Persons & Family Relations Marriage 1. Classification of Marriages/ Relationships.

Parties In Interest; NCC;FC;AM 02-11-10 SC Valid Voidable Void Terminable Others Classifications Legal Separation Separation in Fact Common Law Relationship 34. Lucas v. Lucas June 6, 2011 NACHURA, J.:

of general circulation in the Philippines and that notice be sent to the SolicitorGeneral so that he can represent the State in this case. After learning of the September 3, 2007 Order, Jesus filed a motion for reconsideration where he averred that the petition was not in due form and substance because Jesse could not have personally known the matters that were alleged therein. He argued that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to Jesus as Jesses father. Moreover, jurisprudence is still unsettled on the acceptability of DNA evidence. RTC:set the Petition with Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing. It stressed that the petition was sufficient in form and substance. It was verified, it included a certification against forum shopping, and it contained a plain, concise, and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which petitioner relies on for his claim, in accordance with Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. CA: On a petition for certiorari, the CA ruled in favor of Jesus, holding that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Jesus, as no summons had been served on him. ISSUE 1: Whether service of summons is jurisdictional in a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation. HELD:No, a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation, being an action in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the latter has jurisdiction over the res. RATIO:1) A petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an action in rem. By the simple filing of the petition to establish illegitimate filiation before the RTC, which undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition, the latter thereby acquired jurisdiction over the case. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through

FACTS:On July 26, 2007, Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation (with Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing) before the RTC. Jesse narrated that sometime in 1967 his mother, Elsie, got acquainted with Jesus S. Lucas, with whom she developed an intimate relationship with. Elsie eventually got pregnant and, on March 11, 1969, gave birth to Jesse. The name of Jesses father was not stated in his certificate of live birth. However, Elsie later told Jesse that Jesus was his father. Jesus allegedly extended financial support to Jesse and his mother until Jesus and Elsies relationship ended, when the latter refused to accept Jesus offer of support. Jesus was not served with a copy of the petition; nonetheless, he learned of the petition to establish filiation. His counsel therefore went to the trial court on August 29, 2007 and obtained a copy of the petition. On September 3, 2007, the RTC, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, issued an Order setting the case for hearing and urging anyone who has any objection to the petition to file his opposition. The court also directed that the Order be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in any newspaper

publication.Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort to the right sought to be established. Through publication, all interested parties are deemed notified of the petition. 2) If at all, service of summons or notice is made to the defendant, it is not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but merely for satisfying the due process requirements. This is but proper in order to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses. Hence, failure to serve summons will not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to try and decide the case. In such a case, the lack of summons may be excused where it is determined that the adverse party had, in fact, the opportunity to file his opposition, as in this case. The SCfinds that the due process requirement with respect to Jesus has been satisfied, considering that he has participated in the proceedings in this case and he had the opportunity to file his opposition to the petition to establish filiation. ISSUE 2: Whether the subject Petition to establish filiation is sufficient in form. HELD: Yes. RATIO: 1) The subject Petition was adversarial in nature despite its caption which lacked the name of a defendant, the failure to implead Jesus as defendant, and the non-service of summons upon Jesus. A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. In this petitionclassified as an action in remthe notice requirement for an adversarial proceeding was likewise satisfied by the publication of the petition and the giving of notice to the Solicitor General, as directed by the trial court. 2) It satisfies Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which requires the complaint to contain a plain, concise, and direct statement of the ultimate facts upon which the plaintiff bases his claim. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate. A complaint states a cause of action when it contains the

following elements: (1) the legal right of plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. The petition sufficiently states the ultimate facts relied upon by Jesse to establish his filiation to Jesus. Jesus, however, contends that the allegations in the petition were hearsay as they were not of Jesses personal knowledge. Such matter is clearly a matter of evidence that cannot be determined at this point but only during the trial when Jesse presents his evidence. 3) The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant procedural aspectsin a traditional paternity case which parties have to face A party is confronted by these socalled procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have presented their respective evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CAs observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie casethe first procedural aspect in a paternity case is therefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a partys evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory pleading. ISSUE 3: Whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order. HELD:Yes, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity. RATIO:1) In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or good cause for the holding of the test. In these states, a court order for blood testing is considered a search, which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause.

The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. 2) Notwithstanding these, the issuance of a DNA testing order remains discretionary upon the court. The court may, for example, consider whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA testing. If there is already preponderance of evidence to establish paternity and the DNA test result would only be corroborative, the court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA testing. 2. F.C. Marriage Requirements; Civil Wedding v. Church Wedding; Cert of Civil Registrar 35. Ty v. CA November 27, 2000 QUISUMBING, J.: FACTS: Edgardo M. Reyes married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil ceremony on March 29, 1977 and in a church wedding on August 27, 1977. However, on August 4, 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared their marriage null and voidab initio for lack of a valid marriage license. The church wedding on August 27, 1977, was also declared null and void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties. Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, or on April 4, 1979, Reyes wed Ofelia P. Ty. On April 4, 1982, they also had a church wedding. On January 3, 1991, Reyes filed a Civil Case praying that his marriage to Ty be declared null and void. He averred that at the time he married Ty, he was still married to Anna Maria since the decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not yet been issued then. Ty, in defending her marriage to Reyes, submitted the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City dated August 4, 1980, which declared null and void his civil marriage to Anna Maria Regina Villanueva celebrated on March 29, 1977, and his church marriage to said Anna Maria on August 27, 1977. The fact that the civil marriage of Reyes

and Ty took place on April 4, 1979, before the judgment declaring his prior marriage as null and void is undisputed. RTC: declared Reyes marriage to Ty null and void ab initio. CA: affirmed the RTCs decision. It ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage (to Anna Maria) must first be secured before a subsequent marriage could be validly contracted. ISSUE: Whether in the case at bar a decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a subsequent marriage can be entered into validly. HELD: No, the first marriage of Reyes being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage. RATIO: 1) Reyes first and second marriages contracted in 1977 and 1979, respectively, are governed by the provisions of the Civil Code. Thus, the present case differs significantly from the recent cases of Bobis v. Bobisand Mercado v. Tan, both involving a criminal case for bigamy where the bigamous marriage was contracted during the effectivity of the Family Code, under which a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is clearly required. Article 83 of the Civil Code provides that: Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless: 1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or (2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and before any person

believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court. As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary, the Civil Code contains no express provision to that effect. Jurisprudence on the matter, however, appears to be conflicting. 2) Jurisprudence 2.1 In People v. Mendoza (1954) and People v. Aragon (1957)the SC held that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the nullity of a void marriage. Both cases involved the same factual milieu. Accused contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage. After the death of his first wife, accused contracted a third marriage during the subsistence of the second marriage. The second wife initiated a complaint for bigamy. The Court acquitted accused on the ground that the second marriage is void, having been contracted during the existence of the first marriage. There is no need for a judicial declaration that said second marriage is void. Since the second marriage is void, and the first one terminated by the death of his wife, there are no two subsisting valid marriages. Hence, there can be no bigamy. 2.2 In Gomez v. Lipana (1970) and Consuegra v. Consuegra (1971) however, the SC recognized the right of the second wife who entered into the marriage in good faith, to share in their acquired estate and in proceeds of the retirement insurance of the husband. The Court observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there was a need for judicial declaration of such nullity (of the second marriage). And since the death of the husband supervened before such declaration, the SC upheld

the right of the second wife to share in the estate they acquired, on grounds of justice and equity. 2.3 But in Odayat v. Amante(1977) the SC adverted to Aragon and Mendoza as precedents. The Court held that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages. 2.4 Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (1986) the Court held that there is a need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage. 2.5 In Yap v. Court of Appeals (1986) however, the Court found the second marriage void without need of judicial declaration, thus reverting to the Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon rulings. 3) The confusion under the Civil Code was put to rest under the Family Code. The rulings in Gomez, Consuegra, and Wiegel were eventually embodied in Article 40 of the Family Code. Article 40 of said Code expressly required a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. 3.1 In Terre v. Terre (1992) the Court, applying Gomez, Consuegra and Wiegel, categorically stated that a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary. 3.2 In Domingo v. Court of Appeals (1993) the Court held: xxx came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. (Art. 39 of the Family Code).Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity

is a final judgment declaring previous marriage void.

the

RATIO:1) The church was confirmatory of marriage.

ceremony the civil

4) However, a recent case applied the old rule because of the peculiar circumstances of the case. In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997) the first wife charged a municipal trial judge of immorality for entering into a second marriage. The judge claimed that his first marriage was void since he was merely forced into marrying his first wife whom he got pregnant. On the issue of nullity of the first marriage, the SC applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon, and held that since the second marriage took place and all the children thereunder were born before the promulgation of Wiegeland the effectivity of the Family Code, there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence at that time. Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of Reyes was entered into in 1979, before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon.The first marriage of Reyes being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that Reyess second marriage to Ty is valid. 5) The provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of Ty and of her children. As held in Jison v. Court of Appeals, the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights. In the present case, that impairment of vested rights of Ty and the children is patent.

That the marriage license was used legally in the celebration of the civil ceremony does not detract from the ceremonial use thereof in the church wedding of the same parties to the marriage, for we the latter rites served not only to ratify but also to fortify the first. 36.Alcantara v. Alcantara August 28, 2007 CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: FACTS:RestitutoAlcantara filed a petition for annulment of marriage against Rosita Alcantara alleging that when they were married December 8, 1982, they did so without securing a valid marriage license. Also, when they went through another marriage ceremony on March 26, 1983, said marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. He further alleged that the marriage license appearing on the marriage contract was a sham. In her Answer, Rosita asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry. Furthermore, that Restituto only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage. Rosita, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against Restituto before the MTC. RTC: dismissed the Petition for lack of merit. CA: affirmed the RTCs decision. ISSUE:Whether the marriage between Restituto and Rosita is valid. HELD:Yes. RATIO:1) The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8 December 1982, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration.

ISSUE 2:Whether Reyes and Ty complied with all the essential and formal requisites for a valid marriage. HELD:Yes, Reyes and Ty complied with all the essential and formal requisites for a valid marriage, in both the civil and church ceremonies.

2) A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void abinitio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58 of the same Code. The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the States demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested. 3) To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage contract between Restituto and Rosita reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar. The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely RestitutoAlcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein. 4) The certification issued by the Municipal civil registrar enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official business . The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. However, the presumption prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and, in case of doubt as to an officers act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness. 5) Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are

considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable. 6) Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands,Restituto cannot pretend that he was not responsible or a party to the marriage celebration which he now insists took place without the requisite marriage license. Restituto admitted that the civil marriage took place because he initiated it. He is an educated person. He is a mechanical engineer by profession. He knowingly and voluntarily went to the Manila City Hall and likewise, knowingly and voluntarily, went through a marriage ceremony. He cannot benefit from his action and be allowed to extricate himself from the marriage bond at his mere say-so when the situation is no longer palatable to his taste or suited to his lifestyle. His attempt to make a mockery of the institution of marriage betrays his bad faith. 7) Restitutoand Rosita went through a marriage ceremony twice in a span of less than one year utilizing the same marriage license. There is no claim that he went through the second wedding ceremony in church under duress or with a gun to his head. The logical conclusion is that Restituto was amenable and a willing participant to all that took place at that time. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby cleansing whatever irregularity or defect attended the civil wedding. 8) Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage. Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight. 37.Sy v. CA April 12, 2000 QUISUMBING, J.: FACTS:Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy were married on November 15, 1973 at the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. Both were then 22 years old.

On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived separately, and their two children were in the custody of their mother. On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation before the RTC. Later, upon her motion, the action was later amended to a petition for separation of property on the grounds that her husband abandoned her without just cause; that they have been living separately for more than one year; and that they voluntarily entered into a Memorandum of Agreement dated September 29, 1983, containing the rules that would govern the dissolution of their conjugal partnership. Judgment was rendered dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains and approving a regime of separation of properties based on the Memorandum of Agreement executed by the spouses. In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her husband. The RTC, however, convicted Fernando only of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries. Filipina later filed a new action for legal separation against on the following grounds: (1) repeated physical violence; (2) sexual infidelity; (3) attempt by Fernando against her life; and (4) abandonment of her by her husband without justifiable cause for more than one year. The RTC granted the petition on the grounds of repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity, and issued a decree of legal separation. On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petitionfor the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity. She points out that the final judgment rendered by the RTC in her favor, in her petitions for separation of property and legal separation, and Fernando's infliction of physical violence on her which ledto the conviction of her husband for slight physical injuries are symptoms of psychological incapacity. She also cites as manifestations of her husband's psychological incapacity the following: (1) habitual alcoholism; (2) refusal to live with her without fault on

her part, choosing to live with his mistress instead; and (3) refusal to have sex with her, performing the marital act only to satisfy himself. Moreover, Filipina alleges that such psychological incapacity of her husband existed from the time of the celebration of their marriage and became manifest thereafter. RTC: denied the petition for declaration of absolute nullity, finding that Fernandos alleged acts do not constitute psychological incapacity. CA: affirmed the RTCs decision. ISSUE:Whether the marriage between Filipina and Fernando is void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony. The date of issue of the marriage license and marriage certificate was September 17, 1974, while the date of celebration of their marriage was on November 15, 1973. HELD:Yes, under Article 80 of the Civil Code, the marriage between Filipina and Fernando is void from the beginning. RATIO:1) The pieces of evidence on record plainly and indubitably show that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract shows that the marriage license was issued in Carmona, Caviteyet, neither FilipinanorFernando ever resided in Carmona. 2) While indeed Filipina did not expressly state in her petition before the trial court that there was incongruity between the date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of the issuance of their marriage license, from the documents she presented, the marriage license was issued on September 17,1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on November 15, 1973,the ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license.

Nowhere in the records doesFernando deny these dates on record. 3) Article 80 of the Civil Code is clearly applicable in this case . There being no claim of an exceptional character, the purported marriage between Filipina and Fernando could not be classified among those enumerated in Articles 72-79 of the Civil Code. 38.Cario v. Cario February 2, 2001 YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: FACTS:During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he contracted two marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969, with Susan Nicdaoand the second was on November 10, 1992, with Susan Yee. SPO4 Cario passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both Susan Nicdao and Susan Yee filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. On December 14, 1993, Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of money against Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that the latter be ordered to return to her at least onehalf of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively denominated as death benefits which Susan Nicdao received from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, and Pag-ibig. Despite service of summons, Susan Nicdao failed to file her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in default. Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where she met Susan Nicdao who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. of To bolster her action for collection sum of money, Susan Yee

contended that the marriage of Susan Nicdao and SPO4 Cario is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage license. In support thereof, Susan Yee presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the deceased and Susan Nicdao which bears no marriage license number; and 2) a certification from the Local Civil Registrar which reads This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the spouses SANTIAGO CARINO (sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in this municipality on June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot issue as requested a true copy or transcription of Marriage License number from the records of this archives. RTC: ruled in favor of Susan Yee and ordered Susan Nicdao to pay the former half of the amount which was paid to her in the form of death benefits arising from the death of SPO4 Cario. CA: affirmed the RTCs Decision. ISSUE 1:Whether the Court has authority to rule on the validity of the two marriages. HELD:Yes, that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of the two marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the subject death benefits of the deceased. RATIO:1) Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.

2) However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. ISSUE 2:Whether the first marriage, between Susan Nicdao and SPO4 Cario is void ab initio. HELD:Yes, the marriage between Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is void abinitio. RATIO:1) Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of Susan Nicdao and SPO4 Cario was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void abinitio. 2) There is no question that the marriage of Susan Nicdao and the deceased does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage contract of Susan Nicdao and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar, their office has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that such a certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license.

Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. ISSUE3:Whether the subject death benefits should be awarded to Susan Yee. HELD:No. RATIO:1) Under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void. Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio. 2) One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the spouses according to the applicable property regime. Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage. 2.1 Considering that the marriage of Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed to be valid, the application of Article 148 is therefore in order.In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-

ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home, children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime. The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pagibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. It could not be said that Susan Yee contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by Susan Yee and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and Susan Yee has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said death benefits of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, Susan Yee, not being the legal wife of the deceased is not one of them. 2.2As to the property regime of Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto. Conformably, even if the disputed death benefits were earned by the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a coownership in respect thereto, entitling Susan Yee to share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject death benefits under scrutiny shall go to Susan Nicdao as her share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao. 39.Navarro v. Domogtoy

July 19, 1996

ROMERO, J.:

FACTS:The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigaodel Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law. First, on September 27, 1994, judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife. Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between FlorianoDadorSumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction. Judge Domagtoy holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigaodel Norte. The wedding was solemnized at Judge Domagtoy's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigaodel Norte. Judge Domagtoy: seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized the marriage between Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years. With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction; and that Article 8 thereof applies to the case in question. ISSUE 1:Whether the Joint Affidavit acknowledged before the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, stating thatTagadans wife has not returned nor been heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is already dead, sufficient to validate and excuse Judge

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Domogtoys act of proceeding with the marriage ceremony. HELD: No. RATIO:1) Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides: "A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient. For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse." There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law. 2) In the case at bar, Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Pearanda. Whether wittingly, or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of Judge Domagtoy to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom.

Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. ISSUE 2: Whether Judge Domogtoy had authority to solemnize a marriage ceremony outside his courts jurisdiction. HELD: No. RATIO:1) Articles 7 of the Family Code provides: Art. 7. Marriage solemnized by: may be

(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction; x xxxxx xxx

Under Article 8 of the Family Code, , a marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in a remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario. 2)The elementary principle underlying these provisions is the authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Noncompliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage. A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place

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allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability. 3) Inasmuch as Judge Domogtoy's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigaodel Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, Judge Domogtoy again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law. 40.Araes v. Occiano April 11, 2002 PUNO, J.: FACTS:Mercedita Mata Araes charges Judge Salvador Occiano with Gross Ignorance of the Law via a sworn Letter-Complaint. JudgeOcciano is the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,Camarines Sur. Araes alleges that on 17 February 2000, Judge Occiano solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction. They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband passed away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, Araes right to inherit the vast properties left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy. Araes prays that sanctions be imposed against Judge Occiano for his illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations which allegedly

caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings. ISSUE:Whether Judge administratively liable. HELD:Yes. RATIO:1) Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court. In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of Judge Occiano is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of Araes and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage. 2) Judge Occiano should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license. In People vs. Lara, the SC held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Judge Occiano did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of Araes. In this respect, Judge Occiano acted in gross ignorance of the law. OCA v. Necessario and Anonuevo v. Jalandoni. Ito muna guys, send ko later ung iba. Paxenxa late na naging busy lang ako kagabe and today. Sorry Sorry 41. OCA v. Judge Necessario, et al. Occiano is

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Facts: In this case, the OCA created an audit team in order to investigate the alleged irregularities alleged irregularities in the solemnization of marriages in several branches of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) and Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City. As part of their investigation, two lawyers of the OCA went undercover in order to inquire how swift it was to get married within the Palace of Justice in Cebu City. The investigation found that the different branches of the MTC and RTC of Cebu City, through its court personnel, facilitates and fixes the process of obtaining swift marriages. The OCA found that the most of the marriages solemnized by respondent Judges were made questionable documents (i.e. joint affidavit of cohabitation, alterations in the marriage licenses) and solemnized without the required marriage licenses or pursuant to Art. 34 of the FC (exception to the license requirement). The OCA also found that the joint affidavit of cohabitation that were supposedly executed by the contracting parties, were pro forma. Thus, the OCA submitted a memorandum to the SC regarding the matter. Such memorandum was later treated by the SC as a formal administrative complaint against respondents. The OCA found respondent Judges Necessario, Acosta, and Rosales for gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and for gross ignorance of the law whereas Judge Tormis was found guilty for gross inefficency or neglect of duty. For their part, respondent Judges invoked the presumption of regularity of public documents and marriage licenses submitted to them. They argue that they are not duty bound to verify the authenticity of the documents submitted to them such as joint affidavits of cohabitation, marriage licenses, etc. Issue: Whether respondent judges are guilty of gross neglect of duty and gross ignorance of the law that would warrant their dismissal from service. Held: Yes. The Judges actions warrant their dismissal. First, Judges Necessario, Tormis and Rosales solemnized marriages even if the requirements submitted by the couples were incomplete and of questionable character. Most of these documents showed visible signs of tampering, erasures, corrections or superimpositions of entries related to the

parties place of residence. These included indistinguishable features such as the font, font size, and ink of the computerprinted entries in the marriage certificate and marriage license. These actions of the respondent judges constitute gross inefficiency. In Vega v. Asdala, the Court held that inefficiency implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance, and carelessness. Second, the judges were also found guilty of neglect of duty regarding the payment of solemnization fees. The Court, in Rodrigo-Ebron v. Adolfo, defined neglect of duty as the failure to give ones attention to a task expected of him and it is gross when, from the gravity of the offense or the frequency of instances, the offense is so serious in its character as to endanger or threaten public welfare. The marriage documents examined by the audit team show that corresponding official receipts for the solemnization fee were missing or payment by batches was made for marriages performed on different dates. The OCA emphasizes that the payment of the solemnization fee starts off the whole marriage application process and even puts a stamp of regularity on the process. Third, Judges Necessario, Tormis, and Rosales also solemnized marriages where a contracting party is a foreigner who did not submit a certificate of legal capacity to marry from his or her embassy. What the foreigners submitted were mere affidavits stating their capacity to marry. The irregularity in the certificates of legal capacity that are required under Article 21 of the Family Code displayed the gross neglect of duty of the judges. They should have been diligent in scrutinizing the documents required for the marriage license issuance. Any irregularities would have been prevented in the qualifications of parties to contract marriage. Fourth, Judges Necessario, Acosta, and Tormis are likewise guilty of gross ignorance of the law under Article 34 of the Family Code with respect to the marriages they solemnized where legal impediments existed during cohabitation such as the minority status of one party. The audit team cites in their Supplemental Report that there were parties whose ages ranged from eighteen (18) to twenty-two (22) years old who were married by mere submission of a pro forma joint affidavit of cohabitation. These affidavits were notarized by the solemnizing judge himself or herself.

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Finally, positive testimonies were also given regarding the solemnization of marriages of some couples where no marriage license was previously issued. The contracting parties were made to fill up the application for a license on the same day the marriage was solemnized. The Court does not accept the arguments of the respondent judges that the ascertainment of the validity of the marriage license is beyond the scope of the duty of a solemnizing officer especially when there are glaring pieces of evidence that point to the contrary. As correctly observed by the OCA, the presumption of regularity accorded to a marriage license disappears the moment the marriage documents do not appear regular on its face. The judges gross ignorance of the law is also evident when they solemnized marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code without the required qualifications and with the existence of legal impediments such as minority of a party. Marriages of exceptional character such as those made under Article 34 are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions as a general rule should be strictly but reasonably construed. The affidavits of cohabitation should not be issued and accepted pro forma particularly in view of the settled rulings of the Court on this matter. The five-year period of cohabitation should be one of a perfect union valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. The parties should have been capacitated to marry each other during the entire period and not only at the time of the marriage. *With regard to the court personnel, the SC only suspended them from the service. 42. MAY D. AONUEVO, ALEXANDER BLEE DESANTIS and JOHN DESANTIS NERI, , vs.INTESTATE ESTATE OF RODOLFO G. JALANDONI, represented by BERNARDINO G. JALANDONI as Special Administrator PEREZ, J.: Facts: This case involves the intestate estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni who died in 1966 without issue. On 28 April 1967, Bernardino G. Jalandoni (Bernardino), the brother of Rodolfo, filed a petition for the

issuance of letters of administration with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, to commence the judicial settlement of the latters estate. The petition was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 338 and is currently pending before the intestate court. The controversy of this case began when herein petitioners filed a manifestation with the intestate court praying that they be allowed to intervene in the intestate proceedings. They allege that the children of Sylvia Blee Desantis (Sylvia)who, in turn, was revealed to be the daughter of Isabel Blee (Isabel) with one John Desantis. Petitioners further allege that their grandmotherIsabel was, at the time of Rodolfos death, the legal spouse of the latter. For which reason, Isabel is entitled to a share in the estate of Rodolfo. To support their cause, the petitioners and their siblings appended in their Manifestation, the following documents: a.) Two (2) marriage certificates between Isabel and Rodolfo and b.) The birth certificate of their mother, Sylvia. However, Bernardino Jalandoni disputed the claims of petitioners. Bernardino argued that in Sylvias birth certificate, it provides that the latter is the legitimate child of Isabel and John Desantis. Thus, Sylvias birth certificate shows that Isabel was legally married to another thereby making Isabels alleged marriage to Rodolfo as one that is bigamous; hence, null and void. The intestate court granted petitioners manifestation. The intestate court gave a high probative value to the marriage certificates submitted by petitioners. Further, the intestate court held that the birth certificate of Sylvia was insufficient to prove that there was a previous marriage between Isabel and John Desantis. It ventured on the possibility that the entries in the birth record of Sylvia regarding her legitimacy and the status of her parents, may have been made only in order to save Isabel and her family from the social condemnation of having a child out of wedlock. Respondent filed an action for certiorari with the CA. The CA nullified the order allowing petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings of Rodolfo Jalandoni. Issue: Whether petitioners should be allowed to intervene in the intestate proceedings of Rodolfo Jalandoni; Whether the evidence presented by petitioners are sufficient to prove Isabels marriage to the decendent. Held: The SC emphasized that petitioners and their siblings failed to offer sufficient evidence to establish that Isabel was the legal spouse of Rodolfo. The very evidence

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of the petitioners and their siblings negates their claim that Isabel has interest in Rodolfos estate. Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage between Isabel and John Desantis was adequately established. This holds true notwithstanding the fact that no marriage certificate between Isabel and John Desantis exists on record. While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage.47 Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a persons birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents. In the present case, the birth certificate of Sylvia precisely serves as the competent evidence of marriage between Isabel and John Desantis. As mentioned earlier, it contains the following notable entries: (a) that Isabel and John Desantis were "married" and (b) that Sylvia is their "legitimate" child. In clear and categorical language, Sylvias birth certificate speaks of a subsisting marriage between Isabel and John Desantis. Pursuant to existing laws, the foregoing entries are accorded prima facie weight. They are presumed to be true. Hence, unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, they can, and will, stand as proof of the facts attested. In the case at bench, the petitioners and their siblings offered no such rebuttal. The petitioners did no better than to explain away the entries in Sylvias birth certificate as untruthful statements made only in order to "save face." They urge this Court to take note of a "typical" practice among unwed Filipino couples to concoct the illusion of marriage and make it appear that a child begot by them is legitimate. That, the Court cannot countenance. 43. Miguel Tabalingcos G. Villatuya v. Atty.

Registrar General-National Statistics Office (NSO) certifying that Bede S. Tabalingcos, herein respondent, contracted marriage thrice: first, on 15 July 1980 with Pilar M. Lozano, which took place in Dasmarinas, Cavite; the second time on 28 September 1987 with Ma. Rowena Garcia Pion in the City of Manila; and the third on 07 September 1989 with Mary Jane Elgincolin Paraiso in Ermita, Manila. Subsequently, complainant presented three (3) marriage contracts proving that respondent contracted the three marriages above mentioned. For his part, respondent asserted that he filed Petitions with the RTC to Declare Null and Void his 1st and 2nd marriages. Respondent argues that the resolution of the disbarment case against would be premature considering the pendency of the said petitions. Issue: Whether respondent is guilty of gross immorality on the ground of bigamy. Held: Yes. The SC emphasized that for purposes of disbarment proceedings, Marriage Contracts bearing the name of respondent are competent and convincing evidence proving that he committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the bar. The documents were certified by the NSO, which is the official repository of civil registry records pertaining to the birth, marriage and death of a person. Having been issued by a government agency, the NSO certification is accorded much evidentiary weight and carries with it a presumption of regularity. In this case, respondent has not presented any competent evidence to rebut those documents. According to the respondent, after the discovery of the second and the third marriages, he filed civil actions to annul the Marriage Contracts. We perused the attached Petitions for Annulment and found that his allegations therein treated the second and the third marriage contracts as ordinary agreements, rather than as special contracts contemplated under the then Civil Code provisions on marriage. He did not invoke any grounds in the Civil Code provisions on marriage, prior to its amendment by the Family Code. Respondents regard for marriage contracts as ordinary agreements indicates either his wanton disregard of the sanctity of marriage or his gross ignorance of the law on what course of action to take to annul a marriage under the old Civil Code provisions.

Facts: The case involves a complaint for the disbarment of Atty. Tabalingcos, which was filed by herein petitioner. The complaint charged Atty. Tabalingcos for gross immorality for having contracted a second and third marriage while his first marriage was still subsisting. In order to prove his claim, complainant Villatuya submitted a Certification dated 13 July 2005 issued by the Office of the Civil

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Respondent Disbarred. 44. Ablaza v. Republic of the Philippines Facts: In this case, petitioner Ablaza filed an action for the declaration of nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother Cresenciano Ablaza from Leonilia Honato, which was solemnized under the regime of the Old Civil Code. Petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated without a marriage license and thus, void ab initio. He argued that because his brother died without issue, such entitled him to one half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death thereby making him a real party in interest capacitating him to impugn the validity of his brothers marriage. However, the RTC dismissed his petition on the ground that he is not a party to the marriage; thus, not the proper party to file the action. CA affirmed the RTCs decision. Issue: Whether petition can be allowed to file an action for the declaration of nullity of his brothers marriage. Held: SC held yes. The SC clarified that the rule provided under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (AM 02-11-10-SC), which took effect on March 15, 2003, limiting the husband or the wife as the only proper parties allowed to file for the declaration of nullity of a void marriage extends only to marriages covered by the family code and only to marriages commenced after the effectivity of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Thus, those commenced before March 15, 2003 are not covered by the said rule. Before the said AM took effect, the prevailing jurisprudence provides that a marriage considered as void ab initio could be attacked either directly or collaterally in any civil court between any parties at any time provided that the party seeking the nullification must be a party who stands to be benefited by the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. In the case at bar, petitioner stands to be benefited by the suit considering the allegations that his brother died intestate and without issue; thus, making him an heir to his brothers estate. 45. Juliano-Llave v. Republic Facts: In this case, herein petitioner was married to the late Sen. Tamano in 1993. A year after, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamanos legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites and under the New Civil Code, and that this marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993. For her part, petitioner contends that the marriage of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda had already been dissolved through a divorce pursuant to PD 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws. Further, petitioner asserts that the validity of her marriage with Sen. Tamano can only be assailed the husband or the wife pursuant to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; in otherwords, it is only petitioner that can assail the validity of her marriage with the late Senator. Issue: 1. Whether the marriage between Sen. Tamano and Zorayda is governed by the Code of Muslim Personal Laws; 2. Whether AM No. 02-11-10-SC applies to the case at bar. Held 1: The marriage between Sen. Tamano and Zorayda is governed by the New Civil Code. The marriage between the late senator and Zorayda was solemnized before the effectivity of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws; thus, the only applicable law vis a vis marriages is the New Civil Code in which divorce is not recognized (There was a divorce law, R.A. 394 which was not availed of by Sen. Tamano and Zorayda during its effectivity). Thus, Sen. Tamano and Zoraydas marriage was still subsisting at the time the former married herein petitioner. Held 2: AM No. 02-11-10-SC can only apply prospectively; thus, it does not apply to cases already commenced on March 15, 2003. Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity of Estrellitas marriage in November 1994. While the Family Code is silent with respect to the proper party who can file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it

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has been held that in a void marriage, in which no marriage has taken place and cannot be the source of rights, any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply, Adib, as one of the children of the deceased who has property rights as an heir, is likewise considered to be the real party in interest in the suit he and his mother had filed since both of them stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit. 46. Ilupa v. Abdullah Facts: In this case, complainant Sultan Pandagaranao A.Ilupa and his wife executed a kapasadahan or a divorce agreement. Subsequently, complainants wife applied for a Certificate of Divorce in which respondent (as the Clerk Of Court of the Sharia Court, Marawi City) granted and issued. As a result of such issuance, petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for abuse of authority. Complainant argues that the Certificate of Divorce should not have been issued because divorce is not recognized by the laws of Philippines and that such was based on an invalid Kapasadahan (Ilupa alleged that his consent was vitiated because his life was being threatened when he executed the said agreement). For his part, respondent argued that divorce is valid and applicable in the Muslim law. Further, respondent contended that he issued the Certificate of Divorce because it was his ministerial duty to do so. Issue: Whether the Certificate Divorce was validly issued. of

dower agreed upon), divorce or revocation of divorce and conversion and such other documents presented to him for registration; 47. Carlos VS. Sandoval 48. CYNTHIA S. BOLOS vs. DANILO T. BOLOS G.R. No. 186400 2010 Facts: On July 10, 2003, Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code. After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment. A copy of said decision was received by Danilo. He timely filed the Notice of Appeal. In an order, the RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilos failure to file the required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. A motion to reconsider the denial of Danilos appeal was likewise denied. The RTC issued the order declaring its decision final and executory and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia. Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the orders of the RTC as they were rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. Danilo prayed that he be declared psychologically capacitated to render the essential marital obligations to Cynthia, who should be declared guilty of abandoning him, the family home and their children. CA: The CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC. The appellate court stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took effect. It relied on the ruling of this Court in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli to the effect that the "coverage [of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC] extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988." Cynthia sought reconsideration of the ruling for Partial Reconsideration. The October 20,

Held: Yes. The issuance of a certificate of divorce is within the respondents duties, as defined by law. Articles 81 and 83 of the Muslim Code of the Philippines provide: Article 81. District Registrar. - The Clerk of Court of the Sharia District Court shall, in addition to his regular functions, act as District Registrar of Muslim Marriages, Divorces, Revocations of Divorces, and Conversions within the territorial jurisdiction of said court. The Clerk of Court of the Sharia Circuit Court shall act as Circuit Registrar of Muslim Marriages, Divorces, Revocations of Divorces, and Conversations within his jurisdiction. Article 83. Duties of Circuit Registrar. Every Circuit Registrar shall: a) File every certificate of marriage (which shall specify the nature and amount of the

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CA, however, appealed. Issue:

denied.

Hence,

Cynthia

covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for application.As the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. Ruling: The Court finds the petition devoid of merit. WHEREFORE, DENIED. the petition is

Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10SC entitled "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages," is applicable to the case. Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 0211-10-SC is also applicable to marriages solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code. Cyhthia argued that CA erred when it anchored its decision to an obiter dictum in the aforecited Enrico case, which did not even involve a marriage solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code. She added that, even assuming arguendo that the pronouncement in the said case constituted a decision on its merits, still the same cannot be applied because of the substantial disparity in the factual milieu of the Enrico case from this case. In the said case, both the marriages sought to be declared null were solemnized, and the action for declaration of nullity was filed, after the effectivity of both the Family Code in 1988 and of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC in 2003. In this case, the marriage was solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code and A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC while the action was filed and decided after the effectivity of both. Held: Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 0211-10-SC governs this case. Her stance is unavailing. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads: Section 1. Scope This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines. The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily. The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages

49. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005 Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law? In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision of the RTC of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution denying the MR. The court a quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. Facts: On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva. In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied. In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE

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OSG: The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation. Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination. Orbecido: For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law. Issue: Whether or not Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply to the case of respondent? Held: Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in the first place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment? Brief Historical Background On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states: All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38. On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides: ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid

in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied) Legislative Intent Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization? The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals. In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry. Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them

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becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent. If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26. In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: 1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and 2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. Ruling: In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry. We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by respondent

concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondents wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence. Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondents bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondents submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor. 50. MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN vs. LOUELLA A. CATALANLEE G. R. No. 183622 2012 February 8,

Petition for Review assailing the CA Decision and Resolution regarding the issuance of letters of administration of the intestate estate of Orlando B. Catalan. Facts: Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a divorce in the United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second marriage with petitioner herein. On 18 November 2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines. Thereafter, on 28 February 2005, petitioner filed with the RTC of Dagupan City a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Orlando (Spec. Proc. No. 228). On 3 March 2005, while Spec. Proc. No. 228 was pending, respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC (Spec. Proc. No. 232). The two cases were subsequently consolidated. Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 232 on the ground of litis pendentia, considering that Spec. Proc. No. 228 covering the same estate was already pending.

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On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested person qualified to file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Orlando. In support of her contention, respondent alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed against petitioner before Branch 54 of the RTC of Alaminos, Pangasinan, and docketed as Crim. Case No. 2699-A. Apparently, Felicitas Amor filed a Complaint for bigamy, alleging that petitioner contracted a second marriage to Orlando despite having been married to one Eusebio Bristol. On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted petitioner of bigamy. The trial court ruled that since the deceased was a divorced American citizen, and since that divorce was not recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage between him and petitioner was not valid. RTC: On 26 June 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan dismissed the Petition for the issuance of letters of administration filed by petitioner and granted that of private respondent. Contrary to its findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the RTC held that the marriage between petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was valid and subsisting when she married Orlando (therefore, petitioner is guilty of bigamy). Thus, the trial court held that petitioner was not an interested party who may file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration. After the subsequent denial of her MR, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA via her Petition for Certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in dismissing her Petition for the issuance of letters of administration. Petitioner reiterated before the CA that the Petition filed by respondent should have been dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia. She also insisted that, while a petition for letters of administration may have been filed by an "uninterested person," the defect was cured by the appearance of a real party-in-interest. CA: On 18 October 2007, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision. As to the issue of litis pendentia, the CA found it not applicable in the case. The CA also ruled that the petitioner, armed with a marriage certificate, filed her petition for letters of administration. As a spouse, the petitioner would have been preferred to administer the estate of Orlando B. Catalan. However, a marriage certificate, like any other public document, is only prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. The fact that the petitioner had been charged with bigamy and was acquitted has not been disputed by the petitioner. The deduction of

the trial court that the acquittal of the petitioner in the said case negates the validity of her subsequent marriage with Orlando B. Catalan has not been disproved by her. There was not even an attempt from the petitioner to deny the findings of the trial court. Thus, not being an interested party and a stranger to the estate of Orlando B. Catalan, the dismissal of her petition for letters of administration by the trial court is in place. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this Decision. On 20 June 2008, the CA denied her motion. Hence, this Petition. Issue: Whether the subsequent marriage of Orlando and petitioner is valid and thus, making the petitioner an interested party in the petition for letters of administration. Held: First, it seems that the RTC in the special proceedings failed to appreciate the finding of the RTC in Crim. Case No. 2699-A that petitioner was never married to Eusebio Bristol. Thus, the trial court concluded that, because petitioner was acquitted of bigamy, it follows that the first marriage with Bristol still existed and was valid. By failing to take note of the findings of fact on the nonexistence of the marriage between petitioner and Bristol, both the RTC and CA held that petitioner was not an interested party in the estate of Orlando. Second, it is imperative to note that at the time the bigamy case in Crim. Case No. 2699-A was dismissed, we had already ruled that under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. This doctrine was established as early as 1985 in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. wherein we said: It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces[,] the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. xxx

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We reiterated this principle Llorente v. Court of Appeals, to wit:

in

reception of evidence to establish the fact of divorce. Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent marriage, she has the preferential right to be issued the letters of administration over the estate. Otherwise, letters of administration may be issued to respondent, who is undisputedly the daughter or next of kin of the deceased, in accordance with Sec. 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court. Ruling: Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to ascertain the rightful party to be issued the letters of administration over the estate of Orlando B. Catalan. Petition was partially granted. The Decision and Resolution of the CA were set aside and the case was remanded to the RTC for the determination of the validity of the divorce. 51. GERBERT R. CORPUZ vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS G.R. No. 186571 2010 August 11,

In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law. Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals, that once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could "very well lose her right to inherit" from him. Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven as we have enunciated in Garcia v. Recio, to wit: Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the rules on evidence must be demonstrated. It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of Orlandos divorce under the laws of the United States and the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there is a need to remand the proceedings to the trial court for further

Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision of the RTC of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Facts: Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization. On January 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce, which was granted and took effect a month later. Two years after the divorce, Gerbert met another Filipina. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be

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judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts. RTC: In its October 30, 2008 decision, the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law. This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III; the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." Issue: Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree. Held 1: The alien spouse can claim no right under the 2nd paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse. Through the 2nd paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law this Courts holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. In both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouses assertion of marital rights after a foreign courts divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign

divorce had already severed the marital bond between the spouses. Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision. The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. Section 48, Rule 39 provides: The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows: Xxx (b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by subsequent title. xxx. To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law.

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In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law. Held 2: The Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the decree. The recording is legally improper. Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a persons legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not." A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a persons legal capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry. But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decrees registration.

The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert. Held 3: Another point is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry. Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located; that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the proceedings; and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation. As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry one for recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is

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precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the decision of the RTC Laoag City, Branch 11. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. 52. ROSALINO L. MARABLE vs. MYRNA F. MARABLE G.R. No. 178741 2011 Facts: Petitioner and respondent met in 1967 while studying at Arellano University. On December 19, 1970, petitioner and respondent eloped and were married in civil rites at Tanay, Rizal before Mayor Esguerra. A church wedding followed on December 30, 1970 at the Chapel of the Muntinlupa Bilibid Prison and their marriage was blessed with five children. As the years went by, however, their marriage turned sour. Verbal and physical quarrels became common occurrences. They fought incessantly and petitioner became unhappy because of it. Longing for peace, love and affection, petitioner developed a relationship with another woman. Respondent learned about the affair, and petitioner promptly terminated it. But despite the end of the short-lived affair, their quarrels aggravated. Also, their business ventures failed. Any amount of respect remaining between them was further eroded by their frequent arguments and verbal abuses infront of their friends. Petitioner felt that he was unloved, unwanted and unappreciated and this made him indifferent towards respondent. When he could not bear his lot any longer, petitioner left the family home and stayed with his sister in Antipolo City. He gave up all the properties which he and respondent had accumulated during their marriage in favor of respondent and their children. Later, he converted to Islam after dating several women. On October 8, 2001, petitioner decided to sever his marital bonds. On said date, he filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent on the ground of his January 17,

psychological incapacity to perform the essential responsibilities of marital life. In support of his petition, petitioner presented the Psychological Report of Dr. Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical psychologist from the National Center for Mental Health. Dr. Tayags report stated that petitioner is suffering from "Antisocial Personality Disorder," characterized by a pervasive pattern of social deviancy, rebelliousness, impulsivity, self-centeredness, deceitfulness and lack of remorse. The report also revealed that petitioners personality disorder is rooted in deep feelings of rejection starting from the family to peers, and that his experiences have made him so self-absorbed for needed attention. It was Dr. Tayags conclusion that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision annulling petitioners marriage to respondent on the ground of petitioners psychological incapacity. Upon appeal by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the CA reversed the RTC decision CA: The CA held that the circumstances related by petitioner are insufficient to establish the existence of petitioners psychological incapacity. The CA noted that Dr. Tayag did not fully explain the root cause of the disorder nor did she give a concrete explanation as to how she arrived at a conclusion as to its gravity or permanence. The appellate court emphasized that the root cause of petitioners psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. In addition, the incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the petitioner to assume the essential obligations of marriage. On July 4, 2007, the CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal. Issue: Whether or not petitioner psychologically incapacitated. is

Petitioner claims that his psychological incapacity to perform his essential marital obligations was clearly proven and correctly appreciated by the trial court. Petitioner relies heavily on the psychological evaluation conducted by Dr. Tayag. filed The Republic, through the OSG, a Comment maintaining that

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petitioner failed to prove his psychological incapacity. The OSG points out that Dr. Tayag failed to explain specifically how she arrived at the conclusion that petitioner suffers from an anti-social personality disorder and that it is grave and incurable. Held: The appeal has no merit. The appellate court did not err when it reversed and set aside the findings of the RTC for lack of legal and factual bases. Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, provides: Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. These are the disorders that result in the utter insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party to give meaning and significance to the marriage he or she has contracted. Psychological incapacity must refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36. The Court held, (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.1avvphi1 (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. In the instant case, petitioner completely relied on the psychological examination conducted by Dr. Tayag on him to establish his psychological incapacity. The result of the examination and the findings of Dr. Tayag however, are insufficient to establish petitioner's psychological incapacity. In cases of annulment of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, the psychological illness and its root cause must be proven to exist from the inception of the marriage. Here, the appellate court correctly ruled that the report of Dr. Tayag failed to explain the root cause of petitioners alleged psychological incapacity. The evaluation of Dr. Tayag merely made a general conclusion that petitioner is suffering from an Anti-social Personality Disorder but there was no factual basis stated for the finding that petitioner is a socially deviant person, rebellious, impulsive, self-centered and deceitful. As held in the case of Suazo v. Suazo, the presentation of expert proof in cases for declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and an in-depth assessment of the parties by the

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psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. Here, the evaluation of Dr. Tayag falls short of the required proof which the Court can rely on as basis to declare as void petitioners marriage to respondent. In fact, we are baffled by Dr. Tayags evaluation which became the trial courts basis for concluding that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated, for the report did not clearly specify the actions of petitioner which are indicative of his alleged psychological incapacity. More importantly, there was no established link between petitioners acts to his alleged psychological incapacity. It is indispensable that the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. Ruling: All told, we find that the CA did not err in declaring the marriage of petitioner and respondent as valid and subsisting. The totality of the evidence presented is insufficient to establish petitioners psychological incapacity to fulfill his essential marital obligations. WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the CA and its Resolution are AFFIRMED. 53. JOSE REYNALDO B. OCHOSA vs. BONA J. ALANO G.R. No. 167459 2011 Facts: It appears that Jose met Bona in August 1973 when he was a young lieutenant in the AFP while the latter was a seventeen-year-old first year college dropout. They had a whirlwind romance that culminated into sexual intimacy and eventual marriage on 27 October 1973 before the Judge Principe in Basilan. In 1976, they found an abandoned and neglected one-year-old baby girl whom they later registered as their daughter, naming her Ramona Celeste Alano Ochosa. During their marriage, Jose was often assigned to various parts of the Philippine archipelago as an officer in the AFP. Bona did not cohabit with him in his posts, preferring to stay in her hometown of Basilan. Neither did Bona visit him in his areas of assignment, except in one (1) occasion when Bona stayed with him for four (4) days. Sometime in 1985, Jose was January 26,

appointed as the Battalion Commander of the Security Escort Group. He and Bona, along with Ramona, were given living quarters at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City where they resided with their military aides. In 1987, Jose was charged with rebellion for his alleged participation in the failed coup detat. He was incarcerated in Camp Crame. It appears that Bona was an unfaithful spouse. Even at the onset of their marriage when Jose was assigned in various parts of the country, she had illicit relations with other men. Bona apparently did not change her ways when they lived together at Fort Bonifacio; she entertained male visitors in her bedroom whenever Jose was out of their living quarters. On one occasion, Bona was caught by Demetrio Bajet y Lita, a security aide, having sex with Joses driver, Corporal Gagarin. Rumors of Bonas sexual infidelity circulated in the military community. When Jose could no longer bear these rumors, he got a military pass from his jail warden and confronted Bona. During their confrontation, Bona admitted her relationship with Corporal Gagarin who also made a similar admission to Jose. Jose drove Bona away from their living quarters. Bona left with Ramona and went to Basilan. Jose filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, seeking to nullify his marriage to Bona on the ground of the latters psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage. Trial on the merits of the case ensued. Petitioner along with his two military aides, testified about respondents marital infidelity during the marriage. The fourth and final witness was Elizabeth E. Rondain, a psychiatrist, who testified that after conducting several tests, she reached the conclusion that respondent was suffering from histrionic personality disorder. According to Rondain, respondents psychological disorder was traceable to her family history, having for a father a gambler and a womanizer and a mother who was a battered wife. There was no possibility of a cure since respondent does not have an insight of what is happening to her and refused to acknowledge the reality. With the conclusion of the witnesses testimonies, petitioner formally offered his evidence and rested his case. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submitted its opposition to the petition on the ground that "the factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards required to

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decree a nullity of marriage (Santos v. CA, 240 SCRA 20 [1995])." In a Decision dated 11 January 1999, the trial court granted the petition and nullified the parties marriage. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the said ruling to the CA and ruled that the trial court erred in granting the petition despite Joses abject failure to discharge the burden of proving the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Bona, to comply with the essential marital obligations. Thus, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court Decision. Jose filed a MR but this was denied by the Court of Appeals for lack of merit. Hence, this Petition. Issue: Whether or not Bona should be deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. Held: The petition is without merit. The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage which Jose filed in the trial court hinges on Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit: A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. In the landmark case of Santos v. Court of Appeals, we observed that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. Soon after, incorporating the three basic requirements of psychological incapacity as mandated in Santos, we laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state. The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity. (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

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(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outburst" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Article 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such noncomplied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature." Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void. This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation. (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. (Citations omitted.) In Marcos v. Marcos, we previously held that the foregoing guidelines do not require that a

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physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the partys psychological condition. For, indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. It is also established in jurisprudence that from these requirements arise the concept that Article 36 of the Family Code does not really dissolve a marriage; it simply recognizes that there never was any marriage in the first place because the affliction already then existing was so grave and permanent as to deprive the afflicted party of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was to assume or had assumed. A little over a decade since the promulgation of the Molina guidelines, we made a critical assessment of the same in Ngo Te v. Yu-Te, to wit: In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSGs exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said individuals. However, our critique did not mean that we had declared an abandonment of the Molina doctrine. On the contrary, we simply declared and, thus, clarified in the same Te case that there is a need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of

petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. Furthermore, we reiterated in the same case the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a caseto-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals. Ruling: In the case at bar, the trial court granted the petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the basis of Dr. Elizabeth Rondains testimony and her psychiatric evaluation report as well as the individual testimonies of Jose and his military aides. We are sufficiently convinced, after a careful perusal of the evidence presented in this case, that Bona had been, on several occasions with several other men, sexually disloyal to her spouse, Jose. Likewise, we are persuaded that Bona had indeed abandoned Jose. However, we cannot apply the same conviction to Joses thesis that the totality of Bonas acts constituted psychological incapacity as determined by Article 36 of the Family Code. There is inadequate credible evidence that her "defects" were already present at the inception of, or prior to, the marriage. In other words, her alleged psychological incapacity did not satisfy the jurisprudential requisite of "juridical antecedence." Verily, Dr. Rondain evaluated Bonas psychological condition indirectly from the information gathered solely from Jose and his witnesses. This factual circumstance evokes the possibility that the information fed to the psychiatrist is tainted with bias for Joses cause, in the absence of sufficient corroboration. We have previously held that, in employing a rigid and stringent level of evidentiary scrutiny to cases like this, we do not suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated is mandatory; jurisprudence holds that this type of examination is not a mandatory requirement. While such examination is desirable, we recognize that it may not be practical in all instances given the oftentimes estranged relations between the parties. For a determination though of a partys complete personality profile, information coming from persons with personal knowledge of the juridical antecedents may be helpful. This is an

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approach in the application of Article 36 that allows flexibility, at the same time that it avoids, if not totally obliterate, the credibility gaps spawned by supposedly expert opinion based entirely on doubtful sources of information. However, we have also ruled in past decisions that to make conclusions and generalizations on a spouses psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side, similar to what we have pointed out in the case at bar, is, to the Courts mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence. While we are not insensitive to petitioners suffering in view of the truly appalling and shocking behavior of his wife, still, we are bound by judicial precedents regarding the evidentiary requirements in psychological incapacity cases that must be applied to the present case. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. 54. CYNTHIA E. YAMBAO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 184063 2011 Facts: Petitioner and respondent were married on December 21, 1968 at the Philamlife Church in Quezon City. On July 11, 2003, after 35 years of marriage, petitioner filed a Petition before the RTC, Makati City, praying that the marriage be declared null and void by reason of respondents psychological incapacity, pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. In her petition before the RTC, petitioner narrated that, since the beginning, her and respondents married life had been marred by bickering, quarrels, and recrimination due to the latters inability to comply with the essential obligations of married life. RTC: On February 9, 2007, the RTC rendered a decisiondismissing the petition for lack of merit. The RTC held that petitioners evidence failed to support her argument that respondent was totally unaware of and incapacitated to perform his marital obligations such that the marriage was void from the beginning. The court said that, even as petitioner claimed to be unhappy in the marriage, it is incontrovertible that the union lasted for over thirty years and the parties were able to raise three children into adulthood January 24,

without suffering any major parenting problems. The court also noted that respondent was faithful to petitioner and never physically abused her. Likewise, when the parties lived with petitioners parents, respondent got along well enough with her family. The RTC also rejected the supposed negative effect of respondents Dependent Personality Disorder. The RTC said that, although the evidence tended to show that respondent would unduly rely upon petitioner to earn a living for the family, there was no evidence to show that the latter resented such imposition or suffered with the additional financial burdens passed to her by her husband. On the contrary, the RTC averred that, despite a supposedly horrible married life, petitioner was able to rise in the ranks in her company and buy properties with hardly any help from respondent. The RTC concluded that while respondent might have been deficient in providing financial support, his presence, companionship, and love allowed petitioner to accomplish many things. Thus, respondent could be relied on for love, fidelity, and moral support, which are obligations expected of a spouse under Article 68 of the Family Code. Petitioners MR was denied, she then appealed to the CA. CA: In a Decision, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision. The CA held that petitioner failed to show that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. The CA held that the fact that the parties lived together for 35 years and raised three children well, and the fact that respondent never physically abused petitioner belied the formers psychological incapacity. The CA also held that respondents refusal to care for the children was not psychological incapacity but "merely constituted refusal to perform the task," which is not equivalent to an incapacity or inability. Lastly, the CA found the report of expert witness Dr. Edgardo Juan Tolentino (Dr. Tolentino) to be unsupported by sufficient evidence since the findings therein were not corroborated by any other witness. Petitioners subsequent denied. Hence the petition. Issue: Whether petitioner failed to show the psychological incapacity of the respondent to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Does the totality of petitioners evidence establish respondents MR was

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psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage? Held: The petition has no merit and, perforce, must be denied. Article 36 of the Family Code states: Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. Preliminarily, the Court reiterates its recent pronouncement that each case for declaration of nullity under the foregoing provision must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections, or generalizations, but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals. Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and experience. While the Court has not abandoned the standard set in Molina, the Court has reiterated the tenet that the factual milieu of each case must be treated as distinct and, as such, each case must be decided based on its own set of facts. In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. These guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. Hence, the issue in this case can be summed up, thus: Does the totality of petitioners evidence establish respondents psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage? The Court holds that it does not.

The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Thus, for a marriage to be annulled under Article 36 of the Family Code, the psychologically incapacitated spouse must be shown to suffer no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes him or her to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. In this case, there is no showing that respondent was suffering from a psychological condition so severe that he was unaware of his obligations to his wife and family. On the contrary, respondents efforts, though few and far between they may be, showed an understanding of his duty to provide for his family, albeit he did not meet with much success. Whether his failure was brought about by his own indolence or irresponsibility, or by some other external factors, is not relevant. What is clear is that respondent, in showing an awareness to provide for his family, even with his many failings, does not suffer from psychological incapacity. Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will. This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness. That respondent, according to petitioner, "lack[ed] effective sense of rational judgment and responsibility"does not mean he is incapable to meet his marital obligations. His refusal to help care for the children, his neglect for his business ventures, and his alleged unbearable jealousy may indicate some emotional turmoil or mental difficulty, but none have been shown to amount to a psychological abnormality. Moreover, even respondents faults assuming amount that to

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psychological incapacity, it has not been established that the same existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage. In his psychological report, Dr. Tolentino merely said, "[b]ecause ones personality or character is formed early in life, it has a clear ANTECEDENT and it has an enduring pattern of inner experience that deviates from the expectations of the individuals culture," without explaining this antecedent. Even petitioner, in her allegations, never explained how the alleged psychological incapacity manifested itself prior to or at the time of the celebration of their marriage. To be sure, respondent, perhaps with a little more effort on his part, could have been more helpful and could have made life that much easier for his wife. The fact that he did not, however, does not mean that he is psychologically incapacitated to discharge his marital obligations, as to give the Court a reason to declare the marriage null and void. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. 55. G.R. No. 168335 2011 June 6,

Juvy did not want to wake up early; Juvy often left their child to their neighbors care; and Christopher almost got lost in the market when Juvy brought him there. Aside from his testimony, the respondent also presented Anna Liza S. Guiang, a psychologist, who testified that she conducted a psychological test on the respondent. According to her, she wrote Juvy a letter requesting for an interview, but the latter did not respond. Psychological Test conducted on client Nestor Galang resembles an emotionallymatured individual. The incapacity of the defendant is manifested [in] such a manner that the defendant-wife: (1) being very irresponsible and very lazy and doesnt manifest any sense of responsibility; (2) her involvement in gambling activities such as mahjong and kuwaho; (3) being an estafador which exhibits her behavioral and personality disorders; (4) her neglect and show no care attitude towards her husband and child; (5) her immature and rigid behavior; (6) her lack of initiative to change and above all, the fact that she is unable to perform her marital obligations as a loving, responsible and caring wife to her family. There are just few reasons to believe that the defendant is suffering from incapacitated mind and such incapacity appears to be incorrigible. The RTC nullified the parties marriage in its decision of January 22, 2001. The petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA, in its decision dated November 25, 2004, affirmed the RTC decision in toto. Issue: Whether there is basis to nullify the respondents marriage to Juvy on the ground that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, Juvy suffered from psychological incapacity that prevented her from complying with her essential marital obligations. Held: The totality of the respondents evidence the testimonies of the respondent and the psychologist, and the latters psychological report and evaluation insufficient to prove Juvys psychological

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. NESTOR GALANG, Respondent. Facts: In 1994, Juvy and Nestor contracted marriage in Pampanga. Nestor is working in Clark Development Corporation while Juvy stays at home as housewife. On August 4, 1999, the respondent filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Juvy, under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. He alleged that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage, as she was a kleptomaniac and a swindler. He claimed that Juvy stole his ATM card and his parents money, and often asked money from their friends and relatives on the pretext that Christopher was confined in a hospital. According to the respondent, Juvy suffers from "mental deficiency, innate immaturity, distorted discernment and total lack of care, love and affection [towards him and their] child." He posited that Juvys incapacity was "extremely serious" and "appears to be incurable." The respondent alleged that he was the one who prepared their breakfast because

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incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. The respondents testimony merely showed that Juvy: (a) refused to wake up early to prepare breakfast; (b) left their child to the care of their neighbors when she went out of the house; (c) squandered a huge amount of the P15,000.00 that the respondent entrusted to her; (d) stole the respondents ATM card and attempted to withdraw the money deposited in his account; (e) falsified the respondents signature in order to encash a check; (f) made up false stories in order to borrow money from their relatives; and (g) indulged in gambling. Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. The respondents testimony failed to show that Juvys condition is a manifestation of a disordered personality rooted in some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition that rendered her unable to discharge her essential marital obligation. In this light, the acts attributed to Juvy only showed indications of immaturity and lack of sense of responsibility, resulting in nothing more than the difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations. In Ricardo B. Toring v. Teresita M. Toring,35 we emphasized that irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity, as these may only be due to a person's difficulty, refusal or neglect to undertake the obligations of marriage that is not rooted in some psychological illness that Article 36 of the Family Code addresses. The submitted psychological report hardly helps the respondents cause, as it glaringly failed to establish that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital duties at the material time required by Article 36 of the Family Code. To begin with, the psychologist admitted in her report that she derived her conclusions exclusively from the information given her by the respondent. Separately from the lack of the requisite factual basis, the psychologists report simply stressed Juvys negative traits which she considered manifestations of Juvys psychological incapacity (e.g., laziness, immaturity and irresponsibility; her involvement in swindling and gambling activities; and her lack of

initiative to change), and declared that "psychological findings tend to confirm that the defendant suffers from personality and behavioral disorders x x x she doesnt manifest any sense of responsibility and loyalty, and these disorders appear to be incorrigible." The psychologists court testimony fared no better in proving the juridical antecedence, gravity or incurability of Juvys alleged psychological defect as she merely reiterated what she wrote in her report. She, likewise, failed to successfully prove the elements of gravity and incurability.1wphi1 In these respects, she merely stated that despite the respondents efforts to show love and affection, Juvy was hesitant to change. To be declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to change is another. To hark back to what we earlier discussed, psychological incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. 56. G.R. No. 175367 2011 June 6,

DANILO A. AURELIO, Petitioner, vs. VIDA MA. CORAZON P. AURELIO, Respondent. Facts: Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio respondent Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio married on March 23, 1988. They two sons, namely: Danilo Miguel Danilo Gabriel. and were have and

On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 94, a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.4 In her petition, respondent alleged that both she and petitioner were psychologically incapacitated of performing and complying with their respective essential marital obligations. In addition, respondent alleged that such state of psychological incapacity was present prior and even during the time of the marriage ceremony. Hence, respondent prays that her marriage be declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

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The said petition alleged, inter alia, that both husband and wife are psychologically incapable of performing and complying with their essential marital obligations. Said psychological incapacity was existing prior and at the time of the marriage. Said psychological incapacity was manifested by lack of financial support from the husband; his lack of drive and incapacity to discern the plight of his working wife. The husband exhibited consistent jealousy and distrust towards his wife. His moods alternated between hostile defiance and contrition. He refused to assist in the maintenance of the family. He refused to foot the household bills and provide for his familys needs. He exhibited arrogance. He was completely insensitive to the feelings of his wife. He liked to humiliate and embarrass his wife even in the presence of their children. Vida Aurelio, on the other hand, is effusive and displays her feelings openly and freely. Her feelings change very quickly from joy to fury to misery to despair, depending on her day-to-day experiences. Her tolerance for boredom was very low. She was emotionally immature; she cannot stand frustration or disappointment. She cannot delay to gratify her needs. She gets upset when she cannot get what she wants. Selfindulgence lifts her spirits immensely. Their hostility towards each other distorted their relationship. Their incapacity to accept and fulfill the essential obligations of marital life led to the breakdown of their marriage. Private respondent manifested psychological aversion to cohabit with her husband or to take care of him. The psychological makeup of private respondent was evaluated by a psychologist, who found that the psychological incapacity of both husband and wife to perform their marital obligations is grave, incorrigible and incurable. Private respondent suffers from a Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic features; whereas petitioner suffers from passive aggressive (negativistic) personality disorder that renders him immature and irresponsible to assume the normal obligations of a marriage the RTC ruled that respondents petition for declaration of nullity of marriage complied with the requirements of the Molina doctrine, and whether or not the allegations are meritorious would depend upon the proofs presented by both parties during trial.

CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Issues: I. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED THE APPLICABLE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT HELD THAT THE ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF THE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE ARE SUFFICIENT FOR THE COURT TO DECLARE THE NULLITY OF THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN VIDA AND DANILO. II. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED THE APPLICABLE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONERS ACTION FOR CERTIORARI DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE DENIAL OF HIS MOTION TO DISMISS BY THE TRIAL COURT IS PATENTLY AND UTTERLY TAINTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION; AND THAT APPEAL IN DUE COURSE IS NOT A PLAIN, ADEQUATE OR SPEEDY REMEDY UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. Held: First, contrary to petitioners assertion, this Court finds that the root cause of psychological incapacity was stated and alleged in the complaint. We agree with the manifestation of respondent that the family backgrounds of both petitioner and respondent were discussed in the complaint as the root causes of their psychological incapacity. Moreover, a competent and expert psychologist clinically identified the same as the root causes. Second, the petition likewise alleged that the illness of both parties was of such grave a nature as to bring about a disability for them to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The psychologist reported that respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic Features. Petitioner, on the other hand, allegedly suffers from Passive Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality Disorder.lawph!1 The incapacity of both parties to perform their marital obligations was alleged to be grave, incorrigible and incurable. essential marital obligations that were not complied with were alleged in the petition. As can be easily gleaned from the totality of the petition, respondents

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allegations fall under Article 68 of the Family Code which states that "the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support." It bears to stress that whether or not petitioner and respondent are psychologically incapacitated to fulfill their marital obligations is a matter for the RTC to decide at the first instance. A perusal of the Molina guidelines would show that the same contemplate a situation wherein the parties have presented their evidence, witnesses have testified, and that a decision has been reached by the court after due hearing. Such process can be gleaned from guidelines 2, 6 and 8, which refer to a decision rendered by the RTC after trial on the merits. It would certainly be too burdensome to ask this Court to resolve at first instance whether the allegations contained in the petition are sufficient to substantiate a case for psychological incapacity. Let it be remembered that each case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.18 It would thus be more prudent for this Court to remand the case to the RTC, as it would be in the best position to scrutinize the evidence as well as hear and weigh the evidentiary value of the testimonies of the ordinary witnesses and expert witnesses presented by the parties. Finally, the CA properly dismissed petitioners petition. As a general rule, the denial of a motion to dismiss, which is an interlocutory order, is not reviewable by certiorari. Petitioners remedy is to reiterate the grounds in his motion to dismiss, as defenses in his answer to the petition for nullity of marriage, proceed trial and, in case of an adverse decision, appeal the decision in due time.21 The existence of that adequate remedy removed the underpinnings of his petition for certiorari in the CA.22

Facts: Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez (Malyn) met in 1973 and eventually married i 1976. The couple begot 4 children. Tyrone, after the birth of the last child, got involved in an extra-marital relationship with Jocelyn Quejano, who gave birth to a son in 1983. In 1985, Malyn left their conjugal home and her four children with Tyrone. Meanwhile, Tyrone started living with Jocelyn, who bore him three more children. In 1990, Tyrone went to the US together with Jocelyn and their four children and left his children with Malyn on the care of a househelp. The househelp would just call Malyn to take care of the children whenever any of them got sick. Also, in accordance with their custody agreement, the children stayed with Malyn on weekends. In 1994, the two elder children, Rio and Ria, asked for Malyns permission to go to Japan for a one-week vacation. Malyn acceded only to learn later that Tyrone brought the children to the US.10 After just one year, Ria returned to the Philippines and chose to live with Malyn. Meanwhile, Tyrone and Jocelyns family returned to the Philippines and resumed physical custody of the two younger children, Miggy and Jay. According to Malyn, from that time on, the children refused to go to her house on weekends because of alleged weekend plans with their father. On July 6, 1994, nine years since the de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. 12 He alleged that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform and comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of their marriage. He further claimed that her psychological incapacity was manifested by her immaturity and irresponsibility towards Tyrone and their children during their co-habitation, as shown by Malyns following acts: 1. she left the children without proper care and attention as she played mahjong all day and all night; 2. she left the house to party with male friends and returned in the early hours of the following day; and 3. she committed adultery on June 9, 1985, which act Tyrone discovered in flagrante delicto. Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr. Gates), and a

57. G.R. No. 166357 September 19, 2011 VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner, vs. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.

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Catholic canon law expert, Fr. Gerard Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy), to testify on Malyns psychological incapacity. Dr. Gates explained on the stand that the factual allegations regarding Malyns behavior her sexual infidelity, habitual mahjong playing, and her frequent nights-out with friends may reflect a narcissistic personality disorder (NPD).17 NPD is present when a person is obsessed to meet her wants and needs in utter disregard of her significant others.18 Malyns NPD is manifest in her utter neglect of her duties as a mother.19 Dr. Gates reported that Malyns personality disorder "may have been evident even prior to her marriage" because it is rooted in her family background and upbringing, which the psychologist gathered to be materially deprived and without a proper maternal role model. Fr. Healy corroborated Dr. Gates assessment. He concluded that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital duties.22 He explained that her psychological incapacity is rooted in her role as the breadwinner of her family. This role allegedly inflated Malyns ego to the point that her needs became priority, while her kids and husbands needs became secondary. Malyn is so selfabsorbed that she is incapable of prioritizing her familys needs. Fr. Healy clarified that playing mahjong and spending time with friends are not disorders by themselves. They only constitute psychological incapacity whenever inordinate amounts of time are spent on these activities to the detriment of ones familial duties.23 Fr. Healy characterized Malyns psychological incapacity as grave and incurable.24 Malyn refuted the allegations of Tyrone. While she admitted playing mahjong, she denied playing as frequently as Tyrone alleged. She maintained that she did so only two to three times a week and always between 1 p.m. to 6 p.m. only and with the permission of Tyrone. She also often brought the children and their yayas with them. She also averred that she only left their home due to physical abuse. On the day she left, Tyrone, who preferred to keep Malyn a housewife, was upset that Malyn was preparing to go to work. He called up the security guards and instructed them not to let Malyn out of the house. Tyrone then placed cigarette ashes on Malyns head and proceeded to lock the bedroom doors. Fearing another beating, Malyn rushed out of their bedroom and into her mother-in-laws room. She blurted that Tyrone would beat

her up again so her mother-in-law gave her P300 to leave the house.31 She never returned to their conjugal home. Malyn denied the allegation of adultery. She maintained that Benjie only booked a room at the Hyatt Hotel for her because she was so drunk after partying with friends. She admitted finding her brother Ronald and Tyrone at the door of the Hyatt Hotel room, but maintained being fully clothed at that time. 33 Malyn insisted that she wrote the letter relinquishing all her spousal and parental rights under duress. As an affirmative defense, Malyn maintained that it was Tyrone who was suffering from psychological incapacity, as manifested by his drug dependence, habitual drinking, womanizing, and physical violence.35 Malyn presented Dr. Dayan a clinical psychologist, as her expert witness. Dr. Dayan determined that both Tyrone and Malyn were behaviorally immature. They encountered problems because of their personality differences, which ultimately led to the demise of their marriage. On the testimony of their children, all stated that both their parents took care of them, provided for their needs, and loved them. Rio testified that they would accompany their mother to White Plains on days that she played mahjong with her friends. None of them reported being neglected or feeling abandoned. The two elder kids remembered the fights between their parents but it was only Ria who admitted actually witnessing physical abuse inflicted on her mother.42 The two elder kids also recalled that, after the separation, their mother would visit them only in school. Testimonies follows: of other witness are as
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Dr. Cornelio Banaag, Tyrones attending psychiatrist at the Manila Sanitarium, testified that, for the duration of Tyrones confinement, the couple appeared happy and the wife was commendable for the support she gave to her spouse.46 He likewise testified that Tyrone tested negative for drugs and was not a drug dependent. Malyns brother, Ronald Fernandez, confirmed Tyrones allegation that they found Malyn with Benjie in the Hyatt hotel room, however, refuted Tyrones other allegations. Tyrone then presented Mario Calma (Mario), who was allegedly part of Malyns group of friends. He stated on the stand that they would go on nights-out as

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a group and Malyn would meet with a male musician-friend afterwards. After summarizing the evidence presented by both parties, the trial court concluded that both parties are psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations under the Family Code. The CA reversed the trial courts ruling because it is not supported by the facts on record. Both parties allegations and incriminations against each other do not support a finding of psychological incapacity. Issue: Whether petitioner has sufficiently proved that respondent suffers from psychological incapacity Held: The petition has no merit. Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations.72 The burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff.73 The plaintiff must prove that the incapacitated party, based on his or her actions or behavior, suffers a serious psychological disorder that completely disables him or her from understanding and discharging the essential obligations of the marital state. The psychological problem must be grave, must have existed at the time of marriage, and must be incurable.74 In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity. He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioners experts heavily relied on petitioners allegations of respondents constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioners experts opined that respondents alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD. But petitioners allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the conclusions of his experts, were not actually proven. In fact,

respondent presented contrary evidence refuting these allegations of the petitioner. For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played mahjong and neglected their children as a result. Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother and a wife. Also unproven was petitioners claim about respondents alleged constant visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, and obsessive need for attention from other men. No proof whatsoever was presented to prove her visits to beauty salons or her frequent partying with friends. Petitioner presented Mario (an alleged companion of respondent during these nights-out) in order to prove that respondent had affairs with other men, but Mario only testified that respondent appeared to be dating other men. After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological incapacity. There is no error in the CAs reversal of the trial courts ruling that there was psychological incapacity. The trial courts Decision merely summarized the allegations, testimonies, and evidence of the respective parties, but it did not actually assess the veracity of these allegations, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of the evidence. The trial court did not make factual findings which can serve as bases for its legal conclusion of psychological incapacity. 58. G.R. No. 165321 3, 2010 August

RICARDO P. TORING, Petitioner, vs. TERESITA M. TORING and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. Facts: Ricardo and Teresita first met in 1978 in the former aunts house when the latter was teaching his cousin a Hawaiian dance. Shortly thereafter, they fell in love despite the age difference, Ricardo is younger by 5 years. Eventually they eloped due to another girlfriend of Ricardo who was forcing him to marry her because of pregnancy. Ricardo and Teresita were married on September 4, 1978 and begot three children. On February 1, 1999, more than twenty years after their wedding, Ricardo filed a petition for annulment before the RTC. He claimed that Teresita was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage

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prior to, at the time of, and subsequent to the celebration of their marriage. At the trial, Ricardo offered in evidence their marriage contract; the psychological evaluation and signature of his expert witness, psychiatrist Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran, and his and Dr. Albarans respective testimonies. Teresita did not file any answer or opposition to the petition, nor did she testify to refute the allegations against her. Ricardo alleged in his petition and in his testimony at the trial that Teresita was an adulteress and a squanderer. He was an overseas seaman, and he regularly sent money to his wife to cover the familys living expenses and their childrens tuition. Teresita, however, was not adept in managing the funds he sent and their finances. Many times, Ricardo would come home and be welcomed by debts incurred by his wife; he had to settle these to avoid embarrassment. Ricardo likewise accused Teresita of infidelity and suspected that she was pregnant with another mans child. Ricardo opined that his wife was a very extravagant, materialistic, controlling and demanding person, who mostly had her way in everything; had a taste for the nightlife and was very averse to the duties of a housewife; was stubborn and independent, also most unsupportive, critical and uncooperative; was unresponsive to his hard work and sacrifices for their family; and was most painfully unmindful of him. Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran testified that a major factor that contributed to the demise of the marriage was Teresitas Narcissistic Personality Disorder that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations. She based her diagnosis on the information she gathered from her psychological evaluation on Ricardo and Richardson (Ricardo and Teresitas eldest son). She admitted, though, that she did not personally observe and examine Teresita; she sent Teresita a personallydelivered notice for the conduct of a psychiatric evaluation, but the notice remained unanswered. In opposing the petition for annulment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contended that there was no basis to declare Teresita psychologically incapacitated. It asserted that the psychological evaluation conducted on Ricardo (and his son Richardson) only revealed a vague and general conclusion on these parties personality traits but not on Teresitas psychological makeup. The OSG also argued that the evidence adduced did not

clinically identify and sufficiently prove the medical cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. Neither did the evidence indicate that the alleged psychological incapacity existed prior to or at the time of marriage, nor that the incapacity was grave and incurable. The RTC agreed with Ricardo, and annulled his marriage to Teresita. The CA reversed the RTC decision and held that the trial courts findings did not satisfy the rules and guidelines set by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina.7 However, the RTC failed to specifically point out the root illness or defect that caused Teresitas psychological incapacity, and likewise failed to show that the incapacity already existed at the time of celebration of marriage. Issue: Whether Teresita suffers psychological incapacity due to Narcissistic Personality Disorder, thus, the marriage is void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code. Held: In the leading case of Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al.,11 we held that psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability, to be sufficient basis to annul a marriage. The psychological incapacity should refer to "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."12 We further expounded on Article 36 of the Family Code in Molina and laid down definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of this article. These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability established in the Santos case. Dr. Albaran concluded in her psychological evaluation that Teresita suffers from Narcissistic Personality Disorder that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to assume essential marital obligations. To support her findings and conclusion, she banked on the statements told to her by Ricardo and Richardson, which she narrated in her evaluation. Apparently relying on the same basis, Dr. Albaran added that Teresitas disorder manifested during her early adulthood and is grave and incurable.

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In the present case, the only other party outside of the spouses who was ever asked to give statements for purposes of Teresitas psychological evaluation was Richardson, the spouses eldest son who would not have been very reliable as a witness in an Article 36 case because he could not have been there when the spouses were married and could not have been expected to know what was happening between his parents until long after his birth. Ricardo testified in court that Teresita was a squanderer and an adulteress. We do not, however, find Ricardos characterizations of his wife sufficient to constitute psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations. Mere "difficulty," "refusal, or "neglect" in the performance of marital obligations or "ill will" on the part of the spouse is different from "incapacity" rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness. Root cause of the psychological incapacity needs to be alleged in a petition for annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code Citing Barcelona,25 Ricardo defended the RTC decision, alleging that the root cause in a petition for annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code is no longer necessary. Barcelona does not do away with the "root cause" requirement. The ruling simply means that the statement of the root cause does not need to be in medical terms or be technical in nature, as the root causes of many psychological disorders are still unknown to science. It is enough to merely allege the physical manifestations constituting the root cause of the psychological incapacity. Section 2, paragraph (d) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (Rules)27 in fact provides: SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. xxxx (d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specially allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriages at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such

incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration. As we explained in Barcelona, the requirement alleging the root cause in a petition for annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code was not dispensed with by the adoption of the Rules. What the Rules really eliminated was the need for an expert opinion to prove the root cause of the psychological incapacity. The Court further held that the Rules, being procedural in nature, apply only to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their adoption. 59. G.R. No. 185286 18, 2010 MA. SOCORRO CAMACHOREYES, Petitioner, vs. RAMON REYES, Respondent. Facts: Socorro and Ramon first met in UP Diliman (1972) when Ramon crossenrolled from UPLB in one of the formers subject. From mere acquaintances, the relationship developed to boyfriendgirlfriend. Socorro was easily impressed by Ramons style of courtship which included dining out, unlike other couples their age who were restricted by a university students budget. At that time, respondent held a job in the family business, the Aristocrat Restaurant. Petitioners good impression of the respondent was not diminished by the latters habit of cutting classes, not even by her discovery that respondent was taking marijuana. While Socorro finished her studies, Ramon dropped out of school on his third year and just continued to work in their family business. In 1976, following Socorros graduation, she married Ramon which at that time she is already 5 months pregnant. She was then employed. Thereafter, the newlyweds lived with the respondents family in Mandaluyong City. All living expenses were shouldered by respondents parents, and the couples respective salaries were spent solely for their personal needs. Initially, respondent gave petitioner a monthly allowance of P1,500.00 from his salary. After their first child was born, the financial difficulties started. The allowance being given by Ramon to Socorro stopped. His salary was no longer handed to Socorro. The reason of which is he resigned from work because of the slow advancement to their family business. Respondents game plan was to venture into trading seafood in the province, supplying hotels and restaurants, including the Aristocrat Restaurant. However, this new business took August

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respondent away from his young family for days on end without any communication. Petitioner simply endured the set up, hoping that the situation will change. Afterwards, they decided to live separately from Ramons parents as suggested by the petitioner. This made their financial difficulty even harder. While petitioner struggled to make ends meet as the single-income earner of the household, respondents business floundered. Thereafter, another attempt at business, a fishpond in Mindoro, was similarly unsuccessful. Due to turn of events, they decided to live with petitioners mother. But the new set up did not end their marital difficulties. In fact, the parties became more estranged. Petitioner continued to carry the burden of supporting a family not just financially, but in most aspects as well. In 1989, due to financial reverses, respondents fishpond business stopped operations. Although without any means to support his family, respondent refused to go back to work for the family business. Respondent came up with another business venture, engaging in scrap paper and carton trading. As with all of respondents business ventures, this did not succeed and added to the trail of debt which now hounded not only respondent, but petitioner as well. Not surprisingly, the relationship of the parties deteriorated. Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having an extra-marital affair. Petitioner soon realized that respondent was not only unable to provide financially for their family, but he was, more importantly, remiss in his obligation to remain faithful to her and their family. One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the parties marriage was a surgical operation on petitioner for the removal of a cyst. Although his wife was about to be operated on, respondent remained unconcerned and unattentive; and simply read the newspaper, and played dumb when petitioner requested that he accompany her as she was wheeled into the operating room. After the operation, petitioner felt that she had had enough of respondents lack of concern, and asked her mother to order respondent to leave the recovery room. With the hopes to still save their marriage, Socorro sought the help of her in-laws but was unsuccessful. One of the siblings of Ramon and his wife invited and sponsored the couple to a marriage encounter group but still unsuccessful.

In 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to Dr. Natividad A. Dayan for a psychological assessment to "determine benchmarks of current psychological functioning." As with all other attempts to help him, respondent resisted and did not continue with the clinical psychologists recommendation to undergo psychotherapy. At about this time, petitioner, with the knowledge of respondents siblings, told respondent to move out of their house. Respondent acquiesced to give space to petitioner. With the de facto separation, the relationship still did not improve. Neither did respondents relationship with his children. Thus, in 2009, Socorro filed a petition for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage alleging psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code. This was denied by the respondent. After trial (where the testimonies of two clinical psychologists, Dr. Dayan and Dr. Estrella Magno, and a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas, were presented in evidence), the RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage between the parties null and void on the ground of their psychological incapacity. CA, however, reversed the said decision of the RTC. Issue: Whether the marriage between the parties is void ab initio on the ground of both parties psychological incapacity, as provided in Article 36 of the Family Code. Held: Taking into consideration the explicit guidelines in the determination of psychological incapacity in conjunction to the totality of the evidence presented, with emphasis on the pervasive pattern of behaviors of the respondent and outcome of the assessment/diagnos[is] of expert witnesses, Dra. Dayan, Dra. Mango and Dra. Villegas on the psychological condition of the respondent, the Court finds that the marriage between the parties from its inception has a congenital infirmity termed "psychological incapacity" which pertains to the inability of the parties to effectively function emotionally, intellectually and socially towards each other in relation to their essential duties to mutually observe love, fidelity and respect as well as to mutually render help and support, (Art. 68 Family Code). In short, there was already a fixed niche in the psychological constellation of respondent which created the death of his marriage. There is no reason to entertain any slightest doubt on the truthfulness of the personality disorder of the respondent.

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The three expert witnesses have spoken. They were unanimous in their findings that respondent is suffering from personality disorder which psychologically incapacitated him to fulfill his basic duties to the marriage. Being professionals and hav[ing] solemn duties to their profession, the Court considered their assessment/diagnos[is] as credible or a product of an honest evaluation on the psychological status of the respondent. This psychological incapacity of the respondent, in the uniform words of said three (3) expert witnesses, is serious, incurable and exists before his marriage and renders him a helpless victim of his structural constellation. It is beyond the respondents impulse control. In short, he is weaponless or powerless to restrain himself from his consistent behaviors simply because he did not consider the same as wrongful. This is clearly manifested from his assertion that nothing was wrong in his marriage with the petitioner and considered their relationship as a normal one. In fact, with this belief, he lent deaf ears to counseling and efforts extended to them by his original family members to save his marriage. In short, he was blind and too insensitive to the reality of his marital atmosphere. He totally disregarded the feelings of petitioner who appeared to have been saturated already that she finally revealed her misfortunes to her sister-in-law and willingly submitted to counseling to save their marriage. However, the hard position of the respondent finally constrained her to ask respondent to leave the conjugal dwelling. Even the siblings of the respondent were unanimous that separation is the remedy to the seriously ailing marriage of the parties. Respondent confirmed this stand of his siblings. In the case at bar, however, even without the experts conclusions, the factual antecedents (narrative of events) alleged in the petition and established during trial, all point to the inevitable conclusion that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. Article 68 of the Family Code provides: Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. In this connection, it is well to note that persons with antisocial personality disorder exhibit the following clinical features:

Patients with antisocial personality disorder can often seem to be normal and even charming and ingratiating. Their histories, however, reveal many areas of disordered life functioning. Lying, truancy, running away from home, thefts, fights, substance abuse, and illegal activities are typical experiences that patients report as beginning in childhood. x x x Their own explanations of their antisocial behavior make it seem mindless, but their mental content reveals the complete absence of delusions and other signs of irrational thinking. In fact, they frequently have a heightened sense of reality testing and often impress observers as having good verbal intelligence. x x x Those with this disorder do not tell the truth and cannot be trusted to carry out any task or adhere to any conventional standard of morality. x x x A notable finding is a lack of remorse for these actions; that is, they appear to lack a conscience.28 In the instant case, respondents pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his: (1) sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not connected with the family businesses; and (7) criminal charges of estafa. On the issue of the petitioners purported psychological incapacity, we agree with the CAs ruling thereon: A perusal of the Amended Petition shows that it failed to specifically allege the complete facts showing that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity became manifest only after its celebration x x x. In fact, what was merely prayed for in the said Amended Petition is that judgment be rendered "declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent solemnized on 04 December 1976 to be void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent at the time of the celebration of the marriage x x x At any rate, even assuming arguendo that [petitioners] Amended Petition was indeed amended to conform to the evidence, as provided under Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, Dr. Villegas finding that [petitioner] is supposedly suffering from an Inadequate Personality [Disorder] along the affectional area does not amount to psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family

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Code. Such alleged condition of [petitioner] is not a debilitating psychological condition that incapacitates her from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage.1avvphi1 In fact, in the Psychological Evaluation Report of clinical psychologist Magno, [petitioner] was given a glowing evaluation as she was found to be a "good, sincere, and conscientious person and she has tried her best to provide for the needs of her children. Her achievements in this regard are praiseworthy." Even in Dr. Villegas psychiatric report, it was stated that [petitioner] was able to remain in their marriage for more than 20 years "trying to reach out and lending a hand for better understanding and relationship." With the foregoing evaluation made by no less than [petitioners] own expert witnesses, we find it hard to believe that she is psychologically incapacitated within the contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code.29 All told, it is wise to be reminded of the caveat articulated by Justice Teodoro R. Padilla in his separate statement in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina:30 x x x Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court." In fine, given the factual milieu of the present case and in light of the foregoing disquisition, we find ample basis to conclude that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations at the time of his marriage to the petitioner. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA -G.R. CV No. 89761 is REVERSED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854 declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code is REINSTATED. 60. G.R. No. 173138 December 1, 2010 NOEL B. BACCAY, Petitioner, vs. MARIBEL C. BACCAY and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

Facts: Noel and Maribel were schoolmates at the Mapua Institute of Technology where both took up Electronics and Communications Engineering. After they were introduced (1990), Noel courted Maribel but was only answered by the latter after years of courtship. Noel considered Maribel as the snobbish and hard-to-get type, which traits he found attractive. This observation continued even when Maribel is being invited in Noels family gathering. Maribel was aloof and did not did try to get close to any of his family members. Around 1997, Noel decided to break up with Maribel because he was already involved with another woman. He tried to break up with Maribel, but Maribel refused and offered to accept Noels relationship with the other woman so long as they would not sever their ties. To give Maribel some time to get over their relationship, they still continued to see each other albeit on a friendly basis. Despite their efforts to keep their meetings strictly friendly, however, Noel and Maribel had several romantic moments together. Noel took these episodes of sexual contact casually since Maribel never demanded anything from him except his company. Then, sometime in November 1998, Maribel informed Noel that she was pregnant with his child. Upon advice of his mother, Noel grudgingly agreed to marry Maribel. Noel and Maribel were immediately wed on November 23, 1998 before Judge Gregorio Dayrit, the Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. The couple lived with Noels family. During all the time she lived with Noels family, Maribel remained aloof and did not go out of her way to endear herself to them. Surprisingly, despite Maribels claim of being pregnant, Noel never observed any symptoms of pregnancy in her. He asked Maribels office mates whether she manifested any signs of pregnancy and they confirmed that she showed no such signs. Then, sometime in January 1999, Maribel did not go home for a day, and when she came home she announced to Noel and his family that she had a miscarriage and was confined at the Chinese General Hospital where her sister worked as a nurse. Noel confronted Maribel about her supposed miscarriage which lead to the couples quarrel and woke up the whole household. When the mother of Noel tried to intervene, Maribel cursed her and told her not to meddle. In that case, Noels mother told them to leave her house. Maribel left Noels house and did not come

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back anymore. Noel tried to communicate with Maribel but when he went to see her at her house nobody wanted to talk to him and she rejected his phone calls. After almost two years, Noel filed a petition for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage to Maribel. Despite summons, Maribel did not participate in the proceedings. Despite a directive from the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) also did not submit a certification manifesting its agreement or opposition to the case. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Noel. The RTC found that Maribel failed to perform the essential marital obligations of marriage, and such failure was due to a personality disorder called Narcissistic Personality Disorder characterized by juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability as determined by a clinical psychologist. On appeal of the OSG, CA reversed the decision of the RTC and held that Noel failed to establish that Maribels supposed Narcissistic Personality Disorder was the psychological incapacity contemplated by law and that it was permanent and incurable. Maribels attitudes were merely mild peculiarities in character or signs of ill-will and refusal or neglect to perform marital obligations which did not amount to psychological incapacity, said the appellate court. The CA noted that Maribel may have failed or refused to perform her marital obligations but such did not indicate incapacity. The CA stressed that the law requires nothing short of mental illness sufficient to render a person incapable of knowing the essential marital obligations. Incidentally, the CA held that the OSG erred in saying that what Noel should have filed was an action to annul the marriage under Article 45 (3)14 of the Family Code. According to the CA, Article 45 (3) involving consent to marriage vitiated by fraud is limited to the instances enumerated under Article 4615 of the Family Code. Maribels misrepresentation that she was pregnant to induce Noel to marry her was not the fraud contemplated under Article 45 (3) as it was not among the instances enumerated under Article 46.16 Issue: Whether the marriage between the parties is null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code. Held: of The Court held in Santos v. Court Appeals21 that the phrase

"psychological incapacity" is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Article 68 22 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most serious of cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. The totality of evidence presented by Noel was not sufficient to sustain a finding that Maribel was psychologically incapacitated. Noels evidence merely established that Maribel refused to have sexual intercourse with him after their marriage, and that she left him after their quarrel when he confronted her about her alleged miscarriage. He failed to prove the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity and establish the requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. As correctly observed by the CA, the report of the psychologist, who concluded that Maribel was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder traceable to her experiences during childhood, did not establish how the personality disorder incapacitated Maribel from validly assuming the essential obligations of the marriage. Indeed, the same psychologist even testified that Maribel was capable of entering into a marriage except that it would be difficult for her to sustain one.24 Mere difficulty, it must be stressed, is not the incapacity contemplated by law. 61. G.R. No. 170729 December 8, 2010 ENRIQUE AGRAVIADOR y ALUNAN, Petitioner, vs. ERLINDA AMPARO-AGRAVIADOR and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. Facts: Petitioner and respondent first met in 1971 and eventually became sweethearts and soon entered into a common-law relationship. In 1973, they got married despite the apprehension of the petitioners parents because of the nature of the work of the respondent (waitress in the nightclub) and her coming from a broken family. Out of their union, the petitioner and the respondent begot

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four (4) children, namely: Erisque, Emmanuel, Evelyn, and Eymarey. In 2001, the petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the respondent, under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended.5 The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-081. He alleged that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as she was carefree and irresponsible, and refused to do household chores like cleaning and cooking; stayed away from their house for long periods of time; had an affair with a lesbian; did not take care of their sick child; consulted a witch doctor in order to bring him bad fate; and refused to use the family name Agraviador in her activities. In addition, the petitioner claimed that the respondent refused to have sex with him since 1993 because she became "very close" to a male tenant in their house. In fact, he discovered their love notes to each other, and caught them inside his room several times. Respondent moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the root cause of her psychological incapacity was not medically identified and alleged in the petition. Said motion was denied. In her answer, the respondent denied that she engaged in extramarital affairs and maintained that it was the petitioner who refused to have sex with her. She claimed that the petitioner wanted to have their marriage annulled because he wanted to marry their former household helper, Gilda Camarin. She added that she was the one who took care of their son at the hospital before he died. The petitioner presented a psychiatric report Dr. Juan Cirilo L. Patac. Said report shows that Erlinda is suffering from a Personality Disorder (Mixed Personality Disorder). She has been having this disorder since her adolescence. There is no definite treatment for this disorder. She is deemed psychologically incapacitated to perform the obligations of marriage. RTC ordered nullification of the marriage. However, CA reversed and set aside the said decision of the RTC. It held that Dr. Patacs psychiatric evaluation report failed to establish that the respondents personality disorder was serious, grave and permanent; it likewise did not mention the root cause of her incapacity. The CA further ruled that Dr. Patac had no basis in concluding that the respondents disorder had no definite

treatment because he did not subject her to a mental assessment. The CA added that the "psychiatric remarks" in the Report were nothing but a showcase of respondents character flaws and liabilities. There was no proof of a natal or supervening factor that effectively incapacitated the respondent from accepting and complying with the essential obligations of marriage. If at all, these character flaws may only give rise to a legal separation suit. Issues: Whether there is basis to nullify the petitioners marriage to the respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations? Held: In this case, the petitioners theory that the respondents psychological incapacity is premised on her refusal or unwillingness to perform certain marital obligations, and a number of unpleasant personality traits such as immaturity, irresponsibility, and unfaithfulness. These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of psychological incapacity that the law requires, and should be distinguished from the "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect," in the performance of some marital obligations that characterize some marriages.26 The intent of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders existing at the time of the marriage clearly demonstrating an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.27 The psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.28 In the present case, the petitioners testimony failed to establish that the respondents condition is a manifestation of a disordered personality rooted on some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition that makes her completely unable to discharge the essential marital obligations. If at all, the petitioner merely showed that the respondent had some personality defects that showed their manifestation during the marriage; his testimony sorely lacked details necessary to establish that the respondents defects existed at the inception of the marriage. In addition, the petitioner failed to discuss the gravity of the respondents condition; neither did he

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mention that the respondents malady was incurable, or if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the respondents means to undertake. The petitioners declarations that the respondent "does not accept her fault," "does not want to change," and "refused to reform" are insufficient to establish a psychological or mental defect that is serious, grave, or incurable as contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code. The Court finds that Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation Report fell short in proving that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital duties. We emphasize that Dr. Patac did not personally evaluate and examine the respondent; he, in fact, recommended at the end of his Report for the respondent to "undergo the same examination [that the petitioner] underwent."30 Dr. Patac relied only on the information fed by the petitioner, the parties second child, Emmanuel, and household helper. Sarah. Largely, the doctor relied on the information provided by the petitioner. Thus, while his Report can be used as a fair gauge to assess the petitioners own psychological condition (as he was, in fact, declared by Dr. Patac to be psychologically capable to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage), the same statement cannot be made with respect to the respondents condition. Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation Report likewise failed to prove the gravity or seriousness of the respondents condition. He simply made an enumeration of the respondents purported behavioral defects (as related to him by third persons), and on this basis characterized the respondent to be suffering from mixed personality disorder. Interestingly, Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation Report highlighted only the respondents negative behavioral traits without balancing them with her other qualities. The allegations of infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity, as well as the claim that the respondent refused to engage in sexual intercourse since 1993, of course, came from the petitioner, but these claims were not proven. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these accusations were true, the Psychiatric Evaluation Report did not indicate that unfaithfulness or promiscuousness were traits that antedated or existed at the time of marriage. Thus, SC resolved to deny the petition for lack of merit, and hold that no sufficient basis exists to annul the marriage, pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code and its related jurisprudence.

The totality of evidence presented failed to establish the respondents psychological incapacity.

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