1 Parties without attorney

Joe Lunchbucket
2 Joe Lunchbucket Jr
3 Petitioners

4
5
6
7
8
In the Court of Appeals for the State of California
9
1st Appellate District
10
Joe lunchbucket
11 Joe lunchbucket jr ) No _______________________
12 Petitioner )
)
13 vs. ) Petition for Writ of
) Habeas Corpus and Petition
14 ) for Writ of Certiorari
15 ) Auxiliary to the Writ of
) Habeas Corpus regarding
16 BS COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT ) BS County Superior
) Court Case Number JV666
17 Respondent )
)
18
19 I.
20 1.1 Petitioners Joe Lunchbucket and Joe Lunchbucket jr are
21 each in his own right one of the sovereign people constituent of
22 People of the State of California, whom does herein petition
23 this court:
24 a. to issue an order to the BS County Superior
25 Court to certify its record before this court
26 for review in proceeding number JV666 and,
27 b. to issue the appropriate writ to the BS County
28
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Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
1 Superior Court to vacate and set aside it’s
2 judgments in proceeding number JV666 as void
3 for want or excess of jurisdiction,
4 c. to issue injunctive orders for the correction
5 of records.
6 1.2 Petitioner herein, Joe Lunchbucket is Parent and
7 first counsel to Joe lunchbucket jr a minor whom
8 was the object of the actions challenged, and
9 whom has held sole legal and physical custody
10 pursuant to order in BS County Superior Court
11 case number 66649 since approximately 1992.
12 1.3 Petitioners are restrained of liberty and denied
13 Due Process of law by the juvenile court under
14 color of law in that Petitioner Joe lunchbucket
15 is enjoined of parental right and standing whilst
16 Petitioner Joe Lunchbucket jr now eighteen years
17 of age whom was a minor at the time of the events
18 complained of, has been deprived of Due Process
19 of law and has thus suffered gross restraint of
20 liberty and continues to unjustly suffer
21 defamation of his character and the consequences
22 thereof in that: NCIC reports Joe Lunchbucket jr
23 as a convicted “drug trafficker” when the actions
24 of the court in JV666, if held to be valid
25 supports no such claim even.
26 II.
27
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Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
1 Declaration of Facts
2 2.1 Beginning on November 2nd 2003 and on several
3 subsequent dates petitioner received notices of the filing of
4 petitions in the BS Superior Court alleging one Joe Lunchbucket
5 jr, a minor, to come within the jurisdiction of said court.
6 Respondent immediately made requests for discovery and no answer
7 to any discovery request was ever received.
8 2.2 On December 15, 2004 petitioner received notice of the
9 filing of a petition in the BS Superior Court alleging one Joe
10 Lunchbucket jr to come within the jurisdiction of said court.
11 Respondent again made immediate request for discovery and no
12 disclosure was ever received.
13 2.3 On January 10, 2005 after a perpetual series of abuse
14 of parental standing, Petitioner herein filed with the BS
15 Superior court a “Special Plea in Bar” with accompanying
16 affidavit questioning the courts command in the matter and
17 demanding proof of lawful authority and identity to
18 constitutional jurisdiction.
19 2.4 On March 4, 2005, a date set for further proceedings,
20 Petitioner attempted to file amended pleadings and the Juvenile
21 court clerk refused to accept the documents stating the parent
22 could “present them to the court at the hearing”. Immediately
23 thereafter the matter of Tyler M. was called and BS County Court
24 Commissioner Michael Williams began by Ruling that there were
25 documents in the file that did not belong there, that they were
26 being returned to the father and stating the reasons to the
27 father as “Your not a party to this action”. In response to the
28
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Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
1 fathers objection the commissioner ruled “you can file for a
2 writ if you want to”.
3 2.5 Petitioners affidavit accompanying said Plea in Bar
4 had made it clear that in each previous appearance petitioner
5 had been intimidated by an armed paramilitary individual and was
6 thusly forced to sit in the gallery and not allowed before the
7 bar, and that after minor’s counsel stated the parent to be
8 present, the court proceeded in the matter as if the parent were
9 for all practical purposes absent. The parent was in fact not
10 afforded the status of a party and not allowed to participate in
11 discovery, examination, inquiry or objection. Petitioners
12 affidavit accompanying said Plea in Bar is incorporated herein
13 by reference as if fully restated.
14 III.
15 A PARENT IS A PARTY ENTITLED TO FULL PARTICIPATION IN JUVENILE
16 COURT PROCEEDINGS
17 CASE LAW:
18
3.1 In In re Robert W., 68 Cal.App.3d 705, an action under
19
Welfare and Institutions Code 602, one of the questions raised
20
on appeal was whether a minor's parent had standing to challenge
21
a juvenile court judge or referee under section 170.6, the Court
22
of appeals stated:
23
“In our view, a parent in a juvenile court
24 proceeding is a party to such proceeding with a
substantial interest -- the interest of protecting the
25 parent-child relationship and the parent's right to
custody. The right of a parent to separate counsel
26
representation, recognized by Welfare and Institutions
27 Code sections 633 and 634, indicates legislative
recognition of a parent's interest as a party to the
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Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
1 juvenile court proceeding. [9] Since a juvenile
court's order may take custody of a minor away from a
2 parent, a parent comes within the provisions of Code
3 of Civil Procedure section 902, which authorizes a
"party aggrieved" to take an appeal”
4
The Robert W court then addressed the separate statutory
5
right of parent and child to counsel:
6
“Section 633 provides that at the detention hearing
7 the minor and his parent shall be informed of "the
right of such minor and his parent or guardian to be
8
represented at every stage of the proceedings by
9 counsel." (Italics added.) Section 634 provides, in
pertinent part, that "[w]hen it appears to the court
10 that the minor or his parent or guardian desires
counsel but isunable to afford and cannot for that
11 reason employ counsel, the court may appoint counsel.
12 In a case in which the minor is alleged to be a person
described in Section 601 or 602, the court shall
13 appoint counsel for the minor if he appears at the
hearing without counsel, whether he is unable to
14 afford counsel or not, unless there is an intelligent
15 waiver of the right of counsel by the minor; ... In
any case in which it appears to the court that there
16 is such a conflict of interest between a parent or
guardian and child that one attorney could not
17 properly represent both, the court shall appoint
counsel, in addition to [68 Cal.App.3d 716] counsel
18
already employed by a parent or guardian or appointed
19 by the court to represent the minor or parent or
guardian. ..." (Italics added.)
20 [7] It seems clear that the language of section 633 of
the Welfare and Institutions Code -- which is
21 mandatory in nature -- gives a parent of a minor an
22 absolute right to be represented by counsel at every
stage of the juvenile court proceedings. Under section
23 633, the parent's right to counsel is not affected by
the fact that the minor is represented by counsel.
24 Each is entitled to be so represented.
25 Section 634 gives the court discretionary
authority to appoint counsel for the minor or the
26 parent in case of indigency except that it is
mandatory that counsel be appointed for a minor
27 alleged to come within Welfare and Institutions Code
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Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
1 section 601 or 602. A distinction is thus made in
section 634 between a minor and his parent insofar as
2 the right to a court-appointed attorney is concerned.
3 The minor has an absolute right to a court-appointed
attorney while a parent does not possess such right.”
4
3.2 In contrast the Fifth District Court of Appeals in In
5
re Byron S. (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 822 , 223 Cal.Rptr. 319 (also
6
a 602 case), looked at the fathers right of participation from
7
the perspective of the child’s Due Process Rights.
8
In re Dargo (1947) 81 Cal.App.2d 205 [183 P.2d 282]
9 held the parents have a right to appeal and raise
issues in the interest of the minor as well as
10 themselves. Logic suggests the converse should also be
11 true although neither counsel nor this court, in its
independent research, have found any case, which
12 specifically deals with this issue. Further, and it
may be a fine distinction, the minor is not here
13 asserting his father's right to an interpreter that
14 he, the father, could understand but rather his, the
minor's, right to the full participation and
15 assistance of his father in the juvenile court
proceedings. If his father, for lack of an adequate
16 interpreter, could not understand and thus assist his
son, then it is the minor who is aggrieved and, in our
17
view, has standing to raise the issue on appeal.
18
The Byron S court concluded by stating “the minor is [176
19
Cal.App.3d 829] entitled to the full participation and
20
assistance of his father at the adjudication hearing as well as
21
the disposition hearing.”
22
3.3 “Due process of law requires sufficient notice to the
23
parents with an opportunity to be heard” In Re Moilanen (1951)
24
104 Cal. App. 2d 835, 842 also a 602 case, the court held that
25
such notice was jurisdictional. The California Supreme Court
26
cited Moilanen for this proposition with approval in In Re B.G.
27
(1974) 11 C.3d. 679 (subsequently questioned on other grounds)
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Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
1
2 3.4 The California Supreme Court has even recognized non-
3 relative caregivers to be defacto parents entitled to standing
4 as parties to juvenile court proceedings. in In re Rachael
5 C.(1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1445 , 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 473 citing its

6 holding in In re B. G. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 679 [114 Cal.Rptr. 444,

7 523 P.2d 244]

8 The high court said:

9 "We conclude that de facto parents, such as the foster

parents in this case, should be permitted to appear as
10 parties in juvenile court proceedings. Their standing
should not depend upon the filing of a petition for
11
guardianship, although the filing of such a petition
12 may aid in attesting to their interest in the custody
of the child; nor should their participation be
13 restricted to the limited role of an amicus curiae;
they should be permitted to appear as parties to
14 assert and protect their own interest in the
15 companionship, care, custody and management of the
child."
16
17 They concluded by saying
18 ...." It is a general rule that an order denying a
person the right to participate in a proceeding is an
19 appealable order. (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed.
1985) Appeal, § 50, pp. 74-75.) It would follow that
20
an order denying a person the right to participate in
21 a juvenile proceeding as a de facto parent would be
appealable under Welfare and Institutions Code [235
22 Cal.App.3d 1455] section 395. Second, the decision in
In re B. G. was specifically concerned with the de
23
facto parents' status as parties to the appeal.
24 (Supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 692.) The court concluded that
de facto parents should be allowed to participate as
25 parties in the proceedings, including the appeal. To
the extent that rule 1435(b) would preclude de facto
26 parents from participating in an appeal it is more
27 restrictive than the decision in In re B. G. and
section 395 of the Welfare and Institutions Code and
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Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
1 is therefore to that extent void. We are satisfied
that appellants have properly sought appellate review.
2 We intimate no opinion whether de facto parents should
3 be accorded all of the rights of a parent or guardian,
such as the right to appointed counsel and free
4 transcripts.

5
and again in In re Kieshia E. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 68 , 23
6
Cal.Rptr.2d 775; 859 P.2d 1290
7
Hence, we concluded, de facto parents should be
8 permitted "to appear as [full] parties," not mere
amici curiae, in a juvenile dependency proceeding. [6
9
Cal.4th 76] Their standing, we stressed, does not
10 depend upon pending guardianship applications. Rather,
we held, the fact of de facto parenthood alone should
11 entitle them to intervene and protect their "own
interest" in the child's care and custody. (In re B.
12 G., supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 693.)
13
14 It is obvious from these authorities that a natural parent is a

15 party to a juvenile court action involving their progeny.

16 IV.
17 STATUTORY AUTHORITY:
18 4.1 Under Welfare and Institutions Code Sections 679, 633
19 and Cal Rules of Court 1472(a) Parents have the right to be
20 present and represented by counsel. The question here is what
21 right of the parent does counsel re-present? Is it not the right
22 to participate and to be heard?
23 4.2 Under Welfare and Institutions Code Section 664
24 parents are acknowledged as having substantive rights to
25 subpoena witnesses, if not to examine them then for what
26 purpose? Certainly if parents are entitled to subpoena witnesses
27 to examine for the establishment of evidence in the fact-finding
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Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
1 phase then it follows that they have the right to cross-examine
2 adverse witnesses as well. In fact parental presence is so vital
3 to the validity of the proceedings that if the hearing moves
4 forward in their absence, they are entitled to a rehearing.
5 4.3 Even “De Facto” parents may be able to acquire
6 parental substantive rights including participating as parties,
7 and offer evidence. Cal Rules of court 1410, 1472(e). Welfare
8 and Institutions Code 676, 679, (658, 656(e).
9 V.
10 PARTY AND PARTIES DEFINED
11
5.1 John Bouvier Revised Sixth Edition, 1856
12 PARTY, practice, contracts. When applied to practice,
by party is understood either the plaintiff or
13
defendant. In contracts, a party is one or more
14 persons who engage to perform or receive the
performance of some agreement.
15 Vide Parties to contracts; Parties to 'actions;
Parties to a suit in equity.
16 PARTIES, contracts. Those persons who engage
17 themselves to do, or not to do the matters and things
contained in an agreement.
18 2. All persons generally can be parties to
contracts, unless they labor under some disability.
19 3. Consent being essential to all valid
20 contracts, it follows that persons who want, first,
understanding; or secondly, freedom to exercise their
21 will, cannot be parties to contracts. Thirdly, persons
who in consequence of their situation are incapable to
22 enter into some particular contract. These will be
separately considered.
23
24 PARTIES TO ACTIONS. Those persons who institute
actions for the recovery of their rights, and those
25 persons against whom they are instituted, are the
parties to the actions; the former are called
26 plaintiffs, and the latter, defendants. The term
27 parties is understood to include all persons who are
directly interested in the subject-matter in issue,
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Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
1 who have right to make defence, control the
proceeding, or appeal from the judgment. Persons not
2 having these rights are regarded as strangers to the
3 cause. 20 How. St. Tr. 538, n.; Greenl. Ev. Sec. 523
2. It is of the utmost importance in bringing
4 actions to have proper parties, for however just and
meritorious the claim may be, if a mistake has been
5 made in making wrong persons, either plaintiffs or
defendants, or including too many or too few persons
6
as parties, the plaintiff may in general be defeated.
7 3. Actions are naturally divided into those which
arise upon contracts, and those which do not, but
8 accrue to the plaintiff in consequence of some wrong
or injury committed by the defendant.
9
10 5.2 Blacks Law Dictionary Deluxe Fourth 1951
11 Party, n. A person concerned or having or taking
12 part in any affair, matter, transaction or proceeding,
considered individually. See Parties.
13 “party” is a technical word, and has a precise meaning
in legal parlance. By it is understood he or they by
14 or against whom a suit is brought, whether in law or
15 equity; the party plaintiff or defendant, whether
composed of one or more individuals, and whether
16 natural or legal persons, (they are parties on the
writ, and parties on the record;)and all others who
17 may be affected by the suit, indirectly or
consequently, are persons interested, but not parties.
18
Merchants’ Bank v. Cook, 4 Pick. 405.
19 “party” is not restricted to strict meaning of
plaintiff or defendant in a lawsuit, being defined as
20 one concerned in or privy to a matter as in the
relation of accessory or confidant, and again a
21 partial person, one who takes sides. State v. Orr, 53
22 Idaho 452, 24 P.2d 679.

23 Party, Adj. Relating or belonging to, or composed

of, two or more parts or portions, or two or more
24 persons or classes of persons.
25
PARTIES. The persons who take part in the
26 performance of any act or who are directly interested
in any affair, contract, or conveyance, or who are
27 actively concerned in the prosecution and defense of
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Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
1 any legal proceeding. U.S. to Use of Edward Hines
Lumber Co. v. Henderlong, C.C.Ind., 102 F2; Robbins v.
2 Chicago, 4 Wall. 672, 18 L.Ed. 42; Green v. Bogue, 12
3 S.Ct. 975, 158 U.S. 478 39 L.Ed. 1061; Hughes v.
Jones, 116 N.Y.67, 22 N. E. 446, 5 L.R.A 637,…
4
5.3 The United States in GREEN v. BOGUE, 158 U.S. 478
5
(1895) said:
6
“'Parties, in the larger legal sense, are all persons having a
7
right to control the proceedings to make defense, to adduce and
8
cross-examine witnesses, and to appeal from the decision, if an
9
appeal lies.' 1 Greenl. Ev. 535.”
10
11
5.4 It would necessarily follow that if a parent has an
12
absolute right to be re-presented by counsel at his own expense
13
that the parent also has the right to present themselves in
14
their own person in the absence of either their desire for or,
15
their ability to afford, an attorney or other suitable counsel.
16
It is only limited liability entities, which need to be re-
17
presented as their fictional nature prevents them from
18
presenting them selves. Petitioner has neither granted the right
19
nor the authority to any other to re-present him but has in fact
20
sought to present himself on his own behalf and has been
21
unlawfully enjoined from exercising his right to do so.
22
5.5 A court, for whatever reason, not wanting to recognize the
23
standing of an indigent parent to present themselves in
24 their own person on the one hand and finding it equally
25 within their discretion not to appoint counsel for the
26 indigent on the other, effectively disallows due process in
27 every way.
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Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
1 5.6 In any event the court has a duty to answer regarding its
2 claim of authority to prevent a parent from direct
3 participation in proceedings involving the parents minor
4 child or to enjoin the parent of his rights as a parent via

5 proceedings in which his rights are decided but in which he

6 is not allowed to participate. Surely this cannot be.

7 VI.
8 PARENTAL RIGHTS and RESPONSIBILITIES
9 6.1 Parenting rights are God given and are inherent in the
10 original covenant between man and his creator. The First, Fifth,
11 and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
12 protect these rights from the intrusions of government.
13 In Troxel v. Granville, 99-138 [U.S. 06/05/2000
14 U.S. Supreme Court, November 1999], the Supreme Court
ruled,
15
[49] The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State
16 shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." We have long
17
recognized that the Amendment's Due Process Clause,
18 like its Fifth Amendment counterpart, "guarantees more
than fair process." Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.
19 S. 702, 719 (1997). The Clause also includes a
substantive component that "provides heightened
20 protection against government interference with
21 certain fundamental rights and liberty interests."
Id., at 720; see also Reno v. Flores, 507 U. S. 292,
22 301-302(1993).
23 50] The liberty interest at issue in this case -- the
24 interest of parents in the care, custody, and control
of their children -- is perhaps the oldest of the
25 fundamental liberty interests recognized by this
Court. More than 75 years ago, in Meyer v. Nebraska,
26 262 U. S. 390, 399, 401 (1923), we held that the
"liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause includes
27
the right of parents to "establish a home and bring up
28
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Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
1 children" and "to control the education of their own."
Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
2 U. S. 510, 534-535 (1925), we again held that the
3 "liberty of parents and guardians" includes the right
"to direct the upbringing and education of children
4 under their control." We explained in Pierce that
"[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State;
5 those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
6
prepare him for additional obligations." Id., at 535.
7 We returned to the subject in Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U. S. 158 (1944), and again confirmed that there
8 is a constitutional dimension to the right of parents
to direct the upbringing of their children. "It is
9 cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of
10 the child reside first in the parents, whose primary
function and freedom include preparation for
11 obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."
Id., at 166.
12
13 …..There is a presumption that fit parents act in
their children's best interests, Parham v. J. R., 442
14 U. S. 584, 602; there is normally no reason for the
State to inject itself into the private realm of the
15 family to further question fit parents' ability to
make the best decisions regarding their children, see,
16
e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U. S. 292, 304.
17
…..This primary role of the parents in the upbringing
18 of their children is now established beyond debate as
an enduring American tradition"); Quilloin v. Walcott,
19 434 U. S. 246, 255 (1978) ("We have recognized on
20 numerous occasions that the relationship between
parent and child is constitutionally protected");
21 Parham v. J. R., 442 U. S. 584, 602 (1979) ("Our
jurisprudence historically has reflected Western
22 civilization concepts of the family as a unit with
23 broad parental authority over minor children. Our
cases have consistently followed that course");
24 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745, 753 (1982)
(discussing "[t]he fundamental liberty interest of
25 natural parents in the care, custody, and management
of their child"); Glucksberg, supra, at 720 ("In a
26
long line of cases, we have held that, in addition to
27 the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights,
the `liberty' specially protected by the Due Process
28
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Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
1 Clause includes the righ[t] ... to direct the
education and upbringing of one's children" (citing
2 Meyer and Pierce). In light of this extensive
3 precedent, it cannot now be doubted that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects
4 the fundamental right of parents to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and…
5
6 6.2 It is clear from the above authorities that a parent
7 is not only a party to actions involving their children but that
8 they have both the right and the responsibility to subject all
9 adverse claims against their child to a rigorous scrutiny.
10 6.3 In discussing the distinction in the nature of family
11 versus juvenile courts the California Supreme Court makes it
12 imminently clear that juvenile courts pit the state via its
13 agencies against the parent and child as separate litigants.
14 In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 866; 913
15 P.2d 1075 the court stated very clearly
16 The two courts have separate purposes. The family
court is established to provide parents a forum in
17 which to resolve, inter alia, private issues relating
18 to the custody of and visitation with children. In
that setting, parents are presumed to be fit and
19 capable of raising their children. (Fam. Code, §
3061.) The juvenile court, by contrast, provides the
20 state a forum to "restrict parental behavior regarding
21 children, ... and ... to remove children from the
custody of their parents or guardians." (Edwards,
22 supra, 27 Santa Clara L.Rev. at p. 206, fns. omitted.)

23
6.4 It would appear from this analysis that 602
24
proceedings provide the “state” an environment in which to
25
challenge the parents capacity or capability of raising their
26
own children. Clearly the only “parties” by this analysis are
27
the “state” (by and through its agents) and the “parent”.
28
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1
2 6.5 As per the holding in Ryder v. United States 115 S.Ct.
3 2031, 132 L.Ed.2d 136, 515 U.S. 177 an individual is duty bound
4 to initiate a direct challenge to the claimed authority of
5 anyone representing him or herself as a government officer or
6 agent prior to the finality of any proceeding in order to avoid
7 implications of de facto officer doctrine. When challenged those
8 posing as government officers and agents are required to
9 affirmatively prove whatever authority they claim. In the
10 absence of proof, they may be held personally accountable for
11 loss, injury and damages.
12 6.6 “Public officers are merely the agents of the public,
13 whose powers and authority are defined and limited by law. Any
14 act without the scope of the authority so defined does not bind
15 the principal and all persons dealing with such agents are
16 charged with knowledge of the extent of their authority”
17 Continental Casualty Co. V. United States 113 F.2d 284 (5th
18 Cir.1940)
19 6.7 When the juvenile courts authority to proceed is
20 challenged, its duty to declare its jurisdiction and lawful
21 authority to proceed is not discretionary. "Once jurisdiction is
22 challenged it must be proven." Hagins vs. Levine 415 US 533 note
23 3 (1974).
24 VII.
25
26
27
28
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Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
1 MEMORANDUM ON THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF PARENTAL
2 RESPONSIBILITY
3
7.1 My Rights are my property and where the rights and
4
obligations of parental responsibility are concerned, there can
5
be no tolerance whatever for any unjustified assault from any
6
quarter. The ages old institution of family is so basic to the
7
very foundation of civilization so as to be sacred. It stands as
8
the cornerstone of the very survival of the human species. This
9
fact is so plain and so self-evident as to defy rational debate.
10
7.2 Let it be stated here in the most unambiguous terms.
11
Where the safety, security and well being of the minor child is
12
concerned, no body corporate, whether it be called a government,
13
or any of its agencies, nor even the so called State nor any of
14
its equally fictitious self appointed representatives, has any
15
lawful power to invade the sanctuary of the family and impose,
16
threaten to impose or otherwise bring to bear any force of any
17
kind whatever that would compromise the natural and lawfully
18
protected God given inalienable rights long recognized as being
19
not only fundamental to a civilized society, but indeed, is
20
essential to the very existence of the society itself.
21
7.3 The government of this country was created, brought
22
into being, and given power to serve the interests not of
23
corporate enterprise, nor for collectivist aspirations, but for
24
the purpose of expressing the interests of the individual. Where
25
government, as agency of the state, or its representatives fails
26
to preserve the interests of the individual, they act to support
27
the enemies of the people. Where government officials tolerate
28
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Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
1 or condone the institutionalized assault on the family, they are
2 themselves the enemy.
3 7.4 As sire and therefore lord of the family dominion, a
4 father has a natural, moral and lawful obligation to defend the
5 minor child within his household against wolves be they clad in
6 sheep’s clothing or any other costume. For a father to abrogate
7 this responsibility is nothing short of abandonment. The social
8 consequences of such failure are paramount to the collapse of
9 civilization itself. It therefore becomes not only an obligation
10 to the family that the father place himself in the face of the
11 assault, but also an obligation to his countrymen.
12 7.5 Certainly, every father must so act, in part at least,
13 because he believes that other fathers will and must do
14 likewise, and that therefore the future of his progeny is
15 secured by the righteous example of responsible parenting. In
16 this way, we as a people are able to pass on our learning, our
17 humble wisdom, our meager accomplishments and our hopes for a
18 more moral society to our children and their children's
19 children. Nothing less than this is acceptable to any man who
20 has in his heart the genuine desire to better himself, and to
21 thereby make a meaningful contribution to his progeny, not less
22 his people.
23 7.6 As father and therefore first counsel to my child,
24 there can be no proceedings, representation, counsel, advice,
25 coercive deal making, nor any other transactions with my
26 dependant children without both my consent and my direct
27 involvement.
28
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Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
1 7.7 Any actions concerning the minor child shall be
2 proposed or effected through his parents' sovereign capacity to
3 know and understand and therefore to exercise the law. Failure
4 of those agencies charged with the preservation of public
5 justice to fulfill their obligation to answer where authority is
6 clearly questioned renders all subsequent proceeding in the
7 matter nugatory.
8 7.8 The respondent to this petition has continuously
9 refused or otherwise failed to answer petitioner’s inquiries.
10 7.9 The question of legitimacy raises the question of
11 accountability. Where an act is done in secrecy, there will be
12 found the fruits of a poisonous tree. Where persons who claim
13 authority refuse to reveal their principal, or the basis in law
14 for their actions, there can be no grant of legitimacy, and
15 according to law and reason, no accountability. Where there is
16 no accountability, there is fertile soil for nurturing the
17 fruits of the poisonous tree. Where there is no accountability,
18 there can be no legitimacy, and therefore in accord with law and
19 reason, no basis whatever for lawful action. No lawful court,
20 without the pretense of legitimacy, could possibly entertain
21 such actions where they have been properly challenged.
22 7.10 That which does not appear is presumed not to exist.
23 The primary question of legitimacy is paramount. Acts on the
24 part of persons who claim to be party to the alleged action have
25 yet to identify their lawful authority, nor any other evidence
26 that could establish a basis for legal standing that would
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1 empower them to participate in any proceedings regarding the
2 instant matter.
3 7.11 The alleged claimants before said court have yet to
4 reveal a principal party of interest with standing, have yet to
5 state a rational claim, nor even to substantiate said supposed
6 claim in any way that could empower said court to so constitute
7 itself as to hear the issues as a lawful venue.
8 7.12 The foregoing points to the elements essential to
9 satisfy the most fundamental requirements of subject matter and
10 personum jurisdiction. The defects so far identified are fatal.
11 No amount of presumption nor resort to fictions of law can cure
12 them.
13 7.13 Where jurisdiction is challenged, it must be proven.
14 Our law rests for its very existence on the foundation of facts.
15 Mere fictions are incapable of providing the required evidence
16 that alone has the capacity of establishing substance and
17 justification for any action to be entertained by any court that
18 could in any way whatsoever put in harms way the natural rights
19 of the individual.
20 7.14 Where the claim to authority is used to justify
21 aggression, usurpation, or plunder an individual is within their
22 lawful power to demand substantial evidence of that supposed
23 authority, and to institute and implement all means available to
24 realize effective defense against such assaults. Indeed, in
25 times such as these, when assumed authority supported by the
26 threat of arms is common the world over, it becomes the duty of
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1 every man to question the legitimacy and lawful basis of any
2 presentment of proclaimed authority.
3 7.15 Clearly, the a priori grant of legitimacy to any
4 posture of authority has become an irresponsible and dangerous
5 act. The assumption that anyone with the mere appearance of
6 power thus has legitimacy is not only irrational, in such times
7 as these when the daily news informs us regularly and often of
8 the corruption, greed and avarice that pervades the institutions
9 of government and the corporate enterprises they serve from the
10 national down to the local level, it becomes an act of criminal
11 complicity to give aid and comfort to those who would undermine,
12 sabotage or otherwise corrupt our law. This has been justly
13 called treason.
14 VIII.
15 These considerations bring forward the following determinations:
16 8.1 Resort is here made to quotes from accomplished
17 jurists and delivered opinions and decisions of authentic Courts
18 of Law only where they coincide with well settled principles of
19 law and reason, and where they can be reconciled with the
20 conscience of a dutiful father seeking to exercise his moral and
21 lawful obligations.
22 8.2 Reference to published authorities is utilized here
23 not to substantiate but to corroborate the findings and
24 determinations rendered by one's sovereign capacity and duty to
25 scrutinize and to test the veracity of any and all propositions
26 offered, or agreements proposed that would have a meaningful
27 impact on the lawful duties and obligations, or the capacity to
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1 exercise such lawful duties and obligations, either as father,
2 sovereign, citizen, person or individual man.
3 8.3 The right to counsel is not to be construed as any
4 obligation to be attorned or to accept an attorney, or other
5 officer of the court as counsel, nor as any obligation to
6 surrender or otherwise forfeit one's right to maintain and to
7 effect a responsible defense by the imposition of a limited
8 liability entity as one's supposed representative nor as any
9 compromise of one's capacity to present oneself in ones own
10 person. It is only fictions of law, which need to be re-
11 presented since their fictitious nature forecloses any
12 possibility of their presenting themselves in their own person.
13 8.4 There is no evidence on the record of any principal
14 party of interest who has been identified, or even claimed to
15 exist.
16 8.5 There is no evidence on the record that any pretended
17 representative or agent of a supposed principal party of
18 interest has any authority to act on behalf, or to do any act in
19 the interests of an unidentified principal party of interest.
20 8.6 There is not a single piece of evidence on the record
21 that could support a claim of authenticity for any of the
22 persons who have inserted themselves into the theatre of
23 proceedings thus far before the juvenile court.
24 8.7 The only party appearing thus far with any capacity to
25 lawfully exercise any legitimate authority in the instant matter
26 has been the father and petitioner herein.
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1 8.8 The only party willing to openly enter themselves on
2 the record, without limited liability protections of any kind,
3 has been the father and petitioner herein.
4 8.9 That limited liability is equal to limited
5 credibility, and that therefore the only party evidenced by
6 facts on the record as having credibility is the father and
7 petitioner herein.
8 8.10 There appears no evidence on the record of any open,
9 written or other authentic and voluntary contractual obligation
10 upon which a claim in the instant matter could lie.
11 8.11 There appears no evidence on the record that any of
12 the identified nor unidentified parties of interest have any
13 standing to bring the alleged action.
14 8.12 There appears no evidence on the record of any
15 coherent, rational, open, authentic, verified, substantiated, or
16 otherwise lawful foundation upon which any claim could lie
17 8.13 The only evidence on the record thus far declaring the
18 law of the case is that of the father and petitioner herein, who
19 declares sovereignty in original jurisdiction.
20 IX.
21 Conclusion
22 9.1 It is an outrage and an affront to the dignity of
23 law to suggest that the state, as plaintiff
24 through their county courts, county agencies,
25 district attorney’s, appointed officers of court
26 and probation department agents which act as the
27 states instrumentalities, could conduct a
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1 legitimate proceeding against the rights of a
2 parent as if the parent were not a party to that
3 action but only there as a specter for the states
4 purpose of stating that he was present for the
5 compiling of that record while excluding the
6 parent from partaking of the compiling of that
7 record even to the extent of the clerk refusing
8 to accept his legitimate pleadings!
9 9.2 Petitioner herein moves this court for injunctive
10 order compelling: BS County Superior Court to
11 Vacate and set aside its’ judgments in the above
12 named cause and to purge the void judgment data
13 from their records rendering the matter void ab
14 initio and to remove all taint and disabilities
15 resulting there from.
16 9.3 Petitioner herein further moves this court for
17 injunctive order compelling BS County superior
18 Court, its’ agents and assigns, and all police,
19 public and private agencies to whom such void
20 determinations have been reported to purge the
21 above data from their records.
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24 I Joe Lunchbucket affirm, pursuant to the laws of the
25 republic state of this state, that the foregoing is true and
26 accurate.

27 Respectfully submitted,

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1
2 __________________________________________6/26/2009
3 Joe Lunchbucket
Petitioner
4 Sui Juris
5
6 I Joe Lunchbucket jr. affirm, pursuant to the laws of the

7 republic state of this state, that the foregoing is true and

8 accurate.

9 Respectfully submitted,

10
11 __________________________________________6/26/2009

12 Joe Lunchbucket Jr
Petitioner
13 Sui Juris
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