Galido vs.

COMELEC Post under case digests, Political Law at Tuesday, February 21, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind Facts: Petitioner and private respondent were candidates during the January 18, 1988 local elections for the position of Mayor in the municipality of Garcia-Hernandez, Province of Bohol. Petitioner was proclaimed the duly-elected Mayor by the Municipal Board of Canvassers. Private respondent Saturnino Galeon filed an election protest before the RTC of Bohol, Tagbilaran City, wherein the court upheld the proclamation of petitioner. Private respondent appealed the RTC decision to the COMELEC which reversed the trial courts decision through its First Division and declared private-respondent the duly-elected mayor. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the COMELEC en banc, affirming the decision of the First Division. COMELEC held that the 15 ballots in the same precinct containing the initial C after the name Galido were marked ballots, and, therefore, invalid. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and injunction before the Supreme Court, who resolved to dismiss the said petition. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied with finality by the SC. Still, the petitioner filed another petition for certiorari and injunction which contained the same allegations and legal issues. A TRO was issued by the SC and the private respondent Galeon now seeks for the dismissal of the present petition for 3 main reasons: 1) Final decisions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in election contests involving elective municipal offices are final and executory, and not appealable. 2) The petition involves pure questions of fact as they relate to appreciation of evidence which is beyond the power of review of the SC. 3) It is exactly the same petition which was already dismissed with finality by the SC. These allegations were answered by the petitioner: 1) According to the Constitution, the present petition can still be brought to the SC by certiorari, not by an ordinary appeal. 2) The petition involves pure questions of law. 3) The dismissal with finality of the first petition did not refer to the merits of the petition. Issues: (1) Whether COMELEC has jurisdiction over the case (2) May a COMELEC decision be brought to the Supreme Court by a petition for certiorari by the aggrieved party? (3) Did the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in rendering the decision? Held: (1) Yes. COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials and has appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. (2) Yes. The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the COMELEC in contests involving municipal and barangay officials are final, executory, and not appealable, does not preclude a recourse to the SC by way of a special civil action of certiorari. (3) No. COMELEC has the inherent power to decide an election contest and the extent to which such precedents apply rests on its discretion, the exercise of which should not be controlled unless such discretion has been abused to the prejudice of either party. But this petition has become moot and academic because private respondent has already assumed the position of Mayor of Garcia-Hernandez as the duly-elected Mayor of the municipality by virtue of the COMELEC decision. Petition dismissed.

EN BANC [G.R. No. 135869. September 22, 1999] RUSTICO H. ANTONIO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and VICENTE T. MIRANDA, JR.,respondents. DECISION GONZAGA_REYES, J.: Is the period to appeal a decision of a municipal trial court to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in an election protest involving a barangay position five (5) days per COMELEC Rules of Procedure or ten (10) days as provided for in Republic Act 6679 [1] and the Omnibus Election Code? This is the sole issue posed in the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to annul the order dated August 3, 1998 of the Second Division of the COMELEC, [2] dismissing the appeal of petitioner Rustico Antonio for having been filed out of time pursuant to COMELEC Rules of Procedure, and the order promulgated on October 14, 1998 of the COMELEC en banc, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. The antecedents as found by the COMELEC in the order dated October 14, 1998 are: The parties in this case were rival candidates for the Punong Barangay of Barangay Ilaya, Las Pias City, Metro Manila. After the board of canvassers proclaimed protestee-appellant Rustico Antonio, protestant-appellee Vicente T. Miranda, Jr. filed an election protest docketed as Election Protest Case No. 97-0017 against Antonio before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Las Pias City (Branch LXXIX). The trial court rendered a Decision dated 9 March 1998, the dispositive portion of which states: WHEREFORE, the Court declares the protestant Vicente Miranda as the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay Ilaya, Las Pias City, Metro Manila. Antonio admitted receipt of the above-quoted decision on 18 March 1998. Subsequently, Antonio filed a Notice of Appeal with the trial court on 27 March 1998 or nine (9) days after receipt thereof. Meanwhile, Miranda moved to execute the trial courts decision. Rustico, in his Opposition to the Motion for Execution or Execution Pending Appeal, argued against Mirandas motion for execution. After the trial court denied the motion for execution, the records of this case was forwarded to the Commission (Second Division). On 10 August 1998, protestee-appellant Rustico Antonio received from this Commission (Second Division) an Order dated 3 August 1998 stating as follows: In the light of the aforequoted rules, protestee RUSTICO ANTONIO, failed to perfect his appeal within the five (5) days period prescribed for perfecting his appeal, as he filed his Notice of Appeal only on March 27, 1998 or nine (9) days after receipt of the decision sought to be appealed. The Period aforestated is jurisdictional and failure of the protestee to perfect his appeal within the said period deprives the Commission of its appellate jurisdiction. ACCORDINGLY, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction . Hence, this motion for reconsideration. The instant Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED and We AFFIRM the Order dated 3 August 1998 of this Commission (Second Division). [3] In the instant petition for certiorari, petitioner argues that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it dismissed the appeal for the following reasons: (a) In barangay electoral protest cases, the period of appeal is ten (10) days from receipt of the decision of the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court. This is provided for by Sec. 9 of R.A. 6679 and Sec. 252 of the Omnibus Election Code

(b) The provisions of Sec. 21, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure providing for a five-day period within which to appeal from the decision of the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court could not prevail upon the express provisions of Rep. Act No. 6679 and Sec. 252 of the Omnibus Election Code; (c) Moreover, the COMELEC committed an error of jurisdiction when it disregarded the provisions of Sections 5,6 & 7, Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure requiring the filing of briefs by the appellant and the appellee. The questioned resolution of August 3, 1998 was issued motu propio and without prior notice and hearing. The petitioner was fast tracked; (d) The alleged winning margin of the private respondent over the petitioner as found by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Las Pias is only four (4) votes the results being MIRANDA 1,171; ANTONIO 1,167. The peoples will must not go on procedural points. An election protest involves public interest, and technicalities should not be sanctioned when it will be an obstacle in the determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of its public officials. [Macasundig vs.

Macalanagan, 13 SCRA 577; Vda. De Mesa vs. Mensias, 18 SCRA 533; Juliano vs. Court of Appeals, 20 SCRA 808; Genete vs. Archangel, 21 SCRA 1178; Maliwanag vs. Herrera, 25 SCRA 175; De Castro vs. Genete, 27 SCRA 623] (e) The questioned resolutions violated the above principle because the COMELEC did not appreciate the contested ballots. [4] In dismissing the appeal, the COMELEC relied on Section 21, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which reads: SEC. 21. Appeal From any decision rendered by the court, the aggrieved party may appeal to the Commission on Elections within five (5) days after the promulgation of the decision. On the other hand, petitioner contends that the period of appeal from decisions of the Municipal Trial Courts or Metropolitan Trial Courts involving barangay officials is governed by Section 9 of Republic Act 6679 and Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code. Section 9 of Republic Act 6679 reads: SEC. 9. A sworn petition contesting the election of a barangay official may be filed with the proper municipal or metropolitan trial court by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for a barangay office within ten (10) days after the proclamation of the results of the election. The trial court shall decide the election protest within thirty (30) days after the filing thereof. The decision of the municipal or metropolitan trial court may be appealed within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the aggrieved party to the regional trial court which shall decide the issue within thirty (30) days from receipt of the appeal and whose decision on questions of fact shall be final and non-appealable. For purposes of the barangay elections, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed. Similarly, Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code provides: SEC. 252. Election contest for barangay offices. A sworn petition contesting the election of a barangay officer shall be filed with the proper municipal or metropolitan trial court by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election. The trial court shall decide the election protest within fifteen days after the filing thereof. The decision of the municipal or metropolitan trial court may be appealed within ten days from receipt of a copy thereof by the aggrieved party to the regional trial court which shall decide the case within thirty days from its submission, and whose decisions shall be final. In applying Section 21 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure rather than Section 9 of Republic Act 6779 and Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC rationalized thus: Antonio asserts that Section 9 of Republic Act 6679 and Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code providing for a ten -day period to appeal prevails over the provisions of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. According to Antonio, quasi-judicial bodies, including this Commission, cannot amend an act of Congress and in case of discrepancy between the basic law and an interpretative or administrative ruling, the former prevails. Generally, yes. But the situation herein does not fall within the generic situation contemplated therein. No less than the 1987 Constitution (Article IX-A, Section 6 and Article IX-C, Section 3) grants and authorizes this Commission to promulgate its own rules of procedure as long as such rules concerning pleadings and practice do not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Hence, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure promulgated in 1993 as amended in 1994 is no ordinary interpretative or administrative ruling. It is promulgated by this Commission pursuant to a constitutionally mandated authority which no legislative enactment can amend, revise or repeal. The COMELEC Rules of Procedure (Rule 37 Section 21) provides that from the decision rendered by the court, the aggrieved party may appeal to the Commission on Elections within five (5) days after the promulgation of the decision. Rule 22 Section 9 (d) of Our Rules of Procedure further provides that an appeal from decisions of courts in election protest cases may be dismissed at the instance of the Commission for failure to file the required notice of appeal within the prescribed period. In case at bar, Antonio filed his notice of appeal before the trial court on the ninth (9) day from receipt of the decision appealed from or four (4) days after the five-day prescribed period to appeal lapsed. Therefore, the present appeal must be dismissed. For it is axiomatic that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. As a consequence, the failure to perfect an appeal within the prescribed period as required by the Rules has the effect of defeating the right of appeal of a party and precluding the appellate court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case. So the High Court rules in Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, et.al. (205 SCRA 537). And so, it should also be in the case at bar. Worth noting is that Our Rules of Procedure may be amended, revised or repealed pursuant to the 1987 Constitution (Article VIII Section 5[5]) providing that rules of procedure of quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court . But far from being disapproved the COMELEC Rules of Procedure received approbation and has constantly been cited by the Supreme Court in a number of decisions such as in the case of Pahilan vs. Tabalba(230 SCRA 205, at 211) and Rodillas vs. Commission on Elections (245 SCRA 702, at 704). In the more recent case of Calucag vs. Commission on Elections promulgated on 19 June 1997 (G.R. N.o 123673), the Supreme Court stated that: Therefore, the COMELEC is the proper appellate court clothed with jurisdiction to hear the appeal WHICH APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN FIVE DAYS AFTER THE PROMULGATION OF THE MTC DECISION(page 4-5).

The repeated recognition given by the Supreme Court of this five-day rule within which to file the required notice of appeal will make questionable the legislative enactment providing for a ten-day period.[5] Without adopting the foregoing ratiocination of the COMELEC, we nonetheless find the instant petition devoid of merit. It is beyond cavil that legislative enactments prevail over rules of procedure promulgated by administrative or quasi-judicial bodies and that rules of procedure should be consistent with standing legislative enactments. In relation to the above-quoted Section 9 of Republic Act 6679 and Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code, petitioner points out that in Flores vs. Commission on Elections[6], this Court had declared that decisions of the Metropolitan or Municipal Court in election protest cases involving barangay officials are no longer appealable to the Regional Trial Court but to the COMELEC pursuant to Section 2(2) of Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution.[7] Petitioner submits that the dispositive portion in the Flores case only declared unconstitutional that portion of Section 9 of Republic Act 6679 providing for appeal to the Regional Trial Court but not the ten (10) day period of appeal. The dispositive portion of the Flores case reads: 1. Declaring Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it provides that barangay election contests decided by the municipal or metropolitan trial court shall be appealable to the regional trial court: Petitioner admits that the provisions in Republic Act No. 6679 and for that matter the Omnibus Election Code providing for appellate jurisdiction to the Regional Trial Court had been declared unconstitutional in the aforecited Flores case. A verbatim comparison of both provisions reveals that they provide the same remedy, that is, appeal from a decision of the municipal or metropolitan trial court in barangay election cases to the regional trial court. Both provisions provide that (1) results of a barangay election may be contested by filing a sworn petition with the municipal trial court within ten days from proclamation; (2) the MTC shall decide within thirty days per Republic Act No. 6679 or fifteen days per Omnibus Election Code; and (3) the decision of the municipal trial court may be appealed to the regional trial court within ten days from receipt by the aggrieved party, which decision is final and non-appealable. There is no appreciable basis to make a distinction between the two provisions, except for their different numbers, to advance that they provide for two different remedies. It would be superfluous to insist on a categorical declaration of the unconstitutionality of the appeal provided for in Sec. 252 of the Omnibus Election Code, as the same appeal in Sec. 9, Republic Act No. 6679 had already been categorically declared unconstitutional. Further, Sec. 252 of the Omnibus Election Code[8] as amended by the new law, Republic Act No. 6679[9], has in effect, been superseded by the latter. While the appellate procedure has been retained by the amendatory act, Republic Act No. 6679 nonetheless supersedes the verbatim provision in the Omnibus Election Code. Hence, it was not necessary for Flores to mention Sec. 252 of the Omnibus Election Code, considering that as aforestated, Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6679 was a mere reenactment of the former law. Petitioner is of the opinion, though, that the unconstitutionality extended only as to which court has appellate jurisdiction without affecting the period within which to appeal. According to petitioner, only the portion providing for the appellate jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court in said cases should be deemed unconstitutional. The rest of the provisions, particularly on the period to appeal, free from the taint of unconstitutionality, should remain in force and effect in view of the separability clauses contained in Republic Act 6779 [10] and the Omnibus Election Code.[11] We do not agree. First, petitioners argument raises the presumption that the period to appeal can be severed from the remedy or the appeal it self which is provided in Section 9, Republic Act 6679 and survive on its own. The presumption cannot be sustained because the period to appeal is an essential characteristic and wholly dependent on the remedy. Aptly, the rules on statutory construction prescribe: The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. The presence of a separability clause in a statute creates the presumption that the legislature intended separability, rather than complete nullity, of the statute. To justify this result, the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the legislature would have enacted it by itself if it had supposed that it could not constitutionally enact the other. Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible, and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. The void provisions must be eliminated without causing results affecting the main purpose of the act in a manner contrary to the intention of the legislature. The language used in the invalid part of the statute can have no legal effect or efficacy for any purpose whatsoever, and what remains must express the legislative will independently of the void part, since the court has no power to legislate. The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. In making the parts of the statute dependent, conditional, or connected with one another, the legislature intended the statute to be carried out as a whole and would not have enacted it if one part is void, in which case if some parts are unconstitutional, all the other provisions thus dependent, conditional, or connected must fall with them. [12] In the instant petition, the exception applies. Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6679 and Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code, without the constitutionally infirm portion on the appellate jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts in barangay election protest cases, does not remain complete in itself, sensible, capable of being executed and wholly independent of the portion which was rejected. In other words, with the elimination of the forum, the period cannot stand on its own. Moreover, when this Court stated that Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679 is declared unconstitutional insofar as it provides that barangay election contests decided by the municipal or metropolitan trial court shall be appealable to the regional trial court, it meant to preserve the first two sentences on the original jurisdiction of municipal and metropolita n trial courts to try barangay election protests cases but not, as advanced by the petitioner, the ten-day period to appeal to the Regional Trial Court. This is the logical and sound interpretation of subject portion of the Flores case.

Second, what was invalidated by the Flores case was the whole appeal itself and not just the question of which court to file the petition. If the remedy itself is declared unconstitutional how could the period to appeal possibly survive? How could the time limit exist if there is nothing to be done within such time? Third, we cannot indulge in the assumption that Congress still intended, by the said laws, to maintain the ten (10) day period to appeal despite the declaration of unconstitutionality of the appellate jurisdiction of the regional trial court, Republic Act No. 7166[13] amending the Omnibus Election Code, evinces the intent of our lawmakers to expedite the remedial aspect of election controversies. The law was approved on November 26, 1991, after the Flores case which was promulgated on April 20,1990, and presumably, the legislature in enacting the same was cognizant of the ruling in Flores. Said law provides the same five (5) day period to appeal decisions of the trial court in election contests for municipal officers to the COMELEC. Section 22 thereof reads: Sec. 22. Election Contests for Municipal Officers. All election contests involving municipal offices filed with the Regional Trial Court shall be decided expeditiously. The decision may be appealed to the Commission within five (5) days from promulgation or receipt of a copy thereof by the aggrieved party. The Commission shall decide the appeal within sixty (60) days after it is submitted for decision, but not later than six (6) months after the filing of the appeal, which decision shall be final, unappealable and executory. There would be no logic nor reason in ruling that a longer period to appeal to the COMELEC should apply to election contests for barangay officials. Fourth, since the whole remedy was invalidated, a void was created. Thus, the COMELEC had to come in and provide for a new appeal in accordance with the mandate of the Constitution. As correctly pointed out by the COMELEC, Section 6, Article IX-A[14] of the 1987 Constitution grants and authorizes the COMELEC to promulgate its own rules of procedure. The 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure have provided a uniform five (5) day period for taking an appeal[15] consistent with the expeditious resolution of election-related cases. It would be absurd and therefore not clearly intended, to maintain the 10-day period for barangay election contests. Hence, Section 3, Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not in conflict with any existing law. To adopt a contrary view would defeat the laudable objective of providing a uniform period of appeal and defy the COMELECs constitutional mandate to enact rules of procedure to expedite disposition of election cases. In view of the Flores case, jurisprudence has consistently recognized that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are controlling in election protests heard by a regional trial court.[16] The Court en banc has held in Rodillas vs. COMELEC[17] that the procedure for perfecting an appeal from the decision of the Municipal Trial Court in a barangay election protest case is set forth in the COMELEC Rules of Proce dure. More recently, in Calucag vs. Commission on Elections[18], the Court en banc had occasion to state that: It follows that after the promulgation of Flores, the same arguments propounded therein by the petitioner may no longer be employed. Article 8 of the Civil Code states that (j)udicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. Said pronouncement of the Court, having formed part of the law of the land, ignor ance thereof can no longer be countenanced. Therefore, the COMELEC is the proper appellate court clothed with jurisdiction to hear the appeal, which appeal must be filed within five days after the promulgation of the MTCs decision. The erroneous filing of the appeal with the RTC did not toll the running of the prescriptive period. xxx. The five-day period having expired without the aggrieved party filing the appropriate appeal before the COMELEC, the statutory privilege of petitioner to appeal is deemed waived and the appealed decisions has become final and executory. Significantly, Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution provides in part that [r]ules of procedure of special courts a nd quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. Equally devoid of merit is the contention that petitioner was fast tracked because the COMELEC did not require the parties to file their appeal briefs; that the dismissal was issued motu proprio without prior notice and hearing; and that dismissal of the appeal defeats the peoples will on procedural points. Suffice it to state that the period for filing an appeal is by no means a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is an essential requirement without which the decision appealed from would become final and executory as if no appeal was filed at all. The right of appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provisions of the law.[19] Further, by virtue of Section 9 (d), Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides that an appeal may be dismisse d upon motion of either party or at the instance of the Commission for failure to file a notice of appeal within the prescribed period, the COMELEC is precisely given the discretion, in a case where the appeal is not filed on time to dismiss the action or proceeding. The COMELEC, therefore, did not commit an abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed orders of the Commission on Elections dated August 3, 1998 and October 14, 1998 are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILS. VS. COMELEC [289 SCRA 337; G.R. NO. 132922; 21 APR 1998] Monday, February 02, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. It was declared to be without legal standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it was not able to show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of the subject law. Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand, had the requisite standing to bring the constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No. 881. Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides: Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and televisiontime to be known as the Comelec Time which sh all be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, thefranchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of campaign. Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure print space in newspapers and magazines withpayment, Section 92 provides that air time shall be procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus it contends that Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time. Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several millionpesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio andtelevision stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of private property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one hour each day and, in this years elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELECs requirement that it provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for such.

Issues: (1) Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio andtelevision broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws. (2) Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due process of law and without just compensation. Held: Petitioners argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast that there are frequencies to assign. Radio andtelevision broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmitbroadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the privilege to operate broadcaststations and supervising radio and television stations, the state spends considerable public funds in licensing and supervising them. The argument that the subject law singles out radio and televisionstations to provide free air time as against newspapers and magazines which require payment of just compensation for the print space they may provide is likewise without merit. Regulation of the broadcastindustry requires spending of public funds which it does not do in the case of print media. To require the broadcast industry to provide free air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry gets. As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC.

EN BANC G.R. No. 110045 November 29, 1994 TOMAS R. OSMEA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, and Honorable COMMISSIONERS DOMINGO, ESPIRITU and ORSAL, respondents. The City Attorney for petitioner.

NARVASA, C.J.: In this special civil action of certiorari, petitioner Mayor of the City of Cebu seeks nullification of: (a) the Decision of respondent Commission on Audit (No. 1364, dated June 15, 1990) DISALLOWING the amount of P30,000.00 appropriated by the City of Cebu relative to a compromise agreement entered into in Civil Case No. 4275 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (Branch 23) an action brought by the Spouses Benjamin and Evangeline de la Cerna against the City and others which compromise was in due course embodied in a judgment of the Court rendered on August 1, 1989; and (b) said Commission's Decision (No. 2773, dated March 30, 1993) "denying due course" to the city's motion for reconsideration of its Decision No. 1364 above mentioned. The controversy had its origin in the stabbing by an unknown assailant of Reynaldo de la Cerna, the son of the aforementioned de la Cerna Spouses, in the afternoon of September 6, 1985. He was rushed to the Cebu City Medical Center, but unfortunately expired in the evening of that same day due to severe loss of blood. His parents claimed that Reynaldo would not have died were it not for the "ineptitude, gross negligence, irresponsibility, stupidity and incompetence of the medical staff" of the Medical Center. The de la Cerna Spouses accordingly instituted in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City the above mentioned civil action, for recovery of damages, based on paragraph 5, Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Named defendants were the city of Cebu, the Sangguniang Panlungsod, and five physicians of the Cebu City Medical Center. 1 The City of Cebu which, according to the complaint, "operates, maintains, and manages the Cebu City Medical Center", was impleaded as defendant on the theory that as employer of the alleged negligent doctors, it was vicariously responsible for the latter's negligence since it failed to exercise due care and vigilance over the doctors while acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, to prevent them from causing the death of Reynaldo. The Civil Code provision relied upon by plaintiffs, pertinently reads as follows: Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those persons for whom one is responsible. xxx xxx xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. xxx xxx xxx After the action had been pending for some time, negotiations for an amicable settlement were commenced, which culminated in an agreement designed to put an end to the controversy in a manner acceptable to the parties. Since the compromise agreement included a provision for the payment of the sum of P30,000.00 to the plaintiffs by defendant City of Cebu, the agreement was submitted to the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City, which ratified it on July 31, 1989. The sanggunian authorized "the City Budget Officer, Cebu City, to include in Supplemental Budget No. IV of the City . . . for the year 1989 the amount of THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS for financial assistance to the parents of the late Reynaldo de la Cerna, all of Cebu City." 2 The agreement was also submitted to the Regional Trial Court which, on August 1, 1989, rendered a judgment "(f)inding the same to be in conformity with law, morals and public policy" and enjoining the parties "to comply strictly with the terms and conditions thereof." 3 The compromise agreement 4 included the following stipulations and undertakings, viz.: 1. The plaintiffs after realizing that Defendants were not negligent in the performance of their respective duties as regards the admission of their son Reynaldo de la Cerna at the Cebu City Medical Center, have agreed to enter into this Compromise Agreement;

2. The Defendants in order to buy peace and without admitting any liability for the death of Reynaldo de la Cerna hereby agree to grant financial assistance to the Plaintiffs in the total amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) (which) shall be paid by the Defendants in the following proportion: a) City of Cebu P 30,000.00 b) Dr. Francisco Dy, Jr. 4,000.00 c) Dr. Ernesto Medalle 4,000.00 d) Dr. Zaldy Buac 4,000.00 e) Dr. Revey Nuico 4,000.00 f) Dr. Carmencita Momongan 4,000.00 xxx xxx xxx 5. Plaintiffs hereby releases (sic) all the Defendants from any claims, causes of actions or cases whether present or future which they may have in connection with the death of their son, Reynaldo de la Cerna; xxx xxx xxx 7. Plaintiffs and Defendants agree to dismiss and drop all claims, counter-claims, and cross-claims which they have filed against each other in the above-captioned case. xxx xxx xxx About eleven (11) months later, however (and as already stated in the opening paragraph of this opinion), respondent Commission on Audit (COA) disallowed the "financial assistance" thus granted to the spouses de la Cerna, in its Decision No. 1364, contained in its 3rd Indorsement dated 15 June 1990, supra. 5 This decision reads in part as follows: . . . [I]t is not within the powers of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu to provide, either under the general welfare clause or even on humanitarian grounds, monetary assistance that would promote the economic condition and private interests of certain individuals only. The giving away of public funds to a bereaved family in the form of financial assistance has definitely no casual relation to the general welfare of the inhabitants of the community. In fact, no real or substantial relation to the public health, morals, or general welfare of the community can be perceived from the act of giving such financial assistance. Respondent further stressed that not being a party to the compromise agreement, it was not bound by it; and that any money claim arising therefrom was subject to its usual audit "in pursuance of the valid exercise and discharge of its constitutional power, authority and duty as an independent body to audit all government accounts. The City of Cebu filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated August 15, 1991, but as already stated, the same was "denied due course" by respondent Commission in its Decision No. 2773. 6 Respondent ruled that the motion was filed more than a year after receipt by the City government of notice of its Decision No. 364 dated June 15, 1990 and therefore, pursuant to Sections 50 and 51 of PD 1445, 7 the decision had already become final and executory. In behalf of the City of Cebu, Mayor Tomas R. Osmea has come to this Court ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the COA and its Members in so disallowing the city's appropriation of P30,000.00 made conformably with the compromise agreement in the civil suit against the City, embodied in due course in the Trial Court's judgment. Mayor Osmea assails respondents' characterization of the city government's appropriation as mere "financial assistance to private persons," pointing out that the City would have incurred a greater financial liability if it had not worked out such an amicable settlement. The Court believes that public respondents' disallowance of the appropriation is indeed tainted by grave abuse of discretion and should be correspondingly rectified. There is to be sure no question that under the Constitution, respondent COA has the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to revenue and receipts of, and expenditures, and uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. 8 In the exercise of its broad powers, particularly its auditing functions, the COA is guided by certain principles and state policies to assure that "government funds shall be managed, expended, utilized in accordance with law and regulations, and safeguarded against loss or wastage . . . with a view to ensuring efficiency, economy and effectiveness in the operations of government." 9 There can thus be no question of the COA's competence to act on the supplemental budget for 1989 of the City of Cebu. Whether it acted in the exercise of sound discretion in respect thereto is another matter.

It appears to the Court that respondent COA grievously misconstrued the undertaking of Cebu City to pay P30,000.00 to the heirs of the deceased Reynaldo de la Cerna. For some reason, perhaps partly because of the imprecise phraseology of the Sangguniang Panlungsod's resolution, 10 respondent considered that undertaking as simply furnishing "monetary assistance that would promote the economic condition and private interests of certain individuals only, . . . said financial assistance . . . definitely (having) no causal relation to the general welfare of the inhabitants of the community." The appropriation of P30,000.00 by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City was considered by respondent out of context; it was construed as intended only to promote the private interests of the de la Cerna family, as merely a form of financial assistance to a bereaved family without causal relation to the general welfare of the community. In truth, as respondent was well aware, the appropriation was a part of the package agreed upon by all the parties in Civil Case No. 4275 of the Cebu RTC for the amicable settlement of the controversy; it may not be considered independently of said amicable settlement; it would be meaningless unless considered in the context of the compromise of the case. The participation by the City in negotiations for an amicable settlement of a pending litigation and its eventual execution of a compromise relative thereto, are indubitably within its authority and capacity as a public corporation; and a compromise of a civil suit in which it is involved as a party, is a perfectly legitimate transaction, not only recognized but even encouraged by law. A compromise is a bilateral act or transaction that it expressly acknowledged as a juridical agreement by the Civil Code and is therein dealt with in some detail. "A compromise," declares Article 2208 of said Code, "is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced." The definition is reflective of the general concept of a compromise in other jurisdictions, as "an agreement between two or more persons, who, for preventing or putting an end to a lawsuit, adjust their difficulties by mutual consent in the same manner which they agree on, and which everyone of them prefers in the hope of gaining, balanced by the danger of losing." 11 The Civil Code not only defines and authorizes compromises, it in fact encourages them in civil actions. Article 2029 states that "The Court shall endeavor to persuade the litigants in a civil case to agree upon some fair compromise." And in line with this policy, the Code directs (a) the suspension, pursuant to the Rules of Court, of every civil action or proceeding "(1) if willingness to discuss a possible compromise is expressed by one or both parties, or (2) if it appears that one of the parties, before the commencement of the action or proceeding, offered to discuss a possible compromise but the other party refused the offer," 12 as well as (b) the mitigation of "the damages to be paid by the losing party who has shown a sincere desire for a compromise." 13 The law regards compromises as standing on a higher plane than ordinary agreements, for it declares them, once entered into, to constitute res judicata, although judicial execution thereof is permitted only with respect to judicial compromises. 14 The Code also affirms the capacity of juridical persons to compromise, "in the form and with the requisites which may be necessary to alienate their property." 15 As early as 1917, the Court, applying substantially similar provisions in the (Spanish) Civil Code of 1889, made the following pronouncements in the case of Municipality of San Joaquin v. Bishop of Jaro: 16 As a juridic person, the municipality of Miagao was authorized to execute a contract of compromise in the manner and with the requisites necessary to alienate its property (Civ. Code, art. 1812), and such requisites and formalities were fulfilled in accordance with the provisions of Section 40, subsection (c) of the Municipal Code. The provincial governor was of that opinion when he gave his approval to the contract of compromise, which was deemed to benefit the contracting municipality for the reason that it thereby avoided a lawsuit and got the Church to renounce other claims and to recognize the municipality's right in the other real properties sought to be registered. Furthermore, the record does not show that the Church, on its part, failed to comply with the condition imposed in the compromise, and it is presumed that the latter was executed in accordance with law and that the formalities established by law have been complied with (Code of Civ. Proc., sec. 334, Nos. 14, 18 and 310). There is no proof contrary to these presumptions. That the City of Cebu complied with the relevant formalities contemplated by law can hardly be doubted. The compromise agreement was submitted to its legislative council, the Sangguniang Panlungsod, which approved it conformably with its established rules and procedure, particularly the stipulation for the payment of P30,000.00 to the de la Cerna family. Neither may it be disputed that since, as a municipal corporation, Cebu City has the power to sue and be sued, 17 it has the authority to settle or compromise suits, 18 as well as the obligation to pay just and valid claims against it. Obviously, respondent refused to take account of the foregoing legal principles in relation to the antecedents of the provision in the supplemental budget of the City for payment of P30,000.00. It failed to realize that payment thereof was part of the consideration, not merely for the settlement of a claim, but for the settlement of an actual controversy, 19 and constituted one of the "reciprocal concessions" which the law considers "the very heart and life of every compromise." 20 By making reciprocal concessions, the parties in Civil Case No. 4275 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (Branch 23) put an end to the action in a manner acceptable to all of them. The City thus eliminated the contingency of being made to assume heavier liability in said suit for damages instituted against it in connection with its operation and management of the Cebu City Medical Center, activities being undertaken by it in its proprietary (as distinguished from its government) functions and in accordance with which it may be held liableex contractu or ex delito, 21 for the negligent performance of its corporate, proprietary or business functions. 22 It is noteworthy that the compromise in question was approved by, and embodied in the judgment of, the Court, which pronounced it "to be in conformity with law, morals and public policy" and enjoined the parties "to comply strictly with the terms and conditions thereof." 23

This judicial compromise is conclusive and binding on all the parties, including the City of Cebu. It is enforceable by execution, as above stressed. There was no reason whatever to object to it, much less disallow any disbursement therein stipulated. It should have been approved as a matter of course. One last word. COA avers 24 that its Decision dated June 15, 1990 (No. 1364) became final and executory by reason of the City's failure to appeal the same to this Court within thirty (30) days from notice thereof, pursuant to the Section 7, Article IX of the Constitution, and Sections 50 and 51 of PD 1445. 25 This is not indubitable on the record. For against this contention, there is the allegation in the motion (letter) for reconsideration dated August 15, 1991 of the City, thru its City Attorney, 26 that notice of the decision was "received on July 26, 1991;" and there was at the time the far from settled question as to whether or not the City Auditor, on whom said COA Decision No. 1364 dated June 15, 1990, is not merely an extension (and transmitter of communications) of the Commission on Audit, or may be deemed a proper officer (in lieu of or in addition to the Mayor) on whom such notice should be given to effectively bind the City and to commence computation of the appeal period prescribed by the Constitution and implementing rules. In view thereof, and in the interest of justice, the Court declines to sustain the contention that the City's right of appeal had lapsed and thus resolve the controversy at bar on the basis of the postulated procedural default on the part of the City. WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is issued and the COA decisions dated 15 June 1990 (No. 1364) and 30 March 1993 (No. 2773) are hereby nullified and set aside. The respondent Commission on Audit is ORDERED to approve and allow in audit the appropriation of P30,000.00 of Cebu City approved in connection with the judicial compromise executed by it in Civil Case No. 4275 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (Branch 23). IT IS SO ORDERED.

Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan and Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul Gonzalez, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution Nature: P etition for c erti orari, prohibition, and mandamus to review the decisi on of the Sandiganbayan Facts: Enrique Zaldivar, governor of the province of Antique Sought to restrain the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Raul Gonzalez From proceeding with the prosecution and hearing of criminal cases filed against him On the ground that said cases were filed by the Tanodbayan. The 1987 Consti provided that it is only the Ombudsman who has the authority to file cases with the Sandiganbayan. Issue: WON Tanodbayan had authority to file those cases for Sandiganbayan to prosecute and hear. Held: NO Ratio: 1.Under the 1987 Consti, the Ombudsman (distinguished from Tanodba yan) is charged with the duty to: Section 13, par 1: Investi gate on its own, or on complaint by any pers on, any act or omission of any public officer, employee, office or agenc y, when such act or omissi on appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. 2.The Tanodbayan of the 1973 Consti became the Office of the Special prosecutor that shall continue to function and exercise it powers as now or hereafter may be provided by la w, except thos e conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under the Consti. (article 11, section 7) 3.Thus, beginning on February 2, 1987, the authority to conduct preliminar y investigations and direct the filing of criminal cas es with the Sandiganbayan was vested on the Ombudsman. 4.The Tanodbayan is now the s ubordinate of the Sandiganbayan and it can investigat eand prosecute cases only upon the latters authority or orders. Office of the Tanodbayan: created by PB 1607 GRANTED; GONZALEZ ORDERED TO CEASE AND DESIST FROM CONDUCTING INVESTIGATIONSAND FILING CR IM NIAL CASE S WITH THE S AND IGANB AYAN OR OTHER WISE E XER C ISNG THEPOWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE OMBUDSMAN