to which China is an informal and partial adherent. Nevertheless, because China interprets its MTCR obligations very narrowly and treats missile proliferation as a function of its larger strategic and commercial interests, the question of regime compliance continues to dog US-China relations. What is the MTCR? The United States and its G-7 partners formed the MTCR in 1987. The MTCR is an informal cartel which seeks to ban the export of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and rocket systems capable of delivering a 500 kg payload over a range greater than 300 km. The MTCR's annex of controlled equipment and technologies is divided into two categories. Category I items, which include complete rocket and ballistic missile systems, cruise missiles, their production facilities and complete sub-systems, are subject to a presumption of export denial. On the other hand, Category II items, which cover a wide range of missile parts, components, and subsystems such as propellants, structural materials and flight test instruments, can be exported at the discretion of an MTCR partner government on a case-bycase basis for acceptable end uses. The MTCR initially focused on nuclear capable delivery systems; but in 1993, after the experience of the 1990-91 Gulf War, the guidelines were amended to cover all delivery systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction -- nuclear, biological, and chemical. MTCR and the M-11 controversy China reportedly began negotiating the sale of M-11 ballistic missiles with Pakistan in the late-1980s and signed a sales contract in 1988. In 1991 US intelligence discovered that China had begun transferring the M-11s to Islamabad. Despite Chinese denials, the United States imposed sanctions against Chinese and Pakistani entities engaged in the trade in May 1991. In November 1991, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and US Secretary of State James Baker reached a verbal agreement whereby China agreed to "informally abide by the guidelines and parameters of the Missile Technology Control Regime, MTCR" in exchange

for the lifting of US sanctions. After China sent a letter to the US State Department in February 1992 affirming the agreement, sanctions were lifted. China's 1991 commitment to informally adhere to the MTCR guidelines did not end the M-11 controversy. In December 1992, reports surfaced that China had transferred 34 complete M11 missiles to Pakistan in violation of its 1991 pledge. As a result, in May 1993, the Clinton administration re-imposed MTCR-related sanctions on Chinese entities after determining that Beijing had engaged in missile trade with Pakistan. During post-sanctions negotiations with the United States, China argued that the deal did not violate the MTCR as the M-11 could deliver only a 500 kg payload over an advertised range of 280 km; in a narrow technical sense therefore, the missile's capabilities did not exceed the MTCR parameters. But the Clinton administration held its ground. The impasse was resolved in October 1994 when the United States agreed to lift sanctions in return for a Chinese pledge that it would abide by Category I of the MTCR and ban exports of all ground-to-ground missiles exceeding the primary parameters of the MTCR. More significantly, China also agreed to the concept of "inherent capability" which binds it from exporting any missile that is inherently capable of delivering a 500 kg payload over 300 km. For example, the Chinese M-11 can deliver a 500 kg payload over a range of 280 km; but the missile's range can be extended to cover distances beyond 300 km with a reduced payload. Hence, by agreeing to the inherent capability clause, China agreed to prohibit future exports of the M-11 missile and other longer-range missile systems. Persistent US diplomatic efforts since then led China to reaffirm its 1994 pledge. China also agreed to actively consider joining the MTCR. In June 1998, after India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests, China and the United States issued a joint statement affirming that they would strengthen their export control laws to "prevent the export of equipment, materials or technology that could in any way assist programmes in India and Pakistan for nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles capable of delivering such weapons." However, several issues pertaining to China's missile export policy remain unresolved. According to US government sources, China has interpreted its missile export controls very narrowly. Although Beijing has complied with the MTCR's Category I restrictions and had stopped the transfer of complete missile systems, it has not extended the ban to cover specific missile components and related technologies covered under Category II of the MTCR. In addition, China has kept the precise scope, content and extent of its internal missile export control list a secret. It is also unclear if this control list approximates MTCR guidelines. Continuing Chinese Transfers? New US intelligence reports suggest China has violated its 1994 pledge and has resumed missile-related technology transfers to Pakistan. Suspicions persist that Pakistan's Shaheen-1 and II medium-range ballistic missiles correspond closely to China's M-series of ballistic missiles, although there is no concrete evidence that Pakistan obtained either missile from China. For example, a CIA report on global weapons sales submitted to the US Congress in August 2000 states, "Chinese missile-related technical assistance to Pakistan increased during the reporting period (July-August 1999)." Similarly, another CIA report made public in February 1999 stated, "Chinese and North Korean entities continued to provide assistance to Pakistan's ballistic missile programme during the first half of 1998. Such assistance is critical for Islamabad's efforts to produce ballistic missiles..." This allegation was repeated in a February 2000 CIA report to the US Congress which said, "Some [Chinese] ballistic missile assistance [to Pakistan] continues." Predictably, China has dismissed these reports as "groundless." However, an alarmed Clinton administration recently dispatched John D Holum, senior advisor for arms control and

international security affairs in the State Department, to take up the matter with the Chinese. But Holum failed in his mission and admitted, "The issue remains unresolved." Another senior US official who also attended the talks was more candid and told The New York Times that the two-day talks "Did not allay concerns about recent Chinese help to Pakistan's ballistic missile programme." Explaining Chinese Behavior Why does China continue to transfer missile related technologies to Pakistan? Some analysts argue that the Chinese are the ultimate realists. China's proliferation and nonproliferation policies are governed by strategic and commercial interests. Even more significantly, China calibrates its proliferation behaviour and compliance with global arms control regimes and cartels to gain bargaining leverage in negotiations with the United States over Taiwan. Pakistan is China's "all weather" ally in South Asia and the two countries are united by their rivalry with India. In negotiations with the United States, China has described Pakistan as its "Israel." Therefore, China is committed to Pakistan's security. In the context of the nuclear arms competition in the region, China views Pakistan as the underdog and has therefore accepted the task of underwriting Pakistan's security against advances in the Indian nuclear and missile programme. The Chinese have also probably calculated that aiding Pakistan with nuclear and missile technologies will divert India's military attention and prevent it from focusing on China. This goal might have assumed added priority after May 1998, when India decided to deploy a minimum deterrent with China as its primary target. But China's policies are not monocausal. China also uses missile sales and the ambiguity of its commitment to MTCR standards as a bargaining chip to achieve other foreign policy goals with the United States. For example, during negotiations with American diplomats, China linked the M-11 transfers to Pakistan with the US sale of 150 F-16s to Taiwan. Similarly, continuing technological assistance to Pakistan may be linked to US threats to transfer theater missile defense systems and other sophisticated conventional arms to Taiwan. China probably hopes to use the threat of ballistic missile proliferation and the carrot of full MTCR compliance to persuade the United States to forego any potential transfer of theater missile defense systems currently under development to Taiwan. Finally, commercial motives often merge with strategic concerns to determine Chinese decisions about arms sales. After Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping launched his modernisation drive in the 1980s, state-owned firms came under enormous pressure to adhere to market principles and operate on profit principles. Exports of dual-use nuclear technologies, ballistic and cruise missiles, especially those that were regulated by international cartels or subject to export denials by other countries, became a lucrative means of generating profits. For example, China earned nearly $ 3 billion from its CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missile sales to Saudi Arabia in the 1980s. Similarly, Chinese cruise missile sales to Iran and shortrange ballistic missile sales to Libya and Syria were primarily guided by profit motives. Policy Implications Continuing Chinese missile proliferation to Pakistan will have the unfortunate effect of accelerating the nuclear domino dynamics in South Asia. During the 1980s China helped Pakistan acquire a nuclear weapons capability. It followed up this policy in the 1990s by proliferating ballistic missiles to Islamabad. India's own nuclear and ballistic missile advances played a role in China's decision to help Pakistan develop missile capabilities; but India cited China's policy of covert proliferation as one of the principal reasons why it made its own nuclear capability overt. Renewed Chinese missile assistance will not only help Pakistan weaponized its nuclear forces, but it will also increase pressures in New Delhi to operationalised India's proposed minimum deterrent. Weaponization and deployment of nuclear forces by India and Pakistan will further obstruct the US goal of arranging a formal cap or nuclear "restraint regime" in the region. Fledgling

nuclear arsenals are usually characterised by complex organisational and management problems such as weak command and control, poor real-time surveillance and intelligence gathering, force stability, etc. These problems will increase the chances of a dangerous nuclear crisis in South Asia significantly. Regardless of whether Pakistan's ballistic missile programme is the result of India's own advances, analysts in New Delhi have interpreted the Chinese transfers as another example of Beijing's attempts to contain India. In the United States, conservatives and China-bashers have begun citing China's recurring missile transfers in apparent violation of its earlier pledges as an example of Chinese perfidy. They have used the episode to press their case for robust theater and national missile defenses and have threatened to enact a China nonproliferation law that would mandate sanctions if China continues its recent proliferation behaviour. As a result, the emerging nuclear and missile race between India and Pakistan has the potential to damage US-China relations and affect both regional and global stability. Indeed, unraveling the proliferation connection between China and Pakistan remains one of the most important and difficult challenges for global nonproliferation efforts. Phil Saunders is Director of the East Asia Program at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey, CA. Jing-dong Yuan and Gaurav Kampani are Senior Research Associates at the Center. The Rediff Specials PROSPECTS FOR INDIAN AND PAKISTANI CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES
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ARMS

CONTROL

AND

FEROZ HASSAN KHAN 107 http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc? STRATEGIC ANXIETIES South Asia has settled into a worrisomely peculiarrelationship on the spread of nuclear weapons. As previously suggested, the dynamics associated with the endemic rivalry between India and Pakistan must be viewed through the broader lens of regional politics and security. This becomes more apparent when considering Indias perception of Chinese strategic objectives in South Asia. If any realistic CBMs are to be proposed for the future, such perceptions must be factored into the overall security equation. Indias Strategic Anxieties In general, India believes that China is encircling the country, by establishing special partnerships with many of Indias smaller neighbors. Specifically, India is irked by the evolving relationship between China and Pakistan, a relationship that India believes has the singular purpose of thwarting its own natural rise as an aspiring global power. One of the more onerous issues is a perception that has come to be known as the string of pearls.2 To provide a frame of reference, Pakistans Makran Coast has strategic importance, in that it offers Pakistan options to counter Indias projection of power in the Indian Ocean.

Pakistan has already shown signs that it is moving to develop broader air and naval capabilities. The buildup of the Gwadar commercial port along this coastassisted by China exacerbates Indias anxieties and provides Pakistan with broader strategic utility. For the Chinese, it provides a potential access to energy pipelines that would unlock trade routes to the market and energy supplies of Central Asia, with less risk than at present.3 This is important because India is geographically restricted in its access to both the east and west, due to the physical presence of Bangladesh and Pakistan, and in the north by the Himalayas. In this regard, Indias access to Southwest Asia runs into a geopolitical barrier, because of its rivalry with Pakistan. Similarly, India suffers constraints with respect to East Asia imposed by Bangladesh and Burma, which physically block Indias access to those markets. With China entering the scene with a growing presence along the Makran Coast, the situation from Indias perspective becomes even more tenuous. This strategic handicap, taken as a whole, forces India to rely on its maritime capabilities in order to maintain trade routes and logistics between its continental shores and the rest of the world. As a part of this expanded naval presence, India has launched ballistic-missile submarines and produced other naval capabilities that can act as an extended security arm for its various trade routes, as well as a third strike capability (that is, in addition to its land-based and air assets). Indias growing presence in the maritime environment, in conjunction with its overall strategic rise, makes its smaller neighbors nervous. This strategic apprehension creates a ripple effect across the region whereby the smaller countries move closer to external alliances in order to balance Indias rising power. Additionally, India believes, China is propping up Pakistans nuclear and military capabilities in areas where Western technologies are not meeting the need. In particular, India is under the impression that Pakistan is taking advantage of Americas involvement in Afghanistan, which places it in a unique position to acquire strategic capabilities and political remuneration. Whatever its concerns, however, Indias strategic calculus of structural and conventional force advantages over Pakistan was neutralized (to an extent) when Pakistan demonstrated its nuclear capability in 1998. Many Indian strategists believe that this nuclear hedge enables Pakistan to conduct asymmetric warfare against India, without fear of reprisal. This perception reinforces Indias belief that as long as Pakistan can keep India engaged inwardly through insurgencies and build its own strategic alliances with the United States and China, Indias rise to power will be curtailed. Pakistans Strategic Anxieties Generally speaking, Pakistans strategic anxieties in the region are a mirror reflection of those of India, vis--vis the other half of the enduring rivalry. For Pakistan, however, the objective is threefold but simple: national survival, relevance as an actor in the region, and refusal to be marginalized by India. Pakistan wields vast manpower, with a population of 170 million; possesses strong strategic assets, in the shape of nuclear weapons and natural resources; fields a conventional army of a half-million; and is a proactive player in the

Muslim world. The latter point not only connects Pakistan with the Muslim community in a bilateral sense but also helps in bridging the gaps between Islamic countries and China and with the United States. Despite the credit it has received for such macro-level factors, its intense rivalry and competition with India over the past sixty years have made Pakistan Indiaphobic and paranoid about a variety of issues. Much as India worries over the geographic firewall that restricts its land accessibility to the east and west, so does Pakistan interpret Indian foreign-policy maneuvers as aimed at geopolitically encircling Pakistan itself. As India increases its influence and presence in Afghanistan with a slew of consulates, Pakistan considers these developments hostile to its interests. India has also established a strategically located air base in Tajikistan (Ayni Air Base in Dushanbe), which also adds to these suspicions. Further, Indias investment in the Iranian port of Chabaharfifty miles west of Gwadar Portand construction of roads through Zahedan into Afghanistan add additional tension in an area that is essential for the transportation of goods and energy to a host of countries. All these moves are seen as encircling Pakistan. There are also operational issues that hinder Pakistans strategic balance on its eastern and western borders. Indias strategic orientation remains toward Pakistan, where the bulk of its armed forces are deployed. As a result, Indian and Pakistani troops remain deployedeyeball to eyeballalong the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir; this has been the case since 1948. On its opposite border along the frontier territory with Afghanistan, Pakistans anxieties are manifest in the complex internal strife and multiple insurgencies and instabilities. In sum, Pakistan must balance dealing with India, multiple insurgencies, and retaining interests in Afghanistan. The ultimate nightmare for Pakistan would be to live between two hostile neighbors, India in the east and Afghanistan in the west. Pakistan believes that unless issues are resolved with India, it will have no choice but to seek arrangements with an ethnically diverse and friendly government in Kabula government that would not do the bidding of powers hostile to Pakistan or further destabilize already troubled border areas. On the contrary, if Afghanistan becomes a strategic instrument of Indian geopolitical outmaneuvering, that, added to the ongoing problems in Jammu and Kashmir, would produce a perpetual state of tension and crises among the three countries. Overarching these regional issues is Pakistans fear that its long-term ally the United States may eventually turn against it, under Indian influence. The U.S.-Indian nuclear deal reached in 2005 exacerbated these anxieties, viewed as it is by Pakistan as skewing the balance even more greatly in favor of the already powerful India.4 In fact, since 9/11, there has been a slow erosion of overall international sympathy with Pakistans grievances, especially with regard to Jammu and Kashmir, the socioeconomic costs of three decades of Afghan wars, and daily episodes of terrorism within Pakistan. The prospects of such growing political and economic disparities with respect to India, coupled with these mounting internal problems (especially persistent terrorism, ranging from Quetta to Swat), will continue to endanger Pakistans aggregate national power. Consistent pressure from India, instability in Afghanistan, and a fragile domestic structure are likely to render Pakistan as a state significantly weak and unstable. Its aforementioned strengths could very well become vulnerabilities, stirring broad, international upheaval. These circumstances

make Pakistanis all the keener to obtain a strategic peace with India, one that allows them the space and time to recover from these challenges. BREAKING THE GRIDLOCK Given these strategic anxieties, it is no wonder that both India and Pakistan succumb to gridlock rather than seeking a path of reconciliation and confidence building. Further, because of blatantly conflicting objectives between the two countriesone global, the other regionalsecurity competition and asymmetry of interests continue to grow between the two. Despite negativity and pessimism, however, there is in fact potential for both new confidence building and arms-control measures. A brief overview of CBMs from 1947 to date will illustrate the nature of the problem; a conceptual consideration of past initiatives is especially necessary in that they have been directly connected to crisis and mired in ulterior motives. The lessons of these unsuccessful attempts can strengthen efforts to frame such policies in the future. ________________________________________________________________________ 2. Christopher J. Pehrson, String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of Chinas Rising Power across the Asia Littoral, Carlisle Papers in Security Strategy (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, July 2006), available at www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/. 3. Robert Kaplan, Pakistans Fatal Shore, Atlantic (May 2009). 4. A bilateral accord, jointly declared on 18 July2005 by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and signed in October 2008, by which India would separate its military and civilian nuclear facilities and subject the latter to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, and the United States would work toward full civilian nuclear cooperation with India. See Backgrounder: The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal, Council on Foreign Relations,www.cfr.org/ publication/9663/. __________________________________________________________________________

IPRI PAPER 9 PUBLISHED BY ASIA PRINTERS ISLAMABAD, January 2005 ISBN 969-8721-10-X http://ipripak.org/papers/india-pakistan.shtml accessed on 08/09/2013 India-Pakistan Nuclear Rivalry: Perceptions, Misperceptions, and Mutual Deterrence

Dr. Zulfqar Khan The history of India-Pakistan rivalry constitutes a chronology of struggle to establish hegemony[1] by the former on the latter; action-reaction[2] type of security paradigm; misperceptions;[3]underestimation and overestimation, and mutual fear.[4] The study of hegemonic war comprises a pivotal aspect of international relations theory,[5] and it would be appropriate to conceptualise these theoretical facets before explaining both countries conflict-ridden history. Gilpin defining the theory of hegemonic war writes: The first is that a hegemonic war is distinct from other categories of war: it is caused by broad changes in political, strategic, and economic affairs. Since human beings are driven by three fundamental passions interest, pride, and, above all else, fear they always seek to increase their wealth and power until other humans, driven by like passions, try to stop them. Even advances in knowledge, technology, or economic development would not change the fundamental nature of human behaviour or of international relations. On the contrary, increases in human power, wealth, and technology would serve only to intensify conflict among social groups and enhance the magnitude of war. Thucydides the realist, in contrast to Plato the idealist, believed that reason would not transform human beings, but would always remain the slave of human passions. Thus, uncontrollable passions would again and again generate great conflicts like the one witnessed in history.[6] But, in the South Asian context, India, by virtue of its size, considers the entire region as a single cultural, geographical and strategic entity in spite of the existence of different countries in South Asia. Pakistan is the only South Asian country, which has so far challenged Indias desire to dominate the subcontinent.[7] Therefore, India considers Pakistan a regional destabilizer, that has challenged New Delhis desire to control the entire subcontinent as a single unit.[8] It is generally accepted that the nuclear weapons play a credible role in preventing wars. According to Kenneth Waltz, a leading theoretician of deterrence, nuclear weapons have helped to preserve the peace where it has been most endangered and prevented war from spreading further to the other volatile regions, as it did between the United States and the Soviet Union, between India and Pakistan and the Middle East. [9] In theory, if any one country endeavours to assemble nuclear weapons, then, the other threatened state would also do the same. Thus, it would be self-defeating on the part of any country to involve in a nuclear arms race, or to attempt to use the nuclear strength as a weapon of war. [10] India and Pakistan are still in the early stages of nuclear development, and their C 4I2 (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence and Information) systems are also still in nascent stages. In spite of this, Pakistans earlier ambiguous nuclear status, and its ability to strike back, had restrained India in the 1980s from a preventive strike. [11] The mere fear of Islamabad returning a nuclear attack had kept the Indian war-machine at bay. [12] As Waltz points out that so much comes in such small packages that it could effectively thwart any design to use the nuclear weapons now, or in the future, as a weapon of war. [13] Theoretical Debate

Now, it would not be out of context to elaborate the different realist schools of thought associated with the study of international relations. It was Hans Morgenthau, who had introduced realism as a methodology to examine the international relations. But, in the 1970s, Kenneth Waltzs neorealism made a distinct divergence from Morgenthaus realism that thenceforth was classified as classical realism.[14] Since the 1970s, international political theory has developed around two types of realism: structural realism,[15] and the offensive realism.[16] There is also the theory of defensive realism[17] in addition to other neoclassical, contingent, specific, and generalist realism theories.[18] Some theorists assert that the great powers tend to maximize their relative power[19]with continuous endeavours to issue diktats to other states.[20] For defensive realists, the international structure provides states with little incentive to seek additional increments of power, writes Mearsheimer, which instead pushes them to maintain the existing balance of power. Preserving power, rather than increasing it, is the main goal of states.[21] On the other hand, the Offensive realistsbelieve that status quo powers are rarely found in world politics, because the international system creates powerful incentives for states to look for opportunities to gain power at the expense of rivals A states ultimate goal is to be the hegemon in the system.[22] Interestingly, Kenneth Waltz, who considers that in anarchic conditions in international politics security is the highest end for the states to maintain their positions in the system, rebuts this theory.[23] But, in the nuclear age, regional or global hegemony is only feasible to establish with an explicit nuclear superiority, which Mearsheimer defines as a capability to devastate its rivals without fear of retaliation.[24] As argued earlier, the entire paradigm of security of South Asia is premised on security, fear, and hegemony principles; hence, India and Pakistan have entangled themselves in a perpetual cobweb of offensive and defensive type situations respectively. Consequently, India sought to prevent the emergence of peer[25] competitor on the subcontinent and Pakistan, to challenge its hegemony. This peer rivalry between the two states took a turning point in 1974, when India conducted its first nuclear test, which ushered in a new era of nuclear arms race on the subcontinent. The post-World War II international system was primarily based on the US and Soviet bipolarity, and on the concept of bilateral superpower deterrence. The fear of mutual annihilation had maintained peace between the two superpowers during the heydays of the Cold War. Since the end of the World War II, developments in the nuclear weapons technology immensely transformed the destructive consequences of a war. Generally there is a consensus that, It is highly doubtful that a war between two nuclear powers could be limited and escalation into a full-scale war prevented.[26] In the nuclear age, writes Gilpin, the primary purpose of nuclear forces should be to deter the use of nuclear weapons by ones opponent and thereby prevent the outbreak of a conflict. However, in contemporary international politics, distrust, uncertainty, and insecurity have compelled states to indulge in arms race in which modern technology has added lethality to weapons as never before.[27] There are growing concerns over the possibility of accidental war. Thucydides also expressed similar apprehensions concerning

the role of accidental war while writing the history of the Great War between the Spartans and the Athenians. The war once begun, writes Thucydides, lets loose forces that are completely unforeseen by the protagonists.[28] Even a limited conflict between the two nuclear-armed rivals could set in motion untoward developments over which they would soon lose control.[29] Hence, even a minor misperception on the subject of a limited war could intensify the fog of war thereby reluctantly leading the involved states to a full-scale conflict.[30] This destabilises the very concept of mutual deterrence that has been built on the foundations of nuclear weapons, and may set-up risky dynamics of nuclear deterrence upon which both Pakistan and India have premised their strategies the stability-instability paradox, as some analysts have described the prevailing scenario.[31] Indias Peaceful Nuclear Explosion On May 18, 1974, Indias nuclear detonation at its nuclear testing site in Pokhran, in the Rajasthan desert near the Pakistan border, was claimed by New Delhi as a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE), undertaken to enhance its scientific and technical advancement. It proved to be the turning point in the history of threats and security perceptions in South Asia. Indias nuclear test was perceived in Pakistan as a threat to its security, which required an appropriate response. It immediately revived tensions in India-Pakistan relations, and Pakistans then Prime Minister, Z. A. Bhutto, termed Indias nuclear detonation as its grand strategy to intimidate Pakistan.[32] While, Premier Mrs. Gandhi tried to alleviate Pakistans security apprehensions by quite conveniently claiming that: There are no potential or foreign policy implications of this test.[33] This, Pakistan was not prepared to accept. The Bhutto governments initial reaction was to seek assurances from the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) against possible Indian nuclear blackmail. Pakistans Foreign Minister, Aziz Ahmed, who visited London, Paris, and Washington, failed to secure the necessary guarantees from these countries. Thus, Bhutto decided to initiate Pakistans nuclear option vis--vis Indias possible nuclear blackmail. This, he stated, was imperative and compatible with the countrys geostrategic requirements and status as one of the leading states of the Third World and Muslim bloc.[34] Hence, Bhutto expressed determination not to accept Indian nuclear hegemony in the region.[35] Although India had termed the Pokhran test a peaceful one, it had nevertheless retained the weapons option in order to assemble a nuclear device at a short notice, if so desired by the Indian policymakers.[36] The history of post-independence India indicates that the BJP was not the first government to consider overt nuclearisation of India in May 1998.[37] The Congress Party government of Indira Gandhi conducted the first overt nuclear test in 1974, and the subsequent Congress government of P.V. Narasimha Rao also planned to conduct a test at the end of 1995,[38] which was postponed for different reasons, including continuing benefiting from the Western and the US scientific and technological cooperation, in order to attain a thermonuclear capability and delivery systems for its nuclear weapons in the future. [39] Secondly, the establishment of non-proliferation regime and the enforcement of US legislation, coupled with growing internal political unrest, had restrained India from carrying out more nuclear tests. Above all, there was no immediate military threat to Indias security

in the post-1971 period, as it had emerged the sole preponderant military power in the subcontinent after the break up of Pakistan. However, Indias aspiration to acquire a nuclear capability dates back to Jawaharlal Nehrus period when the foundations of Indias nuclear establishment were actually laid. Since then, to attain the nuclear weapons capability has been part of the Indian diplomacy, especially in the context of its relations with US, and after 1974 with Pakistan.[40] Pakistans Nuclear Diplomacy Since 1974, all successive governments in Pakistan expounded the idea of the establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (NWFZ). This India resolutely opposed, and it even refused to talk to Pakistan on the subject. In addition to the NWFZ concept, Pakistan floated numerous other proposals in various national and international forums to India in order to contain the horizontal nuclear proliferation in the region. These proposals included: 1. Establishment of a NWFZ, made first in 1974.

2. Pakistan repeated the NWFZ proposals to India, in 1976, 1979, 1987, and 1990. On May 4, 2003, President Pervez Musharraf proposed a nuclear-free subcontinent. 3. Pakistan asked India to jointly sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as well as sign bilateral/joint agreements for full-scope safeguards and inspections, in November/December 1984, June 1985, and July 1987. India rejected all these proposals and continued instead to demand a universal, general and complete nuclear disarmament as well as insist on a nondiscriminatory NPT. 4. Declaration to renounce the acquisition, or development of nuclear weapons, in 1978. 5. Simultaneous accession by both India and Pakistan to the NPT, in 1979. 6. 7. Acceptance of full International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, in 1979. A mutual inspection of each others nuclear facilities, in 1979.

8. In 1981, 1998 and September 2000, Pakistan offered a No War Pact to India, which was rejected by New Delhi. The No War Pact proposal carries an interesting history. It was in 1949 and 1950 when India had first proposed a No War Pact to Pakistan, which was accepted by the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, if there was a clear timeframe for the settlement of all outstanding issues between the two countries. On June 12, 2004, Pakistans Foreign Office spokesman proposed a No War Pact with India, which he said was already on the table. The spokesman further reiterated that, If the Indian government offers a pact on No First Use of Nuclear Weapons, let us (India and Pakistan) have a pact for no war at all between the two countries.[41] 9. A signing of a bilateral treaty banning all types of nuclear tests, in 1987.[42]

10. Pakistan offered to India, not to produce or explode nuclear weapons, in 1987 and 1991. India did not respond to Pakistans proposals.

11. Convening of a conference on the issue of nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia, to be attended by Russia, the US, China and, India and Pakistan, in June 1991.[43] 12. A South Asian Zero-Missile Zone, in 1993. These overtures made at different times were rejected by India on the grounds that the nuclear non-proliferation issue in its perspective was a global, rather than a South Asian problem. This clearly indicated how India utilised the ongoing global nuclear disagreement debate to its own advantage of not relinquishing its nuclear weapons as long as global nuclear disarmament did not materialise. Secondly, India asserted that it would only adhere to the NPT until and unless all the countries had subscribed to the treaty, and the NWS had eliminated their respective nuclear arsenals and submitted to the international inspections, and to the International Atomic Energy Agencys safeguards. All these proposals were part of Pakistans nuclear policy whilst in hindsight it appears to have been developing nuclear weapons to counter-Indias nuclear weapons capability. Pakistan perceived this as its security dilemma - how to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of Indias growing military potential.[44] Pakistans nuclear testing was the logical outcome of Indian testing, which later on also accorded rationale for a full-scale Indian nuclear weapons programme after overt nuclearisation in May 1998.[45] Pakistan-Specific Legislations Pakistan belongs to a class of states, writes Stephen Cohen, whose very survival security-related resources are inadequate vis--vis India.[46] Pakistan decided to develop its nuclear weapons plan in 1974 in order to counter the overwhelming conventional and nuclear forces of India.[47] Pakistan, whose nuclear research and development (R&D) was still at an elementary stage, was expected to face tough international pressures and sanctions while securing vital nuclear technology from abroad when its archrival already possessed an impressive nuclear infrastructure. In addition, India had begun a comprehensive rearmament and modernisation of its conventional forces to expound its Indira Doctrine in the region. Mrs. Gandhi undertook this doctrine as a vehicle to exclude the military presence and influence of the major powers, including China and the US, from the Indian Ocean and South Asia as a whole.[48] In spite of these provocative developments in the region, still Pakistans nuclear programme remained comparatively modest, and its ruling elite remained unresponsive right up to 1974 to this emerging danger on the subcontinent.[49] Following the events of 1971 and after 1974, the leaders in Pakistan considered that they could no longer stay insensitive toward the Indian nuclear test, which they perceived posed a direct threat to Pakistans security and to the subcontinent as a whole. Pakistan, because of its mechanistic insecurity syndrome, as noted by T. T. Poulouse, suddenly became activesaw in Indias Pokhran explosion the image of a nuclear weapon power in South Asia.[50] According to Pakistani elite, India had not yet reconciled with the creation of Pakistan, which further aggravated Islamabads insecurity syndrome.[51] Therefore, it can logically be argued that primarily it was the Pokhran-I test, which gave decisive impetus to Pakistans nuclear policy coming as it did soon after the countrys break-up in which Indian intervened militarily. Military security was

the major factor in driving Pakistani nuclear weapons plan soon after 1974.[52] In addition, Pakistan launched a diplomatic campaign on all international forums against the Indian test, to expose the myth of being a peaceful explosion by pointing to how India had beefed-up its conventional forces, and expanded its own nuclear strategy.[53] As discussed above, Pakistans nuclear programme was actually accelerated by the Indian nuclear test of 1974 with a mandate to neutralise Indias conventional and nuclear threats, and to rehabilitate Islamabads strategic position.[54] Pakistan expedited efforts to realise these foreign and security policy goals, and in this connection, it faced stiff opposition from the NWS and India. Both, the Indian PNE and the anticipated nuclear development by Pakistan also contributed to triggering off the US-sponsored international efforts to establish a series of control regimes and mechanisms to contain any further the horizontal nuclear proliferation. As a result, more than India, Pakistan was deprived of critical technologies, which could enable it to attain a nuclear weapons capability, vis--vis Indias conventional and strategic forces, through technology collaboration. The US adopted the Pakistan-specific Symington and Glenn Amendments in 1976 and 1977 respectively to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which ultimately led to the temporary suspension of military and economic assistance to Pakistan in April 1979.[55] Previously, in September 1977, the US had halted military and economic assistance to Pakistan due to its suspected nuclear programme. On the other hand, India and Israel, which had already built reprocessing plants, were excluded from the effects of the Symington-Glenn Amendments. In addition to the United States Pakistan-specific legislation, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG - also called the London Club) also imposed embargoes and restrictions on nuclear exports to Islamabad. Other Pakistan-specific US legislations are as under: 1. In 1981, the Symington-Glenn Amendments were restructured to give waiver to Pakistan, which permitted the US President to waive the prohibitions of section 669 between 1981 and September 30, 1987, to receive assistance in the wake of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

2. In 1985, the Solarz Amendment was approved, regarding the illegal exports of material and technology by a nuclear producing country to Pakistan.[56] This amendment also enabled President Reagan to grant waiver to Pakistan in respect of this legislation. 3. In 1985, the Pressler Amendment required the US President during each fiscal year, to certify that Pakistan did not have a nuclear explosive device. However, President George H. W. Bush Sr. refused to sign the waiver for 1990. 4. The Cranston Amendment of 1985, required annual certification from the US President that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device, before any aid could be given to Islamabad.[57] 5. On December 22, 1987, the US Congress extended the waiver authority to April 1, 1990. President Reagan signed the appropriate certificate. 6. In 1989, the waiver authority was extended for another year.[58]

The US non-proliferation interests had revived in October 1990, because the Soviet forces by then had already completed their withdrawal from Afghanistan (in February 1989) in accordance with the Geneva Accords of April 14, 1988. This naturally changed the geostrategic position of Pakistan in overall US global interests.[59] On October 2, 1990, President Bush refused to provide the mandatory certificate in regard to Pakistan for the year 1990. As a result, this led to a suspension of economic and military aid to Pakistan.[60] Agha Shahi, writing about Pakistan-US nuclear and bilateral relations remarked that the real issue between Pakistan and the US was the latters consistent coercive tactics against Islamabad to force her to renounce its nuclear programme; while Indias nuclear weapons project continued unhindered.[61] Pakistans Nuclear Response Presumably due to these factors, for the first time, an architect of Pakistans nuclear research project, Dr. A. Q. Khan, in 1984 revealed to the world that the Kahuta Research Laboratories (KRL) was processing non-weapons-grade uranium.[62] This information was deliberately leaked by the Zia regime in order to retain nuclear ambiguity so as to deter the large build-up of Indian conventional and strategic forces. In Pakistani perspective, the ambiguity over its nuclear capability had prevented the Indian attack during New Delhis biggest ever-military exercise in 1986-87 Brasstacks - in the Rajasthan desert, near the Pakistani border.[63] In November 1986, Bob Woodward of The Washington Post, citing a classified US intelligence report, claimed that Pakistan was producing weapons-grade uranium (over ninety per cent) at the KRL.[64] Despite extensive external pressures and coercive diplomacy directed against Pakistans nuclear programme, it crossed the Rubicon in the early 1980s. Writing about Pakistans ability to enrich uranium, Ashok Kapur remarked that: The history of Pakistani enrichment work demolishes the Western myth that a poor country lacks the ability to make a quantum jump from the nineteenth century to the twentieth century in the scientific field in a few years. The history provides mounting evidence of Pakistans remarkable breakthrough into the closely guarded world of enrichment.[65] This remarkable achievement by Pakistan in the field of uranium enrichment technology exhibited progress made by the scientific community of Islamabad in a matter of a few years. It was an apt compliment from a leading South Asian writer, because this achievement and breakthrough was attained indigenously in the presence of stiff international opposition. Especially, the NSG and the US had established extensive control regimes, imposed embargoes on sensitive technologies, and tried to isolate Pakistan by various strategies in order to dissuade it from pursuing its nuclear R&D. When Zia died in a plane crash in August 1988, Pakistan had already attained a full-fledged threshold nuclear weapon state status.[66] By that time it was clear that Pakistan would only change its stance regarding the NPT, if it was universally implemented along with Indias adherence to it. Pakistan also refused to accept the coercive diplomacy of the US against its nuclear programme. Incidentally,

Washington could not force India, Israel and South Africa to sign the NPT.[67] In 1985, President Zia also acknowledged that Pakistan did possess a capability to convert its peaceful nuclear programme into a non-peaceful one at anytime if it was required.[68] Later issued a policy statement that Pakistan had a right to possess the nuclear capability. It was a clear and rational nuclear policy statement by the President of Pakistan, which put its stance on the NPT in correct perspective, dual international standards in respect of different countries nuclear programmes, and reflected the height of Zias diplomacy. Zia had successfully steered the country out of diplomatic pressure on the issue of the NPT and its nuclear programme, and despite severe international constraints, he meticulously continued the enhancement of Pakistans nuclear infrastructure. Even the unified nuclear policies of the US, France, Canada, and West Germany to pressurise Pakistan also proved futile and counter-productive, and in a record time Pakistan developed a more sophisticated route leading to nuclear explosions as has been remarked upon by Lt. Gen. Kamal Matinuddin. He maintained that the US had intentionally overlooked the Indian nuclear programme, because it wanted to use the latter as a counter to China.[69] Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif reacting to the Indian nuclear and thermonuclear tests on May 11 and 13, 1998, remarked that: This is posing a very serious threat to the region and Pakistan.[70] The Indian nuclear tests were internationally condemned, and most of the world leaders expressed their horror and disgust over the prospect of an escalation of a nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan. President Clinton termed the Indian nuclearisation a fundamental mistake.[71] A leading US weekly magazine The Newsweek, in its analysis held the US policymakers responsible for adopting a nave and indifferent attitude towards the Indian quest to go nuclear.[72] Pakistan had been frequently cautioning the world community about the Indian nuclear weapons plan. This was generally regarded by the US policymakers and the other countries, as Islamabads obsession towards New Delhi and its insecurity syndrome. On April 16, 1998, Pakistans Foreign Minister, Gohar Ayub Khan, in his meeting with Bill Richardson during the latters visit to Islamabad, informed the dignitary about an Indian plan to introduce nuclear weapons in its arsenal.[73] To this, reportedly Richardson had replied: Are you trying to say the Indian leadership has made suckers of us. To which reportedly Ayub had replied: Yes. Youve just been duped.[74] Yet the US maintained that Pakistan did not provide them with any concrete evidence about the Indian nuclearisation programme.[75] Unlike the US, Pakistan had no satellites orbiting the Indian nuclear testing site. Therefore, it was difficult for Islamabad to provide technical evidence, except through whatever channels and sources it possessed to ascertain the Indian weaponisation plan, and to inform the international community accordingly, including Washington about the impending dangers of nuclear proliferation in South Asia. This controversy has been aptly summarised by the Newsweek: American policymakers have long suspected the Pakistanis of crying wolf about the Indian nuclear programme; partly to justify their secret weapons collaboration with the Chinese. President Clinton was said by his aides to be personally wounded by Indias perfidy. That may be because he had assigned an unrealistic role to India in his bridge to the 21 st century

imaginings. Clinton has spoken of Indias high-tech prowess, its claim to the worlds largest middle class, and envisioned a kind of benign, peace-loving presence stabilizing the Asian Subcontinent. Indian rhetoric can be lulling Will other technologically advanced nations follow Indias example and try to barge into the nuclear club.[76] Hence a state that is amassing instruments of war, writes Kenneth Waltz regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons, even for its own defence, is cast by others as a threat requiring response.[77] This is precisely how the Indian nuclear tests were perceived in Pakistan.[78] Moreover, Pakistan felt threatened by Indian leaders bellicose statements in the aftermath of Pokhran-II. Soon after the tests, Prime Minister Vajpayee, speaking in the Lok Sabha, claimed that India possessed a big bomb, and in unambiguous language declared India a nuclear weapon state and even threatened to use nuclear weapons.[79] He further clarified Indias new nuclear policy by saying: It is not a conferment we seek nor is it a status for others to grant to India.[80] It was in such a charged situation that President Clinton sent his Under-Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, to Pakistan to persuade its policymakers not to test nuclear weapons in retaliation. At that time, the Indian leadership was repeatedly threatening Pakistan. Therefore, Islamabad considered the vague promises of enhanced economic support of the US without any credible guarantees against conventional or nuclear attack by India, obviously insufficient to forego its nuclear weapons option.[81] Secondly, the muted international reaction to the Indian testing had disillusioned Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who could not have possibly gone against the popular demand for a retaliatory nuclear testing.[82] Thirdly, the domestic political pressure was a significant contributory factor, which had motivated Pakistan to overt nuclearisation.[83] Besides, the Indian threats had been explicitly directed against the very survival of Pakistan. After the Indian tests, Indias Home Minister, L. K. Advani, vowed to end the Pakistani menace once and for all.[84] Similarly, the Indian Minister for Science and Technology, Murli Manohar Joshi, on May 12, 1998, declared that the Indian scientists will put a nuclear warhead on missiles as soon as the situation requires.[85] Pakistans failure to retaliate would have dissolved its nuclear deterrence strategy into a hot air. In the eventuality of an India-Pakistan confrontation, Pakistan could not sustain its nuclear deterrence doctrine. Because, a nuclear test would benefit Pakistan by removing any doubt in Indias mind. Therefore, for Pakistan, the show of overt nuclear weapons capability was necessary for military security objective, and to neutralise Indias edge in the strategic and conventional forces. According to Neil Joeck: Thus a nuclear test would benefit Pakistan by removing any doubt in Indias mind. It would harm Pakistan, however, in that it would force nuclear deterrence and its prerequisites more squarely into the centre of Pakistani strategic planning while delivering a severe blow to the economy. Pakistanis complain that they had to pay the price for Indias nuclear detonation in 1974, which galvanized the international community and precipitated the development of extensive export controls. Where India by 1974 had developed its own nuclear capability (with significant help from Western countries, Pakistanis always argue), Pakistan was lagging behind and felt that it had to take any necessary measures to catch up.[86]

Therefore, for Pakistan, the show of overt nuclear weapons capability was necessary for military security objectives, and to neutralise Indias edge in the strategic and conventional forces. The Indian strategic and conventional superiority, in Pakistani perception, could only be held at bay by erecting its own nuclear weapons shield. The Indian testing of the whole range of nuclear weaponry, including battlefield/tactical nuclear weapons were Pakistanspecific, remarked Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub in the Pakistan Senate on May 13, 1998. He further stated: Indian actions, which pose an immediate and grave threat to Pakistans security, will not go unanswered.[87] Accordingly, on May 28 and 30, 1998, Pakistan conducted a series of six nuclear tests at its nuclear testing site in the Chagai Hills of Balochistan province. Thereby neutralising Indias nuclear edge once for all, which in Nawaz Sharifs perspective, was essential to equalise the nuclear score with India.[88] There was a direct link between Pakistans overt nuclear weapons capability and its concept of military security vis--vis India. Like India, the retaliatory decision by Pakistan for overt nuclearisation was also indicative of the predominance of security perception as a factor in domestic politics.[89] Hence, Islamabads response was heavily based on domestic political considerations, writes Neil Joeck, given the vulnerabilities of its national political leaders and given the arguments that India was already deterred by Pakistans previously veiled nuclear capabilities.[90] Therefore, a stable nuclear deterrence was considered an essential element even to reduce the probability of a limited conventional conflict.[91] Moreover, Pakistan considered its nuclear tests as an imperative to contain the hegemonic designs of the Indian foreign and security policy, and essential to neutralise New Delhis conventional and nuclear forces. It thus provided Islamabad with a strategic equity vis--vis New Delhi. After the tit-for-tat nuclear testing, India announced its Draft Nuclear Doctrine in August 1999 as a rationale to further develop and deploy nuclear weapons. It has further escalated tension and priming of nuclear trigger foreboding horrendous consequences for both the countries.[92] Indias Nuclear Doctrine Indias nuclear testing in May 1998 had compelled Pakistan, as argued in the preceding pages, to respond with retaliatory nuclear weapons tests, which opened-up a renewed wave of proliferation in the 1990s.[93] Both India and Pakistan followed these tests, writes Wolfsthal, with steps to institutionalise their nuclear weapon arsenals and expand their delivery capabilities.[94] India and Pakistan had acquired nuclear weapons for divergent objectives. Indias motives to pursue a nuclear weapons plan was inspired from its inherent desire to achieve a great power status for hegemonic motives.[95] India was so obsessed with its yearning for a great power status that any non-proliferation regime would have been ineffective before its aspirations and for the domestic political motives of the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) who was then in power.[96] The Indian policymakers had from time to time spoken of the need for overt nuclearisation as the universal currency of strategic strength and autonomy of a country in international politics.[97] More significantly, the ruling BJP intended to exploit the nuclear weapons capability as a symbol of Indias prowess and of Hindu pride and nationalism.[98] With the induction of nuclear weapons in its arsenal India intended to establish its military and political hegemony on the subcontinent.[99] After

acquiring an overt nuclear weapon state status, a state in the category of India would tend to exploit that potential to achieve a position of greater significance within its particular geographical region.[100] Therefore, after the overt nuclearisation by India and Pakistan, both states were logically expected to establish the command and control systems, as well as to announce their nuclear doctrines with a view to attain a viable deterrent, and to minimise the prospects of nuclear confrontation.[101] Unlike Pakistan, India first announced its Draft Nuclear Doctrine (DND) in August 1999, and subsequently established its Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) almost four years later on January 4, 2003. The announcement of DND and the organization of NCA, was followed by the handing-over of nuclear weapons to the armed forces of India under the newly set-up Strategic Forces Command.[102] Way back in 1987, the then Army Chief, General Sundarji, had stated that India would not like Pakistan to catch-up with India in nuclear weapons field. [103] The Indian rationale for the acquisition of nuclear weapons was inherently quite strong based on the view that it was necessary to sustain its conventional and strategic forces competitive advantage vis--vis Pakistan.[104] Accordingly, the establishment of Indias NCA had formalised the existing eight-point DND under the Political Council, the Executive Council, and the C-in-C of Strategic Forces Command - headed by Air Marshall, T. M. Asthana, was merely instituted to achieve New Delhis strategic objectives and to enhance its military preparedness. India is reportedly also endeavouring to acquire the Green Pine radars, the Phalcon Airborne Early Warning radar system, and the Command and Control Systems (AWACS) from Israel in June 2002 and May 2003 respectively.[105] The acquisition and deployment of nuclear weapons; and institutionalisation of anti-ballistic missiles systems with Green Pines, Raytheons Patriot Advanced Capability-3 anti-missile and AWACS systems; and the possibility of an adoption of launch on warning (LOW) doctrine, would further compound the risks of accidental nuclear conflict on the subcontinent.[106] In the absence of robust C4I2 systems,[107] it is expected to lower the threshold and erode the nuclear deterrence. Moreover, the growing conventional weaponry disparity between India and Pakistan is quite critical from the South Asian nuclear perspective. Because, any conventional arms procurement by India would escalate the possibility of Pakistans quest to enhance its nuclear capability against India. Thus, understandably Pakistan would strive to ensure that its nuclear forces remain robust, and capable of surviving an Indian pre-emptive attack. The formulation of NCA actually operationalised Indias DND by inducting strategic weapons into the forces and, their deployment in order to inflict an unacceptable damage on the adversary in the case of first-strike.[108] In addition, the NCA also envisaged New Delhis right to retaliate with nuclear weapons in event of a major attack against India or Indian forces anywhere even with the biological or chemical weapons.[109] India prima facie appears to be inspired from an emergent new concept - to retaliate with nuclear weapons - which was enunciated by the Bush administration as its new National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (NSCWMD) in December 2002.[110] The chemical or biological weapons attack, even in a conventional conflict, would be responded to, and managed and executed by the all-service Strategic Forces Command (SFC).[111] At

occasions, it would require a pre-delegation of powers in one form or the other, to the SFC to retaliate with punitive strikes against the adversary in the eventuality of such an attack with the chemical or biological weapons.[112] This raises some serious and fundamental questions concerning the actual control of the nuclear arsenal, although, symbolically the Prime Minister will have his finger on the nuclear button.[113] Some obvious flaws in NCAs functioning includes: A centralised system of command and control of nuclear weapons would continue to motivate the policymakers to maintain a deployed arsenal at the highest state of alertness launch on warning (LOW). This in effect means a perpetual state of nuclear readiness, which would be available to the policymakers to authorise their launch on warning. A perpetual state of nuclear preparedness would require a super safe, watertight, and based on a clear line of authority system of C4I2 (discussed later). [114] New Delhi had reluctantly formulated a nuclear weapons command system in January 2003, while Pakistan had established its National Command Authority in February 2000. Behind these efforts was a considerable pressure from the West and US at a time when India-Pakistan were at the brink of war.[115] Regarding the command systems of both countries, it is not clear what type of operational relationship would the different tiers of armed forces commanders would have with each other. For instance, exact relationship the Strategic Forces Command would maintain with the three services chiefs, including with the Chiefs of Staff Committee (CSC) and the NCA. Especially, the role of the NCA and the Executive Council vis--vis to the SFC, the CSC, and the National Security Advisor. As the Executive Council is comprised of senior civil bureaucrats, services officers, including intelligence officials, who would bring into play an organizational bias and conflict. While, the bureaucrats attached with the Government Politics would tend to play a central, competitive game for political or governmental hierarchical status. This distinct incompatibility between all hierarchies would sharply differ in their perceptions, estimates, and problems tackling approach, consequences and finding solutions for the issue,[116] thereby further compounding the situation in the case of an eruption of crisis. Neither India nor Pakistan possess the requisite economic and technological resources, nor the infrastructure, even to establish a partial defence against the kind of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, which the US and the former Soviet Union could establish during the heyday of the Cold War.[117] This would obviously multiply the chances of accidental use, leading to an outbreak of nuclear war on the subcontinent. According to Michael Krepon, President of the Henry L. Stimson Center, This is a region that tends towards misreading, tends towards surprises, tends towards misperceptions.[118] The flight-time of a missile between the two countries is dangerously minimal - ranging from three to around eight/nine minutes, allowing hardly any time for the leadership of the two countries to correctly analyse the situation, or the implications of decisions. For example, during the Cold War, the US Commander of the Strategic Air Command had a designated authority to launch the air force, except authority to proceed towards their target, in the case

of a warning of a nuclear attack.[119] There are also limitations of the civilian leadership to maintain an effective control over the entire nuclear arsenal, including over the other Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) of the three services concerning the operational practices, deployment, training and the targeting elements of these weapons, which are constantly evolved.[120] In the context of South Asia, obviously, the militaries on both sides are expected to consolidate their control over the nuclear weapons in view of frequent military crises on the subcontinent.[121] It would not only destabilise the nuclear deterrence between the two countries, but could also lead to formulation of SOP to prime the nuclear weapons on the delivery vehicles in a crisis situation.[122] More alarmingly, during the Pakistan-India military standoff in 2001-2002, reportedly Vajpayee had authorised the Indian forces to use the short-range nuclear capable Prithvi missiles.[123] This indicates the predominance of an organisational bias, and the fixed SOPs (although they may be eventually changed and refined with the passage of time) in the military planning, instead of critically analysing the situation, and exploring all available alternatives with a view to find a solution for the problem.[124] It is argued that frequent military crises between the nuclear capable states with a high degree of mistrust, misperception, would not only dilute the effectiveness of deterrence in the region, but could also accelerate miscalculations leading to an accidental nuclear holocaust. According to Brajesh Mishra, former National Security Advisor to the former Indian Premier, between January and May 2002, India and Pakistan were pretty close to a war, in spite of their realisation of mutual assured destruction in New Delhi and Islamabad.[125] Therefore, the flaws in the Indian Draft Nuclear Doctrine, NCAs complex hierarchical tiers, and its apparent preparedness to have a LOW doctrine, as argued, could escalate tension between India and Pakistan in future in spite of their claim to mutual nuclear deterrence and the viability of their command and control mechanisms. Militaries in both the countries would tend to have their nuclear weapons deployed, especially during the crises,[126] and therefore, even a limited or a low-intensity conflict, could easily escalate into an open war. As has been noted by V. R. Raghavan, the Indian plans are firmly based on taking a future war into all Pakistani territory, even if the conflict commences in Jammu and Kashmir.[127] Therefore, the risk of a LOW would always be there, which could be further exacerbated due to the proclivity for decisive operations and taking the initiative is likely to encourage military officers to advocatethe development of launch-on-warning options if technically feasible.[128] As a result, it would intensify the fog of war thereby increasing the prospects of miscalculation, bureaucratic momentum, and chaos in any future crises on the subcontinent.[129] At face value, Indias Draft Nuclear Doctrine, the establishment of a two-tier NCA, and the no first-use (NFU) of nuclear weapons policy, indicates that New Delhi has an effective C4I2 system in place under the proper civilian control (Rational Actor). In contrast, India could project that in Pakistan, the C4I2 being under the Armys control could be susceptible to use by the diehard Jihadi elements in the defence establishment. India would exploit, and illustrate that the Islamic elements within the Pakistans defence institutions could handover nuclear weapons to non-state actors in turn threatening the international

peace and security.[130] India would galvanise the international public opinion, nonproliferation regimes, and the existing anti-terrorism clauses of the different UN Resolutions, passed after the 9/11, to disable Pakistans nuclear assets through pre-emptive strikes, or to disarm Pakistan through sanctions and coercive diplomacy.[131] At the same time, India could continue to project to the world that it is a responsible nuclear power that has chiselledout a policy of NFU of nuclear weapons vis--vis Pakistan, in spite of latters strategy to keep its nuclear option open (in order to deter India from amassing its superior conventional forces on its borders). India still retains the option of use of nuclear weapons against Pakistan, by giving its own interpretation of the Draft Nuclear Doctrines clause of no-first use of nuclear weapons.[132] In reality, Indias decision to counter chemical and biological weapons attack anywhere on its combatants with nuclear weapons, has already in a way made its officially stated policy of no first-use redundant.[133] As argued in the preceding pages that Indias no first-use strategy is a carefully calibrated strategy to exploit its superiority in the conventional forces, which New Delhi intends to use to establish its hegemony in the region. However, as has been elaborated earlier, faced with a desperate situation, India would still retain its option of the first-use of its nuclear weapons. On the other hand, Pakistans nuclear capability is a security-centric - designed to protect its strategic nuclear forces, sovereignty and independence that was repeatedly threatened by India since the partition of British India in 1947. It is imperative for Pakistan to retain a potent conventional force to sustain a conventional deterrence. However, since the 1998 nuclear tests by both India and Pakistan, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institutes (SIPRI) annual report concerning the worldwide military spending in the year 2002, India and Pakistans security situation had considerably aggravated. Both were engaged in an arms race, including a gradual consolidation of nuclear weapon infrastructure. The report noted that, both countries have sufficient fissile materials that could enable them to produce between 100 to 400 nuclear weapons. In addition, they were also developing ballistic missiles of different ranges as a mode of delivery for nuclear weapons, which would only aggravate the future situation of the subcontinent when both states deploy nuclear weapons, concludes the SIPRI.[134] The US authorisation to Israel to sell its Phalcon airborne early warning radar system to India would further increase the imbalance of offensive military capability in Indias favour. As a result, it would compel Pakistan to augment its conventional and strategic force balance vis--vis India in order to sustain a credible nuclear deterrence on the subcontinent. Pakistans Nuclear Doctrine The Pakistani nuclear weapons policy has been India-centric, premised on the perception that the dominant security threat emanates from Indias nuclear programme. Pakistans nuclear potential is fundamentally designed to establish a credible deterrent against aggression and to safeguard the countrys independence and sovereignty, and not to use nuclear weapons, or to threaten to employ them, against any Non-nuclear Weapon States (NNWS). Secondly, Pakistan had built nuclear weapons to overcome the shortfalls in its conventional asymmetry vis--vis India and to remove its insecurity syndrome.[135] Therefore, Pakistans nuclear programme was principally influenced by the security model in reaction to the

development of the Indian nuclear and security policy.[136] However, the study of IndiaPakistan nuclearisation supports the assumption that whenever any country develops nuclear weapons for one reason or the other, including balancing against its main competitor, in reaction it also creates nuclear threat perceptions among the other countries in the region. The regional states then also attempt to establish nuclear deterrence to deter their adversary if it is in their power to do so.[137] Pakistans nuclear doctrine is primarily premised on security-considerations, and with a view to establish a credible minimum deterrence. While on the other hand, India for over a decade constantly refused to hold a dialogue with Pakistan on the nuclear issue.[138] This had further compounded the security situation of South Asia and, it was one of the contributory factors behind Indias amassing of forces on Pakistans borders in the wake of attack on its Parliament in December 2001.[139] The military standoff of 2001-2002 clearly indicates that the Indian leadership had ignored the basic principles of deterrence that in a nuclearised situation the superiority of conventional and, even the nuclear weapons, is meaningless.[140] Pakistan has not announced any nuclear doctrine except that its strategy remained premised on basic security-considerations to construct a credible nuclear deterrence, preserve its strategic forces, and its sovereign existence. Therefore, the calculus of Pakistans nuclear threshold has been deliberately shrouded in vagueness with a view to sustain a viable deterrent vis--vis Indias much larger conventional and strategic forces. On May 30, 2002, Pakistans Ambassador to the United Nations (UN), Munir Akram defended Islamabads right to rely on means to deter Indian aggression. The Ambassador further reiterated that Pakistan possessed the means and we will not neutralise it by any doctrine of no first-use. He also stated that: If India reserves the right to use conventional weapons, how can Pakistan, a weaker power, be expected to rule out all means of deterrence. Adding that India had an advantage over Pakistan in the conventional forces, Munir Akram further elaborated Pakistans nuclear policy by saying that: We have not said we will use nuclear weapons. We have not said we will not use nuclear weapons. We possess nuclear weapons. So does India.[141] This statement of Pakistani Ambassador to the UN clearly spells out Islamabads determination to defend its independence and sovereignty at all cost, and to hold Indias much superior conventional force at bay. Munir Akrams statement was issued at the time when the Indian and Pakistani armed forces were fully deployed on the borders. On the other hand, Brajesh Mishra, former National Security Adviser to the former Indian Prime Minister, while accepting the existence of deterrence precept between India and Pakistan, stated that India was too large to be destroyed by Pakistans nuclear capability.[142] This indicates an existence of a serious misperception in the minds of the Indian policymakers regarding the nuclear weapons utility as the weapons of war (and Indias illusion to survive a nuclear attack) - instead of using them as the weapons of mass destruction and the weapons to establish deterrence. Because, in South Asia, the prospects of misreading, and misperceptions are fairly high, writes Michael Krepon. According to Krepon: In all of their wars, they have tended toward misreading, which could obviously forebode horrendous consequences for the entire South Asia.[143]

In an interview given to two Italian scholars, the Director General of Pakistans Strategic Plans Division, Lt. General Khalid Kidwai, stated that Pakistans nuclear threshold is premised on four benchmarks. One, that the use of nuclear weapons by Pakistan would only be contemplated if India attacks and occupies a large part of Pakistan. Two, India manages to destroy a large part of Pakistans army or air force. Three, if India economically strangulates Pakistan. Four, if India foments any political and internal unrest in Pakistan through subversive measures.[144] However, even if the nuclear parity between India and Pakistan is acknowledged, but, still the growing asymmetry in air power in the favour of India, could encourage New Delhi to use military force in the future crises vis--vis Pakistan.[145] More alarmingly, New Delhi while escalating a dangerous military brinkmanship in 20012002 prima facie had overlooked the fundamental rule of the MAD. Because, in the precept of MAD, writes Robert Jervis, trying to protect yourself is destabilizing because it threatens the other side. He further states that the 2001-2002 military standoff had indicated that in a case of India responding with nuclear weapons, but this threat might not be sufficiently credible to deter Pakistan in what would be a desperate situation. In a nutshell, Jervis says that in such a situation the MAD may then be in the dustbin of history, but states that employ nuclear weapons or force their adversaries to do so may find themselves there as well.[146] Interestingly, a study of the Origin of the Pacific War by Scott Sagan also suggests a similar findings, that if a nation is provoked sufficiently can launch a dangerous, even disastrous war, out of desperation. He remarks that ignoring this cardinal principle by the future strategists would be risky and the only path by which a nuclear war could begin.[147] Moreover, on the 40th anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the US, Russian and the Cuban officials held a conference in Havana on October 11-13, 2002, and disclosed that the US and the Soviet Union were close to a nuclear war in 1962. Now, we started from the assumption that if there was an invasion of Cuba, remarked President Castro of Cuba, nuclear war would erupt. We were certain of thatwe would be forced to pay the price, that we would disappear Castro had expressed his determination by saying that: Yes, I would have agreed to the use of nuclear weapons.[148] Another important aspect that the conference had clarified was the factor of luck. According to Robert McNamara: We were lucky, but not only lucky. I believe we would not have survived those 13 days had not the president shaped and directed the ways in which his senior advisers confronted the crisis. Because, the majority of President Kennedys advisers had favoured an immediate air strike on all the Soviet missiles on the mainland Cuba. It was after General Walter-Sweeney, head of the US Air Force Tactical Air Command, presentation that: We have the finest air force in the world. If we cant do the job, nobody can. General Sweeney further stated that there is all the likelihood that one or two missiles and nuclear warheads might still be operational, and can still be fired, after the attack? This had enabled President Kennedy to straightaway rule out any probability of an attack on the Soviet missile sites in Cuba.[149] This indicates two very important aspects of the deterrence theory: one, the role of a rational actor; [150] and two, attacking the vital interests of a country having nuclear weapons may bring the attacker untold losses.[151]

In the presence of misperceptions and a culture of a tit-for-tat escalation of diplomatic and military tensions, a dispute such as over Kashmir, could lead to an uncontrollable situation, for both countries. This could be the likely trigger for a nuclear holocaust on the subcontinent. In South Asia, the key regarding the nuclear weapons, writes Ambassador Teresita C. Schaffer of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, is so intricate that, No one can be certain what would trigger a nuclear response, and the world needs to take the risk seriously even if the chances are less than half.[152] Therefore, there is an urgent need that both India and Pakistan resume a dialogue in consonance with the Lahore Declaration to take measures aimed at prevention of conflict, including the bilateral consultations on security concepts, and nuclear doctrines, with a view to developing measures for confidencebuilding in the nuclear and conventional fields.[153] In thisconnection, the establishment of C4I2 systems would go long way in minimising the possibility of an inadvertent and unauthorised nuclear escalation. Because, a lack of early warning system that could indicate an imminent enemy attack, and the satellite intelligence-apparatus to assist the policymakers to come to a rational decision in the crisis, the prospects of misreading would multiply, especially during a crisis. In this regard, it must be noted that Pakistan had institutionalised its command and control mechanism consistent with countrys obligations as a declared nuclear weapon state by establishing the National Command Authority (NCA) on February 3, 2000, almost three years ahead of Indias NCA formation. India announced the setting up of Nuclear Command Authority on January 4, 2003. C4I2 Systems After the establishment of the respective national command authorities in Pakistan and India respectively, it draws attention on the necessity of fully functional C 4I2 systems in both the countries, inclusive of the entire necessary infrastructure to prevent the false alarms. Obviously, the formation of a C4I2 system is vital in order to minimise the possibility of inadvertent and unauthorised nuclear escalation, especially during crises. Absence of C4I2 system can bring horrendous consequences. For example, as President Zia remarked that during the 1987 Brasstacks exercise held by India: Neither India nor Pakistan wanted to go to war, but we could have easily gone to war,[154] due to a lack of early warning system that could indicate an impending enemy attack, and the satellite-apparatus to assist the policymakers to come to a rational decision in crisis. In addition, it requires an understanding of the basics of the C4I2 systems by the policymakers at the helms of affairs. Since the end of the World War II in 1945, the US has spent $937 billion on the development of C4I2 systems for its strategic defence. But in spite of this enormous investment, it was unable to protect the US from the threat of a nuclear destruction by Soviet missiles and bombers.[155] The Cold War history is testimony to the fact that the tit-for-tat escalation, crises and threats between the US and the Soviet Union, and also between India and Pakistan, could not be prevented. Therefore, to establish an effective C 4I2 system requires an enormous amount of capital investment, which even then cannot make C 4I2 system a fool-proof, or a nuclear arsenal invulnerable to attacks set on a hair triggerfalse alarmsdubious measures of control such as pre-delegating of nuclear launch authority to the military commanders and policymakers.[156] According to Blair, in spite of US expenditure of $270

billion on the C4I2 system, $1 billion on intelligence-related activities, and another $270 billion on the satellites monitoring the Soviet Union, even then, the US could not entirely establish a stable deterrence through its nuclear forces during the Cold War.[157] To develop even the bare-minimum levels of the C4I2 systems cannot be sustained by the economies of India and Pakistan given their poverty levels. Hence, the best available option for both the countries would be, not to escalate the nuclear and conventional arms race, to sustain their respective nuclear deterrence, to avoid conventional and nuclear crises by not assembling and deploying the warheads on nuclear-capable ballistic missiles and aircraft. It is in the longterm interests of India and Pakistan to avoid an irrational nuclear arms rivalry and tensions like the military standoff of 2001-2002, because neither do they have the resource to sustain prolonged confrontations, nor does their geographical contiguity permit them any reaction time in case of a nuclear or conventional crisis.[158] Hence, it is imperative not to chisel-out a LOW-type doctrine, which would prove catastrophic for the regional and international peace and security.[159] In South Asia, the political leaderships of the two countries have occasionally threatened each other with the use of nuclear weapons, which has undermined the concept of deterrence, as well as emitted negative signals to the world regarding the security capabilities of both countries over an accidental use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, the acquisition and deployment of nuclear weapons in the absence of robust C 4I2 systems and confidence and security building-measures (CSBMs) would only enhance the probability of a LOW-type of catastrophic doctrines in India and Pakistan, which may multiply the risk of accidental nuclear war. Therefore, the only logical way out is to give effect to CSBMs, and not to have the LOW doctrines. Similarly, if Pakistan adopts a LOW doctrinal strategy, then it would also compel India to do the same. In this connection, the NWS can play an important role in stabilising India-Pakistan nuclear deterrence by providing them with safety procedures and the related-technologies. Stephen P. Cohen commenting about prevention of a nuclear accident and supporting US policy change concerning the provision of safety devices to both India and Pakistan writes: neither would want a foreign government to have access to its designs, and such assistance could be construed as a violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which bans the transfer of such technology. However, it is not a violation of the treaty to take steps that would reduce the risk of war triggered by an accidental detonation, a false radar signal, or bad intelligence.

To address this problem, the United States should offer to provide hitherto unavailable information to India and Pakistan if they took steps to control or restrain their nuclear deployments, and to make such deployments as non-provocative as possible.

Under such an agreement, the principle of proportionality should apply: America should assist India and Pakistan in developing secure communications systems and verifying

accidental nuclear detonations or unannounced missile launches only to the degree that each country cooperated and made their respective systems more reliable and stable.[160] The past crises between India and Pakistan had primarily stemmed from a variety of factors, including from misperceptions and lack of sufficient intelligence, due to an absence of a robust communication network, and flawed analyses. The faulty analyses and misreading of each others designs, especially relating to misjudging each others thresholds for escalation, could be disastrous for the entire regions peace and stability.[161] Moreover, during the time of crises even conducting conventional military exercises around the border areas could heighten tensions thereby leading to nuclear posturing.[162] According to some analysts, the phase of posturing could dilute the fabric of deterrence that would be further eroded especially in the presence of misperceptions and misreading.[163] In particular, the mating of nuclear weapons with the delivery systems would further exacerbate the already fragile security situation of the region. The deployment of nuclear weapons by either country would only result in lowering the nuclear threshold.[164] Rahul Bedi, an Indian analyst who writes for the Janes Defence Weekly, quoting an official of the Indian Government stated that during the Kargil conflict, India had deployed a basic nuclear weapons systems with a view to retaliate with nuclear weapons if the need arose.[165] It seriously undermined the credibility of Indias stated policy of no first-use of nuclear weapons. Indias loosely integrated command and control structure, and the non-consultation of the political leadership with the top brass of the armed forces, while formulating national security strategy, further complicates the problem. This in the views of the former Indian Army Chief during the 2001-2002 crisis, General Ved Prakash Malik, would seriously risk deterrence credibility.[166] General Malik has also spoken of the huge communication gap between the political and military leadership in terms of what is politically desirable and what is actually being planned by the military hierarchy. He concedes that such dichotomy of approach is particularly prevalent in the nuclear planning affairs of India.[167] In such a situation, the Pakistani policymakers position would be more problematic against Indias paradoxical nuclear strategy as well as its non-integrated command and control structure. In addition, it is also not clear that at present what is the status of the C 4I2 systems in both India and Pakistan, and how they compare with each other, and whether they reduce or eliminate completely the prospects of accidental nuclear strikes? Therefore, apparently subcontinents peace and security, and the viability of deterrence in the presence of the key instability factor Kashmir, would continue to remain attached with the luck factor.[168] Impact Areas: Contributory Factors The widening gulf of misperception over the instability factor of Kashmir between the two nuclear rivals, could bring the security of the subcontinent perilously close to hair-trigger type scenarios, and immune to threats, which could easily spiral out of control thereby leading to an inadvertent use of nuclear weapons. As it was argued in the preceding paragraphs that the prospects of misperceptions can originate both from the strong as well as from the weak states. The former can initiate a limited war on one pretext or the other, with a view to establish its hegemony on the weaker state thereby compelling the latter to launch a dangerous war due to sheer desperation.[169] It is rational to start a war one does not expect

to winif it is believed that the likely consequences of not fighting are even worse, writes Robert Jervis. Secondly, in Jarvis calculus: War could also come through inadvertence, loss of control, or irrationality.[170] In the South Asian context, although the policymakers in India and Pakistan are cautious concerning the nuclear weapons, but the frequent outbreaks of crises, brinkmanship, and nuclear rhetoric emanating both from New Delhi and Islamabad, only heightens perceptions of a destabilised deterrence, and leads to fears of the possibility of accidental use of nukes on the subcontinent.[171] This indicates that both India and Pakistan, either have to stabilise the precept of nuclear deterrence by avoiding crises and effecting more CSBMs; cease issuing threats of use of nuclear weapons against each other; or permit other countries to intervene in their bilateral dispute with a view to minimise, if not eliminate entirely, the possibility of inadvertent use of nuclear weapons.[172] Since, a perpetual state of confusion between the nuclear-armed states not only produces uncertainty, but also broadens the scope of miscalculation.[173] Since one countrys endeavour to establish a stable security system in the presence of nuclear competition is expected to create a sense of insecurity and instability in the other.[174] Impact of Developments of Conventional Forces Other factors contributory to growing instability between India and Pakistan is the widening disparity in their conventional military balance. This disparity has markedly intensified between 1995 and 1999, especially in the favour of India, which increased its military expenditures substantially.[175] In the view of some defence analysts, this disparity could facilitate India to exert a military-based coercive policy against Pakistan in future conflicts. [176] According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, between 1993 and 2002, India received licenses to produce the following aircraft that has further improved the air force asymmetry vis--vis Pakistan markedly in Indias favour: Ten Mirage-2000s. Ten MiG-21s. Ten MiG-29s. 190 SU-30s. Fifty-four MiG-27s. Four TU-22s. Two Harriers. Fifty-two Jaguars. [177]

On the other hand, in the same period, Pakistan Air Force (PAF) could only manage to place orders for the procurement of following aircraft: Ninety-seven F-7s.

Forty Mirage-5s. Ten Mirage-3s.[178]

Michael Krepon writes that the growing disparity between the Indian and Pakistani air forces holds ramifications for escalation and on the stability of nuclear deterrence in at least two ways. One, the attrition capabilities of the PAF in any future air-to-air combat, in a conflict could be a red line of threshold. Two, Pakistan would consider Indian air power, especially its capacity to strike deep against its nuclear and the key conventional military targets, as seriously destabilising for the country.[179] Krepon has suggested ten key commandments to reduce the risks of nuclear escalation: Dont change the territorial status quo in sensitive areas by use of force. Avoid nuclear brinkmanship. Avoid dangerous military practices.

Put in place special reassurance measures for ballistic missiles and other nuclear forces. Implement properly treaty obligations, risk-reduction, and confidence-building measures. Agree on verification arrangements, including intrusive monitoring.

Establish reliable lines of communication, between political leaders and between military leaders. Establish redundant and reliable command and control arrangements as well as intelligence-gathering capabilities to know what the other side is up to, especially in a crisis. Keep working hard on these arrangements. Improve them. Dont take anything for granted. Hope for plan dumb luck or divine intervention.[180]

Krepon further states that all these key principles of nuclear risk reduction and CSBMs, with the exception of luck, are non-existent in South Asia.[181] This is a serious observation by a leading South Asian observer and, it is this paranoia of the West that has led to depiction of different war scenarios between the two South Asian nuclear-armed rivals. As Krepon states, Nuclear capabilities that are in a high state of readiness or are in motion to reduce their vulnerability. This could become more susceptible to accidents or misuse, adds Krepon. In his view, In the event of another major crisis, the increased readiness of nuclear capabilities can be expected, including the movement of missiles to complicate targeting and to signal resolve,[182] thereby escalating the risks of LOW. The war scenario between India and Pakistan is further complicated due to Indias ambivalent policy of no first-use of nuclear weapons on the one hand, and on the other its resolve to resort to a punitive

retaliation using nuclear weapons, in the case of failure of deterrence. Moreover, Indias strategy to use nuclear weapons in the event of a major attack against India or on the Indian armed forces anywhere, with nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, is another significant factor that could affect the bilateral deterrence between the two archrivals. Nuclear War Scenarios Many Western experts during the Pakistan-India military standoff of 2001-2002 had depicted two nuclear scenarios, based on assumptions that both states had a total of 50 to 75 fission weapons, with estimated yields between 5 to 25 kilotons. According to these assumptions, Pakistans weapons are mounted on missiles; Indias gravity bombs are deployed on the fighter aircraft.[183] The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) in a study had concluded that a nuclear war between India and Pakistan could result in twelve million deaths (which had motivated the US government to send its Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, to New Delhi and Islamabad to avert a potential conflict).[184] These war scenarios were premised on the following hypothetical situations: 1. Scenario-1. Ten nuclear weapons of 15 kilotons if dropped over ten major cities: five in India and five in Pakistan, would cause estimated deaths of 1,690,702 (and 2,021,106 injuries) in India, and 1,171,879 (and 1,361,872 injuries) in Pakistan. In case these bombs explode in the air, then a huge fireball would maximise the collateral damage.[185] 2. Scenario-2. Twenty-four nuclear explosions (of 25 kilotons each) on the ground on the same number of cities in India and Pakistan, would release maximum radioactive particles within a short time after the detonation and produce lethal levels of nuclear fallout even at a distance of hundreds of kilometres away from the ground zero. It would cause horrific levels of collateral devastation and deaths, and expose 60.1 million people to lethal radiation doses, which could cause certain deaths. According to NRDCs estimates, 8.1 million people would be instantaneously exposed to such lethal radiation.[186] The NRDC study concludes that as a result from the fallout the devastation would exceed that of caused by the blast and fireball of an explosion. And, that the majority of the Indians (99 per cent) and Pakistanis (93 per cent) would survive the second war scenario, which means that the armed forces of two countries would still remain intact to continue the conflict.[187] One thing is quite clear from the NRDCs simulation research that it was designed on the premise of counter-value instead of a counter-force strategy. As a result, its findings cannot be classified as objective. It did not take into account the other factors contributory to IndiaPakistan deterrence framework. Such as, Indias declared policy of no first-use of nuclear weapons, and its strategy of resorting to a punitive retaliation with nuclear weapons, should deterrence fail. This Indian policy in the Pakistani perspective is New Delhis ploy to gain a moral high-ground vis--vis Pakistan's nuclear policy, in which the first-use option is retained but in extreme circumstances. Because, Pakistans concept of deterrence is premised on averting an external aggression, endangering its national security. Therefore, while analysing the security paradigm of both the countries, it is imperative to appreciate the distinct security dynamics of India and Pakistan.

Prime Minister Vajpayee, while turning down President Musharrafs proposal for a nuclearfree subcontinent in the Lok Sabha on May 8, 2002, stated that, Pakistans nuclear programme is India-specific, but our own nuclear programme goes beyond that. He added that India had to cater for the other nations as well While commenting on the distinct natures of both countries nuclear doctrines, he further remarked that Indias nuclear doctrine is of no first-use while Pakistan has no such provision but they call for a no-war pact.[188] As argued in this paper, the fundamental principle of Indias nuclear weapons policy was to exploit this power-source to project itself at par with the five NWS, which could enable New Delhi to further assume a hegemonic role in the region as well as in the world politics. While on the other hand, Pakistans incessant endeavours ever since its inception as a nation-state has been to protect its independence and sovereignty from the Indian threat in 1947-48, 1965, 1971 - and to keep intact the fragile nature of deterrence during the crises of 1986-87, 1990, 1999, and 2001-2002, in view of Indias hazardous misperceptions concerning the concept of a limited war between the two nuclear-armed rivals.[189] Therefore, logically, Pakistans nuclear strategy had to be India-specific as an obvious security rationale. In the case of Pakistans assurance of no first-use of nuclear weapons to India, it would certainly erode the credibility of Pakistans deterrent posture vis-vis India, due to the then absence of compelling threat that puts in motion the credibility factor.[190] The deep-rooted rivalry between India and Pakistan is characterized by a high hatred and mistrust. Besides, both countries presently do not possess the level assured destruction (MAD) potentials, which US and the former Soviet Union during the Cold War; and that had finally maintained the critical deterrent from down to the 1990s. Michael Krepon writes: degree of of mutual possessed the 1940s

The United States and the Soviet Union managed to avoid nuclear and conventional warfare during the Cold War, while jockeying for advantage in myriad of ways, including proxy wars and a succession of crises that became surrogates for direct conflict The stability-instability paradox was embedded in the enormity of the stakes involved in crossing the nuclear threshold. As posited by Western deterrence theorists, offsetting nuclear capabilities and secure, second-strike capabilities would induce special caution, providing the basis for war prevention and escalation control. Offsetting nuclear deterrents channelled the superpowers competition into safer pursuits, the object of which would be to impose penalties on an adversary without inducing direct conflict.[191] At the present juncture, India and Pakistan are primarily aiming their nuclear deterrence as based on counter-value instead of counter-force targets. The subsequent advancement of their nuclear and defence related technologies, which of course includes the second-strike capabilities, both countries would then be able to plan to attack the counter-force targets as well. Therefore, even in the foreseeable future, superiority in the nuclear weapons would not be of great consequence. What in the name of God is strategic superiority, Kissinger had commented during the heydays of the Cold War concerning the US-Soviet Unions strategic arsenals, which to most of the policymakers was nothing but mutual assured destruction.[192] The same principle could also apparently be applied to South Asia as

well. However, there is a hazard of a stronger state (India) versus a weaker state (Pakistan) contemplating to launch a preventive war in order to check the latter from gaining strength.[193] For instance, after the US attack on Iraq, Indias External Affairs Minister, Yashwant Sinha, drew a parallel between Iraq and the Kashmir situation, to justify the possibility of a pre-emptive attack on Pakistan. US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, vehemently rebutted this comparison by saying I dont think there is a direct parallel between the two situations. Moreover, Powell also termed the India-Pakistan standoff difficult and risky.[194] Irresponsible statements emanating from a responsible policymaker regarding launching a pre-emptive strikes against a nuclear-armed rival, is not only a source of concern for Pakistan, but is also a threat to international peace and security as well. More alarmingly, it would compel the weaker state to formulate a counter-strategy in order to deter the adversary from attempting a counter-force or counter-value strategy against its strategic assets, population and industrial targets. One, by effectively securing its strategic assets from such debilitating attacks. Two, threaten a nuclear retaliation in case such a strategy could not hold its adversary at bay. This would generate a dangerous instability situation. Therefore, the leadership of two countries apparent desire to establish stability with the induction of nuclear arsenals would definitely go down the drain. According to Krepon, One central tenet of the stability-instability paradox that offsetting nuclear capabilities will increase tensions between adversaries has already been amply demonstrated in South Asia.[195] This assessment of Krepon indicates a serious concern regarding the stability-instability inconsistency of India and Pakistan. Krepon further states that: So far, India and Pakistan, like the Soviet Union and the United States, have been fortunate to avoid a nuclear exchange. It is possible that this luck will hold and that New Delhi and Islamabad will make concerted, joint efforts to avoid crossing the nuclear threshold.[196] Therefore, India and Pakistan should not formulate strategies that subject their security, or even their survival, hostage to the luck factor, which could possibly spiral out of control in crises. Krepons prescription of concerted, joint efforts is in the larger interests of the two countries. Stability of Nuclear Deterrence During the India-Pakistan military standoff of 2001-2002, some western scholars, including Rodney W. Jones, while citing Ejaz Haiders article, remarked that Pakistans deterrence had failed to prevent Indiafrom coercing Islamabad primarily due to Islamabads flawed nuclear strategy. According to Haider, it was flawed, because, India was prepared to use force, and Pakistan had to succumb to New Delhis pressure, which had the backing of Washington. [197] The success or failure of deterrence cannot be determined from a single episode, but it should be evaluated on the cumulative outcome of a crisis. Haider writes that the crisis of 20012002 had escalated as a result of Pakistans forward strategy to change the status quo over Kashmir, whereas in comparison to NATOs strategy during the Cold War was to maintain the status quo. Therefore, in his viewpoint, this flawed strategy destabilised the deterrence,

which Pakistan had attained with intent to gain a strategic parity vis--vis Indias conventional asymmetry.[198] A stable mutual nuclear deterrence would only be realised between the two countries once they attain a second-strike nuclear capability. Only then, Pakistan would be able to have a no-first use nuclear policy, and prevent India from threatening the former with its conventional military superiority.[199] Other reasons attributable to lack of Pakistans conventional deterrence against India, that Islamabad lags behind in its modernisation programme for conventional forces, for instance, the state-of-the-art aircraft, air defence, naval capabilities, and in the early warning systems, which it does not possess against India. [200] Moreover, given Pakistans geographical constraint vis--vis India in the opinion of Western analysts like Rodney Jones, it in the face of growing imbalance in conventional forces is making limited conflict between India and Pakistan a real and a dangerous possibility.[201] Hence, conventional military superiority would continue to accord India an opportunity to exploit conventional asymmetry, politically and diplomatically, in order to coerce Pakistan to follow New Delhis diktat.[202] On the other hand, Pakistans short-term strategy is visibly premised on a quick-fix policy pattern, which is obviously undermining the countrys formulation of a long-term foreign and security policy. Therefore, it is imperative that Pakistan restructures its foreign and security policy on more sophisticated and farreaching principles, to secure for itself a honourable future in the 21 st century. Commenting on the prospects of Indo-Pakistan nuclear stability, Jones writes: Just as the extremist attack on Indias parliament on December 13 aroused India to concentrate forces on Pakistans border, another such extremist Muslim attack especially one that slays prominent Indian officials in Delhi would almost certainly ignite war at some level. An Indian origin rogue operation in Islamabad could achieve a similar but reciprocal effect. If that war escalated uncontrollably due to an outpouring of popular rage or to gross operational miscalculations and crossed Pakistans red lines, the odds of the conflict ending in a nuclear exchange would be high far higher, needless to say, than anywhere else in the world today.[203] Similar views were also projected by a documentary-drama titled: The Situation Room, telecasted by the BBC-4 channel, which was set on a hypothetical scenario somewhere in 2004 - when an Indian Defence Ministers assassination by a Pakistan-based terrorist organisation escalates crisis that increase the prospects of a nuclear war.[204] (This hypothetical documentary caught public attention.) A group of Pakistani scholars participating in a discussion on BBCs documentary expressed mixed viewpoints concerning the prospects of a future India-Pakistan military crisis spiralling out of control. However, some of the discussants accorded importance to the mediating role of extra-regional powers in defusing India-Pakistan military tensions. According to Pervez Hoodbhoy, a nuclear war between the two countries in the past was averted due to US intervention.[205] Therefore, a multilateral mediation in India-Pakistans bilateral disputes would be an important factor in maintaining peace and stability on the subcontinent. Nuclear capabilities can only assist in providing a general framework on building a mutual trust for the collective security of the two countries. Otherwise, recurring military tensions would only increase the prospects of

misreading and misperceptions that could inadvertently lead them to a situation where escalating tensions lead to an outright war of mutual destruction. Neither Pakistans nuclear deterrent is vibrant enough to deter the Indian policymakers from launching brinkmanship, nor New Delhi has the operational capability to pre-empt or neutralise Islamabads nuclear arsenal through a sheer strength of its conventional superiority.[206] Consequently, the stalemate is perilously destabilising, especially when both countries have a high-degree of mistrust and misperceptions about each others capabilities. A leading Pakistani defence analyst, Lt. Gen Talat Masood, writes that, Constant violence along the LoC in Kashmir and the semi-mobilized state of the armed forces continues to fuel militancy and religious extremism in both countries, pushing them into a narrow lane. There is always the lurking danger that extremist organizations could set off a chain of events that may ultimately lead to a catastrophic nuclear exchange on the subcontinent. The USinspired pre-emptive strategy could also motivate India to launch its own nuclear war.[207] Therefore, it is imperative that Pakistan and India reaffirm a political route for the resolution of all disputes. In this context, a structured dialogue on Kashmir and nuclear rivalry could provide an impetus to both the countries to interact on all other political issues, including CSBMs on conventional forces, establishment of nuclear hotlines and crisis management centres, in a bid to stabilise the strategic milieu of South Asia.[208] However, after the incident of September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the US, the biggest casualty of the subsequent US war on terror was the degradation of Indo-Pakistan ties, which were further galvanized by terrorist attacks on the Srinagar Assembly on October 1, 2001, and on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001.[209] In spite of both countries retreat from the brink of a war in 2002, they still have not established a strategic restraint regime concerning the nuclear and conventional weapons.[210] The Kashmir issue would remain at the centre of any future dialogue designed to stabilise the bilateral relations of the two countries. Moreover, continuous Indian intransigence to address the issues of Kashmir and nuclear policies,[211] and the growing imbalance in their conventional strength, as has been argued in this paper, is likely to further destabilise the paradigm of deterrence in South Asia. Because, ever since the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC), it has been the experiences of empires and nations that an imbalance in economic and political power between the states had frequently caused wars. What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power, writes Thucydides about the Peloponnesian War, and the fear which this caused in Sparta.[212] Such imbalances, writes von Clausewitz in the nineteenth century, leads to a continuation of politics through violent methods.[213] The resultant war invariably is a clash of interests for power and domination of some states over others.[214] The conventional military imbalance and Pakistans Indocentric basis ofinsecurityIndia has never accepted the idea of Pakistan. India dismembered Pakistan in 1971 and became a regional hegemon, which as a result motivated Islamabad to secure nuclear weapons to establish the nuclear shield vis--vis India.[215] Each time a tension escalates between India and Pakistan, both countries virtually become dependent upon the US to defuse the regional nuclear crisis, which is a sign of unstable mutual deterrence. Therefore, IndiaPakistan rivalry demands a sustained US engagement to defuse tensions.[216] Additionally,

India and Pakistans nuclear deterrence becomes more risky in view of the practically nonexistent and non-reliable early warning systems. Therefore, both countries endeavours to emulate the US-Soviet Cold War model are premised on a faulty assumptions and a dangerous strategy. Pervez Hoodbhoy argues: In the US-USSR deterrence system, a massive system of early warning systems, both spaceand ground-based, was needed to detect missile launchers. In spite of a relatively long flight time of 20 to 25 minutes, the systems remained severely strained and are authoritatively known to have generated false messages of attacks. The existence of redundant and multiple safeguards prevented accidental war, but the margin was not comfortable.[217] The ongoing arms race, and over-optimism regarding the C4I2 of India and Pakistan, could further lead to more dangerous crises in future. Indias intransigence over Kashmir dispute not to implement the UN Resolutions, and Pakistans consistent attempt to liberate Kashmir with an armed struggle, could turn the situation more hazardous. Furthermore, the repeated nuclear rhetoric emanating from New Delhi and Islamabad has only destabilised the traditional concept of deterrence, which would also enhance the fog of war in any future crisis between the two countries.[218] Obviously, this fog of war is likely to generate miscalculation, and chaos in any future crises. According to Farhatullah Babar, the nuclear weapons in the hands of India and Pakistan, instead of deterring each other and keeping peace has brought two countries closer to war. If anything it has served, comments Babar, is that it has escalated the tensions in South Asia as the genuine independence struggle by the people of Kashmir, is now being perceived as an issue of cross-border terrorism sponsored and sustained by Pakistan.[219] Babar argues that Indias declaration that: attack on Indians anywhere in the world would be taken as a nuclear attack on India itself. This declaration came within days of Pakistan flaunting its nuclear capability. General Pervez Musharraf publicly stated in Karachi on December 30 that at the height of the crisis with India he had warned Prime Minister Vajpayee that Pakistan could step beyond conventional warfare if it had to defend its territory.

Pakistans flaunting of nuclear weapons and India upgrading its nuclear arsenal are ominous developments indeed.

The extremists attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13 provoked New Delhi to amass troops along the Pakistan border and close all doors of dialogue and negotiations. It should not be surprising if another such attack provoked even stronger reaction leading to war of some sort.[220] In addition to Indias superiority in the army and air force, its asymmetrical naval prowess vis--vis Pakistan would also impede the maritime confidence-building measures between the two countries.[221] Besides, India is endeavouring to develop a sea-based nuclear delivery system that would further shift the balance of power in its favour. Thereby further

compounding the insecurity of Pakistan against Indias growing military, air, naval, and nuclear power.[222] This would compel Pakistan to adopt a similar strategy to counterbalance Indias growing strategic and conventional forces.[223] The emergence of nuclear asymmetry between India and Pakistan could result in nuclear instability,[224] which would generate more mistrust and misperceptions in their bilateral relations. In this regard, Indias quest to procure missile defence systems from different countries would certainly undermine Pakistans capacity to shield its strategic assets from Indian attacks, and as a consequence enhance Islamabads quest to augment its ballistic missiles system. Thereby further lowering Pakistans nuclear threshold.[225] The perceived insecurity from each other is compelling both the countries to frequently reiterate that their vital strategic assets are fully protected and secure.[226] For instance, after the NCAs meeting of January 2003, an official statement by the Government of Pakistan stated that: The NCA approved to tighten security of different defensive layers, enhancing physical security and ensuring the effectiveness of watertight safety of materials, equipment and technology. It also reiterated Pakistans resolve to sustain its missile development programme in order to maintain the strategic balance with India.[227] Because, the cornerstone of Pakistans nuclear strategy is to maintain a minimum credible deterrence against India without indulging into an arms race.[228] Therefore, Pakistans nuclear policy of a minimum credible deterrence appears to be the correct strategy to balance the prevalent unbalanced system of power in the region.[229] More significantly, a no first use policy does not reduce our inherent capacity or capability to strike first if so warranted, writes the former Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Western Air Command of India, Air Marshal Vinod Patney. He argues that in spite of Indias declared no first-use policy it still retained the option to hit firstif the circumstances have so altered as to force a major change in our nuclear policy.[230] Therefore, for a state like Pakistan it would be an eternal struggle for a security strategy that ensures its survivability. In international politics, security, power and the overwhelming power of a state motivate the other states to balance against it.[231] According to a leading proponent of neo-realism, Stephen Krasner, The international system is anarchical. It is a self-help system. Thus, it is the responsibility of the individual states, writes Krasner, to safeguard their security and well-beingtheir ability to mobilise their own resources against external threats.[232] Hence, Pakistans security compulsion, and the nature of international political system warrant Islamabad to cater for its own specific security requirements, given its distinctive characteristics. In spite of India-Pakistan military standoff in 2001-2002, both the countries still possess some excellent bilateral accords that can provide a framework to improve their ties. In addition, Track-II diplomacy and non-governmental type forums like the Pakistan-India Peoples Forum, think tanks, and other organisations can genuinely assist in improving their relations. But, in view of the astronomical defence expenditures, ongoing acts of terrorism, and the absence of a dialogue between India and Pakistan, are all factors that would continue to undermine the international communitys engagement in the Indo-Pakistan crisis thereby further endangering the peace and security of the region. Because, the absence of dialogue tends to foster misperceptions, and enhance the mistrust, even if the leaderships in both the countries intended to avoid unintended escalation.[233]

The Cold War Paradigm Moreover, there are some interesting parallels embedded in the history of the Cold War period, which could give an insight to the South Asian leadership to pragmatically handle their nuclear arsenals. The Cold War nuclear rivalry between the US and the former Soviet Union concerning the varying nuclear doctrines; from the employment of nuclear weapons as battlefield weapons from the 1940s to 1960s, to the concepts of mutual assured destruction (MAD) and the nuclear winter scenarios, which had provided them a rationale to prevent potential crises. Because, a countrys assured-destruction capacity could deter an adversary from a conflict as it would outweigh the gains in it. If, therefore, a states threat to impose these costs were sufficiently credible, writes Robert Powell, then the adversary would prefer backing down. Powell argues that in the case of both states possessing second-strike capabilities, but why would either state be any more able to exert coercive pressure on its adversary than its adversary would be able to exert on it?[234] According to Thomas Schelling, the chance of escalation to MAD level is invariably present in most of the crises. In his viewpoint, it is the essence of a crisis that the participants are not fully in control of event.[235] Since the demonstration of nuclear weapons capabilities by India and Pakistan, had failed to prevent a series of crises on the subcontinent. The declared NWS like India and Pakistan, by indulging in potential conflicts are merely lowering the threshold and undermining the deterrence paradigm. Since in a crisis situation, in spite of mutual assured destruction potentials of the adversaries, the states may not encourage a state to deliberately launch a nuclear attack, but there is always a possibility that the fury of threats to each other may leave something to chance.[236] Lately, the chance factor, and the role of US in diffusing India-Pakistan military tension, has become visibly significant. On the contrary, in the 1960s when the US-Soviet Union had attained a rough strategic nuclear parity, and a shared realisation of an inherent danger of escalation of tension after the Cuban Missile Crisis, fostered a high degree of caution in giving nuclear threats. More significantly, leaders of both the countries had avoided explicit threats, maintained a strict control over their nuclear forces, sustained direct communications in order to defuse tensions, which could possibly have escalated into a military confrontation that neither side wanted.[237] Therefore, it is imperative that both India and Pakistan, exercise great caution in respect to use of nuclear weapons and also in containing any moves that could escalate tension and create suspicions in another state, which is then tempted to use nukes.[238] Thus, it is in the common interest of both India and Pakistan, to think strategically while handling the vital interests of their states.[239] They should not let their political failure determine their collective future, because in a nuclear confrontation, the war could not be rationally classified as the highest excellence, which the Chinese strategist, Sun-Tzu, had described some 2,300 years ago.[240] Rationally, both India and Pakistan can effectively use their nuclear power for bargaining purposes vis--vis each other with a view to exploit it to effect diplomatic thaw, and to bring about credible CSBMs in the interest of genuine international regime for collective security.[241] Otherwise, in the case of a crisis, then, both the countries would tend to remain dependent upon the US, the UK, and the Russians to pull them back from the brink of a potential nuclear war, as Colin Powell had described the US role in defusing the India-Pakistan military standoff of 2001-2002.[242]

In addition, there is a need for more transparency to determine the reliability of their respective C4I2 systems, in order to prevent the conventional and nuclear confrontation that could trigger a chain-reaction, which would certainly be beyond the capacity of anyone to contain - once unleashed. More exactly, India and Pakistan should never confuse the political negotiations relating to the territorial disputes, with technical dialogue on nuclear balance and security, which impedes the overall process of CSBMs. In spite of the marked dissimilarities (and also some similarities) between the strategies of the Warsaw Pact-NATO countries during the Cold War era, India and Pakistan still have lot to learn from their mistakes. Therefore, both the countries should not be over-optimistic that they possess first-strike nuclear capabilities. The NATOs first-strike strategy against the Warsaw Pact countries never made sense to some experts. For instance, according to some viewpoints, a strategy to use the nuclear weapons by US, in response to a chemical and biological weapons use by any NNWS was absolutely illogical, morally and politically indefensible.[243] The use of nukes in retaliation to a conventional military attack did not make any sense at all, according to Robert McNamara.[244] The nuclear weapons could not bring any advantage to the initiator of a nuclear attack vis--vis a conventional attack. Some analysts are of the view that a continuing territorial dispute between India and Pakistan is increasing the prospects of a nuclear exchange due to the possibility that an escalation of crisis could quite easily spiral out of control primarily because of the greater degree of mistrust between New Delhi and Islamabad than between the superpowers during the Cold War period.[245] The NATO and the Warsaw Pact leaders, during the heydays of the Cold War, in number of strategic appreciations had assumed that the Soviets would never deliberately initiate a general war as long as NATO was prepared to retaliate with nuclear weapons. But, still both the rival blocs had an apprehension that: a danger of general war arising as a result of miscalculation on the part of the Soviets, a misconstruction of Western intentions, or as a result of military operations of a limited nature which the Soviets did not originally expect would lead to general war.[246] In the perceptions of the West of that period, If general war is deliberately undertaken by the USSR, it will probably be initiated by a massive nuclear offensive.[247] Similarly, on the subcontinent, the strategic situation is also dramatically changing due to induction of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles by India and Pakistan, which would obviously shift their future nuclear posture to more hazardous relationship.[248] Hence, multiplying the chances of miscalculations due to variety of factors, including the ever-widening gulf of mistrust; lack of vibrant command and control mechanisms; and simmering territorial dispute over Kashmir. Albeit, the Lahore Declaration and the Memorandum of Understanding signed in February 1999 - envisaged to engage in bilateral consultations on security, disarmament and non-proliferation issues with a view to evolve an appropriate consultative mechanisms to monitor and ensure effective implementation of confidence-building measures.[249] Both India and Pakistan have lot to learn from the earlier experiences of the US and the former Soviet Union concerning the protection of the physical infrastructure of nuclear

materials and installations. India and Pakistan should emphasise on Track-II Diplomacy with a view to draw maximum lessons from the US-Soviet Union cooperation that had existed even during the Cold War; government-to-government interaction and exchanges between Pakistan and US such as the Cooperative Monitoring Center at the Sandia National Laboratories, based in the US; and joint design and construction of a demonstration site for nuclear material and installation protections in US and Pakistan. The cooperation between laboratory-to-laboratory of India and the United States, and also between the latter with Pakistan, would foster confidence.[250] This would go long way in building the relationships required to enhance the physical security of the nuclear and radiological materials and the facilities.[251] Furthermore, interaction between the Indian, Pakistani and the US experts on issues ranging from protection of vital infrastructure from the threat of terrorist attacks to the introduction of projects relating to economic, humanitarian, scientific, and educational fields,[252] could also exert a positive influence on stabilising the deterrence paradigm of the subcontinent. Since the end of the Cold War and the end of bipolar international political system, has enhanced the inequalities between the states.[253] More so, the unbalanced strategic and military power in the favour of one state would not only continue to affect the future shape of the world politics, but it would also influence the future prospects of war and peace between the regional states like India and Pakistan.[254] A tripartite cooperation mechanism between the US, India, and Pakistan, with the former acting as a technological facilitator could assist both India and Pakistan in removing mutual mistrust regarding their nuclear, facilitating their C4I2capabilities and, thus, stabilising the situation of peace in South Asia. Otherwise, both countries nuclear-centric defence strategies [255] would continue to compel both countries to premise their military doctrines on hair-trigger type responses, and foster misconceptions that they could fight a nuclear war and win it too.[256] The UK in a Global Strategy Paper 1952, and the Eisenhower Administration in the US of that period, had emphasised a massive nuclear retaliatory strategy without even differentiating between the counter-value and counter-force targets.[257] This has a striking similarity with the India-Pakistan nuclear brinkmanship in the early period of their overt nuclearisation, particularly, during the military crisis of 2001-2002, and the heightened state of tension between the NATO-Warsaw Pact countries in the 1950s. Like the Soviets, the NATO countries too expected a victory in the case of a war with the Warsaw Pact states. [258] While the NATOs declared policy was to prevent the occupation of the Western Europe by the Soviet forces even if it had to resort to use of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons.[259] And in the case of India and Pakistan, the latter is endeavouring to balance the asymmetrical development of nuclear forces with the establishment of a credible nuclear deterrence and, at the same time New Delhi is attempting to threaten Pakistan with extinction if it used nuclear weapons to hold Indian might at bay.[260] This situation is further complicated by Pakistans policy to employ nuclear weapons in order to deter India from using its conventional and nuclear capabilities to intimidate Islamabad. On the other hand, India is evidently deliberately following a policy of brinkmanship vis--vis Pakistan with a view to achieve its diplomatic and strategic objectives, and to test the resolve of Islamabad and to make the risk of use of nukes intolerably high on the latter. This indicates the

existence of a balance of resolve between India and Pakistan.[261] In such situation, the dynamics of escalation would continue to rest on a complex state of interaction between the states level of resolve and their uncertainty about each other others resolve.[262] This is another hazardous dimension of India-Pakistan nuclear rivalry, which is expected to persist due to both countries pathological mistrust of each other, and the degree of uncertainty attached with their resolve concerning the nuclear weapons employment for the brinkmanship purposes with a view to achieve their strategic objectives. The risk-maximizing approach[263], both by India and Pakistan, is likely to influence their leadership to believe in the brinkmanship with a view to out bid the rival state, especially during the crises.[264] The Impact of Post-9/11 on Security Perceptions After the terrorist attacks on the US on September 11, 2001, the West has expressed serious apprehensions concerning the terrorist groups acquiring weapons of mass destruction and the nuclear-related materials, from the Indian and Pakistani nuclear facilities. But, the fact remains that the prospects of these non-state actors acquiring WMD materials from the Indian and Pakistani facilities is extremely low since both countries keep their nuclear arsenals in an unassembled form, and because their components are stored separately.[265] Therefore, the chances of terrorist groups acquiring nuclear-related materials from within India and Pakistan for terrorism are remote. However, according to Rizvi and Basrur, fears regarding four types of nuclear terrorism cannot be ruled out. These include the sabotage of nuclear facilities, use of a dirty bomb to disperse radiation, terrorist takeover of nuclear installations and a threat to blow them up, as well as clandestine transfer of nuclear material for use/assemblage somewhere else.[266] Rizvi and Basrur have suggested eight measures, which in their viewpoint could substantially enhance the safety and security of nuclear facilities in India and Pakistan: 1. Track-down the groups and the individuals engaged in violent activities and terrorism.

2. Extensive surveillance of the borders and coastlines to contain the movement of goods and people. 3. More use of modern technology to enhance the physical protection of nuclear weapons, material and installations. 4. Thorough scrutiny of the personnel handling the nuclear programmes of the two countries. 5. Acquisition of latest technologies for the transportation of fissile and radioactive materials. 6. Highly trained manpower may be employed for the protection of nuclear facilities.

7. Extensive coordination network amongst all the set-ups dealing with the nuclear infrastructure and, in addition, there should be an independent body to ensure an oversight and accountability.

8. Finally, a disaster management body may be established to handle a security alarm systems, and the actual nuclear-terrorist incidents and emergencies.[267] Obviously, the US and the Western countries have a strong interest in preventing a nuclear war between India and Pakistan. The military standoff of 2001-2002 between the two countries had visibly brought the two countries much closer to a war, which then prompted the US and the European Union countries to assist them in defusing the tension. Therefore, logically, in future, US and the EU countries should be keen to strengthen the safety and security mechanisms of India and Pakistans nuclear weapons programmes, because the threat of nuclear-terrorism is global in range and its effects cannot be contained to a single geographical region alone.[268] On September 17, 2002, the Bush Administration announced National Security Strategy of the United States of America, which laid-down a comprehensive policy to combat the WMD, and to defeat global terrorism.[269] This significant document envisaged a proactive counter-proliferation policy to deter, and to defend against the perceived threat of terrorism before it is let loose.[270] Secondly, to strengthen the non-proliferation regimes with a view to interdict the rogue states and terrorist organisations from gaining the technologies, materials, and expertise to assemble the WMD. Thirdly, to effectively contain the effects of the WMD use, whether by the rogue states or by the terrorist networks.[271] The main thrust of this new policy is on pre-emptive actions even in an anticipatory self-defence against such states and the terrorist groups.[272] More significantly, this doctrine considers the Cold War eras deterrence principles (as a weapon of last resort and defence) as ineffective against the present-day deterrence postures, which is primarily premised on threat of retaliation that is not expected to work against the rogue states, and the terrorist organisations, which would tend to risk the lives of their nations.[273] Interestingly, this strategy has an inherent flaw because it would tend to lead to more reliance on pre-emption that would turn force from an instrument of last resort into one of first resort, comment Ivo H. Daalder, James M. Lindsay, and James B. Steinberg.[274] Moreover, it will accord an opportunity to other states to formulate principles and strategies in accordance with their narrow national interests to have an unfettered right of pre-emption against its own definition of threats to its security to act unilaterally.[275] This doctrine instead of rooting-out the scourge of terrorism is likely to widen the gulf of alienation between the friends and allies and, at the same time fails to address the question of threat to security.[276] It would be appropriate to make a distinction between the state and the non-state actors acquisition and potential to use the nuclear weapons. Since the break-up of the former Soviet Union, the West became apprehensive regarding the proliferation of nuclear materials, equipment, technology, and personnel to the rogue states and terrorist outfits. In 1992, US and Russia, to ensure that nuclear weapons and materials do not fall in the hands of the undesirable elements, established the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programme.[277] Additionally, in 1999, the Clinton Administration announced a policy to expand the work of CTR by the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative (ETRI) plan to ensure that WMD-related technologies did not reach the wrong hands, including to the states sponsoring terrorism.[278] But, since the tragic terrorist incidents of September 11, 2001, the

US perspective concerning the possibility of nuclear terrorism has undergone marked transformation. Robert Kagan, a leading scholar of US foreign policy, writes, Europe is turning away from power, to put it a little differently, it is moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation. It is entering a post-historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Immanuel Kants perpetual peace. Meanwhile, the United States remains mired in history, exercising power in an anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable, and where true security and the defence and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might. Americans generally see the world divided between good and evil, between friends and enemies, while Europeans see a more complex picture. When confronting real or potential adversaries, Americans generally favour policies of coercion rather than persuasion, emphasizing punitive sanctions over inducements to better behaviour, the stick over the carrot. Americans tend to seek finality in international affairs: they want problems solved, threats eliminated. And, of course, Americans increasingly tend toward unilateralism in international affairs.[279] Kagans perspective is widely shared in the United States, including by the Bush Administration, that Washington should pursue a more proactive, rather unilaterally coercive diplomacy, to finally eliminate the scourge of terrorism and to solve the other problems of the world. But, the fact remains that US nuclear non-proliferation policy, and international nonproliferation regimes, still form an integral part of Washingtons security architecture to deal with the potential threats of WMD-related terrorism. Therefore, in the foreseeable future, US would be less inclined on the international institutions like the United Nations in order to achieve its national objectives.[280] In this context, the US National Security Strategy and the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (NSCWMD) would continue to guide a new strategy for the US Homeland Security, and a fundamental diversion from the traditional concept of deterrence with a view to combat the WMD threats.[281] Because, Bush Administration perceives that its enemies were seeking the WMD, and that the NSCWMD would proactively bolster, interdiction-oriented approach to mitigate the WMD threats.[282] Prima facie, the document is intended to target the rogue states, but it also does not rule out action against the other states as well who sponsor or harbour terrorism. [283] The NSCWMD also envisages bolstering of US conventional, nuclear, intelligence/surveillance, interdiction, and domestic law enforcement capabilities to improve its overall deterrent posture vis--vis the WMD threats. This includes capabilities to detect and destroy adversarys WMD arsenals before their use. Therefore, US would consistently endeavour to formalise new agreements, which could cater for its non-proliferation objectives. In addition, strengthen the existing non-proliferation regimes to promote its security interests. Moreover, in parallel conceive a comprehensive sanctions policy as a tool of diplomacy to support its overall strategy of NSCWMD.[284] But rightly in the view of some experts, the question of nuclear terrorism by states is fundamentally different from the issue of the acquisitions and use of such weapons by non-state actors.[285] Thomas Badey writes,

It is highly unlikely that countries with a desire to acquire nuclear weapons, such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan and North Korea, would spend millions of dollars and years of research to acquire nuclear weapons, only to sell or hand them over to non-state actors, knowing that they might be held accountable for the actions of potential clients. It is much more likely that states, particularly those targeted by export controls and economic sanctions, may use non-state actors to acquire nuclear materials for them rather than the other way around. [286] The use of nuclear weapons by the rogue states with an inadequate backing and accompanying capabilities would be counter-productive rather than proving of any strategic gain. Because, in the case of use of nuclear weapons by the rogue states and their sponsored non-state actors, it would certainly eclipse the potential benefits and, the consequences would be more horrendous to contemplate.[287] Besides, it is highly improbable that any single individual could equip a group to have an access to fissionable material[288] or even to crude a form of nuclear device without the assistance of a reliable delivery system, which is otherwise only feasible with the collaboration of a major industrial enterprise.[289] In the views of the former head of nuclear weapons development programme at the Los Alamos, J. Carson Mark, it requires a team of a mechanical engineer, nuclear physicist, a chemist, and explosive expert, a mathematician, and along with other auxiliary staff, and at least a year to develop a nuclear device.[290] Besides, it would be highly unlikely for the non-state actors to hire the services of highly qualified and experienced scientists; the requisite industrial infrastructure; the financial resources; weapons-grade uranium or plutonium; and an access to clandestine transport or to a delivery system, that too, for terrorism, appears to be incredibly implausible.[291] However, the security of nuclear installations, personnel, and the fissionable and radiological materials in possession of the de jure and the de facto NWS, should be made foolproof. Secondly, the existing non-proliferation regimes can be made vibrant to ensure that nuclear technology and material does not pilfer into the possession of non-state actors and the rogue states, which could jeopardise the stability of international peace and security. Though, the non-state actors can easily assemble the chemical and biological elements for terrorist attacks, [292] therefore, rationally the emphasis should be to check the proliferation of chemical, radiological and biological agents, which the terrorist organisations may acquire from the international black-market, and then convert the same into a dirty bomb. In this connection, US President Bush in a statement on May 31, 2003, during his visit to Poland, referred to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) of the US in collaboration with ten other countries, including its allies, to employ all the legal, diplomatic, economic, military channels, including searching planes and cargo ships, to interdict illegal weapons, nuclear, missiles, and radiological materials.[293] Such measures would go long way in deterring the terrorist organisations from implementing their nefarious designs, provided PSI is reconciled within the parameters of the international law. In addition, the nuclear-related CSBMs between thede jure and the de facto NWS, and other developed countries, could also collectively evolve a strategy to seize the transfer of sensitive technologies to rogue states in order to minimise, if not exclude completely, the possibility of such technologies, nuclear and radiological materials falling in the wrong hands.

Unfortunately, in the South Asian context, since the Lahore Declaration of February 1999, both India and Pakistan have not been able to start talks on nuclear-related CSBMs. In August 2003, Pakistan had offered India the resumption of a dialogue on nuclear-related CSBMs that were agreed in principle in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by them at the time of Lahore Declaration, in order to establish the strategic restraint regime. [294] India instead of responding positively to the Pakistani proposal accused it of footdragging on resumption of a dialogue and other diplomatic and peace initiatives between the two countries.[295] In this connection, again on December 18, 2003, President Pervez Musharraf, repeated the offer to India for improving bilateral relations by resolving the Kashmir dispute: We are for United Nations Security Council Resolutionsnow we have left that aside. If we want to resolve this issue, both sides need to talk to each other with flexibility, coming beyond stated positions, meeting halfway somewhere. We are prepared to rise to the occasion; India has to be flexible also. We have come to a stage where there is a thaw in relations, where there is expectation on both sides in the people. If the leadership doesnt rise to the occasion, it is a pity and I think well disappoint our public again. Unfortunately, magnanimity has to come from the bigger and the stronger.[296] President Musharrafs realpolitik and rational diplomatic proposal placed the ball squarely in Indias court. It was up to India to capitalise on Pakistans constructive initiative to resolve the neuralgic dispute over Kashmir, and to set in motion the process of improvement of bilateral relations. During the three-day 12th South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Summit in Islamabad (January 4-6, 2004), the Indian Prime Minister, A. B. Vajpayee, urged the member states for bold transition from mistrust to trust, discord to concord, and tension to peace in the region.[297] Moreover, Indian External Affairs Minister, Yashwant Sinha, in a statement also expressed satisfaction on the progress in bilateral relations and discussed various ways to increase this momentum. While Pakistans Foreign Minister, Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, too, reiterated that, We have developed a good relationship, which is good for the people of both countries. Our relations with India have improved. We will continue to improve our relations.[298] Musharraf and Vajpayee in a bilateral meeting on January 5, further agreed to maintain the momentum generated by the confidence-building measures and diplomacy on the sidelines of the SAARC Summit.[299] Therefore, in the second phase, if the proposed CSBMs can take a concrete shape once both countries resume a comprehensive dialogue and initiate further confidence-building measures process with a view to ensuring peace and security of the region, it could help lay the basis to eliminate the probability of terrorists access to their nuclear, missile, chemical, biological, and radiological materials and facilities. If the momentum resulting out of the thaw in bilateral relations is sustained, it could enable them to find a mutually acceptable solution to all their outstanding disputes, including over Kashmir. Conclusion

For a moment, consider the following quotes of the eminent scholars about the concept and definition of deterrence, victory, and the effects of the nuclear war. According to Lt. Gen. N. Hanning: The political power of nuclear weapons is based on: the yield the number available the number of launch vehicles and the certainty of their availability hit and kill probabilities the credibility of their use.

As long as superiority really exists in all the parameters, the risk for the user is a small and the deterrent concept is credible, as was demonstrated with Hiroshima and Nagasaki.[300] McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara, and Gerard Smith in an article on Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance, in the Foreign Affairs journal wrote: It is time to recognize that no one has ever succeeded in advancing any persuasive reason to believe that any use of nuclear weapons, even on the smallest scale, could reliably be expected to remain limited. Every serious analysis and every military exercise, for over 25 years, has demonstrated that even the most restrained battlefield use would be enormously destructive to civilian life and property. There is no way for anyone to have any confidence that such a nuclear action will not lead to further and more devastating exchanges. Any use of nuclear weapons in Europe, by the Alliance or against it, carries with it a high and inescapable risk of escalation into the general nuclear war which would bring ruin to all and victory to none.[301] Bernard Brodie writes: The first and most vital step in any American security program for the age of atomic bombs is to take measures to guarantee to ourselves in case of attack the possibility of retaliation in kind. Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have no other useful purpose.[302] In April 1980, Physicians for Social Responsibility in An Open Letter to President Carter and Chairman Brezhnev, wrote: As Physicians, scientists, and concerned citizens, alarmed by an international political climate that increasingly presents nuclear war as a rational possibility, we are impelled to renew a warning, based on medical and scientific analyses, that:

1. Nuclear war, even a limited one, would result in death, injury and disease on a scale that has no precedent in the history of human existence; 2. Medical disaster planning for a nuclear war is meaningless. There is no possible effective medical response. Most hospitals would be destroyed, most medical personnel dead or injured, most supplies unavailable. Most survivors would die; 3. There is no effective civil defense. The blast, thermal and radiation effects would kill even those in shelters, and the fallout would reach those who had been evacuated; 4. Recovery from nuclear war would be impossible. The economic, ecologic, and social fabric on which human life depends would be destroyed in the US, the USSR, and much of the rest of the world; 5. In sum, there can be no winners in a nuclear war. Worldwide fallout would contaminate much of the globe for generations and atmospheric effects would severely damage all living things.[303] These quotes vividly reflect that in a nuclear conflict there would be no victors. Therefore, the mutual deterrence would be in the bilateral interests of both the adversaries. Secondly, India and Pakistan, whether they stick to the offensive and defensive deterrent strategies, but, in the absence of robust CSBMs and a nuclear restraint regime, it would be impossible for either of them to achieve any real political gains by allowing unnecessary crises to escalate in the subcontinent.[304] An effective nuclear CSBMs regime and a limited level of nuclear transparency between India and Pakistan would go a long way in stabilising their relationship, and assisting them in averting a catastrophe. Otherwise, like the India and Pakistan crisis of 2001-2002, the first casualty would be the official channel of communication, threats and counter-threats, widening gulf of misperceptions and increased dependence on the other states to defuse tensions. For example, during the heydays of the Cold War, the US in spite of being a superpower and technological advancement was not sufficiently convinced, that in an event of Soviet Unions first strike, its nuclear command structure and the potential to retaliate back would be sustainable under the momentum of a first strike. Still, the US and the former Soviet Union had not severed their official channel of communication. Similarly, in the context of India and Pakistan, the US-Soviet Union paradigm has a direct relevance, because, India too has a declared policy of no first-use of nuclear weapons, though it is accompanied with another clause that employment of chemical or biological weapons on its forces anywhere in the world, would give the Indian leadership the right to retaliate with the nuclear weapons. Since the Indian Defence Minister, Pranab Mukherjees statement of September 13, 2004, in which he spelled out that India, will not hesitate to use nuclear weapons in the event of collapse of deterrence. And on the other hand, Pakistan being a weaker power in comparison to India; and its policy of a nuclear ambiguity for the obvious deterrent purposes against a much stronger entity, India; in addition, it would be a contributory factor in generating a dangerous misperception motivating the Indian policymakers to adopt a LOW policy vis--vis Pakistan. In South Asia, where the

C4I2 systems are still in an embryonic stage, mutual misperceptions are high, and the balance of conventional and strategic forces are quite uneven. Therefore, logically, the prospects of adherence to a launch on warning type SOPs both in India and Pakistan, would be there, which is a sure recipe for using nuclear warheads due to false alarms. Thus, leading both the countries to an accidental nuclear Armageddon. For that reason, it is imperative that both the countries should realise the need of arriving at nuclear CSBMs and display a reasonable degree of nuclear transparency with a view to removing the perpetual state of ambivalent relationship. As argued in this paper that the entire concept of security of South Asia is based on the principles of security, fear, and hegemony. Both India and Pakistan have entangled themselves in a perpetual-cobweb of offensive and defensive types of situations respectively. As a result, India has sought to prevent the emergence of peer competitor on the subcontinent, Pakistan, to challenge its supremacy. This peer competition between India and Pakistan took a turning point in 1974, when India conducted its first nuclear test, which then started a new period of nuclear arms race in South Asia. As it was true during the time of Thucydides, who had expressed apprehensions concerning the role and dynamics of an outbreak of accidental war even at the time of the Great War between the Spartans and the Athenians. The war once initiated, writes Thucydides, let loose forces that are completely unanticipated by the adversaries. Even a limited conflict between India and Pakistan would set in motion the developments over which they would have virtually no control. Therefore, in such a situation even a minor misperception concerning the concept of a limited war could certainly intensify the fog of war thereby reluctantly leading the states to a full-scale war. As Robert Jervis has rightly pointed out that, then, the rest would be in the dustbin of history.[305] It is certainly in the interests of both India and Pakistan to fine-tune their bilateral perceptions, remove misperceptions, and realistically formulate their nuclear and conventional strategies with a view to stabilise the concept of mutual deterrence without ever resorting to threats of mutual annihilation. Because, the significance of deterrence lies in preventing the adversary from initiating a war for which it could be punished with a devastating retaliation. The violence is most purposive and most successful, writes Thomas Schelling, only when it is threatened and not used.[306] Therefore, there is no rational[307] rationale to formulate flawed strategies and to harbour wrong concepts regarding an all-out war or a limited conflict,[308] because even a limited conventional conflict either by India or Pakistan would surely lead to nonwinnable situation.[309] The author is Visiting Fellow at the Islamabad Policy Research Institute. He received his Postgraduate qualification in the Social Science Research Methods from the Nottingham Trent University, Masters degree in International Politics and Security Studies and Doctorate in The Development of Overt Nuclear Weapon States in South Asia from the University of Bradford, UK.

[1] Robert Gilpin, The Theory of Hegemonic War, in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb (eds.), The Origin And Prevention Of Major Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 15-16. [2] Ibid, p. 17. [3] According to Robert Jervis, Although war can occur even when both sides see each other accurately, misperception often plays a large role. Particularly interesting are judgments and misjudgements of another states intentions. Both overestimates and underestimates of hostility have led to war in the past See, Robert Jervis, War and Misperception, in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb (eds.), The Origin And Prevention Of Major Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 101. [4] Robert Gilpin, op. cit., p. 16. [5] Ibid, p. 15. [6] Ibid, pp. 16-18. For the study of Peloponnesian War, see, Thucydides (translated by Johan H. Finley, Jr.), The Peloponnesian War (New York, 1951). [7] George K. Tanham, Indian Strategy In Flux, in Kanti P. Bajpai and Amitabh Mattoo (eds.), Securing India: Strategic Thought And Practice (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 1996), p. 55. [8] Ibid, pp 48 and 51. [9] Kenneth N. Waltz, Thoughts About Virtual Nuclear Arsenals, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Summer 1997), p. 161. [10] Ibid, p. 153.

[11] Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread Of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Paper 171 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981), p. 15. [12] Ibid, p. 14.

[13] Kenneth N. Waltz, Nuclear Myths And Political Realities, American Political Science Review, Vol. 84, No. 3 (September 1990), pp. 731 and 734. [14] For more details, see, Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979); and Hans. J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948 and later editions). [15] The structural realism is attached with Kenneth N. Waltzs theory.

[16] This school of thought is led by John J. Mearsheimer, Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War, International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer

1990), pp. 5-57; Eric J. Labs, Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims, Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 1-49; Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of Americas World Role (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998); and Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). [17] In addition to Kenneth N. Waltz, prominent defensive realisms exponents are: Robert Jervis, Cooperation under the Security Dilemma, World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214; Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N. York: Cornell University Press, 1991); Sean M. LynnJones, Realism and Americas Rise: A Review Essay,International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 157-183; and Colin Elman, Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?, Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Autumn 1996), pp. 7-53. [18] The term: neoclassical realism was coined by Gideon Rose in Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy, World Politics, Vol. 51, No. 1 (October 1998), pp. 144-172. [19] John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001), p. 21. [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] Hans. J. Morgenthau, op. cit., chapter 1. John J. Mearsheimer, op. cit., p. 21. Ibid. Kenneth N. Waltz, fn (footnote) 14, op. cit., p. 126. John J. Mearsheimer, op. cit., p. 145.

[25] The theory of peer competitor was used by planning document of the US Department of Defense in 1992, see, Excerpts from the Pentagons Plan: Prevent the Reemergence of a New Rival,New York Times, March 8, 1992, p. A14. [26] Robert Gilpin, op. cit., p. 35. For more details regarding the 2002 India-Pakistan military standoff, nuclear deterrence of South Asia, and the possibility of a limited war, see, Zulfqar Khan, Pakistan-India Military Standoff: A Nuclear Dimension, IPRI Journal, Vol. III, No. 1 (Winter 2003), 99-125. [27] [28] [29] Robert Gilpin, op. cit., p. 35. See, Thucydides, op. cit. Robert Gilpin, op. cit., p. 36.

[30] Zulfqar Khan, op. cit., p. 124. Different definitions of perceptions have evolved since the ancient times. Ancient Greek philosopher, Theaetetus, defined perception as It seems to me that one who knows something is perceiving the thing that he knows, and,

so far as I can see at present, knowledge is nothing but perception. While Socrates reflected that any object, is to me such as it appears to me, and is to you such as it appears to you. Perception, then, is always something that is, and, as being knowledge, it is infallible. A leading philosopher of the twentieth century, Bertrand Russell, says, Perception and thought are physical processes. Perception is of two sorts, one of the senses, one of the understanding. Perceptions of the latter sort depend only on the things perceived, while those of the former sort depend also on our senses, and are therefore apt to be deceptive. Bertrand Russell, History Of Western Philosophy (London: Routledge of the Taylor & Francis Group, 2001), pp. 163 and 89. [31] See, P. R. Chari, Nuclear Restraint, Nuclear Risk Reduction, and the SecurityInsecurity Paradox in South Asia, in Michael Krepon and Chris Gagne (eds.), The StabilityInstability Paradox: Nuclear Weapons and Brinkmanship in South Asia, Report No. 38 (Washington DC: The Stimson Center, 2001). Michael Krepon writes that, The most dangerous time to control escalation usually comes in the years immediately after both adversaries initially possess nuclear capabilities. During this awkward period, tolerance levels or red lines have not been clarified, the nuclear balance is unclear, and risk-reduction arrangements have not been implemented. At the earliest stages of offsetting nuclear capabilities, new weapon developments add to threat perceptions and uncertainties. India and Pakistan are now proceeding through this difficult passage. See, Michael Krepon, Cooperative Threat Reduction, Missile Defense, And The Nuclear Future (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, A Henry L. Stimson Center Book, 2003), p. 136. [32] Pakistan Times (Islamabad), July 11, 1974.

[33] Lt. Gen (retired) Kamal Matinuddin, Pakistan-India Relations: A Historical Perspective, Regional Studies, Vo. XII, No. 1 (Winter 1993/94), p. 38. [34] Shirin Tahir-Kheli, The United States And Pakistan: The Evolution Of An Influence Relationship (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), pp. 62-63. [35] Surendra Chopra, Post-Simla Indo-Pakistan Relations Confrontation To Deescalation (New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1988), p. 135. [36] Stephen Philip Cohen and Richard L. Park, India: Emergent Power? Strategy Paper 33 (New York: Crane, Russak & Co., 1978), pp. XXI and 91. [37] Neil Joeck, Nuclear Development In India And Pakistan, Access Asia Review, Vol. 2 (1999), http://www.nbr.org/publications/review/vol2/essay.html (March 10, 2000), p. 4. [38] Tim Weiner, US Suspects India Prepares To Conduct Nuclear Test, New York Times, December 15, 1995; and Johan F. Burns, India Denies Atom Test But Then Turns Ambiguous, New York Times, December 16, 1995.

[39] For Indo-US scientific cooperation, see Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, Enchanting Indo-US Strategic Cooperation, Adelphi Paper 313 (London: Oxford University Press for The International Institute for Strategic Affairs, September 1997). [40] Strobe Talbott, Dealing With The Bomb In South Asia, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 2 (March/April 1999), p. 111. [41] Pakistan Reiterates Offer Of No War Pact With India, Daily Times (Lahore), June 13, 2004. Before Pakistans proposal of No War Pact to India, the Indian External Affairs Minister, Natwar Singh, had proposed a joint nuclear doctrine between India, Pakistan and China. Natwar Singhs proposal was not only criticised in Pakistan, but Indias opposition parties had also termed it as preposterous; see First Steps Of A Nuclear Doctrine, Daily Times (Lahore), June 7, 2004. [42] Niaz A. Naik, Towards A Nuclear-Safe South Asia, in Colonel David O. Smith (ed.), From Containment To Stability: Pakistan-United States Relations In The Post-Cold War Era (Washington DC: National Defence University, November 1993), pp. 45-46. [43] Prime Minister Nawaz Sharifs address to the National Defence College, Rawalpindi, on June 6, 1992, quoted in Farhatullah Babar, Nuclear Debate In S. Asia: A Plea For Sanity, Regional Studies, Vol. X, No. 4 (Autumn 1992), p. 59; and also see statement by Munir Akram, Ambassador/Permanent Representative Of Pakistan To The United Nations Conference On Disarmament, on May 14, 1998, at the Plenary of the Second Session of the Conference on Disarmament, <http://cns.miis.edu> (March 1, 2000), p. 3. Also see Kamal Matinuddin, The Nuclearisation Of South Asia (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 307-308. [44] John J. Mearsheimer, op. cit., p. 36; and also see, John H. Herz, Idealist Internationalism And The Security Dilemma, World Politics, Vol. 2, No. 2 (January 1950), pp. 157-180. [45] Joyce Battle, Bureau Of Intelligence and Research Intelligence Note, India: Uncertainty Over Nuclear Policy, June 13, 1974, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 6, (Washington DC: The National Security Archive, The Gelman Library, George Washington University), <nsarchiv@gwu.edu> (March 1, 2000), p. 9. [46] Quoted in, V. K. Nair, The Coming Environment, Link (New Delhi), September 29, 1991. Decade: Indias Security

[47] Chris Smith, Conventional Forces And Regional Stability, in Defense And Insecurity In The Southern Asia, The Henry L. Stimson Center Occasional Paper No. 21 (May 1995), p. 3. [48] Ibid.

[49] For more details concerning the attitude of Pakistani elite, see, Zulfqar Khan, The Development Of Overt Nuclear Weapon States In South Asia (Bradford: unpublished doctoral thesis, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, 2000). [50] T. T. Poulouse, The Politics Of Nuclear Free Zones And South Asia, Pacific Community, Vol. 8, No. 3 (April 1977), p. 556. [51] [52] See chapter seven, Zulfqar Khan, op. cit., fn 49, op. cit. Ibid, see chapter eight.

[53] Zalmay Khalilzad, Pakistan, The Making Of A Nuclear Weapon Power, Asian Survey, Vol. 16, No. 6 (June 1976), pp. 110-111. [54] Stephen Philip Cohen, Nuclear Neighbours, in Stephen Philip Cohen (ed.), Nuclear Proliferation In South Asia: The Prospects For Arms Control (Bouldor, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 8-9. [55] South Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, The Arms Control Reporter, 1-93 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1993), pp. 454.A.3-454.A.4. [56] [57] Ibid, p. 454.A.4. Ibid.

[58] Ibid, pp. 454.A.2-454.A.3; and for more details see, D. Shyam Babu, Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Towards A Universal NPT Regime (New Delhi: Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1992). [59] Samina Yasmeen, Pakistans Cautious Foreign Policy, Survival (Summer 1994), pp. 115-116. [60] The Arms Control Reporter, 1-93, op. cit., p. 454.A.4.

[61] Agha Shahi, Nuclear Non-Proliferation And Pakistan, Strategic Studies, Vol. XIV, No. 3 (Spring 1991), pp. 9-10. [62] Pakistans Nuclear Chief Says It Could Build The Bomb, The Washington Post, February 10, 1984. [63] Samina Ahmed, Pakistans Nuclear Weapons Program: Turning Points And Nuclear Choices, International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999), p. 188. [64] See, Bob Woodward, Pakistan Production, The Washington Post, November 4, 1986. [65] 1987), [66] Reported Near Atom-Arms

Ashok Kapur, Pakistans Nuclear Development (London: Croom Helm Ltd., p. 206. Samina Ahmed, op. cit., p. 188.

[67] [68] [69] [70] [71] [72] [73] [74] [75] [76]

IDSA News Review, Vol. 18, No. 8 (August 1985), p. 597. IDSA News Review, Vol. 18, No. 11 (November 1985), p. 870. Lt. Gen. Kamal Matinuddin, op. cit., p. 25. An Explosion Of Indian Self-Esteem, Newsweek, May 25, 1998, p. 25. Ground Zero, Newsweek, May 25, 1998, p. 25. Ibid, p. 26. Ibid, p. 27. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid, pp. 27-28.

[77] Kenneth N. Waltz, The Origin Of War In Neorealist Theory, in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb (eds.), The Origin And Prevention Of Major Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 43. [78] [79] 13, 1998. [80] For Pakistani perspective, see, Zulfqar Khan, fn 49, op. cit., chapter seven. Vajpayee Threatens To Use Nuclear Bomb, The Statesman (New Delhi), May Ibid.

[81] Munir Ahmed Khan, Nuclearisation Of South Asia And Its Regional And Global Implications, Regional Studies, Vol. XVI, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), p. 29. [82] [83] [84] Samina Ahmed, op. cit., pp. 194-195. Zulfqar Khan, fn 49, op. cit., chapters seven and eight. Asian Age, May 19, 1998.

[85] See statement by Munir Akram, Ambassador/Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations Conference on Disarmament, on May 14, 1998, at the Plenary of the Second Session of the Conference on Disarmament , <http://cns.miis.edu> (March 1, 2000), p. 5. [86] [87] [88] Neil Joeck, op. cit., pp. 14 and 20. Munir Akram, op. cit., pp. 5-6. Lt. Gen. Kamal Matinuddin, op. cit., p. 31.

[89] For a complete study of three theoretical models of security, domestic politics, and norms, and comparative analysis of Indo-Pakistani overt nuclearisation, see, Zulfqar Khan, fn 49, op. cit.; and Scott D. Sagan, Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models In Search Of A Bomb, International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996/97), p. 55. [90] Neil Joeck, op. cit., p. 23.

[91] Graham T. Allison, Essence Of Decision: Explaining The Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), pp. 34-35. The majority of respondents of the survey also supported the overt nuclearisation of Pakistan for deterrence purposes. They linked Pakistans abdication of nuclear weapons capability with the Indian weaponisation plan, and adherence to the NPT. In their viewpoint, Pakistans unilateral adherence to the NPT, and relinquishment of a de facto NWS status, would undermine its prestige and vital national security interests; see, Zulfqar Khan, fn 49, op. cit., chapter seven. [92] See, Karl F. Inderfurth, Inderfurth: Update On Efforts To Stabilize South Asia, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Near East and South Asia of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 3, 1998, <http://www.state.gov/www/policyremarks/1998/980603-inderfurth-efforts.html> (March 10, 2000), p. 1. [93] 170-171. [94] [95] Jon B. Wolfsthal, Asias Nuclear Dominos? Current History, (April 2003), pp.

Ibid, p. 171. Ibid, p. 172.

[96] Ibid. Regarding Indias great power status, in 1949, Nehru in a statement said: In regard to any major problem of a country or group of countries of Asia, India has to be considered. Whether it is a problem of defence or trade or industry or economic policy, India cannot be ignored. She cannot be ignored, becauseher geographic position is a compelling reason. She cannot be ignored also, because of her actual or potential power resources. See, Jawaharlal Nehru, Independence and After: A Collection Of Speeches, 1946-1949 (New York: John Day, 1950), p. 248. [97] The former Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh gave this statement soon after the nuclear tests of May 1998. Quoted in Jon B. Wolfsthal, op. cit., p. 172. [98] [99] Ibid. According to George Quester, that states that desire to dominate a region would

tend to develop nuclear weapons for hegemonic purposes. See, George Quester, The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), p. 18; and Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 50.

[100] See, Lloyd Jensen, Return from the Nuclear Brink: National Interest and the Nuclear Non -proliferation Treaty (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1974), p. 37. [101] Sumit Ganguly, Review Essay, Behind Indias Bomb: The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Deterrence, Foreign Affairs (September/October 2001), p. 139. [102] M. V. Ramana, Nuclear Notebook: Risks Of A LOW Doctrine, Economic and Political Weekly, March 1, 2003, p. 860. [103] India Today, May 25, 1987, p. 77. [104] Ravi Kaul, Indias Strategic Spectrum (New Delhi: Chanakya Publishing House, 1969), p. 200. [105] M. V. Ramana, op. cit., p. 860; and Israel Gets US Nod For AWACS Sale To India, Daily Times (Lahore), May 23, 2003. [106] Ibid. The issue of sale and release of PAC-3 system to India was discussed during the visit of US Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Stephen G. Rademaker, to New Delhi. See, Shishir Gupta, US To Release PAC-3 For India In June, Daily Times (Lahore), May 24, 2003. [107] Moreover, it would be difficult for the developing economies of both the countries to sustain huge expenses incurring on C4I2 systems. For more details see, John E. Pike et al., Defending Against The Bomb, in Stephen I. Schwartz et al. (Eds.), Atomic Audit (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), pp. 269-270. [108] Praful Bidwai, who maintains that the recommendations of the DND were considered too ambitious by the US. The US disapproval of triadic arsenal for the Indian forces, had motivated the Vajpayee government to simply put the DND in abeyance. See, Praful Bidwai, Nuclear South Asia: Still On The Edge, Frontline, January 31, 2003, pp. 116-117. [109] Ibid, p. 117. According to John Cherian, Indias decision to counter the chemical and biological weapons attacks with nuclear weapons indicates that New Delhis stated official policy of no first-use becomes irrelevant. See, John Cherian, Indias Paradoxical no first-use, Daily Times (Lahore), January 20, 2003. [110] See, Facing the WMD Threat: New US Strategy, Janes Terrorism & Security Monitory, January 2003, pp. 1-2. [111] Vishal Thapar and Jay Raina, Indias N-Command In Place, Hindustan Times, January 5, 2003. [112] Ibid.

[113] [114] [115]

Ibid. Praful Bidwai, op. cit., p. 117. John Cherian, op. cit.

[116] Graham T. Allison, op. cit., pp. 29-30, 32-33, 67-77, 144 and 246-247. Also see, Zulfqar Khan, fn 49, op. cit., pp. 11-12. [117] John E. Pike et al., op. cit., pp. 269-270.

[118] Cited in, Paul Richter and Thomas H. Maugh II, One Step Away From Nuclear War, Los Angeles Times, June 2, 2002. [119] Scott D. Sagan, Nuclear Alerts And Crisis Management, International Security, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Spring 1985), pp. 99-139, and 135. Alan F. Phillips writes that he had collected twenty incidents of accidents and mishaps that might have triggered a nuclear war between the US and the former Soviet Union during the Cold War. Alan F. Phillips, 20 Mishaps That Might Have Started Accidental Nuclear War (Toronto: Defence Research and Education Centre, 1998) cited in, Alan F. Phillips, M. D., No Launch On Warning, Ploughshares Working Paper 02-1, <http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/02.05/0506phillipsnolaunch.htm> (October 21, 2003), p. 4. [120] For more details regarding the limitations of civilian leadership see, Scott D. Sagan, The Limits Of Safety: Organizations, Accidents And Nuclear Weapons (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). [121] M. V. Ramana, op. cit., p. 861.

[122] See, Raj Chengappa, The Secret Story Of Indias Quest To Be A Nuclear Power (New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2000), p. 437. [123] Praful Bidwai, Our Mutual Nuclear Death Wish, The News (Islamabad), February 7, 2003. [124] See, Graham T. Allison, op. cit.

[125] See Brajesh Mishras interview to The Indian Express Editor-in-Chief, Shekhar Gupta. India-Pakistan Were At The Brink Of War Twice Last Year, Daily Times (Lahore), May 24, 2003. [126] M. V. Ramana, op. cit., p. 861.

[127] See, V. R. Raghavan, Limited War And Nuclear Escalation In South Asia, Nonproliferation Review (Fall-Winter 2001), pp. 82-98 and 90. [128] [129] Scott Sagan quoted in M. V. Ramana, op. cit., pp. 861-862. Graham T. Allison, op. cit., p. 17.

[130] According to Thomas J. Badey, the threat of nuclear terrorism by non-state actors through the so-called state-sponsors, are apparently low. See, Thomas J. Badey, Nuclear Terrorism: Actor-Based Threat Assessment, Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 16, No. 2, Summer 2001, p. 44. [131] The Bush Administrations National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (USCWMD), which was published in December 2002, is clearly designed to bolster Washingtons proactive and interdiction-oriented policy towards the WMD, materials and technology proliferation to states and terrorist groups. The USCWMD emphasis is on counter-proliferation with right to employ overwhelming force and all options, including pre-emptive measures, to neutralize a perceived threat to US security and interests. This strategy also unequivocally outlines that countries will be held responsible for complying with their (non-proliferation) commitments, which does not explain the mechanism that would induce the other states to comply with this doctrine. Hence, there would be a sufficient room for the US policymakers to interpret this policy in accordance with its global interests. See, Facing The WMD Threat: New US Strategy, Janes Terrorism & Security Monitory (January 2003), pp. 1-2. [132] On December 20, 2002, the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) in its final report urged the Government of India to review its no first-use policy. See, India Not To Review No-First-Use Policy, The Hindu, January 1, 2003. [133] John Cherian, op. cit. Commenting on Indias no-first use of nuclear weapons, Michael Krepon writes: The Indian government has officially adopted a no-first-use doctrine, while issuing an unofficial, draft nuclear posture that undercuts this core principle by embracing the western requirement of prompt nuclear retaliation. This is not at all helpful, since nuclear forces truly configured to retaliate quickly look indistinguishable from those postured to strike first. Declarations of good intentions are clearly insufficient in Asia. Meanwhile, calculations of deterrence acquire a momentum of their own. Michael Krepon, Cooperative Threat Reduction, Missile Defense, And The Nuclear Future (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, A Henry L. Stimson Center Book, 2003), p. 190. [134] SIPRIs report cited in, Indias Arms Imports Up 72% In 2002, Daily Times (Lahore), June 18, 2003. [135] [136] [137] See, Zulfqar Khan, fn 49, op. cit., chapter eight. Scott D. Sagan, fn 89, op. cit., p. 55. See, Zulfqar Khan, fn 49, op. cit., chapter eight.

[138] See, Praful Bidwai, India Should Rethink It Policy On Pakistan, Daily Times (Lahore), May 17, 2003. [139] See, Zulfqar Khan, fn 26, op. cit.

[140] Robert Jervis, Mutual Assured Destruction, Foreign Policy, November/December 2002, p. 40. [141] Pakistan Firm On First-Strike <http://headlines.sify.com/915news5.html> (May 5, 2002). [142] Nuclear Policy,

See Brajesh Mishras interview to The Indian Express, fn 125, op. cit.

[143] Cited in, Paul Richter and Thomas H. Maugh II, One Step Away From Nuclear War, Los Angeles Times, June 2, 2002. [144] Cited in, Khalid Hasan, Nuclear Dangers Remain High In South Asia, Daily Times (Lahore), May 4, 2003. [145]. Robert Jervis, op. cit., pp. 41-42. [146] Robert Jervis, op. cit., p.42.

[147] Scott D. Sagan, Origin Of The Pacific War, in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb (eds.), The Origin And Prevention Of Major Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 352. [148] Robert S. McNamara, Forty Years After 13 Days, Arms Control Today (November 2002), pp. 3 and 8. [149] [150] Ibid, pp. 4-5. Graham T. Allison, op. cit., pp. 29-30, 32-33, 67-77, 144, and 246-247.

[151] Kenneth N. Waltz, fn 11, op. cit., p. 23. According to Michael Krepon, The last fifteen years of the Cold War produced extraordinary accomplishments in reducing dangers associated with weapons of mass destruction. These breakthroughs began with Presidents Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev who pledged that a nuclear war must never be fought and could not be won. Subsequently, they lent credence to this proclamation by concluding the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which eliminated entire classes of nuclear weapon-launchers from Europe. Michael Krepon, fn 133, op. cit., pp. 26-27. [152] [153] 2003. Cited in, Paul Richter and Thomas H. Maugh II, op. cit. Praful Bidwai, Shooting Ourselves In The Foot, The News (Islamabad), May 15,

[154] Pervez Hoodbhoy, Nuclear Issues Between India And Pakistan: Myths And Realities, The Henry L. Stimson Center, Occasional Paper No. 18 (Washington DC: July 1994), p. 12. [155] For more details see, John E. Pike et. al., Defending Against The Bomb, in Stephen I. Schwartz (et. al., Eds.), Atomic Audit (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), pp. 269-270.

[156] [157]

Ibid, p. 198. Ibid, pp. 198 and 261.

[158] K. Subrahmanyam, Nuclear India In Global Politics, Strategic Digest, Vol. XXVII, No. 12 (December 1998), p. 2003. According to Michael Krepon, New nuclear weapon states will certainly not emulate the size of Cold War arsenals, but their early moves have taken a familiar form. Even partial emulation creates special difficulties in Asia. China, India, and Pakistan have all declared that they will avoid the excesses of western nuclear theology, but they appear trapped in calculations where requirements are determined in relative, not absolute, terms. Deterrence calculations will be of an entirely different (and wiser) scale in Asia, but MAD will also be harder to calibrate because the calculus of competition in southern Asia is triangular rather than bipolar. If nuclear capabilities grow on one leg of this triangle, pressures will also grow on the other two. Michael Krepon, fn 133, op. cit., p. 190. [159] For more detail on LOW, see M. V. Ramana, fn 102, op. cit.

[160] Stephen P. Cohen, Moving Forward In South Asia, Policy Brief 81 (May 2001) of the Brookings Institution (Washington DC: 2001), p. 4. [161] Andrew C. Winner and Toshi Yoshihara, India And Pakistan At The Edge, Survival, Vol. 44, No. 3 (Autumn 2002), p. 79. [162] Ibid, p. 71.

[163] According to Keith B. Payne and Colin S. Gray, the past crises between India and Pakistan had a persistent pattern of misinterpretations and misreading of political and military intelligence. See, Keith B. Payne and Colin S. Gray, Deterrence In The Second Nuclear Age (Lexington, KY: The University of Kentucky Press, 1996), p. 22. [164] See, M. V. Ramana, Steps To Peace, Daily Times (Lahore), May 22, 2003.

[165] Rahul Bedi, Indias Nuclear Struggle, Janes Defence Weekly, February 5, 2003, p. 19. [166] [167] Ibid. Ibid.

[168] According to the former US Secretary of Defense, William Perry, the superpowers had avoided nuclear confrontation during the Cold War due to good luck, I can only hope (India and Pakistan) will be as lucky as we were. Cited in, Ben Sheppard, Ballistic Missiles: Complicating The Nuclear Quagmire, in D. R. SarDesai and Raju G. C. Thomas (Eds.), Nuclear India In The Twenty-First Century (N. York, Palgrave-MacMillanTM, 2002), p. 200.

[169] Scott D. Sagan, fn 147, op. cit., pp. 323-352. For a limited war concept between India and Pakistan, see Zulfqar Khan, fn 26, op. cit. [170] Robert Jervis, The Political Effects Of Nuclear Weapons, in Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Steven E. Miller, and Stephen Van Evera (Eds.), Nuclear Diplomacy And Crisis Management (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1990), p. 29. [171] See, Neil Joeck, Maintaining Nuclear Stability In South Asia, Adelphi Paper 312 (Oxford: The Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 12. [172] Although India has always maintained a policy to resolve all the bilateral issues, including the Kashmir dispute, between the two countries bilaterally. But, the 2001-2002 military standoff is testimony to a horrendous fact that this tense situation was defused with the shuttle diplomacy of the Western and US leaders. See, Zulfqar Khan, fn 26, op. cit. [173] See, Richard Betts, Nuclear Blackmail And Nuclear Balance (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1987), p. 211. [174] For more detail on stability and instability concept see, Michael Krepon, The Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, And Escalation Control In South Asia, The Henry L. Stimson Center (May 2003), p. 8. [175] US Department of State, Bureau of Verification And Compliance, World Military Expenditures And Arms Transfer, 1999-2000 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 2002), pp. 2-3. [176] Michael Krepon, fn 174, op. cit, pp. 8-9.

[177] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Transfers And Licensed Production Of Major Conventional Weapons: Exports to India, Transfers And Licensed Production Of Major Conventional Weapons: Exports to India, <http://projects.sipri.sc/armstrade/INDIA MPTS 93-02.PDF>. [178] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Transfers And Licensed Production Of Major Conventional Weapons: Exports to India, Transfers And Licensed Production Of Major Conventional Weapons: Exports To Pakistan, <http://projects.sipri.sc/armstrade/PAK MPTS 93-02.PDF.> [179] Michael Krepon, fn 174, op. cit, p. 9.

[180] Ibid. Alexander I. Nikitin, member of International Pugwash Council, Director, Center for Political and International Studies, Moscow, Russia, has also put forward Ten Commandments in this regard. See, Alexander I. Nikitin, Ten Commandments Originating From 50 Years Of Russian-American Nuclear History To Pakistani and Indian Nuclear Planners, Pugwash Meeting No. 280, Pugwash Workshop On Avoiding An India-Pakistan Nuclear Confrontation, Lahore, Pakistan, March 11-12, 2003. [181] Michael Krepon, fn 174, op. cit, p. 10.

[182] Ibid, p. 14. Other nuclear deterrence theorists, including Bruce Blair and Scott Sagan maintain that the future nuclear threshold would be crossed due to organizational, bureaucratic and institutional bias or mishap instead of a calibrated national strategy. Because, of these factors, writes Bruce Blair, nuclear posturing could lead to accidents waiting to happen. See, Bruce Blair, The Logic Of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1993), p. 9. While Scott Sagans study of the Cold War cases had led him to conclude that, Nuclear weapons may have madedeliberate war less likely, but the complex and tightly coupled nuclear arsenals we have constructed has simultaneously made accidental war more likely. See, Scott Sagan, The Limits Of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, And Nuclear Weapons (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 264, emphasis in the original. [183] The Consequences Of Nuclear Conflict Between India And Pakistan: NRDCs Nuclear Experts Think About The Unthinkable, Using State-of-the-art Nuclear War Simulation Software To assess The Crisis In South Asia Pugwash Meeting No. 280, Pugwash Workshop On Avoiding An India-Pakistan Nuclear Confrontation, Lahore, Pakistan, March 11-12, 2003, p. 1. [184] [185] [186] [187] [188] [189] Ibid. Ibid, pp. 2-3. Ibid, pp. 3-4. Ibid, p. 4. Vajpayee Rules Out Scrapping Nukes, Daily Times (Lahore), May 9, 2003. See, Zulfqar Khan, fn 26, op. cit.

[190] Thomas C. Schelling, Deterrence And Compellence in the Purple Patch column of the Daily Times (Lahore), July 2, 2003. Commenting about the triangulation nature of Asian nuclear rivalry, Michael Krepon writes that, Southern Asia presents a far more complex model. Leaders in Beijing, New Delhi, and Islamabad all say that minimum deterrence will serve as their guide, and that they will avoid the competitive drives leading to ever-larger nuclear arsenals. But national leaders in all three countries have also acknowledged that deterrence is not a static concept. The requirements of each state will depend, in some measure, on what the others are doing or might seek to do. Beijings calculations of nuclear sufficiency will reverberate in New Delhi, and Indias recalibrated nuclear requirements will reverberate in Islamabad. At the top of this cascade, Beijings calculations will be affected by US deployments of national and advanced theatre missile defences. See, Michael Krepon, fn 133, op. cit., pp. 133 and 138. On the issue of bilateral deterrence paradigm between India and Pakistan, on September 13, 2004, Indian Defence Minister, Pranab Mukerjee, in a major policy statement reiterated Indias resolve to use nuclear weapons against Pakistan, if the policy of deterrence fails. See, Iftikhar Gilani, India Will Use Nukes If Deterrence Fails, Daily Times (Lahore), September 14, 2004.

[191]

Michael Krepon, fn 174, op. cit, p. 1.

[192] Cited in Derek Leebaert, The Fifty-Year Wound: The True Price Of Americas Cold War Victory (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 2002), p. 389. [193] Kenneth N. Waltz, fn. 11, op. cit, p. 14.

[194] Powell Snubs Sinha Over Pre-emptive Strike, To Visit Delhi, Political Events (New Delhi), April 17, 2003, p. 15. [195] See, Michael Krepon, fn 174, op. cit, p. 3. Bernard Brodie also observed that, Stability is achieved when each nation believes that the strategic advantage of striking first is overshadowed by the tremendous cost of doing so. See, Bernard Brodie, Strategy In The Missile Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 303. [196] Michael Krepon, fn 174, op. cit, p. 3. Maintaining the nuclear stability is absolutely imperative for both the countries, because, No adequate defence against the bomb exists, and the possibilities of its existence in the future are exceedingly remote, writes Bernard Brodie, in his influential book, The Absolute Weapons. See, Bernard Brodie, The Absolute Weapon (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & Co., 1946), p. 28. While Albert Einstein in an interview to the New York Times Magazine had also concluded that, Rifle bullets kill men, but atomic bombs kill cities. A tank is a defence against a bullet but there is no defence in science against a weapon which can destroy civilization. Cited in Michael Krepon, fn 133, op. cit, p. 85. [197] Rodney W. Jones, Is Stable Nuclear Deterrence Feasible?, Pugwash Meeting No. 280, Pugwash Workshop On Avoiding An India-Pakistan Nuclear Confrontation, Lahore, Pakistan, March 11-12, 2003, pp. 1-2. Also see, Ejaz Haider, Stable Deterrence And Flawed Pakistani Nuclear Strategy, Pugwash Meeting No. 280, Pugwash Workshop On Avoiding An India-Pakistan Nuclear Confrontation, Lahore, Pakistan, March 11-12, 2003, pp. 1-2. [198] Ejaz Haider cited in ibid. Indias then Army Chief, General S. Padmanabhan, had remarked that a limited military conflict with Pakistan was possible with a view to stop the alleged terrorist attacks without ever jeopardising mutual deterrent. See, From One General To Another: Were Ready, The Indian Express (New Delhi), January 12, 2002. Robert Jervis commenting about the stability and instability inconsistency associated with the nuclear weapons, writes that, To the extent that the military balance is stable at the level of all-out nuclear war, it will become less stable at lower levels of violence. See, Robert Jervis, The Illogic Of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University press, 1984), p. 31. Similar views were also expressed by B. H. Liddell Hart, who wrote that, to the extent that the H(ydrogen)-bomb reduces the likelihood of full-scale war, it increases the possibility of limited war pursued by widespread local aggression. See, B. H. Liddell Hart, Deterrent Or Defence(London: Stevens and Sons, 1960), p. 23. For further study, also see, Glenn Snyder, Deterrence And Defense (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961). [199] Rodney W. Jones, op. cit., p. 3.

[200] [201] [202] [203]

Ibid, p. 4. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.

[204] US, Not Nukes, Prevented War Between India And Pakistan, Daily Times (Lahore), March 9, 2003. [205] [206] Ibid. Rodney W. Jones, op. cit, p. 4.

[207] Lt. Gen (retired) Talat Masood, The Indo-Pakistan Impasse, Pugwash Meeting No. 280, Pugwash Workshop On Avoiding An India-Pakistan Nuclear Confrontation, Lahore, Pakistan, March 11-12, 2003, p. 2. [208] Ibid, p. 4. Michael Krepon writes that, If New Delhi, Beijing, and Islamabad are to find nuclear safety, they are likely to do so through a combination of bilateral cooperation, unilateral preparation to reduce the risk of accident or miscalculation, as well as unilateral restraint. In the absence of verifiable treaty regimes, nuclear risk reduction is likely to be found if at all through an acceptance of bilateral asymmetries in force sizing and deployment readiness. Pakistan, the state with the weakest military posture and most vulnerable nuclear deterrent, would have to refrain from competing with India, while maintaining some nuclear capabilities in a survivable status. New Delhi would need to refrain from competing with China and from posturing its nuclear capabilities so as to threaten Pakistan. The establishment of hierarchical and stable nuclear postures in southern Asia is an enormously difficult and ambitious agenda. Successful nuclear risk reduction will require finding a unique mixture of transparency and survivability for nuclear capabilities, as well as creative monitoring arrangements that provide reassurance without increased vulnerability. See, Michael Krepon, fn 133, op. cit., pp. 163-164. [209] [210] [211] Lt. Gen (retired) Talat Masood, op. cit., p. 2. Ibid, p. 4. Ibid, p. 4.

[212] Thucydides cited in, Alexander Nikitin, Analyzing The Causes Of War And Peace, in Majid Tehranian and David W. Chappell (eds.), Dialogue Of Civilizations: A New Agenda For A New Millennium (London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd in association with The Toda Institute for Global Peace and Policy Research, 2002), p. 163. [213] [214] Ibid. Ibid.

[215] Pervez Hoodbhoy, Pakistans Nuclear Future, in Samina Ahmed and David Cartright (eds.), Pakistan And The Bomb: Public Opinion And Nuclear Options (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 70. [216] Andrew C. Winner and Toshi Yoshihara, op. cit, p. 73.

[217] Pervez Hoodbhoy cited in, Samina Ahmed and David Cartright (eds.), Pakistan And The Bomb: Public Opinion And Nuclear Options (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 94. [218] Graham T. Allison, op. cit, p. 17. Indo-Pak Nuclear Confrontation, The

[219] Farhatullah Babar, Avoiding News (Islamabad), March 10, 2003. [220] Ibid.

[221] Commander Rajesh Pendharkar, The Lahore Declaration And Beyond: Maritime Confidence-Building Measures In South Asia, The Henry L. Stimson Center, Occasional Paper No. 51, February 2003, p. 7. [222] Ibid. Besides, India is also planning to buy Phalcon Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AWACS) worth US$ 1.2 billion from Israel, and the Patriot anti-missile system from US. This would seriously undermine Pakistans deterrence credibility. See, Wajahat Ali, India And The Phalcon Sale, Daily Times (Lahore), May 29, 2003. According to Shishir Gupta, While India is still to develop the sea-based retaliatory capability, the exercise of modifying the Mirage-2000HSU-30MKI for nuclear delivery has already begun. The intermediate range Agni II and the long range Agni III missiles are scheduled to be inducted by the end of the current 10 th five-year plan. Otherwise, as it happened during Operation Parakram, India will have to rely on the air force for its second strike capability. See, Shishir Gupta, Agni: Sharpening Our N-Point, Indian Express (New Delhi), January 14, 2003. [223] Ibid, pp. 7-8.

[224] Peter Slevin and Bradley Graham, Indian Arms Plan Worries State Department, The Washington Post (Washington DC), July 23, 2002. [225] Ibid.

[226] Douglas Frantz, US And Pakistan Discuss Nuclear Security, The New York Times (New York), October 1, 2002. Also see, Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, Is The US-Pakistan Honeymoon Over?, Janes Defence Weekly, January 15, 2003, p. 21. [227] Pakistan To Further Tighten Security At Nuclear Facilities, Daily Times (Lahore), January 23, 2003.

[228] See President Musharrafs statement regarding Pakistans nuclear policy, The Reuters, March 6, 2003. [229] For more details regarding the balance of power, see Kenneth Waltz, America As A Model For The World?, PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 24, No. 4 (1991), p. 670. [230] Vinod Patney, Cutting Through The Nuclear Fog, Indian Express (New Delhi), January 13, 2003. [231] Kenneth Waltz, fn 229, op. cit, p. 669.

[232] Stephen Krasner, Realism, Imperialism, And Democracy, Political Theory, 20 (1992), p. 39. The concept of cooperative threat reduction is far too important and useful to be confined to the former Soviet Union, writes Michael Krepon, Instead, CTR-related activities can and should be employed in other troubled regions, wherever dangerous weapons and materials are being held by states that are willing to forgo them in return for economic or security assistance. The practical application of cooperative threat reduction to contain, reduce, and eliminate dangerous weapons and materials should extend as far as political adroitness and financial backing will allow. The elevation of cooperative threat reduction to a central organizing principle for reducing dangers associated with weapons of mass destruction can also clarify missteps in the pursuit of deterrence. See, Michael Krepon, fn 133, op. cit., pp. 11-12. [233] Michael Krepon, Those Fuzzy Red Lines, Daily Times (Lahore), February 3, 2003.

[234] Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory, Nuclear Proliferation, And National Missile Defense, International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Spring 2003), p. 89. [235] Thomas C. Schelling, Arms And Influence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 97. [236] Ibid, p. 187.

[237] Scott. D. Sagan and Jeremi Suri, The Madman Nuclear Alert, International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Spring 2003), p.150. [238] McGeorge Bundy, Danger And Survival: Choices About The Bomb In The First Fifty Years (New York: Random House, 1988), p. 542. [239] Karl von Clausewitz cited in, Robert D. Kaplan, Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands A Pagan Ethos (New York: Vintage Books, 2002), p. 42. [240] Ibid, pp. 41-42.

[241] Accord to Thomas Schelling, The power to hurt is bargaining power. To exploit it is diplomacy. See, Thomas Schelling, fn. 235, op. cit. [242] India And Pakistan Now Committed To Dialogue, Says Powell, Daily Times (Lahore), July 25, 2003.

[243] [244]

Robert S. McNamara, fn 148, op. cit, pp. 4-8. Ibid.

[245] Ben Sheppard, op. cit, p. 201. The symmetry of power was a significant factor for the endurance of the mutual deterrence between the US and the Soviet Union, writes P. Terrence Hopmann. He elaborates that; Furthermore, although there were some minor differences across various categories of strategic weapons, the overall strategic balance was one of approximate parity. This parity was most clearly reflected in the balance often described as mutual assured destruction. That is, neither side had an ability to launch a disarming first strike against the other. Of course, some individual analysts were sceptical of this overall strategic balance and focused on asymmetries of specific weapon systems. Therefore, reliance on these weapons created crisis instability, the possibility that in a crisis the Soviets might be tempted to launch these missiles before they could be attacked by an opposing force. P. Terrence Hopmann, Strategic Arms Control Negotiations: SALT And START, in Rudolf Avenhaus et al. (Eds.), Containing The Atom: International Negotiations On Nuclear Security And Safety (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2002), pp. 44-45. [246] NATO Military Committee 14/2 (Revised) (Final Decision), p. 9 cited in, Beatrice Heuser, NATO, Britain, France And The FRG: Nuclear Strategies And Forces For Europe, 1949-2000 (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1997), p. 10. [247] Ibid.

[248] Ben Sheppard, op. cit, p. 201. Indias Defence Minister, George Fernandes in a statement on July 30, 2003, in the Parliament stated that New Delhi had conducted 20 tests of seven missiles in the first half of 2003 (between January 1 to June 30). The two variants of the nuclear-capable Agni missiles with a range of 700 (Agni-I) and 2000 (Agni-II) kilometres were being inducted into the Indian Army. Additionally, the Prithvi missile, which has a range of 200 kilometres, has already been inducted in the army. [249] The Lahore Declaration, IPRI Factfile, Vol. V, No. 6 (June 2003), p. 5. In 1998, India-Pakistan had concluded an agreement on the Non-Attack of Nuclear Facilities, which was brought into force in 1991. This accord obliges each state to provide a list of facilities in January of each year, but, with no mechanism to verify the completeness of the lists presented. [250] Rose Gottemoeller and Rebecca Longsworth, Enhancing Nuclear Security In The Counter-Terrorism Struggle: India And Pakistan As A New Region For Cooperation, NonProliferation Project, Working Papers, No. 29 (August 2002), Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, p. 8. [251] Ibid, p. 11.

[252] Rose Gottemoeller and Rebecca Longsworth have suggested 14 areas of potential cooperation, pp. 12-14.

[253] Kenneth N. Waltz, Globalization And American Power, The National Interest (Spring 2000), p. 7. [254] John J. Mearsheimer, Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War, International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), p. 6. [255] Derek Leebaert, op. cit., p. 149.

[256] According to William T. Lee, the Soviet Defence Minister, General Yazov, Until Chernobyl, I was convinced that we could fight a nuclear war and prevail. See, William T. Lee, CIA Estimates Of Former Soviet Union Military Expenditures: Errors And Waste (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1997), p. 157. Similarly, the Indian leadership also frequently expressed a dangerous misperception regarding winning a nuclear war against Pakistan, especially during the military standoff of 2001-2002. For instance, Indian Defence Minister, George Fernandes in a statement stated that in the case of a nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan, the former would be able to survive a couple of nuclear attacks, but the latter would cease to exist. See, A Dangerous Verbal War, Daily Times (Lahore), January 10, 2003. Irresponsible rhetoric and the deployment of nuclear weapons would continue to heighten the state of alertness, especially during the crises, which could motivate the leadership of two countries to rely on the pre-emptive attack or the LOW strategies. For detail, see, M. V. Ramana, Military Planning And Nuclear Weapons, Daily Times (Lahore), January 16, 2003. [257] Beatrice Heuser, op. cit, p. 37. On January 12, 1954, the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, in a statement also announced administrations determination to meet any eventuality through a policy of massive retaliation at the places and targets of their own choice. Cited in, Beatrice Heuser, p. 37. [258] See NATOs strategy Military Committee Paper 48, cited in Beatrice Heuser, op. cit, p. 36. [259] Ibid, p. 37.

[260] See, A Dangerous Verbal War, Daily Times (Lahore), January 10, 2003. On September 13, 2004, the Indian Defence Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, in a statement reiterated Indias resolve to use nuclear weapons if the policy of deterrence failed between India and Pakistan. See, India Will Use Nukes If Deterrence Fails, Daily Times (Lahore), September 14, 2004. [261] [262] [263] Robert Powell, op. cit, p. 91. Ibid. Richard K. Betts, op. cit, pp. 10-11.

[264] Regarding the role of the statesmen during crisis, see, Marc Trachtenberg, The Influence Of Nuclear Weapons In The Cuban Missile Crisis, International Security, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Summer 1985), p. 146.

[265] Rizvi and Basrur, Nuclear Terrorism In South Asia, Pugwash Meeting No. 280, Pugwash Workshop On Avoiding An India-Pakistan Nuclear Confrontation, Lahore, Pakistan, March 11-12, 2003, p. 1. [266] Ibid. According to Joby Warrick, There have been dozens of cases of trafficking in radiological materials over the past three years, along with what some weapons experts describe as a disturbing new trend. While most sellers of such materials have traditionally been amateurs opportunists and lone actors in search of easy profits authorities now seeing a surge of interest among criminal groups. In a string of incidents from the Caucasus and Eastern Europe to West Africa and South America, gangs have stalked and stolen radiological devices to sell for profits or to use in crimes ranging from extortion to murder. The new interest in radiological material by smugglers and criminal networks complicates an already difficult task confronting governments: how to stop terrorists from obtaining any of the tens of thousands of powerful radiological sources around the world that are currently in private hands or have simply been discarded. See, Joby Warrick, Smugglers Enticed By Dirty Bomb Components, The Washington Post, November 30, 2003. [267] Ibid, pp. 1-2.

[268] Ibid, p. 4. According to US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, During 2002, a major war between them perhaps involving nuclear weapons seemed distinctly possible. So, working with partners in Europe and Asia, we mobilized to help end the crisis. We have since been trying to turn our parallel improvement of relations with India and Pakistan into a triangle of conflict resolution. We do not impose ourselves as a mediator. But we do try to use the trust we have established with both sides to urge them toward conciliation by peaceful means. Cited in, Mr Powells Useful Mea Culpa, Editorial of the Daily Times (Lahore), January 2, 2004. [269] National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The White House, Washington DC (September 2002), pp. 5-7, 13-16. [270] [271] Ibid, p. 14. Ibid.

[272] Ibid, pp. 6 and 15. Elaborating the concept of pre-emption, US Secretary of State Colin Powells article A Strategy Of Partnerships in the Foreign Affairs issue of JanuaryFebruary 2004, writes, As to pre-emptions scope, it applies only to the undeterrable threats that come from non-state actors such as terrorist groups. It was never meant to displace deterrence, only to supplement it. Above all, the Presidents strategy is one of partnerships that strongly affirm the vital role of NATO and other US alliances including the UN.The United States National Security Strategy does commit us to pre-emption under certain limited circumstances. We stand by that judgement, the novelty of which lies less in its substance than in its explicitness. But our strategy is not defined by pre-emption. Cited in, Powell Admits US Diplomatic Errors, Daily Times (Lahore), January 1, 2004. Also see, Mr Powells Useful Mea Culpa (editorial), Daily Times (Lahore), January 2, 2004.

[273] National Security Strategy of the United States of America, op. cit., p. 15. According to M. V. Ramana, a physicist and research staff member at the Princeton Universitys Programme on Science and Global Security and co-editor of Prisoners of the Nuclear Dream, Worse still, pro-nuclear advocates in the US have called for developing smaller yield nuclear weapons to use against regimes involved in international terrorism. And instead of sending them to lunatic asylums, the US government is acting on their advice. Thus the nuclear terrorism bandwagon has become a convenient rationalisation for continued possession of nuclear arsenals by states. Finally, by emphasising that non-state actors are crazy and irresponsible, the discourse of nuclear terrorism allows the mindset of political elites, who are capable of far more death and destruction in the pursuit of grandiose aims (vital national interests), to go unchallenged. See, M. V. Ramana, Nuclear Terrorism The Greater Dangers, Daily Times (Lahore), December 18, 2003. [274] Ivo H. Daalder, James M. Lindsay, and James B. Steinberg, The Choices: National Security And The War On Terrorism, Current History (December 2002), p. 412. [275] Henry Kissinger cited in ibid.

[276] Ivo H. Daalder, James M. Lindsay, and James B. Steinberg, op. cit., p. 413. [277] Rose Gottemoeller and Rebecca Longsworth, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

[278] See the statement by Ambassador Stephen Sestanovich, US Department of State, New Independent States, >http://www.state.gov/www/budget /fy 2001/fn 150/forops_full/150fy01_fo_nis.html<. [279] Robert Kagan, Of Paradise And Power: American And Europe In The New World Order (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), pp. 3-4. [280] Ibid, pp. 5-6.

[281] National Security Strategy of the United States of America, op. cit. pp. 13-16. Also see, Facing The WMD Threat: New US Strategy, Janes Terrorism & Security Monitory (January 2003), pp. 1-2. For more details regarding the US pre-emption policy, see, Colin Powells article titled: A Strategy Of Partnerships in the Foreign Affairs magazines of January-February 2004. [282] [283] [284] [285] [286] [287] National Security Strategy of the United States of America, ibid, p. 14. Ibid, pp. 5-7. Ibid, pp. 5-7, and 13-16. Thomas J. Badey, op. cit, pp.41-42. Ibid, pp. 41 and 44. Ibid, pp. 44-45.

[288] See Mark, Taylor Eyster, Maraman and Wechsler, Can Terrorists Build Nuclear Weapons? (Washington DC: Nuclear Control Institute) >http://www.nci.org/makeab.htm<. [289] See, David Hughes, When Terrorists Go Nuclear, Popular Mechanics (January 1996). [290] Ibid.

[291] See Table 1: Threat Assessment Scale For Nuclear Terrorism, Thomas J. Badey, op. cit, p. 43. [292] Barry R. Posen, The Struggle Against Terrorism, International Security, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Winter 2001/02), pp.41-42. [293] See, Wade Boese, US Pushes Initiative To Block Shipments Of WMD, Missiles, The Arms Control Today (July/August 2003). On February 11, 2004, President Bush announced new measures to counter the WMD proliferation, see President Announces New Measures To Counter The Threat Of WMD, <http://www.edu/info/whatsnew/PresBush-NDU.cfm> (March 7, 2004). [294] See Masood Khan, Pakistans Foreign Office spokesman statement of August 22, 2003, Pakistan Renews Talks Offer On Nuclear CBMs, Daily Times (Lahore), August 23, 2003. [295] [296] Ibid. Pakistan To Forgo Kashmir Plebiscite, Daily Times (Lahore), December 19, 2003.

[297] Vajpayee Wants Transition From Tension To Peace, Daily Times (Lahore), January 5, 2004. [298] Vajpayee Meets Musharraf Today, Daily Times (Lahore), January 5, 2004.

[299] Musharraf-Vajpayee Meeting: Peace Momentum Will Continue, Daily Times (Lahore), January 6, 2004. After Musharraf-Vajpayee meeting, in a joint statement issued by Pakistan and India on January 6, 2004, reiterated, Both leaders welcomed the recent steps towards normalisation of relations between the two countries and expressed the hope that the positive trends set by the CBMs (confidence-building measures) would be consolidated. Prime Minister Vajpayee said that in order to take forward and sustain the dialogue process, violence, hostility and terrorism must be prevented. President Musharraf reassured Prime Minister Vajpayee that he would not permit any territory under Pakistans control to be used to support terrorism in any manner. President Musharraf emphasised that a sustained and productive dialogue addressing all issues would lead to positive results. To carry the process of normalisation forward, the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India agreed to commence the process of the composite dialogue in February 2004. See, Text Of Joint Statement, Daily Times (Lahore), January 7, 2004

[300] Lt. Gen. N. Hanning (ret.), Essential Equivalence: The End Of The Nuclear Deterrent Myth, International Defense Review, Vol. 12, No. 2 (April 4, 1979), p. 179. [301] McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara, and Gerard Smith, Nuclear Weapons And The Atlantic Alliance, Foreign Affairs, (Spring 1982), p. 9. [302] 76. Bernard Brodie (ed.), The Absolute Weapon (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946), p.

[303] An Open Letter To President Carter And Chairman Brezhnev, Physicians For Social Responsibility, PSR Newsletter, Vol. 1, No. 2 (April 1980), p. 1. [304] For more details on contradictions in a deterrent strategy, see Allan Krass, Deterrence And Its Contradictions, in Burns H. Weston (ed.), Toward Nuclear Disarmament And Global Security: A Search For Alternatives (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press Inc., 1984), pp. 209-244. [305] [306] [307] Robert Jervis, op. cit., fn 140, p. 42. Thomas Schelling cited in, Allan Krass, op. cit., p. 209. An Open Letter To President Carter And Chairman Brezhnev, op. cit., p. 1.

[308] During the North Atlantic Council meeting in May 1965, US Defence Secretary, Robert McNamara, stated that neither he expected an all-out war or a limited nuclear attack and neither a massive conventional conflict between the Warsaw Pace and NATO forces. Cited in, Beatrice Heuser, op. cit., p. 13. According to Raymond Aron, the most important French political commentator of the last century, Wars are by nature unpredictable. But the wars of the twentieth century have been much more unpredictable than those of the past. And the way they unfold turns the situations that gave rise to them upside down. Raymond Aron (Translated by Barbara Bray, and Edited by Yair Reiner) , The Dawn Of Universal History: Selected Essays From A Witness Of The Twentieth Century (New York: Basic Books, 2002), p. 77. [309] On June 20, 2004, India and Pakistan officials during talks on nuclear-related CBMs in New Delhi, had agreed to establish a dedicated secure hotline to prevent misunderstandings and reduce risks relevant to nuclear issues, and also reaffirmed to maintain moratorium on nuclear tests; see Pakistan, India To Set Up N-Hotline, The News (Rawalpindi), June 21, 2004. _______________________________________________________________________
http://www.npolicy.org/article_file/Nuclear_Weapons_Stability_or_Anarchy_in_the_ 21st_Century__China,_India,_and_Pakistan_250211_1545.pdf accessed on 08/09/2013

What Drives Chinese, Indian, and Pakistani Nuclear Force Development?

For purposes of this essay, it is assumed China has 150 operationally deployed nuclear weapons +/- 50.50 It is assumed that both India and Pakistan have approximately 80 nuclear weapons +/- 20.51 These numbers differ from conventional wisdom in several ways. First, Chinas operationally deployed nuclear forces may be significantly smaller than the oftquoted number of 400 nuclear weapons.52 Second, most assessments of the India-Pakistan nuclear balance have argued India has been ahead of Pakistan for several decades. 53 This may or may not be correct today. Based on the assumptions used in this essay, three possibilities exist for the Indo-Pak nuclear balance. India and Pakistan may be approximately equal. India may be ahead by as much as 100 to 60. Alternatively, Pakistan may be ahead by as much as 100 to 60. Two important conclusions can be drawn from this assessment. First, if India is ahead of Pakistan or Pakistan is ahead of India in quantitative terms, the differences are relatively small. They are insignificant in terms of military power or deterrence impact. Second, when viewed in terms of the history of nuclear weapons, China, India, and Pakistan all have relatively modest nuclear forces at present. However this situation may not remain static for the future. China and India have significant breakout potential if they decide to use reactor grade plutonium in their nuclear weapons. Pakistan has a huge appetite for nuclear weapons and has publicized no statements that provide any suggestion an end point is yet in sight.54 A review of the history of Chinese, Indian, and Pakistan nuclear weapons programs reveals that each started with multiple drivers, see Appendix 3. These drivers have changed over time. Today we find that the primary driver for China is a fear of a conventional or nuclear attack on its nuclear forces by the United States. For India, the primary pressure seems to be from its nuclear and defense scientists who want to prove, against most evidence to date, they are world class. For Pakistan, the primary driver appears to be a fear of Indias superior conventional force. For each of these three countries, one could see a future with two dramatically different nuclear futures. One would feature a nuclear arms race that takes place for several decades leading to several hundred nuclear weapons. The other would be relatively stable nuclear forces maintained close to current levels. The key will be elite decision-makers within each country. If senior leaders want nuclear weapons to play a limited role in their national security to deter the use of nuclear weapons, then medium-sized and stable nuclear forces are compatible with their countries national security interests and targeting requirements. On the other hand, if senior leaders believe their national survival rests on nuclear war fighting capabilities to deter superior conventional forces, then large nuclear forces and hair trigger nuclear postures will be required. These key decisions will be made in South West Asia, not in the Middle East or North East Asia. A close examination of the drivers in each country suggests that Indian scientists have a major influence on government decision-making. Drawing on the excellent article in this volume by Mian and Ramana, Indian policy makers have always sought to maintain the capability to use its civilian nuclear power program for weapons purposes. Not only does India have an estimated 6.8 ton stockpile of mostly un-safeguarded RGPu, but it has the potential to produce WGPu in its eight un-safeguarded power reactors and its breeder reactor. Figures calculated by Mian and Ramana suggest India could have an arsenal of over 850 nuclear weapons using these sources.

16,000 km range missile: Dream project of Indian DRDO (defense research and development organisation)
http://combatgears.wordpress.com/2013/01/21/16000-km-range-missile-dreamproject-of-indian-drdo-defense-research-and-development-organisation/ accessed on 08/09/2013

JAN 21 Posted by Nikhil Kumar India is seriously contemplating to enhance the reach of its strategic missiles. The Defence Ministry is considering a proposal to develop intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) [often labelled Surya 1 or 2] capable of hitting targets 10,000 km away. At present, there is a voluntary cap on developing missiles beyond 5,000-km range and the ICBM capabilities will propel India into the elite league of nations possessing the deterrent with nuclear warheads China, the US, Russia and the UK [France and Israel (Jericho II)]. The proposal for developing ICBM capabilities was moved by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) last month and currently being examined by the Defence Ministry. Since it is a major policy decision as ICBM has international ramifications and India is a nuclear weapon State, sources said here on Saturday that the ultimate decision to go for it would be taken by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS). Air Chief Marshal PV Naik had recently pitched for developing ICBMs with a strike capability of 10,000 km and beyond, given Indias growing influence globally. While he had called for breaking out of the regional context, he also questioned the need for capping the missile programme, especially, if India had the technical capability to build it. Explaining the significance of the proposal, sources said the Government had put a voluntary moratorium on developing a missile beyond a range of 5,000 km. This cap came about after India successfully test-fired Agni-III missile [see missilethreat.com Agni III specs] with a range of more than 3,000 km in 2006. The Agni-III test enabled the DRDO to develop capabilities for an ICBM but a political nod is needed to go ahead. The Agni series of missiles fall into the category of intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) which can hit a target at 5,000 km. The DRDO will carry out preliminary tests of Agni-V [see more Agni V details] in December this year or early next year. This missile will have a range of 5,000 km. India embarked on the indigenously designed and produced integrated missile development programme in the late 1980s and successfully developed Prithvi, Akash and Agni series of missiles. With the successful launch of Agni-3, the Government announced that the integrated missile programme had concluded. As regards the ICBM, sources said the main objective of the proposed programme is to develop capabilities and have a deterrent in place to counter the growing military might of China. The neighbour has a very robust and the state-of-the-art missile programme, including ICBMs, and the capability to shoot down a missile in space.

Keeping this factor in view and the growing economic and strategic stature of India in international community, the security establishment has urged the political leadership to go ahead with the ICBM programme, sources said. The security establishment wants India to develop ICBM as New Delhi is not part of Missile Technology Control (MTCR). Moreover, though a declared nuclear weapon State, India has resisted international pressure to ink Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as it has a no first use of nuclear weapons doctrine in place. This policy was announced after India conducted the Shakti series of nuclear tests in 1999. All the UN Security Council countries having ICBMs can fire these long-range missiles from land or underwater from submarines known as submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). The first ICBM was reportedly developed by the erstwhile Soviet Union during Cold War with the US, and China quickly followed. While short range and medium-range ballistic missiles known as theatre ballistic missile carry conventional warheads, ICBMs which can travel across oceans and hit targets across continents are strategic weapons with one or more nuclear warheads.