Section 4: 1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices.

It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. (2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. (3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc. Fortich v. Corona FACTS: Office of the President, issued through then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres rendered a Decision which approved the conversion of a one hundred forty-four (144)-hectare land from agricultural to agro-industrial/institutional area. On March 29, 1996, alleged farmer-beneficiaries of the contested parcels of land staged a dramatic and well-publicized hunger strike front of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The strike stirred nationwide attention that even church leaders and some presidential candidates tried to intervene for the strikers cause. President Fidel V. Ramos then held a dialogue with the strikers and promised to resolve their grievance within the framework of the law. This led the Office of the President, through then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, to issue the so-called Win-Win Resolution on November 7, 1997, substantially modifying its earlier Decision after it had already become final and executory. The said Resolution modified the approval of the land conversion to agro-industrial area only to the extent of forty-four (44) hectares, and ordered the remaining one hundred (100) hectares to be distributed to qualified farmerbeneficiaries. Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. Management and Development Corporation (NQSRMDC), one of the petitioners who claims ownership of the land in question (by virtue of TCT 14371 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Bukidnon), opposed said resolution and urged the Supreme Court to annul and set aside the Win-Win Resolution and to enjoin respondent Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao of the Department of Agrarian Reform from implementing the said Resolution. The Court ruled in favor of the petitioners. Undeterred, respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. The Supreme Court, on November 1998, issued a Resolution wherein it voted [two-two] with finality the denial of respondents separate motions for reconsideration ratiocinating that more of the impoverished of society will be benefited by the agroeconomical development of the disputed land which the province of Bukidnon and the municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon intend to undertake. Subsequently, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed their Motion For Reconsideration Of The Resolution

Dated November 17, 1998 And For Referral Of The Case To This Honorable Court En Banc (With Urgent Prayer For Issuance Of A Restraining Order) In their respective motions for reconsideration, both respondents and intervenors pray that this case be referred to this Court en banc. They contend that inasmuch as their earlier motions for reconsideration (of the Decision dated April 24, 1998) were resolved by a vote of two-two, the required number to carry a decision, i.e., three, was not met. Consequently, the case should be referred to and be decided by this Court en banc, relying on the following constitutional provision: Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc ISSUE: W/N the November 1998 two-two Resolution should be reffered and voted on by the Court En Banc?

HELD: The respondents and intervenors prayer is untenable: It is clear that only cases are referred to the Court en banc for decision whenever the required number of votes is not obtained. Conversely, the rule does not apply where, as in this case, the required three votes is not obtained in the resolution of a motion for reconsideration. Hence, the second sentence of the aforequoted provision speaks only of case and not matter. The above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3) pertains to the disposition of cases by a division. If there is a tie in the voting, there is no decision. The only way to dispose of the case then is to refer it to the Court en banc. On the other hand, if a case has already been decided by the division and the losing party files a motion for reconsideration, the failure of the division to resolve the motion because of a tie in the voting does not leave the case undecided. There is still the decision which must stand in view of the failure of the members of the division to muster the necessary vote for its reconsideration. Quite plainly, if the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is lost. The assailed decision is not reconsidered and must therefore be deemed affirmed. THE COURT based this ruling by distinguishing between cases and matters: CASES MATTERS Decided Resolved NOTE: The Court Apply the doctrine of reddendo singula singulis [By referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate object.(Blacks Law Dictionary)] APPLICATION: The two-two Resolution (matter) of November 17, 1998 in effect was a dismissal. Corollary to that, the Decision sought to be reconsidered was arrived at by a unanimous vote of all five (5) members of the Second Division of the Court. Consequently, the present motions for reconsideration necessarily partake of the nature of a second motion for

reconsideration. Since the Win-Win Resolution was declared null and void in the April 24, 1998 Decision, the March 29, 1996 OP Decision (Resolution) was accordingly upheld and thus vested appurtenant rights to the land in dispute on petitioners as well as on the people of Bukidnon and other parts of the country who stand to be benefited by the development of the property. SECTION 5: The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: 1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. (2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: (a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. (b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto. (c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue. (d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved. (3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned. (4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice. (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law. Aruelo v. CA

June 15, 1992: Instead of submitting his answer, Gatchalian filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that: (a) the petition was filed out of time; (b) there was a pending protest case before the COMELEC; and (c) Aruelo failed to pay the prescribed filing fees and cash deposit on the petition. June 6, 1992: COMELEC denied Aruelo's petition for noncompliance with Section 20 of R.A. No. 7166, which requires the submission of the evidence and documents in support of the petition to annul Gatchalian's proclamation. July 10, 1992: The trial court issued an order dated, denying Gatchalian's Motion to Dismiss and ordering him to file his answer to the petition within five days from notice, otherwise, "a general denial shall be deemed to have been entered. The trial court also directed Aruelo to pay the deficiency in his filing fee. Gatchalian filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order but the trial court denied the same on August 3, 1992. August 6, 1992, Gatchalian filed before the Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying his Motion to Dismiss and his Motion for Reconsideration. July 23, 1992: Gatchalian filed before the trial court a Motion for Bill of Particulars. The trial court denied Gatchalian's motion in an order dated August 5, 1992, a copy of which was received by him on August 6, 1992. August 11, 1992, Gatchalian submitted before the trial court his Answer with Counter-Protest and Counterclaim, alleging that Aruelo was the one who committed the election fraud and that were it not for the said fraud, Gatchalian's margin over Aruelo would have been greater. Gatchalian prayed for the dismissal of the petition, confirmation of his election and award of damages. On the day, the trial court issued an order directing the revision of ballots in the precincts enumerated in Gatchalian's Counter-Protest and Construction. The trial court ordered the delivery of the contested ballot boxes to the Branch Clerk of Court. August 14, 1992: Aruelo filed a Motion to Reconsider As Well As To Set Aside "Answer with Counter-Protest and Counterclaim" Filed Out of Time by Protestee. The trial court denied Aruelo's motion and scheduled the constitution of the revision committee. September 28, 1992, Aruelo prayed before the Court of Appeals for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the trial court from implementing the revision of ballots. The Court of Appeals belatedly issued a temporary restraining order on November 9, after actual revision ended on October 28. September 21, 1992: Gatchalian filed with the Court of Appeals another petition for certiorari again alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in issuing the Order which denied his Motion for Bill of Particulars. The Court of Appeals dismissed this petition for lack of merit. November 24, 1992: CA rendered a decision denying Gatchalian's petition, but declared that Gatchalian's Answer With CounterProtest and Counterclaim was timely filed. The appellate court also lifted the temporary restraining order and ordered the trial court to "proceed with dispatch in the proceedings." Aruelo claims that in election contests, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure gives the respondent only five days from receipt of summons within which to file his answer and that this five-day period had lapsed when Gatchalian filed his answer. According to him, the filing of motions to dismiss and motions for bill of particulars is prohibited by Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the

FACTS: Aruelo and Gatchalian were rival candidates in the May 11, 1992 elections for the office of the Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Balagtas, Province of Bulacan. Gatchalian won over Aruelo by a margin of four votes. May 22, 1992: Aruelo filed with the COMELEC a petition seeking to annul Gatchalian's proclamation on the ground of "fraudulent alteration and tampering" of votes in the tally sheets and the election returns. June 2, 1992: Aruelo filed a petition protesting the same election. Aruelo, however, informed the trial court of the pendency of the pre-proclamation case before the COMELEC. June 10, 1992: Gatchalian was served an Amended Summons from the trial court, giving him five days to answer the petition.

COMELEC Rules of Procedure; hence, the filing of said pleadings did not suspend the running of the five-day period, or give Gatchalian a new five-day period to file his answer. ISSUE: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion when COMELEC Rules of Procedure was not followed HELD: No. Petitioner filed the election protest with the Regional Trial Court, whose proceedings are governed by the Revised Rules of Court. Sec 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not applicable to proceedings before the regular courts. Section 2, Rule 1, Part I of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure states that the filing of motions to dismiss and bill of particulars, shall apply only to proceedings brought before the COMELEC. Section 2, Rule 1, Part I provides: Sec. 2. Applicability These rules, except Part VI, shall apply to all actions and proceedings brought before the Commission. Part VI shall apply to election contests and quo warranto cases cognizable by courts of general or limited jurisdiction. Nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it provided that motions to dismiss and bill of particulars are not allowed in election protests or quo warranto cases pending before the regular courts. COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court (Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 5 [5]). Private respondent received a copy of the order of the RTC denying his motion for a bill of particulars on August 6, 1992. Under Section 1 (b), Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, a party has at least 5 days to file his answer after receipt of the order. Therefore, he had until August 11, 1992 within which to file. The Answer with Counter-Protest and Counterclaim filed on August 11, 1992 was filed timely. The instant case is different from a pre-proclamation controversy which the law expressly mandates to be resolved in a summary proceeding. Pre-proclamation controversies should be summarily decided. Questions as those involving the appreciation of the votes and the conduct of the balloting, which require more deliberate and necessarily longer consideration, are left for examination in the corresponding election protest. An election protest does not merely concern the personal interests of rival candidates for an office. It is the deep public interest to determine the true choice of the people. It is a well-established principle that laws governing election protests must be liberally construed to the end that the popular will expressed in the election of public officers, will not, by purely technical reasons, be defeated Sotto v. COMELEC FACTS: Sotto filed for a review for the decision of COMELEC declaring Javier as the true and legitimate Pres. of the Popular Front (Sumulong) Party. Sotto contends that he is the President. ISSUE: W/N the Supreme Court(S.C) can review Sottos petition under sec.9 of the Commonwealth Act 657 w/c states that any decision, order or ruling of COMELEC may be reviewed by the SC by writ of certiorari in accordance with the Rules of Court or w/ such rules as may be promulgated by the SC

HELD: The court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is unavoidable or is the very lis mota. No. The words may be reviewed by writ of certiorari does not refer to the special civil action of certiorari. Sotto filed a special civil action of review of decision w/c means that the SC can only review the acts of the inferior court, board or officer exercising judicial functions when it acted in excess of his/its jurisdiction (not the review of the actual decision of the lower court w/c should be filed as an appeal) (STATCON PRINCIPLE: NECESSITY OF DECIDING CONSTITUTIONALITY) A court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide on it unless it is raised by the parties. If a constitutional question is raised, it should present some other ground upon w/c the court may rest its judgment. The constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case arises in w/c the decision for it is inevitable. Republic v. Gingoyon

FACTS: Keyword: Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III (NAIA 3) GIST: The Government insists that Rule 67 of the Rules of Court governs the expropriation proceedings in this case to the exclusion of all other laws. On the other hand, PIATCO claims that it is Rep. Act No. 8974 which does apply. The present controversy has its roots with the promulgation of the Courts decision in Agan v. PIATCO, promulgated in 2003 (2003 Decision): Decision nullified the "Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III" entered into between the Philippine Government (Government) and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO), as well as the amendments and supplements thereto. The agreement had authorized PIATCO to build a new international airport terminal (NAIA 3). The contracts were nullified, among others, that Paircargo Consortium, predecessor of PIATCO, did not possess the requisite financial capacity when it was awarded the NAIA 3 contract and that the agreement was contrary to public policy. [NOTE: At the time of the promulgation of the 2003 Decision, the NAIA 3 facilities had already been built by PIATCO and were nearing completion. In his Separate Opinion, Justice Panganiban, joined by Justice Callejo, declared that the government pay reasonable expenses incurred in the construction of the Terminal] PIATCO and several respondents-intervenors filed their respective motions for the reconsideration of the 2003 Decision. These motions were denied by the Court in its Resolution dated 21 January 2004 (2004 Resolution). After the promulgation of the rulings in Agan, the NAIA 3 facilities have remained in the possession of PIATCO, despite the avowed intent of the Government to put the airport terminal into immediate operation. The Government and PIATCO conducted several rounds of negotiation regarding the NAIA 3 facilities [21 December 2004]: the Government filed a Complaint for expropriation with the Pasay City Regional Trial Court (RTC), together with an Application for Special Raffle seeking the immediate holding of a special raffle. The Government sought

upon the filing of the complaint the issuance of a writ of possession authorizing it to take immediate possession and control over the NAIA 3 facilities. The Government also declared that it had deposited the amount of P3,002,125,000.0012 (3 Billion)13 in Cash with the Land Bank of the Philippines, representing the NAIA 3 terminals assessed value for taxation purposes.14 The case15 was raffled to Branch 117 of the Pasay City RTC, presided by respondent judge Hon. Henrick F. Gingoyon (Hon. Gingoyon). [21 December 2004]: RTC issued an Order directing the issuance of a writ of possession to the Government, authorizing it to "take or enter upon the possession" of the NAIA 3 facilities. Also on the same day, the RTC issued a Writ of Possession. According to PIATCO, the Government was able to take possession over the NAIA 3 facilities immediately after the Writ of Possession was issued. [4 January 2005]: the RTC issued another Order designed to supplement its 21 December 2004 Orderand the Writ of Possession where the RTC noted that its earlier issuance of its writ of possession was pursuant to Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. However, it was observed that Republic Act No. 8974 (Rep. Act No. 8974), otherwise known as "An Act to Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-of-Way, Site or Location for National Government Infrastructure Projects and For Other Purposes" and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules) had amended Rule 67 in many respects. Accordingly, on the basis of Sections 4 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 8974 and Section 10 of the Implementing Rules, the RTC made key qualifications to its earlier issuances. 1. First, it directed the Land Bank of the Philippines, Baclaran Branch (LBP-Baclaran), to immediately release the amount of US$62,343,175.77 to PIATCO, an amount which the RTC characterized as that which the Government "specifically made available for the purpose of this expropriation;" and such amount to be deducted from the amount of just compensation due PIATCO as eventually determined by the RTC. Second, the Government was directed to submit to the RTC a Certificate of Availability of Funds signed by authorized officials to cover the payment of just compensation. Third, the Government was directed "to maintain, preserve and safeguard" the NAIA 3 facilities or "perform such as acts or activities in preparation for their direct operation" of the airport terminal, pending expropriation proceedings and full payment of just compensation. However, the Government was prohibited "from performing acts of ownership like awarding concessions or leasing any part of [NAIA 3] to other parties."

compensation for the NAIA 3 Complex. That same day, the Government filed a Motion for Inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon. [10 January 2005] RTC heard the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Inhibition on denied these motions in an Omnibus Order. [3rd Order - affirmed the earlier dispositions in the 4 January 2005 Order, except "the superfluous part of the Order prohibiting the plaintiffs from awarding concessions or leasing any part of [NAIA 3] to other parties."] [13 January 2005] Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition: prayed for the nullification of the RTC orders dated 4 January 2005, 7 January 2005, and 10 January 2005, and for the inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon from taking further action on the expropriation case. The Government, in imputing grave abuse of discretion to the acts of Hon. Gingoyon, raises five general arguments, to wit: (i) that Rule 67, not Rep. Act No. 8974, governs the present expropriation proceedings; (ii) that Hon. Gingoyon erred when he ordered the immediate release of the amount of US$62.3 Million to PIATCO considering that the assessed value as alleged in the complaint was only P3 Billion; (iii) that the RTC could not have prohibited the Government from enjoining the performance of acts of ownership; (iv) that the appointment of the three commissioners was erroneous; and (v) that Hon. Gingoyon should be compelled to inhibit himself from the expropriation case.22 ISSUE: W/N Rule 67, not Rep. Act No. 8974, should govern the said expropriation proceedings?

HELD: Application of Rule 67 Violates the 2004 Agan Resolution. It is the finding of this Court that the staging of expropriation proceedings in this case with the exclusive use of Rule 67 would allow for the Government to take over the NAIA 3 facilities in a fashion that directly rebukes our 2004 Resolution in Agan. This Court cannot sanction deviation from its own final and executory orders. The 2004 Resolution Which Is Law of This Case Generally Permits Expropriation The pronouncement in the 2004 Resolution is especially significant to this case in two aspects, namely: (i) that PIATCO must receive payment of just compensation determined in accordance with law and equity; and (ii) that the government is barred from taking over NAIA 3 until such just compensation is paid. The parties cannot be allowed to evade the directives laid down by this Court through any mode of judicial action, such as the complaint for eminent domain. It cannot be denied though that the Court in the 2004 Resolution prescribed mandatory guidelines which the Government must observe before it could acquire the NAIA 3 facilities. Thus, the actions of respondent judge under review, as well as the arguments of the parties must, to merit affirmation, pass the threshold test of whether such propositions are in accord with the 2004 Resolution. Still, in applying the laws and rules on expropriation in the case at bar, we are impelled to apply or construe these rules in accordance with the Courts prescriptions in the 2004 Resolution to achieve

2.

3.

[5 January 2005] the Government filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, which was set for hearing on 10 January 2005. [7 January 2005] the RTC issued another Order which appointed three (3) Commissioners to ascertain the amount of just

the end effect that the Government may validly take over the NAIA 3 facilities. Insofar as this case is concerned, the 2004 Resolution is effective not only as a legal precedent, but as the source of rights and prescriptions that must be guaranteed, if not enforced, in the resolution of this petition. Otherwise, the integrity and efficacy of the rulings of this Court will be severely diminished. It is from these premises that we resolve the first question, whether Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or Rep. Act No. 8974 governs the expropriation proceedings in this case. Application of Rule 67 Violates the 2004 Agan Resolution Rule 67 outlines the procedure under which eminent domain may be exercised by the Government. Yet by no means does it serve at present as the solitary guideline through which the State may expropriate private property. Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently more favorable to the property owner than Rule 67, inescapably applies in instances when the national government expropriates property "for national government infrastructure projects." Thus, if expropriation is engaged in by the national government for purposes other than national infrastructure projects, the assessed value standard and the deposit mode prescribed in Rule 67 continues to apply. Rep. Act No. 8974 Rule 67 Government commences expropriation proceedings through the filing of a complaint. there is no need under Rule 67 or Rep. Act No. 8974 for legislative authorization before the Government may proceed with a particular exercise of eminent domain. the Government is Government is required to make required only to immediate make an initial payment to the deposit with an property owner authorized government upon the filing of the complaint to depositary be entitled to a writ of possession standard for initial prescribes that the compensation, the initial deposit be market value of the equivalent to the property as stated assessed value of in the tax the property for declaration or the purposes of current relevant taxation zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), whichever is higher, and the value of the improvements and/or structures using the replacement cost method.

possession. Such an injunction squarely contradicts the letter and intent of the 2004 Resolution. Hence, the position of the Government sanctions its own disregard or violation the prescription laid down by this Court that there must first be just compensation paid to PIATCO before the Government may take over the NAIA 3 facilities. Thus, at the very least, Rule 67 cannot apply in this case without violating the 2004 Resolution. Even assuming that Rep. Act No. 8974 does not govern in this case, it does not necessarily follow that Rule 67 should then apply. After all, adherence to the letter of Section 2, Rule 67 would in turn violate the Courts requirement in the 2004 Resolution that there must first be payment of just compensation to PIATCO before the Government may take over the property. It likewise bears noting that the appropriate standard of just compensation is a substantive matter. It is well within the province of the legislature to fix the standard, which it did through the enactment of Rep. Act No. 8974. Specifically, this prescribes the new standards in determining the amount of just compensation in expropriation cases relating to national government infrastructure projects, as well as the manner of payment thereof. Rep. Act No. 8974 Fits to the Situation at Bar and Complements the 2004 Agan Resolution Rep. Act No. 8974 is entitled "An Act To Facilitate The Acquisition Of Right-Of-Way, Site Or Location For National Government Infrastructure Projects And For Other Purposes." Obviously, the law is intended to cover expropriation proceedings intended for national government infrastructure projects. Rep. Act No. 8974 contemplates within its coverage such real property constituting land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil. It is moreover apparent that the law and its implementing rules commonly provide for a rule for the valuation of improvements and/or structures thereupon separate from that of the land on which such are constructed. Even as the provisions of Rep. Act No. 8974 call for that laws application in this case, the threshold test must still be met whether its implementation would conform to the dictates of the Court in the 2004 Resolution. APPLICATION: Unlike in the case of Rule 67, the application of Rep. Act No. 8974 will not contravene the 2004 Resolution, which requires the payment of just compensation before any takeover of the NAIA 3 facilities by the Government. The 2004 Resolution does not particularize the extent such payment must be effected before the takeover, but it unquestionably requires at least some degree of payment to the private property owner before a writ of possession may issue. The utilization of Rep. Act No. 8974 guarantees compliance with this bare minimum requirement, as it assures the private property owner the payment of, at the very least, the proffered value of the property to be seized. Such payment of the proffered value to the owner, followed by the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of the Government, is precisely the schematic under Rep. Act No. 8974, one which facially complies with the prescription laid down in the 2004 Resolution.

COMMENCEMENT

LEGISLATIVE AUTHORIZATION

WRIT OF POSSESSION; ENTITLEMENT

VALUE OF THE EXPROPRIATED PROPERTY

If Section 2 of Rule 67 were to apply, PIATCO would be enjoined from receiving a single centavo as just compensation before the Government takes over the NAIA 3 facility by virtue of a writ of

Clearly then, we see no error on the part of the RTC when it ruled that Rep. Act No. 8974 governs the instant expropriation proceedings. In Re: Integration of the Bar of the Phil. FACTS: On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration 1 submitted its Report dated November 30, 1972, with the "earnest recommendation" on the basis of the said Report and the proceedings had in Administrative Case No. 526 2 of the Court, and "consistently with the views and counsel received from its [the Commission's] Board of Consultants, as well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar" that "this Honorable Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule." The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing provincial and other local Bar associations. On August 16, 1962, arguments in favor of as well as in opposition to the petition were orally expounded before the Court. Written oppositions were admitted, 3 and all parties were thereafter granted leave to file written memoranda. 4 Since then, the Court has closely observed and followed significant developments relative to the matter of the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction. In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a strong nationwide sentiment in favor of Bar integration, the Court created the Commission on Bar Integration for the purpose of ascertaining the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar. In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor." The measure was signed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on September 17, 1971 and took effect on the same day as Rep. Act 6397. This law provides as follows: SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively. SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated, out of any funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to carry out the purposes of this Act. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the same purpose shall be included in the annual appropriations for the Supreme Court. SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. The Report of the Commission abounds with argument on the constitutionality of Bar integration and contains all necessary factual data bearing on the advisability (practicability and necessity) of Bar integration. Also embodied therein are the views, opinions, sentiments, comments and observations of the rank and file of the Philippine lawyer population relative to Bar integration, as well as a proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission and presented to them by that body in a national Bar plebiscite. There is thus sufficient basis as well as ample material upon which the Court may decide whether or not to integrate the Philippine Bar at this time.

ISSUE: (1)WON the Court has the power to integrate the Philippine Bar? (2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional? 1. HELD: YES. The Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court's constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that "the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither confers a new power nor restricts the Court's inherent power, but is a mere legislative declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote public interest or, more specifically, will "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively." YES.

2.

The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning: - Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of law. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a privilege, moreover, clothed with public interest, because a lawyer owes duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation; and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State, the administration of justice, as an officer of the court. Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest, it is far and just that the exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities. These public responsibilities can best be discharged through collective action; but there can be no collective action without an organized body; no organized body can operate effectively without incurring expenses; therefore, it is fair and just that all attorneys be required to contribute to the support of such organized body; and, given existing Bar conditions, the most efficient means of doing so is by integrating the Bar through a rule of court that requires all lawyers to pay annual dues to the Integrated Bar.

A.

Freedom of Association. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The body compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues.

B.

Regulatory Fee

A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for regulation, while the purpose of a tax is revenue. If the Court has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to push through an Integrated Bar program without means to defray the concomitant expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily includes the power to impose such an exaction.

C.

Freedom of Speech.

For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote measures to which said member is opposed, would not nullify or adversely affect his freedom of speech.