Failure Mode & Effects Analysis (FMEA)

Anything that can go wrong, will go wrong. Murphys Law FMEA is an opportunity to defeat Murphys law
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Why FMEA?
Toyota incurred $ 2Bn due to sales halt and massive recalls in 2009-10:

Pedal stuck below the mat

- 4.3 Mn vehicles for incorrect floor mats causing accelerator pedals getting stuck with floor mat.
- 2.3 Mn vehicles for issues with sticking accelerator pedals due to increased friction from shoe on the pedal.

Increased friction

Recall fix: Steel shim added To reduce friction

Not doing thorough analysis on unexpected things could cost Billions to companies
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Why FMEA?
Tata Nano fire Insufficient cooling? Foreign body in exhaust? Burst fuel pipe?

Tire burst due to mudflap bracket that came loose on one bolt and rubbed on tire at high speeds

Kansas city Hyatt Regency walkway collapse Unexpected load transfer caused failure and killed 114

Unsafe seed filter- caused injuries to user

Not doing thorough analysis on unexpected things could cause safety issues
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Why FMEA?
Got a scissor to cut! But, wait! How do we cut the tab?

Dell Latitude How do we plug second USB?

Envision Tiltable screen - Good! But things inside the cup holder falls when we tilt!

Got a cactus shaped pencil! Cool! But, How do we use the eraser?

Not doing thorough analysis on unexpected things could cause user inconveniences/ dissatisfaction
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Why FMEA?
Expecting the unexpected and being prepared for the same is the essence of FMEA Eventually leads to a robust product : A product that is insensitive to the variations/ noise factors. Example Ambassador car is termed as robust because It can run on any type of roads Driven by variety of drivers Runs on adulterated petrol Saves the occupants in case of accidents Carry as many people as can get in

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FMEA
Tool for Risk Identification and Mitigation in NPD process Methodology of identifying ways in which a product or process can fail and plan how to prevent the failures. Systematic / Efficient thinking Process to ensure the quality & reliability of a product or service. Helps To Identify, Control & Document - Various Failure Modes - Special Characteristics - Design Deficiency Links Failure Cause to Effect
FMEA attempts to beat Murphys Law
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Background
Developed in United States Military. Governing standard is MIL-P-1629. FMEA was used as reliability evaluation technique to determine the system / equipment failure. Failures were categorized according to their impact on mission success and personnel / equipment safety.

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FMEA Terms What they mean

Failure The inability of a part or process to meet specification Failure Mode - The manner or mechanism by which a part or process can fail to meet specification or deliver the intended function Cause - A deficiency that results in a Failure Mode. These may be sources of Variability associated with Key Process Input Variables Effect - Impact on Customer if Failure Mode is not prevented or corrected
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Purposes & Benefits - FMEA

Helps improve quality, reliability and safety of product Helps in solving customer complaints and increased customer satisfaction Increases the efficiency of product development activity (reduced time and cost) Documents and tracks action taken to reduce risks Helps in reducing maintenance and warranty costs Helps in reducing the likelihood of Product Liability claims Helps in optimizing the design concepts Helps in evaluating requirements and alternatives

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Motivation to do FMEA
Need for right first time Need for preventive (not corrective) approach To identify any inadequacies in development of the product Limit tests and trails to a few products To meet regulatory requirements Need for Continuous Improvement

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FMEA When and Who

New Product Design Major Design change in Existing Design either product or process Applying existing design to a new environment New regulations need to be complied with Problems indicated by Customer feedback
Cross functional team, including Engineering, R&D, Manufacturing, Quality and Customers & Suppliers (if feasible) Lead facilitator for meeting set-up, resource allocation and ensure the team is moving towards FMEA completion Best team size would be 4 to 6 members
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FMEA Types
System FMEA also called Concept FMEA, it is used to analyze systems at early concept and design stages; focus on failure modes caused by design to the functions of the system Project / Program FMEA to foresee what can go wrong with a major project Design FMEA - to analyze products before production release thru focus on potential failure modes caused by design deficiencies. Process FMEA to analyze processes like manufacturing, assembly, etc. i.e. potential failure modes caused by process deficiencies.

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FMEA Types
Service FMEA - focuses on service functions Application FMEA - focuses on how the end-customer uses the product Equipment FMEA - focuses on machinery, equipment or tooling, which are generally one-off in nature Software FMEA focuses on software functions

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FMEA Types Another Classification

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FMEA and Improvement Process

1. Select the Team 6. Determine the potential 2. Understand the failure modes 11. Calculate RPN for Product 7. List the potential each failure mode / Process effects 12. Determine & 3. Study the Application of the failure undertake of the Product / 8. Brainstorm the recommended actions Process and review potential and document key elements causes of the failure 4. Understand the Control 9. Check the current 13. Recalculate RPNs system in place controls 14. Repeat cycle till 5. Identify functions, 10.Assign ratings to reliable solution is create boundary Severity, Occurrence obtained diagram & Interface & Detection matrix
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FMEA - Template

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FMEA Creation Walk-thru

Functions are design intent or engineering requirement of the system Identify Primary and Secondary Functions Guideline to Identify Functions What the Item supposed to do? How Much? When? What the item is not supposed to do? Example for Pen Functions are To write (P) To enable Grip (S) Write continuously - (P) Should not damage the paper (P)
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FMEA Example Gondola cable car

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FMEA Creation Walk-thru

Failure Mode Pen not writing Could not make continuous stroke Not writing when the environment is cold Damaging the paper Failure mode type could be No Function Total Shutdown Partial / Over Function / Degraded over time Intermittent Failure Unintended Function
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FMEA Example Gondola cable car

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FMEA Creation Walk-thru

Effects Identified by answering following questions, If Failure Mode happens, What are the consequences on Parts / Sub Components Next level Assembly System Whole Unit Customer/Government regulations
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FMEA Example Gondola cable car

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FMEA Creation Walk-thru

Effect . None Very Slight Slight Minor

Rank 1 2 3 4

Moderate
Significant Major Extreme Serious Hazardous

5
6 7 8 9 10

Criteria: Severity of Effect No effect Customer not annoyed. Very slight effect on product performance. Non-vital fault noticed sometimes. Customer slightly annoyed. Slight effect on product performance. Non-vital fault noticed most of the time. Customer experiences minor nuisance. Minor effect on product performance. Fault does not require repair. Non-vital fault always noticed. Customer experiences some dissatisfaction. Moderate effect on product performance. Fault on non-vital part requires repair. Customer experiences discomfort. Product performance degraded, but operable and safe. Nonvolatile part inoperable. Customer dissatisfied. Product performance severely affected but functional and safe. Subsystem inoperable. Customer very dissatisfied. Product inoperable but safe. System inoperable. Potential hazardous effect. Able to stop product without mishap, time-dependent failure. Compliance with government regulation is in jeopardy. Hazardous effect. Safety related - sudden failure. Noncompliance with government regulation.
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FMEA Example Gondola cable car

Since the Gondola is suspended well above the ground, if it were to fall the result could certainly be the death or serious injury of the occupants. Hence Severity 10 chosen.

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FMEA Creation Walk-thru

What might cause Failure? Two assumptions when cause is to be investigated - Item manufactured and assembled within engineering specifications; Parts made to print - Design may include deficiency that may cause unacceptable variation. Noise factors from P- Diagram will become an input here Root Cause must be done, when severity is 9 or 10.
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FMEA Example Gondola cable car

Why would the cable break? We need to brainstorm the potential causes that might make the cable break.

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FMEA Creation Walk-thru

- Number of failures happened / anticipated to happen during the product life cycle. - If data for the failure mode is not available, then the ranking should be based on the probability of failure
Occurrence Almost impossible Remote Very slight Slight Low Medium Moderately high High Very high Almost certain Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Criteria: Likelihood of Occurrence Failure unlikely. History shows no failures. Rare number of failures likely. Very few failures likely. Few failures likely. Occasional number of failures likely. Medium number of failures likely. Moderately high number of failures likely. High number of failures likely. Very high number of failures likely. Failure almost certain. History of failures exist from previous/similar design
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FMEA Example Gondola cable car

In 1998 a US Marine Jet impacted the cable supporting a cable car and resulted in the deaths of the 20 people. Since this "cause" has already occurred, it is not a 1. After taking into account the proximity of the lift to military training areas and the height of the lift, assigned an occurrence of 3. A similar analysis resulted in an occurrence of 10 for corrosion (the cable is going to corrode) and 1 for Max Strength Exceeded.

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FMEA Creation Walk-thru

Identifying controls; Historical methods used Previous FMEA Previous Design Verification Plan Reliability & Robustness checklist Previous Test Report Design review, CFD, CAE, Mathematical Modeling, etc. New controls needed to be identified through brainstorming.
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FMEA Example Gondola cable car

Corrosion- If the cable is coated with an overcoat that will prevent corrosion it would be noted as the current design control. If we use an electromagnetic instrument to detect corrosion damage in the cable, this would be also be noted. Max Strength Exceeded - The cable includes a 10X safety margin and instrumentation to detect increasing loads due to increased winds. Aircraft Collision - The current system has no method of preventing or detecting an aircraft collision.
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FMEA Creation Walk-thru

Detection
Almost certain Very High High Moderately High Moderate Low Very Low Remote Very Remote Absolute Uncertainty

Rank
1 2 3

Criteria: Likelihood of Detection by Design Control

Design Control will almost certainly detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. Very high chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause / mechanism and subsequent failure mode. High chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. Moderately high chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. Moderate chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. Low chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. Very low chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. Remote chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause / mechanism and subsequent failure mode. Very remote chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause / mechanism and subsequent failure mode. Design Control will not and/or can not detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode; or there is no Design Control. 14 June 2013 31

4
5 6 7 8 9 10

FMEA Example Gondola cable car

We have almost no chance of detecting an aircraft collision before it occurs. Therefore, using the detection table the "Det" value for "Aircraft Collision" is 10.

The corrosion sensor is run daily and so the detection rating for "Corrosion" is 1.
The load sensor is run continuously and hence the detection rating is 1.

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FMEA Creation Walk-thru

Calculate RPN
RPN = SEV x OCC x DET

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FMEA Example Gondola cable car

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FMEA Calculation Risk Ratings and RPN

Severity (SEV) - How significant is the impact of the Effect to the customer (internal or external)?
Occurrence (OCC) - How likely is the Cause of the Failure Mode to occur? Detection (DET) - How likely will the current system detect the Cause or Failure Mode if it occurs? Risk Priority Number (RPN) A numerical calculation of the relative risk of a particular Failure Mode. RPN = SEV x OCC x DET This number is used to place priority on which items need additional quality planning.

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RPN Interpretation-Example
Case 1 S=5; O=5; D=2; RPN = 50; Case 2 S=3; O=3; D=6; RPN = 54; Case 3 S=2; O=10; D=10; RPN= 200; Case 4 S=9; O=2; D=3; RPN= 54;

What do you infer?

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RPN Interpretation-Example
Dont go by just RPN; Look at individual Rankings Case 1: High Risk to Customer Satisfaction Sev. > or = to 5 and Occ > or = 4; Potential significant characteristics Case 2: OK Case 3: Annoyance; Try to improve O Case 4: Extreme Safety/Regulatory Risk =9 & 10 Severity Consider Detection only as a measure of Test Capability; Avoid using it for improving the RPN

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FMEA Creation Walk-thru

Engineering assessment, for preventive / corrective actions, should be done for high severity & high RPN failure mode. If there is no action planned, enter None or Not at this time in this column.

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FMEA Example Gondola cable car

We need to take actions to reduce the RPN of this item since the severity is 10. For example, placing beacons on the tops of the towers that support the cable would make it easier for the pilots to see that a hazard is in their path (much like the large blinking red lights on the top of radio towers). This would greatly decrease the probability of occurrence. We would therefore update our FMEA to include this action.

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Examples of Recommended Corrective Action

Improve Design Robustness by Add safety features Add Design Redundancies Taguchi Technique / Design of Experiment (DOE) to find optimal parameter settings Mistake proofing techniques De-rate the Component Revisit Material specification Controlled tolerancing SC/CC; Control plans; Operating procedures/ training Improve Design Verification Plan (DVP) Employ CAE simulations Enhance Test Plan
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Taguchi technique for Design Robustness

Systematic and efficient method for determining near optimum design control parameters for performance and cost and is least sensitive to noise factors

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6 Mistake Proofing principles

Elimination of the step that causes the error. Facilitationmaking the correct action far easier than the error

Replacement of the step with an errorproof one.

Detection

Preventionmaking the error very difficult

Mitigation (Fail-Safe/ Fail secure)

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Factors that influence Risk assessment

Corrective Action Redesign the product Improve Current Control Change material parts Change the application Change the field environment Improve Reliability Program Improve Employee Training Implement FMEA program Implement SPC program Improve quality plan Occurrence Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No Severity Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes No No Detection Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No

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FMEA Creation Walk-thru

Enter the individual responsible for the action items. Enter a due date for each action item.

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FMEA Creation Walk-thru

Action items implementation and follow up needs to be monitored closely. Action items results should be updated in the FMEA chart and recalculate the RPN.

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FMEA Creation Summary

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FMEA example

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Limitations of FMEA
Resources need to be dedicated in performing FMEA. This calls for effort and time. Key product failures may get overlooked by the team FMEA proposes but may not result in corrective action, Team composition is critical and results may vary depending on that Also, team composition not including all stake-holders may lead to a less comprehensive analysis FMEA is required to be a generative process and needs the report to be worked on several times during development cycle

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FMEA Exercise

Make a group of 6~8 associates

Each team to pick one of the following scenario and prepare a FMEA Security system in TCS Safety in buses Engineering educational system Any simple product (Pencil sharpener, stapler, punching m/c etc) The product ideas that was arrived from earlier exercises

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Sources of information
Knowmax Home -> iQMS wiki (under KM Platforms) -> iQMS classic -> TCS-iQMS-135 (Mechanical Design Methods Guidelines)
Good books on FMEA Other Websites
www.weibull.com www.npd-solutions.com/fmea www.fmea-fmeca.com

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Thank You
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DFMEA Tools

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TCS Confidential

Design FMEA Tools - Summary

DFMEA is a top down failure analysis which starts with the function of the product as valued by the customer/end-user. To understand the system interactions and material/information flow, the following tools are typically used as inputs to DFMEA Boundary Diagram Defines elements, their positions, system boundary and elemental relationships Interface Matrix - Identifies and quantifies the strength of system or sub-system interaction P-diagram Identify inputs, intended outputs, error states, noise factors and control factors
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F M A

Boundary Diagram
Simple Block Diagram, which is a key first step of DFMEA Blocks in the diagram represent major functions Sets Boundary and defines element positions for the analysis Defines relationship among elements (sub-systems, assemblies or components), as well as the interfaces with neighbours and the environment Identifies Noise Factors. Gives input to Interface Matrix and P-Diagram

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Boundary Diagram Example Ball Pen

First, the elements that form the system/assembly are identified
Body Clip

Spring

Ring Pen Gear

Refill

Knob

PEN Assembly
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Boundary Diagram Example Ball Pen

Next, the interfacing elements, internal or external are identified Interconnects are placed and the boundary is drawn

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Boundary Diagram Example Auto Gear Box

Engine Mounting System Engine Lubrication System -breather Carburetor Electrical System Evaporative Emissions System

Vehicle Frame System

Primary Drive System Exhaust System & Mounts

Crank Case (Big Twin) Starter System

(All Subsystems) Secondary Drive System (All Subsystems) Instrumentation

Rear Brake Line

(Speedometer & Sensor) Lubrication System -Dyna/FLT; physical interface -Buell; material exchange Engine Management System (ECM) Shift Mechanism Shifter Cam Assembly Shifter Forks/Rails/Drums Synchronizers Shifter Controls/Shafts/Links/Pedals Shift Mechanism Accessories Crank Case System (Mid Weight)
DFMEA Boundary Physical Energy Data Materials

Rider Interface (Foot Pegs)

Transmission/Gearing
Transmission Case/Covers/Gaskets Main shaft Bearings/Bushings/Seals Main shaft Gears Countershaft/Bearings/Bushings/Seals Countershaft Gears Transmission/Gearing Accessories

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Interface Matrix
An input to the Potential Causes of Failure. Mainly captures the type of interactions and their importance for system functioning

Identifies and quantifies the strength of system interaction by,

Identifying the type of relationship Showing whether the relationship is necessary or adverse Negative values are analyzed for corrective action and recommendations, if deemed to contribute to a Failure cause or

Failure mode.

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Interface Matrix Method to Construct

Write down the hardware identified in the boundary diagram in rows and columns Identify the type of interactions between them, Physical Contact Energy Transfer Information Exchange

Material Exchange Identify positive and negative interactions. While positive interactions are expected, negative interactions are unexpected. For every interaction both positive and negative must be verified
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Interface Matrix Method to Construct

Quantify the strength of interaction by allocating the following values +2 - Interface is necessary for function +1 - Interface is beneficial but not absolutely necessary for function 0 - Interface doesnt affect functionality -1 - Interface cause negative effects but not prevent functionality -2 - Interface must be prevented to achieve functionality Use the above formed matrix, analyze the adverse effect of interactions and find a suitable remedy. This will be recorded in the FMEA chart and audited for implementation.
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Power Conversion Unit Motor / Gear Box Park Mechanism Acuation Halfshafts (2) Mounting sub frame #1 Mounting sub frame #2 Mounting sub frame #3 PCU Signal Connector Shield Motor Power leads High voltage power leads (positive) High voltage power leads (negative) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

2 2

2 -2

-2

High voltage power leads (negative)

High voltage power leads (positive)

Interface Matrix Sample

Park Mechanism Acuation Shield Motor Power leads Power Conversion Unit Mounting sub frame #1 Mounting sub frame #2 Mounting sub frame #3 PCU Signal Connector Motor / Gear Box Halfshafts (2)

P E I M

P: Physically touching I: Information exchange

E: Energy transfer M: Material exchange

P E I M Required Desired Indifferent Undesired Detrimental

P: Physically touching I: Information exchange

E: Energy transfer M: Material exchange

2 Necessary for function 1 Beneficial, but not absolutely necessary for functionality Does not affect functionality -1 Causes negative effects but does not prevent functionality -2 Must be prevented to achieve functionality

Required Desired Indifferent Undesired Detrimental

2 Necessary for function 1 Beneficial, but not absolutely necessary for functionality Does not affect functionality -1 Causes negative effects but does not prevent functionality -2 Must be prevented to achieve functionality
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P-diagram
A structured tool recommended to identify the intended inputs (called signal factor) and outputs (called response variable) Once these desired outputs are defined, the following are identified (in order) error states noise factors that could lead to the error states control factors P - Diagram is essentially a schematic diagram that encompasses signal factor, control factor, noise factor and response variable.

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P-diagram The inherent meanings

Control Factors form via-medium for conversion of input into the desired output. Examples - design, materials and processes that the engineer has 'control' over. Error States are the Failure Modes or Effects of Failure as defined by an end user when using the product. The Noise Factors are those that can influence the design but are not under the control of the engineer, such as environmental factors, customer usage, interfaces with other systems, degradation over time, etc. If not protected for, can make the design useless
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P-diagram (Sample)
Noise Factors 1. Piece to piece variation
Case variation -center variation Fork variation Drum variation Lubricant quality Speed Sensor Bearing plate variation Gear variation Assembly Process Variation Frame variation Torque on fasteners

2. Other systems
Case and Bearings Speed Sensor Primary drive / clutch Secondary Drive External Shift Linkage Engine Lubrication system Hydraulic Clutch Cover System Exhaust

3. Customer usage/duty cycle

Overloaded Aftermarket changes / Performance modifications Poor service practices Poor quality oil Oil change freq. Abusive shifting Low oil Extreme duty cycle in high heat

Potential Causes

4. Deterioration/degredation over time

Self generated debris Gear wear / Dog and teeth wear Fork Wear Bearing wear Shaft wear Clamp Load loss Shifter componenet fatigue Fatigue failures Spacer wear Seal / Gasket wear Oil degradation Thrust surface wear

5. Environment
Poor road conditions Contamination Air and temp changes

Design Function (Detail)

Input
Engine RPM and torque Gear selection / shift input Rear wheel input on coast Clutch drag torque Heat and vibration from engine Secondary drive belt tension Vibration Energy Vehicle inputs - Strain, twist, vibration

Ideal function (musts)

Transmission System

Transfer power from engine to rear wheel Meet noise regulation requirements (NVH) Reduce speed from engine to rear wheel Can not effect current emissions performance No measurable decrease in shift quality Must meet Durability requirements Provide a clean signal to the vehicle speed sensor Must maintain clearance to other engine components Must interface with vehicle frame system Must interfece with engine management system Must interface with external shifter linkages Must interface with starter system Must interface with engine lube system Must interface with secondary drive system Must interface with primary drive system must interface with evaporative emisions system Must provide acceptable ground for electrical system Must maintain acceptable rider interface ergonomics Must have approiate gear ratios for vehicle applications Must meet styling requirements Must meet current cosmetic zoning reqs. Must meet social noise reqs. Must deliver acceptable handling characteristics Design meets the needs of the shipping duty cycle

Design Function

Error states
Does not transfer power from engine to rear wheel Does not meet noise regulations requirements Fails to reduce speed from engine to rear wheel Effects current emissions performance Change in shift quality Does not meet durability requirements Does not provide a clean signal to the vehicle speed sensor Interference with other engine components Does not interface with other vehicle components Does not provide electrical ground poor rider ergonimics excessive social noise poor handling characteristics does not meet assemblability requirements damage during shipping cannot operate in required ambient temps

Control factors
Emissions Regulations NVH Passby Regulations - EEC 97/24/Ch. 9 - Europe - Australia ADR 39/00 - Japan MOT articles 30 & 31 - Korean EPA Notice 91-26
- Mexican Noise Emission Standard NOM-082-ECOL-1994

Design Controls

- USA F76a 40 CFR Ch. 1 (7-1-86 Ed.)

Launch timing-MW MY05 Big Twin MY06 Homologation requirements

Jed Program deliverables

Failure Modes

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