Mind-Body Problem:

A Brief Sketch of Discourse and Comparison between Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadras Solution Cipta Bakti Gama ICAS MA Islamic Philosophy Comparative Study of Philosophy

1.Introduction One of the oldest and the most important problem in philosophy is that of the nature of the soul and its relation to the body (the so-called mind-body problem). This problem might be traced back far behind up to the most ancient philosophical discourse found. And this is so important so that even after more than two millennia debated by philosophers without any agreeable solution they keep having a great deal with this topic, even after some have declared that this problem is unsolvable.1 The mind-body problem involves a wide range of aspects derived from ontological framework and epistemological commitment (including methodology), but still, the debate is centered on the nature of the soul and its relation to the body. In western tradition, there are three frameworks which have dominated much discussion: the Aristotelian paradigm, the Cartesian paradigm, and the scientific materialist (or physicalist) paradigm.2 In the Islamic context, the debate might be set based on major philosophical schools: peripatetic, illuminative, and hikmah mutaaliyah frameworks (including those of theologians and sufis). This paper shall try to describe briefly the major positions of philosopher concerning the mind-body problem with their frameworks and the solution proposed by Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra comparatively.

2.Mind-Body Problem: Major Positions and Their Frameworks According to David J. Chalmers, traditionally, views on the mind-body problem can be divided into two main classes.3 Dualist views hold that the mind is quite distinct from the body and the brain (although they
1

One of them is Karl Popper. See: Mario Bunge, Treatise of Basic Philosophy: Ontology II - A World of Systems,

(Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979), vol. v, p. 124.

2 3

Tim Crane and Sarah Patterson (ed.), History of the Mind-Body Problem, (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 2. See: David J. Chalmers, Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, (New York: Oxford UP,

2002), p. 1-7.

may be associated in some fashion), and/or that mental states are fundamentally distinct from physical states. Materialist views hold that the mind is itself a broadly physical entity, and/or that mental states are derivative on physical states. There also exist idealist views, according to which physical states are derivative on mental states. Dualist views come in two main varieties. Interactionism (e.g. Rene Descartes) holds that the mental and physical are fundamentally distinct but interact in both directions: physical states affect mental states, and mental states affect physical states. Epiphenomenalism (e.g. Thomas Huxley) denies any causal role for mind in the physical world. In the second half of the twentieth century, dualism was widely rejected, and many of different forms of materialism were explored. This was both a reaction to the problems of dualism and a product of success of physical explanation in many different domains. One of the alternative position is offered by positivists (like G. Ryle) and logical-positivists (like Rudolf Carnap) which is called behaviorism. Roughly speaking, this position views the mind as an aspect of behavior. The other alternative positions are those of the identity theory (e.g. J. J. C. Smart), functionalism (e.g. Hilary Putnam), and emergentism (e.g. C. D. Broad). The identity theory holds that mental states are at least associated or correlated with brain states. Functionalism holds that mental states correspond to functional states: states of playing a certain role within the cognitive system. And emergentism holds that a mental state is an emergent property of an underlying physical substrate. As its cited before, those positions are built up on one of three dominant paradigms: Aristotelian, Cartesian, and scientific materialism. Idealist position is certainly outside of those paradigms. And which position belongs to which paradigm is a matter of dispute. For an example, it is said that Aristotelian paradigm is the root of functionalism. 4 However, then, an objection comes up saying that this is unacceptable since the very basic concept of matter in Aristotelian notion is quite different to that of the funtionalists.5 Regardless of that dispute, one thing to note is that there must be any relation between those paradigms and positions.

4 5

See: Tim Crane and Sarah Patterson (ed.), History of the Mind-Body Problem, p. 3-4. Ibid.

3.Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadras View on Mind-Body Problem: A Brief Comparison I shall treat this comparison through three points. First of all, Ibn Sina and Mulla are in agreement with Aristotelian definition of soul. For them the soul is the primary perfection of an instrumental natural body. 6 Perfection means actualization. And adjective primary modifying that perfection is to distinguish two kinds of perfection: the primary and the secondary. Primary perfection is that of which the actualization of the essence of a species, e.g. rationality for rational animal. Secondary perfection is that of which the actualization of accidental properties of an essence, e.g. walking for rational animal.7 And the last part of the definition is instrumental natural body. This part indicates that there is no complete dichotomy between the soul and the body. In the one hand, the soul is not the body itself, but in the other hand, the soul is also not the same as the body, rather it is certain bodys perfection. In Mulla Sadra expression, the existence of soul is a kind of relational category () .8 Moreover, Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra also consider the soul as an immaterial substance. At the first place, it is important to note that a substance in Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadras term is a category of quidity which underlies any properties in the external world.9 In other words, it might be said that a substance is a real subject. The other categories of quidity like relation (), quality (), quantity (), position (), where (), when (), possession (), action () , and passivity ( ) are properties (or real predicates). Here it is obvious, for Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra, the soul is not a property of a body (e.g. brain), but it is a substance which has properties like relation. And in the second place, as a substance, the soul is immaterial (not physical).10 Secondly, there are several important differences in how Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra respectively treat this problem, one of which is related to trans-substantial movement () . Ibn Sina rejects this
6

This is my own translation of its Arabic expression: "" . See: Ibn Sina, al-Najat, (Beirut: Dar

al-Afaq al-Jadidah, 1982), p. 197; Mulla Sadra, al-Hikmah al-Mutaaliyah fi al-Asfar al-Aqliyyah al-Arbaah, (Beirut: Dar Ihya al-Turots al-Arobi, 2002), vol. viii, p. 15-23. For the comparison between Ibn Sinas philosophy of the soul and that of Aristotles, see: Fazlur Rahman, Avicennas Psychology, (London: Oxford UP, 1952).
7

This explanation of the terms is by Mulla Sadra, but I use my own examples. See: Mulla Sadra, al-Asfar, vol. viii,

p. 15-17.
8 9

Mulla Sadra, Ibid., p. 12. See: Ibn Sina, al-Syifa, (Wizaroh al-Tsaqofah wa al-Irsyad al-Qoumi li al-Jumhuriyah al-Arobiyyah al-

Muttahidah), vol. I, p. 57-60; Mulla Sadra, al-Asfar, vol. iv, p. 185-199.

10

For the entire arguments of substantiality and immateriality of the soul proposed by Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra, see:

Ibn Sina, al-Najat, p. 213-220; Mulla Sadra, al-Asfar, vol. viii, p. 29-43 and 225-281.

notion. 11 For him, to undergo a movement there must be a constant substance which underlies it. By definition, movement is the first actualization of potency in a process (Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra are in agreement at this point).12 In other words, it might be said that the movement is the process of continue actualization or series of a gradual change. For Ibn Sina it is impossible to say that there is a gradual change of a substance because a change must be a change of a substance. The only possible explanation of a change to a substance is its existence, which is the principle of generation ( )and corruption (). In contrast to Ibn Sinas view, Mulla Sadra maintains that besides to accidents, motion is also applied to substance.13 That is because basically a motion is a mode of existence () 14 which is a gradual process of actualization. If those who reject the notion of trans-substantial motion because of that a real subject is a necessary condition for motion, the real subject itself is actually the existence. The gradual process of accidental change is actually a process of change of existence, so that a change of its substance. Regardless that argumentational dispute, it seems that Mulla Sadras notion of trans-substantial movement is very helpful to explain how a material entity, like a body, can undergo a process of perfection and then become immaterial. Thirdly, the most fundamental framework which differentiates Mulla Sadras position from that of Ibn Sina is his principle of fundamentality, singularity, and gradation of existence.15 Based on those three fundamental principles16, Mulla Sadra holds that the discourse on substantiality-accidentality of the soul, its materiality-immateriality, and its relation to the body, is a debate on quidity, not on existence. And since quidity is merely considerative/perspectival not real, so the discourse cant be considered as a debat e on the reality of the soul. Moreover, those principles also help to clarify the possibility of movement of material substance to become immaterial. It is obvious because basically there is no any real (existential) limit among the degrees of it. The limitation between material and immaterial substance is only perspectival. The
11

For Ibn Sinas explanation of his rejection to the notion of trans-substantial movement, see: Ibn Sina, al-Syifa, vol. In formal expression they say that motion/movement ( )is defined by "" . For Mulla Sadras explanation of his support to trans-substantial motion, see: Mulla Sadra, al-Asfar, vol. iii, p. 81-

iv, p. 98-101.
12

See: Ibn Sina, al-Syifa, vol. iv, p. 83; Mulla Sadra, al-Asfar, vol. iii, p. 33.
13

91.
14 15 16

Mulla Sadra, al-Asfar, vol. iv, p. 6. Mulla Sadra scrutinizes those principles in his al-Asfar, vol. I, p. 67-95. Another explanation on how those principles work in Mulla Sadras notion of the soul (followed by Mulla Hadi

al-Sabzawari) can be found in Kamal Haidaris commentary to Sabzawaris Ghuror al-Faroid. See: Kamal al-Haidari, Buhuts fi Ilm al-Nafs al-Falsafi, (Dar Feroqed, 2003), p. 74-90.

real movement is the movement of existence. In other words, the real perfection is existential perfection. And what is considered as perfection of substances (including their properties) is in reality the perfection of existence from a lower level to the higher one. 4.Concluding Remarks The discourse of mind-body problem is old and up to date at the same time. In Western tradition, there are several positions held by philosophers regarding this problem, among them are interactionism, epiphenomenalism, behaviorism, identity theory, functionalism, and emergentism, which are derived from dualism and materialistic monism. Idealist also has their own position, but it seems not attractive enough for the twentieth century philosophers because of the development of cognitive science. Actually scientific approach to the problem is only one of the other paradigms (Aristotelianism and Cartesianism) framing the discourse. Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra as the representation of Islamic peripatetic school and hikmah mutaaliyah respectively also have their own position. Basically, their position has some important similarity to that of Aristotles, but its not to say that both stand on Aristotelian paradigm. Especially Mulla Sadra, his hikmah mutaaliyah as a unique philosophical system has offered a unique solution to the given problem. He starts from the same definition of the soul as that of Aristotles and Ibn Sina, but he then develops it differently as his principles of trans-substantial motion and fundamentality-singularity-gradation of existence work.