Life in The Flesh Mind - and - Body in Philosophy

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Mind and Body

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Universidad Javeriana - Biblioteca General; date: 14 September 2013
Lfe n the Fesh: An Ant-Gnostc Sprtua Phosophy
Adam G. Cooper
Prnt pubcaton date: 2008
Prnt ISBN-13: 9780199546626
Pubshed to Oxford Schoarshp Onne: |an-09
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199546626.001.0001
Mnd and Body
Adam G. Cooper (Contrbutor Webpage)
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199546626.003.0008
Abstract and Keywords
Phosophca debate contnues over the reaton of mnd to body. Cartesan
duasm s the drty word, but can even a moderate materasm make
proper sense of the fu range of human nteectua and sprtua actvty?
Determnng whether, what, and how we know cas for a phosophy of the
fesh artcuated n fu conscousness of our body stuatedness. At the
same tme, a phosophy of the fesh, or even a phosophy n the fesh, does
not requre a sceptcsm about the human capacty for transcendence, or
agnostcsm about the reaty of transcendent truth.
Keywords: mnd, body, bran, knowedge, epstemoogy, neuroogy, duasm, cognton
|E|ven contemporary phosophers must grant that an
mmatera mnd s possbe. An argument for the mpossbty
of an mmatera mnd woud be n effect an argument aganst
the exstence of God.
Eeonore Stump
1
In the prevous chapter, I referred n passng to a number of questons that
often arse n dscussons concernng what s commony caed the mnd-
body probem. The probem can perhaps best be expressed as a seres
of questons: What s the reatonshp between the human mnd and the
sentent bran? Is that aspect of human reaty Chrstan tradton cas sou
or mnd or sprt ony an epphenomenon of the bran's eectrochemca
actvty? How do dscoveres n the fed of cogntve scence, whch suggest
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Mind and Body
the essentay sub|ectve character of human sense percepton, or the
nherenty metaphorca and neuray embedded character of conceptua
knowedge, mpact upon tradtonay hed vews about sou and body or
about the human beng's capacty to know both matera and non-matera
reates? Are non-matera bengs such as God or the sou smpy a construct
of the matera human mnd?
In ths chapter I sha respond to these and other questons by attemptng to
artcuate what I hope s an emprcay responsbe phosophy of the human
mnd. I mean to gve an account of the nature of human nteectua actvty
and ts reaton to the sentent body and the externa word that s fathfu
both to Chrstan reveaton and to the actua human stuaton, at east as far
as t can be (p.161) ascertaned by emprca observaton and refecton on
common human experence.
PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH
The chaenge for me to attempt such a formdabe task was ssued not so
ong ago n the form of a compendous monograph by Amercan authors
George Lakoff and Mark |ohnson, entted Philosophy in the Flesh: The
Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought. Eschewng a
a'pror assumptons and camng to start out wth ony the best emprcay
verfabe data about the nature of the mnd, Lakoff and |ohnson cam n
ths book to have constructed an entrey new phosophy, an emprcay
responsbe phosophy, a phosophy n the fesh. Ths phosophy, they say,
proposes a vew of the human person and the word radcay dfferent from
that aegedy proposed n the cassca Western phosophca tradton. They
cam t rases fundamenta questons about the capacty and mtatons of
emboded human nature, questons that, as far as they are concerned, few f
any thnkng persons have up unt now ever before consdered. Sgnfcanty,
they aso cam t cas nto queston much of what Chrstan tradton has
understood as consttutve of authentc sprtua experence.
There s a hubrstc tone to these assertons. Yet Lakoff and |ohnson's
nvtaton to engage n an emprcay responsbe phosophy of mnd
amounts n my vew to a worthwhe chaenge. Wth them I share a concern
to take serousy the gvenness of our emboded stuaton, to attend to the
physcay embedded and metaphorca character of nteectua actvty.
Cogntve scence has ed Lakoff and |ohnson to beeve somethng that
has been beeved by others qute apart from the fndngs of contemporary
scence, namey, that the human capacty to know s condtoned not ony
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by the state of knowabe ob|ects, but aso by the physca and conceptua
nstruments by whch knowedge s humany possbe. Human bengs are
ntrnscay stuated wthn, and to some extent unconscousy shaped by,
a network of spata, matera, and soca structures that (p.162) necessary
mpnge upon and condton ther percepton of the word. Lakoff and
|ohnson are surey rght to oppose a vew of the human person that woud
post a fuy autonomous facuty of dsemboded reason separate from and
ndependent of neuray nstantated conceptua actvty and a spatay
specfc framework of body exstence. Our sense of what s rea begns
wth and depends crucay upon our bodes, especay our sensormotor
apparatus, whch enabes us to perceve, move, and manpuate, and the
detaed structures of our brans.
2
My queston n ths chapter w be to
ask whether such a vew s unquey ther own. For whchever phosophca
tradton Lakoff and |ohnson may cam to have debunked, t cannot be
the cassca Chrstan tradton whch they carcature varousy as a'pror
phosophzng, monothc metaphyscs, or fok theory unsubstantated
by emprca nvestgaton. It w be my contenton, contrary to Lakoff
and |ohnson, that the Thomst nteectua tradton n partcuar remans
a reevant and mportant voce n the phosophca conversaton they so
urgenty wsh to foster. For t shoud be remembered that t was Aqunas
who, qute wthout the ad of modern bran scence, sad that the change by
whch we pass from gnorance to knowedge must be attrbuted drecty to
the body. It was Aqunas who, n contradstncton to the prevang Patonsm
of the day, sad that a our dscernments somehow and necessary refer
back to the senses. It was Aqunas who sad that, even n the encounter wth
dvne reveaton, we are nonetheess never fted so hgh as to perceve
these reates n any other way than through the word of the senses.
3
In
hs beautfu study on the nteectua vocaton, A. D. Sertanges summarzes
the Thomst tradton n terms precsey apposte to the thess Lakoff and
|ohnson are so eager to ay cam to as ther own: Knowedge nvoves
everythng n us, from the vta prncpe to the chemca composton of the
east ce.
4
Drawng on ths tradton, therefore, we can be confdent of beng reasonaby
we equpped to make a start on tackng a seres of questons that go to the
heart of the contemporary mnd-body (p.163) probem: frst of a, whether
or not the mnd s matera; second, what knd of reatonshp exsts between
the mnd and the body; and thrd, what knd of reatonshp exsts between
the mnd and the externa word of matera and non-matera reaty.
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IS THE MIND MATERIAL?
One of the frst questons one woud normay need to sette n dscussng
questons of mnd s the meanng of terms. Words such as mnd, nteect,
sou, understandng, reason, concepton, percepton, thought, mage, and
sense are a used varousy n the terature on the sub|ect wth greater or
esser degrees of precson. What does each of them sgnfy? How are these
varous tems dstnct? How are they reated?
By the word mnd contemporary wrters usuay mean somethng dfferent
from what the ancents ca sou. Sou, as we have seen n our chapter on
the Thomst phosophca tradton, s a prncpe of fe and actvty. A vng
organsms have sous; t s that whch makes them ave. Pants have pant
sous: vegetatve powers enabng metabosm, growth, and reproducton.
Anmas have anma sous: addtona powers of sense and appette and
ocomoton. And as the hghest of the anmas, humans have human sous:
the addtona and unque capactes of the nteect, wth ts powers of
concepton, reasonng, sef-conscousness, and voton. The human sou s
the frst act of the body; t s the actuazng power responsbe for makng
the matter specfc to a partcuar human organsm a vng person. In ths
respect, sou penetrates every dmenson of the body, and s whoy and
ndvsby present to each body member, even to each ce.
In contemporary dscussons on the mnd-body probem, however, the
word mnd does not usuay carry these connotatons connected wth
the Chrstan concepton of the human sou or dstnctve nteect. Rather,
the conscous mnd s conceved of more as a deveoped neuroogca
functon by whch we thnk, magne, conceve, sense, categorze, deduce,
decde, dream, and remember. It s the genera ocus and agent of that
measurabe actvty (p.164) ambguousy caed thought, both conscous
and unconscous. It remans to be seen whether ths s a defnton adequate
to our experence of human exstence and behavour, or whether t has to
be expanded to ncude those eements the Thomst tradton ntends wth
the word anima or sou, or n earer Chrstan tradton, sprt, nteect, or
nous. For the moment, however, t s enough to have fagged the probem of
termnoogy, n the hope that we sha arrve at deeper carty n due course.
In askng whether the mnd as the organ of thought s matera, we are
bascay askng whether there s a dfference between mnd and bran. If
there s no dfference, then mnd and bran are synonymous terms. They
refer to the same thng. Ther actvtes are exacty coextensve. What peope
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ca menta processes are essentay equvaent to neura processes.
Psychoogy and neuroogy are dentca.
Few, apart from those who hod to a strcty reductve physcasm, as one
fnds t for nstance n the popuarzng scence of Tufts Unversty professor
Dane Dennett, woud assert ths knd of strct dentty between mnd and
bran.
5
It s true that neuroscentsts have amassed a substanta body of
evdence pontng to the fact that a arge proporton of what we typcay
dentfy as menta actons and experences are functons emergng from
compex but observabe neuroboogca processes. It s aso true, as Lakoff
and |ohnson pont out, that we commony conceptuaze our mnd and
ts actvty n body terms. We say my mnd was wanderng, or I can't
get my mnd around t, or I'm turnng t over n my mnd, or my mnd s
overoaded, and so on. By means of these physca mages and metaphors
we try to conceptuaze menta processes. Yet nether of these facts means
that the mnd shoud be dentfed wth the physca mass consttuted by
the bran and nervous system, any more than the content and meanng of a
nove shoud be dentfed wth the nk and paper that consttutes ts matera
base. Nor are we entted to concude, wthout beggng the queston, that
neura actvty s a that s gong on when a person thnks. Neuroscentsts
speak not ony of a bottom-up reaton between mnd and bran, but of
(p.165) a top-down reaton as we. In other words, some menta processes
have a determnatve and causa effect on the physca actvty of the bran.
The reatonshp of nteracton s not a one way; the ocazaton s not a n
the measurabe, matera sphere.
6
There s another qute smpe reason that precudes us from dentfyng mnd
and bran. A neuroogst can physcay nspect my bran wth scape and
eectrode and take carefu note of ts observabe features and actvty. But he
does not thereby gan access to any of the contents of my conscous mnd,
st ess my unconscous mnd, whch even persona ntrospecton cannot
reach. He can perhaps know that I am thnkng; he cannot know what I am
thnkng. The contents of mnd competey escape externa observaton.
At the very east, then, we must say that mnd and bran are anaytcay
dstnct: we cannot smpy nterchange the terms denotng the mnd and
menta actvty wth the terms denotng the bran and neura actvty. They
are ncommensurabe: each beongs to a dfferent order or modaty. It may
be that menta actvty emerges from and n arge part depends on neura
actvty, yet wthout needng to be reazed n matter at a, as argued for
exampe by Rchard Boyd.
7
But ths s far from sayng that the two are
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dentca. As noted, menta actvty sometmes has a causa, top-down effect
on neura actvty. At the same tme we know that changes n bran actvty
can and do nfuence menta actvty; some menta experences can be
physcay and chemcay nduced. In short, and recang the chaenge
to artcuate an emprcay responsbe phosophy, mnd and bran are
certany reated, yet they must aso be somehow dstnct.
THE EMBODIED MIND AND THE WORLD
There s no doubt that the engmatc and mysterous reatonshp between
mnd and bran w contnue to puzze both scentsts and phosophers we
nto the future. We sha hardy sette t here. (p.166) Whether t w ever
be possbe to dentfy the nk or pont of nteracton between them, as
Descartes tred to do wth the pnea gand, or neurophysoogst Sr |ohn
Ecces (d. 1997) wth the synapses of the cerebra hemspheres, s uncertan.
The very dea of nteracton s frowned upon by some neuroscentsts, snce
t mpes the exstence of two dfferent sorts of stuff, two dstnct substances.
It suggests that we are to ascrbe varous actvtes that we understand to be
typcay human to two dfferent sub|ects, a duastc souton that mght have
peased Pato or Descartes, but whch cogntve scence, aong wth Chrstan
anthropoogy, does not accept.
On the contrary, the pont must be emphaszed that, strcty speakng, t
s not the mnd, but the person who thnks. I am not, as Pato taught, a
sou usng a body. It s I mysef, a psychophysca whoe, and not some
separate mmatera part of me, that consttutes a thnkng thng. It
s I mysef, a psychophysca whoe, and not some separate matera
part of me, that consttutes a sensng thng. It s the person, a unty n
duaty, who senses and perceves, fees and magnes, remembers and
conceves. Of course, each acton the ndvdua person performs requres a
commensurate nstrument or potenta; each occurs ony wth respect to an
nnate and correatng capacty to carry t out, whether organc, senstve,
and emotona, or conceptua, or sprtua. But n the end t s I, a unfed
mora sub|ect and not some part of me, who ws, knows, and acts, each n
accordance wth my nnate and acqured capactes to do so.
Ths n turn eads us to ask what knd of powers we actuay possess. What
are we as human bengs capabe of? What are our dstnct capactes suted
for? Do they dffer, and n what respect? It was stated above that the actvty
of the mnd s condtoned by ts nstantaton n the matera body. Thus,
whe the mnd may possess a capacty for actvty that dffers from that of
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the body and ts senses, t does not operate ndependenty of them. Anythng
we know wth the mnd s condtoned by the mtatons of our emboded
crcumstances. An obvous exampe of ths s found n our percepton of
coour. Our mnd, drected towards the word externa to t, tes us that
coour s a property beongng to the varous ob|ects about us, a property
that s thers ndependenty of our body experence of them. Grass s green.
Snow s whte. Strawberres are red. It seems straghtforward. However t s
ncreasngy accepted by many as a (p.167) scentfcay proven fact that our
sense percepton of certan coours n partcuar ob|ects s a consequence of
our physca nteracton wth them; t does not arse from a coour-quaty n
the ob|ect tsef. Lght waves, refectng n varabe engths off the surface of
an ob|ect, enter the eye and trgger a reacton n the optc rods and cones
n the back of the retna. The reacton vares accordng to the dfferent
ength of the ght waves. It s ths varabty n the reacton that resuts n
the sensaton of seeng dfferent coours. The ght waves themseves are
not cooured; ke rado waves, they are nvsbe. That whch we perceve
as coour n an ob|ect s the resut of the eye's eectrophysca response to
refected ght waves, a response that can vary accordng to dfferent ght
condtons, dfferent refectances n the surface of ob|ects, and dfferences n
the sub|ect's own vsua apparatus.
In Philosophy in the Flesh, Lakoff and |ohnson dscuss the mpcatons of
these vsua mechancs for an understandng of truth and for our knowedge
of the word. From a purey phenomenoogca and experenta pont of vew,
coour nheres n ob|ects. In ths sense, say Lakoff and |ohnson, green is
a one-place predicate characterizing a property that inheres in an object.
From a cogntve-scentfc pont of vew, however, coour s the product of a
compex physca and neurochemca nteracton n the eye and bran. In ths
sense, say Lakoff and |ohnson, green is a multiplace interactional property.
8
How are these two cams to be reconced? The authors propose to accept
the quafed vadty of both eves of truth under a vew they ca emboded
reasm. Emboded reasm requres us to gve up the uson that there
exsts a unque correct descrpton of any stuaton. Because of the mutpe
eves of our embodment, there s no one eve at whch one can express a
the truths we can know about a gven sub|ect matter.
9
But ths, I woud urge, s an odd concuson. Are not Lakoff and |ohnson here
advocatng, under the venerabe name of reasm, a vew more akn to
metaphysca reatvsm? Ther concusons about coour echo the coour ant-
reasm of Gaeo, who hed that coours are mere names, or that of Locke,
who reduced coour to an (p.168) nherenty non-measurabe by-product of
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the mnd.
10
It coud be, of course, that Lakoff and |ohnson want smpy to
say that every reaty possesses mutpe eves of meanng and sgnfcance,
that the word of nature s ontoogcay rcher and more dverse than meets
the eye. In whch case they woud be echong the wonder fet by human
bengs down through the ages at the surprsng and nexhaustbe profundty
of reaty, a fact that, ncdentay, ensures a contnua suppy of ever new
scentfc data.
As t s, however, Lakoff and |ohnson go on to cam that ther anayss of
vsua mechancs requres us to abandon metaphysca reasm and ts
concomtant, the correspondence theory of truth. Ths step, they argue, s
necesstated because the correspondence theory of truth does not aow
for dfferent eves of truth, but assumes that a truths can be stated at
once from a neutra perspectve.
11
In vew of ths curous aegaton Wam
Ferraoo has pubshed a compeng rebutta, showng that merey by fasey
characterzng the correspondence theory of truth one hardy renders t
untenabe. The correspondence theorst need not (and probaby shoud not)
nsst that a truth-bearers are made true or fase by cognton-ndependent
facts that obtan n some perceptuay neutra, cognton-ndependenty-
descrbabe-word-n-tsef.
12
St ess, we mght add, does t cast doubt
on metaphysca reasm. Accordng to Ensten, beef n an externa word,
ndependent of the percevng sub|ect, s the bass of a natura scence.
13
A certan knd of word must exst for scence to be possbe. The scentfc
task, even the cogntve scentfc task, assumes not ony the exstence
but aso the ntegbty, that s, the potenta knowabty and ordered
coherence, of reates externa to the human mnd. The truth of what we
see or know can ony be measured by those thngs that are seen or known.
We have acknowedged that vsbe reaty, as t has come to be more
ceary defned at a certan eve of specfcaton, requres us to quafy the
asserton grass s green by addng that when we say green we mean ess
a matera thng than a reatve quaty. Coour, we coud say aong perfecty
tradtona nes, s an accdent, that s, a phenomena modfcaton of the
substance, the percepton of whch (p.169) vares accordng to dfferences
n ght and the sensbe capactes of the seeng sub|ect. To admt as much
changes nothng about the fundamenta metaphysca consttuton of
the ob|ect tsef. Coour s to a cooured ob|ect what shape s to a shaped
ob|ect: an accdent essentay reated to ts proper sub|ect, wthout whch
t cannot exst. Thus we are n no way obged to adopt a poston of
epstemoogca sceptcsm, nor shoud we suppose that reast metaphyscs
or the correspondence theory of truth has faen nto obsoescence. True,
our percepton of coour s a compex busness; moreover, the proposton
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Mind and Body
that coours are rea attrbutes of surfaces s not somethng that admts of a
strct demonstraton.
14
Nevertheess, there s some quaty nherng n the
ob|ect as form n matter, that mmedatey reates to ts capacty to absorb
and refect certan waves of ght. Ths capacty, whch n no way depends on
the seeng agent for ts actuazaton, and whch s causay and necessary
nked to our percepton of t as cooured n a certan way, s predcabe to the
ob|ect as one of ts accdents or a property of ts nature. It s st the externa
reaty, n ts vsbe aspect, that determnes our knowedge of t by means of
sght. We do not ourseves create coour, but are modfed n our senses by
sensbe quates externa to ourseves.
15
Part of the probem that emerges here s that Lakoff and |ohnson seem to be
gnorant of the reast vew of reaty artcuated n Thomst phosophy. To
beeve that there s an externa word ndependent of the percevng sub|ect,
whch not ony scence but phosophy must do, s not to say that that
externa word has no reaton to the mnd, or that our nherent stuatedness
as emboded bengs wthn the word s of no account. Reasm dffers from
deasm n that the atter so separates mnd and the word that any rea
reaton between them s mpossbe, or ese so fuses mnd and the word that
any rea dstncton between them s mpossbe. Reasm aso guards aganst
that scentstc ob|ectvsm-and ths I thnk s Lakoff and |ohnson's rea
target-whch seeks (n van) to emnate a sub|ectvty from the human
encounter wth reaty. Knowedge aways begns wth a rea ob|ect; but for
potenta knowedge to turn nto actua knowedge somethng more than
body sense s requred from (p.170) the sub|ect. I can know by regsterng
at a purey sensory eve that my eyes are recevng stmu n the form
of pnprcks of ght. Or I can know by regsterng at a deeper perceptua
eve that I am actuay seeng a custer of stars beongng to a gaaxy many
hundreds of ght years away. And I can know at another ntegbe or
sprtua eve st that these stars somehow refect the omnpotent wsdom
of God. We hnted earer at the prncpe asserted by the ancents that the
ob|ect of knowedge s aways proportonate to the power of knowedge,
or conversey, that the understandng of the knower must be adequate to
the thng known. Ths prncpe of adequation means that the same reaty
can be known at a number of dfferent eves and n dfferent degrees. Each
thng, each order of reaty wth ts dfferng grade of sgnfcance, must be
gven ts due, and t can ony be gven by a correspondng order and power
of knowedge. If there s ntegbty n the word of matera thngs (and
metaphysca reasm says there s), then we must suppy a correspondng
ntegence to have any hope of understandng t.
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THE EMBODIED MIND AND KNOWLEDGE
Ths brngs us to the queston concernng the mnd's capabtes. Thomst
phosophy teaches that the mnd and the unverse are nnatey ordered
towards one another. Whe the senses are whoy receptve, the mnd s
not atogether a bank sate passvey watng for data. Nor s the unverse a
mute and empty chaos, passvey watng to be arranged. Each s somehow
oriented, so that knowedge arses as a meetng and unon of the two.
Chesterton umnatngy expans:
The mnd s not merey receptve, n the sense that t
absorbs sensatons ke so much bottng-paper..On the
other hand, the mnd s not purey creatve, n the sense
that t pants pctures on the wndows and then mstakes
them for a andscape outsde. But the mnd s actve, and
ts actvty conssts n foowng, so far as the w chooses
to foow, the ght outsde that does reay shne upon rea
andscapes. That s what gves the ndefnaby vre and
even adventurous quaty to ths vew of fe; as compared
wth that whch hods that matera nferences pour n upon
an uttery (p.171) hepess mnd, or that whch hods that
psychoogca nfuences pour out and create an entrey
baseess phantasmagora. In other words, the essence of the
Thomst common sense s that two agences are at work;
reaty and the recognton of reaty; and ther meetng s a
sort of marrage.
16
These words remnd us of two mportant ponts. Frst, whe the mnd may be
descrbed as a tabula rasa, t s both actve and passve. Sense mpressons
of matera thngs, converted and syntheszed by the nterna senses of
percepton, magnaton, and memory, provde the raw matera for an
actve conceptua process. The human mnd s therefore a potent force,
naturay orented towards ntegbe assmaton of the word. It actvey
progresses n the attanment of knowedge, enargng tsef as t ncreasngy
comprehends and so dentfes tsef wth the unverse of ob|ects. Second, the
w pays a vta roe n human knowng. The roe of the w has gone argey
unexpored n ths chapter, yet t s the w and the affectons whch govern
the degree to whch the mnd and the senses are receptve and doce to new
knowedge. Ths fact fts n turn wth the rreducby ntentona character
of conscous psychc actvty, unearthed agan near the turn of the twenteth
century by German phosopher Franz Brentano (1838-1917). Ths s not to
Page 11 of 22
Mind and Body
say that the mnd mposes upon reaty an a'pror pattern or sgnfcance that
reaty woud otherwse ack. It smpy means that a actvty of the mnd,
a thought and percepton, s drected towards a content, towards some
thng. It s not the case, as wth Kantan man, that I |ust thnk (lch denke
berhaupt). Thought aways nvoves an orentaton, and even then not |ust
to the fact of thngs, but to ther what. Ony by vountary gvng ourseves
over to the ob|ects that we know, as t were by an act of fath or ove, can we
formuate true |udgements about them.
We are now faced wth a strkng possbty that becomes cear when
we ask what foows from ths mutua orentaton of the mnd wth the
word of reaty, from ths tendency or ncnaton of the unverse to
yed understandng of tsef precsey to the human beng. |osef Peper
summarzes the Schoastc doctrne thus: A that exsts s essentay open
to human percepton. The form of thngs, ther ntrnsc confguraton, s n
ts essence orented toward (p.172) becomng the possesson of the human
mnd (snce "to know an ob|ect" means "to have ts form")..A thngs are
ntrnscay knowabe, ncudng those reams that reman hdden to us.
17
If
the organ of knowng must be ftted to that whch s known, and f that whch
s known ncudes matera enttes as we as ther ntegbe character
(form), then n prncpe the human mnd s capabe of comprehendng the
entre matera and ntegbe unverse of bengs; t s, n Thomstc terms,
capax universi. And so by thought, as Pasca ater put t, I encompass the
unverse.
18
In sayng ths, we are grantng to the mnd powers that the ancents
predcated of the entty they termed sou or sprt. Our engagement wth
the word nvoves the cooperatve nterpay of a range of sensory and
nteectua powers, whose operaton provdes an nterpretatve framework
wthn whch we try to make sense of the word. To know somethng s
not smpy to encounter ts phenomenoogca appearance, but to grasp
ts form, to understand ts ntrnsc confguraton, ts pattern or prncpe of
organzaton, a comprehenson that mpes, as Mchae Poany proposed,
a tact knowedge of what to ook for.
19
We know somethng not merey
when we have perceved t as a partcuar thng, but ony when we have
understood t to be a partcuar thng of a certan knd. Unt then, unt,
that s, our mnd has embraced ts form, t remans unntegbe to us. We
know that t s, but we do not know what t s. And snce a thng's form s ts
ntegbe content and not ts matera composton, t cannot be grasped
by matera sense aone. It can be grasped ony by mmatera nteect. For
uness the mmatera, ntegbe forms of whch we are speakng are mere
Page 12 of 22
Mind and Body
fctons, or puttng t another way, uness the commonates we perceve
between certan ndvdua bengs are not rea and actua n them but are |ust
a fgment of our own makng, then the mnd that conceves and knows and
understands them must, n needng to be adequate to them, be ntegent
and mmatera.
Thomas Aqunas argues ths very pont n a number of paces, usuay aganst
those who, hodng to a reductonst physcasm, (p.173) suppose that the
nteect s matera. Aqunas starts from the fact that bodes can ony know
other bodes by some knd of quanttatve nteracton or contact. Human
bengs, aong wth some of the hgher non-human anmas, possess certan
sensory-motor and perceptve powers that aow them to sense, perceve,
magne, dream, and remember. A these operatons are neuray and
materay nstantated. The ob|ects known by them are aso a matera or
partcuar or both. But we aso know that human bengs are capabe of an
even hgher mode of actvty. They are capabe of knowng non-matera
and genera ob|ects: concepts and casses, patterns and prncpes. These
consttute ntegbe ob|ects or forms, whch cannot be grasped materay.
Snce these unversa and ntegbe ob|ects are vrtuay nfnte n scope,
the human mnd or nteect must aso have nfnte capabtes.
20
What then s the roe of the body n the mnd's unque nteectve
operatons? Are we here back to a duastc anthropoogy n whch the mnd
or sou, as a dstnct mmatera substance, apprehends a word of ntegbe
ob|ects ndependenty of ts specfc, emboded condton n the word?
In the descrpton of the mnd-body reatonshp |ust outned, the operatons
of the mnd are certany mmatera. But ths fact n no way means that the
source of these operatons, the sprtua sou or nteect, s compete n tsef
or ndependent of the ntegray emboded human consttuton. Let us hear
the expanaton of Sertanges:
Thought s born n us after ong processes of preparaton n
whch the whoe body machne s at work. The chemstry of
the ce s the bass of everythng; the most obscure sensatons
prepare our experence; ths experence s the product of the
work of the senses, whch sowy eaborate ther acqustons
and fx them through memory. It s amd physoogca
phenomena, n contnuty wth them and n dependence on
them, that the nteectua operaton takes pace.
21
Page 13 of 22
Mind and Body
In other words, the human mnd s a part of a compex psychophysca
whoe. Yet t s a part whose mmatera operatons are nfntey (p.174) more
determnatve for the whoe than the matera operatons of the sentent
body. At any gven moment, a person's body s undergong contnua fux and
repacement. The ndvdua ces that presenty consttute my physca body
are by and arge dfferent from those that consttuted t tweve months ago.
Yet I am st mysef. Some non-matera quaty or prncpe that makes me
what I am has remaned contnuous. Ths I, ths persona source or centre
of dentty, s coextensve wth my body n so far as the atter s dentfed
as an organzed corporea pattern, a form, a Cestalt, rather than a specfed
number of actua matera partces. The prncpe that makes ths pattern
what t s, that makes ths congomeraton of partces a vng, partcuar
human beng rather than a cow or refrgerator, s that whch the Schoastc
tradton dentfes as the sou, the form of the body.
THE EMBODIED MIND AND SPIRITUALITY
It may seem that we have wandered n ths chapter far beyond the bounds
of our book's man concern wth sprtua fe n the fesh. Yet t s not wthout
sgnfcance that Lakoff and |ohnson concude ther Hercuean voume wth a
secton devoted to the reaton between ther concept of the emboded mnd
and sprtua or regous experence, and t s ths secton that I shoud ke
now to address.
A far porton of Philosophy in the Flesh s amed at demonstratng the
metaphorca character of a conceptua thought. Before human bengs
even begn to conceptuaze, certan structures or patterns of thnkng-
derved from a combnaton of persona hstory, spata orentaton, and
body experence, and the specfc physoogca structure of the human
bran-have been determnatvey ntegrated at an unconscous eve nto the
very processes by whch thnkng s possbe. Lakoff and |ohnson are carefu
to add that ths does not rue out the reatve vadty of certan mora or
truth cams about the way thngs are or shoud be. In so far as they serve
to ensure human survva (a concept eft undefned), those basc-eve
conceptua categores that can be shown from emprca evdence to ft
(p.175) the categores of the word, may be defended as egtmate.
22
Never
do Lakoff and |ohnson stop to ask whether the evauatve framework they
themseves are proposng as normatve mght aso arse from metaphorca
categores based on nvad a'pror assumptons. Assertng that emprca
evdence aone s suffcent to determne the adequacy of one metaphorca
category over another, they unashamedy prvege the metaphorca
Page 14 of 22
Mind and Body
categores produced by ther partcuar verson of cogntve scence, whch
they propose as aone capabe of provdng a pror understandng of a
other conceptua systems, ncudng those of phosophy and regon.
23
Now f cogntve scence has earned anythng about the mnd-body
reatonshp, t s, as |osef Peper once remarked on the observatons of Erch
Przywara (1889-1972), to have dscovered the dmenson of mystery n
a our knowng.
24
Lakoff and |ohnson, so far as I can te, are not wthout
cognzance of ths fact. In argung that the mnd's capacty for perceptua
and conceptua knowedge s condtoned by and dependent on ts essenta
embodment, they reartcuate one of the most fundamenta and orgna
contrbutons of the Thomstc anthropoogca synthess. Accordng to ths
dua-though expressy non-duastc-vson of the human person, the mnd
s not so much ocazed somewhere n the body, but tsef contans and
confgures and consttutes the body n ts dynamc, ordered unty. Mnd
makes the vng human organsm what t s, whch s not a corpse, nor a
coaguated mass of ces and energy, but a person: an ntegrated, actuazed,
and ratona mora sub|ect. The mnd's orentaton towards the matera word
s a consequence of ts nherent orentaton towards the body, a naturay
consttutve orentaton whch makes t, aong wth the body, an ntegra part
of the matera word. Peper comments on the sgnfcance of ths vson over
aganst a forms of dscarnate sprtua deasm:
Ths reastc outook knows and accepts that man, n order
to functon as man, needs to move wthn the structure
of accustomed surroundngs; that he needs the famar
envronment of hs day work and actvtes; n short, that he
needs the specfc, physca word cose to hs senses. Because
man s ndeed not pure sprt, he cannot ve excusvey vis-
-vis de l'univers, (p.176) aways facng the whoe word; he
cannot smpy ve beneath the stars, he aso needs a roof
over hs head.
25
If ths s the cassca Chrstan outook, and t has been ths book's basc
asserton from the start that t s, then t s curous that Lakoff and |ohnson
target the Chrstan tradton n ther sweepng crtque of regous forms
that deny the fundamenta ntegrty of body exstence. The frst part of
ther argument poses no rea probem, snce t descrbes nothng proper to
ncarnatona Chrstanty, but ony what one fnds n orenta, gnostc, and
New Age regons:
Page 15 of 22
Mind and Body
Requrng the mnd and Sou to be emboded s no sma
matter. It contradcts those parts of regous tradtons around
the word based on rencarnaton and the transmgraton of
sous, as we as those n whch t s beeved that the Sou can
eave the body n seep or n trance. It s not consstent wth
those tradtons that teach that one can acheve, and shoud
aspre to acheve, a state of pure conscousness separate from
the body.
26
From here, however, Lakoff and |ohnson go on to characterze two promnent
tradtons n Chrstanty, one of whch apparenty transgresses ther dea
vson of emboded sprtuaty. Here they cte, wthout any eaboraton, the
dstncton made by |esus Semnar fgure Marcus Borg n hs book subtted
8eyond Dogmatic Religion to a More Authentic Contemporary Faith, between
a monarcha mode of God, n whch God s dstant (bad), and sprt
modes of God, n whch God s mmanent (good). Here s not the pace
to dscuss the theoogca and hstorca vadty of ths partcuary vugar
characterzaton. Needess to say, Lakoff and |ohnson's preferred tradton
s the sprt mode. The monarcha mode or dstant-God tradton, by
contrast, s purported by Lakoff and |ohnson to be bound up wth the dea
that we are essentay dsemboded sous, faen nto the terrestra ream,
destned to return to the word of God. Chrstans, n ths vew, are supposed
to ead a hoy fe espousng a moraty n keepng wth what God requres
for ther savaton, so that they mght go to heaven and be unted wth God n
the ream beyond ths earthy word.
27
(p.177) Lakoff and |ohnson coud have avoded makng an embarrassng
error on ths pont by readng the prmary sources of the New Testament
and the cathoc Chrstan tradton themseves, nstead of reyng on Marcus
Borg. That tradton s perennay characterzed by the convcton that ts
members are nvoved n a persona, rtua, narratve, and soca encounter
wth God n the fesh, that s, wth a transcendent, ntegbe beng who
has rendered hmsef accessbe and mmedatey present va sensbe and
persona forms. In the openng words of St |ohn's frst epste, Chrstan fath
concerns that whch we have heard, whch we have seen wth our eyes,
whch we have ooked at and our hands have touched. Of course, few woud
deny that Chrstan dscourse nvoves a metaphorca conceptua vocabuary
and hstorcay embedded forms. As Aqunas asserts, Incorporea thngs,
of whch there are no mages, are known by us by means of ther reaton to
sensbe bodes of whch there are mages.
28
Any natura knowedge of God
depends on sense-experence and the emboded, materay and cuturay
Page 16 of 22
Mind and Body
contextuazed magnaton. But as |anet Martn Soskce has argued n her
cogent defence of theoogca reasm, ths contextuaty does not deprve
the descrptve vocabuary of ts referenta status.
29
Snce anguage about
God s based on the rea, anaogous reaton between created thngs and
ther creator, Chrstans regard ther metaphors both as expanatory and
reaty depctng. And perhaps most sgnfcanty, and n contrast to the
ndvduasm more characterstc of gnostc regon, ths knd of theoogca
reasm emphaszes, n a way that nether an emprcst nor an deast
poston does, the mportance to Chrstan beef of experence, communty,
and an nterpretve tradton.
30
The odd verson of monarcha Chrstanty
that Lakoff and |ohnson present more cosey resembes the ngerng sprt
of Manchaean gnostcsm whch ncarnatona Cathocsm, precsey as
a dogmatc regon, has for ts entre two mena-ong exstence roundy
condemned. Lakoff and |ohnson are after an emboded sprtuaty that
at east begns to do |ustce to what peope experence. It s no good,
they compan, speakng of transcendence or mystery or reveaton or God
f there are no attendng body (p.178) experences of these otherwse
conceptua enttes. Not surprsngy, they suggest a way forward through
the panenthest doctrne of neo-pagansm, descrbed n amost Bergsonan
terms as a sprtuaty of empathc connecton wth the dvne n a thngs.
31
In speakng of the dvne n a thngs, Lakoff and |ohnson have departed
from the sef-mposed emprca parameters of ther research, and, mpcty
acknowedgng that man s a regous anma, have embarked wth the Stocs
of od upon a quest for a dvne word sprt, whch besdes sex may arguaby
be the ony mystcsm eft open to a materast wordvew. Paradoxcay
t s a quest common to a those forms of dogma-ess sprtuaty whch,
precsey n tryng to get away from the evs of exstence, end up gettng
away from exstence.
There s, of course, a measure of vadty n panenthesm. Tradtonay
Chrstanty has aways affrmed the presence of God n a thngs n ts
doctrne of creaton and provdence. In ts fundamenta reatedness to ts
creator the unverse bears traces of the dvne. Through sensbe experence
the mnd can penetrate the matera unverse and dscover ts ntegbe
content, by whch we can rse to a rea, though mted knowedge of God.
But by no means does ths encounter wth the dvne n the natura word
requre us to carcature the mystery of God and emnate a sense of
dvne transcendence. For no matter how satsfyng t may be for our sou to
commune wth God n nature, t st eaves unanswered that more pressng
phosophca queston, expcty asked by Lebnz and Hedegger, but reay
forced upon hstory for the frst tme by the |udaeo-Chrstan tradton: why
Page 17 of 22
Mind and Body
s there somethng, rather than nothng? Here we see that the rea mystery
before us, as Wttgensten put t, s not smpy how thngs are n the word,
but that the word exsts.
32
And ony a regon of reveaton, et us even ca
t a monarcha regon, can come cose to touchng upon ths mystery.
The Chrstan regon has vewed the neary unversa regous nstnct to
fnd sprtua reates embedded n symbos and sensory experence as a
natura human mpuse, an orentaton propery reazed n the experenta
daectc of affrmaton and negaton. (p.179) By means of ts reveatory
symbos, ts narratve and hstorca roots, and ts sacramenta and turgca
ceebratons, Chrstanty affrms the consttutve pace of certan body,
matera, and partcuar forms as contngent, symboc meda mpregnated
wth dvne presence. By dweng n these forms, as Poany woud say,
by surrenderng our body to them, we come to experence the God present
n them.
33
But not |ust any symboc meda w do. As Aqunas expans,
Chrstan sacramenta meda have a doube dmenson. On the one hand,
they serve as vehces for the human worshp of God; on the other hand,
they serve as vehces for God's sanctfcaton of human bengs. And snce
ths atter es n God's power, man cannot decde what shoud be used for
the purpose: that s for God to determne. Natura regon ooks for God n
any and everythng, and naturay so. But whether a thng utmatey makes
us hoy or not depends not on ts natura power, but on God's decson.
34
Thus the causa, sprtua power of reveatory meda es not n ther natura
propertes, but n the speca use God makes of them n communcatng
hmsef to hs creatures, a use ndcated by the specfc words and events of
savaton hstory.
Few have expressed ths sacramenta partcuarzaton n such stark terms as
Martn Luther who, n hs defence of God's sef-ocazaton for the sake of the
mts of human apprehenson, based a hs theoogzng on the fact of God's
body presence n the human fesh of Chrst and n ts rtua extenson n
the church's consttutve turgca practces. Luther of course acknowedged
the dvne presence n a thngs n genera: he s present n a creatures,
and I mght fnd hm n a stone, n fre, n water, or even n a rope, for he
certany s there.
35
Nevertheess, these thngs te us nothng of God's true
dsposton towards us, and so ther reveatory capacty remans obscure
or ambguous. God therefore has conceaed hmsef n the sure and certan
sgns dscosed n the Scrptures and emboded n the church's sacraments.
In ths way we can take hod of hs sef-gvng n a manner commensurate
not ony wth hs w to be known (p.180) as a gracous God but aso wth the
mtatons of our psychophysca make-up.
36
Page 18 of 22
Mind and Body
The fpsde to ths affrmatve or kataphatic way s the negatve or apophatic
way: God s affrmed precsey by negatng the experence of the senses
and the capacty of any symboc meda fnay to dscose hm. Ths aspect
of the daectc, known aready to the Aposte Pau when he spoke of the
engmatc character of Chrstan experence, was expressed wth ncreasng
carty n the mystca tradton runnng n a ne from Cement of Aexandra
through Gregory of Nyssa, Donysus the Areopagte, and Maxmus the
Confessor, rght through to Aqunas and the ate-medeva mystcs. Thus,
n the mystcsm of Donysus the Areopagte, whose bref corpus s quoted
n the 5umma theologiae of Thomas neary as often as the wrtngs of
Augustne and Arstote, God s known most certany n the darkness of
unknowng, so that the most dvne knowedge of God, that whch comes
through unknowng, s acheved n a unon far beyond mnd, when mnd turns
away from a thngs, even from tsef, and when t s made one wth the
dazzng rays, beng then and there enghtened by the nscrutabe depth of
Wsdom.
37
THE LIMITS OF SCIENCE
In summarzng our evauaton of Lakoff and |ohnson's work, t s mportant
to remember that t s posed as a theoretca argument arsng from what
the authors ca second-generaton cogntve scence, whch n turn has
appeared on the stage of hstory as one trend of many wthn a much wder
fed of research that s currenty the scene of ntense schoary debate and
contnua theoretca revson. It has not been my ntenton, nor woud t
be wthn my competence, to evauate the vadty of Lakoff and |ohnson's
scentfc cams. As t has become cear, however, a sgnfcant porton
of ther argument (p.181) s devoted to debunkng certan phosophca
postons whch, n ther vew, consttute most of the centra themes of
the Western phosophca tradton. As t turns out, however, Lakoff and
|ohnson's postve cams reay chaenge ony a few dosyncratc and
wdey debated streams of thought, ncudng strct Cartesan duasm and
aspects n the tradton of Ango-Amercan anaytc phosophy. Ths amost
omncompetent range of the authors' scope, a not untypca trat n any
revsonst enterprse, hardy bosters confdence n the vadty of ther
phosophca and scentfc argumentaton n genera. Further |udgement
must rest wth those better quafed than I, athough, n the words of one
revewer,
ther expct and oft-repeated expectaton that the work
of cogntve scentsts w deepy change the practce of
Page 19 of 22
Mind and Body
phosophy.s based on a questonabe understandng of the
foundatons of phosophy, an apparenty mted apprecaton
of the breadth and dversty of Western Thought, and, more
mportanty, on a vson of the roe of scence n cuture that s
at best somewhat nave, and at worst a tte dangerous.
38
One repeatedy has the sense that the authors commt the mstake of
confusng the ways of knowng for thngs known. That s, they make the
mstake of takng a partcuar epstemoogca descrpton, one proposed by
a partcuar scentfc endeavour aready undergong substanta revson
on the bass of ever new fndngs, and makng t the foundaton for an
new ontoogy of humanty and the word. In ths way, t seems to me, they
commt what Gson dentfed as an od error, substtutng the defnton for
the defned, the descrpton for the descrbed, the map for the country.
39
For no matter how our concepts come to be expressed, the queston remans
whether and how they are nformed by the reates of the word.
For the daogue that Lakoff and |ohnson have entered to proceed frutfuy,
t seems to me that t w be vta not to re|ect ether tradtona Chrstanty
or the reast phosophca tradton prematurey, or at east not unt there
s certanty as to what they are. Those tradtons frmy acknowedge the
body as an ontoogca good and an ntegra epstemoogca key. At the
same tme, they deny that the body s the measure of a thngs. It has
been my am to show (p.182) that t s qute possbe, startng from ordnary
experence, to express the tradtona Chrstan doctrne of the sou n
emprcay responsbe terms. Foowng the rudments of what has been
reated here to ther proper concusons, one coud aso do so wth the
Chrstan doctrne of the mmortaty of the sou, ts tempora separaton
from the body at death, and the defntve rentegraton of sou and body at
the resurrecton. In ths way we mght come to see that the phosophca
reasm and Chrstan transcendentasm that Lakoff and |ohnson so ghty
dsmss may n fact end support to ther attempt to artcuate a phosophy
of the fesh, for fe n the fesh. It mght aso aert us to the dangers of takng
one aspect of a reaty and wrongy turnng t nto the whoe, n attendng to
the emboded partcuars of fe and human hstory n such a way that one
oses sght of the sprtua dmenson. In ths respect, I beeve that Thomst
phosophy, n addton to beng true, s of mmense assstance. Copeston
concuded hs exquste summary of Thomst teachng wth words most
apposte to our topc:
Page 20 of 22
Mind and Body
To those who thnk that phosophca theores must be erected
on the changng hypotheses of the scences, the phosophy
of Aqunas can be of tte but hstorca nterest. But to those
who thnk that phosophca refecton s grounded n common
experence and that metaphyscs has an ntmate connexon
wth ths experence t can be a source of constant stmuus
and nspraton.
40
(p.183) Further Readng
Peper ( 1989 | 1963-6 |), Ader ( 1990 ), and Phppe ( 1999 ) are common-
sense gudes, whe Gson (1990) on epstemoogca reasm shoud be
hgh on any readng st. Stump ( 2003 : 191-276) brngs to questons on
mnd, body, and cognton a ucd understandng of Aqunas and a humbe
apprecaton of the chaenges of contemporary scence. I have earned much
from Decaen ( 2001 ) on coour reasm, |ak ( 1983 , 1989 ) and |eeves (
1994 ) on bran scence, and Soskce ( 1985 ) on metaphor.
Notes:
(1) Stump 2003 : 204.
(2) Lakoff and |ohnson 1999 : 17.
(3) Aqunas, Disputed Ouestions on the Truth 2. 6 ad 3; quoted n Peper
1989 |1963-6|: 95.
(4) Sertanges 1961 |1921|: 20.
(5) I do not ntend to engage wth Dennett's un|ustfaby popuar work here.
For a crtca revew, see Hart 2007 .
(6) See |eeves 1994 .
(7) Boyd 1980 .
(8) Lakoff and |ohnson 1999 : 105. Itacs n the orgna.
(9) Ibd. 109.
(10) See Decaen 2001 .
(11) Lakoff and |ohnson 1999 : 105.
Page 21 of 22
Mind and Body
(12) Ferraoo 2002 : 60.
(13) Ouoted n |ak 1983 : 92.
(14) Decaen 2001 : 208.
(15) See the penetratng anayss of sght by Phppe 1999 : 61-4.
(16) Chesterton 2001 |1933|: 155.
(17) Peper 1989 |1963-6|: 56, 58.
(18) Base Pasca, Penses (Trotter 1934 : 97).
(19) For a dscusson of Poany's dea of tact knowedge, see Louth 1983 :
59-65.
(20) See Thomas Aqunas, 5umma contra gentiles b. 2 d. 49 nn. 1-11
(Anderson 1956 : 146-9).
(21) Sertanges 1961 |1921|: 34.
(22) Lakoff and |ohnson 1999 : 26-30.
(23) Ibd. 136.
(24) Peper 1989 |1963-6|: 36.
(25) Ibd. 96.
(27) Ibd. 564.
(28) 5umma theologiae Ia q. 84 a. 7.
(29) Soskce 1985 : 150.
(30) Ibd. 112, 149.
(32) Ludwg Wttgensten, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1919): 6. 44 (Pears
and McGunness 1971 : 149).
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Mind and Body
(33) See Buckey and Yeago 2001 .
(34) 5umma theologiae IIIa q. 60 a. 5.
(35) See Martn Luther, The 5acrament of the 8ody and 8lood of Christ-
Against the Fanatics (1526): LW xxxv. 342.
(36) Martn Luther, 5ermons on the Cospel of 5t. john: Chapters 6-8 (1530-
2), LW xx. 123.
(37) Donysus the Areopagte, The Divine Names 7. 3 (Lubhed and Rorem
1987 : 109).
(38) O'Donovan-Anderson 2000 .
(39) Gson 1937 : 72.
(40) Copeston 1955 : 255.

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