DHARAVI AND DRP Today the government of Maharahstra is looking to redevelop Dharavi without a clear and detailed idea

a of how many people live and work there and how its large and diverse economy functions. No-one knows how many people live and work in Dharavi; estimates vary from 350,000 to 600,000. But within its 223 hectares are concentrated an extraordinary range of industries and other enterprises producing embroidered garments, export quality leather goods, pottery, soap, cutlery, food and a great range of recycling enterprises. It certainly has an annual turnover work several hundred million dollars. It probably contributes far more to the Indian economy than most special economic zones. It also provides incomes and livelihoods for hundreds of thousands of Mumbai citizens who would otherwise have no employment. It also provides cheap accommodation. Conditions may be poor and most housing very over-crowded but Dharavi is one of the few central locations in Mumbai with cheap accommodation even if this is renting a bed in a room shared with many others. Dharavi is not a new squatter settlement formed by recent migrants (as it is sometimes portrayed). It has a long history. Many of its residents were borne here. Dharavi was already listed on maps of Mumbai over 100 years ago. Originally a fishing village on the edge of Mumbai, as the city grew so new trades developed here potters, tanners, garment workers. Walking through Dharavi, it is also possible to see the kinds of redevelopments that can work careful in-situ developments that expand living and working areas - for instance moving from one to three storey buildings with piped water and toilets installed. There are also grassroots organizations in each of the 85 neighbourhoods within Dharavi which can help design and manage such redevelopments. There is a very ambitious US$2 billion official plan for Dharavis redevelopment. It claims that it will rehouse all residents, transform the quality of life in Dharavi (with good quality provision for water, sanitation, drainage, health care and schools) at no cost to the government. Indeed, the proposed scheme suggests that government will receive hundreds of millions of dollars from this redevelopment. This redevelopment will be done by international companies who win a competitive bidding process for the right to redevelop different parts of Dharavi. The incentive for them is that they are allowed to Build many residential and commercial units for sale in Dharavi; Dharavi is so close to Bandra Kurla, the new financial district, which is what makes its redevelopment so attractive. But the residents and entrepreneurs of Dharavi have not been involved in the redevelopment plans. But the residents of Dharavi have not been consulted about this plan. It is not clear that everyone who lives in Dharavi will get rehoused. Any commercial developer will want to restrict the number of people they have to rehouse which is easily done only rehousing those who have proof of residency that many Dharavi dwellers cannot produce. Even if they do rehouse everyone, they are not likely to allow the residents much say in what kind of housing and where it is. It is very unlikely that the housing they get will make provision for their livelihoods. It is also difficult to see how the residents needs will be accommodated in what is already one of the worlds most dense settlements when the redevelopment plans will greatly increasing the number of residential units. Every company redeveloping Dharavi will

try to maximize the space for units they can sell to outsiders and minimize the space and cost of accommodating Dharavi residents and enterprises. At best, they will try to cram as many poor households as possible into multi-storey tenements which ill-suit their needs and whose maintenance costs they cannot afford. There is another way. This can include many new commercial developments to help pay for the redevelopment for instance for office buildings and for high-rise apartments for middle and upper income groups. The residents of Dharavi recognize the need for this. But they demand that the planning and its implementation must involve them. There needs to be a detailed enumeration of all households and enterprises in Dharavi something that the grassroots organizations in Dharavi and the National Slum Dwellers Federation and many professionals supporting this process, can do with government agencies. Then it needs careful plans developed with the residents of each of Dharavis 85 neighbourhoods. New housing will have to be developed but to rehouse the current population, most of this will have to be in three or four storey buildings with provisions also made to accommodate enterprises. This must also be done in-situ and incrementally, with careful provision for housing close by for those who have to move to allow this redevelopment. Again, grassroots organizations can manage this. We have also worked with architects from the Kamla Raheja Vidyanidhi Institute for Architecture and students from the Centre for Environmental Planning and Technology (Ahmedabad) to show how this can be done. How high-density redevelopment for residents can be achieved without high rises. The true story of Dharavi Start of DRP

October 2003: A task force headed by chief secretary and consisting of 11 government and non-government officials constituted by government to prepare an action plan for transforming Mumbai into a world-class city by 2013.

February 2004: The task force emphasised that its recommendations should be processed on fast track. One such initiative recommended was the development of Dharavi

February 2004: A proposal of a project management consultant (PMC) Mukesh Mehta for redevelopment of Dharavi was accepted by the government on the recommendation of Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA). The government appointed the PMC with a consultancy fee of one per cent of the estimated project cost of Rs 5,600 crore. The expenditure on DRP was to be met from the resources of SRA.

Incomplete survey

April 2004: In order to identify the details of the structures on the project area, the work of Plane Table Survey (physical enumeration of land details with structures and slum dwellers) for the project started, but could not be completed.

November 2007: A fresh geographical information system based biometric baseline socioeconomic survey was ordered for DRP by the Officer on Special Duty. Even this survey was not completed. Non-acquisition of private land

September 2008: DRP covers an area of 240.35 hectares of which 57.68 hectares is owned by private parties and needs to be acquired for the project. As the land acquisition process is complicated and time-consuming, the government in September 2008 decided that the developers should do the land acquisition. If the developer fails to acquire the land, it would have to be acquired under the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act 1976 or the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act 1976 as the case may be. It was decided to exclude 66.60 hectares of land (57.68 hectares private land plus 8.92 hectares of railway land) from DRP with a condition to merge the same in the project at a later date. Even now the process of land acquisition is not complete. Cancellation of global tenders

June 2007: DRP invited expression of interest from developers and short-listed 19 on the basis of specified selection criteria. At the time of inviting tenders, the basic parameters like eligibility, acquiring of land under private ownership, modification of DCRs for the project etc were not finalised. CAG claims it noticed that these are still pending and owing to nonfinalisation of basic parameters of the project, 13 bidders withdrew. Six bidders remained for five sectors in Dharavi.

September 2008: The OSD consulted an expert regarding the tendering process initiated by DRP and the expert found it defective. As DRP was a public-private partnership project

(PPP) the invitation should have been a request for proposal (RFP) instead of bids invited by DRP. The various risks such as political risks, the risk of acceptance by slum dwellers, delays in approvals by various bodies like MCGM, trends in real estate market were not analysed by DRP. The bid document didnt even provide for any risk sharing mitigation. Based on this, the expert suggested rewriting the RPF. However, this advice was not heeded by DRP and the bids were kept alive and cancelled only in May 2011.

May 2011: Government issued an order to award the redevelopment of one sector, i.e. sector V, through MHADA. MHADA has not yet prepared any proposal for this sector. EFFECTS OF DRP

It offered massive profits to developers and government without actually providing for Dharavi residents displaced by new development.

The planning process was top-down, without community participation. Previous redevelopment plans had required, in principle, the consent of at least 70 percent of residents; even if imperfectly implemented, this provision forced developers to take residents' wishes into account. The DRP, in contrast, explicitly set out to remove this check on developers.

With public input excluded, the proposed redevelopment would inevitably be aligned with the interests of global investors and their local affiliates, not the residents of Dharavi. Advantage Fostering inclusion. Slum upgrading addresses serious problems affecting slum residents, including illegality, exclusion, precariousness and barriers to services, credit, land, and social protection for vulnerable populations such as women and children. Promoting economic development. Upgrading releases the vast untapped resources of slum dwellers that have skills and a huge desire to be a more productive part of the economy, but are held back by their status and marginality. Addressing overall city issues. It deals with city issues by containing environmental degradation, improving sanitation, lowering violence and attracting investment.

Improving quality of life. It elevates the quality of life of the upgraded communities and the city as a whole, providing more citizenship, political voice, representation, improved living conditions, increased safety and security. Providing shelter for the poor. It is the most effective way to provide shelter to the urban poor at a very large scale and at the lowest cost. In addition, in-situ slum upgrading is: Affordable. Slum upgrading costs less and is more effective than relocation to public housing. Developing land with basic services costs even less. Flexible. It can be done incrementally by the city and by the residents at a pace that is technically and financially possible for both. Viable. The poor can and are willing to pay for improved services and homes.

Disadvantage The population to be relocated is comparatively very high , so developing phase by phase will take many year, and hence the project cost may increase. Political conflicts will increase. The 1bn$ industry which includes approx. 4000+ SSU will get scattered. Slum Dwellers are not ready to accept change. Staying in dharavi is comparatively low even being centrally located , and is affordable by many low income groups . Implementation of DRP will increase the land cost and hence staying cost of dharavi . 70% will be commercialized and 30% will remain for slum dwellers. So, 70% privatization will dominate the rest 30% , which may result in increasing conflicts between two groups. DRP plans to give 225 Sqft houses for each family , but few families may need more space due to different reasons. DRP will increase the living cost of the individual , which may force them to rent their houses to earn livelihood and move to another slum. DRP may lead to exclusion of poors from the city and only benefit the middle income group in the future. Global Economic Crisis puts the massive projects into question.