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Imprisonment and internment: Comparing penal institutions North and South

Christopher Birkbeck Punishment & Society 2011 13: 307 DOI: 10.1177/1462474511404320 The online version of this article can be found at: http://pun.sagepub.com/content/13/3/307
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Article
Imprisonment and internment: Comparing penal institutions North and South

Christopher Birkbeck
University of Salford, UK
Punishment & Society 13(3) 307332 ! The Author(s) 2011 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1462474511404320 pun.sagepub.com
Abstract n-depo sito Recent references to the warehouse prison in the United States and the prisio in Latin America seem to indicate that penal confinement in the Western Hemisphere has converged on a similar model. However, this article suggests otherwise. It contrasts penal facilities in North America and Latin America in terms of six interrelated aspects: regimentation; surveillance; isolation; supervision; accountability; and formalization. Quantitatively, control in North American penal facilities is assiduous (unceasing, persistent and intrusive), while in Latin America it is perfunctory (sporadic, indifferent and cursory). Qualitatively, North American penal facilities produce imprisonment (which enacts penal intervention through confinement), while in Latin America they produce internment (which enacts penal intervention through release). Closely entwined with this qualitative difference are distinct practices of judicial involvement in sentencing and penal supervision. Those practices, and the cultural and political factors that underpin them, represent an interesting starting point for the explanation of the contrasting nature of imprisonment and internment. Keywords imprisonment, internment, Latin America, North America, penal facilities
Introduction
In their introduction to a useful set of essays on criminal justice and political cultures, Newburn and Sparks (2004: 3) comment on the increasing evidence of certain forms of convergence in the languages and practices of crime control.
Corresponding author: Christopher Birkbeck, University of Salford, Salford, M5 4WT, UK. Email: c.h.birkbeck@salford.ac.uk
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Punishment & Society 13(3)
A look at recent research and commentary on penality in the Americas would seem to conrm this trend. For example, US scholars often use the term warehouse when talking about prisons in that country (e.g. Fleisher, 1989; Irwin, 2004; Lynch, 2001; Robertson, 1997; Simon, 2000; Toch, 1985). In so doing, they invite us to recognize that contemporary prisons in the USA do little more than provide secure connement for sentenced oenders. In Latin America, penal facilities are similarly perceived to emphasize connement and neglect treatment, and are often referred n, 2008; Neuman, 2004; Sozzo, 2008). to as depositos (warehouses) (e.g. Carrio The use of equivalent terms for connement seems to imply that, in the penal domain if nowhere else, convergence in the Americas is now complete. However, such a notion is problematic in both a quantitative and qualitative sense. The quantitative problem concerns the extent to which warehousing has emerged in the penal institutions of either region (e.g. Listwan et al., 2008; Sozzo, 2008). The qualitative problem concerns the degree to which the terms warehouse and deposito can be understood and used in the same way in their respective regions. Addressing this latter question is the primary objective of the present article. Melossi (2001: 405) points out the problem in working with supercial notions of linguistic equivalence: the usage of identical words often obscures the degree to which they are embedded in the dierent history of dierent places, as well as being articulated through (partially) dierent discourses (see also Worrall, 2000). I take this to mean, among other things, that terms which have cross-linguistic equivalence may conceal underlying dierences in content and context. In relation to the sito may be apt specic focus of this article, I seek to show that warehouse and depo descriptors of their respective realities, but that they denote very dierent kinds of institution and are embedded (to use Melossis term) in very dierent conceptions of penal intervention. Whether or not the Americas are witnessing a convergence in patterns of crime and social control, which is a matter that cannot be debated here, the character of penal connement is still markedly dierent in each region. I develop my analysis by comparing six interrelated aspects of penal facilities: regimentation; surveillance; isolation; supervision; accountability; and formalization. Collectively, they represent dimensions of control the heart of all penal projects. I seek to show that the level of control is considerably higher in the North than the South1 and that there is also a qualitative dierence in the character of connement. While imprisonment, in the Foucauldian sense of spatially concentrated disciplinary technologies (Foucault, 1979), is still an apt descriptor of penal connement in the North, internment is a better descriptor of connement in the South. Assembling the material for such an analysis is a challenge because of the need to construct a general description that is not distorted by excessive attention to particular years or institutions. The challenge is also compounded by the unequal volume and availability of material on penal connement in each region. Wealthy societies (such as those in North America) produce more certied knowledge than poorer ones (such as those in Latin America), whether through government agencies, universities or research organizations, and this generalization holds for penological studies as well. In what follows, I focus particularly on the United States
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and Venezuela, the two countries in the hemisphere that I know best, but where possible I broaden the descriptions to Canada and to other Latin American nations in order keep the comparison at the level of regions. If comparative studies of penality are aligned according to the emphasis that they place on similarities or dierences in institutional developments and procedures, my analysis falls squarely in the latter category. And dierence, of course, invites explanation, as evidenced by the small but growing body of studies in comparative penology and by the calls to add to them (e.g. Garland, 2009; Jeerson, 2007; Lacey, 2006). Almost without exception, those studies have focused on sentencing and rates of imprisonment in Western Europe and North America (e.g. Cavadino and Dignan, 2006; Downes, 1988; Tonry, 2004; Whitman, 2003; Zimring and Hawkins, 1991; but see also Weiss and South, 1998). Their explanandum tends to be conceptualized as tolerance or harshness and their explanatory frameworks too diverse and nely wrought to be adequately summarized here incorporate political (e.g. Whitman, 2003; Zimring and Hawkins, 1991), legal (e.g. Downes, 1988) and cultural (e.g. Garland, 2001; Melossi, 2001) variables. In contrast to prior research, the present essay focuses not on punitiveness (a normative property) but on regimes of penal connement (a social property). Its comparative framework is not limited to wealthier societies, but also includes poorer ones. Given these departures from what has gone before, I prefer to let the description, albeit provisional, suggest a possible explanation. My hypothesis for the existence of imprisonment in the North and internment in the South, briey outlined in the nal section of this article, focuses on diering conceptions of penal intervention. With imprisonment, penal intervention is enacted through connement; with internment, it is enacted through release. Closely entwined with these alternative conceptions of intervention are dierent models of judicial involvement in sentencing and penal supervision. This type of explanation, centred on the differing roles of the judiciary in each region, points immediately to the relevance of comparative legal studies (e.g. Damaska, 1986) but also to the importance so well illustrated by existing work in comparative penology of placing penal practices in their social, political and cultural contexts (Garland, 2006; King and Maguire, 1994). Such extensive theoretical exploration would, however, be premature at this stage: the assembly of comparative descriptive material is the rst necessity.
Physical arrangements in confinement: Regimentation, surveillance, isolation Regimentation

As used here, regimentation refers to the spatial organization of inmates. Such organization is obviously relevant to the goals of the institution because it reects and enables a particular kind of control. A key aspect of regimentation is classication an activity that has a long history in some penal systems (e.g. McCartney, 1933). In general, classication allows the grouping of like individuals in order to
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achieve some purpose. In penal facilities, key dimensions of classication are reected in residential arrangements, whereby dierent classes of inmate inhabit dierent spaces or buildings. Classication also aects patterns of movement within the institution another important aspect of regimentation. In North America, facilities for connement reect a systemic approach to organization. First, a basic distinction exists between jails (used for preventive detention and short-term connement) and prisons. Second, individual prisons generally form part of a classicatory system which encompasses both their role in relation to other prisons in the same jurisdiction, and the characteristics and uses of their component parts. The current organizing principle for classication is the level of security, and the basic categories of facility are maximum, medium and minimum security. What these terms mean is illustrated by the following description from the North Carolina Department of Correction (NCDC, 2007):
Close security prisons typically are comprised of single cells and divided into cell blocks, which may be in one building or multiple buildings. Cell doors are generally remotely controlled from a secure control station . . . The perimeter barrier is designed with a double fence with armed watch towers or armed roving patrols . . . Medium security prisons typically are comprised of secure dormitories that provide housing for up to fty inmates each . . . Each dormitory is locked at night with a correctional ocer providing direct supervision of the inmates and sleeping area . . . The prison usually has a double fence perimeter with armed watch towers or armed roving patrols . . . Minimum security prisons are comprised of non-secure dormitories which are routinely patrolled by correctional ocers . . . The prison generally has a single perimeter fence which is inspected on a regular basis, but has no armed watch towers or roving patrol.
Of course, the classication of inmates also requires its own facility (or unit within a facility), where convicted oenders spend the rst weeks or months of their sentence and are assessed in terms of risks and needs. In addition, custodial sta require a disciplinary unit in order to handle particularly troublesome inmates, usually known as the maximum security unit/facility (or supermax if the term maximum has already been applied to a lower security level). Once again, the North Carolina Department of Correction (NCDC, 2007):
Maximum security units are comprised of cells with sliding doors that are remotely operated from a secure control station . . . These units are utilized to conne the most dangerous inmates who are a severe threat to public safety, correctional sta, and other inmates. Inmates conned in a maximum security unit typically are in their cell 23 hours a day. During the other hour they may be allowed to shower and exercise in the cell block or an exterior cage.
Freedom of movement within the facility is closely correlated with the security level: at maximum security level, physical restraints are used when inmates are moved and all inmates are escorted by custodial sta; medium security facilities
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may employ a pass system for inmates; while at minimum security facilities, control on movement may be limited to certain spaces and times of the day. In Latin America, the classication of dierent types of facility may exist on paper, but much less so in practice. The distinction between jails and other penal facilities is not so clear because physical arrangements do not correspond entirely with legal categories of inmate. Thus, the police have holding cells, but these rarely represent the equivalent of the American jail. They are used for short-term detention during the initial phases of the criminal case, but individuals on preventive detention are held in larger facilities. By law, these larger facilities would approximate to the North American jail, but in practice they are part of the prison system and used as such. For example, in Venezuela, the Criminal Code (Venezuela, 1964, 2005) and the penal laws (Venezuela, 1975, 2000) have for long distinguished between penitentiaries (solitary connement, forced labour), prisons (group connement, voluntary labour), penal colonies (for frontier regions) and judicial internment centres (for preventive detention and sentences of up to one year). The materialization of this array of institutions required the construction of judicial internment centres in each state2 and the construction of prisons, penitentiaries and penal colonies in selected sites around the country to house oenders serving longer sentences. In practice, the resources for such a system were never forthcoming, and as a result most states have one or other of these types of facility, but only one. Thus, the ocially designated judicial internment centres not only house suspects in preventive detention and convicted oenders with sentences of up to one year, but also house convicted oenders with longer sentences. Likewise, the prisons and the penitentiaries house all categories of convicted oenders and also suspects in preventive detention. Moreover, the distinction between prisons and penitentiaries is found only in their architectural characteristics and not in their regimes. In a similar vein, Ecuador implemented a new law in 1982 which renamed penal institutions as Social Rehabilitation Centres and classied them into maximum, medium and minimum security levels. However, this classication system was never implemented (lack of resources was cited as one reason), and Today, there are 36 Centres of Social Rehabilitation in abominable physical condition, where classication is applied only in terms of sex (del Olmo, 1998: 128). Colombia represents a slight exception to this trend because during the 1990s it embarked on an ambitious programme for constructing new maximum security facilities to house drug trackers and guerrilla leaders. However, these facilities relied on both ideas and nancial aid from the United States and have a limited, though high prole, presence in the countrys inventory of penal facilities (del Olmo, 1998; Toro Vanegas, 2007). As an exception, they prove the rule that most Latin American governments are unable (or unwilling?) to construct penal facilities, even in the face of quite high levels of overcrowding (Carranza, 2003).3 The distinction between preventive detention and the diverse types of secure connement could still be maintained if facilities were internally divided into specialized units, but often this does not occur: oenders are located according to other criteria, mainly social extraction or geographic region of origin (Aldana, 1972; Olivero, 1998). This results in a mixing of inmates by legal category (accused
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or convicted), sentence length and type of crime, which makes the population within any facility far more heterogeneous than in North America.4 However, the relative lack of dierentiation between facilities makes Latin American institutions far more homogeneous than their North American counterparts, most of them approximating the latters medium security model.
Surveillance
Surveillance of inmates relies on the physical presence of custodial sta together with any technological resources that are available to them. Table 1 shows the ratio of inmates to sta in Canada, the United States and Latin American countries for which data were available. Although these gures contain an unknown amount of internal error springing from likely dierences in the methods for dening and counting sta, the broad picture that emerges is one of higher numbers of inmates per sta member in Latin America. In a detailed comparison of a US jail and a Venezuelan judicial internment centre, Jordan (1996) found that the US facility had an average of one custodial sta member for every ve inmates, while the Venezuelan facility had one custodial sta member for every 17 inmates. In terms of custodial sta on the job at any time, the ratios were 1:20/25 and 1:65, respectively. As is to be expected, North American facilities also routinely incorporate surveillance technology, particularly CCTV and metal detectors, in order to keep an eye on what is going on. The trend for the future is well illustrated by a new 186-bed jail that was recently opened in New York State:
[T]he facilitys integrated electronic security system . . . included ve touchscreen control stations, three graphic panels, 260 controlled and monitored doors, 165 intercom stations, 165 proximity readers and more than 110 cameras . . . With the installation of
Table 1. Ratios of inmates to staff, North and Latin America Country Canada United States Colombia Costa Rica Chile Ecuador El Salvador Peru Venezuela Year 2001a 2000b 2001c 2001d 2001a 2001a 2002a 2001a 2001a Total number of inmates 35,166 1,305,253 53,156 11,152 34,717 7738 11,055 26,989 18,768 Total number of staff 32,588 430,033 6390 2258 6614 1567 1303 4812 2703 Number of inmates/staff member 1.1 3.0 8.3 4.9 5.2 4.9 8.4 5.6 6.9
squez and Vargas de Roa (2003); dRico (2003). Sources: aUnited Nations (2005); bBJS (2003); cCampo Va
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[a] security electronics system, the facility is able to signicantly increase its inmate monitoring capacity. The intuitive and scalable nature of the touchscreens, as well as its ease of conguration enables a single corrections ocer to view the activity of 42 inmates at a time compared to the original capacity of 24. (Werner, 2006)
In addition, various inmate tracking systems have also been developed, based on bracelets worn by inmates, and are gradually being installed in prisons and jails. The publicity for one of these systems cites the following benets:
The RFID prison management system is intended to have a three-fold function. It ensures inmates do not escape by issuing an alarm if the bracelet approaches the jail perimeter; it reduces violence by allowing ocers to monitor who is congregating with whom; and it allows for administrative functions such as tracking where an inmate is when they are needed. (Swedberg, 2005)
Not surprisingly, in the less wealthy continent that is Latin America, technology is almost entirely absent from penal facilities. With fewer custodial sta to man them, Latin American penal institutions exercise a far lower level of surveillance over their inmates than do correctional facilities in North America.
Isolation
The degree of isolation of inmates from society is governed by policies on visiting, the use of telephones, the availability of televisions and so on. In this regard, an interesting dierence emerges around visiting. In North America, the extent and mode of visitation generally varies by the security level of the facility. Inmates in maximum security facilities are only permitted non-contact visits (conducted in booths with glass partitions and telephone intercoms), with greater restrictions on the number of visitors and the length of time for which the visits can last. Inmates in medium and minimum security facilities are allowed contact visits (in a supervised visiting room or patio) from a greater number of visitors and for a greater period of time. Family (conjugal) visits are also available to these inmates (e.g. CSC, 2007a). The degree of control over visitors and visiting is quite strict. Inmates must request approval of nominated visitors; visitors must comply with guidelines regarding appropriate attire (Comfort, 2003); and behaviour in the visiting room must minimize physical contact:
An inmate and his/her visitor(s) are allowed to briey embrace and kiss at the beginning and end of their visit. An inmate may hold his or her minor children . . . Holding hands on top of the table in plain view is permitted, with no other physical contact. Excessive contact, (kissing, massaging, stroking, and sitting with legs intertwined or sitting on laps) could result in termination of the visit. (CDCR, 2007: 9)
This, at least, is the mandate from the authorities.
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Visiting policy in Latin American facilities is much more permissive. Typically, one or two days per week are designated for visits and on these days the friends and family of all inmates except those in administrative or disciplinary segregation are allowed in to the facility. Sta do not keep lists of authorized visitors, but anyone wishing to enter the facility must know the name of a person held there, must produce identication, must comply with a minimum dress code and must be willing to be searched. The visiting period generally lasts from four to six hours and there is usually no designated visiting area, nor direct supervision of visitors and inmates. In Brazil, for example:
Few penal facilities have special areas for visits; instead, visitors are often allowed to enter directly into prisoners living areas. In some prisons, such as Sao Paulos Casa de Detenc ao, social visits with family and friends take place in the courtyard, while wives and girlfriends are allowed to enter prisoners cells. (HRW, 1998: 115)
Conjugal visits are also permitted for most inmates, on a relatively frequent basis, and independent of marital status (Olivero, 1998). In some cases, prostitutes may go into the facility on pre-arranged appointments with inmates (HRW, 1997, 1998). All observers agree that visiting days transform penal institutions in Latin America. Thus, MacNeil (2006: 9495) on a Venezuelan facility:
After three days in prison, I experienced my rst visit day. The atmosphere of the prison was completely transformed as women and children streamed in to the compound, laden with bags of groceries, and the whole place took on a gala atmosphere for a few hours.
And Olivero (1998: 104) reports an analogous situation in Mexico: In some facilities, entire families are allowed to live for extended periods behind prison walls with their loved ones. It is common for children to be seen running and playing throughout Mexican prisons. In Bolivia, too, many facilities have families living in with the inmates (Pinto Quintanilla, 2007). While visits clearly reect the importance of family in Latin American countries and provide welcome relief from the boredom and violence of institutional life, it is their character as open days that I wish to emphasize here. Once or twice weekly, the institution becomes an arena for mingling with visitors which draws in almost all of the inmates whether or not someone goes specically to visit them (an inmate can meet the visitors of companions, or even sell snacks and handicrafts to the assembled throng). This represents a signicant weakening of the social isolation that would otherwise prevail. In addition, the relative freedom given to inmates and visitors to do what they like, where they like, is a considerable departure from the close control that is typically associated with penal facilities in North America and constitutes a visible acknowledgement that the interior of each facility belongs to the inmates, not the authorities.
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Social arrangements: Supervision, accountability, formalization Supervision

Penal institutions are a clear example of Gomans (1991 [1961]) assertion that in total institutions there is a basic division between a large managed group of inmates and a small supervisory sta. But these institutions can vary in the extent to which the inmates are managed by the supervisory sta and the extent to which they manage themselves. In North America, the last 70 years have seen a marked decline in inmate participation in running the facility (Jacobs, 1977; Marquart and Crouch, 1984, 1985). Nowadays, participation by inmates in administrative or custodial matters is rarely (if ever) countenanced and instead tends to be conned to programme development and management (e.g. D az-Cotto, 1996). Even here, the possibilities may be limited: using DiIulios tripartite typology of managerial styles (control, responsibility, consensual), Reisig (1998) found that only two out of 11 state facilities surveyed in the United States corresponded to the responsibility model (which gives inmates a greater voice in institutional aairs). One result of the trend to exclude them from administrative and custodial procedures is a greater levelling of inmates, because there are fewer positions from which to garner power or inuence. Although gangs represent an important mode of social organization among contemporary inmates (Gaes et al., 2002), and in some respects reproduce the hierarchies and styles of control shown by the old convict-guards and building tenders, unlike the latter they are not sponsored by the facilitys administration and are therefore seen as a far less suitable mechanism for internal governance. Thus, the attitude of the custodial sta towards gangs may range from strictly adversarial to cautiously tolerant, but never to wholesale acceptance. Absent the possibility of the formal incorporation of inmates into the structure of internal control, administrations appear to have responded in a variety of ways: increasing the number of custodial sta; increasing the restrictions and control on the movements of inmates; increasing surveillance; seeking a balance of power between gangs; or simply turning a blind eye to all but the most egregious disorder. In Latin America, the use of some kind of building tender appears to be widespread and longstanding. For example, Aldana (1972: 54) described the Delegado de Pabellon (Dormitory Delegate) in the Catia Judicial Internment Facility (Caracas) where he served time (an inmate whom the authorities recognise as having good behaviour and the capacity to exercise internal control over each dormitory), as did Bayer (1978) the jefes de patio o pasillo (heads of patio or corridor) at about the same facility. More recently, Human Rights Watch (HRW, 1997) found time in a Bogota that the dormitory delegates in Catia Prison were being called polipresos (inmate police); Pinto Quintanilla (2007) described the prisoner Delegate Councils in Bolivia; and MacNeil (2006) found a well-entrenched system of inmate control in Venezuelas Western General Penitentiary.5
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MacNeil, however, had previously been in a Venezuelan facility where there was no strategic alliance between the prison sta and the inmates, nor any attempt to replace that form of control with a more permanent and intrusive presence on the part of the administration. The custodial sta limited themselves to controlling certain doors and railings, to trying to impose some kind of order on the lines that formed at meal times and to the evacuation of inmates who were ill, injured or dead. Human Rights Watch found a similar situation in some Brazilian prisons. For example, at the Joa o Chaves Penitentiary in Natal, with an inmate population of 646, only three guards were on duty while the organization was visiting: [T]he three guards remained stationed at a table near the entrance of the prison. During a day at the facility, we rarely saw them get up from the table to monitor the situation of the inmate population (HRW, 1998: 71). When custodial sta give up any attempt at internal control, relations between prisoners can quickly descend into internecine warfare (Hidalgo and Jordan, 1993 1994), with truces only for visiting days. This is the more problematic form of prisoner self-government, built on anarchy rather than authority.6 Throughout Latin America these two styles of internal governance ebb and ow, providing a striking contrast to the structure of power in the North.
Accountability
As a result of relatively recent historical developments, North American prisons currently nd themselves accountable to a broad range of institutions and groups. Since the 1960s, inmates and prisoners rights groups in the United States have successfully used litigation to seek redress for the inhumane treatment of inmates and the arbitrary nature of decisions regarding key aspects of the penal trajectory, such as, good time, furloughs and parole (Feeley and Rubin, 1999; Feeley and Swearingen, 2004; Jacobs, 1980). Judicial responses have not only materialized in decisions that are often favourable to inmates, but also in the active involvement of the courts in the oversight of prison reform. In Canada, government-appointed commissions of inquiry have performed something of a similar role, their creation often triggered by crises in the correctional system and their reports lled with criticisms of the inhumane and arbitrary treatment of prisoners and with proposals for reform (Gaucher and Lowman, 1998). Collectively, the activities in the US courts and the Canadian commissions of inquiry reect a trend to include prisoners as members of mass society with many of the same rights as other citizens (Jacobs, 1977). A second set of external observers comprises the general public and elected politicians who, concerned by rising crime rates from the 1960s onwards, have often developed strategic alliances to demand punishment rather than welfare and treatment for oenders (Garland, 2001). This trend is generally acknowledged to be stronger in the United States (Melossi and Lettiere, 1998) than in Canada (Moore and Hannah-Moatt, 2005) and, insofar as it has aected penal facilities, has arguably led to a greater concern for security (understood as the attempt to
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limit problem behaviours among inmates). The conuence of these external demands on penal control is neatly reected in the Correctional Service of Canadas slogan Safety, Respect and Dignity for All (CSC, 2007b) and has led to a self-conscious attempt to achieve a balance (Meyer and OMalley, 2005) between what many see as potentially conicting objectives. However, one result has been that the principle of less eligibility, which in the penal domain mandates worse material conditions for inmates than for the poorest members of society, has been somewhat attenuated.7 Latin America has experienced a similar punitive turn to that in the North but there has not been the counter-trend towards more humanitarian connement. Rapid increases in crime rates since the late 1980s have not necessarily translated directly into expanding prison populations, but they have fuelled historically high levels of concern about crime and personal safety (Caldeira, 2000; Rotker, 2000) which have led to calls for mano dura (a strong hand) (Godoy, 2005). They have also been an important stimulus to self-help in crime prevention as communities gate themselves o, harden property targets and hire varying types of watchmen and security personnel. Attitudes towards oenders have also hardened (Bricen o n et al., 2006) and self-help in criminal justice has spilled over into execution, Leo either as spontaneous lynching (Godoy, 2006) or the more organized death squads (Huggins and Mesquita, 1995; Perea, 2003). In this social climate, the prospects for examining what goes on in penal facilities and for improving the inmates lot are quite bleak. Latin American penal facilities have always attracted their share of moral crusaders, whether they be wealthy philanthropists (Aguirre, 2005), religious groups rdova, 1999) or, more recently, human rights (Miller, 1998), academics (e.g. Co groups (e.g. HRW, 1997, 1998). These have done much to publicize and criticize conditions inside. Inmates themselves have also drawn attention to the conditions of connement through letters, the occasional book and, most frequently, protests and strikes. However, these initiatives have not been sucient to produce a sustained ` -vis the rest of society. One shift in the position of penal facilities, or inmates, vis-a barrier has been the relative lack of inmates organizations and of the articulation of their problems: the typical inmate has little education or social capital. This situation only changes when political gures are conned in these facilities, because they have a peculiar motivation and the necessary discursive skills to publicize penal ills (Aguirre, 2005; del Olmo, 1998). Occasionally, a government takes it upon itself to n government in 1950s proclaim a new condition for inmates, as did the populist Pero Argentina (Caimari, 2004), but such changes have rarely gone beyond rhetoric and have lasted only as long as the corresponding political regime. Another barrier to the humanitarian movement has been the unwillingness of the courts to get involved with conditions within the facilities. This is striking because the courts have for long held the legislatively assigned responsibility of nchez Galindo, 2004), although they periodically inspecting all penal facilities (Sa have rarely complied with this directive (e.g. Saavedra, 1977).8 The response to the penal crisis in Latin America has been an attempt to lower the use of preventive
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detention through reforms to criminal procedure (Tocora, 2005; Vogler, 2005), rather than to deal with the problems of penal facilities themselves. In Latin America, these facilities continue to be much less open to scrutiny than their counterparts in North America.
Formalization
In North America, accountability has accentuated the trend in correctional bureaucracy towards the development of codied rules and the use of written documentation as part of a culture of audit and control (Feeley and Swearingen, 2004; Riveland, 1999). A brief look at the websites of correctional administrations or of accessory bodies concerned with standards conrms this. For example, the Correctional Service of Canada has nearly 140 Commissioners Directives and nine Standard Operating Practices (CSC, 2007c); and the United States Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has more than 280 policy documents (BOP, 2007). The latter deal with such varied matters as the acceptance of donations, incentive awards for employees, inmate grooming and furniture testing. The avour of this style of administration is well captured in a recent statement by the Director of the BOP to the Prison Commission:
Beyond externally-mandated oversight, the Bureau is a policy-driven agency with numerous built-in mechanisms of critical self-review and management control . . . The primary system of control in the Bureau of Prisons is the program review process . . . [An example] from the Food Services institution guidelines [is] provided below: . Review documentation over the past 6 months to determine if job eciency lectures (monthly safety talks) are being conducted and topics include instruction on job specic equipment, hazardous materials, safety, and sanitation procedures. . Determine through direct observation if safety procedures are established and there is proper use of all protective safety equipment (where applicable) in the inmate work area (e.g. machine guarding, eye protection, safety shoes, re extinguishers charged and functional, and eye wash stations operable). (Lappin, 2006: 57)
The meaning of this comparatively new administrative style for corrections personnel is direct and obvious:
Its a new day. When I rst started with the department, there was very little documentation. If you locked an inmate up, you verbally reported that to the captain on duty. You did not write a report at that particular time like we do now . . . In the old days, you had what you referred to as a guidebook. Now we manage by standards and policies. We are not allowed mistakes. Its important that
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ocers stay on top of the rules and regulations. Its important they stay on top of the standard operating procedures and its important they stay on top of the administrative memos that come out from the department, the division or the wardens oce. (Beck, 2005: 2)
This managerial style is absent in Latin American penal facilities, where policy is largely legislated. Most countries have a basic penal law which is complemented by a few sets of legislated regulations and by the occasional ministerial decree. For example, Argentina has ve sets of regulations that accompany its Organic Law of the Federal Penitentiary Service (SPFA, 2007), while Colombia which has been more diligent in this regard has at least 40 presidential or ministerial decrees that develop or modify the basic Ley 65 de 1993 (see INPEC, 2007). Neither these nor other countries approach the level of codication or administrative control found in North America. Legislative guidelines, sometimes dubbed as bright and shiny,9 coexist with a preference for verbal orders and control within penal facilities (Jordan, 1996). Administration is based heavily on inertia and institutional tradition while documentation is relatively scarce. Two consequences ow from this. The rst is that relatively little information is routinely collected about these facilities, further underlining their opacity to the public gaze. In extreme situations, there may not even be an accurate count of the number of inmates in the facility (e.g. Hidalgo and Jordan, 19931994). The second is that the specication and control of operating procedures may be tenuous, such that wardens have a lot of autonomy and outcomes can be quite varied. The development and codication of rules usually promotes a universalistic ethos in bureaucracies, and where this does not occur particularism may be quite strong. Evidence of the latter is seen in the reproduction within the Latin American penal facilities of the social inequalities found in wider society, a feature commented on by numerous observers who compare the relatively comfortable quarters of the wealthy inmates with the squalid dormitory areas inhabited by the poor (Bayer, 1978; Bretas, 1996; Olivero, 1998).10
Imprisonment and internment

Looking across the various institutional dimensions reviewed in this essay, we nd a relatively clear set of dierences between North America and Latin America. In the North, inmates are more regimented, more isolated and subject to greater surveillance; they are also less involved in the running of the institution. North American penal facilities are more open to external scrutiny and their bureaucracies are more formalized. In Latin America, inmates are less regimented, less isolated and subject to less surveillance; they are also more involved in the running of the institution. Latin American penal facilities are less open to external scrutiny and their bureaucracies are less formalized. One way to express these contrasts quantitatively is as a dierence in the level of control: in North America, control is assiduous in the sense that it is unceasing,
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persistent and intrusive; in Latin America, control is perfunctory in the sense that it is sporadic, indierent and cursory. But another way to express these contrasts qualitatively is in terms of the character of connement: in North America there is imprisonment; in Latin America there is internment. Despite the lengthy historical existence of the word prison, there is much of value in Foucaults (1979: 233) point that, since the late 18th century, the prison is to be dierentiated from detention because it also involves the technical transformation of individuals: [t]he margin by which the prison exceeds detention is lled . . . by techniques of a disciplinary type. In other words, the prison is an institution in which individuals are not merely detained, but disciplined through projects, improvements, experiments, theoretical statements, personal evidence and investigations (Foucault, 1979: 235). It does not matter that what is being done has changed over time, from reform to rehabilitation (Rothman, 1995) to punishment (Feeley and Simon, 1992); it does not even matter that the technical transformations fail to materialize (as evidenced by the periodic and persistent pronouncements on the failure of prisons). Even when imprisonment is reduced to nothing more than control, it is still more than detention: Inmates do not control anything inside the walls. Everything is structured in accordance with strict policy and procedure (Bruton, 2004: 41). In all of this, imprisonment is conceived as a project, as an act of social engineering. It may be possible to transform criminals through rehabilitation or treatment; but even when not, it is still possible to organize facilities and people in a rational, planned and calculated manner to reduce disorder, danger and risk (Feeley and Simon, 1992). In Irwins (2004: 80, emphasis in the original) characterization of the contemporary warehouse prison: the routine . . . is not brutal, dangerous, or excessively cruel. It is tightly controlled, limited, monotonous, and lacking in opportunities for self-improvement. Scholars who study the history of penal institutions in Latin America have provided some valuable insights into the emergence and spread of ideas regarding penitentiaries, prisons and the rehabilitative ideal as social and political projects (Aguirre, 2005; del Olmo, 1981; Salvatore and Aguirre, 1996a). In these studies, we nd ample evidence of experts, commentators and reformers who, in the best tradition of social engineering, articulated visions of the prison as a site for the technical transformation of oenders. Most drew heavily on international sources but also incorporated local, more idiosyncratic, perspectives. However, there is also equally ample evidence that these visions were either never realized or only short lived (see particularly, Aguirre, 2005; Salvatore and Aguirre, 1996b; SantiagoValles, 1996). For reasons that require exploration, the margin by which these regimes went beyond detention, that is, became a prison in Foucaults terms, was either small or non-existent. The information presented here suggests that this state of aairs still persists today.11 When detention is the sole objective, penal intervention is limited to a spatial policy of connement. What happens inside penal facilities is strictly irrelevant and concern only arises when inmates escape. Control focuses on containment rather than internal organization and activity. This is the paradigm of internment, which
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materialized to a greater or lesser degree in forms as diverse as the pre-modern English jail (McConville, 1998), US prisoner of war camps (Glidden, 1973) and relocation centres (Hayashi, 2004; Starn, 1986), and other concentration camps the world over (Applebaum, 2001; Walston, 1997). For the observer familiar with contemporary Latin American penal facilities, the literature on internment oers many points of resonance: makeshift and relatively harsh conditions; inmate self-government; inmate unrest; and the overwhelming focus on containment. By contrast, for the same observer, the literature on North American prisons is as likely to stimulate a sense of dierence from Latin American penal facilities as it is to generate a perception of similarity.
Conclusion imprisonment, internment and the role of the judiciary

In seeking to understand these dierent regimes, the key to any explanation for their separate occurrences must focus on the presence (imprisonment) or absence (internment) of projects for doing something with or to inmates while in connement, whether it is rehabilitation, punishment, treatment or caring. Viewing the task in this light immediately indicates that certain sorts of explanation are invalid or unhelpful. Thus, we cannot explain imprisonment and internment by the presence or absence in wider society of projects for penal connement, because research attests to the ready availability of such projects across the hemisphere, both historically (e.g. Rothman, 1971; Salvatore and Aguirre, 1996a) and currently (Feeley and Simon, 1992; OLP, 2007; Rico, 1997: 269291). Nor should we cast the explanation in terms of resource disparities, as if the wealthier North American societies have had the resources to implement penal projects while the poorer Latin American societies have not. Disciplinary projects (in the Foucauldian sense) depend much more on social organization than they do on economic resources and material technology. We should also be wary of explanations built on normative perspectives that, implicitly or explicitly, view internment simply as a failure to produce and sustain imprisonment. The modernization agenda of earlier Latin American reformers and academics (Salvatore and Aguirre, 1996a) and the currently fashionable critical stances that portray the regions prisons in terms of deciencies, problems and the failure to live up to legislative prescriptions (OLP, 2007) all point to explanations that ultimately rest on some notion of state capability in the North and incapability in the South. The problem with this kind of explanation is that it ranges imprisonment and internment along a scale rather than treating them as qualitatively distinct categories. In so doing, it precludes the signicant possibility that each type of connement regime combines with other penal practices to produce a particular form of criminal justice. Viewed in isolation, internment looks like an empty and meaningless container a simple holding action. And that may be all there is to it, at least in cases where
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inmates are subsequently to be expelled from society (through deportation or death), or in which problematic social events such as wars (that generate the need to conne groups such as aliens and captives) have well-dened and structurally important conclusions (peace). But most crime is not dealt with by deportation or death, and criminality (as an attribute ascribed to oenders) does not have a clearly dened end. Therefore, holding criminals by internment inevitably raises the question of how and when they will be released. It means that the heart of penal social control lies in the journey back to society, not in the time away from it. Whereas imprisonment enacts penal intervention through connement, internment enacts it through release. I will focus briey on several aspects of the criminal justice system in the United States and Venezuela that t with the preceding characterization. First, penal connement in the United States is a sentencing option, and its use is determined by criteria of appropriateness, such as criminal history and seriousness of the current oence. In fact, currently, about 30 per cent of US convicted oenders are not sentenced to prison at all, but to probation (mostly) and other non-connement sanctions (BJS, 2007). By contrast, in Venezuela penal connement is prescribed for all felony convictions and there is no possibility of sentencing to probation (Venezuela, 2005). All convicted oenders therefore begin their sentence in a penal facility; probation must be applied for by inmates and is treated as a type of early release mechanism. Second, the mechanisms for early release from penal connement are fewer in the United States than in Venezuela and restricted to the nal segment of the prison sentence. Thus, in the United States work release and halfway house programmes, when not used as an initial sentencing option, are only available to inmates within four to six months of their release date (e.g. Knapp and Burke, 1992; Savage and Dumovich, 1991). Discretionary parole, in many ways a progressive step down from minimum security connement, has declined markedly in the face of mandatory parole, which simply adds a phase of penal supervision to an already completed prison sentence (Petersilia, 1999). In Venezuela, work release is available after a quarter of the sentence has been completed, halfway houses after a third, conditional release after two-thirds, and connement12 after three-quarters. In addition, presidential pardons can be granted to inmates who have completed two-thirds of their sentence (Ministerio de Justicia, 1997; Venezuela 2005, 2006). Given this array of mechanisms, inmates naturally tend to focus more on getting out of connement rez Santiago, 2006). than they do on getting through it (Birkbeck and Pe Third, criteria for awarding total or partial release from connement tend to look backwards in the United States and forwards in Venezuela. In the United States, decisions concerning release are based mainly on criminal history and the instant oence and partly on in-prison performance, the latter envisaged as what has been done to make sure this criminal is no longer a danger before he is released (Petersilia, 1999: 481). In Venezuela, decisions are based mainly on projected arrangements for conventional living (family support, the oer of employment) following release (e.g. Birkbeck, 2007, 2009) and in the oft-cited words
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from the Penitentiary Law are concerned with concepts of social responsibility and coexistence and the will to live according to the law (Venezuela, 2000: Article 7). Fourth, release decisions in the United States are in the hands of prison administrators and parole boards and are routinized through the use of computer systems (that deduct good time, monitor and ag up time served, etc.) and through predictive instruments that indicate the probability of recidivism. In Venezuela, all release decisions except presidential pardons are taken by judges. Judicial control over release and presidential control over pardons not only reect the importance assigned to these decisions but also frame them as matters of justice (however dened) rather than of management. The attempt to explain the existence of imprisonment in the North and internment in the South might protably begin with this latter dierence. In the United States, judicial involvement in criminal cases usually ends with the act of sentencing and convicted oenders are handed over to prison and parole bureaucracies to serve out their terms.13 The administrative uncoupling of sentencing from penal supervision which arguably emerged 200 years ago has undoubtedly been an important stimulus to the growth of those bureaucracies and to the penal projects that they have envisaged or adopted. In Venezuela, judicial involvement in criminal cases is a constant:14 even the release from connement after serving a completed sentence requires a judicial order. Judicial authority over the penal trajectory creates enduring links between judges and convicted oenders, which the latter must seek to cultivate and rez Santiago, 2006). exploit if they are to regain their freedom (Birkbeck and Pe Given this fundamental relation, those who sta the penal bureaucracy are merely custodians for the judicial system and they generally know it. For convicted oenders (and arguably also for those held in preventive detention), the content and meaning of criminal justice is essentially supplied by the judges remote and often inaccessible gures who vary from ecient to indolent, honest to corrupt, but who control all penal destinies. This dierence between North and South suggests that a plausible explanation of imprisonment and internment could emerge from further study of the roles of the judiciary in sentencing and penal supervision, and of the cultural and political processes that underpin those roles.15 Acknowledgements
This article was written for the University of Floridas programme on Crime, Law and Governance in the Americas. My thanks to Michael Welch, Odilza Lines and colleagues at the University of Florida for comments on an earlier version of this essay.
Notes
1. North and South are used as abbreviations for North America and Latin America. 2. Criminal law and criminal justice (with the exception of some police agencies) are organized nationally. Within this framework, each state constitutes a judicial circuit.
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3. According to figures presented by Carranza (2003), the average level of overcrowding (prison population as a percentage of rated capacity) in Latin America was 147 per cent in 1999. This compares with the following situation in the United States: 134 per cent for federal facilities, 101 per cent for state facilities, 89 per cent for private facilities (BJS, 2003) and 93 per cent for jails (BJS, 2001). In Canada, a recent government report observed that in many jurisdictions, the number of incarcerated adults has reached the levels of institutional capacity in recent years (Juristat, 2006: 19), therein suggesting that overcrowding has not been a recent problem, although it may become so. 4. One consequence is the existence of a large number of prisoners without sentence (Carranza et al., 1983) or punishment before trial (HRW, 1997), which has been of so much concern to penal reformers in Latin America. 5. We were introduced to the cabo, or head man in the letra [dormitory], and began to understand a little about how the prison was organised. There was the usual management team of hard men who ran the prison, but they, together with everyone else in the prisoners organisation, played a dual role. To the prisoners, they were the gremio, or management, and were the law within the prison, holding the power of life and death over prisoners. . . To the prison authorities, though, they were known as the prisoners committee, and met regularly with the prison director and other officials to organise sports competitions, cultural events, educational courses and other aspects of prison life. (MacNeil, 2006:200; cf. Marquart and Crouch, 1985) 6. When warring factions of inmates are not kept apart, a considerable number of deaths can occur, as for example at the Sabaneta National Prison in Maracaibo, Venezuela, where more than 100 inmates were killed in one day of internal conflict in January 1994 (HRW, 1994). Typically, this style of inmate self-government and conflict is also accompanied by military containment and re-take strategies on the part of the authorities, which are prime opportunities for state brutality. The most egregious example was the retaking of the Carandiru prison in Sao Paulo, Brazil, after a riot in October 1992, during which 111 inmates were killed (HRW, 1998). 7. When the demand for greater punitiveness has been particularly vocal, some of the frills of institutional life (the weight room, TVs and so on) may disappear for a while (Riveland, 1999). However, there is little doubt that the material conditions of life in North American facilities are now above those experienced by the poorest segments of society: Prison staff must deliver services and programs to an increasingly diversified inmate population. Staff must be sensitive to the lighting, caloric intake of inmates, food temperature, recreational needs, cell size and population density, racial and ethnic composition of offender living areas and cells, disciplinary requirements and personal security, health care, mail and correspondence needs, hygiene needs, and a host of other issues on a daily and hourly basis (Marquart, 2005: 6). 8. However, there are isolated cases of judges ordering the closure of individual facilities, for example in Brazil (HRW, 1998: 19) and Venezuela (Mart nez, 19931994).
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9. These [penal] codes have been referred to as bright and shiny, which is a polite way of saying that they are seldom, if ever, used in so far as the practice in the prisons is concerned (Teeters, 1946: 24). 10. The organization of life within Mexican prisons is a mirror image of life in Mexican society. That is to say that there are clear class and economic distinctions. Those who can afford the quality amenities of life can purchase them (Olivero, 1998: 103). 11. del Olmo (2002: 377) posits that contemporary Latin American penal facilities fall into three categories: (1) the prison-ghetto, which looks like a very poor urban settlement and where inmates are self-governing and have much contact with family members and the world outside prison (e.g. in Bolivia, Mexico); (2) the prison-concentration camp, characterized by high levels of violence perpetrated by inmates and prison personnel, inmate self-government and very poor infrastructure (e.g. Venezuela, Brazil); (3) the prison hotel, occupied mainly by wealthier inmates. 12. Confinement (confinamiento) dates at least from the Criminal Code of 1915 and requires the person to reside in a municipality designated by the court and to report periodically to the parish Prefect. 13. The most important exceptions are the recently developed reentry courts (based on the drug court model) which move the court into a sentence management role, overseeing the convicted persons eventual return to the community (Maruna and LeBel, 2003: 92). 14. This contrasts with judicial oversight of penal facilities which, although mandated by law (Venezuela, 1962, 2006), is rarely exercised. 15. One place to begin (but not end) this kind of exploration in North America would be to look at therapeutic jurisprudence (e.g. Wexler, 2001; Winick and Wexler, 2003) and the sometimes heated reactions that it produces (Hoffman, 2002). In Latin America, extensive discussion of jueces de vigilancia, or jueces de ejecucion nchez Galindo, n.d.) tends to focus on their (sentence oversight judges) (e.g. Sa potential role as prison ombudsmen rather than their role as penal case supervisors. This latter role seems to be so taken for granted that it escapes comment among those who research criminal law and criminal justice.
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Christopher Birkbeck is a Professor of Criminology at the University of Salford, UK, and an Emeritus Professor of Criminology at the Universidad de Los Andes, Venezuela.

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Imprisonment and internment: Comparing penal institutions North and South

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Imprisonment and internment: Comparing penal institutions North and South

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Punishment & Society 13(3)

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Physical arrangements in confinement: Regimentation, surveillance, isolation Regimentation

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Punishment & Society 13(3)

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Punishment & Society 13(3)

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This, at least, is the mandate from the authorities.

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Punishment & Society 13(3)

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Social arrangements: Supervision, accountability, formalization Supervision

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Punishment & Society 13(3)

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Punishment & Society 13(3)

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Imprisonment and internment

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Conclusion imprisonment, internment and the role of the judiciary

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Punishment & Society 13(3)

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Punishment & Society 13(3)

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Punishment & Society 13(3)

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Punishment & Society 13(3)

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Punishment & Society 2011 Birkbeck 307 32

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