Natural Risk Assessment Methodologies

ARMONIA PROJECT (Contract n 511208) APPLIED MULTI-RISK MAPPING OF NATURAL HAZARDS FOR IMPACT ASSESSMENT DELIVERABLE 2.
Report on current availability and methodology for natural risk map production
Zuzana Boukalova, Jakub Heller Ceske Centrum pro Strategicka Studia (CCSS), Water Management Department
Prague, 30 June 2005

Project funded by the European Community under the:
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, GLOBAL CHANGE AND ECOSYSTEMS
Report on current availability and methodology for natural risk map production (Del. 2.1)
Overview
Del. 2.1 collected the state-of-art for individual natural risk assessment methodologies for different risk categories applied either by scientific community or administrative end-users. Considered risks were:
o o o o o o o
Floods Earthquakes Landslides Forest fires Volcanic activities Meteorological extreme events and climate change, as well as Possible secondary effects of natural hazard discussed by the example of groundwater pollution.
The report on the results of the analysis consists of an introduction, the collection of the state-of-the art for risk assessment methodologies for each identified natural event, and a summary of state-of-the art of current methodologies for individual risk assessment methodologies for different risk categories. Each singular report on a natural event is following a common structure. The goal of the proposed research activity was to be the basis for the further research on the harmonisation of existing methodologies, data availability, technological tools and outputs, for the benefit of end users, achieving a practical result that can optimise the deployment of resources (financial, human, technological) and improve disaster mitigation and prevention. A risk assessment process for each natural hazard event was defined, always in the view of its integration into land planning. Specific methodologies and spatial resolutions were identified, corresponding to three different scales. The main differences between the three approaches, apart from the spatial resolution, are as follows: the Susceptibility approach, is developed at regional scale (ranging from 1/100,000 to 1/1,000,000): definition of areas prone to impacts of natural events and probability of occurrence in discrete categories (e.g. high, medium, low). the Hazard approach, is developed at local scale (ranging from 1/2,000 to 1/10,000): the probability that a specific event may occur in a given area within a given time window. the Site Engineering approach, is developed at site scale (ranging from 1/100 to 1/1000): suited to direct the work needed to reduce risk.
Main findings:
The state of art and the experience of ARMONIA Workpackage 2 in the field of hazard and risk assessment clearly showed that spatial planning is dealing with a multi-scale approach: spatial (regional, local general, local detailed), return period for hazard assessment (short, medium, long), methodology (susceptibility i.e qualitative, hazard i.e. diagnostic, site i.e. prognostic).
ARMONIA - Applied multi Risk Mapping of Natural Hazards for Impact Assessment
ARMONIA PROJECT
Contract n 511208
WP2: Collection and evaluation of current methodologies for risk map production
Del. 2.1 Report on current availability and methodology for natural risk map production
Project funded by the European Community under the:
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, GLOBAL CHANGE AND ECOSYSTEMS
ARMONIA PROJECT (Contract n 511208)
Deliverable 2.1
Contract Number: 511208 Project Acronym: ARMONIA Title: Applied multi Risk Mapping of Natural Hazards for Impact Assessment Deliverable N: 2.1 Due date: 30th May 2005 Delivery date: 7th June 2005
Short Description: Del. 2.1 is collecting the state-of-art for individual natural risk assessment methodologies for different risk categories applied either by scientific community or administrative end-users. Considered risks are: floods, earthquakes, landslides, forest fires, volcanic activities, meteorological extreme events and climate change, as well as possible secondary effects of natural hazard discussed by the example of groundwater pollution. Partners owning: CR4 (CCSS) Partner contributed: CO1 (T6), CR5 (UNINA), CR7 (HRW), CR9 (ECJRC), CR10 (PIK), CR11 (POLIMI) Made available to: All project partners and EC Versioning Version 0.1 1.1 1.2 2.0 Date 03.05.2005 12.05.2005 18.05.2005 30.06.2006 Name, organization First stable draft version for internal reviewers, Zuzana Boukalova, CCSS Second stable draft version, Zuzana Boukalova, CCSS Third stable draft version, Zuzana Boukalova, CCSS Final version, Jakub Heller, CCSS
Quality check Internal Reviewers: 1st Internal Reviewer: Adriana Galderisi, UNINA 2nd Internal Reviewer: Peter Bobrowsky, GSC 3rd Internal Reviewer: Daniele Spizzichino, T6 AII
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Table of contents
A. INTRODUCTION B. STATE-OF-THE-ART FOR INDIVIDUAL RISKS ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGIES FOR DIFFERENT RISK CATEGORIES B.I B.II Floods Earthquakes
B.III Landslides B.IV Forest fire B.V Volcanoes B.VI. Meteorological extreme events and climate change B.VII Possible secondary effects of natural hazards as example of groundwater pollution C. SUMMARY - Collection and evaluation of current methodologies for risk map production
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A.
Introduction
The main goal of WP 2 was to analyse the state-of-the art for individual risks assessment methodologies for different risk categories. The following natural events were studied, selected according to their diffusion and importance throughout Europe: Floods Earthquakes Landslides Forest fire Volcanoes Meteorological extreme events and climate change Possible secondary effects of natural hazards as example of groundwater pollution
Deliverable 2.1 reports on the results of the analysis and consists of the following three main parts: o o o Part A: Introduction Part B: Collection of the state-of-the art for risk assessment methodologies for each identified natural event Part C: Summary of state-of-the art of current methodologies for individual risk assessment methodologies for different risk categories.
For the singular reports of each natural event of Part B a common template was used:
Template Definition of risk (Physical definition of the natural phenomena) Typology Intensity Magnitude and Severity Definition of hazards Current methodologies for analysing representation of risks (hazard) with respect to temporal scale Data typology, format and avalability Example of hazard maps
Hazard assessment
Element at risk and exposure (Meaning the population, buildings and engineering works, economic activities, public services utilities, AIV
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infrastructure and environmental features in the area potentially affected by risk) Typology of elements Definition of exposure
Analysis of vulnerability (Characteristic of a system that describes its potential to be harmed. This can be considered as a combination of susceptibility and value) Definition of vulnerability and/or consequence Methodologies for assessment related to structural and nonstructural elements at risk
Analysis of risk (a methodology to objectively determine risk by combining probabilities and consequences or, in other words, combining hazards and vulnerabilities). Definition of risk Methodologies for risk analysis assessment Examples of risks maps and legends Risk managament
Appendix: Minimum standard (simplified model) for hazard mapping aimed at a legal directive o Various methodologies related to the 3 assumed scales of analysis in the light of a potential harmonisation of hazard maps, based on a multi-hazard perspective
Minimum standard (simplified model) for risk mapping aimed at spatial planning o o Multi-risk assessment perspective as element of the Strategic Environmental Assessment Methodologies, functions and outputs Vulnerability and/or consequence functions Risk functions Legends
Specific methodologies and spatial resolutions were identified, corresponding to three different scales. The main differences between the three approaches, apart from the spatial resolution, are as follows: the Susceptibility approach, is developed at regional scale (ranging from 1/100,000 to 1/1,000,000): definition of areas prone to impacts of natural events and probability of occurrence in discrete categories (e.g. high, medium, low).
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the Hazard approach, is developed at local scale (ranging from 1/2,000 to 1/10,000): the probability that a specific event may occur in a given area within a given time window. the Site Engineering approach, is developed at site scale (ranging from 1/100 to 1/1000): suited to direct the work needed to reduce risk.
The goal of the proposed research activity was to be the basis for the further research on the harmonisation of existing methodologies, data availability, technological tools and outputs, for the benefit of end users, achieving a practical result that can optimise the deployment of resources (financial, human, technological) and improve disaster mitigation and prevention. A risk assessment process for each natural hazard event was defined, always in the view of its integration into land planning.
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B.
STATE-OF-THE-ART FOR INDIVIDUAL RISKS ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGIES FOR DIFFERENT RISK CATHEGORIES
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B.I Floods
Author: Darren Lumbroso, HRW
1 Definition of floods .................................................. 4
1.1 Typologies....................................................................... 4 1.2 Flood magnitude, intensity and severity .............................. 4
1.2.1 Annual probability of exceedence ............................................ 4 1.2.2 Return period ....................................................................... 6
2 Hazard assessment.................................................. 6
2.1 Definition of flood hazard .................................................. 6 2.2 Current methods for analysing and representation of hazard with respect to temporal scales............................................... 6
2.2.1 Background .......................................................................... 6 2.2.2 The link between flood hazard and flood risk: The Source Pathway - Receptor - Consequence model ............................... 6
2.3 Methods for assessing flood hazard .................................... 7

2.3.1 Information on historical floods............................................... 7 2.3.2 Soil maps ............................................................................. 7 2.3.3 Aerial photography ................................................................ 8 2.3.4 Satellite imagery................................................................... 8 2.3.5 Catchment scale modelling..................................................... 8 2.3.6 Detailed hydrological and hydraulic modelling .......................... 8
2.4 Assessment of the flood hazard at different spatial scales ..... 8

2.4.1 National flood hazard assessment ........................................... 8 2.4.2 Regional or catchment scale flood hazard assessment ............... 9 2.4.3 Local scale flood hazard assessment........................................ 9 2.4.4 Assessment of coastal floods ................................................ 10
2.5 Dynamic nature of flood hazard climate change and other effects .......................................................................... 11
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2.6 Data typology, format and availability .............................. 11

2.6.1 Fluvial floods ...................................................................... 12 2.6.2 Coastal floods ..................................................................... 12
2.7 Examples of flood hazard maps........................................ 12
3 Elements at risk and exposure ............................... 18

3.1 Typology of elements ..................................................... 18 3.2 Definition of exposure..................................................... 18
4 Analysis of vulnerability ........................................ 19

4.1 Definition of vulnerability and/or consequence ................... 19 4.2 Methodologies for assessment related to structural and nonstructural elements at risk............................................... 19
4.2.1 Assessment for structural elements - economic damage to properties .......................................................................... 19 4.2.2 Assessment for non-structural elements agriculture and people ......................................................................................... 20 4.2.3 Functions for vulnerability/consequence analysis .................... 22 4.2.4 Examples of vulnerability maps............................................. 24
5 Analysis of risk ...................................................... 25

5.1 Definition of risk ............................................................ 25 5.2 Units of risk................................................................... 26 5.3 Future flood risk ............................................................ 26
5.3.1 Climate change ................................................................... 27 5.3.2 Change in values of assets ................................................... 27 5.3.3 Improved flood warning ....................................................... 27 5.3.4 Changes to flood mitigation measures ................................... 27 5.3.5 Changes in land use ............................................................ 28
5.4 Methodologies for risk analysis assessment ....................... 29

5.4.1 Qualitative and quantitative methods .................................... 29 B.I-2
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5.4.2 Functions of risk analysis ..................................................... 29 5.4.3 Examples of risk maps and legends....................................... 35
6 Risk management.................................................. 38
6.1 Generic risk management options .................................... 38
6.1.1 Controlling the source.......................................................... 38 6.1.2 Controlling the pathway ....................................................... 38 6.1.3 Controlling the exposure ...................................................... 38 6.1.4 Examples of controlling vulnerability ..................................... 38
6.2 Significance of risk ......................................................... 38
7 Glossary of all keywords ........................................ 41 8 References ............................................................ 44 Appendix: Operational standards for risk assessment aimed at spatial planning ........................................... 45
1. Simplified model for flood hazard mapping aimed at a legal directive ....................................................................... 45 1.1. Methodologies related to the three assumed scales of analysis in the light of a potential harmonisation of hazard maps, based on a multi-hazard perspective .............................. 46 2. Simplified model for risk mapping aimed at spatial planning 47 2.1. Multi-risk assessment perspective as element of the Strategic Environmental Assessment ........................................... 48 2.2. Methodologies, functions and outputs............................. 48
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1 Definition of floods
The term flood can be defined in many ways. In the context of this report a flood will be defined as a general and temporary condition of partial or complete inundation of dry land caused by the overflow of the boundaries of a water body or by the rapid accumulation of surface water runoff. This can be put more succinctly as a temporary covering of land by water outside its normal confines.
1.1 Typologies
Floods may be classified by their various causes, speed of onset and potential damage. The following broad categories of flood causes are often recognised: Flash floods that build up rapidly and lowland or plains floods which have a slower and more predictable onset; Floods from the precipitation in a rainfall event (pluvial floods) or from stored water as snowmelt; Floods from natural events and those from the failure of flood defence infrastructure or dam breaks; Flooding directly from raised groundwater and the contribution antecedent moisture conditions to increasing runoff rates Flooding from inadequate surface water drainage in urban areas (urban floods) and from minor watercourses and roadside ditches; Tidal surges and other marine conditions leading to coastal and estuarial flooding (coastal floods).
Table 1.1 shows the major types of flood and how they may be categorised.
1.2 Flood magnitude, intensity and severity

The magnitude of a flood can be defined by its relative size and frequency. The size of a flood is generally measured in terms of its flow or discharge. The common unit of discharge in rivers is cubic metres per second (m3/s). The magnitude of a flood is usually described in terms of either: An annual probability of exceedence; Return period.
It should be noted that floods are not normally described in terms of their intensity or severity. In some parts of the world (e.g. the USA) flood severity categories have been developed. These are qualitative categories such as Major flooding extensive inundation of structures and roads. Significant evacuation of people required.
1.2.1 Annual probability of exceedence

The annual probability of exceedence of a flood is the probability of a particular condition, usually a maximum flow or water level, occurring within any given year. For example a flood with a 1% annual probability of exceedance has a 1 in 100 chance of occurring in any one year.
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Table 1.1
Type of flood
Flood typologies
Type or frequency of event Winter season Number of properties affected 1 to 500? Major towns and cities may give larger numbers Geographic distribution Type of damage Type of mitigation
Coastal
Coastal fringe/estuary/mapped flood risk zone Flooding possible over large lengths of coast (for example 1953 storm) River floodplain Flooding in one or more river catchments at any one time
Inundation damage to buildings and contents Possible loss of life (in excess of 3,000 in 1953) Campsites and caravan parks particularly vulnerable Vehicles written off
Hard defence measures Soft engineered defences Storm-tide warning service Land use regulation Hard defence measures Flood storage Flood warning service Land use regulation
River (fluvial)
Winter season Summer storms
1 to 500? Major towns and cities may give larger numbers
Inundation damage to buildings and contents, vehicles written off, possible structural damage Possible loss of life especially in flash floods (for example Lynmouth, 1952 or Sarno, 1997) Deep flooding possible behind raised defences Campsites and caravan parks particularly vulnerable Inundation damage to buildings and contents especially basements
Groundwater
Prolonged seasons of rainfall
Small clusters
Certain geologies (for example limestone, chalk) Outside main river floodplain Anywhere Anywhere Outside main river floodplain Anywhere adjacent to roads or urban areas Hills? Outside main river floodplain Specific river valleys Outside main river floodplain
None?
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Water mains burst Sewerage
Any time Any time
Small clusters Isolated or Small clusters Isolated or Small clusters Isolated
Inundation damage to buildings and contents especially basements Inundation damage to buildings and contents especially basements Inundation damage to buildings and contents Possibly vehicle accidents Inundation damage to buildings and contents
None? Asset renewal by water service providers None
Storm/ highway drainage Overland flow
Intense storms especially in summer Prolonged heavy rainfall Rare
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Dam break
1 to over 1,000?
Inundation damage to buildings and contents, vehicles written off, destruction of buildings, destruction of bridges, major infrastructure disrupted Potential significant loss of life within 25 km of dam
Monitoring on-site. Risk management by owners
Minor watercourses
1 to 20 plus?
Outside main river floodplain
Inundation damage to buildings and contents
Land use regulation Hard defence measures
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1.2.2 Return period

The return period of a flood describes the frequency with which a particular condition (for example maximum flow or water level) is, on average, likely to be equalled or exceeded. It is normally expressed in years and is therefore the reciprocal of the annual exceedence frequency. It is not a reciprocal of the annual probability of exceedence although this is a reasonable approximation at higher return periods. For example a 1 in 100 year flood describes a flood event that has a approximately a 1% annual probability of being equalled or exceeded in any given year. This does not mean such a flood will occur only once in one hundred years. Whether or not it occurs in a given year has no bearing on the fact that there is still about a 1% chance of a similar occurrence in the following year.
2 Hazard assessment
2.1 Definition of flood hazard
A hazard may be defined as a situation with the potential to result in harm . A hazard does not necessarily lead to harm, but identification of a hazard does mean that there is a possibility of harm occurring. In the context of flooding, a flood hazard exists in areas where flooding can occur.
2.2 Current methods for analysing and representation of hazard with respect to temporal scales
2.2.1 Background
To evaluate flood hazard fully, the following is needed: The areal extent of the floodwater; The depth of the floodwater; Speed of onset of the flooding; The velocity of the flow in the floodplain; How often the floodplain will be covered by water; The length of time the floodplain will be covered by water; At what time of year flooding can be expected.
In many cases flood hazard maps only show the flood extent for a particular annual probability of flooding or return period.
2.2.2 The link between flood hazard and flood risk: The Source - Pathway - Receptor - Consequence model
The method used to estimate the flood hazard is linked to the way in which flood risk is to be assessed. For example, if the flood risk to people is to be assessed then a flood hazard may need to be assessed in terms of flood depths and velocities. However, if flood risk is to be estimated in terms of economic damage to buildings then the flood hazard is usually established in terms of the floodwater depth and the duration of the inundation.
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To understand the link between hazard and risk it is useful to consider the commonly adopted Source-Pathway-Receptor-Consequence model. This is a simple conceptual tool for representing systems and processes that lead to a particular consequence. For a flood risk to arise there must be flood hazard that consists of a 'source' or initiator event (i.e. high rainfall); a 'receptor' (e.g. houses or people in the floodplain); and a pathway between the source and the receptor (e.g. overland flow). This conceptual model is shown in Figure 2.1. A hazard does not automatically lead to a harmful outcome, but identification of a hazard does mean that there is a possibility of harm occurring.
Source: Reference 1
Figure 2.1
Source Pathway Receptor Consequence conceptual model
2.3 Methods for assessing flood hazard

This section will concentrate on methods that are used to assess the flood hazard in terms of its extent and depth. It should be noted that to assess some types of flood risk other aspects of the flood hazard such as the floodplain velocity and the duration for which the floodplain is inundated need to be estimated.
2.3.1 Information on historical floods

Historical flood information from major flood events that have occurred in the past can be used to produce flood hazard maps. Information on historical floods may range from local to national in its coverage. Flood hazard maps based on historical flood events often do not identify the probability associated with a flood event.
2.3.2 Soil maps

Soil maps can provide information on soil series associated with river, lake, wetland and tidal deposition. They can be useful in determining the historical floodplain at geological time-scales but do not provide any B.I-7
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indication of event probability. Raised beaches provide an example of how soil data can mislead, as these were created by isostatic uplift and may be several metres above any current flood level.
2.3.3 Aerial photography

If a historical flood was particularly large and of sufficient duration to permit mobilisation of aircraft then aerial photography may have been carried out by an organisation with an interest in flooding (for example a river management organisation or news media). This will provide information on areas that flooded during the particular flood being photographed although the magnitude of the flood (expressed in terms of probability of occurrence) may not be known.
2.3.4 Satellite imagery

Microwave and optical satellite imaging of selected river reaches can be used to detect flood conditions and produce flood extents. The limitation of flood maps based on historical events is described above.
2.3.5 Catchment scale modelling

Catchment scale hydrological and hydraulic modelling is used when assessing flood hazard at the scale of a hydrological catchment or river basin. This is described in Section 2.4.2.
2.3.6 Detailed hydrological and hydraulic modelling

Detailed hydrological and hydraulic modelling is usually used when assessing the flood hazard at a relatively small scale e.g. less than 1:10,000. This approach is discussed in Section 2.4.3.
2.4 Assessment of the flood hazard at different spatial scales

2.4.1 National flood hazard assessment
An effective method of producing national flood hazard maps is to use a digital terrain model (DTM) of the whole country combined with estimates of design flood water levels at various locations. In some European countries Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) have been mounted on an aircraft to produce a DTM of the whole country with a good vertical resolution (for example 0.5 m). A DTM produced using airborne SAR has been used to produce a national flood hazard map of the UK showing flood extents for the 1 in 100 and 1 in 1,000 year floods. The steps in producing a national flood hazard map via this method are as follows: 1 2 Establish the magnitude of the floods to be mapped (for example the 1 in 100 year flood); Estimate the peak flows for the defined floods at any point along the rivers in the country. This could be done by catchment modelling or statistical analysis of flow data;
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3 4 5
Produce a DTM of the country with a sufficiently accurate vertical resolution; Estimate the water level for the defined flood at any point along the rivers. This may require the use of a hydraulic model; Use the DTM in combination with the water levels for the defined flood to delineate the flood extent and estimate flood depths. This is usually carried out using a Geographical Information System (GIS).
2.4.2 Regional or catchment scale flood hazard assessment

To estimate flood hazard at a catchment or river basin level a catchment scale model is required. The model should be able to predict water levels at any location in the catchment for a variety of conditions. Water levels depend on river flows, which in turn depend on inflows from subcatchments. The broad scale catchment model must be able to represent: Rainfall-runoff processes, to predict inflows from sub-catchments; Flood hydrographs throughout the catchment including: - Attenuation as flood waves move along a river; - Combination of flood hydrographs at confluences and other lateral inflows; Water levels at selected points in the catchment.
Table 2.1 outlines the modelling methods to estimate catchment flood hazard.
Table 2.1
Method
Catchment modelling methods

Method for flood flow prediction Rainfall-runoff modelling and flow routing Rainfall-runoff modelling and flow routing Rainfall-runoff modelling Method for flood level prediction Rating curves, derived from a hydrological routing model Rating curves, derived from detailed hydraulic models Hydrodynamic model with minimal number of nodes or cross-sections
Simple hydrological routing Enhanced hydrological routing Sparse hydrodynamic modelling
A DTM is used together with the design water levels to delineate the flood extent and depths, within a GIS environment.
2.4.3 Local scale flood hazard assessment

At a local scale (e.g. less than 1:10,000), for example when a flood hazard assessment is required for a new housing development, flood mitigation scheme or small scale planning detailed hydrological and hydraulic modelling is required. The steps in this process are summarised below. Step 1 Topographic survey of the watercourse and floodplain
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The upstream and downstream limits of the survey should be defined by the objectives of the flood hazard assessment. The cross-sections surveyed should be representative of the watercourse channel and floodplain. The spacing between cross sections is determined by the nature of the watercourse (for example width, channel depth, slope). Survey data of any hydraulically significant structures are also required (for example, weirs, bridges, flood walls). Step 2 Hydrological assessment A hydrological assessment of the flood flows should be made using appropriate methodology and design inflows for the model produced. These are usually in the form of a hydrograph. Step 3 Construction of a hydraulic model A full hydrodynamic model should be constructed if the area contains either structures whose operation varies with time (for example pumps, sluices, tidal outfalls) or a tidal estuary. In other cases, either a steady-state or hydrodynamic model may be chosen. However, a steady-state hydraulic model may give an overestimation of water levels where significant storage is present. Step 4 Calibration and verification of the modelling Wherever practicable, the hydrological assessment and the hydraulic model should be calibrated against recorded flows and/or water levels from observed flood events. If calibration is carried out, at least one separate observed event should be run through the model after the calibration to verify the adjustment of parameters. Step 5 Estimate the design flood water levels The design flood water levels are estimated for the required return periods. A commonly used return period is the 1 in 100 year flood. Step 6 Delineate the flood extent The flood extent and depth should then be delineated using the design flood water levels and a DTM.
2.4.4 Assessment of coastal floods

The assessment of coastal floods is similar at national, regional and local scales. The primary steps involved are as follows: Step 1 Setting up tide levels and wave overtopping rates Probability distributions of the tide levels and wave overtopping rates at particular coasts are evaluated. After that, time series data of tide levels and wave overtopping rates are set up to correspond to the respective maximums in the target period for hazard maps. Step 2 Prediction of coastal dike failure The time of coastal dike failure is determined based on the destruction of the defence with the time series data of wave overtopping rate.
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Step 3 Flood simulation Inundation depth, velocity of flood flow, and flood arrival time in coastal zones are estimated by numerical simulation, taking the time series data of tide level and wave overtopping rate, and the time of coastal dike failure into account. A GIS is usually used to map the flood extent and depth. Figure 2.2 shows a schematic diagram that outlines the method for assessing coastal floods.
Wave overtopping rate Setting of tide level and wave overtopping rate
Tidal level Inundation extent Inundation depth Coastal flood dike
Figure 2.2
Example of method used to assess coastal flood extent and depth
2.5 Dynamic nature of flood hazard climate change and other effects
Allowances for the affect of climate change on the flood hazard are generally taken into account as follows: Fluvial floods A factor is applied to the peak design flow. For example, in the UK for some catchments initial research has shown that under a high emissions scenario, peak flows could increase by up to 20% by the year 2050. Hence, using the precautionary principle, in the UK peak flood flows are often increased by 20% to estimate the worst case 2050 climate change fluvial flood hazard and risk scenarios; Coastal floods When estimating future coastal flooding future increases in sea level rise are taken into account. For the UK the worst case sea level rise vary from 4 mm to 6 mm per year depending on the part of the coastline. These figures are used to estimate the worst case coastal flooding scenarios under climate change.
The flood hazard can also change for a number of other reasons for example deterioration of flood defences, geomorphological changes such as the reduction in capacity of a river channel owing to siltation or weed growth, or the construction of infrastructure such as dam.
2.6 Data typology, format and availability
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2.6.1 Fluvial floods

The type of data required for fluvial flood hazard mapping will vary depending on the scale at which the hazard assessment is being carried out and how the risk is to be quantified. However, key data requirements are as follows: Topographic data at a suitable resolution, for example: - Surveyed river cross-sections; - Surveyed floodplain sections; - Photogrametric data or contour maps; - Digital terrain model (DTM); Hydrological and hydrometric data: - Design and historical rainfall data; - Design and historical river flow data; - Details of hydrological gauging stations; Surveys of structures that have an impact on floodwater levels, for example: - Weirs; - Bridges and culverts; - Dams and reservoirs; - Flood defences and walls; Calibration and verification data from previous floods , for example: - Observed water levels; - Observed flows.
The data format should be compatible with the hydrological and hydraulic models as well as the GIS software being used to delineate the flood extent. The availability of the above data will vary depending on the catchment and watercourse. In some catchments the data will be readily available in others it may have to be collected. The quantity and type of data available will affect the method used to estimate the hazard.
2.6.2 Coastal floods

The type of data required for coastal flood hazard mapping includes: Topographic data at a suitable resolution in the form of a DTM; Surveys of coastal flood defences if these are in place; Fragility curves for coastal flood defences to assess their probability of failure; Extreme sea levels, for a range of return periods; Tidal information.
2.7 Examples of flood hazard maps

Examples of flood hazard maps are given below. Figures 2.3 to 2.13 show examples of flood maps from England, The Czech Republic, France, Italy and Germany that have been produced at different scales and using a variety of different methods.
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Source: Reference 2
Figure 2.3
Example of a national flood hazard map for the River Thames in England showing two high return period floods
Source: Reference 3
Figure 2.4
Example of a flood map showing water depth for a flood on the River Elbe in Prague
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Source: Reference 4
Figure 2.5 Example of a catchment scale 1 in 100 year flood extent and depth map using a 50 m x 50 m DTM of the catchment
Source: Reference 5
Figure 2.6 Example of a flood hazard map in London for a 1 in 1000 year flood event with climate change used in a flood risk to people assessment
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Legend Probabil ity of inund ati o n

H igh Medi um Low
Source: Reference 6
Figure 2.7
Example of a qualitative flood hazard map used in England
Source: Reference 3
Figure 2.8
Example of a flood extent generated for Prague by three different methods B.I-15
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Figure 2.9 Example of a flood extent between Belleville and Villefranche in France for a flood that occurred on 27 March 2001 using radar data
Figure 2.10 Part of a flood map in the Tagliamento basin, Italy based on a flood that occurred on 15 November 1996 B.I-16
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Figure 2.11 Flood extent map for Dresden, Germany based on the 2002 floods with a 50 m buffer round the extent
km
Source: Reference 7
Figure 2.12 Flood map for the Hague and Rotterdam in the Netherlands showing flood depths assuming a breach in the flood defences B.I-17
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Source: Reference 8
Figure 2.13 Coastal flood map for the Gretna in Scotland
3 Elements at risk and exposure

3.1 Typology of elements
The elements at risk are the receptors. These can be broadly classified as follows: The built environment, for example commercial and residential properties, schools, hospitals; People; Transport links for example roads and railways; Agriculture including crops, land and machinery; Amenity and recreation facilities for example parks and footpaths; Natural environment for example wetlands and salt marshes.
3.2 Definition of exposure

Exposure refers to the receptors (for example, the people, assets and activities) threatened or potentially threatened by a hazard. Exposure may be defined as the quantification of the receptors that may be influenced by a flood (for example, number of people and their demographics, number and type of properties). It is important to note that exposure typically refers to quantities of receptors.
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4 Analysis of vulnerability
4.1 Definition of vulnerability and/or consequence
Vulnerability may be defined as the characteristic of a system that describes its potential to be harmed. This can be considered as a combination of susceptibility and value. Consequence can be defined as an imp act su ch as economic, socia l or env ironmenta l damage/improvement that may result from a flood. It may be expressed quantitatively (e.g. by. monetary value), by category (e.g. High, Medium, Low) or descriptively. Vulnerability is often captured in the assessment of the consequences of flooding The consequences of flooding are usually assessed in terms of the following: Economic damage to assets, for example residential and commercial properties, or agricultural land; Injuries or deaths to people.
4.2 Methodologies for assessment related to structural and non-structural elements at risk
4.2.1 Assessment for structural elements - economic damage to properties
The economic damage caused by flooding to commercial and residential properties is a normally assessed by estimating the flood hazard in terms of the following two parameters: Depth of floodwater; Duration of flooding.
To estimate the economic damage for properties a relationship is required between floodwater depth and economic damage. A generic example of such a relationship is shown in Figure 4.1. The data required to estimate economic damage for properties: Type of property (for example, school, office, library, workshop); Location of each property referenced to a national grid system; Floor area of each property; Threshold level of each property. This is the level at which the property becomes inundated by floodwater; Floodwater level versus economic damage curve for each type of property; Depth and duration of flooding for a number of design return period floods.
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Figure 4.1
Generic floodwater depth versus economic damage curve used to assess economic damage to a property
It should be noted that considerable amounts of data are required to estimate economic damage to residential and commercial properties.
4.2.2 Assessment for non-structural elements agriculture and people Agriculture

The economic damage caused to agriculture by flooding is often several orders of magnitude less than the economic damage caused to properties. Economic damage to an arable crop is difficult to establish as it is a function of a number of variables including: Crop yield and price; The cost of seeds, fertilisers and agro-chemicals for the crop; Pollution of the land, for example by chemicals or saline water; The cost for the post flood clean up.
The minimum data requirements to assess agricultural economic damage caused by floods is: Classification of agricultural land into different categories (for example in terms of general crop types); Typical crop rotations that are used; Extent of flooding for a number of design return periods; Duration of the flooding; Seasonality of the flooding; Economic damage incurred by different agricultural land use classes. B.I-20
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People
The number of people injured or killed during a flood is another method by which the flood risk can be assessed. A recent research project in the UK found that the number of people injured within a given zone that is at risk of flooding can be expressed as follows: Ninj = function (Nz, FHR, AV, PV) Where: Ninj is the number of people; Nz is the number of people in the flood hazard zone at ground or basement level; FHR is the flood hazard rating. This is a function of floodwater depth, velocity and debris; AV is the area vulnerability. This is a function of the effectiveness of flood warning, the speed of onset of flooding and the nature of the area (for example the type of buildings) PV is the people vulnerability. This is a function of the age and health of the people living in a particular flood hazard zone. The number of fatalities caused a flood, Nfat, can be expressed as a follows: Nfat = function (Ninj, FHR) Hence to assess the flood risk to people the following has to be assessed: Flood hazard with respect to people; Number of people in the flood hazard zone; The area vulnerability; The people vulnerability.
To assess the risk to people posed by floods, the flood hazard is often estimated in terms of the following: Depth of floodwater (m); Velocity of the floodwater in the floodplain (m/s) The amount of debris in the water.
A simple method of establishing the flood hazard rating (HR) used in the UK is given by the formula: HR = d(v + 1.5) + DF Where: HR is the flood hazard rating; d is the depth of the floodwater in the floodplain in metres; v is the velocity of the floodwater in the floodplain in metres/second; DF is a debris factor. The debris factor has a value of 0, 1 or 2. The debris factor is a function of land use, flood depth and velocity. A flood hazard map is required that provides information on the conditions that harm people during a flood event. The way this is done is dependent B.I-21
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on the scale at which the analysis is carried out. The flood hazard, with respect to people, is categorised as follows: Low caution; Moderate dangerous for some people (for example the elderly and children); Significant dangerous for most people; Extreme dangerous for all people.
Area vulnerability
The vulnerability of a particular area to floods, with respect to people may be expressed as follows: AV = function (SO, NA, FW) Where: AV is the Area Vulnerability; SO is the Speed of Onset of the flood. This may vary from a few minutes to several hours; NA is the Nature of the Area. For example areas with mainly multi-storey apartments would be classed as low risk areas, whereas areas comprising parks or mobile homes would be classed as high risk; FW is the Flood Warning and is a function of the coverage, warning time and action taken.
People vulnerability
Vulnerability of people to flooding in a particular area may be expressed as a function of the percentage of the residents over 75 years of age and the percentage of residents suffering from long-term illnesses.
4.2.3 Functions for vulnerability/consequence analysis Economic

The flood risk in terms of economic damage is usually expressed in terms of the Annualised Average Damage (AAD). The AAD is normally calculated separately for properties and agriculture. The standard procedure for this is as follows: (i) Assess the economic damage caused by flooding for a number of return periods to allow a sufficiently accurate probability versus economic damage curve to be constructed. Integrate the area under the probability versus economic damage curve to give the annualised average damage.
(ii)
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(iii)
A typical probability versus economic damage curve used to assess annualised average damage is shown in Figure 4.2. A number of considerations are critical to the accuracy of the calculation of annualised average damage. These are:
It is vital that the threshold of flooding is correctly defined. This is as the return period at which flood damage just begins; It is important that the probability versus economic damage curve is described by a number of points exceeding four, so that errors of interpolation are not excessive.
In general it has been found that economic damage needs to be estimated for the 1 in 5, 1 in 10, 1 in 25, 1 in 100 and 1 in 200 year return period floods to accurately estimate annualised average damage. It should be noted that where there is a high level of protection against flooding a higher return period flood (for example, a 1 in 1000 year return period). When interpreting the flood risk in terms of annualised average damage (AAD), it should be noted that the AAD could be large in two contrasting situations as follows: When the consequence (i.e. economic damage) is large but the probability of the flood event is low. This is when high economic damage occurs from an event with a large return period i.e. many thousands of properties might be affected by a flood with a return period of 1 in 1,000 years; When the probability of a flood occurring is high and economic damage is low i.e. a small number of properties could be affected on a regular basis, for example annually or biannually.
Figure 4.2
Generic probability versus economic damage curve used to assess annualised average damage B.I-23
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People
The annualised average deaths or injuries to people may be estimated in a similar way to the annualised average damage.
4.2.4 Examples of vulnerability maps

Figures 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 show typical examples of vulnerability maps related to flooding.
Source: Reference 5
Figure 4.3
Area and people vulnerability maps used on the tidal River Thames in the UK to estimate risk to people
Figure 4.4 Mapping showing consequences of flooding in terms of number and economic damage to properties at a catchment level
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Figure 4.5
Mapping showing social vulnerability and number of people affected by flooding at a catchment level
5 Analysis of risk
5.1 Definition of risk
To evaluate the flood risk, consideration needs to be made of a number of components: The nature and probability of the hazard (p); The degree of exposure of the Receptors (numbers of people and property) to the hazard (e); The susceptibility of the Receptors to the hazard (s); The value of the Receptors (v).
Therefore: Risk = function (p, e, s, v) Hence vulnerability is a parameter that is taken account of in this definition of risk. Vulnerability is a function of the susceptibility of the Receptors to the flood hazard and the value of the Receptor. Vulnerability may be defined as: Vulnerability = function (s, v)
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In practice, however, exposure and vulnerability are often captured in the assessment of the consequences; thus risk can be viewed in simple terms as: Risk = Probability of flood event occurring x Consequences
5.2 Units of risk

In general, risk has units. However, the units of risk depend on how the probability and consequence are defined. Flooding can have many consequences, some of which can be expressed in monetary terms. Consequences can include fatalities, injuries, damage to property or the environment. The issue of how some of the consequences of flooding can be valued continues to be the subject of contemporary research. However, risk-based decision-making is greatly simplified if common units of consequence can be agreed upon. It is, therefore, often better to use surrogate measures of consequence for which data are available. For example, number of properties may be a reasonable surrogate for the degree of harm/significance of flooding and has the advantage of being easier to evaluate than, for example economic damage or social impact. An important part of the design of a risk assessment method is to decide on how the impacts are to be evaluated. Some descriptions of consequence are: Economic damage (national, community and individual; Number of people/properties affected; Degree of harm to an individual (fatalities, injury, stress etc); Environmental and ecological damage (sometimes expressed monetary terms).
in
5.3 Future flood risk

Flood risk is unlikely to remain constant in time and it is often necessary to predict changes in risk in the future, to make better decisions. Causes of change to flood risk include: Climate (for example, greenhouse-gas induced climate change); Change in the value of assets at risk (for example, an increase in value or contents of residential properties); Improved flood warning and response; Changes to flood mitigation measures (for example, construction of new flood defences); Changes in land use.
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The dynamic 5.1.:
nature
of
future
flood
risk
is
shown
in
Figure
Source: Reference 1
Figure 5.1
Factors that may affect future flood risk
5.3.1 Climate change

This has been discussed in Section 2.5.
5.3.2 Change in values of assets

Changes in the future value of assets will have an impact on the future flood risk. Any future changes in asset value can be taken account by modifying the economic data.
5.3.3 Improved flood warning

A well designed flood warning system can reduce the impact of flood events and as a consequence reduce flood risk. However, it is often difficult to assess fully the impact of this in the estimation of economic damage to properties resulting from flooding. However, it is possible to assess the effect of improved flood warning on the flood risks posed to people resulting from improvements in lead-times, accuracy of water level and extent predictions and a reduction in false alarms.
5.3.4 Changes to flood mitigation measures

Future changes to flood mitigation measures (for example such as the construction of flood walls or flood attenuation reservoirs) will change the flood risk. Future changes to flood mitigation measures should be represented in hydraulic models and the reduction (or increase) in flood hazard and risk estimated. B.I-27
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5.3.5 Changes in land use

The following changes in land use will change the level of flood risk: Change in the number of properties and/or people living in the floodplain; An increase in the urbanisation of the catchment resulting in increased runoff.
When estimating changes in flood risk resulting from an increase (or decrease) in urban area in an area should initially be based on development scenarios based on information from local, regional and national planning authorities. These changes should be incorporated in any future hydrological and hydraulic modelling to assess future hazard and also when assessing the consequences of flooding (for example in terms of the number of people or properties affected). A typical example of the urban development scenarios that are often assessed at short and medium/long term temporal scales are shown in Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2
Illustration of possible urban development scenarios
Land use change other than urban developments, (for example, aforestation/deforestation, changes in land management practice) may occur in the future. The impacts of rural land use change on runoff generation have not been clearly established for areas greater than 10 km2. The difficulty in obtaining consistent evidence of the effects of land use change on downstream flood response at this scale suggests that it is probably relatively moderate and dependent on the exact nature of the previous land use and local conditions (for example, climate, topography, soils). In general it would only appear that rural land use change does not have a major influence on influencing flood hazard and flood risk.
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5.4 Methodologies for risk analysis assessment

Risk analysis can be defined as a methodology to objectively determine risk by analysing and combining probabilities and consequences. Flood risk assessment comprises understanding, evaluating and interpreting the perceptions of risk and societal tolerances of risk to inform decisions and actions in the flood risk management process.
5.4.1 Qualitative and quantitative methods

Risk is generally assessed in terms of a qualitative or quantitative analysis. In terms of flood risk qualitative assessments tend to categorise flood risk to people or buildings (for example as high, medium or low). In terms of quantitative assessments flood risk in terms of damage to assets will be quantified typical in economic terms () and for people it is in terms of the number of people injured or who have died.
5.4.2 Functions of risk analysis

To evaluate the flood risk, separate consideration needs to be made of the three generic components: The nature and probability of the hazard; The degree of exposure of people and assets to the hazard; The vulnerability of the people and/or assets to damage or harm should the hazard occur.
The main steps that need to be undertaken in a risk assessment are shown in Figure 5.3. There are a variety of flood risk assessment tools that can be applied, ranging from high level methods to intermediate methods to detailed methods. The appropriate level of risk analysis to use depends upon the scale of the assessment and type of decision to be made, as shown in Figure 5.4.
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Source: Reference 1
Figure 5.3
Flood risk assessment process
Source: Reference 1
Figure 5.4
Appropriate level of risk analysis
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Flood risk assessments in terms of economic damage

The process used to assess flood risk in terms of economic damage is summarised in Figure 5.5.
Assessment of flood risk in terms of economic damage at different spatial scales

Method used to assess flood risk in terms of economic damage at different spatial scales is summarised in Table 5.1. It should be noted that at each scale a national property data set is required. This national property data set would include for each residential and commercial property in the country the data defined in Section 4.2.1 of this report. Table 5.1 Summary of assessing flood risk in terms of economic damage at a number of different spatial scales
Level of assessment National
Flood hazard Flood extents and depths based on a national DTM and flood levels Broad scale hydraulic modelling of the catchment Detailed one or two dimensional hydraulic model calibrated and verified against a number of observed flood events
Economic damage National property and agricultural data sets together with generic water level versus economic damage curves. Threshold level of properties assumed to be the same as the DTM. National property and agricultural data sets together with generic water level versus economic damage curves. National property data set with detailed water level versus economic damage for each type of property. Detailed data on property threshold levels. Agricultural estimated using detailed knowledge of crop types and damage. Farm scale assessments carried to assess crop damage.
Regional or catchment Local
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Figure 5.5
A summary of the process for analysing flood risk in terms of economic damage
Flood risk assessments in terms of injuries and death to people

The process used to assess flood risk in terms of economic damage is summarised in Figure 5.6.
Assessment of flood risk in terms of people at different spatial scales

Method used to assess flood risk in terms of injuries or deaths to people at different spatial scales is summarised in Table 5.2. It should be noted that at each scale a national property data set is required. B.I-32
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Figure 5.6
A summary of the process for analysing flood risk in terms of injuries and deaths to people
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Table 5.2
Summary of assessing flood risk in terms of people at a number of different spatial scales
Flood hazard Flood extents based on a national DTM and design flood levels Broad scale hydraulic modelling Area vulnerability Based on national property data sets People vulnerability Information based on national census data
Level of assessment National
Regional or catchment
Local
Detailed one or two dimensional hydraulic model calibrated and verified against a number of observed flood events
Based on national property data sets augmented by information from local government Based on national property data sets augmented by information from local government
Information based on national census data augmented by information from local government Information based on national census data augmented by information from local government
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5.4.3 Examples of risk maps and legends

Examples of flood risk maps are shown below. Figure 5.7 show shows a national flood risk map for England and Wales showing how the flood risk in terms of economic damage may change under different economic development scenarios by the year 2080. Figure 5.8 shows a flood risk to people map in terms of the number of deaths that are likely to occur if a 1 in 1000 year coastal flood event occurred.
2080s World markets
2080s Global sustainability
Change in average annualised economic damage under future climate change scenarios
Negligible (-1,000 to +1,000) Low increase (1,000 to 100,000) Medium increase (100,000 to 10 million) High increase (Greater than 10 million) Decrease (Less than -1,000) Outside floodplain
Source: Reference 9
Figure 5.7 National flood risk map for England and Wales showing economic damage in 2080 under different development scenarios in terms of relative average annualised damage referenced to 2002
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Source: Reference 5
Figure 5.7 Flood risk maps showing the percentage of deaths that may occur under a 1 in 1000 year flood event in Kinmel, Wales
Source: Reference 1
Figure 5.7 A high level flood risk map showing the economic risk in qualitative terms at the mouth of the River Parrot in the UK B.I-36
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Figure 5.8 A local flood risk map showing the economic damage for a flood that occurred in 1993 in Offenau in Neckar, Germany
Number of casualties
km
Source: Reference 8
Figure 5.9
Number of expected casualties in The Hague and Rotterdam if the flood defences are breached.
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6 Risk management
6.1 Generic risk management options
There are several ways of managing and reducing the overall risk of flooding, which may be discussed in similar generic terms to the risk identification process, broadly these are: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) Controlling Controlling Controlling Controlling the the the the source; pathway; exposure; vulnerability.
6.1.1 Controlling the source

Examples of source control options include:

Use of infiltration systems to manage surface water runoff; Dredging and the cutting of the channel vegetation to maintain channel capacity; Retention of natural flood storage on floodplains.
6.1.2 Controlling the pathway

Examples of controlling the pathway are:

Construction of mitigation measures such as flood walls; Emergency operations to temporarily raise defence levels during a flood.
6.1.3 Controlling the exposure

The exposure of receptors to floods can be controlled by:

Implementation of land-use planning policies to limit development in flood risk areas; Abandonment of buildings on the floodplain; Public information on reducing flood damage; Flood warning systems;
6.1.4 Examples of controlling vulnerability

The vulnerability of the Receptors can be controlled by:

Specific building regulations on flood resistant construction in flood risk areas; Ensuring safe evacuation routes; Installation of flood proofing devices; Well-practised emergency plans.
6.2 Significance of risk

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the risk, distinguishing between rare, catastrophic events and more frequent less severe events. For example, risk methods adopted to support the targeting and management of flood warning represent risk in terms of probability and consequence, but low probability/high consequence events are treated very differently to high probability/low consequence events. Other factors include how society or individuals perceive a risk (a perception that is influenced by many factors including the availability and affordability of insurance or exposure to high flow velocities for example), and uncertainty in the assessment. It is thus important when considering the significance of a risk that reference is made not only to the numerical value of the probability times consequence, but also to how it will be perceived by society or the individual. A central question in risk management refers to the acceptance of risk by the people and the decision-makers. From an engineering point of view a general framework for acceptability criteria has been developed that is based on a three-tier system, shown in Figure 6.1. This involves the definition of the following elements: An upper-bound on individual or societal risk levels, beyond which risks are deemed unacceptable; A lower-bound on individual or societal risk levels, below which risks are deemed not to warrant concern; An intermediate region between (i) and (ii) above, where further individual and societal risk reduction are required to achieve a level deemed as low as reasonably practicable (the so-called ALARP principle).
The ALARP method derives from industrial process safety applications and thus is often seen to have an engineering rather than social science heritage. Although this general framework gives a first impression on how risk acceptance can be approached, it must be stated from a social science point of view that the realms of acceptance and non-acceptance of Figure 6.1 may differ significantly between persons and that a public. Consensus on risk acceptance may not exist. Furthermore, this framework does not answer the question of how acceptance should be measured.
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Source: Reference 1
Figure 6.1
Acceptable risk levels and the ALARP principle
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7 Glossary of all keywords

Accuracy The closeness to reality. Annualised average damage This is the average economic damage from flooding that can be expected in any year. Catchment modelling A model that is represents the whole of the catchment Coastal floods A flood generated by a high tide or storm surge in the coastal plain Consequence - An impact such as economic, social or environmental damage/improvement that may result from a flood. It may be expressed quantitatively (e.g. by. monetary value), by category (e.g. High, Medium, Low) or descriptively. Damage potential - A description of the value of social, economic and ecological impacts (harm) that would be caused in the event of a flood. Deterministic process/method - A method or process that adopts precise, single-values for all variables and input values, giving a single value output Digital elevation model (DEM) - A database of elevation data represented by a regularly-spaced set of x,y,z locations. Digital terrain model (DTM) A digital representation of the height of the earths surface referenced to a particular datum. Exposure The qualification of the receptors that may be influenced by a flood hazard, for example, the number of people and their demographics, number and type of properties. Flash floods Floods that generally occur on steep or urban catchments with little warning and result in a rapid rise in water level. Flood - A general and temporary condition of partial or complete inundation of dry land caused by the overflow of the boundaries of a water body or by the rapid accumulation of surface water runoff. Flood hazard map A map with the predicted or documented characteristic (for example, extent, or velocity or depth) of flooding, with or without an indication of the flood probability. Flood risk map map showing the flood risk usually in terms of economic damage or number of injuries/deaths of people. Flood risk zoning - Delineation of areas with different possibilities and limitations for investments, based on flood hazard maps. Floodplain the area adjacent to a river that would be naturally flooded in the absence of engineered interventions. Hazard - A physical event, phenomenon or human activity with the potential to result in harm. A hazard does not necessarily lead to harm. Harm - Disadvantageous consequences. Hydrodynamic model A hydraulic model where the flow varies with time. Inundation - Flooding of land with water. (Note: In certain European languages this can refer to deliberate flooding, to reduce the consequences of flooding on nearby areas, for example. The general definition is preferred here). One dimensional hydrodynamic model A hydrodynamic model that provides on dimensional results. B.I-41
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Pathway In the context of floods provides the connection between a particular source (for example, marine storms) and a receptor (for example, property) that may be harmed. For example, the pathway may consist of the flood defences and flood plain between a flow in the river channel (the source) and a housing development (the receptor). Plains floods Floods that are usually generated from large catchments that have been subjected to long periods of heavy rainfall. They are characterised by long periods of inundation and a relatively slow rise in water level. Probabilistic method - A method in which the variability of input values and the sensitivity of the results are taken into account to give results in the form of a range of probabilities for different outcomes. Rainfall-runoff modelling A model used to estimate runoff from an area under various rainfall, land use and soil moisture conditions Rating curve The relationship between water level and flow for a given river cross-section. Receptor - Receptor refers to the entity that may be harmed (for example a person, property, habitat etc.). For example, in the event of heavy rainfall (the source) floodwater may propagate across the flood plain (the pathway) and inundate housing (the receptor) that may suffer material damage (the harm or consequence). The vulnerability of a receptor can be modified by increasing its resilience to flooding. Resilience - The ability of a system/community/society/defence to react to and recover from the damaging effect of realised hazards. Return period - The expected (mean) time (usually in years) between the exceedence of a particular extreme threshold. Return period is traditionally used to express the frequency of occurrence of an event, although it is often misunderstood as being a probability of occurrence. Risk - Risk is a function of probability, exposure and vulnerability. Often, in practice, exposure is incorporated in the assessment of consequences, therefore risk can be considered as having two components the probability that an event will occur and the consequence (or impact) associated with that event. Risk = probability x consequence. Risk analysis - A methodology to objectively determine risk by combining probabilities and consequences or, in other words, combining hazards and vulnerabilities. Risk assessment - The process of judging risks that have been analysed. Risk mapping - The process of establishing the spatial extent of risk (combining information on probability and consequences). Risk mapping requires combining maps of hazards and consequences. These maps usually show the magnitude and nature of the risk. Risk management measure - An action that is taken to reduce either the probability of flooding or the consequences of flooding or some combination of the two. River basin - The area defined by the watershed limits of a system of waters, both ground and surface, flow to a common outlet. Routing model A model used for routing flood flow hydrographs. Steady-state hydraulic model A model where the flow remains constant i.e. it does not vary with time. Source The origin of a hazard (for example, heavy rainfall, strong winds, surge).
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Susceptibility The propensity of a particular receptor to experience harm. System - In the broadest terms, a system may be described as the social and physical domain within which risks arise and are managed. Threshold level The threshold level, in the context of a property, is the level above which the property will be inundated by floodwater. Two dimensional hydrodynamic model A hydrodynamic model that provides results in two dimensions. Vulnerability - Characteristic of a system that describes its potential to be harmed. This can be considered as a combination of susceptibility and value.
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8 References
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. FLOODSite (2005) Language risk project definitions, Version 4.0, Report T32-04-01, EC project on Integrated Flood Risk Analysis and Management Methodologies Environment Agency, England and Wales website http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk/ Danish Hydraulics Institute (DHI) Department of the Environment Food and Rural Affairs (Defra)/Environment Agency, UK (2004) Modelling and decision support framework version 3.0 Department of the Environment Food and Rural Affairs (Defra)/Environment Agency, UK (2005) Flood risk to people project Department of the Environment Food and Rural Affairs (Defra)/Environment Agency, UK (2004) Risk Assessment of flood and coastal defence for Strategic Planning (RASP) project Delft Hydraulics, The Netherlands HR Wallingford Ltd, UK UK Government Department of Science and Technology (2002) Foresight: Future flooding
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Appendix: Operational standards for risk assessment aimed at spatial planning

1. Simplified model for flood hazard mapping aimed at a legal directive
One of the simplest ways in which flood hazards can be displayed is in terms of the spatial extent of the flooding. The spatial extent of the flood should be assigned to a specific return period or annual probability. In general the most commonly used return period is 1 in 100 years, i.e. the flood that has an annual probability of 1% of occurring. Other commonly mapped return periods include: 1 in 100 years, 1 in 200 years, 1 in 50 years, 1 in 20 years, 1 in 10 years and 1 in 5 years. An example of a flood extent map is showing the flood extents without flood defences in place is shown in Figure A1.
Figure A1
Typical national flood extent map showing two return periods
It is important to note that the way in which the hazard is to be assessed will affect the way in which risk is to be assessed. To assess risk in terms of economic damage or in terms of injuries or deaths to people then the depth of the floodwater is also required. A typical local scale flood map showing flood depths is shown in Figure A2.
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Figure A2
Local scale flood depth map
To summarise the minimum requirement to produce flood hazard mapping is to map the spatial extent of the flood. This should be mapped for at least the 1 in 100 year return period flood and if possible the 1 in 1000 year flood. The method by which this can be carried out is detailed in Section 2.4.1 of this report.
1.1. Methodologies related to the three assumed scales of analysis in the light of a potential harmonisation of hazard maps, based on a multi-hazard perspective
National scale flood extent and depth map To produce a national scale flood extent and depth map the following are data required: A national digital terrain model (DTM). The vertical resolution of the national DTM should be sufficient accurate to allow flood extents to be produced at a national level. Typically the resolution of the DTM should be a maximum 5 m. The scale of the DTM grid used to map the flood hazard is dependent on the size of the country and width of the floodplain. A typical national DTM grid size is 50 m x 50 m. However, in some cases a higher resolution grid may be needed. Estimate of flood flows. A method of estimating flood flows at a national level is required. This is normally done by extrapolating flows at B.I-46
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gauging stations. If significant areas of the country are unguaged then a simple method is needed to estimate flood flows. This is often based on a simple empirical model (e.g. where flood flows are correlated against catchment area, rainfall etc) Production of relationships between flood flows and flood levels. This is often done by using a simple equation such as the Mannings equation that relates flow to water level. Production of the flood extent and depth . A Geographical Information System (GIS) is used to produce a flood extent and depth grid. A water surface needs to be generated. This is done by triangulating the water levels to form a triangular irregular network (TIN) representing the water surface. The flood extent is calculated from the point at which the water surface intersects the DTM. A water depth grid can be created by converting the water surface TIN to a water surface grid. The DTM grid is then subtracted from the water surface grid to give average depths in each grid square.
Catchment scale flood extent and depth maps To produce a catchment scale flood extent and depth map the following are data required: A digital terrain model (DTM) that covers the entire catchment; A broad scale hydraulic model of the catchment; Production of. the flood extent and depth. This has been described above.
This is described in more detail in Section 2.4.3 of this report. Local scale flood extent and depth maps The method for assessing local flood extent and depths is detailed in Section 2.4.3 of this report.
2. Simplified model for risk mapping aimed at spatial planning

The two most commonly used receptors for flood risk assessment are: Direct economic damage to buildings; Injuries or fatalities to people.
The detailed methods and models to assess these have been described in Section 4.2 of this report.
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2.1. Multi-risk assessment perspective as element of the Strategic Environmental Assessment

The EU Directive on Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) that in terms of natural hazards the following risk-related aspects should be considered: The The The The probability, duration and frequency of the event; risks posed to human health or the environment; magnitude and the spatial extent of the hazard; value and vulnerability of the area.
In terms of the relationship between natural hazards and SEAs it would appear that both the risks to properties and to people need to be assessed.
2.2. Methodologies, functions and outputs

The most common methodologies and their associated functions and outputs for the assessment of risk to properties and to people have been described in Chapters 4 and 5 of this report. Figures A3 and A4 show schematic diagrams of the methods for assessing the flood risk in terms of economic damage to properties and injuries/deaths to people respectively.
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B.I-50 Figure A4 Schematic diagram showing the method to assess flood risk in terms of injuries and deaths to people
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B.II Seismic risk

Authors: Silvia Cozzi, Floriana Pergalani, Vincenzo Petrini, POLIMI
Physical definition of Seismic Risk .......................... 3

1.1 1.2 Typologies.................................................................... 3 Intensities, Severity, Magnitude ...................................... 3
Hazard assessment ................................................ 4

2.1 2.2 2.3 Definition ..................................................................... 4 Current methodologies for analysis and data availability..... 5 Problem of scale............................................................ 6
2.3.1 Temporal scale ..................................................................... 6 2.3.2 Scale of analysis and representation ....................................... 6
Elements at risk, exposure and analysis of vulnerability ........................................................... 6

3.1 3.2 Definition of vulnerability ............................................... 6 Current methodologies for assessment, typology of elements at risk and most common damage potentials .................... 7
3.2.1.1 Scale of analysis and representation...........................................9
3.2.1 Analysis of vulnerability for building........................................ 7 3.2.2 Analysis of vulnerability for large areas ................................... 9
3.2.2.1 Scale of analysis and representation.........................................10
3.2.3 Analysis of bridges vulnerability ........................................... 10

3.2.3.1 Scale of analysis and representation.........................................11
3.2.4 Analysis of vulnerability for tunnels....................................... 11

3.2.4.1 Evaluation of vulnerability index ..............................................12 3.2.4.2 Scale of analysis and representation.........................................12
3.2.5 Analysis of vulnerability for supporting works ........................ 12

3.2.6 Analysis of vulnerability for network infrastructures................ 13

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Analysis of risk ..................................................... 14

4.1 4.2 4.3 Definition of risk.......................................................... 14 Levels of investigation ................................................. 14 Methodologies for risk assessment for different levels of study ..................................................................... 15
4.3.1 First level studies: territorial exposure .................................. 16 4.3.2 Second level studies: damage scenario ................................. 17
4.3.2.1 Basic Seismic hazard..............................................................17 4.3.2.2 Physical vulnerability..............................................................26 4.3.2.3 Damage scenario evaluation....................................................29
4.3.3 Third level studies: seismic risk ............................................ 31

4.3.3.1 Local seismic hazard assessment .............................................31 4.3.3.1.1 Methodologies for evaluating site effects ...........................31 4.3.3.1.2 Instability evaluation......................................................32 4.3.3.1.3 Scale of analysis and representation.................................32 4.3.3.2 Physical vulnerability assessment.............................................37
4.3.4 Laboratorial experiments ..................................................... 42
Risk management................................................. 42
5.1 5.2 5.3 Perception .................................................................. 42 Tolerance, acceptability, mitigation measures ................. 43 Preparedness, response, recovery ................................. 44
6 7
Glossary of all key-words ..................................... 45 Bibliography......................................................... 47
Appendix: Operation Standards for Risk Assessment aimed at Spatial Planning........................................... 51

A1 Simplified model for Seismic Hazard mapping aimed at legal directive............................................................................. 51
A1.1 Hazard methodology............................................................. 51 A1.2 Map scales........................................................................... 51 A1.3 Characteristics and use of hazard maps .................................. 54 A1.4 Data acquisition and mapping procedures ............................... 54
A2 Simplified model for risk mapping aimed at spatial planning 56

A2.1 Risk methodology, data acquisition and use ............................ 56 A2.2 Map scales........................................................................... 58
A3 Minimum standard for multi-risk assessment and mapping .. 60

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1 Physical definition of Seismic Risk

1.1 Typologies
Earthquakes are the most evident expression of crustal breaking occurring at a variable depth ranging from a few to some hundreds kilometres. According to this hypothesis, crustal rocks are subject to deformation because of movements of the ground that make them accumulate energy. When in some points this level of deformation overcomes the resistance of the material, there occurs a breaking occurs that quickly propagates across a surface, called fault plane; the extension of the rupture depends on the characteristics of the materials and on the level of deformation of the area: the bigger the broken area is, the stronger the earthquake will be. After the breaking, part of the energy is given back in terms of elastic waves that propagate in all directions. The most evident aspect of the seismic event is therefore the rapid and sometimes violent soil motion.
1.2 Intensities, Severity, Magnitude

The earthquakes destructive power can be described in several ways depending on the information available at each singular event. Data available for the study of earthquakes can be collected under three categories, correlated with three different approaches: a. Damage effect. The first method is based on the description of damage effects on the built environment, on buildings and on the natural environment (macroseismical effects). To this end several scales have introduced that allow to associate the entity of the effects with an intensity level. It is clear that the intensity, as it is defined, supplies a precise evaluation of the earthquake, and therefore, for the same event, there are different intensity values for different places. Studying earthquakes, intensity and severity are used as synonyms, because they are expression of the same category of effects. b. Seismometric registrations. A second method to measure earthquakes is provided by soil motion registrations, which are obtained thanks to the use of seismograms (instruments able to reproduce ground motions in horizontal or vertical direction quite faithfully) Different kinds of waves that contribute to soil motion can be distinguished as follows: - volume waves, divided in P-wave (from the Latin term "primae"), that are compression waves which propagate from the source in all direction with a sequence of compressions and dilatations; and S-wave (from the Latin term "secundae") shearing waves which cause orthogonal displacements; - surface waves, so called because they propagate only on terrestrial surface; they are a consequence of the interaction of P and S-waves
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with terrestrial surface. The difference in arrival times of the waves is the basic element for the location of the earthquake source. c. Accelerometric registrations. The third and last method to evaluate earthquakes is through soil motion registration obtained hanks o accelerograms, instruments capable of supplying registrations in proportion to earthquake accelerations. The simplest parameter that can be used for this measure is the amount of the maximum recorded acceleration. The magnitude is, instead, a value that represents the level of energy released by the singular considered event. This value is recorded in the Historical recorded events catalogue that associate the magnitude value with the singular earthquake took into consideration.
Intensity
Magnitude: 6.9
Fig1.1 - Earthquake of 1980.11.23 Epicentre area: IRPINIA-LUCANIA (Italy) - Study POA85
2 Hazard assessment
2.1 Definition
Hazard can be analyzed in two different ways: considering it as a concept linked to the probability that in a specific site a certain severity event may happen in a predefined time-window (probability is the term used, B.II-4
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because an exact prevision cant be given for the time being. Statistic analysis of the past events that occurred in a specific site must be done in order to obtain a right value of the hazard), or considering an individual event (in this case a deterministic approach is followed). A variety of methods can be classified according to different initial hypotheses, objectives and detail levels. They are divided into: A. Probabilistic approach: they permit to obtain foresights about future events in a specific site, in particular they consent to define the probability of having an event stronger than an established severity in a given time period, thanks to probabilistic analysis of past events. The result is a distribution function in the site and the determination of possible hazard indicators. A.1. Source zone method. It is one of the most used methods for hazard assessment. It is based on two hypotheses: - uniform spatial distribution of the events in seismogenetic; - Poissonian distribution of occurrence periods. A.2. Renewal process. This method modifies the basic hypothesis of the preceding approach, abandoning the hypotheses of stationarity and the one about the uniform spatial distribution to calculate the time-window between subsequent events. B. Deterministic approach: damage scenario. They consider a singular event and its propagation in surrounding areas (scenario), this will permit to study site effects (damage scenario).
2.2 Current methodologies for analysis and data availability

The procedure for hazard assessment allows to determine a level of ground motion in an established area. To do that, knowledge of structural geology and historical seismic data can be used. The following methodology refers to the Italian situation. Basic data: 1 Historical recorded events catalogue. For every recorded event it is possible to find out information including the indicators of epicentral severity: epicentral intensity and magnitude. 2 Source zones. Those are areas that can be considered geologically, structurally and kinematically homogenous. A seismic zone is defined through the probabilistic distribution of the epicentral intensities. 3 Attenuation model. The evaluation of hazard is necessary to know, beside the localization and the epicentral severity, how the phenomenon propagates from the epicentre and, as a result, the variation of correlated severity parameters. - Intensity attenuation. Using the epicentral severity as indicator, the result of the attenuation laws is still an intensity value.
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Magnitude attenuation. These models use as severity indicator the magnitude value.
The above data are applied to investigate how a phenomena propagates far from the epicentre and, consequently, they can be used to investigate the variation of severity parameters of intensity attenuation or of magnitude attenuation.
2.3 Problem of scale

2.3.1 Temporal scale
The time scale can be taken into consideration with respect to the as far as the hazard and to the vulnerability. When a probabilistic hazard is estimated, it is possible to foresee some recurrence periods by assigning (at regular time intervals), a Pick Ground Acceleration (P.G.A.) in given time intervals and in a specific site. Obviously the P.G.A. value will be more or less serious according to the considered time-window: i.e., it can be considered more serious as far as a 1000-yearrecurrence period rather than a 500-years one.
2.3.2 Scale of analysis and representation

In order to study the hazard component it is possible to map the territory according to two methods: by subdividing it through the overlapping of a regular grid, or on the basis of territorial boundaries. Anyway, seismic hazard studies can be carried out on a national scale, that is 1:500.000 or more, but it is possible to range up to the municipal one.
3 Elements at risk, exposure and analysis of vulnerability

3.1 Definition of vulnerability
With this term we intend to ascertain how much an object is prone to be damaged in case of occurrence of the very event. Vulnerability is an intrinsic characteristic of an object and so it can change on the basis of the phenomena we are considering. The concept of vulnerability is closely linked to the EXPOSURE one, which analyses the event considering the consequence for the exposed people and goods. Therefore it seems relevant only if there are objects that could be damaged or people who can be involved in the area where the event occurs. It is then important to analyse the area and verify which and how many kinds of objects and people are present, and how vulnerable they are.
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3.2 Current methodologies for assessment, typology of elements at risk and most common damage potentials
3.2.1 Analysis of vulnerability for building
Referring to buildings, seismic vulnerability is the behavioural characteristic described by a cause-effect law, where the earthquake is the cause and the damage is the effect. Seism and damage measures are the most widely used parameters, macroseismic intensity or soil maximum acceleration are the ones used for territorial dimension. Existent techniques to supply data about vulnerability can be variously divided: A. Based on the results produced: 1. direct techniques: just in one step they supply an effective prevision of damages caused by earthquakes; 2. indirect techniques: they consist in two steps. The first a vulnerability index V is produced; then a correlation between earthquakes and damages depending on the index is established; 3. finally, the conventional techniques produce a vulnerability index that, unlike the direct ones, is not associated to a damage forecast, but is substantially useful to compare different buildings located in equal seismic areas. B. Based on the measurement method used each time: 1. quantitative techniques: they express damage probability or equivalent deterministic relations in numerical terms; 2. qualitative techniques : they make use of vulnerability descriptions in terms of low, middle and high; C. 1. 2. 3. Using the main information source: based on statistic elaborations of the collected data; based on seismic response calculation; based on expert judgments;
D. Depending on the organism to which a building is assimilated: 1. typology techniques: they classify the buildings as in typological class, defined according to materials, techniques, or some other factors. They have the advantage to be cheap and to require quite simple research in the field; besides, they benefit from substantial basis of data. On the other hand, they dont distinguish singular buildings inside the same class and so they dont allow to make a list out of them; they are used to derive information about urban areas on the whole. In particular for typology techniques Braga et al. (1982, 1984) and Zuccaro et al. (1999) can be used as reference. In this case vulnerability is assessed by assigning a given building to a certain structural typology B.II-7
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characterized by few main features (i. e. the type of vertical or horizontal structures), for which a probability damage matrix is defined. An example of vulnerability assessment, carried out according to this method, has been carried out using data resulting from about 36.000 buildings in 41 municipalities damaged by the earthquake of the Irpinia in 1980 (Braga et al., 1982; 1984) for which the following procedure was followed: 1) Detailed survey carried out on the basis of a card containing data about the structural typology and damage levels of each building; 2) Damage level related to thirteen different structural typologies singled out on the basis of the kind of vertical and horizontal structure; 3) the above mentioned thirteen typologies have been successively grouped in three classes (A, B, C) to make them correspond to the vulnerability classification included in the macroseismic scale MSK-76 (Medvedev, 1977); 4) Statistics elaboration of damages observed in recent earthquakes to define the relationship between the severity of the event and the characteristics of the building; 5) Computing of the probability that a building belonging to a specific typology class, undergoes a certain damage level when it is hit by an earthquake of a given intensity. This can be done by considering all the buildings which have undergone the effects of the same damage level within municipalities that were affected by different intensities degrees; 6) damage probability matrix obtained by repeating the operation for all the damage levels and for all three typology classes. These matrixes supply, for each vulnerability class, the probability that a specific damage level will take place according to the macroseismic intensity. 2. mechanistic techniques , they substitute a theoretical mechanical model of the building to the building itself. Such techniques allow not only to obtain results for entire urban areas, but also other results valid for single buildings. On the other hand, they require that in the building a sufficiently clear static pattern can be recognized.
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3. semeiotical technique: it considers the building vulnerability on the basis of its symptoms. In general, a certain number of vulnerability factors are introduced, such as the general organization of the resistant system, its quality, the global resistant of the building to horizontal actions, the state of deterioration, etc. To every level of vulnerability degree is assigned for every building factor; the increase of the levels shows an increase in vulnerability. It is then possible to draw up for each building typology (like masonry buildings), appropriate vulnerability cards (currently used by G.N.D.T. Gruppo Nazionale per la Difesa dai Terremoti), to assess buildings seismic vulnerability, based on several information about buildings constitutive elements. The first level card includes general information about buildings location, geometry, and typology. In detail, the survey card consists in the following 8 sections: B.II-8
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
data about the card (building identification key, municipality, card, team, date); building location (aggregate, building, toponymy, town planning bonds); metric data (surfaces, landing hights, maximum and minimum out of round highs); use (kinds of use, state, property, users); building age (typologies and classes of age); state of the trimmings; structural typology (vertical, horizontal, staircase, roofing); damage level and expance.
The second level allows to assess vulnerability by using representative data about buildings propensity to be damaged by a seismic event. In particular some factors accounts for the behaviour of the elements, structural or not, some others of the behaviour of the whole building complex. 1 sort and organization of resistant system; 2 quality of the resistant system; 3 conventional resistance; 4 position of the building and of the foundations; 5 ceilings; 6 planimetric configuration; 7 elevation configuration; 8 maximum distance between brickworks; 9 roofing; 10 non structural elements; 11 general conditions/present state; In order to obtain a numerical index, one of the four available classes, (from A, the best one, to D, the worst and a weight) is attached to each of the above mentioned parameters. The do obtained vulnerability index constitutes a conventional measurement of the propensity to damage that should not be confused with the damage expected for a given level of severity of the earth tremor. Therefore, to move from the hazard assessment to the e risk valuation, it is necessary to find a correlation between the damage level, the quality of the building and the parameter used to measure the severity of the earth tremor.
3.2.1.1 Scale of analysis and representation

The scale of analysis for this kind of survey is the one that better highlight the single building: 1:500 1: 5000 in order to allow punctual, and therefore very in-depth researches (third level analysis).
3.2.2 Analysis of vulnerability for large areas

The most direct process to establish the built environment vulnerability is to make use of vulnerability investigations. It is clear that is very difficult to investigate the whole built patrimony for large areas, but it is possible to obtain approximate evaluations for the national territory.
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For the Italian case, the assessment of vulnerability derives from the combined use of two data-sets: ISTAT census data (that supply, for every single municipality, an esteem of the number and the volume of buildings) and the data collected in different occasions using vulnerability cards by G.N.D.T. (Gruppo Nazionale per la Difesa dai Terremoti). In short, the building heritage is subdivided in: - two classes (brickwork and reinforced concrete) on the basis of the structural typology; - six classes on the basis of the age of construction for the brickwork buildings (<1919, 1919-1945, 1946-1960, 1961-1971, 1972-1981, >1982) and four classes for reinforced concrete ones (<1960, 19611971, 1972-1981, >1982); - two classes (good and bad maintenance state) on the basis of the efficiency of technical systems; - two classes (since two floors or more) on the basis of the number of floors. Once that the building patrimony has been subdivided in classes, a vulnerability description for every class must be developed. To do that same criteria adopted to classify the national buildings inventory are followed, using the archives of second level vulnerability cards. With the support of a table or using density probability curves derived by data regression it is possible to assign a vulnerability index value to every class.

To study the buildings ISTAT data are used as reference, adopting the local scale: 1:5.000 1:50.000. This way it is possible to proceed with simplified surveys concerning vulnerability ( second level studies).
3.2.3 Analysis of bridges vulnerability

For these structures too it is possible to draw up survey cards articulated in different sections regarding: - identification and general information; - main dimensions, typology; - preservation condition; - detailed analysis for each component of the bridge; - marginal information in order to investigate the seismic behavior, but useful for some other kinds of analysis. This method is assimilable to the first level analysis; in fact, typically structural elements (such as foundations or frameworks) are not take into consideration the method is just based on a few visual noticeable parameters or on direct measures parted in the survey card. The result of this procedure is a vulnerability value that supplies an indication about bridges conditions from the point of view of the seismic response. The model consists in the following steps: - subdivision of bridges in typological classes which are correlated to a basic vulnerability value; B.II-10
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evaluation of further factors that can increase or decrease, for every bridge, the vulnerability value compared with the one attributed on the basis of the belonging class.

For this kind of studies, aimed at the analysis of an individual object, it is possible to refer to the town planning scale: 1:500 1: 5000.
3.2.4 Analysis of vulnerability for tunnels

This kind of evaluation concerns the already existent tunnels as well as those not accessible by means of the related project report. In this methodology the survey is based on detectable appearance on the outside of the gallery and on measurements on the covering by using geotechnical instruments. The survey card is made up of seven different parts concerning: general information and characteristics (sections from 2 to 4); conditions on the inside and appearance on the outside (Section 5); covering characteristics and stress conditions (Section 6).
The survey is then articulated in three levels: 1. General characteristics of the work: In the sections from 2 to 4 the card notes the following data. Work geometry and parameters, such as: o planimetric development, o altimetrical profile of the tunnel and of his roofing, o form and section. Overlooking slope condition: o nature e conditions of the slope, o presence of instability, o presence of supporting works and their conditions, o presence of vegetation, etc. Geological characteristics of the formations crossed by the tunnel.
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2. Internal condition of the tunnel: The card notes the presence of: areas with a bad state of covering, slots in the covering, damp areas, systems hanged on the covering.
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3. Measures conducted on the tunnel covering: In the card are indicated: - the area of the measurements; - the conglomerate appearance; - the concrete mechanical resistance; - the parietals stress in the covering and the modulus of elasticity.
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3.2.4.1 Evaluation of vulnerability index

To evaluate the vulnerability index, the conditions of the slope at the entrance and the exit, of the internal covering and hanged systems of the tunnel are taken into consideration.

For this kind of studies, aimed at the analysis of the singular object, it is possible to refer to the town planning scale: 1:500 1: 5000.
3.2.5 Analysis of vulnerability for supporting works

This measurement deals with already existent supporting works as well as the ones not accessible by means of the related project report. Therefore, many technical data are not available, that is: wall width, possible armature plan, geotechnical characteristics of foundation soil and embankment. Analysis is thus a first level analysis and it is based on parameters the can be detected by means of either direct and surface measurements or optically detectable aspects, which are recorded in the proper data form. As technical objective data are missing, in the evaluation of the vulnerability index the conditions of the building and of the surrounding environments must be considered. Main characteristics of the survey card data The survey card supplies information concerning: parameters about the state of the work, as: o develop of the plant, average height, slope of the hangings, thickness at the head; o sort of work and covering, year of construction, presence of drainage works; o structure and soil of foundation; o work use condition; o conditions of the work about slots, falling blocks, presence of vegetation, surrounding environment: o - side of the mountain slope (towards the mount and the valley); o - condition of the side of the mountain; o - presence of super weights due to buildings and of barriers against stone fallings; Improvement or alteration operations in the structure or in the surrounding environment.

The score is composed considering the work height and development in plane. The survey card responses are examined, homogenously grouped by the above mentioned different aspects and put in a table with maximum and B.II-12
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minimum scores foe each group of aspects and considering the best and the worst situations.

For this kind of studies, aimed at the analysis of the singular object, it is possible to refer to the town planning scale: 1:500 1: 5000.
3.2.6 Analysis of vulnerability for network infrastructures

Network infrastructures (waterworks, sewage pipes, gas network, electric network, streets and railways, etc) are complex structures composed by pipes, joints and plants, sometimes strongly, sometimes loosely linked one to the other. So, it is important to study their vulnerability not only from a physical point of view but also considering systemic and territorial aspects. The following methodology has been proposed in Italy to define interventions to reduce impacts that events like the seismic one can produce. Analysis and evaluation procedure The method is composed by some analysis cards and evaluation matrix related to the networks in the different phases of emergency and restoration. They contain the main parameters that can most influence vulnerability. The first step consists in compiling the analysis card of the singular network and an assessment is carried out through a weighed sum of the vulnerability scores assigned to each component. The results are cartographically represented and interpreted. Analysis cards are organised a matrix structure and, for each network, the parameters to survey are described: Emergency phase o performance aspects o relationship between a given network to others lifelines,; o performance invaliding parameters; o location feature; o physical continuity between networks Restoration phase o big economical dependence to the networks of various fields, o possible damages induced by the earthquake

The second step is to assess the vulnerability. This way, on the basis of the information collected in the cards, it is possible to express a judgement about their resistant capacity related to a seismic event. The parameters values collected in the analysis cards must be insert in the evaluation card, so that is possible to calculate vulnerability degree: Intrinsic vulnerability and emergency phase o performance and localizable aspects Territorial vulnerability and restoration phase o restoration of the normal conditions. B.II-13
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In order to investigate the whole network system or just one singular network on the territory, the scale to use is 1:5.000 1:50.000. Instead, if a particular network junction must be studied, it is better to refer to the town planning scale: 1:500 1:5000.
4 Analysis of risk
Combining the above-mentioned factors (hazard and vulnerability), it is possible to assess the risk. This term defines the entity of damages expected in an area due to future events and it comes from the convolution between the hazard and the risk components. Damages expected can be the result of two different approaches to the risk assessment: the probabilistic or the deterministic one. Depending on the adopted methodology it is possible to achieve different results, useful to reach different aims.
Hazard
Vulnerability
RISK
RISK = Hazard * Vulnerability Fig. 4.1 Definition of Risk as a convolution between hazard and vulnerability
4.2 Levels of investigation

Using the definition above mentioned, it is possible to investigate risk on different levels of study, on the basis of several factors as: - the level of investigation to carry out; - the sort of data available; - the cost to support for the research and for the implementation of the project; - the local hazard situation (more or less serious) to investigate. B.II-14
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There are three different levels of investigation connected with three scales of analysis and representation. For spatial planning, for example, they can go from general analysis to study the territory at macro scale to carry out expeditious studies, in the first level, to an intermediate stage for the second level (regional scale), to a punctual level of study for the third level, where local aspects are investigated (local scale). Those levels of study depend also on different objective fixed in advance. If the intend of the study is the macro-priority research aimed to establish a priority of intervention on a territory, it can be enough to carry out probabilistic analysis in the first level of investigation. The second level of investigation can be useful to prearrange emergency plans, having a look at the over-local scale. To arrange urban plan, instead, it is possible to implement both probabilistic analysis and scenario evaluations at local scale for an in-depth level of investigation.
Objective of the study Scale of analysis and representation Nation scale Level of investigation First Level
Type of analysis General analysis to study the territory at macro scale to carry out expeditious studies Intermediate stage of investigation for over-local analysis Punctual level of study, where local aspects are investigated Macro-priority research aimed to establish a priority of intervention on a territory Prearrange emergency plans, having a look at the over-local scale Implementation of urban plans, using both probabilistic analysis and scenario evaluations at local scale for an in-depth level of investigation.
Spatial planning
Regional scale Local scale National scale
Second Level Third Level First Level
Urban policy
Regional scale
Second Level
Local scale
Third Level
Tab. 4.2.1 Different levels of investigation aimed at spatial planning and urban policies
4.3 Methodologies for risk assessment for different levels of study

In the European Union seismic risk has been evaluated in various ways and different studies about this subject have been collected in more volumes edited by the European Commission, Environmental and Climate Programme Climate and natural hazards. The common aim of all the studies is to reduce seismic risk, but there are many different ways to face this argument.
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The main directions that have been followed are: - experimental studies applied in one or more sites by well known geological and seismological characteristics, both following a seismic event, and for preventive purposes; - laboratorial experiments and models to improve current available engineering technologies; - new monitoring systems implementation for large and little crustal movements, increasing current available instrumentation by realizing new software and past events registration systems. Despite of the variety of pursued objectives, materials and methods used and achieved results, the studies have been directed to reduce risk by characterizing and decreasing hazard or uncertainty elements, as well as protection of more vulnerable territorial elements. Depending on starting hypothesis assumed to define the hazard, there are many different ways to assess risk that can be carried out on three different investigation levels, from preliminary analysis to special investigations. Working on territorial viewpoint, it means to lead studies reach to characterize: - areas that need analysis of expected damages, meant to territorial seismic risk unit of measurement, for the first level of investigation; - damage areas on the basis of different scenarios, in order to conduct intermediate level analysis; - punctual indications for special studies.
4.3.1 First level studies: territorial exposure

In this kind of analysis, the different experiments are aimed at examining the exposure and classifying the territory on the basis of the detected seismic risk classification on the basis of the seismic Italian code. The Italian legislation foreseen territorial diversification by identifying and classifying seismic zones. The rules defining general criteria to characterize seismic areas are the Law February, the 2, 1974, n. 64: Measures for buildings with particular prescription in seismic zones and the successive Decree of Prime Minister March, the 20, 2003: First elements about general criteria to classifying seismic areas in national territory and about technical provisions for building in seismic areas. The basic criteria for dividing regions are described in the Technical Codes, that indicate 4 horizontal acceleration values (a g /g) of anchoring of elastic response spectrum and planning and building rules to apply; so, the number of zones is arranged in 4.
B B
Each area is identify on the basis of expected horizontal acceleration values (a g ), with probability of exceeding of 10% in 50 years, as the following table shows:
B B
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Zone
Expected horizontal acceleration values with probability of exceeding of 10% in 50 years (aBgB/g) > 0,25
Horizontal acceleration values of anchoring of elastic response spectrum (Technical Codes) (aBgB/g) 0,35
0,15 0,25
0,25
0,05 0,15
0,15
< 0,05
0,05
Tab. 4.3.1 Identification of the basic criteria for identifying and classifying seismic regions What should be avoided is lack of homogeneity in border seismic areas between different regions. To this end, their identification must take into account of a reference document at national scale. Starting from reference document, it is possible to estimate seismic zones lists formation and to update them.
4.3.2 Second level studies: damage scenario

These studies are going to value:
4.3.2.1 Basic Seismic hazard

It is by analyzed using deterministic models to investigate attended shock in a selected area. Several experiments are based, from time to time, on different parameters such as seismotectonic characteristics of the area, the source energy release ways, the seismic waives propagation course. Starting whit these inputs, the procedure manages to define: - the historical seisicity, by searching in archives and historical recording; - the recent seismicity, that is the one recorded by seismographes. In the light of these data, several objectives can be pursued, like identifying source areas and the events characterized by different recurrence periods. In this way it is possible to calculate (using a specific attenuation model) the expected shaking at the site:
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Table I: Second level studies- Basic seismic hazard

PROJECT Geodynamic modelling of an active region of the Mediterranean: the Apennine geomodap
WORKING GROUP Istituto Nazionale di Geofisica, Roma, Italy and GeoModAp working group
INVESTIGATED AREA The Apennines
ABSTRACT Multidisciplinary approach to model the recent geodynamic evolution of the Apennines, one of the most active regions of the Mediterranean.
OBJECTIVES Definition of a geodynamic model of the Apennines to serve as a basis for future multi-disciplinary research and data collection and as a framework for immediate application in the assessment of seismic hazard, earthquake surveillance, vulnerability of cultural heritage, protection of critical facilities, earthquake prediction, land use planning, and deep fluids exploitation.
MATERIAL AND METHODS 1) Definition of a geodynamic model of the Apennines 2) Collection and processing of new GPS data in the area using existing vertices and installing new ones to increase the coverage in the most interesting areas 3) Compilation of a new catalogue of seismic moments of large historical earthquakes 4) Definition of soil structure in depth to improve digital data quality 5) Compilation of data-base with actual stress-data 6) Two and three-dimensional analogical models of the Apennines/Tyrrhenian system 1) Compilation of the working file 2) Evaluating the supporting data sets 3) Retrieving and improving the supporting data sets 4) Compilation of a comprehensive primary dataset 5) Earthquake parameters determination
RESULTS Data elaboration for determine the force acting in the region between the Appennines and the Adriatic/Ionian plate
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A basic European earthquake catalogue and a database for the evaluation of long-term seismicity and seismic hazard (BEECD)
Istituto di Ricerca sul Rischio Sismico, CNR, Milano, Italy
Europe
Prepare a basic parametric earthquake catalogue of Europe and a database of primary data, with special reference to long-term seismicity
1) To retrieve, evaluate and make available, in a standard format, the considerable body of data existing in published and unpublished studies 2) To investigate, according to standard criteria, the main earthquake for which no primary data is available 3) To use this material for preparing, according to rigorous and transparent procedures a basic parametric earthquake catalogue of Europe, to serve both as a tool for understanding the longterm seismicity and as a reliable input for seismic hazard evaluation
1) To develop a procedure which can be adopted for future implementation 2) Providing a good set of data and of establishing priorities for future investigation At this stage it can be predicted that the earthquakes included in the WF will be divided into three categories: A. Selected earthquakes for which complete, good quality studies will be retrieved or produced, including intensity data points (8-10 %) B. Earthquakes for which the available data will be retrieved and evaluated, without special improvement (20-30 %) C. Other earthquakes, for which at least root evaluation will be performed (6070 %).
Deliverable 2.1
PROJECT Earthquakes prediction in tectonic active areas using space techniques
WORKING GROUP Universita Federico II di Napoli, Napoli, Italy Universitt Stuttgart, Stuttgart, Germany Departement Geophysique et Imagerie geologique, BRGM, Marseille, France
INVESTIGATED AREA CampanoMolise Apennines
ABSTRACT Study of the geodynamics processes which have affected the chain of Matese, and on medium-short term through the study of the historical and actual seismicity and of ground deformations which precede and accompany earthquakes
OBJECTIVES Earthquake prediction on the Matese by: 1) monitoring of the ground deformation and the seismicity 2) seismotectonic modelling of the area using historical seismicity, tectonic and geodynamical modelling of the area
MATERIAL AND METHODS 1) Historical and current seismicity 2) Monitoring 3) geological analysis 4) Analysis of the deformation of Appennine-Tyrrhenian System and geodynamical model 5) Hypothesis for a seismotectonic model
RESULTS
In such conditions adequate results for earthquakes prediction could be achieved through the following way: 1) Realization of the geodynamical model of the regiontough which it is possible to build the stress field currently acting 2) definition of hierarchy of seismogenetic areas through the geodynamical and seismotectomc models 3) monitoring of the deformations of the suspect areas
High resolution imaging of 3-d strain in seismic and volcanic regions using differential SAR interferometry
Institut de Physique du Globe de Paris, Paris, France IPGP Institut fur Navigation, Stuttgart, Germany INS Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales, Toulouse, France CNES Politecnico di Milano, Milan, Italy - POLIMI
The use of multiple SAR images such as those currently collected by the satellites ERS-1 and Radarsat makes it now possible to detect subtle changes in the Earth's land and ice surface over periods of days to years with an unprecedented scale (global), accuracy (cm level) and reliability (dayand night, all-weather). The technique involves interferometric phase comparison of successive SAR images. SAR interferometry can also generate high resolution topographic maps
1) The goal of this project is to assess the accuracy of the differential SAR interferometry technique to measure crustal deformations in a real environment 2) Calibrating the differential SAR interferometry technique in different environments. This calibration phase is the central part of the present study. The characteristic signature, amplitude and spatial distribution of each of these effects on SAR complex images and SAR interferogram must be investigated on different sites representative of different conditions and different geophysical processes, namely earthquakes, volcanoes and landslides.
Experiment in the following selected sites: 1) The Campi Flegrei and Vesuvius, in Italy which provide a good example of critical interferometric conditions: small displacements, rugged topography, low coherence (urban area). Yet, this area is of major interest, given the risk involved for the population of Pozzuoli and Napoli. 2) The Etna volcano where a wide range of observations are available for a long period of time 3) The Saint-Etienne-de-Tinee area where a major landslide is moving at the impressive rate of Icm/day. This provides an example of large displacements with high spatial variability over a very small area (of the order of 1km). 4) The Antarctic which provides an example of SAR interferometry applied to the ice-shelf
In this study, SAR interferometry has demonstrated its capability to produce large scale digital elevation models or to detect small displacements of various origins, such as surface deformation produced by a volcano, a landslide or A moving ice-shelf. Other studies detected the effect of earthquakes, tides on glaciers, or phase surface changes. This capability provides several fields of application with revolutionary tools which chance the accuracy of the study regardless of the accessibility or ground instrumentation.
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Deliverable 2.1
PROJECT * Genesis and impact of tsunamis on the European coast GITEC - an European effort to foster tsunami research
WORKING GROUP Dipartimento di Fisica, Settore di Geofisica, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy
INVESTIGATED AREA European areas
ABSTRACT The project is structured in four main areas of research and activity embracing: 1tsunami generation, 2tsunami potential, 3- tsunami propagation 4 - tsunami warning and risk mitigation
OBJECTIVES Illustrate the main results attained by the project GITEC and the basic methods used in order to achieve them
MATERIAL AND METHODS 1) European tsunami catalogue 2) Study and simulation of earthquake-induced tsunami cases 3) Study and simulation of landsidesinduced tsunami cases 4) Assembling of bathymetric data 5) Recognition of tsunami deposits through geological methods 6) Tsunami warning system 7) Epilot land management study
RESULTS
Tsunamis are produced by submarine and coastal earthquakes, by submarine landslides and by volcanic eruptions. Though it is clear that the generation process must involve a sudden displacement of a large volume of ocean water, it is presently recognized that there are still many aspects of this process that are uncertain and deserve investigation, which makes tsunami generation one of the key problems of tsunami research.
* Southern Europe network for analysis of seismic data
Istituto Nazionale di Geofisica, Roma, Italia Istituto Geografico Nacional, Madrid
National Observatoryof Athens, Atene Finsiel s.p.a., Roma
In this paper we present the results of the Project "Southern Europe Network for Analysis Seismic Data" sponsored by the European Community. The project is structured in four themes of seismological interest developed by three National Institutes (Greece, Italy and Spain) working in geophysical fields, and supported by high technology companies as Digital, Finsiel and Telecom.
1) A telematic system for seismic data exchange by means of a private satellite network was created and a standard protocol for seismic data exchange between the three seismic national networks connected by the satellite networks was realized 2) recovery of old waveforms recordings of the main earthquakes occurred at the beginning of this century. 3) 3D Tomography and an international Workshop was organized in the frame of the Southern Europe Network for Analysis of Seismic Data project
1) 3-D model of seismic wave velocity of the mediterranean area 2) data-bank connection to the MEDNETnetwork 3) digitization of historical seismograms
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Deliverable 2.1
PROJECT * Rapid transfrontier seismic data exchange network: Transfrontier group
WORKING GROUP Transfrontier Group
INVESTIGATED AREA
ABSTRACT Understanding the sources and reasons for our seismicity and the hazards we are exposed to depends fundamentally on good data and, for Europe, which is divided politically into small regions in relation to its tectonics, it is essential that good data exchange is achieved
OBJECTIVES 1) Establish the definition of "significant earthquake"; 2) Install a computer bollettin board at each partecipant's laboratory which will show data acquired during the previous three months together with an 'earthquake alert' area containing information on immediate significant earthquakes; 3) Develop or adopt standard data exchange formats to be used for computer-tocomputer transfer of waveform data; 4) Implement waveform exchange between participants for significant earthquakes; 5) Transmit data continuously across selected borders where this proves to be administratively possible; 6) Upgrade the seismic monitoring network in Portugal and add key monitoring stations in border regions of other participants where appropriate. Attenuation relationships for peak and response spectra for ground accelerations incorporating site conditions provide an estimate of ground shaking at a given distance from an earthquake of specified magnitude. For practical engineering applications such relationships: 1) must be based on reliable observational data 2) must be relatively simple 3) must involve design variables that can be assessed by the engineer with some confidence
MATERIAL AND METHODS
RESULTS
Establishment of a network of institutions with national or quasi-national responsibilities for earthquake monitoring The adoption and gradual implementation of the e-mail based software developed at ETH, Zunch (Auto Data Request Manager, ADRM) is speeding up data transfer and is placing participants on a convergent path with other related activities in Europe and more widely. New seismc stations have been installed to improve border region coverage and a modern digital, remote data access network is now functioning in southern Portugal
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Measurement of strong ground motion in Europe (MASGE) Imperial college of Science Technology & Medicine, London European area Present the current status of the MASGE project for the development of predictive relationships for peak ground acceleration and spectral ordinates for the European area for engineering purposes and, at the same time, to discuss the experience gained from this exercise.
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9) 10)
strong-motion records seismological parameter source distance station location focal depth magnitudes moment magnitude local soil condition dataset attenuation model
1) Regression test for zero-period horizontal acceleration 2) Depth controlled test of horizzontal acceleration 3) Site effects test 4) Magnitude dependent shape test 5) Attenuation of zero-period horizontal acceleration 6) Effect of site condition 7) Attenuation of spectral ordinates for horizontal acceleration with site effects 8) Attenuation of zero-period vertical acceleration 9) Site effects 10) Attenuation of spectral ordinates for vertical accelerations with site effects
Deliverable 2.1
PROJECT Long period earthquake risk in Europe
WORKING GROUP EQE International, London
INVESTIGATED AREA Europe
ABSTRACT Quantification of this seismic hazard regime Attention has also been directed towards the practical engineering implications for the seismic safety of structures vulnerable to long period, long duration, excitation
OBJECTIVES Establish a sound empirical and theoretical basis for the assessment of long period earthquake risk in Europe. This has involved pursuit of a number of seismological research studies, each of which affords insight into the characteristics of long period motion 1) A data base of measurement data coming from a multiparameter data acquisition network (the Poseidon centre installed in Sicily), has been developed and methods of recognising these patterns have been devised. 2) A real time patterns and trends recognition system has been implemented which searches for identified precursors for events in geophysical data coming from the automatic acquisition system of the Poseidon centre. 3) Models of expected damage in term of macroseismic intensity maps, due to seismic events which incorporate parameters derived from the incoming geophysical data at the centre have been implemented.
RESULTS
1) analysis of empirical seismograms 2) numerical simulation of seismograms 3) optimization of 2D laterally heterogeneous complete synthetics programs 4) stochastic modelling long period motion 5) rayleigh wave propagation 6) long period earthquake effects
Time dependent hazard estimate based on a multi-parameter geophysical observatory system SCENARIO
ISMES, Bergamo National Geophysics Institute, Roma National Observatory, Athens
Development of a software system which supports the reduction of seismic risk in earthquake-prone zones. The system implements possible scenarios through the integration of models and data layers. A pattern recognition system, linked with a multiparameter geophysical observatory system, provides time dependent evidences for possible seismic events and following damage scenarios.
1) damage scenarios 2) precursor analysis 3) software implementation
The SCENARIO system can be directly applied in various fields related to civil protection activities, and several developments may be envisioned The same technology may be used in the emergency phase, when complete information about actual damages is not available and the best possible estimate is required to cope with unforeseen situation. The main foreseen development of the project is the integration with damage modelling systems at a different scale
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Deliverable 2.1
PROJECT Seismic hazard zonation: a multidisciplinary approach using fluidgeochemistry method (GSZ)
WORKING GROUP University of Rome 'La Sapienza' Istituto Nazionale di Geofisica, Italy University of Exeter, Earth Resources Centre (ERC) Thessaloniki University (AUT) CNRS Nancy (CRG)
INVESTIGATED AREA Italy, Greece, United Kingdom
ABSTRACT Development of a multidisciplinary approach mainly based on fluid geochemistry data coupled with geological and geophysical information. Surveys were planned in different geological, structural and seismotectonic scenarios to test the reliability of such an approach in locating active fault systems and evaluating their seismogenic potential
OBJECTIVES 1) to refine seismic hazard zonation by fluid geochemistry modelling and monitoring in a few selected test-sites 2) to understand better the preseismic processes , seismic sources and seismic stressstrain phenomena linked to rising fluid 3) to develop a multidisciplinary approach to seismic zonation 4) to enhance the basic knowledge of geochemical earthquake prediction studies
MATERIAL AND METHODS The GSZ research is divided into the following steps: 1) the comprehensive investigation of water-rock-gas interaction mechanisms characterising the geological and seismo-tectonic setting of the investigated areas (i.e. geochemical modelling); 2) the location in the surveyed areas of potentially seismo-related; 3) fault systems characterised by deep input and minimal contamination by shallow aquifers.
RESULTS
University of Rome subcontractors: 1) soil-gas surveys in the Fucino and Gargano area 2) stable isotopes geochemestry in Gargano groundwater 3) gravity features in the Gargano area 4) structural geologicy survey in the Gargano area CNRS Nancy: 1) rare cases isotopic ratio in the Gargano fluids Exeter University, U.K.: 1) structural model geology of the study areas in Devon and Cornwall 2) review of fluids seismicity 3) seismic hazard of the area 4) soil gas mapping 5) structural analysis from topographic features ING and subcontractors: 1) geological review and geochemical survey in Sardinia 2) geological and geochemical survey in the Gargano area 3) interdisciplinary GIS data management 4) the development of the geochemical monitoring system (GMSII)
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Genesis and impact of tsunamis on the European coasts tsunami warning and observations - GITEC TWO Dipartimento di Fisica, Settore di Geofisica, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy Atlantic, Ionian Sae, eastern Mediterran ean GITEC-TWO is the acronym of an international project involving nine partners of seven European countries: France, Greece, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain and United Kingdom. 1) tsunami warning systems 2) new techniques to model tsunami genesis 3) new techniques to model tsunami propagation 4) tsunami observations 5) tsunami risk 1) tsunami 2) tsunami 3) tsunami 4) tsunami warning systems generation propagation and run-up observation
One of the final products will be a 'Tsunami risk management-prevention and mitigation measures' map that will summarise the tsunami risk analysis and the proposed counter-measures
Deliverable 2.1
PROJECT Satellite seismic network
WORKING GROUP Istituto Nazionale di Geofisica of Rome Istituto Geografico Nadonal of Madrid National Observatory of Athens
INVESTIGATED AREA
ABSTRACT The Argo project represents the first European digital seismic network on data transmission via satellite. This project connects two independent networks used for emergency communication (ECN) and environmental data collection (ADCN), respectively, with the following institutions: control centre of the Italian Civil Defence Department, the Istituto Nazionale di Geofisica (ING) and the volcanological and hydrological centres.
OBJECTIVES
RESULTS
- Assigns the capacity of transmission to the peripheral stations according to the kind of probes used in each station. - Sends to the peripheral stations a time mark reference to the timing of the acquired data. - Controls the satellite link between the peripheral stations and datacollection centre - Forms with 30 packets received from specific peripheral stations a unique packet which is forwarded again by a satellite relaunching, to the qualified data-processing centre
The expected results of this project are as follows: 1) The creation of a distributed system for the real-time monitoring of the network area seismicity 2) ) The analysis of at least 10 important seismic events with the highest magnitudes occurring in this century, based on the original instrumental tracks from stations in various countries, which will allow a substantial improvement of the present seismic catalogue of the Mediterranean area 3) The creation of an infrastructure and the study of common methods for the determination, the selection and the exchange of seismic data between European countries via satellite link 4) The creation of a common database where a suitable choice of the data representing the main seismic events monitored by the southern Europe network stations will be cumulated 5) The elaboration of a threedimensional kinematic model of the Mediterranean Sea through the comparison of the different tomography techniques currently studied by the scientific partners
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Deliverable 2.1
PROJECT * Time-dependent hazard estimate based on a multi parameter geophysical observatory system
WORKING GROUP ISME5, Bergamo, Italy National Geophysics Institute, Rome, Italy National Observatory of Athens, Athens, Greece
INVESTIGATED AREA
ABSTRACT Development of a software system which supports the reduction of seismic risk in earthquake-prone zones. The system implements possible scenarios through the integration of models and data layers.
OBJECTIVES The objective of this project is to reduce the seismic risk by developing a software system to support the civil defence authorities in planning their response to an earthquake
MATERIAL AND METHODS 1) A database of patterns and trends of anomalies related to earthquakes in data coming from a multiparameter data-acquisition network (the Poseidon centre installed in Sicily) will be developed, then methods of recognizing these patterns will be devised. 2) A real-time patterns and trends recognition system will be implemented, which will search for identified precursors for events in geophysical data coming from the automatic acquisition system of the Poseidon centre. The system will have a semiautomatic learning facility for enlarging the database described above 3) Models of expected damage in terms of macroseismic intensity maps, due to seismic events, which incorporate parameters derived from the incoming geophysical data at the centre will be implemented.
RESULTS
The benefits of this project lie in reducing loss of life and damage to the infrastructure through seismic protection procedures and an efficient civil defence response after the event. Moreover, the system described would improve the ability to manage the risk to the environment associated with seismic events.
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Legend: * Project relevant for spatial planning
Deliverable 2.1
Deliverable 2.1
4.3.2.2 Physical vulnerability

It is analyzed by using direct methods as vulnerability surveys or by means of approximate evaluations combining different available data. In this way is possible to subdivide the heritage to value on the basis of more factors (such as the structural typology, the age of building, the state of maintenance) and reach at defining a vulnerability index for different structures considered.
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Table II: Second level studies- Physical vulnerability

PROJECT * Earthquake protection for historic town centres TOSQUA
WORKING GROUP School of Architecture and Civil Engineering, University of Bath, U.K. The Martin Centre, Cambridge University Architecture Department, Cambridge, U.K.
INVESTIGATED AREA Lisbon, Naples, Rhodes and Castiglione Casauria
ABSTRACT The present project addresses this issue with particular reference to historic town centres in areas of Europe where the seismic hazard is relatively high while the architectonic and urban heritage is of unquestionable value, for it is unique.
OBJECTIVES 1) Verify current and develop new vulnerability assessment techniques at purpose for historic town centres 2) Produce guidelines for local authorities on the subject of cost effective and unobtrusive upgrading strategy, which will improve the seismic behaviour of the existing building while preserving their historic and architectonic character
MATERIAL AND METHODS 1) assembling data on the vulnerability of the historic building stock for the four case studies 2) comparing existing methods of earthquake vulnerability assessment 3) developing a new method to evaluate buildings which have undergone typical renovation and structural strengthening and do not show damage directly related to seismic causes 4) identifying general strategies for cost-effective retrofit strengthening of key types of buildings such as multi-storey residential blocks 5) disseminating these findings locally to professional and administration officers Seismic shaking-table tests have been carried out on 14 two-storey masonry housing models: 1) The structural models have been subjected to real earthquake-like dynamic excitation up to appearance of significant damage 2) then they were repaired by application of retrofitting techniques 3) Subsequently, the repaired housing models have been again subjected to earthquakelike shaking, in order to assess the actual effects and efficiency of the applied retrofitting techniques
RESULTS The importance of comparative studies in the field of seismic vulnerability of historic centres. The distinctive character and history through which each of the case studies has developed to the present state, as it would be for any other historic centre, make any general assumption on assessment methods an almost futile exercise. The European TOSQA project therefore represented a unique occasion to identify crucial parameters that should be taken into account when devising a vulnerability methodology, providing the opportunity to test them on different cases.
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** Experimental evaluation of technical interventions to reduce seismic vulnerability of old existing buildings
ISMES (Bg) National Technical University of Athens / LEE, Athens (Greece)
Results of a large experimental programme carried out on 15 models, scaled 1:2, of which fourteen two-storey regular masonry buildings and one threestorey irregular building. After suffering damage, the models have been repaired and strengthened and again tested. A total number of 25 buildings have thus been subjected to test by the shaking table facilities of ISMES and NTUA/LEE
Provide a better insight into the actual seismic response of existing masonry buildings and to experimentally assess the efficiency of practical techniques for upgrading their earthquake resistance capacity
The results have been collected in a table
Deliverable 2.1
Italian research programmes in earthquake engineering
National Group for the Earthquake Loss Reduction, Italy
Emilia Romagna, Italy
Description of the present situation of research in earthquake engineering in Italy and to the future scientific applied activities, deal with two aspects: further research but also dissemination of knowledge and preparation of concrete tools for an effective policy of seismic protection.
PROJECT ** An expert system to support retrofitting of masonry buildings
WORKING GROUP M, Cadei, P. Panzeri, A. Peano, P. Salvaneschi ISMES, Bergamo, Italy
INVESTIGATED AREA
ABSTRACT A mobile laboratory supporting the seismic assessment and planning of retrofitting for masonry buildings has been designed and implemented in ISMES. It is equipped with devices allowing experimental tests to be performed for the acquisition of data related to the physical properties of the materials and to the structural features of the buildings. It is also provided with software systems for data acquisition and management and, in particular, with a knowledgebased system for supporting the evaluation and planning process. Develop the methodology and quantitative tools for seismic vulnerability assessment of masonry gravity dams
OBJECTIVES Support the procedures leading to the seismic assessment of masonry buildings and the planning of precautionary operations on them
MATERIAL AND METHODS 1) generate all the input data required by the seismic assessment software 2) ensure reliable and really interesting information 3) provide quick and low-cost tests and analysis 4) limit weight and volume of related devices 5) limit electric power required 6) allow execution of the tests on site, particularly on a building in an old urban nucleus
RESULTS The whole mobile laboratory has been used in seismic assessment to three buildings in an old Italian urban nucleus
Seismic vulnerability assessment of masonry gravity dams
C. Noret, A. Carrere
1) Detection of the key factors influencing the dynamic response of water-retaining masonry structures 2) Prediction of permanent deformations occurring as a result of the seismic response of masonry gravity dams 3) Gaining an improved engineering knowledge enabling the seismic vulnerability of masonry gravity dams to be reduced
1) Survey of the materials commonly used in the construction of existing European masonry gravity dams 2) Definition of a constitutive law for stone masonry used in dam construction 3) Laboratory testing on large-scale internal filling material specimens 4) Full-scale dynamic experimental investigation on a typical masonry gravity dam 5) Numerical modelling of seismic behaviour of gravity dams 6) Improvement and validation of simplified methods 7) Safety criteria, seismic vulnerability evaluation and upgrading possibilities
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Legend: * Project relevant for spatial planning ** Laboratory experiments
Deliverable 2.1
Deliverable 2.1
4.3.2.3 Damage scenario evaluation

A more relevant approach for planning purpose, thought less considered in studies carried out until today, concerns the evaluation of the damage scenario that can supply useful elements for emergency management and to arrange emergency programs. This kind of evaluation can supply indicators about damage scenario regarding: - the cost of buildings direct damages (physical and economic); - the number of the buildings expose to collapse risk (for planning emergency operations); - the number of potential victims and wounded people (for estimate the impact of the event on the damaged population) Having P.G.A. and vulnerability values for each event, it is possible to find out the damages costs expected value for unit of volume, which could be compared to the entity of the physical damage too. The number of victims and injured can be calculated by the following steps: evaluation of the number of collapsed buildings; evaluation of the number of present inhabitants in collapsed buildings; evaluation of the number of victims as an equal to 50% of present inhabitants; evaluation of the number of injured as an equal to 30% of present inhabitants in collapsed buildings and as an equal from 0 to 50% of inhabitants of buildings where the damage is bigger than 30%.
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Table III: Second level studies- Damage scenario

PROJECT * Seismic risk evaluation through integrated use of geographical information systems and artificial intelligence techniques SERGISAI WORKING GROUP S. Menoni, V. Petrini, G. Zonno Istituto di Ricerca sul Rischio Sismico, Milan, Italy with the contribution of the Sergisai working group INVESTIGATED AREA ABSTRACT The project Sergisai has developed a computer prototype in which a methodology for seismic risk assessment has been implemented OBJECTIVES MATERIAL AND METHODS RESULTS An ideal prototype should allow end-users to carry out a complete risk assessment and evaluation of preventive strategies communicating through a friendly user interface. The risk assessment should address not only all the parameters defining the hazard but also give a complete picture of the vulnerability of the most important sub-systems that are part of the life of human settlements.
1) Probabilistic model forecasting the future seismic activity in the area to be studied 2) Deterministic methods for assessing the hazard input 3) Probabilistic methods for assessing the hazard input 4) Models and codes selected for vulnerability assessment 5) Method to assess the vulnerability of buildings 6) Developing a model to assess the vulnerability of urban systems 7) Definition and application of the prototype to test areas (Toscana, Garfagnana, Barcelona) 8) Use of the prototype in decision-making process
* A rapid warning system for earthquakes in the European-Mediterranean region
European-Mediterranean Seismological Centre (EMSC), Bruyeres-leChatel,France Institute Geografico Nacional (IGN), Madrid, Spain British Geological Survey (BGS), Edinburgh, United Kingdom University of Thessaloniki (AUTH.GL), Thessaloniki,Greece GeoForschungsZentrum (GFZ), Potsdam, Germany Istituto Nazionale di Geofisica (ING), Rome, Italy
Mediterranean Sea
This project intends on improving the existing system in use at the EuropeanMediterranean Seismological Centre (EMSC) which federates several seismic networks. New networks are going to be connected to the system and automatic data processing will be improved in order to achieve higher accuracy in the determination of the earthquake focal parameters
1) Releasing accurate location information within one hour of any event of magnitude 5.0 in Europe 2) Providing detailed source analysis for these events within a few hours
1) Enhance the geographical coverage of short period seismological station transmitting data in real time 2) Increase the number of seismological observatories centralising their regional/national data and locating in quasireal-time earthquakes in the European-Mediterranean areas 3) Realise information for events magnitude greater than 5.0 4) Carry out a study for defining better propagation model for the European-Mediterranean region 5) Carry out a study for designing a better location software integrating automatic depth evaluation 6) Integrate the automatic computation of the scalar seismic moment and Mm magnitude 7) Develop/enhance techniques for fast moment tensor inversion
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Deliverable 2.1
Legend: * More relevant project relevant for spatial planning
Deliverable 2.1
4.3.3 Third level studies: seismic risk

Those are typically engineering and technical studies, aimed at studing a specific area.
4.3.3.1 Local seismic hazard assessment

First the basic seismic hazard is valued, and then local seismic hazard is investigated. Local seismic hazard effects can change on the basis of particular geological and morphological conditions characterizing a specific area (e.g. topological irregularity, deposits, landslides). For areas that can produce local effects (and so potentially dangerous) their response to different shock levels must be investigated. Geological and geomorphological particular conditions in one area, when a seismic event is occurring, can produce different effects that must be taken into consideration for the local seismic hazard assessment. These effects are called local effects and can be distinguished in: instability effects: collapses or movement of big soil masses incompatible with structure stability, which are different depending on condition present in site; site effects: represented by the interaction of seismic waves with particular local condition, that can modify the characteristics of superficial seismic movement compared with the shaking in the bedrock. Local conditions are represented by superficial and buried morphologies (topography) and by particular geological and stratigraphical soil characteristics, that can generate local amplifications of seismic actions transmitted by terrain and by resonance phenomenon due to the specific terrain and structure under investigation.
These analyses constitute the seismic microzoning study that obviously is an interdisciplinary analysis, including geological and seismological studies, and also geotecnical and structural engineering studies.
4.3.3.1.1 Methodologies for evaluating site effects

To evaluate site effects there are different procedures depending on the adopted methodologies and on the attended result: qualitative approach: it is the first step to characterize generally the problem of local effects; semi-quantitative approach: it represents a very clear and useful guide, from the methodological point of view, for the development of seismic microzoning studies, illustrating, for each category of phenomenon associated with a seismic event, some zoning methodologies subdivided in three levels of investigation, related to the extension of the area under examination, the available data and the detail level of the enclosed cartography; quantitative approach: it represent a detail study for limited local situations, so they are individualized physical size useful to quantifying local effects. B.II-31
Deliverable 2.1
Quantitative evaluation
The quantitative evaluation is subdivided in: a . instrumental approach: based on analysis and elaboration of recorded seismic data in site. The most diffuse and used methods are the Nakamura Method (1989) and the spectral ratio method (Kanai e Tanaka, 1961). b. numerical approach: based on numerical analyses of real situations by suitable and detailed geometrical and mechanical site characterization and evaluating the local seismic response by using calculation codes. In order to carry out a numerical analysis the following steps must be taken into consideration: 1. Construction of geological section; 2. Definition of input movement; 3. Definition of geotechnical parameters; 4. Selection of calculation programmes: monodimensional, bidimensional, tridimensional; 5. Choice of the sort of result to supply.
4.3.3.1.2 Instability evaluation

The evaluation of landslides hazard (such as slides and flows or as falls) triggered by earthquakes, consists in landslide stability analysis or in slope static condition analysis, both in pseudostatic conditions and, then, in dynamic conditions. The first step is to recognise unstable areas, by means of a geological study in appropriate scale, whose result can be the preparation of: 1. A geological map, a geomorphological map, a lithotecnical map, and in particular a landslides and subject to landslides areas map; 2. A cataloguing of these areas in order to store characteristic data (typology, activity, geology, morpholocical elements, etc.) (Scheda IFFI, 2001); 3. Landslides movements evolution control, both by means of traditional techniques such as inclinometers, piezometers, etc, and by means of innovative techniques as SAR interferometry, etc. Following the characterization and identification of landslide movements, you must procede quantifying them, meaning the assessment of stability index in static, pseudostatic and dynamic conditions.
4.3.3.1.3 Scale of analysis and representation

To analyse local effects the scale to take into consideration is the detail one (1:500 1:5.000), that permits to microzone the area. This way it is possible to characterize the individual phenomenon, such as a land subject to landslides or a deposit. But if the aim of the analysis is to characterize the phenomenon at a regional level, the regional scale up to 1:10.000 can be used. Above this threshold the phenomenon in examination cannot be characterized anymore.
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Table IV: Third level studies - Local seismic hazard assessment

PROJECT Short term earthquake prediction measurements in Greece at sites sensitive to observation of seismic electric signals -SES WORKING GROUP Solid State Section, Department of Physics, University of Athens INVESTIGATED AREA Western Greece (Lefkada), Chalkidiki, Northern Greece (Grevena-Kozani) and Central Greece (EratiniEgion) ABSTRACT During the period June 1994 - May 1995, significant earthquake activities occurred in Western Greece (Lefkada), Chalkidiki, Northern Greece (Grevena-Kozani) and in Central Greece (EratiniEgion). They were preceded by SES electrical activities that led to predictions issued well in advance. These predictions contained information concerning: 1) the time-window 2) epicentral area 3) magnitude of the impending earthquakes 1. OBJECTIVES investigation of whether a SES vertical component exists 2. investigation of the influence of local and regional inhomogeneities (of the geoelectrical structure in general) on the sensitivity of "a site" for SES collection 3. investigation of precursor changes, if any in the impedance tensor that interrelates the variations of the magnetic and the electric field of the earth 4. laboratory investigation of the emission of electrical precursory phenomena 1) tectonic and seismological results obtained from field work and data acquisition, giving evidence for and describing the earthquake source complexity 2) develop more refined data analysis and numerical simulations, concerning both source and propagation effects 3) seismic hazard and engineering application MATERIAL AND METHODS The electrotelluric measurements have been carried out: 1) in three remote SES sensitive stations in Greece 2) using several dipoles with lengths ranging between fifty meters and several kilometers 3) measuring the vertical electrotelluric component using pairs of electrodes installed at each of two independent boreholes with depths of around 50m 4) using a sampling rate of the order of 1 sample/sec 1) RESULTS The big earthquakes which occurred in Greece during the period June 1994-May 1996, were preceded by significant SES activity 2) The vertical component of an SES is not always observed. For example, the SES electrical activity that preceded the strongest EQ in Greece during the last 10 years, did not show any vertical component. 3) Laboratory experiments show that the rock rupture is preceded by transient electric changes similar to SES.
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Observation and modeling of heterogeneities in seismic sources and crustal structures for seismic hazard assessment around active faults in the mediterranean region.
Institut de Physique du Globe de Paris International Center for Theoretical Studies, Trieste Istituto di Geodesia e Geofisia, Trieste University of Oxford Universidad Complutense Madrid Institute Geografico National, Madrid Institute Superior Tecnico, Lisbon Aristotele University of Thessaloniki National Kapodistrian University of Athens National Observatory of Athens
Mediterranean region
Seismic hazard assessment in the Mediterranean region to contribute to the understanding and proper simulation of this complexity, in order to constrain the physical processes at work during the rupture of a fault, and to better assess the seismic hazard in tectonically active zones
1) tectonic study of active fault system multidisciplinary study of destructive earthquakes 2) seismic source analysis from seismic records in the Mediterranean Area 3) modelling the complexity of seismic source 4) complexity of wave propagation 5) a seismic hazard and engineering application
PROJECT Euro-seistest: volvithessaloniki: a European test site for engineering seismology, earthquake engineering and seismology.
WORKING GROUP COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES Directorate General XII for Science, Research & Development
INVESTIGATED AREA Alluvial valley 30 km northeast of Thessaloniki, on the active fault of the large earthquake (Ms=6.5) of June 20. 1978
ABSTRACT The objective of the EUROSEISTEST R&D project is to establish in a seismically active area a European Test Site in order to study various problems in the field of Engineering Seismology, Earthquake Engineering and Seismology.
OBJECTIVES Produce, for a long period of time, a high quality instrumental in-situ data which are extremely well controlled regarding their seismological, geological, geotechnical and structural backgrounds, so that they can validate various methods and analytical numerical - empirical tools used in seismology (prediction of ground motion, site effects etc) and earthquake engineering (building response, soil-structure interaction, lifeline problems etc).
MATERIAL AND METHODS 1) site description 2) seismological networks 3) temporary seismic survey 4) geodetic survey 5) geophysical and geotechnical investigation 6) instrumentation accelerometric network, free field 7) prediction studies of strong motion 8) processing of site effects 9) instrumentation and testing over a structural model
RESULTS 1) Create an area perfectly well known from seismological, geological and geodynamical point of view that is a high quality experimental site in order to study different problems related to the aforementioned subjects. 2) The strong motion network installed is operational since 1994. The temporary seismic survey injunction with the instrumental structure offers a good possibility to the research engineers and scientists in European or international level, to test their methods to validate their codes and to develop new methods and codes more precise and applicable. Two models are being prepared: 1) a scheme comprising the main ridge parts in Iceland and the North Atlantic Ridge to the north and to the south of Iceland 2) a model of the SISZ and the adjacent part of the eastern rift zone
Earthquake-prediction research in a natural laboratory PRENLAB
Prenlab group
Iceland
Multinational project of earthquake prediction research at reducing seismic risk; High quality earthquake data acquisition and evaluation system
1) to develop methods for automatic extraction of all information available in the frequent micro-earthquake recordings, including fault mapping, rock stress tensor inversion, and monitoring of crustal instability 2) to make use of information from micro-earthquakes, geological information, historical as well as older seismological information for physical interpretation of and modelling the tectonic processes leading to earthquakes 3) to improve the understanding of the space and time relationship between earthquakes and other observable features associated with crustal deformation 4) to apply this knowledge for improved real-time evaluations and alert systems and for improved hazard assessments
1) extension of the monitoring networks 2) acquisition, evaluation and storing of data 3) to search for time and space patterns in the multilpidy of the information of the SIL data 4) introduction of new algorithms into the alert system and other evaluation of the SIL system 5) retrieving of data and other preparatory work for modelling destructive earthquakes 6) development of methods using micro-earthquakes for monitorig crustal instability 7) monitoring stress change before earthquakes using seismic shear wave splitting
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PROJECT 3d site effects and soilfoundation interaction in earthquake and vibration risk evaluation (TRISEE)
WORKING GROUP Politecnico di Milano, Italy Universita di Cagliari, Italy EC Joint Research Centre, Ispra National Technical University, Athens Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden
INVESTIGATED AREA
ABSTRACT New 3D/2D wave propagation tools for investigating site and source effects in earthquake and vibration environments, application to significant engineering problems, large laboratory cyclic tests on non-linear soil-foundation interaction, and development of an artificial intelligence approach to assess sitedependent risk based on numerical simulations and actual observations
OBJECTIVES The model can be used to: 1) investigating site effects and source effects of earthquake and environmental vibrations 2) apply model to solve relevant engineeristic problems 3) laboratory cyclic tests on non-linear soil-foundation interaction 4) develop an artificial intelligence approach to assess site-dependent risk
MATERIAL AND METHODS 1) numerical tools 2) experimental data and field observation
RESULTS Codes created for wave propagation and soil-structure interaction Validation and applications of numerical tools Experimental results from large scale laboratory test Preliminary recommendation on site-dependent risk assessment for earthquake codes
A European test site for earthquake precursors and crustal activity: the Gulf of Corinth, Greece
GAIA: Geotectonic Activity, Instrumentation and Analysis P. Bernard et al.
Gulf of Corinth, Greece
The project will contribute to defining optimal methodologies in terms of instruments, site selection, data analysis, and physical modelling for the detection and understanding of seismic and a seismic crustal instabilities
The objective of the GAIA project is to install around the Gulf of Corinth a network of multiparameters sites with continuous monitoring of seismicity, ground deformation, hydrogeology, and electromagnetism, for recording and modelling the geophysical processes related to the seismic and a seismic deformation in the fault system of the rift
Several dozen sensors have been already been set up in multiparameter sites with continuous monitoring. Incoming data are being analysed at present for noise removal, and decorrelated from meteorological factors: 1) seismicity 2) crustal deformation 3) radon and groundwater 4) electromagnetism
A large part of the multiparameter equipment planned in the GAIA project is now installed. The analysis of the incoming data is just starting for most of the stations: correlation of recorded signals to meteorological factors and the tide will be the first step; intercorrelation between various geophysical parameters and various sites, as well as with the local seismic activity, will then be carried out.
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Active faulting and seismic hazard in Attica (Greece) SEISFAULTGREECE
Universit Joseph Fourier, Grenoble Institut de Physique du Globe, Paris Aristotle University of Thessaloniki National Kapodistrian University, Athens National Technical University of Athens University of Cambridge
Gulf of Evia and the Aegean
The project concerns a multidisciplinary study of the active faulting around the Gulf of Evia and a seismological study of the Aegean to mitigate better the seismic hazard around Athens (Greece)
- Deploy a network of 30 broad-band seismological stations over the Aegean. This network will record local, regional and distant earthquakes that will be used for the study of the local seismicity, the structure of the crust and the upper mantle - Conduct a seismological survey to the Gulf of Evia to study the seismicity and the velocity structure of a very active extensional region - Geodetic survey and a tectonic survey
PROJECT Euro-seistest Volvi, Thessaloniki: a European test site for engineering seismology, earthquake engineering and seismology
WORKING GROUP K. D. Pitilakis, Professor, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki (Coordinator) D. Hatzidimitriou Aristotle University of Thessaloniki G. Manos 1. T. S. A. K, Thessaloniki P. Y. Bard L. G. 1. T., Grenoble D. Jongmans L. G. 1. H., Liege
INVESTIGATED AREA Valley near Thessaloniki, where the major earthquake's epicentre of June 1978 was located
ABSTRACT Establish in a seismically active area a European test site for engineering seismology, earthquake engineering and seismology
OBJECTIVES Produce for a long period of time high-quality instrumental in situ data, which are extremely well controlled, regarding their seismological, geological, geotechnical, structural backgrounds, so that they can ground valid tests and checks of methods already used in engineering seismology (prediction of ground motion, site effects) and earthquake engineering (concerning building behaviour, soilstructure interaction, lifeline problems, etc.) and calibrate new methods to be developed. The optimization of techniques aimed at prevention will be one of the basic themes of the development of seismic zoning in the 21st century.
MATERIAL AND METHODS 1) seismological survey 2) geotecnichal and geo phisical survey 3) free-field strog motion instrumentation 4) strong motion instrumentation of model structure 5) data retrieving and processing 6) data analysis
RESULTS Euro-Seistest will generate: for a long period of time a high-quality database from weak and strong motion measurements. This database and the analysis that will be made throughout this project will be extremely useful for improving methods of estimating the site effects and the seismic behaviour of buildings. It also provides valuable data to improve the methods for the localization of seismic events as well as the determination of their focal mechanism.
* Realistic modelling of the seismic input
Universita degli Studi di Trieste, Istituto di Geodesia e Geofisica International Centre for Theoretical Physics CNR Gruppo Nazionale per la Difesa dai Terremoti Institut fur Oeophysik, ETH Hoenggerberg Zurich
Italy, Ethiopia, and Bulgaria Microzoning of large, mediumsized and small towns: Mexico City, Rome, Naples, Benevento, Buia
Computation of synthetic seismograms, and makes it possible, as required by a realistic modelling, to take source and propagation effects into account, fully utilizing the large amount of geological, geophysical and geotechnical data already available
1) seismic zoning in the 21st century 2) examplemof deterministic zoning using sinthetic seismograms 3) European projects in framework of EPOCH
The computation of realistic synthetic seismograms, using methods that make it possible to take source and propagation effects into account, utilizing the huge amount of geological, geophysical and geotechnical data already available, gives a very powerful and economically valid scientific tool for seismic zonation and microzonation. The method provides a economically and scientifically valid procedure for the immediate, first-order seismic microzonation of any urban area, where the geotechnical data are available. The possibility to model the seismic input also at long period supplies a useful tool for the engineering design and for the retrofitting of special objects, with relatively long free periods that is acquiring a continuously increasing importance, due to the widespread existence in the built environment of special objects.
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Legend: *
More relevant project relevant for spatial planning
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4.3.3.2 Physical vulnerability assessment

This aspect is lacking in European studies. Different physical structures are exposed to various magnitude of earthquake. The elements contributing to make the structures vulnerable are numerous and can change on the basis of the considered structure, of its function, of surrounding environment, and also on others main characteristic of the building, like age, condition, materials, irregularities, reported damages and repairs. It is possible to collect every kind of information in specific evaluation cards for each structure (bridges, supporting works, tunnels).
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Table V: Third level analysis- Physical vulnerability assessment

PROJECT Monuments under seismic action a contribution to the understanding of structural behaviour and to the improvement of restoration techniques Vulnerability of buried pipe-lines under seismic loading (VULPIP) WORKING GROUP AMTE Consulting Engineers, Athens, Greece INVESTIGATED AREA Parthenon in Athens as a classical temples St. Pierre's Cathedral at Beauvais as a gothic cathedral Institute of Structural Analysis and Aseismic Research (ISAAR), NTUA, Athens, Greece Centre Experimental de Recherchcs et d'Etudes du Batiment and des Travaux Publiques (CEBTP), Saint Remy les Chevreuse, France Greek France ABSTRACT OBJECTIVES MATERIAL AND METHODS RESULTS
The Project aims at investigating methods for analysing the structural response under seismic action of discontinuous "blocky" structures, such as old and ancient monuments. Two sites representative of Classical temples and Gothic cathedrals have been selected and investigated for collecting geometrical and structural history data
1) collect and record informations about the two sites and about historical response of the strctures 2) test materials and connect their properties for develop models 3) obtain response by simulations that can be used to derive a general approach 4) try to investigate the actual methodology of response for structural analysis of discontinuous "blocky" structures 1) pipeline systems 2) quantification of the seismic environment 3) mechanical properties of bare pipelines 4) determination of soilpipeline parameters 5) structural analysis of the pipeline system 6) vulnerability of pipelines Under the maximum anticipated earthquake in the studied regions, wave propagation effects are not negligible. More specifically, an avoidable contact between jointed segments will always occur under compression. Results under tension indicate that a safer design for the PVC pipelines could be attained by altering the ductility of their rubber joints
Investigation of the wave propagation effects on long buried pipelines
The behaviour of long, straight jointed buried pipelines subjected to excitations due to seismic wave propagation is investigated in order to assess their vulnerability and provide recommendations to improve their overall design. The seismic environment is quantified by considering imposed ground axial strains and imposed ground rotations. Different sets of experiments are performed to establish the mechanical behaviour of joints and the soil-pipeline interaction parameters. The most prevailing PVC and cast iron pipelines with joints in France and Greece are investigated.
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Seismic vulnerability assessment of masonry gravity dams Noret, Da Rin, Aubry Spain France Germany Materials commonly used in the construction of masonry dams
Develop a methodology and quantitative tools for the assessment of the seismic vulnerability of masonry gravity dams
1) history of European masonry dams 2) materials commonly used in the construction of masonry dams 3) constitutive law for stone masonry used in dam construction 4) laboratory testing of largescale specimens of internal filling material
Bibliographical research led to determination of the main characteristics of the masonry material used in the core of the dams and to definition of an appropriate constitutive law for the material. Preliminary laboratory tests of the material showed different failure mechanisms.
PROJECT ** Pseudodynamic testing of largescale models of civil engineering structures at Elsa
WORKING GROUP European Commission Joint Research Centre, Ispra establishment
INVESTIGATED AREA
ABSTRACT Pseudodynamic test method at the ELSA reaction-wall facility.
OBJECTIVES 1) Description of innovative hardware and software aspects related to the implementation of the PSD test method at the ELSA facility. presented of the testing activity at large scale conducted since the opening of the laboratory in 1992. 2) Presentation of the testing activity at large scale conducted since the opening of the laboratory in 1992. 1) to save properties by identifying emergency strengthening needs and measures 2) to record damages for subsequent repair and strengthening and thus provide the basis for allowing use of as many buildings as possible, as soon as possible and at an acceptable level of risk 3) to collect the data necessary for obtaining estimates of the disaster that will allow authorities to take relief measures, formulate disaster mitigation policies and allocate available resources Experimental testing programme which has been planned with the purpose of contributing to a deeper knowledge of the following problems: 1) the low cycle fatigue behaviour of welded joints 2) the implications of brittle failure in welded connections on the global frame response.
MATERIAL AND METHODS Tests realised using several typology of structures
RESULTS Tests realised for updating actual knowledge about antiseismic construction techniques
* Research and development needs for postearthquake emergency damage and usability assessment of buildings
Department of Civil Engineering University of Patras, Greece
1) Post-earthquake damage evaluation and assessment of building safety for emergency measures necessary for mitigating the consequences of damaging earthquakes as well as saving human life from possible aftershocks. 2) Assessment of a building's safety, involving estimates of its resistance to lateral forces in relation to the observed damage and the expected future seismic activity. The attention of researchers has been focused on the problem of the brittle collapse of beam to column connections in moment resisting steel frames
1) organizational aspects 2) legal aspects 3) research and development needs
Policy for mitigation of earthquake risks should be directed along two lines of action: 1) increasing the safety of construction, future and existing, and another aimed at predisaster planning 2) preparedness for coping with the emergency created by a catastrophic event
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** A European research programme to improve the assessment of steel buildings behaviour during earthquakes 'STEELQUAKE'
Department of structural engineering, Politecnico of Milano Milan, italy JRC - Ispra Italy ISMES Bergamo, Italy Institut Du Genie Civil, Universite De Liege Belgium NTUA - Lee Athens, Greece
Analysis of the behaviour of civil engineering steel structures, of the moment resisting category, under earthquake loads. The overall objective is to provide a better insight into the actual behaviour of civil engineering steel structures, of the moment resisting category, under earthquake loads, implementing in such an analysis a quantitative reference to the failure of connections in terms of low cycle fatigue, considering the duration of the earthquake and the corresponding number of cycles supported in dissipative (plastic) zones.
PROJECT General guidelines and specifications for repair and strengthening of old masonry structures against seismic actions
WORKING GROUP P. Carydis Laboratory for Earthquake Engineering, National Technical, Athens, Greece
INVESTIGATED AREA Two old masonry monuments in Greece: the Knight's Palace on Rhodos island and the old palaces on Corfu island.
ABSTRACT Necessary actions and studies that must be carried out for the repair and strengthening of old masonry structures against seismic actions are exposed
OBJECTIVES 1) investigation for determining the origin of the materials 2) structural details and any other character of the structure up to the verification methods for proving the success and the effect of the interventions to the whole structure Develop better ways of assessing the effectiveness of alternative strengthening methods for the buildings in historic centres of European towns and cities, and to provide a reference document on the subject to guide city and conservation authorities in devising appropriate earthquake protection strategies for these buildings
RESULTS
1) assessment of existing situation 2) logic of the selection of the various intervention 3) interventions 4) verification procedure monitoring
* Evaluating the vulnerability of Europe's historic town centres
Robin Spence, Dina D'Ayala Cambridge University, Department of Architecture, Cambridge, United Kingdom
This project brings together six institutions' with relevant experience and skills in different parts of Europe to study vulnerability of Europe's historic town centres in relation to the differing local situations, upgrading strategies for each of the following criteria: 1) life safety for occupants 2) limitation of damage from future earthquakes 3) limitation of alterations to the appearance and fabric of the buildings 4) responsiveness to economic needs Fictitious buried pipeline Methodologies for the assessment of seismic hazard to buried pipelines are developed
1) assemble data on the vulnerability of four historic town centres 2) compare existing methods of earthquake vulnerability assessment for historic buildings and centres by application to case-study areas within these town centres 3) develop these methods to make them applicable to buildings which have undergone typical renovation and structural strengthening 4) identify general strategies for cost-effective retrofit strengthening of key types of buildings: principally multistorey residential blocks 5) communicate such strategies to the key non-technical decision-makers and planners involved 6) disseminate these findings locally and through a major publication
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Seismic behaviour and vulnerability of buried lifelines Gesellschaft fur Schwingungsuntersuchungen und dynamische Prfmethoden mbH Mannheim D'Appolonia, Genoa Universite Libre de Bruxelles Aristotle University of Thessaloniki National Kapodistrian University of Athens
Design a new pipeline by utilizing the developed tools and methodologies or at least redesign or requalify an existing pipeline, such a task would clearly break the limits of a research
1) 2) 3) 4)
Investigation of seismic hazard local effects description analysis methodology and tools risk analysis
PROJECT Vulnerability of buried pipelines under seismic loading
WORKING GROUP Institute of Structural Analysis and Aseismic Research (ISAAR), NTUA, Athens Centre experimental de recherches et d'etudes du batiment and des travaux publiques (CEBTP), SaintRemy-les-Chevreuse
INVESTIGATED AREA
ABSTRACT The behaviour of long straight jointed buried pipelines subjected to excitations due to seismic wave propagation is investigated. A structural model is developed to analyse the pipeline system.
OBJECTIVES 1) Assessing the vulnerability of buried pipelines on the basis of the critical parameters, as well as at providing recommendations that will improve the overall design of pipeline systems. 2) Investigation of the wave propagation effects on long buried pipelines. These effects occur during an earthquake and can act on a large area around the epicentre. Obtain useful indications concerning the effective vulnerability of European hospitals as well as possible strategies for their seismic improvement
MATERIAL AND METHODS 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6)
RESULTS
pipelines systems quantification of the seismic environment mechanical properties of bare pipelines determination of soil-pipeline parameters structural analysis of the pipeline system vulnerability of pipelines
* Evaluation of vulnerability and retrofitting strategies for a hospital building
Camillo Nuti, Giorgio Monti
Hospital of Castel di Sangro, Abruzzi region, Italy
Evaluation of the seismic vulnerability of a hospital building, based on the logic of the infrastructure functional system, the corresponding minimal cut-set description is obtained and the probability of failure is calculated for different peak ground accelerations. The method permits a rational evaluation of different intervention strategies on both structural and nonstructural components as well as on installations and equipment.
1) description of case-study hospital 2) local seismicity 3) vulnerability of operating theatre system
The method proved to be very effective in allowing the relative quantification of efficiency of different intervention strategies, on structural and non-structural components as well as on equipment. Absolute estimates can be carried out as well, and it has been found that the hospital has a very large vulnerability also at moderate seismic intensities. Simple and cheap interventions can sensibly reduce vulnerability, even though to obtain relevant levels of seismic protection structural retrofitting is unavoidable.
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Legend: * Project relevant for spatial planning ** Laboratory experiments
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4.3.4 Laboratorial experiments

Other European studies, less concerned with territorial planning, consist in laboratorial experiments. In fact they are more relevant in technicalengineeristic area, so they became useful for planning just in a second step. They are physical structures models carried out to investigate the materials resistance to different shock degrees (seismic simulations) in order to increase the endurance and also to elaborate improvement and successful repairs. These kind of experiments are helpful to plan emergency programs and to evaluate physical vulnerability and of people exposition level. The importance of the dialogue between different subjects involved in risk assessment comes out in order to reduce and monitor hazard and vulnerability elements as well as to plan and manage emergency programs by mutual data exchanging, database updating, and many other solutions.
5 Risk management
5.1 Perception
The perception of an existent risk on a territory can be dealt with different points of view: in particular in sociological or technical way. The sociological perception of a risk regards the involved population and how it is disposed to cohabit with the natural hazard. In this way different sociological studies have been carried out by various authors. The following bibliography reports some of them: Stallings R., Promoting Risk. Contructiong the earthquake threat, Aldine de Guyter, New York, 1995; Joh H., Disaster stress of the 1995 Kobe earthquake, in Psychologia An International Journal of Psychology in the Orient, vol. XL, n.3, September 1997; Berke Ph. anf Beatley T., Planning for earthquakes. Risk, politics and policy. The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1992; Bogard W.C., Bringing social theory to hazard research. Conditions and consequences of the mitigation of environmental hazards , in "Sociological Perspectives", vol.31, n.2, April 1988; Drabek T., Human System response to disaster. An inventory of sociological findings, Springer-Verlag, New York, 1986; Mushkatel A., J. Nigg, Effect of objective risk on key actor support for seismic mitigation policy, in "Environmental Management", vol. 11, n.1, January 1987; Mushkatel A., J. Nigg, Opinion congruence and the formulation of seismic safety policies, in "Policy Studies Review" vol. 6, n.4, May 1987.
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5.2 Tolerance, acceptability, mitigation measures

Risk management foresees two main phases: emergency phase and normal time. Mitigation measures can be implemented just in planning phase and not in the emergency one. Elements to act on to start implementing mitigation measures are: Vulnerability: making buildings and lifelines safer; Exposure: avoiding exposure in the most critical areas; Hazard: in this case is possible to act just on local hazard and not on basic hazard, by measures as safety measures for slope, good planning measures for building areas, etc.
Acting on these parameters it can be possible to reduce the risk, but it is impossible to reach the zero risk level, because it always remain a residual threshold of risk, that can be more or less critical in the wake of the mitigation measures to undertake on the basis of several economical and sociological factors. Those strategies can be differently accepted by the involved population according to their level of comprehension of the phenomena and on their availability to accept to cohabit with the residue risk, depending on the efficacy of the undertook mitigation measures. A factor whose presence is determinant to modify those aspects depends on the way the risk is transmit to the involved population an how the available information is managed by the scientific community and the public administration. Mitigation measures to undertake are decided in the wake of suitable analysis, the most appropriate of which is the Cost/Benefit Analysis, that can quantify both costs for mitigation measure and benefits that this improvement can produce. Comparing costs and benefits is possible to define the acceptable level of risk: if costs exceed benefits, the acceptable level will be high; vice versa, if benefits are exceeding costs, the tolerance to cohabit with an hazard is very low and so planning mitigation measures is appropriate. This kind of analysis allows to look at the question following the double way of the cost of the work and its benefits. The knowledge of these parameters is useful: To valuate the order of preference of the mitigation measure compared with other interventions for land management; To valuate if costs to support brings substantial benefits; To apply Cost/Benefit Analysis to value seismic risk compared whit other natural or technological hazards existent on a territory.
In this way is possible to know damages level and so making a redevelopment. In practice, mitigation measures are building and engineering interventions, which are different depending on the site, the work and the level of risk that interests the structure, but they also depend on the availability of the society to accept the costs needed for decrease different levels of the vulnerability component. In fact, every vulnerability degree reduction has a specific cost, and the ways to manage and undertake mitigation measures B.II-43
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can be differently accepted by the population, and so the reduction of the vulnerability can change depending on it.
5.3 Preparedness, response, recovery

Preparedness implicate the arrangement of emergency plan, clear and easy to consult, which gives indications about: 1. the first actions to undertake after the impact: what to do (or not), where to go and how; 2. how to manage the emergency phase and, for plan managers part, how to organize this; 3. early prepare risk-expose population to know how to behave in case of emergency. A good and complete information is helpful to avoid warped information and panic, which should make difficult the management of the situation. In order to prepare the emergency plan, the following points must be taken into consideration: more escape ways, well distributed on the territory; areas to establish collection centres and recover centres for the escaped population; centre of operations to manage the emergency, in a due distance from the devastated area; available territorial resources (as hospitals, fire brigades stations, etc.) and different ways to reach them.
The first aim to achieve is to get population safe, and in particular: to save as more people as possible; to manage the emergency trying to avoid the spread of panic and chaos; to offer prompt shelter.
The arrangement of emergency plan depends on several factors, which are different for every considered territory. Main territorial characteristics to take into consideration in planning the emergency are: physical geography, local town planning, sort of resource present, etc. So it is clear that is impossible to draw up an emergency plan universally useful.
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6 Glossary of all key-words

Earthquake: this phenomenon is the most evident expression of crustal breaking happening in changeable depth from a few to some hundred kilometres. Hazard: this concept can be analyzed in two different ways: considering it as a concept linked to the probability that in a specific site a certain severity event may happen in a predefined time-window (probability is the term used, because an exact prevision cant be given for the time being. Statistic analysis of the past events occurred in a specific site must be done in order to obtain a right value of the hazard), or considering an individual event. Different methods can be classified on the basis of different starting hypothesis, objectives and detail level. They are divided into Probabilistic approach and Deterministic approach (damage scenario). Vulnerability: this terms means how much an object can be damaged in case of occurrence of the very event. Vulnerability is an intrinsic characteristic of an object and so it can change on the basis of the phenomena we are considering. The concept of vulnerability is closely linked to the e x p o s u r e one, which analyses the event considering the consequence for the subjects and the objects exposed. Risk: Combining hazard and vulnerability, is possible to establish the risk. This term defines the entity of damages attended in a data area because of future events. It is measured in the basis of the sort of damage to evaluate. Depending on starting hypothesis assumed for define hazard, there are many different ways to assess risk that can be carried out on three different investigation levels, from preliminary analysis to special investigation. First level studies - basis seismic hazard: In this kind of analysis, the different experiments are aimed to examining the exposure and classifying the territory on the basis of the detected seismic risk classification on the basis of the seismic Italian code (the Italian code considers four zones). Second level studies - damage scenario: these studies are going to value the Basic Seismic Hazard, by using deterministic models to investigate attended shock in a selected area. They consider a singular event and his propagation in surrounding areas (scenario), this will allow to study site effects (damage scenario). - physical vulnerability: it is analysed by using direct methods as vulnerability surveys or by means of approximate evaluations combining different available data. Third level studies - local seismic hazard. local seismic hazard effects can change on the basis of particular geological and morphological conditions who characterize a specific area (e.g. topological irregularity, deposits,
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landslides). For areas who can produce local effects (and so potentially dangerous) their response to different shock level must be investigated Geological and geomorphological particular conditions in one area, when a seismic event is occurring, can produce different effects that must be taken into consideration for the local general seismic hazard assessment. - physical vulnerability assessment: different physical structures are exposed to various magnitude of earthquake. The elements contributing to make the structures vulnerable are numerous and can change on the basis of the considered structure, of its function, of surrounding environment, and also on others main characteristic of the building, like age, condition, materials, irregularities, reported damages and repairs. It is possible to collect every kind of information in specific evaluation cards for each structure (bridges, supporting works, tunnels). Laboratorial experiments: they are physical structures models carried out to investigate the materials resistance to different shock degrees (seismic simulations) in order to increase the endurance and also to elaborate improvement and successful repairs. These kind of experiments are helpful to plan emergency programs and to evacuate physical vulnerability and of people exposition level. Source zones : they are areas which can be considered geologically, structurally and kinematically homogenous. The seismic zone is defined through the probabilistic distribution of the epicentral intensities. Earthquake shaking data: data available to study earthquakes. They are divided into: - Shock effect on antropic environment, on buildings and on natural environment (macroseismical effects); - Seismometric registrations of soil motions; - Accelerometric registrations of soil motion registration by using accelerograms, instruments capable to supply registrations proportional to earthquake accelerations. Maximum recorder acceleration value: it is the most simple parameter used to measure the strength of an earthquake.
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7 Bibliography
Floriana Pergalani, Vincenzo Petrini, Scheda tecnica per la valutazione dello scenario di danno e del rischio sismico, Dicembre 2003; Floriana Pergalani, Vincenzo Petrini, Massimo Compagnoni, Dipartimento di Ingegneria Strutturale, Politecnico di Milano, Valutazione della risposta sismica locale di piccoli centri a scala nazionale Illustrazione dei metodi di valutazione degli effetti di sito -, Convenzione tra Servizio Sismico Nazionale, Dipartimento della Protezione Civile e Dipartimento di Ingegneria Strutturale del Politecnico di Milano, Novembre 2002; V. Petrini, S, Menoni, F. Pergalani, M.P. Boni, M. Mandelli, Vulnerabilit sismica delle infrastrutture a rete, da Ingegneria Sismica n2, 2000; Regione Lombardia, Settore Ambiente ed Energia, Servizio Geologico e Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche- Istituto di Ricerca sul Rischio Sismico, Determinazione dei rischio sismico a fini urbanistici m Lombardia, Milano, Giugno 1996; Maria Pia Boni, Scira Menoni, Floriana Pergalani, Vincenzo Peti-ini , Scenario sismico di danno delle tnfrastruttijre a rete in una zona campione della Regione Lombardia, da Ingegneria Sismica 2/2002); European Commission, Environmental and climate programme, Seismic and volcanic risk. Proceedings of the workshop Monitoring and research for mitigating seismic and volcanic risk held at Reykjavk Iceland, from 20 to 22 October 1994, Edited by B. Thorkelsson, M. Yeroyianni, Directorate-General Science, Research and Development; European Commission, Environmental and climate programme Climate and natural hazards; Collaborative European research activities for seismic risk prevention and reduction. Proceedings of the workshop held at Bergamo, Italy from 9 to 11 November 1994, Edited by M. Yeroyianni, A. Peano, P. Panzeri, Directorate-General Science, Research and Development; European Commission, Environmental and climate programme Climate and natural hazards; Seismic risk in the European Union (Volume I). Proceedings of the rewiew meetings held in Brussels on 2-3 and 23-24 May 1996, Edited by A. Ghazi, M. Yeroyianni, Directorate-General Science, Research and Development; European Commission, Environmental and climate programme Climate and natural hazards; Seismic risk in the European Union (Volume II). Proceedings of the rewiew meetings held in Brussels on 27 and 28 November 1997, Edited by M. Yeroyianni, Directorate-General Science, Research and Development; Historical Investigation of European Earthquakes, Materials of the CEC project. Rewiew of Historical Seismicity in Europe 1 , Edited by Massimiliano Stucchi, CNR Istituto di Ricerca sul Rischio Sismico;
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Historical Investigation of European Earthquakes, Materials of the CEC project. Rewiew of Historical Seismicity in Europe 2, Edited by Paola Albini and Andrea Moroni, CNR Istituto di Ricerca sul Rischio Sismico; Starr, C., Social benefit versus technological risk , Science, 165, September 1969; Petrini, V. and Scirocco, F., Procedimento per la costruzione di una carta sismica italiana su basi statistiche, Istituto Lombardo (Rend. Sc.), A 110, 1976; Grandori, E. and Grandori, G., An application of decision theory to seismic zoning, Sixth world Conference on Earthquake Engineering, New Delhi, January 1977; Boore, D. M., The effect of simple topography on seismic waves: implications for the accelerations recorded at Pacoima Dam, San Fernando Valley, California. Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America, Vol. 63, No. 5, pp. 1603-1609, 1973; Faccioli, E. e al., Elementi per una guida alle indagini di Microzonazione Sismica. Quaderni de "La Ricerca Scientifica" N. 114. CNR, Roma, 1986; Gli, L, Bard, P.Y., Jullien, B., The effect o topography on earthquake ground motion: a review and new results. Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America, Vol. 78, No.1, 1988; Lucantoni, A., Bosi, V., Bramerini, F., De Marco, R., Lo Presti, T., Naso, G., Sabetta, F., Il Rischio sismico in Italia. Ingegneria sismica, XVIII, N. 1, pp. 5-36+CD allegato, 2001; Regione Lombardia, CNR-IRRS, Determinazione del rischio sismico ai fini urbanistici in Lombardia, 1996. Ambraseys N., Srbulov M.. Earthquake induced displacement of slopes. Soil Dynamics and Earthquake Engineering, 14, pp 59-71, 1995; Bieniawski Z.T., Rock Mass classifications in rock engineering applications. Fourth International Congress on Rock Mechanics , Montreaux, 1979; Bishop A.W., The use of the slip circle in the stability analysis of slopes. Geotechnique, 5, pp 7-17, 1955; Callerio, A., Petrini, V., Pergalani, F., ELCO, A program for twodimensional analyses using boundary element method. Rapporto Tecnico, IRRS, Milano, 2000; Casadei, F., Gabellini, E., Implementation of a 3D coupled spectralelement/finite- element solver for wave propagation and soil-structure interaction simulation. Technical report, Joint Research Centre, Ispra, Italy, 1997; Cividini A., Pergalani F., Petrini V., La risposta dei versanti ad azioni sismiche attraverso un modello semplificato, Ingegneria Sismica , anno VIII, 3, pp 28-44, 1991; Cividini A., Pergalani F., On some aspects of the numerical evaluation of permanent displacements, Proceeding of French-Italian conference on
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"Slope stability in seismic areas", Bordighera (Imperia), Italia, pp 167180, 1992; Farmer I.W., Engineering behaviour of rocks. Chapman and Hall ltd., 1983; Grandori G., Perotti F., Tagliani A., On the Attenuation of Macroseismic Intensity with Epicentral Distance, Ground Motion and Engineering Seismology, A.S. Cakmak Ed., Elsevier, 1987; Graham J., Methods of stability analysis. Slope Instability, ed. D. Brunsen & D.B. Prior. Wiley and Sons, New York, pp 523-602, 1984; Gruppo di Lavoro CPTI 1999 - ING, GNDT, SGA, SSN, Catalogo Parametrico dei Terremoti Italiani, Bologna, pp 92, 1999; Gruppo di Lavoro 2004, Redazione della mappa di pericolosit sismica prevista dallOrdinanza PCM 3274 del 20 marzo 2003 . Rapporto conclusivo per il Dipartimento di Protezione Civile, INGV, Milano-Roma, pp 65 + 5 appendici, aprile 2004; Guagenti E., Petrini V., Il caso delle vecchie costruzioni: verso una nuova legge danni-intensit, Proceedings of the 4 th Italian National Conference on Earthquake Engineering, Milano, Volume I, pp 145-153, 1989;
P P
Jibson R.W., Harp E.L., Michael J.A., A method for producing digital probabilistic seismic landslide hazard maps: an example from the Los Angeles, California, area. US Geological Survey O-F Report, pp 98-113, 1998; King J.L., Tucker B.E., Observed variations of earthquake motion across a sediment filled valley. Bull. Seism. Soc. Am., 74, pp. 137-151, 1984; Luzi L., Pergalani F., Application of statistical and GIS techniques to slope instability zonation (1:50.000 Fabriano geological map sheet), Soil Dynamic and Earthquake Engineering, Elsevier Science, vol. 15, pp 8394, 1996; Luzi L., Pergalani F., Slope instability in static and dynamic conditions for urban planning: the Oltre Po Pavese case history (Regione LombardiaItaly), Natural Hazard, 20, pp 57-82, 1999; Luzi L., Pergalani F., A correlation between slope failures and accelerometric parameters: the 26 september 1997 earthquake (UmbriaMarche, Italy), Soil Dynamic and Earthquake Engineering , Elsevier Science, vol. 20, pp 301-313, 2000; Malagnini L., Tricarico P., Rovelli A., Hermann R.B., Opice S., Biella G., de Franco R., Explosion, earthquake, and ambient noise recording in a Pliocene sediment-filled valley: interferences on seismic response properties by reference and non-reference-site techniques. Bull. Seism. Soc. Am., 86, pp. 670-682, 1996; Malagnini L., Herrmann R,B., Di Bona M., Ground motion scaling in the Apennines (Italy). Bull. Seism. Soc. Am., 90, 4, pp 1062-1081, 2000; Malagnini L., Akinci A., Herrmann R,B., Pino N.A., Scognamiglio L., Characteristics of the ground motion in northeastern Italy. Bull. Seism. Soc. Am., 92, 6, pp 2186-2204, 2002;
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Margottini C., Molin D., Serva L., Intensity versus ground motion: a new approach using Italian data, Engineering Geology, 33, pp 45-58, 1992; Newmark N. M., Effects of earthquake on dams and embankments. Gotechnique, 23, 1965; Pergalani, F., Romeo, R., Luzi, Seismic microzoning of the area Ms 5.9 earthquake of the 26 Earthquake Engineering, Elsevier L., Petrini, V., Pugliese, A., San, T., struck by Umbria-Marche (central Italy) september 1997. Soil Dynamic and Science, 18, pp. 279-296, 1999;
Pergalani, F., Compagnoni, M., Petrini, V., Valutazione degli effetti di sito di alcuni centri dellAlta Valtiberina Umbra tramite modellazione numerica, Ingegneria Sismica, 1, pp. 44-56, 2002; Pergalani, F., de Franco, R., Compagnoni, M., Caielli, G., Valutazione degli effetti di sito tramite analisi numeriche e sperimentali nellabitato di Citt di Castello: analisi, confronti e utilizzo dei risultati, Ingegneria sismica, 1, pp. 66-77, 2002; Pergalani F., Compagnoni M., Petrini V., Evaluation of site effects in some localities of Alta Val Tiberina Umbra (Italy) by numerical analysis, Soil Dynamic and Earthquake Engineering, Elsevier Science, 23, 2, pp 85-105, 2003; Regione Lombardia, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, Analisi di stabilit in condizioni statiche e pseudostatiche di alcune tipologie di frane di crollo finalizzata alla stesura di modelli di indagine e di intervento, Milano, 2001; Romeo R., Seismically-induced landslide displacements: a predictive model. Proc. XXIII General Assembly of European Geophysical Society, Nice, 1998; Sabetta F., Pugliese A. Attenuation of peak ground acceleration and velocity from italian strong motion record, Bulletin of Seismic Society of America, 77, pp. 1491-1513, 1987; Sabetta F., Pugliese A., Estimation of response spectra and simulation of nonstationary earthquake ground motions, Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America, 86, pp. 337-352, 1996; Scheda IFFI, Scheda di censimento dei fenomeni franosi, Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, Dipartimento per i Servizi Tecnici Nazionali, Servizio Geologico, 2001; Spencer E., A method of analysis of the stability of embankments assuming parallel interslice forces. Geotechnique, 17, pp 11-26, 1967; Stucchi M., Camassi R., NT4.1.1 Un catalogo parametrico di terremoti di area italiana,GNDT, 1998.
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Appendix: Operation Standards for Risk Assessment aimed at Spatial Planning

A1 Simplified model for Seismic Hazard mapping aimed at legal directive
A1.1 Hazard methodology
To study hazard in order to obtain a simplified model we have to recourse to a deterministic model. Minimum data required for increase this model are: 1) Historical recorded events catalogue. For every recorded event it is possible to find out information including the indicators of epicentral severity: epicentral intensity and magnitude. 2) Source zones . Those are areas that can be considered geologically, structurally and kinematically homogenous. A seismic zone is defined through the probabilistic distribution of the epicentral intensities. 3) Attenuation model. The evaluation of hazard is necessary to know, beside the localization and the epicentral severity, how the phenomenon propagates from the epicentre and, as a result, the variation of correlated severity parameters: Intensity attenuation. Using the epicentral severity as indicator, the result of the attenuation laws is still an intensity value. Magnitude attenuation. These models use as severity indicator the magnitude value. The above data are applied to investigate how phenomena propagates far from the epicentre and, consequently, they can be used to investigate the variation of severity parameters of intensity attenuation or of magnitude attenuation.
A1.2 Map scales

The choice of the scale to study spatial planning is conditioned by multifaceted factors. Out of all these the most influential are: the depth level chosen to lead the analysis; the object of the study (infrastructure network, building, landslide, etc.); the sort of approach to use (preliminary study, cognitive survey, detailed survey, etc.).
In particular, there are three different detail levels to investigate: B.II-51
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1.
The Local scale: it allows to analyse in depth the local hazard present in one or more municipalities (1:500 1: 5000). In the map, the local hazard is represented by P.G.A. values, that decrease getting away from the epicentre.
GARGNANO
VOBARNO TOSCOLANO MADERNO

La go di Ga rda
1.25 1.15 1.05
GARDONE RIVIERA
VILLANUOVA ROE` VOLCIANO SUL CLISI SALO` r
2.75 2.65 2.55 2.25 2.45 2.35 2.15 2.05 1.85 1.95 1.75 1.65 1.55 1.45 1.35
GAVARDO
0.95
0.85
Legend: P.G.A. values
Fig. A1.1 Example of Local Hazard Map: an earthquake near Garda Lake (Lombardia Region), the epicentre is in the municipality of Sal. The Regional scale : at this scale it is possible to investigate the hazard for areas including a big number of municipalities that can be represented at 1:5.000 1:50.000 scale.
2.
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Return Period = 72 years
Fig. A1.2 Example of Regional Hazard Map: Expected Maximum Acceleration values (Amax (g)) for different Return Periods in the Lombardia Region 3. The National scale: with this scale of representation it is possible to have a full picture of the national hazard (1:500.000 or more).
Fig. A1.3. Seismic Hazard Map of the national territory (Italy) with a return period of 475 years (National Institute of Geophysic and Vulcanology) B.II-53
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A1.3 Characteristics and use of hazard maps

Having three different levels of detail to produce hazard maps, means having different ways to use them. In particular, the national scale is useful to classify the national territory in seismic areas or not; while the regional one, apart from this function (but more in detail that in the national scale), is of use for draft a more or less hazardous areas list. The local scale is the most detailed one and it is used to zoning the region in study or to give indications about the buildings protection levels to adopt.
A1.4 Data acquisition and mapping procedures

Data available for the study of earthquakes can be collected under three categories, correlated with three different approaches: a. Damage effect. This method describes the damage effects on the built environment, on buildings and on the natural environment (macroseismical effects).
b. Seismometric registrations. This method is provided by soil motion registrations, which are obtained thanks to the use of seismograms (instruments able to reproduce ground motions in horizontal or vertical direction quite faithfully) Different kinds of waves that contribute to soil motion can be distinguished as follows: volume waves, divided in P-wave (from the Latin term "primae"), that are compression waves which propagate from the source in all direction with a sequence of compressions and dilatations; and Swave (from the Latin term "secundae") shearing waves which cause orthogonal displacements; surface waves, so called because they propagate only on terrestrial surface; they are a consequence of the interaction of P and S-waves with terrestrial surface. The difference in arrival times of the waves is the basic element for the location of the earthquake source.
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c. Accelerometric registrations. The third and last method to evaluate earthquakes is through soil motion registration obtained hanks o accelerograms, instruments capable of supplying registrations in proportion to earthquake accelerations. The simplest parameter that can be used for this measure is the amount of the maximum recorded acceleration.
GNDT
0.3
0.2
0.1
Pga (g)
0.0
-0.1
-0.2
-0.3 0 5 10 15 Time (s) 20 25 30
The data so obtained are implemented and acquired using G.I.S. (Geographic Information Systems).
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A2 Simplified model for risk mapping aimed at spatial planning

A2.1 Risk methodology, data acquisition and use
To define a simplified model for risk mapping is necessary to work on the hazard and vulnerability components. As far as the minimum standard for the hazard component, is concerned to use a deterministic input model (as explained above). So, only vulnerability component remains to be analysed. Vulnerable elements are distinct between the ones inferable from ISTAT catalogues and the ones that involved population and buildings or other structures. Summarizing, a simplified model for risk mapping needs of two components: 1. a deterministic input to define the hazard. To do that Basic Seismic Hazard is used to investigate the attended shock in a selected area. Several experiments are based, from time to time, on different parameters such as seismotectonic characteristics of the area, the source energy release ways, the seismic waives propagation course. Starting whit these inputs, the procedure manages to define: the historical seisicity, by searching in archives and historical recording; the recent seismicity, that is the one recorded by seismographes.
In the light of these data, several objectives can be pursued, like identifying source areas and the events characterized by different recurrence periods. In this way it is possible to calculate (using a specific attenuation model) the expected shaking at the site. 2 . the v u l n e r a b i l i t y from ISTAT data to assess the vulnerability component. Physical vulnerability is analysed by using direct methods as vulnerability surveys or by means of approximate evaluations combining different available data. In this way is possible to subdivide the patrimony to value on the basis of more factors (such as the structural typology, the age of building, the state of maintenance) and reach at define a vulnerability index for different structures considered.
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Fig. A2.1 Vulnerability map for buildings at local level for the municipality of Sal (Lombardia Region)
Fig. A2.2 Vulnerability map for infrastructure network at local level for the municipality of Sal (Lombardia Region) B.II-57
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A2.2 Map scales

1. The Local scale: these kind of analysis are appropriately feasible on an intermediate detail scale, such as the local one (1:500 1: 5000).
Fig. A2.3 Example of Local Risk Map: Values of risk in the municipality of Toscolano Maderno (Lombardia Region) Legend: Damage level ratio: cost of damage / value of the new building D < 0,001 0,001 < D < 0,01 D > 0,01 2. The Regional scale: for the regional scale too (1:5.0001:50.000), it is possible to carry out studies and maps about seismic risk.
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Fig. A2.4 - Example of Regional Risk Map: Values of risk in the Toscana Region (Italy) (C.N.R. G.N.D.T, 1998) Legend: Damage level ratio: cost of damage / value of the new building > 0,40% O,20 0,40% 0,09 0,20% 0,01 0,09% < 0,01% 3. The National scale: at present, for the Italian case, the production of seismic risk map concerns only the local and the regional levels; so there is not a risk map for the whole national territory.
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A3 Minimum standard for multi-risk assessment and mapping

In order to achieve a simplified model for multi-risk assessment to use it as an element of Strategic Environmental Assessment, it is necessary to have, for every natural events considered, an univocal definition of risk in terms of attended damages. This way, having the same terms of comparison for every kind of hazard, it is possible to compare different nature risks, and then to define a multi-risk approach. For this case too, the choice of the scale is linked to the sort of study to carry out. For a simplified model, where isnt possible to achieve a high level of detail, also the scale of analysis and representation couldnt enter into detailed levels.
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B.III Landslides
Authors: Giuseppe Delmonaco, Daniele Spizzichino, T6
1 2 Definition of Landslide..................................................... 4 Landslides classification .................................................. 4
2.1 2.2 Material type ............................................................................5 Landslide activity ......................................................................6
State of activity .........................................................................6 Distribution of activity ................................................................8 Style of activity .........................................................................8
2.2.1 2.2.2 2.2.3
2.3
Landslide causes .......................................................................9 Velocity.................................................................................. 10 Dimension .............................................................................. 12 Energy ................................................................................... 13 Consequences......................................................................... 13 Hybrid ................................................................................... 14 Geomorphological criteria or qualitative analysis......................... 15 Analysis of temporal series related to effects.............................. 15 Analysis of temporal series related to causes ............................. 16
Precipitation............................................................................16 Earthquakes............................................................................17 Mechanical approach ................................................................18 Kinematics approach ................................................................18
Intensity or Magnitude (I)............................................. 10

3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5
Return period of landslides............................................ 15

4.1 4.2 4.3
4.3.1 4.3.2
4.4
Monitoring.............................................................................. 18
4.4.1 4.4.2
Hazard assessment (H) ................................................. 19

5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 Basic concepts ........................................................................ 19 Prediction of landslide types ..................................................... 20 Prediction of landslide intensity................................................. 20 Prediction on landslide affected area ......................................... 21
5.4.1 Methods of relative hazard analysis ............................................21 5.4.1.1 Qualitative methodologies...................................................21 5.4.1.1.1 Field geomorphologic analysis .........................................21 5.4.1.1.2 Combination of index maps or heuristic approach ...............22 5.4.1.2 Quantitative methodologies.................................................23 5.4.1.2.1 Statistical analysis .........................................................23 5.4.1.2.2 Geotechnical models ......................................................25
5.5
Temporal prediction ................................................................ 27

Analysis of return time .............................................................27 Analysis of intensity/magnitude .................................................29
5.5.1 5.5.2
5.6
Prediction of evolution ............................................................. 29 B.III-1
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Prediction of run-out ................................................................30 Prediction of retrogression limits ................................................30 Prediction of lateral expansion ...................................................30
Landslide hazard mapping ............................................. 30

6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 Introduction ........................................................................... 30 Susceptibility and hazard mapping ............................................ 31 Hazard zoning scales ............................................................... 33 Landslide Hazard map types..................................................... 33 Approaches to landslide mapping .............................................. 34
The Inferential Approach...........................................................34 The Statistical Approach ...........................................................34 The Process-Based Approach .....................................................35
6.5.1 6.5.2 6.5.3
6.6
The mapping unit for GIS Technique ......................................... 35 Definition ............................................................................... 36 Cartography related to the element at risk - Map of Exposure -.... 37 Economic value of element at risk............................................. 37
Human life Value .....................................................................38 Goods and activities value.........................................................38 Global Value ...........................................................................39
Element at Risk (E) or exposure .................................... 36

7.1 7.2 7.3
7.3.1 7.3.2 7.3.3
Vulnerability (V) ............................................................ 39

8.1 8.2 Vulnerability: some web definitions ........................................... 40 Conceptual approach: vulnerability assessment.......................... 40
Definition ...............................................................................40 Vulnerability components..........................................................41
8.2.1 8.2.2
8.3 8.4
Human life vulnerability ........................................................... 42 Vulnerability of good and activities............................................ 42 Definition ............................................................................... 45 Qualitative analysis ................................................................. 45
Damage propensity ..................................................................45 Total risk ................................................................................46
Analysis of Risk (R) ....................................................... 45

9.1 9.2 9.3
9.2.1 9.3.1
Quantitative analysis ............................................................... 46
9.3.2 Potential damage (WL)..............................................................47 9.3.2.1 Rigorous assessment .........................................................48 9.3.2.2 Simplified assessment. .......................................................49 9.3.3 Specific Risk (Rs) .....................................................................50
9.4
Probability of acceptable rupture............................................... 50
10 Risk management .......................................................... 52

10.1 Introduction ........................................................................... 52 10.2 Framework for landslide risk management ................................ 53
10.2.1 10.2.2 General framework ..................................................................53 Increasing of social acceptable threshold risk...............................54
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10.3 Acceptable and tolerable risk from landsliding............................ 55

10.3.1 10.4.1 10.4.2 General issues.........................................................................55 Risk mitigation through structural action and measures.................58 Risk mitigation with non-structural action and measures ...............58
10.4 Treatment.............................................................................. 57
10.5 Public Awareness, Education and Capacity Building .................... 59 10.6 Emergency Preparedness Plan.................................................. 59
10.6.1 10.6.2 10.6.3 Before the Landslide ................................................................59 When it Rains..........................................................................60 Key Considerations ..................................................................61
10.6.4 What Can You Do If You Live Near Steep Hills ..............................61 10.6.4.1 Prior to Intense Storms: .....................................................61 10.6.4.2 During Intense Storms: ......................................................61 10.6.5 10.7.1 10.7.2 After the Disaster ....................................................................62 Emergency Phases ...................................................................62 Planning Phase ........................................................................62
10.7 The Phases of emergency Plan (planning, response, recovery) .... 62
10.7.3 Response Phase ......................................................................63 10.7.3.1 Initial Response.................................................................63 10.7.3.2 Extended Response............................................................64
10.8 Recovery Phase ...................................................................... 64
11 Glossary of all keywords................................................ 64 12 Bibliography .................................................................. 70 13 Appendix: Operational Standards for Risk Assessment aimed at Spatial Planning ................................................... 92
13.1 Minimum standard (simplified model) for hazard mapping aimed at a legal directive................................................................. 92
13.1.1 Various methodologies related to the 3 assumed scales of analysis in the light of a potential harmonisation of hazard maps, based on a multihazard perspective...............................................................................92
13.2 Minimum standard (simplified model) for risk mapping aimed at spatial planning .............................................................................. 98
13.2.1 Multi-risk assessment perspective as element of the Strategic Environmental Assessment....................................................................98 13.2.2 Methodologies, functions and outputs .........................................99 13.2.2.1 ........................................................................................ 101
13.3 Minimum Standard for Landslide Risk Maps ............................. 106

13.3.1 Local Scale mapping ( 1: 10.000) .......................................... 106
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1 Definition of Landslide
The term "landslide" describes a wide variety of processes that result in the downward and outward movement of slope-forming materials including rock, soil, artificial fill, or a combination of these (UNESCO, 1984). A landslide event is defined as "the movement of a mass of rock, debris or earth down a slope" (Cruden 1991). The word 'landslide' also refers to the geomorphic feature that results from the event. Other terms used to refer to landslide events include 'mass movements', 'slope failures', 'slope instability' and 'terrain instability'. Limits and uncertainties There is a conceptual confusion in the term landslide since it is referred both to landslide deposit (displaced mass) and the movement of material along a slope.
2 Landslides classification
In spite of the simple definition, landslide events are complex geological/geomorphological processes and are therefore difficult to classify. An adequate classification system should be based on parameters and/or features that can be measured and observed in the field. At the same time, a classification system should satisfy requisites of uniqueness, rationality, homogeneity and readiness of application, though the detection of classes mutually exclusive. The classification system, most for this report, is modified from upon material type and type of classification of slope movements commonly used worldwide, and proposed Varnes (1978). The classification is based movement, and is similar to the updated suggested by Cruden and Varnes(1996).
This is based on the movement, with a special attention to the spatial distribution of displacements and their velocity as well as to the shape of the failure and landslide body. The Cruden & Varnes classification can be resumed in the following landslide types: 1. Falls: take place rapidly by free-fall, bouncing, or rolling, and may develop into either slides or flows. 2. Topples: consist of the rapid rotation of a unit of rock or soil about some pivot point. Toppling may not lead to either falls, slides or flows. 3. Slides: involve the movement along one or more distinct surfaces. Slides are subdivided into 'rotational slides' and 'translational slides', depending upon the shape of the failure plane. a . Rotational slides: also referred to as slumps, involve movement along a curved failure plane. Often the failure plane did not exist
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before movement occurred. Rotational slides usually involve relatively few distinct rock or soil units. b . Translational slides: involve the movement of many rock or soil units along a plane. If few distinct units are involved, the movement is referred to as a 'translational block slide'. Often the failure plane existed before movement occurred. 4. Lateral spreads: are dominated by lateral extension of the ground, accompanied by shear or tensile forces, and a general subsidence of the ground surface. They generally occur relatively slowly. 5. Flows describe movement that resembles a viscous fluid. Some flows occur slowly, others occur rapidly. Velocity within the flowing mass is usually decreases with depth and laterally. In most cases, water is an integral component. Creep is a type of flow that occurs very slowly. 6. Complex landslides involve the combination of two or more types of movement. Commonly one type of movement starts the material moving, such as a debris slide, and once underway the material takes on the character of another type of movement, such as a debris flow. The name of the complex movement is a combination of the types of movement, in order of occurrence, such as a debris slide-debris flow. The rate of movement depends on the types of movements and material types involved. According to WP/WPLI (1990-1994), complex landslides should be classified following the types of movement involved related to the genetical and temporal sequence of the single types that compose the phenomenon.
2.1 Material type

The material involved in a landslide should be classified according to its state before the initiation of the movement or, if the movement changes in the time, according to the state that characterizes the material before the movement where such a change occurs The material involved in a landslide is classified into two groups, 'bedrock' and 'soil'. Soil, which is generally unconsolidated superficial material, is further subdivided into 'debris' and 'earth' depending upon its texture. Rock refers to earth materials that have lithified by some rock-forming process. Its strength depends not only on the rock type but also on the degree of weathering and the density and orientation of the discontinuities, which are generally the planes of weakness in the rock mass. Debris is composed of predominantly coarse grained soil, or as mentioned above, can also include highly fractured bedrock. The strength of coarse grained soil is generally derived from friction between the grains. Earth refers to predominantly fine grained soil (primarily of silt and clay sized materials). The strength of fine grained soil is generally derived from cohesion, the chemical and electrical bonding between the small particles.
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2.2 Landslide activity

The activity defines the temporal evolution of a landslide, through the analysis of movement, displaced materials and areas involved. The activity can be regrouped under three headings: 1. State of activity, that is related to the timing of a landslide 2. Distribution of activity, that describes the area where a landslide is moving 3. Stile of activity, that indicates the contribution of single movements to the landslide
2.2.1
State of activity
The state of activity is defined as follows Cruden & Varnes, 1996): active: landslide currently moving; suspended: landslide moved within the last annual cycle of seasons, but not presently moving; reactivated: landslide that is again active after being inactive; inactive : landslide that moved more than one annual cycle of seasons ago. Inactive landslides can be subsequently divided in: dormant: if the causes of movement remain apparent; naturally stabilised: inactive landslide protected by its original causes without human interventions; artificially stabilised: inactive landslide protected by its original causes with artificial remedial measures; relict: inactive landslides developed under geomorphologic and climatic setting, considerably different from present conditions. The geomorphological information of the state of activity are generally related to the type and state of preservation of some diagnostic elements, as reported in Table 2.1.
Active Scarps, terraces and crevasses with sharp borders Crevasses and depressions without secondary filling Secondary mass movements on scarps Fresh striae over the failure surface and marginal shear planes Fresh crack surfaces on blocks Irregular drainage system, diffuse ponding and depressions with internal drainage Pressure crests at the contact with sliding margins Absence of soil on the exposed portion of the failure surface Presence of rapid-growing vegetation Different vegetation between internal and external landslide areas Tilting trees without vertical growth Inactive Scarps, terraces and crevasses with rounded borders Crevasses and depressions with secondary filling Absence of secondary mass movements on scarps Absent or weathered striae over the failure surface and marginal shear planes Weathered crack surfaces on blocks Well preserved drainage system Abandoned marginal cracks and banks Growth of soil on the exposed portion of the failure surface Presence of slow-growing vegetation No difference of vegetation between internal and external landslide areas Tilting trees with vertical growth in the portions succeeding the tilted part
Table 2.1. Geomorphic criteria for field survey of landslide state of activity (Crozier, 1984, modified)
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The state of activity of a landslide and its geomorphologic characteristics are strictly depending on climate conditions, as reported in Figure 1.
Fig. 1. Block diagrams of morphologic changes with time of idealized landslide (a) in humid climate: A, active or recently active (dormant historic) landslide features are sharply defined and distinct; B, dormant young landslide features remains clear but are not sharply defined owing to slope wash and shallow mass movements on steep scarps; C, dormant mature landslide feature are modified by surface drainage, internal erosion and deposition, and vegetation; D, dormant old landslide features are weak and often subtle. (Turner & Schuster, 1996).
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2.2.2
Distribution of activity
The distribution of activity describes where the landslide is moving and permits to predict the type of landslide evolution in the space. Following the distribution of activity a landslide is: advancing : if the surface of rupture is extending in the direction of movement; retrogressive : if the surface of rupture is extending in the direction opposite the movement of the displaced material; progressive or multi-directional: if the surface of rupture is enlarging in two or mode directions; diminishing : if the volume of displaced material is decreasing with time; confined : landslide with a scarp but no visible surface of rupture in the foot of the displaced mass; c o n s t a n t : if the displaced mass continues to move without considerable change of the rupture surface and volume of the displaced mass; enlarging: if the rupture surface is developed on one or both lateral margins of the landslide.
2.2.3
Style of activity
The style of activity is the way in which different movements contribute to the landslide. Following the style of activity a landslide can be defined as: complex: characterised by the combination, with time, of at least two types of movement (fall, topple, slide, expansion, flow); composite : characterised by the combination, with time, of at least two types of movement (fall, topple, slide, expansion, flow) simultaneously in different areas of the displaced mass; successive : characterised by a movement of the same type to an earlier and adjacent landslide, where displaced masses and rupture surfaces are clearly distinct; single: characterised by a single movement of the displaced mass; multiple : characterised by repeated movements of the same type, often following enlargement of the failure surface. In order to characterise the type of evolution of a landslide it can be very useful to refer to the frequency of reactivations instead of the state of activity detected during field survey. On this subject the distinction proposed by Del Prete et al. (1992) among continuous, seasonal and intermittent (pluriannual or pluridecennial return time) landslides or what proposed by Bisci & Dramis (1991) and Flageollet (1994) reported in Table 2.2.
State of activity ACTIVE Recurrence Continuous Seasonal Short-term recurrence Medium-term recurrence Long-term recurrence Very long-term recurrence Return time > 1 year 1 - 10 years 10 - 100 years 100 - 1000 years > 1000 years Last activation Presently moving Recent Recent history Recent history Recent or ancient history Ancient history and prehistory
QUIESCENT STABILISED
Tab. 2.2 Landslide activity (BISCI & DRAMIS, 1991 and FLAGEOLLET, 1994, modified).
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2.3 Landslide causes

Landslide causes analysis consists in examining the various factors that contribute to slope instability, in their parameterisation and subdivision in classes and, finally, in their representation as thematic maps. A list of major predisposing factors, derived by literature (Terzaghi, 1950; Carrara & Merenda, 1974; Cotecchia, 1978; Varnes, 1978; Hansen, 1984; Esu, 1984; Crozier, 1986; Canuti et al., 1992; Amanti et al., 1992; Cruden & Varnes, 1994; Hutchinson, 1995) is reported in the following table:
LITHO-STRATIGRAPHY a) lithological characteristics (i.e. weak materials, presence of clayey particles); b) stratigraphical characteristics (i.e. rheological contrast: rigid material over ductile material; c) textural characteristics (i.e. porosity, materials with metastable texture); d) primary structures (layers, schistosity, fissility); e) mineralogical, petrographical, geochemical characteristics (i.e. typology of clayey minerals, weathering). TECTONIC a) secondary structures (joints, faults, folds, shear bands, bending); b) tectonic setting of the area; c) neo-tectonic uplift and/or e/o tilting; QUATERNARY GEOLOGY a) weathering (physical and/or chemical); b) depth of soil, regolith and degradation covers; c) climatic fluctuations; d) eustatic fluctuations; e) melting of glaciers (i.e. unloading of pressures); f) melting of permafrost; g) glacio-eustasy and glacio-isostasy; h) ancient or relict landslides. HYDROGEOLOGY a) hydrography and springs; b) permeability, contrast of permeability; c) drainage conditions; d) characteristics of groundwater (i.e. free, suspended, confined, semi-confined aquifers); e) pore pressure in soils and discontinuities; f) filtration; g) capillarity and negative pore pressures; h) evapotranspiration, runoff and infiltration; i) groundwater geochemistry; GEOTECHNICS AND GEOMECHANICS a) granulometry; b) index properties (i.e. Atterberg limits, point load); c) cementation (i.e. content of CaCO3); d) density (with natural water content, dry, saturated); e) shear strength of material (peak, critical condition, residual; drained or undrained); f) tensile strength; g) geometrical characteristics of discontinuities (i.e. orientation, spacing, persistence, roughness); h) mechanical characteristics of discontinuities (i.e. shear strength); i) presence of pre-existing shear surfaces; j) presence of organic matter; k) sensitivity (change in strength with remoulding); l) fragility and progressive rupture; m) cracking and softening; n) swelling and consolidation; o) stress history (i.e. pressure and overconsolidation ratio); p) in situ tensional state; SEISMICITY a) neotectonics, regional geodynamic model; b) historical and instrumental seismicity, seismotectonic model; c) characteristics of the source (recurrence, maximum expected magnitude, hypocentral depth, geometry of the source); d) attenuation law; e) seismic macrozoning: ground shaking (i.e. intensity, peak acceleration, response spectrum) f) seismic microzoning: local seismic response (i.e. amplification), dynamical effects on terrain properties (liquefaction; dynamical effects on pore pressure and shear strength). VOLCANIC ACTIVITY a) steam emission and subsequent condensation; b) tephra accumulation; c) hydrothermal alteration; d) ice and snow melting; e) volcanic uplift; f) diversion of hydrographic network. GEOMORFOLOGY a) slope morphometry (i.e. slope angle, height, length, shape, orientation); b) morphometry of catchments and channels; c) relief energy; d) erosion (i.e. fluvial, marine, glacial) on the foot of the slope; e) superficial erosion (diffuse or concentrated runoff); f) underground erosion (i.e. solution, karst, piping); g) slope loading; h) deforestation (natural causes); CLIMATOLOGY, METEOROLOGY E HYDROLOGY a) rainfall pattern; b) frequency, intensity and duration of extreme events (i.e. intense rainfall, extremely prolonged rainfall); c) thermal pattern (ice/snow melting, freezing of spring waters); d) fluctuation of hydrographical level (lakes or rivers); e) fluctuation of sea level; f) thermal excursion (freeze-thaw cycles); g) fluctuation of soil humidity (imbibition / desiccation). h) pre-existing mass movements and frequency of reactivations. VEGETATION AND LAND USE a) pedologic characteristics (i.e. soil type, texture, structure, depth, organic matter, content in carbonates); b) agricultural land use (i.e. crop, tree crop, specialised cultures, grassland, bush, forest) c) type and state of vegetation (i.e. leave cover, depth and strength of roots, weight of vegetation); d) agricultural techniques (i.e. superficial tillage, strip, terrace). HUMAN FACTORS a) excavation on the slope or slope toe; b) overloading on slope or crest; c) fluctuation of piezometric levels of artificial basins (i.e. critical height; rapid emptying); d) deforestation and forestation; e) irrigation; f) mining activity; g) artificial vibrations; h) water leakage (reservoirs, aqueducts, sewage systems).
Tab.2.3 Causative factors of landslides.
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3 Intensity or Magnitude (I)

Geometrical and mechanical severity of a landslide. It may be expressed as a relative scale or as one or more landslide parameters (i.e. velocity, volume, energy). A conceptual distinction between magnitude and intensity is reported in Hungr (2001) in the dynamic analysis of fast-moving landslides (flows and slides). The magnitude is a parameter that describes the scale of an event. As a general rule, the volume of the involved material can express the magnitude of a landslide. The initial volume (i.e. the volume of a rock mass before the detachment) should be distinguished from the volume of a landslide deposit, that can be larger due to swelling or erosion phenomena, or smaller due to partial deposition or diversion of material during the travel. Therefore, the magnitude defines the total volume of the displaced mass, as a sequence of connected episodes, considered as a single event. The intensity , as for earthquakes, is not a single parameter but a spatial distribution of different characteristics that describe, qualitatively or quantitatively, the impact of a landslide in different sites. Velocity, duration of movement, height of displaced mass, depth of deposits are some of quantitative parameters of intensity. These parameters are a function of the areas involved by a landslide and tend to annul at lateral and distal margins of the path, defining in such a way the extension of the impact zone. With respect to other field such as seismicity and flood where the intensity may be clearly defined (i.e. magnitude of an earthquake, height or discharge of water flow) the definition of the severity of a landslide (in terms of intensity or magnitude) is a very difficult task for experts due to the objective difficulty in the assessment of the various parameters. In addition, the expression of intensity related to potential damage or losses should be avoided being depending on vulnerability of potential exposed element.
3.1 Velocity
Hungr (1981) proposed a scale of landslide intensity based on classes of velocity related to a scale of damage. This scale has been partially modified by Cruden & Varnes (1996) as shown in Table 3.1.
Class Description 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Extremely rapid Very rapid Rapid Moderate Slow Very slow Extremely slow Potential damage Catastrophe of major violence; buildings destroyed by impact of displaced material; many deaths; escape unlikely. Some lives lost; velocity too great to permit all persons to escape Escape evacuation possible; structures, possessions and equipment destroyed Some temporary and insensitive structures can be temporarily maintained Remedial construction can be undertaken during movement; insensitive structures can be maintained with frequent maintenance work if total movement is not large during a particular acceleration phase Some permanent structures undamaged by movement Imperceptible without instruments; construction possible with precautions Velocity 5 m/s 3m/min 1.8 m/h 13m/mon th 1.6 m/year 15 mm/year (mm/s) 5 x 103 5 x 101 5 x 10-1 5 x 10-3 5 x 10-5 5 x 10-7
Table 3.1. Scale of landslide intensity based on velocity and induced damage (Cruden & Varnes, 1996)
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The assessment of velocity of a landslide is generally a difficult task; it may be assessed approximately considering the typology and activity of a landslide (Varnes, 1978) (Tab 3.2).
1 Fall Topple Rock slide (F) Rock slide (R) Debris slide Earth slide (F) Earth slide (R) Lateral expansion of rock mass Lateral expansion of rock mass overlaying clay bedrock Lateral expansion due to liquefaction Rock flow Debris flow Cohesive earth flow (F) Cohesive earth flow (R) 2 CLASSES OF VELOCITY 3 4 5 6 7
Tab. 3.2 - Landslide velocity (referred to the classes proposed by Cruden & Varnes, 1996) based on typology, material and state of activity; F =first-triggered landslide; R = reactivation
A similar approach has been proposed by Canuti & Casagli (1996), based on landslide typology, involved material and state of activity (first-triggered or reactivated landslides) (Tab. 3.3).
Typology Material State of activity Class of velocity Fall Rock 6-7 Rock F R 5-6 1-5 Slide Debris 1-6 Earth F R 5-6 1-5 Rock 1-2 Flow Debris 1-7 Earth 1-4
Table 3.3. Landslide velocity proposed by Canuti & Casagli (1996) based on typology, material and state of activity. F =first-triggered landslide; R = reactivation
The relationship between movement and velocity is quite evident: a debris flow or a rock fall are generally very rapid or extremely rapid, while an earth flow is usually slow or very slow. Generally a first-triggered landslide exhibits a higher velocity than a reactivation, except for some cases discussed by Hutchinson (1987). The former is characterised by a fragile rupture mechanism while the latter by a ductile rupture mechanism where the shear strength is proximate or equal to residual values. Another way to assess landslide intensity, based on velocity, can be done comparing the surface area of present or potential landslides with their estimated velocity (Tab.3.4 and 3.5). The potential unstable areas are assessed taking into account landslide phenomena that are developing over slopes with similar geological and morphological setting.
Class Values Class A0 A1 A2 A3 Values < 103 m2 103 - 105 m2 > 105 m2 Description NEGLIGIBLE SMALL MEDIUM LARGE V0 NEGLIGIBLE I0 I0 I0 I0 VELOCITY V1 V2 < 10-6 m/s 10-6 - 10-4m/s (< m/month) (m/month - m/h) SLOW MODERATE I0 I0 I1 I2 I1 I2 I2 I3 V3 > 10-4 m/s (>m/h) RAPID I0 I3 I3 I3
A R E A
Tab. 3.4 Diagram for simplified assessment of intensity
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I0 I1 I2 I3
Intensity NEGLIGIBLE SMALL MEDIUM LARGE
Description Stable or potentially stable areas Areas with small or potentially small landslides Areas with intermediate or potentially intermediate landslides Areas with large or potentially large landslides
Tab. 3.5 Classes of intensity referring table 3.4
3.2 Dimension
Landslide intensity can be also estimated through the dimension of the displaced mass (Fell, 1994) (Tab. 3.6).
Intensity (I) Description Volume (m3) 7 Extremely large > 5 x 106 1 x 106 5 x 106 6 Very large 2.5 x 105 1 x 106 5 Large 5 x 104 2.5 x 105 4 Medium 5 x 103 5 x 104 3 Small 5 x 102 5 x 103 2.5 Very small 2 Extremely small < 5 x 102
Table 3.6 - Scale of intensity of landslides based on the volume of the displaced mass (Fell, 1994)
The estimation of the displaced mass is often difficult to calculate; therefore, the intensity may be preferably expressed as landslide area. The assessment of intensity, based on dimension, should take into account the different landslide typologies. DRM (1990) has proposed to associate the volume of displaced mass following landslide types (Tab. 3.7) compared with intensity levels and consequent damage on human life and economy. The intensity of slides is evaluated through the depth of phenomena since the estimation of volumes, for this type of landslides, is rather difficult.
FALLS AND TOPPLES Volume (m3) E1 < 102 E2 102 - 104 E3 104 - 106 E4 > 106 FLOWS Volume (m3) E1 < 5 x 102 E2 5 x 102 - 104 E3 104 - 106 E4 > 106 SLIDES Depth (m) E1 <2 E2 2 10 E3 10 50 E4 > 50 Description Fall of isolated blocks Fall, topple or sliding of blocks Large fall of blocks Catastrophic fall or sliding Description Mud flow or mud slide Mud or debris flow Rapid debris flow Exceptional mass movement Description Superficial slide or solifluxion Localised slide Slide of a slope Exceptional slide
H1 H2 H3 H3
H1 H2 H3 H3
H0 H0 H0 H0
Table 3.7 - Relationship between intensity and physical characteristics of landslides (DRM, 1990)
In the table 10 the distinction between intensity and consequences on human setting (H0 H3) and economic setting (E1 E4) has been kept. With respect to the velocity of movements, the scales of intensity referred to falls and slides (rapid movements) are the same; as regarding slides, that are generally slow movements, the intensity, referred to human setting, is B.III-12
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equal to zero (H0) independently from landslide dimension. This definition includes an analysis of social and economic vulnerability. Finally, the symbols H and E are referred to the French terminology humaine and conomique (human and economic respectively) and not to the UNESCO terminology H (Hazard) and E (Element at risk).
3.3 Energy
As reported by Morgenstern (1985) and Cruden & Varnes (1996), small and very rapid landslides may be more disastrous than large slow-moving landslides due to their high kinetic energy. Intensity may be considered as equal, or proportional, to the kinetic energy developed by landslides. The energy is variable with the time: equal to zero at the initial conditions, increasing up to the highest value after the landslide triggering, then decreasing up to zero again. Landslide intensity can be measures as the maximum kinetic energy or the average value developed by a landslide. An assessment of the energy balance may be done following the sled model , proposed by Heim (1932) and after by Scheidegger (1973), Hs (1975) and Sassa (1988), based on the assumption that all the energy of the movement is lost for friction.
3.4 Consequences
Another way of assessing landslide intensity is to relate the event with the potential damage. This approach has been proposed by the French project PER (Plan dExposition aux Risques) (DRM, 1988, 1990) where the intensity levels are defined with respect to the potential damage for human lives (Tab. 3.8) and economy (Tab. 3.9).
Degree H0 H1 H2 H3 Very low Medium High Very high Intensity Potential consequences Landslide types Improbable damage (except induced Slow-moving landslides damage) Isolated damage Isolated falls Some victims Falls, slides or mud flows Catastrophic falls and slides, Catastrophe (some tens victims) rapid mud/debris flows
Table 3.8 - Scale of landslide intensity with respect to potential consequences on human life (DRM, 1990)
Degree E0 E1 E2 E3 Low Medium High Very high Intensity Potential consequences Example 10% of worth of an individual single Detachment of unstable blocks house Rock detachment or falling Technical intervention on few houses or rock barriers; drainage of small lots small unstable areas Stabilisation o f a large High qualified technical intervention of a landslide; consolidation of a large area, with relevant costs rock slope Any t e c h n i c a l intervention has Catastrophic fall or slide unacceptable costs for populations
Table 3.9 - Scale of landslide intensity with respect to potential economic losses (DRM, 1990)
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3.5 Hybrid
Landslide intensity can be assessed using different parameters as velocity, kinetic energy, depths and heights of landslide deposits, applied, following their suitability, for different landslide types. This approach is adopted in the guidelines for landslide hazard and risk assessment in Switzerland (Raetzo et al., 2002). Indicative values of these parameters are used to subdivide potential unstable areas or risk areas in three different intensity classes: high, medium, low (Tab. 3.10). The criterion for assessing landslide intensity is applied on the most diffuse landslide types, distinguishing for each one those parameters that properly characterise the intensity.
Landslide types Rock falls Rock avalanches Slides Earth/debris flow Potential Real Low intensity E < 30 kj v 2 cm/year Average intensity 30 < E < 300 kj v: dm/year (> 2 cm/year) High intensity E > 300 kj E > 300 kj Large differential movements: v > 0.1 m/day for superficial slides; displacement > 1 m per event e>2m h>1m
e < 0.5 m -
0.5 m < e < 2 m h<1m
Table 3.10 - Criteria for intensity assessment. E = kinetic energy; v = long-term average velocity; e = depth of unstable mass; h = height of deposit (Raetzo et al., 2002)
The BUWAL method (1998), used for the assessment of hazard in Switzerland, provides an intensity analysis by defining the magnitude as product of velocity vs. geometrical severity. The velocity is compared with velocity classes provided by Cruden & Varnes (1996) (see table 3.11).
Class 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Description Extremely rapid Very rapid Rapid Moderate Slow Very slow Extremely slow Velocity 5 m/s 3m/min 1.8 m/h 13m/month 1.6 m/year 16 mm/year Potential damage for people Severe injury and/or death Moderate injury Minor/no injury Velocity BUWAL 3 2 1
Table 3.11 - Landslide intensity scale following BUWAL (1998) compared with intensity scale from Cruden & Varnes, 1996
The geometrical severity is defined through the following table.

Falls Diameter of blocks > 2 m Diameter of blocks 0.5 - 2 m Diameter of blocks < 0.5 m Slides and flows Geometrical severity Depth > 10 m 3 Depth 2 - 10 m 2 Depth < 2 m 1
Table 3.12 - Landslide intensity scale following BUWAL (1998) based on geometrical severity compared with different landslide types
The magnitude is the product of geometrical severity by velocity (Tab 3.13)

Potential damage to structures Magnitude Severe (disruption) 6-9 Functional 3-4 Minor 1-2
Table 3.13 - Landslide intensity expressed as total magnitude (BUWAL, 1998)
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4 Return period of landslides

The most common criteria for the assessment of landslide return times are the following: a) Geomorphological criteria or qualitative analysis; b) Analysis of temporal series related to effects: the analysis of temporal series of mass movements enables to define directly the return times of landslides; c) Analysis of temporal series related to causes: the correlation between landslides and long-time records of possible triggering elements (i.e. rainfall, seismicity) permits to define critical thresholds and associated return times; d) Monitoring: the instrumental observation of piezometric levels or slope displacement for single landslides allows the prediction of slope movements through the comparison with thresholds or models calibrated on the observed unstable or potentially unstable areas.
4.1 Geomorphological criteria or qualitative analysis

The recurrence of landslides can be assessed subjectively from general or qualitative information such as historical, geomorphological and geotechnical analyses. The direct analysis, using geomorphological and geotechnical information, in case of lack of historical data, can provide a probabilistic estimation on landslide occurrence. This approach, although subjective, is an effective way for assigning relative probability of return times of landslides in a given area. For instance, a lower probability of landslide occur in slope that exhibit rounded and vegetated crown areas while higher probability can be associated to steep slopes with tension cracks.
4.2 Analysis of temporal series related to effects

Historical analysis is the main source for assessing landslide return times. The main sources are: a) Multi-temporal analysis of maps (i.e. geomorphological maps, landslide inventory maps); b) Multi-temporal analysis of aerial photos or satellite images; c) Newspapers; d) Direct observations; e) Scientific publications; f) Technical reports. Long-term activity of landslides can be analysed with datation methods, commonly used in Earths Sciences, such as radiocarbon, lichenometry and dendrocronology methods (Starkel, 1966; Schoeneich, 1991; Corominas et al., 1994). The annual frequency f(N) of landslides in a period of N years, is the ratio between the number of events n and the number N of observed years. If N is quite long, f(N) is an estimation of the annual probability of occurrence P. Landslide hazard can be calculated as follows: H(N) = 1 - (1 - P)N = 1 - (1 - 1/T)N B.III-15 (4.1)
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When landslide events are very low compared to the time under analysis, namely N << T, the equation is: H(N) NP = N/T (4.2)
4.3 Analysis of temporal series related to causes

Return time of landslides can be estimated through the recurrence of critical threshold related to specific triggering causes. These are mainly related to precipitation, human activity and, subordinately, seismicity. Theoretically, the probability of a landslide occurrence is the sum of probabilities related to different triggering causes (Fell, 1994): P = Pr + Pa + Ps (4.3) The problems related to landslide hazard assessment associated to human activity regard the prediction stage and should be analysed in the phase of spatial planning and risk management.
4.3.1
Precipitation
Precipitation can be considered the most common triggering cause of landslides. The effect of precipitation is the increasing of pore pressure u that cause a decreasing of shear strength. This, for saturated terrains, is expressed by: = - u (4.4) where and represent respectively total and effective strength. Such a reduction results in decreasing of shear strength, following the MohrCoulombs failure criterion: f = tan + c (4.5) In literature numerous studies on landslide-induced precipitation are available. Generally pluviometric data are available for areas where pluviometric stations are working; therefore, rainfall data can be effectively used both for implementing landslide hazard models (forecasting) and for prevention scopes (e.g. alarm systems for risk mitigation). The possible approaches may be summarised in 7 different cathegories, starting from empirical to quantitative models (Polemio & Petrucci, 2000): 1. empirical correlations aimed at detecting possible triggering thresholds based on rainfall duration-intensity functions vs. landslides; 2. reconstruction of cumulated and antecedent rainfall vs. landslides; 3. long-term precipitation vs. landslides; 4. methods for analysis of effective precipitation 5. hydrological simplified methods, 6. integrated methods for precipitation-slope stability analysis; 7. complete slope stability methods. These approaches can be grouped in 3 categories: a) statistical or empirical models (black-box models ): where a direct correlation between rainfall height, in a defined time interval, and slope
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movements is analysed without implementing physical laws that rule the transformation rainfall-infiltration-piezometric response; b) deterministic models: where hydrological models are use for analysis of various parameters (rainfall, run-off, effective infiltration) and hydrogeological models for analysis of piezometric height and aquifer recharge; c) hybrid models: where the above approaches are usually coupled (e.g. aquifer recharge through a hydrological model and piezometric response by means of a statistical analysis).
4.3.2
Earthquakes
The influence of earthquakes on slope stability is still quite controversial and, often, overestimated. The effects of an earthquake on a slope can be direct or indirect. The former may cause slope movements during the seismic event; the former may occur from some hours to some days after an earthquake (Hutchinson, 1993). The main effect results in increasing of destabilizing stresses through the application of a transient horizontal inertial stress (F = KW), where W is the weight of the potential unstable mass and K is the coefficient of seismic acceleration. Such a stress is generally assumed in the calculation of limit equilibrium for the assessment of the safety factor under pseudo-static conditions. Since the wavelengths of strong earthquakes, in most of terrains, are some tens meters, the effects of direct destabilization may occur only along short slopes, with length generally < 30m (Ambraseys, 1977; Hutchinson, 1987). For longer slopes, in fact, the destabilizing acceleration produced toward the external part of slopes is balanced by a stabilizing acceleration, with opposite direction, caused by the succeeding waves. The highest synchronous acceleration, associated to the maximum peak of K , results for landslides that have a dimension equal to half wavelength. Rock falls, debris flows and earth flows are the most common landslide types triggered by earthquakes, especially under saturated conditions of terrains. Re-activation of slides and flows may occur also in cohesive materials (Hutchinson & Bhandari, 1971). Another important effect of earthquakes, affecting saturated loose granular soils, is the dynamic liquefaction (Seed & Idriss, 1967; Seed, 1968; Valera & Donovan, 1977; Crespellani et al., 1988). An earthquake can cause a consolidation of soils due to a structural collapse and, consequently, promote critical pore pressure values that result in liquefaction. In this case, the shear strength of soils can decrease abruptly causing sliding also along gentle slopes. Many landslide-induced earthquakes are generally associated to liquefaction (Seed, 1975). Moreover, since ground failure is fragile, landslides generated by liquefaction are characterised by high velocity and long run-out, constituting very hazardous phenomena. The assessment of potential liquefaction of a soil is based on seismic parameters (e.g. magnitude, duration, number of cycles, distance from epicentre, maximum site acceleration) as well as on geotechnical parameters (e.g. grain-size distribution, uniformity, relative density, SPT test, initial stress state). B.III-17
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The indirect effects, generally, cause the re-activation of pre-existing landslides, also large landslides in cohesive soils, due to the cyclic load on pore pressure regime. Some investigations (Lemos et al., 1985; Sassa, 1992) have shown that the application of rapid cyclic loads in special shear ring apparatus can cause, in some cohesive materials, a progressive decreasing of residual shear strength after an initial peak. Such a behaviour can explain the delay between the seismic shake and landslide trigger. The triggering thresholds of landslides can be assessed as local seismic response parameters (i.e. intensity, peak acceleration) or as earthquake source parameters (i.e. magnitude). A common adopted methodology is to implement a deterministic analysis (i.e. pseudo-static slope stability analysis) to calculate the critical acceleration that produce a safety factor equal to 1. Another method is to compare empirically landslides occurrence with site intensity of magnitude at the source.
4.4 Monitoring
The assessment of landslides occurrence based on monitoring provides the most detailed and reliable information, especially in landslide hazard and risk analysis at local/site scale. Two distinct approaches can be adopted in landslide hazard analysis through monitoring: mechanical and kinematical approaches.
4.4.1
Mechanical approach
Theoretically, the prediction of landslide movements or potentially unstable slopes can be done through the monitoring of all parameters, variable in time, that define the safety factors such as pore pressure, slope morphology, geotechnical parameters of terrains, loads. In practical terms, pore pressure is the parameter that exhibits a large uncertainty as well as a wide variability in time. Therefore, the mechanical approach is essentially based on piezometric measures. Generally, 1-2 years of piezometric observations are used to deduce a possible correlation between rainfall and groundwater fluctuation. The prediction of hazard can be done through a statistical analysis of precipitation. Estimated pore pressures can be used as input in slope stability models for assessing the safety factor; in addition, their probabilistic assessment through the analysis of annual extremes enables to associate a return time to each safety factor value (hazard analysis). A wide scientific literature is available on the prediction of piezometric fluctuation related with rainfall and other meteorological parameters, based on empirical, deterministic and hybrid approaches applied to slope stability assessment.
4.4.2
Kinematics approach
A direct approach for predicting the time of failure of a slope is based on displacement monitoring, through topographic, extensometric or inclinometric measures.
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5 Hazard assessment (H)

Hazard is defined as the probability that a landslide with a given intensity may occur in a specific time and area. It can be expressed as annual probability or return time of a landslide. Landslide hazard is to be referred to a well defined intensity: H = H (I)
5.1 Basic concepts

As a basis for landslide hazard assessment and zoning any methodology should be referred to the following four fundamental assumptions, widely accepted by landslide experts (Varnes et al., 1984; Carrara et al., 1991; Hutchinson & Chandler, 1991; Hutchinson, 1995; Turner & Schuster, 1995): Landslides will always occur in the same geological, geomorphological, hydrogeological and climatic conditions as in the past; The main conditions that cause landsliding are controlled by identifiable physical factors and laws that can be empirically, statistically and deterministically defined; The degree of hazard can be evaluated; All types of slope failures can be identified and classified.
On this basis a complete assessment of landslide considers prediction of the following parameters (Hartln & Viberg, 1988): Typology: prediction of the landslide type that may occur in the considered area; Affected area: prediction of where a landslide may occur; Return time: prediction of when a landslide may occur; Intensity: prediction of dimension (area and/or volume), velocity or energy of a landslide; Evolution: prediction of run-out, retrogression limits and/or lateral expansion of a landslide.
Limits and uncertainties A rigorous landslide hazard assessment needs a large amount of information on the various parameters. In addition, considering that reliable scenarios should be done at local/site scale, this implies a time and moneyconsuming activities for analysis and mapping. The basic principle for which past and present unstable areas will be affected by landslides in the future can be valid for factors that are constant in time, such as geological, structural and geotechnical setting. A correct landslide hazard assessment should take into account the variability of those factors that may play a role in slope stability like climate and land use modifications. Due to the objective conceptual and operational limits, most of landslide hazard maps should be defined as landslide susceptibility maps. Limitations of landslide hazard analysis mainly include: o Spatial and temporal discontinuity of landslides,
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o o
Objective difficulty in the prediction of causes, triggering factors and cause-effect relations, Long-term and exhaustive historical records on landslides and potential triggering factors (i.e. long-term climatic records).
5.2 Prediction of landslide types

The prediction of landslide types that may occur in an area can be done starting from an accurate landslide inventory map. In this case, the spatial and temporal prediction of landslides can be differentiated according to Cruden & Varnes classification. As concerning potentially unstable areas, the expected landslide type can be assessed on the basis of the typologies occurring in areas with similar geological, geomorphological, geotechnical and land use characteristics.
5.3 Prediction of landslide intensity

The prediction of the landslide intensity is mainly depending on the amount and quality of information from landslide inventory. Landslide hazard, or the probability of occurrence, should be differentiated according to the intensity, in order to have an estimation of consequences (risk analysis). On this issue, some authors (i.e. Fell, 1994) provide a different definition of landslide hazard that can be expressed as the product of intensity (I) and probability of occurrence (P). The methodology proposed by Fell (1994) considers the product of an index of intensity by an index of probability associated to intensity and hazard classes (Tab. 5.1).
INTENSITY I Description Volume (m3) 7 Extremely high > 5 x 106 1 x 106 5 x 6 Very high 106 2.5 x 105 1 x 5 High 106 5 x 104 2.5 x 4 Medium 105 5 x 103 5 x 3 Small 104 5 x 102 5 x 2.5 Very small 103 Extremely 2 < 5 x 102 small PROBABILITY P Description 12 Extremely high 8 Very high 5 3 2 1 High Medium Small Very small P (annual) 1 0.2 0.05 0.01 0.001 0.0001 HAZARD H=IP Description 30 Extremely high 20-29 Very high 10-19 7-9 3-6 2 High Medium Small Very small
Table 5.1 - Assessment of landslide hazard with prediction of intensity (Fell, 1994)
The approach proposed by DRM (1990) for PER implementation is more correct since it provides the definition of the probability of occurrence depending on different levels of intensities. Anyway, in the implementation of PER sometimes the local authorities have used operational criteria where landslide hazard is not properly expressed as combination of probability by intensity (Perrot, 1988).
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Limits and uncertainties The expression of hazard as I x P is not coherent with the UNESCO terminology and can present some problems. In fact, an event of small dimensions and very frequent can have the same hazard of a very large and less frequent landslide event. In addition, the vulnerability is already related to landslide intensity. This implies that intensity is taken into account two times in the risk assessment. To overcome this problem Fell defines the specific risk as the product of probability by vulnerability.
5.4 Prediction on landslide affected area

The spatial prediction of hazard consists in the assessment of relative hazard. This is the degree of hazard of a slope compared with other slopes, without indicating the probability of occurrence of landslides (temporal occurrence), generally based on historical and present instability.
5.4.1
Methods of relative hazard analysis
The methods for the assignment of the different hazard levels can be qualitative or quantitative, direct or indirect: Qualitative methods are subjective and describe the hazard zoning in terms substantially descriptive; Quantitative methods provide numerical estimations, in terms of probability, on landslide occurrences for each hazard class; Direct methods produce essentially geomorphological mapping of landslide hazard (Verstappen, 1983); Indirect methods are essentially carried out through distinct stages. First of all, these require a field analysis and a landslide inventory map in the study area or in a subset area (training area). The second step is the detection and mapping of a set of physical factors that are directly or indirectly related to slope instability (predisposing factors). Finally, an assessment of the relative contribution of the various predisposing factors for landsliding and a hierarchisation of landslide hazard in areas with distinct hazard degree (hazard zoning).
5.4.1.1
Qualitative methodologies
In general qualitative approaches are based entirely on expert judgement. The input data are usually derived from assessment during field trips, possibly integrated by aerial photo interpretation. These methodologies can be divided into two types: field geomorphological analysis and combination or overlaying of index maps (heuristic approach).
5.4.1.1.1 Field geomorphologic analysis

This approach is a direct and qualitative method based on the experience of the earth scientist in assessing present and potential landsliding without any specific indication of rules that have led to the assessment and/or zoning. In this case the stability maps are directly evolved from detailed geomorphological maps. The assessment of slope stability takes into consideration a very large number of factors. They can be used successfully at any scale and adapted to specific local requirements. The field geomorphological analysis does not require the use of a Geographical B.III-21
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Information System which, in this case, is simply a drawing tool. Examples of geomorphological-based hazard analysis are very frequent in scientific literature of the 70s and 80s. Perhaps one of the most comprehensive projects reported in the literature is the French ZERMOS (Zones Exposes des Risques aux MOuvements du Sol et du sou-sol) procedure which involves two main phases: analysis and extrapolation. In the first phase, all the predisposing factors are examined, both permanent (e.g. topography, geology, hydrogeology) and temporary (e.g. climate, land use and other man-made factors). Active and/or inactive landslides may be analysed. In the following phase all the factors are extrapolated by the author to areas with similar physical conditions, thus enabling zoantion of the area into three sections with varying degrees of hazard (defined as risque): null or low hazard, areas in which no instability should occur; potential or uncertain hazard, areas with potential instability of uncertain nature and extent; ascertained hazard, areas with declared instability and certain threat of failure. The hazard calculated is of a relative nature and the authors acknowledge that the various hazard categories cannot be compared from one area to another. The choice of three classes is inspired to the necessity to let the hazard maps comprehensive by stakeholders and end users (Public Administration) Limits and uncertainties The main disadvantages of such approaches are: The subjectivity in the selection of both the data and the rules that govern the stability of slopes or the hazard of instability; this fact makes it difficult to compare landslide hazard maps produced by different investigators or experts; Use of implicit rather than explicit rules hinders the critical analysis of results and makes it difficult to update the assessment as new data become available; Lengthy field surveys are required.
5.4.1.1.2 Combination of index maps or heuristic approach

In this approach, the expert selects and maps the factors that affect the slope stability and, based on personal experience, assigns to each a weighted value that is proportionate to its expected relative contribution in generating failure. The following operations should be carried out: subdivision of each parameter into a number of relevant classes; attribution of a weighted value to each class; attribution of a weighted value to each of the parameters; overlay mapping of the weighted maps; development of the final map showing hazard classes. The advantages of such a methodological approach are that it considerably reduces the problem of the hidden rules and enables total automation of the operations listed above through appropriate use of a GIS. Furthermore, it enables the standardisation of data management techniques, from acquisition through final analysis. This technique can be applied at any B.III-22
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scale. In order to provide a better coherence to physical processes, the attribution of weights can be supported by statistical analysis on the assessment of the contribution of single predisposing parameters to slope instability. Limits and uncertainties The major disadvantage is the lengthy operations involved, especially where large areas are concerned. In addition, the reliability of heuristic methods depends largely on how well and how much the investigator understands the geomorphological processes acting upon the terrain. Since this knowledge can be formalised into rules, the method could take into account local geomorphological variability or specific conditions leading to slope failures. Major limitations refer to the fact that in most cases the available knowledge on the causal relations between environmental factors and landslides is inadequate and, most importantly, is essentially dependent on the experience of the investigator. At present, maps obtained by this method cannot be readily evaluated in terms of reliability or certainty. Additionally, landslide hazard is not directly expressed in terms of probability, limiting the use for risk evaluation and economic estimates.
5.4.1.2
Quantitative methodologies
5.4.1.2.1 Statistical analysis

The attribution of weighted values on a subjective basis to the numerous factors governing slope stability represents the main limitation in all the methods described above. The solution to this problem could be to adopt a statistical approach that compares the spatial distribution of landslides with the parameters that are being considered. The results could then be applied to areas currently free of landslides but where conditions may exist for susceptibility to future instability. The major difficulty consists in establishing the slope failure processes and in systematically identifying and assessing the different factors related to landsliding. One of the principal advantages is that the investigator can validate the importance of each factor can validate the importance of each factor and decide on the final input maps in an interactive manner. The use of GIS makes these operations much easier and to a large extent explains the increasing adoption of the statistical approach which closely parallels the everincreasing application of GIS techniques. Statistical analyses can be either bivariate or multivariate. Bivariate statistical analysis In bivariate statistical analysis each individual factor is compared to the landslide map. The weighted value of the classes used to categorise every parameter is determined on the basis of landslide density in each individual class. The following operations are required: selection and mapping of significant parameters and their categorisation into a number of relevant classes; landslide mapping; overlay mapping of the landslide map with each parameter map;
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determination of density of landslides in each parameter class and definition of weighted values; assignment of weighting values to the various parameter maps; final overlay mapping and calculation of the final hazard or susceptibility value of each identified land unit.
The simplest models consider the determination of threshold value of slope angle, for each lithological type, that may cause potential slope instability. The models are based on a series of empirical functions that relate two or more significant parameters, such as slope height or slope angle of landslide areas. The bivariate statistical approach is widely employed by the earth scientists and numerous parameters may be taken into consideration: lithology, slope angle, slope height, land use, distance from major structures, drainage density, relief morphology, closeness of the facet to a river, attitude of lithotypes. This approach has been successfully employed by researchers mapping hazard of superficial failures that affect prevalently weathered and soil covers, triggered by heavy rainfall. Multivariate statistical analysis Although the multivariate statistical approach had already been successfully applied in several areas of applied geology, such as petroleum exploration, the application of this technique to landslide hazard assessment began since the second half of 70s. The so-called black-box statistical approaches are based on the analysis of functional links among the various predisposing factors and present and past landslide distribution. The procedure involves several preliminary steps which are undertaken in a test area. Once the results achieved have been verified, they are extended to the entire area under examination. The following steps are required. 1. Classification of the study area into land units. 2. Identification of significant factors and creation of input maps. The input variables include information concerning the landslides (i.e. typology, degree of activity) and geo-referencing. Several attributes are automatically derived from statistical operations performed on the basic parameters (mean, standard deviation, maximum or minimum values). An important aspect is the conversion of various parameters from nominal to numeric, such as geological composition or vegetation cover. This can be done through the creation of dummy variables or by coding and ranking the classes based on the relative percentage of the area affected by landsliding. The two methods are similar but the latter is to be preferred. 3. Construction of a landslide map. 4. Identification of the percentage of landslide-affected areas in every land unit and their classification into unstable and stable units. The threshold value of this classification is fixed every time on the basis of two requirements: a) in areas with high landslide density, the threshold should be based on relatively high percentages in order to achieve two statistically representative groups; b) however, even a relatively low landslide density must be taken into consideration as it could represent a B.III-24
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risk for human activities. In general, the decision to carry out the analysis on two groups only (unstable and stable land units) simplifies the problem from a statistical point of view but hinders the identification of various combinations of factors related to different hazard types. 5. Combination of the parameter maps with the land unit map and creation of an absence/presence matrix of a given class of a given parameter within each land unit. 6. Multivariate statistical analysis. The statistical analysis most frequently used are discriminant analysis or regressive multiple analysis which are often employed in parallel within the same project. It is preferable to apply discriminant analysis (stepwise or canonical discriminant analysis) with continuous variables, while the regressive analysis can be used even with nominal variables. 7. Reclassification of land units based on the results achieved in the previous phase and their classification into susceptibility classes. In the discriminant analysis for example, the inspection of the standardised discriminant coefficient allows the contribution of various parameters in causing slope instability to be quantified and, as a result, enables objective reclassification of the study area. By transforming the classification function scores into probabilities, the susceptibility map can then be converted into a hazard map. Limits and uncertainties Black-box are conceptually simple but, due to the great complexity in identifying the slope failure processes and the difficulty in systematically collecting the different factors related to landsliding, the task of creating a geomorphological predictive model enabling actual/potential unstable slopes to be identified over large areas, is difficult operationally. Errors in mapping past and present landslides will exert a large and not readily predictable influence on statistical models, particularly if errors are systematic in not recognizing specific landslide types. Additionally, being data-driven, a statistical model built up for one region cannot readily be extrapolated to the neighbouring areas.
5.4.1.2.2 Geotechnical models

Deterministic analysis This type of approach involves analysing specific sites or slopes in engineering terms. The main physical properties are quantified and applied to specific mathematical models and the safety factor is calculated. These models (mono, bi- and tri-dimensional) are commonly used in soil engineering for slope-specific stability studies. The approach is widely employed in civil engineering and engineering geology and has been applied to landslide hazard assessment and mapping, especially after the introduction of GIS. Accuracy and reliability is improved as detailed knowledge of the area of application increases. A deterministic approach was traditionally considered to be sufficient for both homogenous and nonhomogenous slopes. The index of stability is the well known safety factor, based on the appropriate geotechnical model. The calculation of the safety B.III-25
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factor, F, requires geometrical data, shear strength parameters and information on pore water pressure. Moreover, decisions must be made on whether to use peak shear strength values or residual shear strength values (or values in between) for specific parts of the slip surface. For these reasons such methods are normally applied only in small areas and at detailed scales. Calculations of the safety factor must be made for each individual slope or area before a hazard map can be prepared. The safety factor enables the evaluation on the slope stability degree and an objective comparison among different slopes. Usually the probability of occurrence of a landslide is not calculated unless the safety factor is related to the temporal occurrence of the possible triggering factor (i.e. critical precipitation return time). A reference for assessing the relative hazard based on F has been proposed by Ward (1996).
Hazard High Medium Low F < 1.2 1.2 - 1.7 > 1.7
Tab.5.2 - Hazard classes related to safety factor F (Ward, 1976).
Probabilistic analysis For decades, geotechnical modelling and analysis within a deterministic framework has facilitated the quantification of safety or reliability. However, performance indicators such as the factor of safety, F, do not take into account the variability of geotechnical parameters of terrains such as cohesion c, angle of internal friction and the undrained shear strength su some of which may also vary in magnitude with time. The spatial and temporal variability of pore water pressure is again very important but is not reflected in the calculated values of the conventional factor of safety. The probability of failure is defined as the probability that the performance function has a value below the threshold value. Considering the factor of safety, F, as the performance function, the threshold value is 1 and probability of failure pf may, therefore, defined as: pf = P[F<1] (5.1) The probability of success or the reliability ps is therefore the complement of pf: ps = 1 - pf (5.2) In order to calculate the probability of failure, the probability density function of the performance function is required. Thus it is recognised that F is not a single-valued function. Its probability distribution may be characterised by means of at least two statistical parameters, the mean or central value F and the standard deviation F. It is often useful to define a reliability index which combines the mean and standard deviation of the performance function. Thus, if F is the performance function = (F 1)/ F (5.3)
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The numerator gives the extent to which the average value is above the threshold value and the denominator reflects the dispersion from this average value. Three commonly used methods of probability calculation are: First Order Second Moment Method (FOSM); Point Estimate Method; Monte Carlo Simulation Method. The availability of GIS can facilitate the use of a deterministic or a probabilistic geotechnical approach as part of a methodology of landslide hazard assessment. For example, after subdivision of an area or region into elements or small areas, the factor of safety of individual sloping areas may be computed and then mapped. Alternatively, using a probabilistic framework, the probability of failure of individual slopes could be computed and then mapped. Depending on the adopted hazard assessment approach, this information could be used on its own or combined with other factors or factor maps to produce susceptibility maps and/or hazard maps. Limits and uncertainties The deterministic models that provide safety factor calculation usually do not provide return time of landslide phenomena. Systematical uncertainties derive from the following considerations: o a soil mass can only be investigated at a finite number of points; o the number of field and laboratory tests conducted to determine soil parameters is limited by financial and time constraints; o the testing equipment and methods are not perfect. Other uncertainties are associated with geotechnical models, landslide mechanisms, their occurrence and impact. A deterministic analysis of landslide hazard can be done only for single slopes or limited areas where a large and detailed geotechnical data are available. Reliable mechanical models are not yet available for several types of structurally complex rock units.
5.5 Temporal prediction

The temporal prediction of landslide hazard is essentially based on definition of the probability of occurrence of landslides. While spatial prediction provides a relative hazard of different slopes, the temporal prediction provides an absolute hazard. For some authors the term absolute hazard is not referred to the probability of occurrence, but to the definition of the safety factor (F) that, as already discussed, indicates only a relative zoning of a slope-failure propensity and not a probabilistic estimate of occurrence.
5.5.1
Analysis of return time
If P is the annual probability of occurrence of a landslide, the return time T of the event is given by 1/P.
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The probability of occurrence of m events in a period of N years is given by:
P(m, N ) =
N! P m (1 P) N m m!( N m)!
In case of rare events compared with the available temporal scale (for N >30 or P <0.02 the error is <1%) the binomial distribution can be represented by Poissons distribution:
m NP) ( P(m, N ) =
e NP
m!
Hazard, H, is defined as the probability of occurrence of at least one landslide in a period of N years or:
H ( N ) = 1 P(m = 0, N )
Therefore, on the basis of binomial distribution the equation is:
1 H ( N ) = 1 (1 P) N = 1 1 T
while following Poissons distribution:
H ( N ) = 1 e NP = 1 e N /T
As concerning rarer events compared with the analysed temporal scale (for NP<0.02 the error is <1%) the equation can be approximated to:
H ( N ) NP =
N T
The probability of occurrence can be calculated both in absolute terms (annual probability or return times) or following nominal scales (e.g. high probability, low probability). In literature, the interpretation of recurrence of slow-moving re-activated landslides is illustrated in the following tables.
Class Hazard
1 2 3 4 5 Very high High Medium Low Very low
T (years) Landslide movement

>2 2-5 5-20 20-50 >50 Continuous or seasonal Periodical Periodical Periodical Periodical
Table 5.3 - Landslide hazard classes based on return time (Del Prete et al., 1992)
Hazard
Extremely high Very high High Medium Low Very low
T (years) P (annual)
1 5 20 100 1000 10000 1 0.2 0.05 0.01 0.001 0.0001
Table 5.4 - Landslide hazard classes based on return time (Fell, 1994)
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5.5.2
Analysis of intensity/magnitude
The BUWAL method (1998) is used for the analysis of landslide hazard. This is calculated through a matrix between intensity, expressed as velocity (Tab. 5.5) and magnitude (Tab. 5.6), vs. return times of potential landslides.
Velocity
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3
Return time (years)

< 1 (active) 1-30 30-100 100-1000 < 1 (active) 1-30 30-100 100-1000 > 1000 < 1 (active) 1-30 30-100 100-1000 > 1000
Probability (annual)
1 0.03 0.01 0.001 1 0.03 0.01 0.001 0.0001 1 0.03 0.01 0.001 0.0001
Hazard
1 3 2 2 3 4 3 2 1 4 4 4 3 2
Table 5.5 - Potential landslide hazard related to velocity and return time (BUWAL, 1998)
Magnitude Return time (years)

1-2 1-2 1-2 1-2 3-4 3-4 3-4 3-4 3-4 6-9 6-9 6-9 6-9 6-9 < 1 (active) 1-30 30-100 100-1000 < 1 (active) 1-30 30-100 100-1000 > 1000 < 1 (active) 1-30 30-100 100-1000 > 1000
Probability (annual)
1 0.03 0.01 0.001 1 0.03 0.01 0.001 0.0001 1 0.03 0.01 0.001 0.0001
Hazard
2 3 2-3 2 3 3-4 3 2-3 1 4 4 4 3 1-2
Table 5.6 - Potential landslide hazard related to magnitude and return time (BUWAL, 1998)
Since vulnerability is proportional to landslide phenomena, the levels of landslide hazard, when associated to the elements at risk, correspond to specific risk (Cruden & Varnes, 1996).
5.6 Prediction of evolution

The prediction of landslide evolution consists in the detection of the area that can be directly or indirectly affected by a landslide, through the analysis of: o prediction of run-out; o prediction of retrogression limits; o prediction of lateral expansion.
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5.6.1
Prediction of run-out
Current an past research into the run-out calculation of a fast-moving landslide (i.e. rock falls, debris flows, rock avalanches) can generally be grouped into three categories. The first includes empirical models aimed at providing practical tools for predicting the run-out distance and distribution of landslide accumulation. The second category includes simplified analytical models that describes the physical behaviour of mass movement, based on lumped mass approaches in which the mass is assumed as a single point. The third includes numerical simulations of conservation equations of mass, momentum and energy that describe the dynamic motion of landslide mass, and/or a rheological model to describe the material behaviour of sliding mass.
5.6.2
Prediction of retrogression limits
The prediction of retrogression limits is essentially based on the analysis of geomorphologic evidences on the field that define the distribution of activity (i.e. tension cracks, counter slopes). Some landslide typologies are generally characterised by a retrogressive evolution such as rotational and translational slides, rock topples/falls affecting jointed rocks. In most cases, the ultimate limit is represented by the catchments divide so that the analysis, although conservative, can be carried out simply by using topographical information.
5.6.3
Prediction of lateral expansion
The prediction of lateral expansion is important in the analysis of earth flows or liquefaction phenomena, when the displaced mass is very fluid and may expand to the slope toe. The prediction is very complex and mostly depends on slope morphology, grain-size and water content of soils, shear strength of materials, pore pressure and lateral stress coefficient.
6 Landslide hazard mapping

6.1 Introduction
The identification and map portrayal of areas highly susceptible to damaging landslides are first and necessary steps toward loss-reduction (Zeizel, 1988). There are four general categories of potential users of landslide hazard information (Wold and Jochim, 1989): o o o o scientists and engineers who use the information directly; planners and decision makers who consider landslide hazards among other land-use and development criteria; developers, builders, and financial and insuring organizations; interested citizens, educators, and others with little or no technical experience.
Members of these groups differ widely in the kinds of information they need and in their ability to use that information (Wold and Jochim, 1989). Most local governments do not have landslide hazard maps and do not have funding available for mapping activities, and such communities usually look to a higher level of government for mapping. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) has provided maps in some areas (e.g., demonstration B.III-30
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mapping of San Mateo County, California; Brabb et al., 1972), but in general, landslide hazard mapping by the USGS has had limited geographic coverage. Although most local communities look to their state as the primary source of maps, few states have undertaken significant landslide hazard mapping programs. However, there are important exceptions. California and Oregon, for example, have undertaken landslide hazard mapping at standard USGS mapping scales. These maps provide an excellent starting point for local communities and, importantly, form the basis for state laws that require a certain level of compliance with the information they provide. The considerable variability among state geological agencies, particularly in terms of their existing mapping capabilities and projected funding environments, makes it difficult to provide detailed commentary and suggestions regarding the partnerships between the USGS and states for landslide hazard mapping and assessment. Historically, there have been strong ties between the USGS and state geological surveys in the realm of mapping (e.g., Ellen et al., 1993; Coe et al., 2000b) and, to a lesser extent, for the identification and mitigation of natural hazards. The suggestion in the national strategy proposal (Spiker and Gori, 2000) of mapping partnerships, using a model based on competitive grants and matching funds (as with the existing National Geologic Cooperative Mapping Program), would undoubtedly provide resources for a considerable amount of much-needed mapping. However, such a model raises the possibility that hazard mapping assessed as having a high priority might not be possible if state matching funds are not available. It is important that the details of the cooperative mapping partnership be worked out carefully, in close consultation with state geologists, as the national strategy implementation plan is being developed. Landslide hazard zonation is commonly portrayed on maps. Preparation of these maps requires a detailed knowledge of the landslide processes that are or have been active in an area and an understanding of the factors that may lead to an occurrence of potentially damaging landslides. Accordingly, this is a task that should be undertaken by geoscientists. In contrast, vulnerability analysis, which assesses the degree of loss, requires detailed knowledge of population density, infrastructure, economic activities, and ecological and water quality values and the effects that a specific landslide would have on these elements. Specialists in urban planning and social geography, economists, and engineers should perform these analyses. Because landslides both leave a topographic signature when they occur and are driven largely by topographic effects, improved sources of highresolution topographic information have the potential to greatly increase the accuracy of landslide hazard maps.
6.2 Susceptibility and hazard mapping

A national strategy (Spiker and Gori, 2000) should identify three activities that are required to provide the maps, assessments, and other information needed by officials and planners to reduce landslide risk and losses:
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1. Develop and implement a plan for mapping and assessing landslide and other ground failure hazards nationwide. 2. Develop an inventory of known landslide and other ground failure hazards nationwide. 3. Develop and encourage the use of standards and guidelines for landslide hazard maps and assessments. The landslide inventory and landslide susceptibility maps are critically needed in landslide prone regions of the nation. These maps must be sufficiently detailed to support mitigation action at the local level. To cope with the many uncertainties involved in landslide hazards, probabilistic methods are being developed to map and assess landslide hazards (Spiker and Gori, 2000, p.13). Hazard zoning may be mapped at various scales; user requirements and the intended applications determine the appropriate scale. Because a clear understanding of the different types of landslide hazard maps is critical for successful implementation of a national strategy. In the absence of accepted national standards for landslide hazard maps, a variety of mapping styles have been employed for each type of map. This even applies to landslide inventory mapsthe most basic type of landslide map. These document the locations and outlines of landslides that have occurred in an area during a single event or multiple events. Small-scale landslide inventory maps may show only landslide locations and general outlines of larger landslides, whereas large-scale maps may distinguish landslide sources from landslide deposits, classify different kinds of landslides, and show other pertinent data. The quantitative definition of hazard or vulnerability requires analysis of landslide-triggering factors, such as earthquakes or rainfall, or the application of complex models. Both tasks are extremely difficult when dealing with large areas. Consequently, the legends for most landslide hazard maps usually describe only the susceptibility of certain areas to landslides, or provide only relative indications of the degree of hazard, such as high, medium, and low. Not all methods of landslide zonation are equally applicable at each scale or for each type of analysis. Some require very detailed input data that can be collected only for small areas because of the required levels of effort and the high cost. Consequently, selection of an appropriate mapping technique depends on the type of landslide problems occurring within an area of interest and the availability of data and financial resources, as well as the duration of the investigation and the professional experience of the experts involved. When carefully applied by well-qualified experts, the inferential approach may describe the real causes of slope instability, based on scientific and professional criteria. However, due to the scale and complexity of slope instability factors, the basic inferential approach is unlikely to be definitive over large areas when mapping is conducted at small scales. For such applications, the combination of expert inference and qualitatively weighted contributing parameters greatly improves the objectivity and reproducibility of the zoning. Combined statistical and process based approaches may efficiently provide reliable regional landslide zoning over large areas, by classifying the terrain into susceptibility classes that reflect the presence and intensity of causative factors of slope instability. B.III-32
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For detailed studies of small areas, large amounts of data may become available, and in such cases, simple process-based models become increasingly practical for establishing landslide hazard zoning. They allow variations in the safety factor to be approximated and, thus, yield information useful to design engineers.
6.3 Hazard zoning scales

Characteristics and Use National zoning maps: Provide a general inventory of problem areas for the landslide inventories nation with a low level of detail. These maps are useful to national policy makers and the general public. Regional zoning maps: Provide engineers and planners an overview of potential landslide impacts on large projects or regional developments during initial planning phases. The areas investigated are quite large and the required map detail is low. Local zoning maps: Identify land sliding zones for large engineering structures, roads, and urban areas. The investigations may cover quite large areas; yet a considerably higher level of detail is required. Slopes adjacent to landslides should be evaluated separately and may be assigned different hazard scores depending on their characteristics. Site-specific zonation maps: Used during site investigations to provide absolute hazard classes and variable safety factors as a function of slope conditions and the influence of specific triggering factors. Data Acquisition and Mapping Procedures National summary of regional landslide and map products
Detailed data collection for individual factors (geomorphology, lithology, soils, etc.) is not a costeffective approach. Data gathered from stereoscopic satellite imagery combined with regional geologic, tectonic, or seismic data should delineate homogeneous terrain units. Data collection should support the production of detailed multi temporal landslide distribution maps and provide information about the various parameters required in statistical analysis.
Data collection should relate to the parameters needed for slope stability modelling (e.g., material sequences and geotechnical properties, seismic accelerations, hydrologic data).
Table 6.1 Hazard zoning scales
6.4 Landslide Hazard map types

A landslide inventory map shows the locations and outlines of landslides. A landslide inventory is a data set that may represent a single event or multiple events. Small-scale maps may show only landslide locations, whereas large-scale maps may distinguish landslide sources from deposits, classify different kinds of landslides, and show other pertinent data. A landslide susceptibility map ranks slope stability of an area into categories that range from stable to unstable. Susceptibility maps show where landslides may form. Many susceptibility maps use a colour scheme that relates warm colours (red, orange, and yellow) to unstable and marginally unstable areas and cool colours (blue and green) to more stable areas. A landslide hazard map indicates the annual probability (likelihood) of landslides occurring throughout an area. An ideal landslide hazard map not only shows the chances that a landslide may form at a particular place, but also the chances that a landslide from farther upslope may strike that place. A landslide risk map shows the expected annual cost of landslide damage throughout an area. Risk maps combine the probability information from a landslide hazard map with an analysis of all possible consequences (property damage, casualties, and loss of service). B.III-33
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6.5 Approaches to landslide mapping

6.5.1 The Inferential Approach
This approach is very common and relies on visual analysis of aerial photographs, and other remote-sensing images, topographic and geologic maps, and field observations and historical data, to create interpretative maps of the extent and relatively activity of landslide features. Four major classes of maps may be produced by the inferential approach: 1. Landslide inventory maps show the spatial distribution of mass movements, represented either as affected areas to scale or as point symbols (Wieczorek, 1984). 2. Landslide density maps show landslide distributions by landslide isopleths (Wright et al., 1974). 3. Landslide activity maps are usually based on interpretation of aerial photographs taken at different times. 4. Qualitative combination maps result when a scientist uses individual expert knowledge to assign weights to a series of parameter maps and then sums these to produce a series of relatively homogeneous slope instability zones (Stevenson, 1977). Limitations Maps produced by the inferential approach, while rooted in direct observation, are strongly dependent on the experience and skill of the mapmaker. Inventory, density, and activity maps are costly to create and require repeated updating after major landslide-producing storms. Qualitative combination maps may be unreliable when insufficient field knowledge of the important factors prevents the proper establishment of factor weights, leading to unacceptable generalizations.
6.5.2
The Statistical Approach
The statistical approach consists of mapping a large number of parameters considered to potentially affect landslides, and subsequent (statistical) analysis of all potential contributing factors. This analysis hopefully identifies conditions leading to slope failures. The advent of digital elevation data has encouraged the use of two distinct statistical approaches: 1. Bivariate statistical analysis evaluates each factor map (e.g., slope, geology, land-use) in turn with the landslide distribution map, and weighting values based on landslide densities are calculated. Brabb et al. (1972) provided an early example of such an analysis. USGS personnel in Menlo Park, California later applied geographic information system (GIS) techniques to statistical landslide mapping (Newman et al., 1978; Brabb, 1984, 1987; Brabb et al., 1989). Subsequently several statistical methods have been applied to calculate the weighting values (van Westen, 1993). 2. Multivariate statistical models for landslide hazard zonation have been developed in Italy, mainly by Carrara (1983, 1988) and his colleagues (Carrara et al., 1991, 1992). All relevant factors are evaluated spatially within grid cells or by morphometric units. The statistical model is built up in a training area, where the spatial distribution of landslides is well known. Then the model is extended to the entire study area, based on the B.III-34
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assumption that the factors that cause slope failure in the target area are the same as those in the training area. Bernknopf et al. (1988) applied multiple regression analysis to a GIS data set, using presence or absence of landslides as the dependent variable and the factors used in a slope stability model (soil depth, soil strength, slope angle) as independent variables. Limitations. Statistical approaches have the advantage of using an objective procedure for hazard delineation and are relatively inexpensive to create once the digital data are available and statistical analyses have been performed. Good results are found in homogeneous zones or areas with only a few types of slope instability processes. In more complex situations, very large data sets may be required because the methods do not make use of selective criteria based on professional experience. Another disadvantage of the statistical approach is that specific empirical relationships may be of limited generality; hence statistical relationships have to be determined for each study region, the boundaries of which are not clear.
6.5.3
The Process-Based Approach
This approach uses a deterministic or process-based analysis to delineate relative landslide potential. Quantitative theory for slope instability is applied using digital elevation data and other digital information, such as geologic attributes and vegetation cover. The slope instability theory is commonly coupled to process-based hydrologic models. This approach emerged in the past 10 years and is undergoing rapid evolution, driven in part by new observational technology (see below). Despite problems related to collection of sufficient and reliable input data, deterministic models are increasingly used for hazard analysis over larger areas, especially with the aid of GIS techniques, which can handle the large number of calculations involved when determining safety factors over large areas. Yet this approach is applicable only when the geomorphic and geologic conditions are fairly homogeneous over the entire study area and the landslide types are simple. Limitations . The main problem with process-based methods is their high degree of simplification. Slope stability is often strongly dependent on local conditions, such as planes of weakness in bedrock, root strength, or groundwater conductivity, which are at present nearly impossible to map at the resolution needed over a large area. Hence, the controlling parameters in processed-based models can be difficult to estimate, and considerable uncertainty must be accepted in model results.
6.6 The mapping unit for GIS Technique

Evaluation of landslide hazard requires the preliminary selection of a suitable mapping unit, according to data availability, scale of analysis and representation and potential landslide hazard methodological approach to be implemented. The mapping unit refers to a portion of the land surface which contains a set of ground conditions that differ from the adjacent units across definable boundaries (Hansen, 1984). At the scale of the analysis, a mapping unit represents domain that maximises internal homogeneity and between-units heterogeneity. Various methods have been proposed to partition the B.III-35
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landscape for landslide hazard assessment and mapping (Meijerink, 1988; Carrara et al., 1995). All methods fall into one of the following five groups: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. grid-cells; terrain units; unique-condition units; slope units; topographic units.
Grid-cells , preferred by raster-based GIS users, divide the territory into regular squares of pre-defined size which become the mapping unit of reference. Each grid-cell is assigned a value for each factor (e.g. morphology, lithology, geotechnical parameters) taken into consideration. Alternatively, a stack of raster layers, each mapping a single instability factor, is prepared. Terrain units, traditionally used by geomorphologists, are based on the observation that in natural environments the interrelations between materials, forms and processes result in boundaries which frequently reflect geomorphological and geological differences. Terrain units are the base of the land-system classification approach which has found application in many land resources investigations. Unique-condition units imply the classification of each slope-instability factor into a few significant classes which are stored into a single map, or layer. By sequentially overlying all the layers, homogeneous domains (unique conditions) are singled out whose number, size and nature depend on the criteria used in classifying the input factors. Slope-units , automatically derived from high-quality DTMs, partition the territory into hydrological regions between drainage and divide lines. Depending on the type of instability to be investigated the mapping unit may correspond either to the sub-basin or to the main slope-unit. Slopeunits can be further subdivided into topographic units defined by the intersections of contours and flow tube boundaries orthogonal to contours. For each topographic unit, local morphometric variables and the cumulative drainage area of all up-slope elements are computed. Selection of an appropriate mapping unit depends on a number of factors such as: the type of landslides under analysis; the scale of investigation; the quality, resolution, scale and type of the thematic information required; the availability of the adequate information management and analysis tools. Each technique for tesselling the territory has advantages and limitations that can be stressed or reduced choosing the appropriate hazard evaluation method.
7 Element at Risk (E) or exposure

7.1 Definition
Elements at risk can be defined as Population, property, economic activity, public services or environmental goods situated in a location exposed to danger. In landslide risk assessment, finalised on spatial planning, the main topic is not only calibrated on the existing activities and goods but also on the scenario provide by development plane. B.III-36
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7.2 Cartography related to the element at risk - Map of Exposure The map of element at risk (map of exposure), constitute one of the most important start data, not only for a complete landslide risk analysis (forecasting applications), but also for the mitigation measurements planning and for preparedness of emergency plan. Data available for the production of an exposure map could be provided by public stakeholders (i.e. municipality, region, province, district) trough their planning and urbanisation instruments (i.e. strategic regional plan, preparatory land-use planning, detailed land-use planning) A correct and exhaustive exposure map could be containing the inventory of all settlement, structure and infrastructure element exposed at risk like: a ) Urban settlement, commercial, industrial and agriculture activities, organized by human density, buildings typology and function; b ) Transport infrastructure and in particular the more sensitive area, in order to prevent the problems of services interruption; the infrastructure exposed at fall and occlusions; c) Services infrastructure like hydro drinkable distributions net, lifelines in general and pipelines in general; in order to pointed out the more sensitive tract and point; d ) Public structures (i.e. school, barrack, city hall) and rescue and emergency structures (i.e. hospital, fire department, civil protection) e) Technological and industrial plant potentially pollutant; f) Cultural heritage, historical, artistic, cultural, environmental and landscape goods.
7.3 Economic value of element at risk

For each single typology of element at risk could be defined the economic value W or number of units of each element at risk situated in a given location: W = W(E) The value of element at risk could be expressed in terms of number N or quantity of exposed unity (i.e. number of persons, buildings) or in terms of exposed area S (i.e. hectares of terrain) or in alternative in monetary terms. The value is a specific function of every single element at risk: W=N otherwise W=S For the comparison between different element at risk sometimes is usefull to express the value in monetary terms, simply multiply the number N o element or the surface S by a unitary cost w W=Nxw otherwise W=Sxw The expression of the value in monetary terms is particularly indicated for the risk analysis of elements with difficult parametrisation. For examples in the national France project PER, risk is been calculated separately between human life and socio economical settlement.
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7.3.1
Human life Value
The economic value of element at risk, in terms of human life proposed by DRM (1990) is showed below in the table. The monetary value is normalized with the assumption that 1 is the medium cost of the human life. The high value linked to injured is strictly connected by the highest social cost for the permanent invalidity with respect the dead.
Dead 1 Injured 2-3 Homeless 0.2 - 1
Tab.7.1. - Relative costs about human life at risk in France (DRM, 1990)
7.3.2
Goods and activities value
The economic value of goods and activities should be evaluated for each homogeneous area of land use (tab 7.2) The monetary value is normalized with the assumption that 1 is the medium cost of the losses of one hectares of agricultural terrain As been carried out a different relative costs depending on typologies of goods and activities developed into.
Land use zone Goods Activities Agricultural zones 1 0.5 Isolated houses 6 2 Groups of houses 10 1 Big urban areas 23 8 Industrial, artisan, commercial area 8 28 Urban centre 16 30 Tab.7.2. - Relative costs per hectares linked by land use in France (DRM, 1990)
In the experiences of Province of Modena & GNDCI (1994), focused on the risk assessment in urban area, the socio economical value for the element at risk has been estimated trough an empirical scale as shown below.
Cost: Weight: Buildings Streets Aqueduct Electro duct Gas duct Various infrastructures High 1 Civil habitations, public buildings, cemetery, agricultural areas, hotel and residence Road conditions: public primary road Reservoir, main collector Power station, cabin of transformation Architectonic emergency Medium 0.7 Civil habitations, tourist habitations, stalls Public secondary road Low 0.3 Service infrastructure commercial and artisan infrastructure Minor road system
Urban power station Reservoir, Main pipelines Phone line Drainage system Sports center, tourist infrastructure
Tab.7.3 - socio economic value for the element at risk in urban area (Province of Modena & GNDCI U.O. 2.9, 1994a e 1994b)
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7.3.3
Global Value
In same cases could be useful to express a global value taking into account all the element at risk in a particular area In monetary terms, the global value is given simply by the sum of the single cost of each different element at risk. Del Prete et alii (1992) propose, as an example, the use of the following expression for the evaluations of the total value of the element at risk W = [Rm(Mm-Em)] Nab + Ned Ced + Cstr + Cmorf where: Rm is Mm is Em is Nab is Ned is is Ced Cstr is Cmorf is the the the the the the the the medium income of the inhabitants; medium age of dead of inhabitants; medium age of inhabitants; number of inhabitants; number of buildings; medium costs of buildings; costs of structures and infrastructures; costs of morphological modifications.
In the correct definitions of risk, the total value W could be multiply to an appropriate index of vulnerability.
8 Vulnerability (V)
Vulnerability is the degree of loss produced on specific element or group of element at risk as a consequence of a natural phenomena of a specific intensity. In other terms is the propensity of a society to experience damage, disruption and causalities as a result of a natural hazard. The vulnerability should be expressed by a scale starting from 0 (nobody loss) to 1 (total loss) and is a function of intensity of the phenomena and typology of element at risk. V=V(I;E) More in details the concept of vulnerability define the correlations between the intensity of a specific phenomena with his possible consequences. Formally the vulnerability concept should be expressed in terms of dependent probability (Einstein, 1988): V = P(damage event) In other words: the probability that the element at risk suffers a specific damage due to the occurrence of a landslide of a specific intensity. In the same time the vulnerability concept should be include a measurement of severity of damage. Using Morgan et al.(1992) definition, the complete evaluation of vulnerability is expressed by the simple product of several quantity (everyone defined trough a relative scale from 0 to 1): V = VS x VT x VL B.III-39
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where: VS is the probability of spatial impact: define the probability that a certain element at risk is involved by a landslide, (e.g. the probability that a rapid debris flow involve a specific building ). VT is the probability of temporal impact: define the variability of characteristics of the element at risk trough the time (e.g. the probability that a specific building is occupied in during the landslides occurrence). VL is the probability of loss of human life of each occupant of the element, or in otherwise the value portion injured that could be lose. In addition of the intensity of the phenomena and typologies of the element at risk, in the definitions of the vulnerability, several factors, with difficult parametrisation, are involved. This parameters are linked to social organisation of the area test (Panizza, 1988). The vulnerability, with parity of other conditions, is minor in that country equipped with prevention and emergency plan The evaluation of vulnerability could be based on statistic method, in the specific case of frequent and repeatable phenomenas. For example, in the case of rock fall is possible to estimate, on statistical base, the probability that a rock detachment produce a specific damage on a specific building.
8.1 Vulnerability: some web definitions

In the following table various definitions of vulnerability are listed:
Source http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Lobby/6075/Glossar y.htm http://www.ben.edu/semp/htmlpages/glossaryh1.html http://www.mmeirs.org/glossary.html International Agreed Glossary of Basic Terms Related to Disaster Management (1992) UN-DHA, IDNDR http://www.reliefweb.int/library/mcda/refman/glossary.htm l American Heritage College Dictionary, 3 rd edition Fema (2001) Definition Likely to be damaged or disrupted Susceptibility of a population The degree to which a socio-economic system, for example, is either susceptible or resistant Degree of loss The extent to which a community, structure, service or geographic area is likely to be damaged or disrupted Susceptibility to a physical injury or attack. How exposed or susceptible to damage an asset is.
Tab.8.1 - Definitions of vulnerability
8.2 Conceptual approach: vulnerability assessment

8.2.1 Definition
Vulnerability assessment poses problems of understanding the interaction between this phenomenon and the exposed element. This interaction can be expressed by so-called damage functions, or by extension, vulnerability functions. These enable a structuring of the various components of the vulnerability concept, which is the first step towards vulnerability assessment (Leone et al., 1996).
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8.2.2

Vulnerability components
property or land, including any structures on it, but also whole areas or land use means; people; various activities and functions. a structural-damage function for material assets; a corporal-damage function for people; an operational-damage function for the various activities and functions
Three main groups of exposed elements susceptible to damage are defined:
Each group has its corresponding specific type of damage function:
Vulnerability of a structural asset depends on the intensity of the phenomenon and the resistance of the structure to the mechanical stress by the phenomenon. Vulnerability of a person also depends on the intensity of the phenomenon, plus the intrinsic and extrinsic sensitivity of the person concerned: Intrinsic sensitivity is made up of: perceptive factors (level of danger perception); cognitive factors (knowledge of how to protect oneself); mobility factors (level of mobility when faced with danger). factors of physical protection (provided by the surrounding structures); technical and functional circumstances (efficiency of the ways and means of raising the alarm, evacuation, emergency aid, treatment, e.g.). damage level of the material assets (technical factors); people (human factors); secondary functions that ensure the activity in question (functional factors) as well as the ability of the disaster-struck society to restore this activity (social, economic and institutional factors).
Extrinsic sensitivity is made up of:
Functional vulnerability depends on the:
The specificity of landslide phenomena is essentially manifested by structural and corporal damage. Such functions are difficult to formalize from an analytical point of view due to the: diffuse character of the phenomena, complexity of the type of associated damage, rarity of consolidated balance sheets to the damage.
To progress, it is vital to collect and compare historical data of the damagerecording. The result is the progressive development of damage matrices, after drawing up: suitable typologies for the processes, modes of occurrence, and damage rate that are specifically caused by landslides. B.III-41
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In general the estimations of vulnerability in large part is based on objectives assessment methodologies. A lot of researchers includes in the vulnerability evaluation, a sort of implicitly estimation of phenomena unpredictability. Its our opinion, for a correct evaluation of every single parameters, in the risk assessment procedure, to remain separate the concept of hazard, value of element at risk and vulnerability. Its opportune discriminate the vulnerability evaluations in terms of typology of element at risk, because the vulnerability depends of the intensity of the phenomena. In particular different approach are developed depending from the typology of element at risk (e.g. human life vulnerability or goods and activities vulnerability)
8.3 Human life vulnerability

In the real case in which the element at risk is mainly represented by human life, the vulnerability should be expressed by the probability of dead, injured or homeless after the occurrence of a specific landslide of a specific intensity. The vulnerability in that case is directly dependent by the populations density in an exposed area (Fell, 1994). In the scope of PER projects, the value of probability of dead, injured and homeless is fixed by the DRM (1990), in relationship by the intensity of landslides phenomena (see tab. 8.2). That kind of value of probability could be used directly to express vulnerability.
Damage dead injured homeless H0 0 0 0 H1 -5 10 -4 10 -4 10 H2 -3 10 -2 10 -1 10 H3 -2 10 -1 10 -1 10
Tab. 8.2. - Probability in terms of effects on human life for different scale of intensity. (DRM, 1990)
If we are able to define the intensity in terms of displacement velocity, the edge of human life vulnerability (possibility of dead or injured) has been fixed by Hungr (1981) and Morgenstern (1985) in 1 m/s, corresponding to human run velocity. Del Prete et al. (1992) propose to halve that threshold, considering the time of reaction of all the people involved. Cruden & Varnes (1996) reduce the threshold to 0.05 m/s (about 3 m/min), in order to consider the possibility of totally evacuation of the risk area.
8.4 Vulnerability of good and activities

In the situations of a particular element at risk, for example good and or activities, the vulnerability express the percentage of the economic value that could be loss after the occurrence of a landslides phenomena.
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Depending on the scale of work the vulnerability of each building could be detected and evaluated or in alternative the vulnerability of an homogeneous land use. In the case of a single building the vulnerability evaluation is based on the estimation of damage. A preview estimation of damage is given by the economic commitment useful to restore and re establish the situation before the landslide occurs. In a very preliminary approach the damage could be evaluated by: aesthetical; functional; structural. by Tomlinson et al. (1978), in particular referred to foundations problems; by Alexander (1989) for damages due to different typologies of landslides; and by Ragozin & Tikhvinsky (2000) linking deep of foundations and slip surfaces (tab 8.3).
Depth of slip surface (m) <2 <2 2 10 2 10 2 10 > 10 Vulnerability 1.0 0 1.0 0.5 1.0 0 0.5* 1.0**
Scale of damage severity about buildings has been developed and adopted:
Depth of foundations (m) 2 >2 Minor than slip surface 10 13 > 13 Every depth
Tab.8.3 - Vulnerability value respect to depth of foundations and slip surfaces (Ragozin & Tikhvinsky, 2000) Note: (*) the value are grater than 0 for the slip surface landslides major than the depth of foundations, the displacements velocity Vs the building is more than 1 m/s and the volume is grater than 100 m3, (**) not including special foundations
Scale of damage severity in terms of percentage of building cost, is given by DRM (1990) and shown in the tab 8.4.
Degree of damage 1 2 3 4 5 % of building Kind of damage value some % Light damage and non structural. The stability is uncompromised. 10 30 Crack on the walls. 50 60 Important deformations. Crack open. Evacuation is necessary. 70 90 Partial floor subsidence and walls disarticulations. Immediate evacuation. 100 Total disruption: Restoration is impossible. Tab.8.4 - Conventional scale of damage severity (inspired to Mercalli scale) (DRM, 1990)
The damage degree is strictly linked by the intensity of phenomena and structural typologies (tab. 8.5).
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Intensity E1
E2
E3
E4
Typology Sliding Flow Fall Sliding Flow Fall Sliding Flow Fall Sliding Flow Crollo
A 5 25 45 5 35 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
B 34 13 35 5 14 5 5 35 5 5 5 5
C1 2 12 35 35 13 5 45 15 5 5 5 5
C2 12 1 23 35 1 45 45 15 5 5 5 5
Tab.8.5 - Relative damage evaluation due to different landslide typology and intensity correlated to building structural typology (DRM, 1990) A = old buildings, mediocre quality, without foundations, in that categories belong the B typology with a particular level of decay; B = normal and traditional buildings in masonry or light structure without concrete (small cottage and so on ); C = Good quality buildings in concrete or CAP. The categories is divided in two sub classes:; C1 = single buildings of small dimension; C2 = buildings with more than three floor .
At spatial planning level, for examples at the municipality scale, it is very difficult to evaluate the vulnerability for each single building. It is more reasonable trying to define percentage of damage in homogeneous areas of land use in function of the landslides intensity. For that kind of vulnerability map always in DRM (1990) is useful the tab.8.6.
Land use area Agricultural area Isolated building Group of buildings Village Commercial and industrial areas Urban areas E1 70 60 36 10 40 50 E2 90 90 80 60 80 80 E3 100 100 100 90 100 90 100
Tab.8.6 - Damage degree divided in percentage of homogeneous area of land use and intensity of landslide (DRM, 1990)
Fell (1994) gives a relative and descriptive scale for the vulnerability associated to property loss tab. 8.6 That kind of scale could be used to link a numerical value to an empirical evaluation of degree of loss
Vulnerability of good and activity Extremely high high medium low Very low Vulnerability V 0.9 0.5 V < 0.9 0.1 V < 0.5 0.05 V < 0.1 V < 0.05
Tab 8.7 - Vulnerability scale of good and activity (Fell, 1994)
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9 Analysis of Risk (R)

9.1 Definition
Risk: A combination of the probability or frequency of occurrence of a defined hazard and the magnitude of the consequences of the occurrence. More specifically, risk is defined as the probability of harmful consequences, or expected loss (e.g. lives, injured people, property, livelihoods, economic activity disrupted or environment damaged) resulting from interactions between natural or human-induced hazards. The evaluation of landslide risk is the combination and parameterisation of several different factors (e.g. socio economical factors, environmental geological factors). The definition of those parameters involves different competences and skills (e.g. geologists, engineers, spatial planners, stakeholders). The three different components of risk (Hazard, Vulnerability and Worth of elements at risk) should be defined with different degree of detail depending on data availability and experiences from expertises and scientific communities. In some cases, it could be necessary to develop only a simple and partial synthesis of information, evaluating the specific risk rather than total risk. During the risk assessment procedure, a fundamental priority is the acceptable risk threshold definition, because it is possible to define the critical interpretation of the results and further activities (i.e. risk assessment, zoning). The acceptable risk definitions permit the discrimination of a list of priority in order to assess mitigation measurements. Depending on the objectives of the analysis and data availability, the acceptable thresholds risk could be defined as total or specific risk.
9.2 Qualitative analysis

This is the most simple expression of landslide risk assessment. This considers the acquisition of information on landslide hazard, elements at risk and their vulnerability, by expressing them with qualitative classifications (i.e. low, medium, high risk) based on expert judgement.
9.2.1
Damage propensity
The definition of the damage propensity or risk susceptibility considers only a part of the base elements or simply defining them qualitatively or semiquantitatively. In the landslide risk analysis a typical approach of damage propensity can be implemented by, for instance, overlapping the elements at risk with landslide inventory maps or landslide susceptibility maps. Due to the objective difficulty to undertake an exhaustive and quantitative landslide risk analysis, almost all the existing literature and applications on landslide risk assessment can be considered as damage propensity analysis.
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For instance, the Italian Law 180/98 on landslide risk assessment is a typical example of damage propensity analysis. This takes into account the following steps: a) Landslide inventory mapping; b) Overlapping of landslide areas with the potential elements at risk; c) Definition of 4 distinct risk classes (R1-R4), defined qualitatively according to the social and economic consequences.
9.3 Quantitative analysis

The general framework of a quantitative landslide risk assessment is a typical multi-discipline approach based on the following tasks: a ) Landslide hazard assessment, namely the probability of occurrence and characteristics of potential landslides; b) Identification of elements at risk, as number and characteristics; c) Analysis of vulnerability of the various elements at risk; d) Risk evaluation.
9.3.1
Total risk
Expected loss of human lives, injured, damage to the property and economic activities caused by a landslide event. It can be expressed as annual cost or number or amount of lost units per year. It is a function of the elements at risk E and a given intensity I of the landslide: R(I;E) = H(I) V(I;E) W(E) According to the considered element at risk, the following risk typologies can be identified: a) Induced risk on human life: expected number of deaths, injured or homeless per year, or their economic worth caused by a landslide; b) Induced risk on properties: expected number of damaged houses per year or lost land surface per year, or expected cost of damage caused by a landslide; c) Induced risk on economic activities: expected cost of direct and indirect damage on economy caused by a landslide; d) Induced risk on goods of public interest: expected cost of damage on facilities and environment caused by a landslide. By expressing all the quantities as money it is possible to define a global risk given by the algebraic sum of the costs associated to each simple component. The a priori definition of the total risk applied to spatial planning is quite problematic. The choice of the risk levels should be done at local level taking into account the specific socio-economic condition of each zone. Nevertheless, this differentiation at local level determines some difficulty in comparing various risk maps designed in distinct areas. For this scope it can be useful to identify some general criteria for the choice, time by time, of the risk classes to adopt for landslide risk zoning. This approach has been adopted for the implementation of PER in France that identify three distinct landslide risk classes (tab. 9.1). The cost for prevention measures equal to 10% of the worth of the element at risk is the acceptable risk threshold. B.III-46
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Class Red Zone Blu Zone
Description Prone to landslide with high intensity and high probability of occurrence Prone to landslide with moderate intensity and probability of occurrence No expected hazard. No prescription adopted.
White Zone
Prevention measures Protection measures cannot be implemented. Constructions are not allowed. Landslide risk mitigation measures can be implemented for structures done before the publication of the Plan; the cost of measures cannot exceed 10% of the worth of goods. Landslide mitigation measures are not necessary.
Tab.9.1 Classes of risk zoning in the project PER (DRM, 1988)
Another general scheme is proposed in table 9.2 where risk is classified in 4 classes. Where a quantitative assessment of the various components of risk cannot be undertaken, it is possible to adopt nominal scales, as proposed in 9.1 to utilise combining hazard, following table 9.4, and potential damage assessed with table 9.5.
Risk R0 R1 R2 R3 NUL LOW MEDIUM HIGH Description Negligible risk Socially tolerable risk No prevention activities Socially intolerable risk Prevention activities are necessary Catastrophic risk Urgent prevention activities to implement
Tab. 9.2 Total risk classes WL0 H0 H1 H2 H3 R0 R0 R0 R0 WL1 R0 R1 R1 R2 WL2 R0 R1 R2 R3 WL3 R0 R2 R3 R3
Tab.9.3 Scheme for risk assessment based on hazard and potential damage
9.3.2
Potential damage (WL)
Potential amount of losses caused by a landslide with a given intensity. It can be expressed as number or amount of exposed units or as monetary worth. For a given typology of element at risk E and a given intensity I the potential damage is: WL(I;E) = W(E) V(I;E) Potential damage WL takes into account the worth of elements at risk and their potential degree of loss or damage, as a function of the element characteristics and landslide intensity. Thus, the assessment of potential damage requires only general information on landslide intensity (that affects vulnerability) and is mostly based on the characteristics of the elements at risk. Such an assessment can be done, therefore, by urban planners and administrators. The unit of the loss worth is the same of the worth of the elements at risk, namely the number or area of damageable units, or the expected cost for damage. B.III-47
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The risk can be estimated from potential damage, starting from assumptions on landslide hazard (recurrence intervals) using the following equation: R(I;E) = WL(I;E) H(I) In the following sub-chapters, two distinct methodologies for the assessment of potential damage are reported: the former is based on a direct application of the definition where vulnerability and worth of elements at risk are calculated separately; the latter is a simplified assessment based on the typology of the element at risk and landslide intensity (taking into account, implicitly, vulnerability and worth of the elements at risk). The choice between the two methodologies is substantially based on the level of analysis and data availability.
9.3.2.1
Rigorous assessment
The risk assessment methodology adopted in the project PER (DRM, 1985, 1988, 1990) considers a detailed definition of potential losses (defined, not properly, as vulnerability) vs. one or more landslide events with given hazard and intensity. In general, potential damage can be expressed as money loss: WL = N w V (9.1) Where N is the number of exposed elements, w their unitary worth and V their vulnerability. The assessment of potential damage is differentiated according to the different typologies of element at risk: a) potential damage for human life WLh: possibility that a landslide can cause deaths, injured or homeless; b ) potential damage for goods and economic activities WLe: economic worth of damage to goods and employment; c) potential damage on goods of public interest: damage on public structures and infrastructures. Each component of potential damage is assessed separately following different landslide intensities, as defined in the Tables 6 and 7. In addition, the potential damage is assessed for each homogeneous land area defined by the Municipality Plans. The potential damage at municipality scale can be obtained by summing the values referred to the different homogeneous areas. The potential damage associated to human life can be calculated with the following function: WLh (zone) = N [(w V)deaths + (w V)injured + (w V)homeless] (9.2) where N is the number of residents in the considered zone, w the monetary worth of each element at risk (Tab. 16) and V their vulnerability (Tab. 19). The potential damage of goods and economic activities WLe is calculated with the following equation: WLe (zone) = S [(w V)goods + (w V)activities] (9.3)
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where S is the area of the zone, w the worth of elements at risk per area (Tab. 16) and V their vulnerability (Tab. 23). The potential damage for goods of public interest WLp is calculated with the following equation: WLp (zone) = k WLe(zone) + D (9.4) where k is a coefficient that depends on landslide intensity and D a coefficient that takes into account the number and worth of public facilities in the zone. The potential damage at municipality scale is given by, respectively: WLh(municipality) = [WLh(zone) A] human life; WLe(municipality) = [WLe(zone) C] goods and economic activities; WLp(municipality) = WLp(zone) goods of public interest; where A is a coefficient that takes into account the additional presence of people in tourist areas (1.3 in tourist areas and 1 in non-tourist areas) and C is a coefficient that considers the density of facilities vs. municipality population.
9.3.2.2
Simplified assessment.
The analysis is based on a schematic classification of the territory in homogeneous urban and land use areas. For each zone, the potential damage is calculated following the type of element at risk, considering its relative worth, and landslide intensity. Four general classes of elements at risk are proposed, combined with the four classes of intensity defined in tab. 9.4 and tab. 9.5, provide four classes of potential damage.
Elements at risk E3 Urban areas, large industrial and commercial areas, architectural, historical and artistic goods, main roads, relevant social facilities E2 Small urban areas, minor industrial, artisan and commercial areas, secondary roads E1 E0 Isolated houses, minor roads, agricultural areas, public parks WL 0 Uninhabited or unproductive areas WL 0 WL0 WL0 WL 0 Tab. 9.4 Scheme for simplified assessment of potential damage) Danno WL0 WL1 WL2 WL3 NUL LOW MEDIUM HIGH Descrizione No damage Aesthetic or minor functional damage on buildings that are neither affecting human life safety nor the continuity of socio-economic activities Functional damage to buildings, possibility of homeless and occasional accidents, possible breakdown of socio-economic activities Severe damage to buildings, possibility of deaths and injured, disruption of socioeconomic activities WL1 WL1 WL 2 I0 WL 0 WL0 Intensity I1 I2 WL2 WL1 WL3 WL2 I3 WL 3 WL 3
Tab. 9.5 Classes of potential damage
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9.3.3
Specific Risk (Rs)
Expected degree of loss as consequence of a landslide with a given intensity. It is expressed as annual probability. For each typology of element at risk E and a given landslide intensity I the specific risk is: Rs(I;E) = H(I) V(I;E) The specific risk, unlike potential damage, is a parameter mainly based on landslide characteristics. The assessment of specific risk, hence, is typically undertaken by landslide specialists. The total risk can be estimated by the specific risk using the information on elements at risk worth: R(I;E) = Rs(I;E) W(E) The assessment of the specific risk is very important since it allows to estimate the consequences of landslides independently from the number and worth of the element at risk. The specific risk can be used, in specific cases, for the definition of the acceptable risk (see chapter 10).
Specific risk Extremely high High Medium Low Very low Rs (annual) Rs 0.1 0.02 Rs < 0.1 0.005 Rs < 0.02 0.001 Rs < 0.005 Rs 0.001
Tab. 9.6 Scale of specific risk of goods and activities (Fell, 1994)
9.4 Probability of acceptable rupture

In the framework of reliability analysis, there are well defined levels of probability of acceptable rupture. These values can be differentiated according to the typology and amount of elements at risk and, therefore, the vulnerability is implicitly taken into account. For this reason they can be considered as measures of acceptable risk. Anyway, the temporal factor is not directly considered. In fact, the acceptable thresholds are directly compared with the values of probability of rupture calculated with probability analysis (probability that the safety factor is lower or equal to 1). The uncertainty of the safety factor is only a consequence of the uncertainties of the various input parameters in slope stability calculation. Hence, the probability of rupture cannot be directly associated to a probability of occurrence (landslide return time). In civil engineering, different criteria for the calculation of probability tolerable rupture are adopted. CIRIA (Construction Industry and Research Information Association) in USA has proposed the following criteria: nd (%) where: Social criteria: Pa ( s) = Ks 1000 nr Ks nd nr is a constant depending on work typology and its social use; is the service time of the system; is the number of individuals exposed to risk in the time nd.
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Economic criteria: Pa (e) = 100
b 2.3 C Ei
(%) where:
b is a constant depending on population standard of living (0.06 in USA for 1982-83); Ei is the initial cost (USD) of the structure; C is a coefficient referred to the cost of a rupture consequence related to the initial cost of the structure (namely a measure of the vulnerability). Socio-economic criteria: Pa ( se) = 100 b q
Ks 2 2.3 q nd
(%) where:
is the average value (USD) established by the insurance system for human life (100 000$ in USA for 1982-83).
Kirsten & Moss (1985) have adapted the criteria of CIRIA to rock slope stability criteria, providing the values of the input coefficients and risk thresholds following an empirical classification of slopes based on service time, social use and surveillance required.
Cat. 1 Service time ZERO Social use Access forbidden Access strongly forewarned Access actively forewarned Access forewarned Access discouraged Access permitted Free access Free access Surveillance required Continuous monitoring with high-tech systems Continuous monitoring with high-tech systems Continuous monitoring with high-tech systems Continuous monitoring with simple systems Intentionally superficial observation Occasional observation No control No control Ks 12000 nd (ys) 0.4 nr 0.06 4 0.16 Pa(s) (%) 75 Pa(se) (%) 75
EXTREMELY SHORT (temporary open mines) VERY SHORT (temporary slopes in open mines) SHORT (semi-temporary slopes in open mines, quarries, civil works MEDIUM (semi-permanent slopes) LONG (almost-permanent slopes) VERY LONG (permanent slopes) VERY LONG (impact on environment and threat for human life) EXTREM. LONG (high impact on environment; serious threat for human life
5600
35
5.6
2400
2.5
0.4
15
0.38
1200
6.25
1.0
7.5
0.018
5 6 7 8
460 160 30 6
16 40 100 250
2.56 6.4 16 40
2.5 1.0 0.19 0.003 8 0.006 3
0.031 10-4 3 10-6 10-7
Free access
No control
625
100
2.6 109
Table 9.7 Criteria for the assessment of the probability of acceptable rupture for rock slopes (from Kirsten & Moss, 1985). The probability of the acceptable rupture following an economic criterion is independent from the slope category and is equal to Pa(e)=0.00013%.
Priest & Brown (1983) have proposed some criteria for the interpretation of rock slope stability probabilistic analysis. According to the typology of slope B.III-51
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and elements at risk, they have defined different threshold values for the average value of the safety factor E(F ), rupture probability P (F <1), and probability that F<1.5 (Table 9.8). If one, two or all three criteria are satisfied, the authors provide an interpretation of the slope behaviour, suggesting risk mitigation strategies (Table 9.10).
Class 1 2 3 Consequences Slight Moderate Severe Element at risk Quarry terraces Modest excavation (H<50m) far from roads Permanent or semi-permanent slopes Medium-high slopes (H>50m) near roads or below structures CRITERIA E(F) P(F<1.0) 1.3 0.1 1.6 2.0 0.01 0.003 P(F<1.5) 0.2 0.1 0.05
Table 9.8 - Acceptable risk assessed following probabilistic analysis (from Priest & Brown, 1983)
CRITERIA E(F) V V V F F F F
P(F<1.0) V F V V V F F
P(F<1.5) V V F V F V F
Interpretation STABLE Risk can be or cannot be acceptable; the risk level can be decreased with monitoring The risk level can be decreased with a modest re-shape of the slope UNSTABLE: the risk level can be decreased only with a substantial reshape of the slope, or with reinforcement of the rock slope; monitoring can be necessary
Table 9.10 Interpretation of the risk level and mitigation strategies following the criteria proposed in Table 3.5 (from Priest & Brown, 1983): V = criterion satisfied; F = criterion not satisfied.
10 Risk management
10.1 Introduction
Landslide and slope engineering have always involved some form of risk management although it was seldom formally recognised as such. This informal type of risk management was essentially the exercise of engineering judgement by experienced engineers. Recent advances in risk analysis and risk assessment are beginning to provide systematic and rigorous processes to formalise the engineering judgements and enhance slope engineering practice. Landslide risk management, like many other forms of risk management of natural and/or civil engineering hazards, is a relatively new discipline with evolving analysis techniques. Risk management is relatively well established in other industries, particularly the nuclear and hazardous process industries, where standards for risk analysis and risk management have been developed. Within the societal context, safety regulation involves achieving an appropriate balance between cost and safety over a range of diverse activities. If it is possible to achieve this balance, either in part or in full, then consistent methods of evaluation across the entire range of activities will be required. In developing landslide risk management methods, it is important to keep in mind the wide range of landslide and slope stability problems which need to
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be considered. The systems need to be capable of handling landslides which are: small, (e.g. single boulders) through to very large (several million m3) extremely slow moving (mm per year) to extremely rapid (>100 km/hr) from natural slopes (eg. boulder falls, debris flows, avalanches), and man-made slopes (e.g. cuts and fills, for highways, behind buildings, houses) a hazard to property and life. The systems also need to recognise that there are many levels of detail and different methods which can be used depending on the situation, e.g. detailed probabilistic analysis may be appropriate for slopes with detailed engineering investigation, but observational methods using geomorphology and expert judgement may be appropriate for assessment of natural slope.
10.2 Framework for landslide risk management

10.2.1 General framework
The risk management process comprises three components: 1. Risk analysis 2. Risk assessment 3. Risk management Risk analysis and risk assessment are sub-sets of risk management and risk analysis is a subset of risk assessment. In contrast, in an engineering standards approach, the level of safety is not known, rather those design, construction and maintenance standards that have proven to be successful in the past, form the bases for decisionmaking. Standards usually increase if a standards based engineered facility fails, because failure of an engineered facility, represents to many, failure of engineering. In terms of standards-based approaches, the engineering profession is almost completely in control of the level of safety of engineered facilities. We use the term almost to indicate that engineering standards are not solely decided by engineers, the requirements of the courts, economics and public expectation also play a role. Unfortunately, there is no unified framework to integrate all of the components of the standards-based approach, and the engineering profession often finds itself trying to balance the often conflicting interests of owners, who pay the engineers fees and the public who would be affected by the failure of the facility. One consequence of this is the enormous legal liability carried by engineers, a liability that in many cases is rather more onerous than that associated with other professions that deal with matters of public safety. Conversely, risk-based methods involve acceptance of failure as an inevitable consequence of societys need for engineered facilities. Failure is permissible provided the risks (probability of failure x consequences) are tolerable. Risk based methods, when used for safety evaluations of existing facilities do not involve the concept of designing for failure, and many of the criticisms of risk-based engineering do not apply. Risk management techniques provide an integrated approach to safety decision-making and have the advantage that the engineer is not faced with B.III-53
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having to determine what is an appropriate level of safety, this is done by those policy makers who are responsible for these matters. The engineers perform the risk analysis, and provide a measure of how safe a facility is. How safe it needs to be is determined by the owner and the government body that represents the public (regulators). Engineers can provide various risk management related services in addition to analysing risk; they can even assist decision makers in developing decision analysis techniques and in choosing appropriate decision criteria, without being responsible for the actual decision. One of the most important knowledge base for the risk assessment and management is the hazard zoning; that specific step is structured by the interpretation and the possible framework of operational decision for the risk reduction and mitigation. The risk management aspect phase is typically under the influence of political and administrative approach; nevertheless fundamental should be the rules of scientist and experts of the scientific communities in order to define the priority of actions and mitigations strategies. One of the most important example of risk management comes from the experiences of Plans dExpsition aux Risqu (PER, DRM 1987), in France. PER instruments are integrated document, of spatial planning and urban standard, regulating, land use and territory development. Three possible prevention strategies are individuated: 1) increasing of social acceptable threshold risk; 2) mitigation of risk through structural action to hazard reduction; 3) mitigation of risk through non structural action to potential damage reduction; The total risk evaluation, (in terms expected annual cost of damage), permits to choose through different mitigations strategies with cost-benefit analysis. By every single cost of each action, a benefit in terms of risk reduction should be associated, expressed by the reduction of annual cost of landslide damage. In this view it is possible to define the minimum number of years in which the total cost could be amortized.
10.2.2 Increasing of social acceptable threshold risk

The increasing of social acceptable threshold risk could be obtained through the population information and responsibility. It is widely demonstrated that the awareness of tolerable risk thresholds are in general higher than the unconscious ones. It is possible to encourage a campaign of information in the highest risk areas, not only in the emergency phase, but also preventively , in order to let the population aware of risk. Instruments for that kind of campaign could be: a) use of mass media communication;
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b) diffusion of informative brochures that describe the kind of risk and the behaviour to assume in case of alarm and emergency; c) assemblies and meetings with administrations and stakeholders; d) installation of hazard signage; e) stipulation of insurance for damage coverage. The informative activities for the risk tolerance increasing is a very low-cost approach and could be adopted for large areas.
10.3 Acceptable and tolerable risk from landsliding

10.3.1 General issues
There is an implied level of acceptability and tolerability of landslide risks in every jurisdiction where slope instability poses a problem. Unfortunately, there is rarely, if ever, any indication of what this level of tolerable risk actually is. Landslide risk analysis can be carried out, albeit with difficulty, without the requirement to define what is tolerable whereas such a definition is required for landslide risk management. There have been a number of initiatives to define acceptable risks for engineered facilities, unfortunately few have been accepted by policy makers (the nuclear industry and hazardous chemical industries are the exceptions). There are several reasons why this is so. These include but are not limited to the following: 1. Apparent reluctance of policy makers to deal with the issues. 2. Apparent unreasonableness of court decisions concerning hazardous activities. 3. Apparently unreasonable public expectations. 4. Possibly an unreasonably high standard of duty of care assumed by some professional bodies responsible for public safety, or imposed on them by the courts. 5. Lack of suitable framework to deal with such complex decision making processes. 6. Apparent unwillingness of stakeholders to invest the time and resources necessary to develop a sound and logical process. 7. Shortage of suitably trained and experienced individuals and groups to develop the processes, even if the resources were available. 8. A prevailing attitude that the problem of developing rational methods of risk management is so enormous that it is a hopeless task which is simply not worth the effort. 9. Shortage of data necessary for precise estimates of probabilities. 10. Lack of engineering analysis tools developed for predicting failure, and so on. While Fell (1994), Hungr, Sobkowicz and Morgan (1993) and Morgan et al (1992) have discussed acceptable risk criteria for landsliding, there have been no acceptable risk criteria established for landslides established by a government authority, National or International Technical Society in the way that has been done for hazardous industries or other like dam. Some example of acceptable risk diagram as shown in the following figures:
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Starr (1999), according to statistical data on accidents and diseases, propose a standard level of acceptable specific risk of Rs=10-6 per year. Fell (1994) observes that public opinion seem to tolerate high levels of risk (Rs=10-210-4 per year) when voluntarily exposed to risk (e.g. road accidents, work or sport accidents) while when prone to unintentional risk (e.g. fires, natural hazards, engineering works collapse) it tolerates much lower levels (Rs=10-510-6 per year).
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For landslides developed in natural slopes, when the population is aware of risk, the tolerance is high, comparable with the tolerance of voluntary risk. In those situations Whitman (1984) indicates an acceptable specific risk of 10-2 per year. Fell (1994) estimates an acceptable specific risk of 10-2 per year, for damage to properties, and 10-3 for human life. In artificial slopes, the tolerable risk is like those for unintentional risk (Rs = 10-5 per year). This value, or slightly lower, should represent also the acceptable risk for landslides developed on reinforced slopes. A further consideration, associated to the concept of voluntary or unintentional risk, is the distinction between the acceptable specific risk of a single individual in a landslide hazardous area, and the acceptable specific risk of the whole population. For instance, according to the data provided by the Italian Ministry of Public work (Catenacci, 1992), the global probability of death caused by landslides in Italy, in the period 1945-1990, is about 106 per year per person. This is comparable with the acceptable unintentional specific risk thresholds. Nevertheless, in landslide areas, the population is exposed, almost consciously, to risk levels of some orders higher. Fell (1994) has proposed a scale of specific risk of damage to properties that can be used for interpreting the results of a risk zoning or to compare risk levels calculated for different scopes.
10.4 Treatment
At the end of the evaluation procedure, it is up to the client or policy makers to decide whether to accept the risk or not, or to decide that more detailed study is required. The landslide risk analyst can provide background data or normally acceptable limits as guidance to the decision maker, but as discussed above, should not be making the decision. Part of the specialist advice may be to identify the options and methods for treating the risk. Typical treatment options would include: Accept the risk; this would usually require the risk to be considered to be within the acceptable or tolerable range. Avoid the risk; this would require abandonment of the project, seeking an alternative site or form of development such that the revised risk would be acceptable or tolerable. Reduce the likelihood ; this would require stabilisation measures to control the initiating circumstances, such as re-profiling the surface geometry, groundwater drainage, anchors, stabilising structures or protective structures etc. After implementation, the risk should be acceptable or tolerable. Reduce the consequences ; this would require provision of defensive stabilisation measures, amelioration of the behaviour of the hazard or relocation of the development to a more favourable location to achieve an acceptable or tolerable risk. Monitoring and warning systems; in some situations monitoring (such as by regular site visits, or by survey), and the establishment of warning systems may be used to manage the risk on an interim or permanent basis. Monitoring and warning systems may be regarded as another means of reducing the consequences. B.III-57
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Transfer the risk; by requiring another authority to accept the risk or to compensate for the risk such as by insurance. Postpone the decision; if there is sufficient uncertainty, it may not be appropriate to make a decision on the data available. Further investigation or monitoring would be required to provide data for better evaluation of the risk.
10.4.1 Risk mitigation through structural action and measures

The landslide probability occurrence (hazard) in certain risk area should be minimized through the following structural action: a) reduction of the triggering factors (previous mentioned in chapther 4 and 5), for example by land use reclamations and hydrological and geological environmental restoration work, or through rationalisation of land use and agricultural activities; b) direct intervention on actives landslides in order to prevent remobilisation and control the evolution. This is possible by means of stabilisation works. These can be designed to reduce the mobilisation forces (slope reprofiling, detachment of unstable blocks) or increase resistant forces (i.e. drainage, chemical and physical treatment, concrete injection, walls, nails, anchors, bolts, piling) Structural actions and measures have often high costs and are usually adopted for the risk mitigation of unstable slope where other strategies cannot be promoted (i.e. urban areas, Cultural Heritage, strategic structures).
10.4.2 Risk mitigation with non-structural action and measures

The non-structural actions are oriented to the reduction of the potential damage. This can be done by acting on the elements at risk an their vulnerability. The reduction of the worth and importance of the elements at risk have to be assessed during the spatial planning activities. The action of reducing value of the element at risk can be summarised in: a) transfer of the element at risk from landslide prone areas to stable areas (delocalisation); b) limitation of urban expansion (restrains and limits); c) land use definition of unstable areas; The vulnerability should be reduced through the implementation of technical measures or restrains according to the social characterisation of the territory. Some actions are summarised below: a) reinforcement of buildings with reduction of the potential damage; b) implementation of mitigation measures (stabilising structures or protective structures i.e. anchors, rails, tunnels, trenches), in order to prevent or reduce the possibility that the element at risk could be affected by a landslide; with no constrain for the occurrences and magnitude of the event;
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c) d)
setting up of monitoring systems and early warning systems to reduce potential losses (human lives and goods) organisation of prevention, emergency and recovery plans, in order to reduce the effects and damage.
The non-structural actions and measures are more flexible than structural measures; in addition, the former usually have lower costs. This kind of measures are strongly recommended in high landslide risk areas.
10.5 Public Awareness, Education and Capacity Building

Before individuals and communities can reduce their risk from landslide hazards, they need to know the nature of the threat, its potential impact on them and their community, their options for reducing the risk or impact, and how to carry out specific mitigation measures. Achieving widespread public awareness of landslides hazards will enable communities and individuals to make informed decisions on where to live, where to purchase property, or locate a business. Local decisions and critical facilities to reduce the potential damage from landslides hazard are: Develop public awareness, training, and education programs involving land-use planning, design, landslide hazard curricula, landslide hazard safety programs, and community risk reduction; Evaluate the effectiveness of different methods, messages, and curricula in the context of local needs; Disseminate landslide hazard related curricula and training modules to community organizations, universities, and professionals societies and associations.
10.6 Emergency Preparedness Plan

A landslide usually occur without warning. The energy of a landslide mass moving down a slope can devastate anything in its path. The emergency prepardeness plan are generally structured in this form: 1. Before landslide occur; 2. During disaster event; 3. After the event. Two simple example of preparedness plan developed by the F.E.M.A. is reported below.
10.6.1 Before the Landslide

You can reduce the potential impacts of land movement by taking steps to remove yourself from harm's way. Assume that burn areas and canyon, hillside, mountain and other steep areas are vulnerable to landslides and mudslides. Build away from steep slopes. Build away from the bottoms or mouths of steep ravines and drainage facilities. Consult with a soil engineer or an engineering geologist to minimize the potential impacts of landslides. Develop a family plan that includes: Out-of-state contact Place to reunite if family members are separated B.III-59
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Routes to evacuate Locations of utility shut-offs
Store the following emergency supplies: Food Water First aid kit Flashlights and batteries Battery-operated radios Special medications/eye care products Store an evacuation kit that includes: Cash (small bills and change) Important documents (Birth certificates, insurance policies, marriage certificates, mortgage documents) Irreplaceable objects Games, toys for children Purchase supplies to protect your home: Hammer Nails Plywood Rain gauge Sand Sandbags Shovel Limit the height of plants near buildings to 18 inches. Use fire-retardant plants and bushes to replace chaparral and highly combustible vegetation. Water landscape to promote early growth. Eliminate litter and dead and dry vegetation. Inspect slopes for increases in cracks, holes and other changes. Contact your local public works department for information on protection measures.
10.6.2 When it Rains

Monitor the amount of rain during intense storms. More than three to four inches of rain per day, or 1/2-inch per hour, have been known to trigger mudslides or debris flows. Look for geological changes near your home: New springs Cracked snow, ice, soil or rocks Bulging slopes New holes or bare spots on hillsides Tilted trees Muddy waters Listen to the radio or watch television for information and instructions from local officials. Prepare to evacuate if requested to do so. Respect the power of the potential mudslide. Remember, mudslides move quickly, can cause damage and kill. Prioritize protection measures: Make your health and safety and that of family members the number one priority. Make your home the number two priority. B.III-60
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Make pools, spas, patios and other elements the next priority.
Implement protection measures when necessary: Place sandbags Board up windows and doors
10.6.3 Key Considerations

Use permanent measures, rather than sandbags, if possible. Deflect, rather than stop or dam debris. Use solutions that do not create problems for your neighbours.
10.6.4 What Can You Do If You Live Near Steep Hills

10.6.4.1 Prior to Intense Storms:
1. Become familiar with the land around you. Learn whether debris flows have occurred in your area by contacting local officials, State geological surveys, or departments of natural resources, and university departments of geology. Slopes where debris flows have occurred in the past are likely to experience them in the future. 2. Support your local government in efforts to develop and enforce land-use and building ordinances that regulate construction in areas susceptible to landslides and debris flows. Buildings should be located away from steep slopes, streams and rivers, intermittent-stream channels, and the mouths of mountain channels. 3. Watch the patterns of storm-water drainage on slopes near your home, and note especially the places where runoff water converges, increasing flow over soil-covered slopes. Watch the hillsides around your home for any signs of land movement, such as small landslides or debris flows or progressively tilting trees. 4. Contact your local authorities to learn about the emergency-response and evacuation plans for your area and develop your own emergency plans for your family and business.
10.6.4.2 During Intense Storms:

1. Stay alert and stay awake! Many debris-flow fatalities occur when people are sleeping. Listen to a radio for warnings of intense rainfall. Be aware that intense short bursts of rain may be particularly dangerous, especially after longer periods of heavy rainfall and damp weather. 2. If you are in areas susceptible to landslides and debris flows, consider leaving if it is safe to do so. Remember that driving during an intense storm is hazardous. 3. Listen for any unusual sounds that might indicate moving debris, such as trees cracking or boulders knocking together. A trickle of flowing or falling mud or debris may precede larger flows. If you are near a stream or channel, be alert for any sudden increase or decrease in water flow and for a change from clear to muddy water. Such changes may indicate debris flow activity upstream, so B.III-61
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be prepared to move quickly. Dont delay! Save yourself, not your belongings. 4. Be especially alert when driving. Embankments along roadsides are particularly susceptible to landslides. Watch the road for collapsed pavement, mud, fallen rocks, and other indications of possible debris flows.
10.6.5 After the Disaster

Stay away from the slide area as there may be additional danger from further slides or flows; Check for injured or trapped victims and give first aid if you're trained; Check on neighbours, especially elderly or special needs victims; Listen to radio or television for emergency information; Flooding can occur after a mudflow or landslide; Check for damaged utility lines, building foundations and surrounding damage; Replant damaged areas as soon as possible since erosion can cause addition flooding and slides; Have the area inspected by geo-technical experts to evaluate the area for additional risks.
10.7 The Phases of emergency Plan (planning, response, recovery)

10.7.1 Emergency Phases
Emergency management activities are often conducted within three generally defined phases. However, because each disaster is unique, individual disasters may not include all indicated phases: Planning; Response; Recovery.
10.7.2 Planning Phase

The planning phase involves activities that are undertaken in advance of an emergency or disaster. These activities assess threats, develop operational capabilities and design effective responses to potential incidents. Planning activities include: o o o o o o o Completing hazard analyses; Designing and implementing hazard mitigation projects consistent with the hazard analyses; Developing and maintaining emergency plans and procedures; Developing mutual aid agreements; Conducting general and specialized training; Conducting exercises; Improving emergency public education and warning systems. B.III-62
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10.7.3 Response Phase

The response phase includes increased readiness, initial and extended response activities upon receipt of a warning or the observation that an emergency situation is imminent or likely to occur. Incidents that may trigger increased readiness activities include: Receipt of a flood advisory or other special weather statement; Conditions conducive to wild land fires, such as the combination of high heat, strong winds, and low humidity; A hazardous materials incident; Information or circumstances indicating the potential for acts of violence or civil disturbance. Increased readiness activities may include, but are not limited to the following: Increasing public information efforts; Accelerating training efforts; Inspecting critical facilities and equipment, including testing warning and communications systems; Warning threatened areas of the population; Conducting precautionary evacuations in potentially impacted areas; Mobilizing personnel and pre-positioning resources and equipment.
10.7.3.1 Initial Response

The Countys initial response activities are primarily performed at the field response level. Emphasis is placed on minimizing the effects of the emergency or disaster. Support and coordination activities take place in the Emergency Management Center with operational links to field response units. Examples of initial response activities include: Making all necessary notifications, including County departments and personnel, local cities; Disseminating warnings, emergency public information, and instructions to the citizens of Santa Cruz County; Declaration of a local emergency; Conducting evacuations and/or rescue operations; Caring for displaced persons and treating the injured; Road clearing, debris removal, flood fight Conducting initial damage assessments and surveys; Assessing need for mutual aid assistance; Restricting movement of traffic/people and unnecessary access to affected areas; Developing and implementing Initial Action Plans; Securing incident sites Conducting search and rescue operations; Fire suppression.
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10.7.3.2 Extended Response

Extended response operations involve the coordination and management of resources and information necessary to facilitate the transition to recovery. Although not a specific action, but rather an evolutionary transition in the response timeline, extended operations generally begin 72 hours after the initial disaster incident. Examples of extended response activities include: Coordination with state and federal agencies working within the local agencies; Preparing initial damage assessments; Operating mass care facilities; Conducting coroner operations, Procuring, allocating and monitoring resources required to sustain operations; Coordinating mutual aide resources; Restoring essential services; Initiating advance planning activities; Documenting expenditures; Developing and implementing Action Plans for extended operation; and Disseminating emergency public information.
10.8 Recovery Phase

Recovery activities involve the restoration of the affected area(s) to preemergency conditions. Recovery activities may be both short-term and long-term, ranging from restoration of essential utilities such as water and power, to implementation of mitigation measures designed to minimize the impact of future occurrences of a given threat. Examples of recovery activities include: Restoring utilities and infrastructure; Reinstating autonomy for displaced persons Reconstruction of damaged property; Conducting residual hazard analyses; Coordination of Federal, State, public and private assistance; Determining and recovering costs associated with response and recovery.

Absolute Risk: Pure risk without the mitigating effects of Internal Controls. See also Managed Risk. Acceptable Risk A risk for which, for the purposes of life or work, we are prepared to accept as it is with no regard to its management. Society does not generally consider expenditure in further reducing such risks justifiable. Aleatoric Probability: Relating to the uncertain outcome of an event (such as the role of a die) in a generally predictable distribution; also known as pure chance.
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Assurance: A system of Corporate Governance that provides feedback on the efficiency and effectiveness of operations, compliance with laws and regulations, and accuracy and reliability of financial information. Both Internal Audit and Risk Management are part of the assurance process. Avoiding Risk: A Risk Management technique of redesigning the task to deal with a different set of risks (usually lower). Not to be confused with Eliminating Risk. Behavioral Risk Assessment: The assessment of Risk to an organization as a result of examining its culture, structure, employee attitudes, and mechanisms to relieve employees of stress. Chief Risk Manager: The manager or executive who reports to senior management on the organization's risk exposures and alternative management actions required to deal with them. conditional analysis: technique, based on Bayes theorem (Morgan, 1968), according to which frequency data (such as landsliding area or number of landslides) can be used to calculate probabilities that depend on knowledge of previous events. Containment: The Risk Management strategy that attempts to limit the negative Consequences of a Risk Event. This strategy can include Internal Controls and/or Contingency Planning. Consequence The outcomes or potential outcomes arising from the occurrence of a landslide expressed qualitatively or quantitatively, in terms of loss, disadvantage or gain, damage, injury or loss of life. Control: That functional part of a system that provides Feedback on how the system is accomplishing its purpose or objectives. See Internal Control. Control Framework: A Model or recognized System of Control categories that covers all internal controls expected in an organization. Control frameworks include COSO, CoCo, Cadbury, and the like. See also, Risk Frameworks. Control and Risk Self Assessment: Abbreviated CRSA . See Control Self Assessment. Control Self-Assessment: Abbreviated CSA. A class of techniques used in an audit or in place of an audit to assess risk and control strength and weaknesses against a Control Framework. The "self" assessment refers to the involvement of management and staff in the assessment process, often facilitated by internal auditors. CSA techniques can include workshop/seminars, Focus Groups , Structured Interviews , and survey questionnaires. Control Risk: The tendency of the Internal Control system to lose effectiveness over time and to expose, or fail to prevent exposure of, the assets under control. Cost/Benefit Analysis: A Risk Management tool used to make decisions about Accepting Risk or using some other risk management technique. discriminant analysis: a multivariate statistical method aimed at maximizing the distance (separation ) between two or more predefined groups of objects on the basis of a linear combination (discriminant function) of a set of known variables (discriminating variables). drainage-divide networks: streamlines and corresponding watersheds usually automatically derived form a DTM.
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DTM (digital terrain model) or DEM (digital elevation model): any digital representation of the continuous variation of ground relief over space. Elements at Risk Meaning the population, buildings and engineering works, economic activities, public services utilities, infrastructure and environmental features in the area potentially affected by landslides. Expected Loss or Expected Value Approach: The evaluation of Risk based on the dollar variation that results as a Consequence to the risky Events. Exposure: The susceptibility to loss, perception of Risk , or a Threat to an asset or asset-producing process, usually quantified in dollars. An exposure is the total dollars at risk without regard to the probability of a negative event. A measure of importance. Exposure Approach: The approach to Risk Assessment from the perspective of the four classes of assets (physical, financial, human, intangible) and their size, type, portability, and location. factor: any characteristics, natural or man-induced, of the environment which is directly or indirectly related to the causes of landsliding in a given region. Frequency A measure of likelihood expressed as the number of occurrences of an event in a given time. See also Likelihood and Probability. Global Risks: External or Environment risks that are outside of the immediate political or government regulatory risk boundaries. Hazard A condition with the potential for causing an undesirable consequence (the landslide). The description of landslide hazard should include the location, volume (or area), classification and velocity of the potential landslides and any resultant detached material, and the likelihood of their occurrence within a given period of time. heuristic (model): a method of solving a problem in which several approaches are attempted and progresses toward a solution are evaluated after each attempt. Individual Risk The risk of fatality or injury to any identifiable (named) individual who lives within the zone impacted by the landslide; or who follows a particular pattern of life that might subject him or her to the consequences of the landslide. Insurance: A contract to finance the cost of risk. Should a named risk event (loss) occur, the insurance contract will pay the holder the contractual amount. See Risk Financing. Integrated Risk Management: The consideration of Risk at all levels of the organization, from the Strategic to the day-to-day job of the customerfacing employee. Integrating risk management into internal auditing means adopting Risk-Based Auditing and using risk management tools to plan internal audits. landslide hazard zonation: the division of the land surface into homogeneous areas or domains and their ranking according to different degrees of hazard due to mass-movement (see Varnes et al. , 1984). landslide hazard: the probability of occurrence within a specific period of time and within a given area of a potentially damaging landslide (see Varnes et al., 1984.
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Landslide Intensity A set of spatially distributed parameters related to the destructive power of a landslide. The parameters may be described quantitatively or qualitatively and may include maximum movement velocity, total displacement, differential displacement, depth of the moving mass, peak discharge per unit width, kinetic energy per unit area. landslide inventory: the systematic mapping, through various techniques (i.e., field surveys, aerial-photointerpretation, site measurements, historical records, etc.) of past and recent landslides in a region. landslide susceptibility (or propensity): an estimate of the slopeinstability conditions of a region mainly based on the qualitative judgment of the investigator. Likelihood used as a qualitative description of probability or frequency. logistic regression analysis: a multivariate statistical method aimed at estimating the probability of a dichotomous outcome variable on the basis of a set of independent, variables measured in any scale. The model assumes the form: Pr(event) = 1/(1 + exp(-(B0 + B1*X1 + B2*X2 + ...... + Bm*Xm))). Long-Term: The planning or Time Horizon that deals with events beyond the Short-Term and Mid Term, typically from two to twenty years, though most often two to five or seven years. Loss: A negative outcome. Matrix Approach: In Risk Assessment, an approach that matches system components with risks, threats or controls with the object of measuring and examining the combinations of the two axes. Mean: The average value in a distribution. Median: The value in a distribution where 50% of the distribution values are greater than or less than the median value. Mode: A measure of statistical central tendency that notes the most frequent value in the distribution of values. The mode is also the peak (highest) value of the curve. See Normal Curve. m o d e l : a mathematical or physical system, obeying certain specific conditions, whose behavior is used to understand a physical (or biological or social) system to which is in some way analogous multiple regression analysis: a multivariate statistical method aimed at estimating a (dependent) variable on the basis of a linear combination of a set of known (independent) variables. multivariate model: a model which aims to predict or explain the behavior of a dependent variable on the basis of a set of known independent variables. Planning Risk: The risk that the planning process is flawed. In Risk Assessment , it is the risk that the assessment process is inappropriate or improperly implemented. predictive (model): a statistical or heuristic model which aims to forecast the occurrence in space or time of an event on the basis of the values of a set of variables or factors. Probability The likelihood of a specific outcome, measured by the ratio of specific outcomes to the total number of possible outcomes. Probability is expressed as a number between 0 and 1, with 0 indicating an impossible outcome, and 1 indicating that an outcome is certain. B.III-67
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raster (structure): an array of cells (pixel) referenced by a raw and column number; each cell is independently addressed with the value of an attribute; it is one of the fundamental ways of representing and storing spatial data (see vector structure). Residual Risk: The remaining Risk after Risk Management techniques have been applied. Risk A measure of the probability and severity of an adverse effect to health, property or the environment. Risk is often estimated by the product of probability x consequences. However, a more general interpretation of risk involves a comparison of the probability and consequences in a nonproduct form. Risk Analysis The use of available information to estimate the risk to individuals or populations, property, or the environment, from hazards. Risk analyses generally contain the following steps: scope definition, hazard identification, and risk estimation. Risk Estimation The process used to produce a measure of the level of health, property, or environmental risks being analysed. Risk estimation contains the following steps: frequency analysis, consequence analysis, and their integration. Risk Evaluation The stage at which values and judgements enter the decision process, explicitly or implicitly, by including consideration of the importance of the estimated risks and the associated social, environmental, and economic consequences, in order to identify a range of alternatives for managing the risks. Risk Assessment The process of risk analysis and risk evaluation. Risk Control or Risk Treatment The process of decision making for managing risk, and the implementation, or enforcement of risk mitigation measures and the re-evaluation of its effectiveness from time to time, using the results of risk assessment as one input. Risk Management The complete process of risk assessment and risk control (or risk treatment). Risk Prioritization: The relation of acceptable levels of risks among alternatives. See also Risk Ranking. Risk Ranking: The ordinal or cardinal rank prioritization of the risks in various alternatives, projects or units. Risk Reduction: Application of Risk Management principles to reduce the Likelihood or Consequences of an Event, or both. Risk Response: Management's decisions and actions when risks are revealed. See also Risk Management. Risk Retention: Intentional (or unintentional) retaining the responsibility for loss or Risk Financing within the organization. Risk Scenarios: A method of identifying and classifying risks through creative application of Probabilistic events and their Consequences. Typically a Brainstorming or other creative technique is used to stimulate "what might happen." See also Threat Scenarios. Risk Transfer: Shifting the responsibility or Risk Financing burden to another party. Risk Treatment: Another term for Risk Management. sampling unit: terrain-unit treated as a case in any statistical analysis. B.III-68
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slope-unit: the right or left side of a sub-basin of any order into which a watershed can be partitioned, usually by means of a computer algorithm which enables the automatic detection of stream lines and related divides (see drainage-divide networks). Scenario-Building (Scenario Building): The exercise of developing Scenarios. Scenario Planning: The use of Scenarios in (usually) Strategic Planning. Scenario Plots: Various standard forms of organizing the Scenario-Building process. Typical plots are: Winners and Losers (either/or), Lone Ranger (us against them), Challenge and Response (both/and), Good News/Bad News (worst thing), Tectonic Change (structural alteration), etc. Scenarios: Narrative descriptions of assumptions, risks and environmental factors and how they may affect operations. Scenarios attempt to explore the effect of changing several variables at once with objective analysis and subjective interpretations. See also Risk Scenarios and Threat Scenarios. Societal Risk The risk of multiple fatalities or injuries in society as a whole: one where society would have to carry the burden of a landslide causing a number of deaths, injuries, financial, environmental, and other losses. Specific Risk: The type of risk that is found in specific activities. The level of this risk is expected to vary from activity to activity, even though all activities may have it. Strategic Planning: Long-term plans based on the organizations overall business objectives. Strategic plans are typically multiple years and reach out 5 or 10 years (or more) using Scenarios or other planning methods that identifies Assumptions, Risks, and Environmental factors. Temporal Probability The probability that the element at risk is in the area affected by the land sliding, at the time of the landslide. terrain-unit (or mapping unit or homogeneous domain): that portion of land surface which contains a set of ground conditions which differ from the adjacent units across definable boundaries (Hansen, 1984). By definition, the terrain-unit must be mappable at effective cost over the entire region through criteria which are as objective as possible. TIN (triangulated irregular network): a relief representation consisting of a continuous set of connected triangular facets based on a Dalauny triangulation of irregularly spaced nodes or elevation points. Tolerable Risk A risk that society is willing to live with so as to secure certain net benefits in the confidence that it is being properly controlled, kept under review and further reduced as and when possible. In some situations risk may be tolerated because the individuals at risk cannot afford to reduce risk even though they recognise it is not properly controlled. Transfer Risk: A Risk Management technique to remove risk from one area to another or one party to another. Insurance transfers risk of financial loss from insured to insurer. Partial transfers are known as Sharing Risk. Triggers: In planning, these are external decisions or events that create the need (or perecption) that a project must be planned. uncertainty (certainty): the estimated amount by which an observed or calculated value may depart from the true value.
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union (of sets): a set consisting of those elements which are members of at least one set in a given family of sets. unique-condition unit: terrain-unit obtained by the sequential overlay of a set of base maps portraying slope-instability factors (Chung et al. , 1995). vector (structure): a set of graphic data that can be ultimately decomposed into point locations described by generally absolute coordinates; it may include points, lines (a set of related points) and areas (a line or set of lines defining a polygon); it is one of the fundamental ways of representing and storing spatial data (see raster structure). Vulnerability: The degree of loss to a given element or set of elements within the area affected by the landslide hazard. It is expressed on a scale of 0 (no loss) to 1 (total loss). For property, the loss will be the value of the damage relative to the value of the property; for persons, it will be the probability that a particular life (the element at risk) will be lost, given the person(s) is affected by the landslide.
12 Bibliography
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Varnes D.J. & IAEG Commission on Landslides (1984). Landslides Hazard Zonation a review of principles and practice. UNESCO, Paris, 63 pp. Vecchia O. (1978) - A simple terrain indexfor the stability of hillsides or scarps. In: J.D. Geddes (ed.) Large Ground Movements and Structures. J.Wiley & Sons, New York, 446-461. Verstappen H.T. (1983). Applied Geomorphology: Geomorphological Survey for Environmental Development. Elsevier, Amsterdam. Viberg L. (1984). Landslide risk mapping in soft clay in Scandinavia and Canada. Proc. 4th Int. Symp. on Landslides, Toronto, 1, 325-348. Voellmy A. (1955). ber die Zerstrungskraft von Lawinen. Sweiz Bauzeitung, 73, 159-165, 212-217, 246-249, 280-285. Voight B. (1988). Material science law applied to time forecast of slope failure. Landslide News, 3, 8-11. Wadge G. (1988). The potential of GIS modelling of gravity flows and slope instabilities. Int. Journal of Geographical Information systems 2, 143152. Ward T.S. (1976) - Factor of safety approach to landslide potential delineation. PhD Dissertation, Department of Civil engineering, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colorado (USA). Wieczorek G.F (1984). Preparing a detailed landslide-inventory map for hazard evaluation and reduction. Bull. IAEG, 21 (3), 337-342. Wieczorek G.F. (1987). Effect of rainfall intensity and duration on debris flows in central Santa Cruz Mountains, California. In: Costa J.E., Wieczorek G.F. (Eds.) Debris flows/Avalanches: process, Recognition and Mitigation. Reviews in Engineering Geology, vol. VII. Geological Society of America, Boulder, CO, 93-104. Wieczorek G.F. & Sarmiento J. (1988) - Rainfall, piezometric levels and debris flows near La Honda, California, in storms between 1975 and 1983. In: Landslides, floods and marine effects of the storm of Jan 35, 1982, in the S.Francisco Bay region, California. USGS Prof. Papers., 1434, 43-63. Wieczorek G.F., Gori P.L., Jager S., Kappel W.M., Negussey D. (1996). Assessment and management of landslide hazards near Tully Valley landslide, Syracuse, New York, USA. Proc. 7th Int. Symp. On Landslides, Trondheim, June 1996, 1, 411-416. Whitman R.V. (1984). Evaluating calculated risk in geotechnical engineering. ASCE Journal of Geotechnical Engineering, 110(2); 145188. Wilson R.C., Wieczorek G.F. (1995). Rainfall threshold for the initiation of debris flows at La Honda, California. Environmental and Engineering Geoscience, 1 (1), 11-27. Wong H.N., Ho K.K.S., Chan Y.C. (1997). Assessment of consequence of landslides. In: Cruden D, Fell R. (Eds.), Landslide Risk Assessment. Balkema, Rotterdam, 111-149. WP/WLI-International Geotechnical Societies UNESCO Working Party on World Landslide Inventory (1990). A suggested method for reporting a landslide. IAEG Bull., 41, 5-12. WP/WLI-International Geotechnical Societies UNESCO Working Party on World Landslide Inventory (1991). A suggested method for a landslide summary. IAEG Bull., 43, 101-110.
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WP/WLI-International Geotechnical Societies UNESCO Working Party on World Landslide Inventory (1993). A suggested method for describing the activity of a landslide. IAEG Bull., 47, 53-57. WP/WLI-International Geotechnical Societies UNESCO Working Party on World Landslide Inventory (1994). Multilingual glossary for landslides. Wright R.H. & Nilsen T.H. (1974). Isopleth map of landslide deposits, Southern San Francisco Bay Region, California. US Geol. Surv. Misc. Field Studies Map, MF-550. Wright R.H., Campbell R.H., Nilsen T.H. (1974). Preparation and use of isopleth maps of landslide deposits. Geological Society of America. Geology, 2, 483-485. Wu T.H., Tang W.H., Einstein H.H. (1996). Landslide hazard and risk assessment. In: Turner A.K. & Schuster R.L. (Eds.) Landslides: Investigation and Mitigation. Transportation Research Board Special Report 247. National Academy Press, WA, 106-120. Yin K.L. & Yan T.Z. (1988). Statistical prediction model for slope instability of metamorphosed rocks. Proc. 5th Int. Symp. on Landslides, Lausanne, 2, 1269-1272. Yong R.N., Alonso E., Tabba M.M., Fransham P.B. (1977). Application of risk analysis to the prediction of slope instability. Canadian Geotechnical Journal, 14 (4), 540-543. Yoshimatsu H. (1991). Study of the mechanics of debris flow and its simulation model. Journal of Japan Landslide Society, 28-2. Zika et alii (1988) - Proc. 5th Int. Symp. on Landslides, Lausanne, 1, 3-36 Zimmerman M., Bichsel M., Kienholz H. (1986). Mountain hazards mapping in the Khumbu Himal, Nepal, with prototype map, scale 1:50.000. Mountain Research and Development, 6 (1), 29-40.
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13 Appendix: Operational Standards for Risk Assessment aimed at Spatial Planning

13.1 Minimum standard (simplified model) for hazard mapping aimed at a legal directive
The simplified model for landslide hazard mapping should follow, implicitly, the definition of landslide hazard: Probability that a landslide, with a given typology, intensity and return time, may occur in a specified area. An exhaustive landslide hazard assessment, as consequence of the above postulates, considers the fulfilment of the following issues: Typological prediction: landslide type or types that may occur; Spatial prediction: where a landslide may occur; Intensity prediction: landslide dimension or magnitude (area, volume, velocity, energy); Temporal prediction: when a landslide may occur; Evolution prediction: landslide run-out, retrogression limits, lateral expansion.
13.1.1 Various methodologies related to the 3 assumed scales of analysis in the light of a potential harmonisation of hazard maps, based on a multi-hazard perspective
The methods that can be adopted to identify landslide hazard are strictly depending on the scales of investigation and mapping, extension of the study area, as well as on availability, typology and format of data. Generally, three different approaches can be used according to scales of analysis and representation of landslide hazard maps: o Susceptibility approach: usually developed at regional/national scales (> 1:50.000), where areas prone to landslide occurrence are depicted in discrete and qualitative categories, without any specification on landslide probability of occurrence and potential causes of the events. This approach is generally based on low but homogeneous data on landslide preparatory factors such as a general inventory of landslides, geology, geomorphology, land-use, climatic setting. Hazard approach: developed at local scale (1:2.000 1:10.000), where landslide probability/return time is provided. Legends may describe landslide types, landslide intensity, landslide activity, actual and/or potential spatial extent of phenomena, potential triggering causes. This approach need a large amount of data (i.e. geology, lithology, structural setting, historical information, accurate landslide inventory maps) and multi-discipline tasks. Site Engineering approach: developed at site scale (1:100 1:1.000). Maps and legends describe carefully landslide or potentially unstable areas, mostly through the calculation of the Safety Factor of slopes. B.III-92
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They need very detailed data, especially geotechnical parameters, for implementing 2D or 3D slope stability modelling.
Geomorpholo gical l
Combination or overlay of Logical analytical methods
Qualitativ e
Index or Parameter
Hazard
Statistical analysis
Bivariate
Multivariate Deterministi c h Probabilistic approaches
Quantitati ve
Geotechnical engineering approach
Neural Network l i
Figure 1: List of landslide hazard methodological approaches
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According to landslide hazard zoning scales and spatial planning scales, the following table has been developed (Table 1).
MAP SCALE (SPATIAL PLANNING) MAP SCALE (LANDSLIDE HAZARD) Site-specific scale (< 1:1,000) CHARACTERIST ICS / USE Absolute Hazard (classes, SF) related to specific triggering factors. Implementation and design landslide hazard and risk mitigation projects. Absolute hazard and/or relative hazard according to landslide types. Large engineering structures, roads, urban areas, soil protection (detailed studies). DATA ACQUISITION MAPPING PROCEDURES Slope stability modeling parameters (i.e. stratigraphy, geotechnical properties, hydrological data, seismic input). Data collection should support the production of detailed multi-temporal landslide distribution maps and provide information about the various parameters required in the adopted methodology. Detailed data of individual factors (i.e. landslide inventory, lithology, structural setting), mostly derived by remote sensing techniques and literature (homogeneous terrain units). National summary of regional landslide inventories and map products. HAZARD METHODOLOGY Deterministic approaches geotechnical modeling). LEGEND
(i.e.
Hazard classes expressed as failure probability (affected area, return time, intensity) or SF range. Relative hazard as qualitative scales that depict spatial and/or temporal probability of occurrence (i.e. low, medium, high, very high). Rarely, (1) hazard as landslide probability (affected area, return time, intensity) or SF range. Relative hazard as qualitative scales that depict spatial and/or temporal probability of occurrence (i.e. low, medium, high, very high).
Local scale (< 1:5,000)
Local scale (1:1,000 1:10,000)
Deterministic approaches (i.e. geotechnical modeling coupled with hydrological analysis). Statistical modeling. Geomorphological approach. Indexed maps. Hazard maps when geomorphic, geologic conditions and landslide types, are homogeneous (1). Statistical modeling. Geomorphological approach based on a detailed landslide inventory. Indexed maps. Hazard maps (1).
Local scale (1:5,000 1:50,000)
Regional scale (1:10,000 1:50,000)
Relative hazard or susceptibility maps (mediumlow detail). Large projects (feasibility studies) or regional developments.
Regional/ Strategic scale (> 1:50,000)
National scale (> 1:50,000)
General inventory of landslide areas or susceptibility maps with low level of detail. National policy makers and the general public.
Susceptibility maps derived from geomorphological approach. Indexed maps. Descriptive statistical analysis.
Relative hazard as qualitative scales that depict spatial probability of occurrence according to expert judgment (i.e. low, medium, high, very high).
Table 1: Summary of landslide hazard mapping vs. scales
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Landslide Hazard Mapping Site Specific Scale (< 1:1.000) The site specific scale provide absolute hazard classes and variable safety factor related to specific triggering factors, such as rainfall, seismicity, human-induced. All data are related to slope stability modelling parameters (i.e. stratigraphical setting, shear strength values, hydrological data, seismic input). Generally, geotechnical engineering approaches (i.e. deterministic and or probabilistic modelling) are implemented. Hazard classes (legends) are expressed as failure probability, that may not be referred to return time of landslides, or safety factor (SF) range. The maps are used for the implementation and design of landslide hazard and risk mitigation projects (Fig. 2).
Figure 2: Landslide site specific analysis: from safety factor calculation to landslide mitigation strategies (example of Civita di Bagnoregio reinforcement works)
Landslide Hazard Mapping Local Scale (1:1.000 1:10.000) Generally, a relative hazard is provided in qualitative scales that depict spatial and/or temporal probability of occurrence (i.e. low, medium, high, very high). Rarely, when the study area is homogeneous as geological, morphological, climatic setting and landslide types are mostly superficial, a hazard analysis is possible, expressed as landslide probability (affected area, return time, intensity) or safety factor range (Fig. 3). According to data availability, qualitative approaches (i.e. geomorphological) and quantitative methods (i.e. geotechnical, statistical) can be adopted for analysis. This scale of analysis is usually addressed for large engineering structures, roads, urban areas, soil protection (detailed studies).
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Figure 3: Local scale analysis: example of landslide hazard analysis through a geotechnical approach (SF range) (Map 1) and a multivariate statistical analysis (relative hazard) (Map 2) Source: Delmonaco et al. (2001, 2003).
Landslide Hazard Mapping Regional Scale ( 1:10.000 1:50.000) At regional scale, landslide relative hazard or susceptibility analysis can be carried out. The investigation may cover quite large areas with medium-low data resolution. Usually, data on individual factors are collected (i.e. landslide inventory, lithology, land use) mostly derived by remote sensing techniques and literature. The approaches can be different, mostly statistical and geomorphological. A relative hazard is provided in qualitative scales that depict a spatial probability of occurrence mostly based on a subjective judgement of experts. These maps are generally used for large projects (feasibility studies) or regional developments.
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Figure 4: Regional scale analysis: example of landslide hazard analysis through a geomorphological approach (relative hazard) starting from aerial photo interpretation. Source: ESA, project SLAM 2, 2002.
Landslide Hazard Mapping National Scale ( > 1:50.000) At national scale a relative hazard is provided in qualitative scales that express a spatial probability of occurrence according to expert judgement. Another approach is to depict a general inventory on landslide areas. The investigation usually covers very large areas with low-very low data resolution. Usually, data on individual factors are collected (i.e. landslide inventory, lithology, land use) mostly derived by bibliography, and analysed through statistical descriptive or heuristic approaches. A relative hazard is provided in qualitative scales that depict a spatial probability of occurrence mostly based on a subjective judgement of experts. The maps are generally used for national policy makers and the general public.
Figure 5: National scale analysis: example of landslide susceptibility analysis; Source: USGS
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13.2 Minimum standard (simplified model) for risk mapping aimed at spatial planning
13.2.1 Multi-risk assessment perspective as element of the Strategic Environmental Assessment
The main purpose of a multi-risk mapping is to put together in one map the various hazard-related information on a study area to provide a general scenario of the natural hazards of varying magnitude, frequency, area. Many natural hazards can be caused by the same natural event (i.e. heavy rainfall inducing floods and fast-moving landslides), so that to depict a multiple hazard map is mainly possible for hazards that can be related to similar triggering mechanisms. Apart from the actual capability to produce reliable multi-hazard maps, that are very rare in the scientific literature or, when existing, very general, the adoption of a multiple hazard strategy is fundamental for assessing integrated vulnerability and risk, that maybe represent the right key to solve the problem of multiple hazard and spatial planning. A multiple risk perspective, rather than a multi-hazard perspective, could be the proper way to cope with different potential hazards affecting a specified area, towards the integrated development planning process. Failure to consider all of the natural hazards in the development planning process and to provide for their reduction will result eventually in the loss of lives, bodily injuries, property damage, critical facility failures and disruption of important economic activities. Depending upon the size of the event, its location and its effects, the actual impact of the hazard can be catastrophic and disastrous. As a general rule, considering hazard mapping related to land use and spatial planning, the approaches at the local level consist of general plans, zoning regulations, and subdivision regulations. Mapping, even at small scale (1:50.000), can be useful to a community in helping shape its general plan for future development. Major areas of potential instability can be identified as needing special investigation or, in some instances, designated for open space use. In extreme conditions, general plans may propose cluster development in which construction is limited to stable areas and unstable areas serve as open space attend to the development. The creative use of geological hazard information in preparing general plans, however, depends on a staff has had training in the application of geological information to plan making. Recognition that there are often negative implications from the identification of landslide prone areas, in the form of decreased valuations, emphasizes the important support role that nationally accepted standard of practice have for staff at local level. Local zoning regulations stipulate, usually in great detail, how land can be used. Some communities have developed landslide matrices that are including in the zoning ordinance or as an adjunct to the ordinance. These matrices correlate categories of land stability with permitted or recommended land uses; they reflect a certain level of risk that the community has accepted. In some cases, not only are the land uses B.III-98
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identified, but they may be tied to general building types. It is at the subdivision stage that the future pattern of ownership and land use is firmly established. It is at this stage that the community must demand the most detailed information about geological hazards. The preparation of subdivision regulations that address geological hazards is not complicated a more difficult task is to ensure that the regulations are properly administrated. In addition, elected officials have to be convinced of the need for such regulations, and there must be both an administrative process and a staff capable of implementing the regulations. Guidance and assistance, in the form of publications and effective outreach, should be provided to local governments as part of the national strategy outreach, so that they are better able to incorporate landslide mitigation provisions into their general plan, zoning regulation, and subdivision regulations.
13.2.2 Methodologies, functions and outputs

A landslide risk map should report the expected losses, direct and indirect, due a specific landslide with given intensity, affecting a given area and having a specific probability of occurrence. Risk is thus the product of hazard and the capability of resistance of the various elements at risk vs. a landslide event (vulnerability). Likely for hazard mapping, also landslide risk mapping is a very complex task, due to the difficulty of assessing landslide hazard in a rigorous way as well as the complex and still poorly development of landslide vulnerability. Consequently, the available outputs (landslide risk maps) are generally incomplete and sometimes misleading, especially in defining key terms (i.e. hazard, vulnerability, risk). Likely for hazard, considering landslide vulnerability, the following table has been resumed (Table 2).
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MAP SCALE (SPATIAL PLANNING)
MAP SCALE (LANDSLIDE VULNERABILITY) Site-specific scale (< 1:1,000)
CHARACTERISTICS / USE Individual element at risk, exposed to landslide. Implementation and design of specific measures for vulnerability reduction.
DATA ACQUISITION MAPPING PROCEDURES Data are related to all the characteristics of the exposed elements (i.e. typology, worth, potential damage) at the highest possible resolution.
VULNERABILITY METHODOLOGY Site detailed inventory of exposed elements.
LEGEND
Local scale (1:1,000 - 1:10,000)
Overview of homogeneous sectors (i.e. districts, villages, land use, main infrastructures) exposed to potential landslides. Implementation and design of specific measures for vulnerability reduction.
Data are related to all the characteristics of the exposed elements (i.e. typology, worth, potential damage) with resolution related to single or group of elements.
Inventory of exposed elements (i.e. type and characteristics).
Local scale (1:5,000 1:50,000)
Regional scale (1:10,000 1:50,000)
Overview of homogeneous sectors (i.e. districts, villages, land use, main infrastructures) exposed to potential landslides. Implementation of specific policies for vulnerability reduction.
Data are related to all the characteristics of the exposed elements (i.e. typology, worth) with resolution related to group of elements.
Inventory of exposed elements (i.e. type and characteristics). Vulnerability indicators.
Overview of homogeneous sectors (i.e. districts, villages, land use, main infrastructures) exposed to potential landslides. Implementation of specific policies for vulnerability reduction.
Data are related to categories of the exposed elements (i.e. typology, worth) with low resolution.
Inventory of typology of exposed elements. Vulnerability indicators.
Quantitative vulnerability classes (i.e. potential damage vs. landslide intensity expressed as worth or number) for each typology of element at risk (i.e. population, structures, economic activities). Quantitative vulnerability classes (i.e. potential damage vs. landslide intensity expressed as worth or number) for each typology of element at risk (i.e. population, structures, economic activities) Qualitative vulnerability classes for each typology of element at risk (i.e. population, structures, economic activities) as worth and number of exposed elements. Qualitative vulnerability classes for each typology of element at risk (i.e. population, structures, economic activities) as worth and number of exposed elements.
Table 2: Summary of landslide vulnerability mapping vs. scales
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Landslide Vulnerability Mapping Site Specific Scale (< 1:1.000) Provide individual element at risk, exposed to landslide. Data are related to all the characteristics of the exposed elements (i.e. typology, worth, potential damage) at the highest possible resolution. Legends may be expressed as quantitative vulnerability classes (i.e. potential damage vs. landslide intensity) for each typology of element at risk (e.g. population, structures and infrastructures, economic activities). The maps are used for implementation and design of specific measures for vulnerability reduction.
Figure 6: Landslide vulnerability mapping at site scale undertaken in the archaeological site of the ancient Stabiae (Italy). Source: ENEA, 2004.
Landslide Vulnerability Mapping Local Scale (1:1.000 - 1:10.000) Provide an overview of homogeneous sectors (e.g. districts, census sections, land use, main infrastructures) prone to potential landslides. Data are related to all the characteristics of the exposed elements (i.e. typology, worth, potential damage) with resolution related to single or groups of elements. Legends may be expressed as quantitative vulnerability classes (i.e. potential damage vs. landslide intensity) for each typology of element at risk (e.g. population, structures and infrastructures, economic activities). The maps are used for implementation and design of specific measures for vulnerability reduction.
13.2.2.1
Figure 7: Landslide exposure and potential damage maps at local scale performed in the village of Craco (Italy). Source: ENEA, 2004.
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Landslide Vulnerability Mapping Regional Scale ( 1:10.000 1:50.000) This approach provides an overview of homogeneous sectors (e.g. districts, census sections, land use, main infrastructures) prone to potential landslides. Data are related to all the characteristics of the exposed elements (i.e. typology, worth) with resolution related to groups of elements. The inventory of the exposed elements is related to type and characteristics or vulnerability indicators. Legends are usually qualitative, defining vulnerability classes for each typology of element at risk (e.g. population, structures and infrastructures, economic activities) as worth and/or number of exposed elements. The maps are used for addressing specific policies of vulnerability reduction.
Figure 8: Landslide vulnerability index map at regional scale applied to Cultural Heritage. Source: Istituto Centrale del Restauro, 2001.
Landslide Vulnerability Mapping National Scale ( > 1:50.000) Provide an overview of homogeneous areas (e.g. urban areas, land use) exposed to potential landslides. Data are related to categories of the exposed elements (i.e. typology, worth) with low resolution. The inventory of the exposed elements is related to type and characteristics or vulnerability indicators. Legends are usually qualitative, defining vulnerability classes for each typology of element at risk (e.g. population, structures and infrastructures, economic activities) as worth and/or number of exposed elements.
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The maps are used for addressing general policies of vulnerability reduction.
Figure 9: Land use map as data base for vulnerability analysis at national scale. Source: CORINE Land Cover, application to Saulx watershed, 2000.
Landslide risk mapping according to the various scales are reported in Table 3.
MAP SCALE (SPATIA L PLANNIN G) MAP SCALE (LANDSLID E RISK) CHARACTERISTICS USE / DATA ACQUISITION MAPPING PROCEDURES RISK METHODOLOGY LEGEND
Site-specific scale (< 1:1,000)
Local scale (1:1,000 1:10,000)
Provide rigorous risk classes related to probabilistic landslide occurrence and potential damage. The maps are used for implementing and design landslide risk mitigation projects. Provide absolute or relative risk. The maps are used for implementing and design landslide risk mitigation projects Provide relative risk. The maps are used for depicting landslide risk scenarios at regional levels. Provide relative risk. The maps are used for depicting landslide risk scenarios at regional/national levels.
Data are related to hazard and vulnerability classes or values and their combination.
Quantitative analysis: rigorous assessment.
Quantitative risk classes expressed as worth or number of potential losses.
Local scale (1:5,000 1:50,000)
Regional scale (1:10,000 1:50,000)
Data are related to hazard and vulnerability classes or values and their combination. Data are related to hazard and vulnerability classes or values and their combination. Data are related to hazard and vulnerability classes or values and their combination.
Quantitative analysis: potential damage, specific risk.
Qualitative analysis: damage propensity or risk susceptibility.
Qualitative analysis: damage propensity or risk susceptibility.
Quantitative risk classes expressed as worth or number of potential losses. Qualitative risk classes according to social and economic consequences. Qualitative risk classes according to social and economic consequences.
Table 3: Summary of landslide risk mapping vs. scales
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Landslide Risk Mapping Site Specific Scale (< 1:1.000) At the highest resolution, this approach may provide rigorous risk classes related to probabilistic landslide occurrence and potential damage expressed as worth and/or number of potential losses. Generally, landslide risk maps at site scale are simply reporting the potential damage of few elements at risk, namely structures or infrastructures according to a single landslide. In literature these maps are not available for urban scale. The maps are used for implementation and design of specific measures for landslide risk mitigation. Landslide Risk Mapping Local Scale (1:1.000 - 1:10.000) Provide an absolute or relative risk according to the resolution of hazard (absolute or relative). At the highest resolution, legends report potential damage or specific risk as worth and/or number of potential losses. Usually, risk is expressed as qualitative classes according to social and economic consequences, simply by superimposition of landslide hazard/susceptibility maps with location of elements at risk. The maps are used for implementation and design of specific measures for landslide risk mitigation.
Figure 10: Landslide risk mapping at local scale. Source: Autorit di Bacino, Regione Calabria Piano Stralcio.
Landslide Risk Mapping Regional Scale ( 1:10.000 1:50.000) Provide a relative risk depicting a damage propensity or risk susceptibility through the superimposition of landslide susceptibility maps with elements at risk. Legends are typically qualitative (e.g. low, medium, high risk) according to potential socio-economic loss. The maps are used for defining general scenarios of landslide risk.
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Figure 11: Landslide risk map at regional scale. Source: Plan de Prvention aux Risques, Municipality of VeureyVoroize, 1999.
Landslide Risk Mapping National Scale ( >1:50.000) Provide a relative risk depicting a damage propensity or risk susceptibility through the superimposition of landslide susceptibility maps with elements at risk. Legends are typically qualitative (e.g. low, medium, high risk) according to potential socio-economic loss. The maps are used for defining general scenarios of landslide risk.
Figure 12: Landslide risk map at national scale. Source: Plan de Prvention aux Risques, France, 1999.
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13.3 Minimum Standard for Landslide Risk Maps

Considering the above mentioned examples derived from landslide hazard/risk mapping state of the art and the capability to produce an operational standard in the light of a multiple risk analysis applied to spatial planning, as the main objective of ARMONIA Project, the following scales of analysis are suggested: Local scale: 1:10.000 Regional scale: > 1:50.000
13.3.1 Local Scale mapping ( 1: 10.000)

Hazard Due to the objective difficulty to define rigorously all the parameters required in a landslide hazard analysis due to the large amount of highresolution data (landslide type, affected area, intensity, return time, triggering mechanism, evolution), a landslide hazard map should, at least, provide the following minimum requirements: o Landslide typology according to Varnes (1984) or Cruden & Varnes (1996) classifications o Physical extension of existing landslides and/or potential landslides Further information, if available, should be referred to: o Landslide state of activity (active, quiescent, inactive) and evolution o Intensity (volume, velocity, energy) o Landslide probability of occurrence Landslide hazard maps may be depicted as follows: o Landslide absolute/relative hazard maps HIGH STANDARD o Landslide relative hazard/susceptibility maps MEDIUM STANDARD o Landslide inventory maps MINIMUM STANDARD Vulnerability The analysis of vulnerability should take into account the following: o o Typology of potential elements at risk with their absolute location (map of elements at risk) Analysis of potential damage of the various elements at risk vs. landslide intensity. The vulnerability of all the exposed elements is calculated, from 0 to 1, according to the potential landslide intensity, considering the main typologies of the elements at risk (population, land use, structures and infrastructures) following the examples derived from the French experience (DRM, 1990) HIGH STANDARD The vulnerability is simply calculated from 0 to 1 by overlapping the landslide area with the elements at risk (0 = no exposure; 1 = presence of the exposed element) MINIMUM STANDARD
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Risk The analysis of risk should take into account the following: o Analysis of potential damage of the various elements at risk vs. landslide hazard. The risk of all the exposed elements is calculated according to landslide hazard (absolute hazard) and vulnerability of elements at risk following the examples derived from the French experience (DRM, 1990), as number of value of potential losses HIGH STANDARD The risk of all the exposed elements is calculated according to landslide hazard qualitative classes (i.e. low, medium, high) and vulnerability of elements at risk (0/1) by overlapping landslide hazard areas with the location of all the exposed elements, providing a qualitative risk assessment (i.e. low, medium, high, very high) (see Italian experience of the Law 267/98) MEDIUM STANDARD The risk of all the exposed elements is calculated according by simply overlapping landslide inventories maps/susceptibility maps with the location of all the exposed elements, providing a qualitative risk assessment (i.e. low, medium, high, very high) MINIMUM STANDARD Regional Scale mapping (> 1:50.000) Hazard This scale of analysis is mainly based on medium-low quality data. The requirements for producing a landslide hazard map are the following: o Landslide inventory map reporting, if possible, landslide types according to Varnes (1984) or Cruden & Varnes (1996) classifications o Physical extension of existing landslides and/or potential landslides Further information, if available, should be referred to: o Landslide state of activity (active, quiescent, inactive) and evolution o Intensity (volume, velocity, energy) o Landslide probability of occurrence Landslide hazard maps may be depicted as follows: o Landslide relative hazard/susceptibility maps HIGH STANDARD o Landslide inventory maps MINIMUM STANDARD Vulnerability The analysis of vulnerability should take into account the following: o Typology of potential elements at risk with their absolute location (map of elements at risk) o Analysis of potential damage of the various elements at risk vs. landslide occurrence. The vulnerability of all the exposed elements is calculated, from 0 to 1, according to the potential landslide occurrence, considering the main typologies of the elements at risk or groups of elements at risk or vulnerability indicators HIGH STANDARD
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The vulnerability is simply calculated from 0 to 1 by overlapping the landslide area with the elements at risk (0 = no exposure; 1 = presence of the exposed element) MINIMUM STANDARD
Risk The analysis of risk should take into account the following: o Analysis of potential damage of the various elements at risk vs. landslide hazard. The risk of all the exposed elements is calculated according to landslide hazard qualitative classes (i.e. low, medium, high) and vulnerability of elements at risk (0/1) by overlapping landslide hazard areas with the location of all the exposed elements, providing a qualitative risk assessment (i.e. low, medium, high, very high) HIGH STANDARD The risk of all the exposed elements is calculated according by simply overlapping landslide inventories maps/susceptibility maps with the location of all the exposed elements, providing a qualitative risk assessment (i.e. low, medium, high, very high) MINIMUM STANDARD
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B.IV Forest Fires

Author: Andrea Camia, EC-JRC
1 Physical definition of Forest Fires ............................ 2
1.1 1.2 Typologies .................................................................... 2 Intensities, Severity, Magnitude....................................... 2
2.1 Definition...................................................................... 4 2.2 Current methodologies for analysing and representation of hazard with respect to temporal scales .................................... 5 2.3 Dynamical hazard climate change effects ....................... 7 2.4 Problem of scale ............................................................ 7 2.5 Data availability typology, format GIS structure ........... 9 2.6 Examples of hazard maps and legends referred to assumed scales10
3 Element at risk and exposure................................. 20

3.1 Typology of elements ................................................... 20
4 Analysis of vulnerability ........................................ 21

4.1 Definition of vulnerability and/or consequence................. 21 4.2 Methodologies for assessment related to structural and nonstructural elements at risk.................................................... 21
5 Analysis of risk ...................................................... 22

5.1 5.2 Definition of risk .......................................................... 22 Methodologies for risk assessment ................................. 22
6 Risk management.................................................. 22 7 Glossary of all keywords ........................................ 24 8 References ............................................................ 25 Appendix: Operational Standards for Risk Assessment aimed at Spatial Planning........................................... 30
1. Minimum standard (simplified model) for hazard mapping aimed at a legal directive ..................................................... 30 1.1. Various methodologies related to the 3 assumed scales of analysis in the light of a potential harmonisation of hazard maps, based on a multi-hazard perspective ............................ 30 2. Minimum standard (simplified model) for risk mapping aimed at spatial planning ..................................................... 32
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1 Physical definition of Forest Fires

Fire is a self-sustaining chemical reaction that can release energy in the form of light and heat. Three main ingredients must be present for fire to exist: heat, oxygen and fuel (fire fundamentals triangle). This is a general definition of fire as a physical phenomenon. Forest fires are combustion processes that occur in the forest or, more generally, in the wildland which includes not only forests but also other natural vegetation such as shrublands or pastures, in other words all the vegetated lands which are not agriculture. In fact in the literature forest fires are often referred to as wildland fire, normally meaning the same as forest fires. The fuel that is burned in forest fires is mainly made up by vegetative material (either dead or live). It is important to consider also the legal definition of forest fire, since the risk analysis must be ultimately done within a legal framework. The legal definition is different according to the country. Within the European Community, the Regulation (EC) No 2152/2003 (Forest Focus) forest fire is a fire which breaks out and spreads on forest and other wooded land or which breaks out on other land and spreads to forest and other wooded land. The definition of forest fire excludes: prescribed or controlled burning, usually with the aim of reducing or eliminating the quantity of accumulated fuel on the ground.
1.1 Typologies
Different phases of the combustion process can be identified. In the simplest approach they are pre-ignition, ignition, combustion and extinction. These phases are continuously occurring during a forest fire, for which the flame front is moving in space always finding new unburned fuel. Three main typology of fires can be identified: ground fires, surface fires, crown fire. Ground fire is a fire that consumes the organic material beneath the surface litter, such as a peat fire. It normally burns without flame (smoldering combustion), being the combustion occurring in scarce oxygen, just under to thick organic layer on the ground. A surface fire is a fire that burns loose debris on the surface, which includes dead branches, leaves, and low vegetation. Therefore surface fires spread by flaming combustion through fuels at or near the surface (grass, shrubs, dead and down limbs, forest needles and leaf litter, or debris from harvesting or land clearing). A crown fire is a fire that advances from top to top of trees or shrubs, more or less independent of a surface fire. Crown fires are sometimes classed as running or dependent to distinguish the degree of independence from the surface fire.

The intensity of a fire can be expressed by the combustion rate, also referred to as the reaction intensity, which is the rate of heat release, per
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unit area of the flaming fire front. Although the reaction intensity can be considered an indicator of the effective intensity of the physical phenomenon, the standard fire behavior parameter used to identify its magnitude is the fireline intensity. The fireline intensity is the product of the available heat of combustion per unit of ground and the rate of spread of the fire, interpreted as the heat released per unit of time for each unit length of the fire front. The units are kW per meter of fire front or kcal per meter per second. The fireline intensity is the fire behavior parameter directly related to the fire suppression activities and the fire effects on the ecosystems. The length of the flames (flame length) is a function of the fireline intensity. Fireline intensity and the flame length are related to the heat felt by a person standing next to the flames. The following table gives fire suppression interpretations of flame length and fireline intensity. Flame Length (m) Under 1.2 Fireline Intensity (kW/m) Under 350 Interpretation
Fires can generally be attacked at the head or flanks by persons using hand tools. Hand line should hold the fire. Fires are too intense for direct attack on the head by persons using hand tools. Hand line cannot be relied on to hold the fire. Equipment such as dozers, pumpers, and retardant aircraft can be effective. Fires may present serious control problems -torching out, crowning, and spotting. Control efforts at the fire head will probably be ineffective. Crowning, spotting, and major fire runs are probable. Control efforts at head of fire are ineffective.
1.2-2.4
350-1730
2.4-3.4
1730-3460
Over 3.4
Over 3460
Table 1: Flame length and fireline intensity suppression interpretation. Source: Rothermel (1983)
Numerically, fireline intensity is derived as the product of the fuel heat content, the quantity of fuel consumed in the fire front, and the rate of fire spread (Byram, 1959). The widely used expression for the Byrams fireline intensity is the following: I = Hwr Where: I = Fireline intensity [kW/m] H = Net low heat of combustion [kj/kg] w = Quantity of fuel burned in the active flame front [kg/m2] r = Linear rate of fire spread [m/sec].
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Therefore fireline intensity is a function of rate of spread and heat per unit area, and it is directly related to flame length through the expression (Byram, 1959): Fl = 0.45 I
0.46
Where Fl (flame length) is in feet and I (fireline intensity) in BTU/ft/sec. The rate of spread can be generically defined as the relative activity of a fire in extending its horizontal dimensions. It can be expressed as rate of increase of the total perimeter of the fire, as rate of forward spread of the fire front, or as rate of increase in area, depending on the intended use of the information. In the fireline intensity calculation it is intended as the rate of forward spread of the fire front in a given direction. Fire severity is generally referred to as the degree to which a site has been altered or disrupted by fire. Loosely, can be considered a product of fire intensity and residence time, where residence time is the time required for the flaming front of a fire to pass a stationary point at the surface of the fuel; In other words is the total length of time that the flaming front of the fire occupies one point. There are not standard quantitative indications adopted about fire severity.
2 Hazard assessment
2.1 Definition
Forest fires are natural hazard, although it must also be considered that in the European context most forest fires are caused directly or indirectly by human activities. Therefore the triggering factors, the ignition sources of forest fires in Europe are in the large majority of cases of anthropogenic nature. Only a small percentage of fires are caused by lightings in dry storms or other even rarer events. When the fire origin is human, the cause can be deliberate (arson) or accidental (negligence) the latter meaning connection to a human activity but without any intention of causing the fire (e.g. accidents caused by power lines, railways, works, bonfires, etc.). If the causative factor meets the environmental conditions for ignition, the fire starts. The major environmental factors that can interact with the ignition source affecting forest fire behaviour are fuels, weather and topography, which together constitute the so called fire environment triangle. The changing state of each of such environmental components and their interaction with each other and with the fire itself determine the characteristics and behaviour of a fire at any given moment. Changes in fire behaviour in space and time occur in relation to changes in the environmental components. From the viewpoint of fire environment changing conditions, topography does not vary with time but it can vary greatly in space, the fuel component varies in both space and time, weather is the most variable component, changing rapidly in both space and time.
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Also because of the specificities illustrated, in the forest fire related terminologies, fire hazard is not explicitly associated to the probability of fire occurrence. In many English speaking countries (except the USA) fire hazard is a measure of that part of the fire danger contributed by the fuels available for b u r n i n g (worked out by their relative amount, type and condition, particularly their moisture content). In the USA fire hazard is normally referred to as a fuel complex, defined by volume, type, condition, arrangement, and location, that determines the degree of ease of ignition and fire suppression difficulty (FAO, 1986, McPherson et al. 1990). On the other hand, from the same terminology sources, the concept of fire risk is referred to as the probability of fire initiation due to the presence and activity of a causative agent. Fire risk is considered an element of the broader fire danger, meant as the resultant, often expressed as an index, of both constant and variable danger factors affecting the inception, spread, and difficulty of control of fires and the damage they may cause (FAO, 1986). A similar terminology has been adopted also in Europe, through the DELFI Concerted Action "Definition and Creation of a Common Knowledge Base for Forest Fires", whose aim was to organize and disseminate existing knowledge on forest fires, aiming to bridge the gap between researchers and practitioners and which produced a multi-language vocabulary of forest fire terms. It should be also pointed out that in the forest fire domain there is not a generalized agreement about the use of the terms hazard, risk and danger, and in the literatures many different interpretations can be found. A summary of the more common current definitions is given in the Glossary chapter. In the context of ARMONIA project the need of harmonizing the fire risk terminology with the other natural hazard is quite important. Within this framework we propose to adopt a terminology which is closer to the other natural hazard vocabulary and which is also in line with some recent approaches of EU research projects, such as INFLAME and SPREAD. The risk of a given natural hazard is most often referred to as the combination of the probability of occurrence of an event and its consequences. In this respect fire risk can be well be meant as a combination of the probability of occurrence of a fire with a given intensity and the extent of the consequences of the fire impact. The consequences of the fire impact are due to the vulnerability of the ecosystem and the value given to the natural resources affected (perception of the potential impact).
2.2 Current methodologies for analysing and representation of hazard with respect to temporal scales
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Based on the temporal scale considered, both the assessment procedures or methods, and the fire management objectives or context supported by the estimates of fire risk distribution are ultimately quite different. Two temporal scales are commonly identified in fire risk estimation: shortterm and long-term. Short-term fire risk estimations refer to the most dynamic factors of fire ignition or fire behaviour, mainly those based on the estimation of vegetation moisture content (either dead or live fuels) and the effect of meteorological variables on fire behaviour. Therefore short term risk estimation requires daily or also hourly information on fuel moisture content, weather variables as temperature, relative humidity, wind, and precipitation. This kind of estimation allows to organise the activity of fire presuppression, detection and suppression and update decisions according to changes in the fire risk level. Therefore this temporal scale has a main practical use in the update of the level of alert and in the organisation of the fire fighters actions directly on the flaming front. Based on meteorological input data and physical, semi-physical or empirical model calculations, Wildland Fire Danger Rating Systems provide indirect values numerical indices at different temporal scales (e.g., daily, weekly, monthly) denoting the physical conditions that may lead to fire ignition and support fire propagation. The results can be expressed as fire danger levels, ranging from low to very high, and are commonly used in operational wildland fire management (e.g., the Canadian Fire Weather Index [FWI] System (Van Wagner, 1987), the Russian Nesterov Index (Nesterov, 1949), or the U.S. National Fire Danger Rating System [NFDRS] (Deeming at al. 1974; Deeming at al. 1977; Bradshaw, 1983; Burgan, 1988). Today, fire danger levels are often turned into broad scale maps with the help of Geographical Information Systems (GIS) showing the areas with the different fire danger levels, and are distributed via the World Wide Web. Long-term fire risk includes the fire risk that does not change, or changes very slowly over time, in practical term the risk level determined by factors that can be considered, for the purpose of risk assessment, static along at least a fire season. Therefore in the long term trends of fire risk the variables involved are mostly related to the structural factors that affect fire ignition and propagation in a given site (Chuvieco, 1999). Examples of such factors can be fuel types, topography or climatic patterns. In general the long term temporal scale estimation provides information for the wildfire defence plan and so for the distribution of structural protection resources and the prevention activities. Within ARMONIA the focus will be on the long term fire risk analysis. The long term which focus on the static components of fire risk, is normally addressed in the fire management planning context. Therefore the main
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issues dealt with are related to fire prevention (i.e. fire suppression and post fire analysis are not considered). To define the reference time frame for the analysis it must be pointed put that forest fire occurrence is strictly related to the socio-economic context which affects to anthropogenic causes of fires and which is continuously evolving, therefore significantly modifying the hazard conditions. The time frame normally referred to in order to correctly represent the actual fire hazard conditions is less then 15 years, i.e. historical fire data analyzed for assessing current fire hazard conditions should cover around 10 to 15 years On the other hand, the assessed current static fire hazard conditions, can be taken as such for a period of around 5 years, meaning that after this time the assessment should be revised (e.g. the fuel conditions can change substantially due to vegetation dynamics).
2.3 Dynamical hazard climate change effects

Some studies on the climatic warming effect on forest fire risk suggest a generalized increases in fire frequency (Overpeck et al., 1990; IPCC 2002). According to Flannigan et al. (200), the universality of these results is questionable because an individual fire is a result of the complex set of interactions that include ignition agents, fuel conditions, topography and weather including temperature, relative humidity, wind velocity and the amount and frequency of precipitation. Increasing temperature alone does not necessarily guarantee greater fire disturbance. Flannigan et al. (2000) argue that, in addition to climatic influences on the fire regime other factors such as ignition agents, length of the fire season, vegetation characteristics and human activities such as fire management policies and landscape fragmentation may greatly influence the fire regime in the next century. Ignition probabilities may increase in a warmer world due to increased cloud-to-ground lightning discharges with warming. The fire season will start earlier and extend longer. An increase in fire activity may be expected especially in terms of fire severity due to climatic warming, increased frequency and severity of drought years, increased climatic variability and incidence of extreme climatic events The important aspect of the impact of climate change on forest fires with respect to the influence on vegetation is that fire may be more important than the direct effects of climate change with respect to species distribution, migration, substitution and extinction (Weber and Flannigan, 1997).

Although the risk of wildland fires changes in a continuous way both in time and space, for practical purposes in the assessment of fire risk it is common to distinguish different spatial scales. With reference to the spatial scale, the global approach involves territories of millions square kilometres (Chuvieco et al. 2003), and the resulting maps B.IV-7
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of the global (continental or world wide) distribution of fire risk have scales of the range of 1:1,000,000 or less. Fire risk assessment at this scale is mainly undertaken for establishing general guidelines or strategic purposes and for enhancing international cooperation. On the other hand local scale is referred to areas extended from hundreds up to few thousands square kilometres, with related thematic maps of 1:10,000 to 1:250,000 scale, addressing various fire management issues at regional or lower level. The scale often referred to as local in the forest fire literature, includes the 3 scales addressed in ARMONIA Project, which are the following: regional (<1:50,000), local1 (1:5,000- 1:50,000) and local2 (>1:5,000). At these scales the use of the fire hazard information is linked to the following general fire planners requirements: To plan fire prevention measures Spatialize protection priorities Define and locate prevention measures (i.e. firebreak, water reservoirs etc..) Set up rules for fire management and settlements in the Wildland Urban Interface To manage natural resources for risk mitigation Fuel management, prescribed fire Defensible space management (settlements) Forest management
More specifically, according to the different ARMINIA scales, the following management needs have been identified: Scale: > 1:5,000 design and locate prevention measures (firebreaks, water reservoirs, look out points etc..) management rules for individual settlements and specific ecosystems (fuel management, forest management etc..) Scale: 1:5,000 1:50,000 typical scale for local fire management plans spatialization of protection priorities identification of prevention measure management guidelines at landscape level Scale: < 1:50,000 scale for regional fire management plans spatialization of general protection priorities definition of protection strategies and allocation of protection resources general management guidelines
The approaches to fire hazard assessment and mapping change according to the spatial scale not only because of the different user needs, but also B.IV-8
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due to the variables that can be considered and their changing role in modelling and representing the spatial distribution of fire hazard,. From one part because of the different explanation the variables can provide to the spatial distribution of the wildfire phenomenon, but also because of the different purposes of the different hazard assessment perspectives and because of data availability at the different scales. Considering for example the risk variables related to human activities, at smaller scale a more important focus must be given to socio-economical context, and their spatial distribution is often analysed using administrative boundaries to define geographical units. On the other hand at larger scale it is easier to go into more detailed analysis considering for example the location of anthropogenic infrastructures, such as roads or railway, that can be correlated with the spatial distribution of fire ignition sources.
2.5 Data availability typology, format GIS structure

To map fire hazard spatial information are needed about historical fires occurred in the area and data layers related to the mentioned fire environmental triangle (topography, fuels, meteorology) and to the anthropogenic factors. Sound historical data on fire occurrence are not always available and fire location in Europe is mainly given with reference to an administrative polygon (e.g. Commune). Thus the geographical unit of analysis is often the administrative unit. In some countries (e.g. Spain) fires are also located with geographical coordinates but with poor resolution (i.e. using a grid 10 km spaced). For limited areas, i.e. for some National Park, or only for major fire events, the fire perimeter are digitized and geo-referenced. In some cases fire data may be sensitive data, so local authorities are not always willing to make them available to the public. Around 10 years of individual fire events data may be required. The basic environmental data layers that may be useful for fire hazard assessment are a Digital Elevation Model (DEM) for topography (from which slope and aspect maps can be derived), a fuel type map for vegetation and a long term weather pattern or climatic classification map for meteorology. All these maps are normally in raster formats, and their use and typology depend on the scale. Socio-economic data layers are normally represented using statistics which are referred to administrative units, therefore they can be polygons that correspond to the administrative boundaries used in the statistics. At larger scales the role of anthropogenic factors can be accounted for or modeled using features representing infrastructures that are directly or indirectly linked to the wildfire phenomenon. For example the road or
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railway networks, the camping or barbeque areas, location of settlements in the wildland urban interface areas and so on. Human fire-related activities, such as recreation or arson, are very difficult to model anyway, and research efforts are still required in this direction. The data layers mentioned can be further detailed according to the scale considered and the specific environmental conditions. Quite in general, the minimum data required for fire hazard assessment and mapping in the 3 scales of spatial planning adopted in ARMONIA are the following: Scale: > 1:5,000 DEM, fuel map, settlements, roads, weather patterns (not spatialized) Scale: 1:5,000 1:50,000 DEM, fuel map, settlements, roads, weather patterns, fire data, administrative boundaries Scale: < 1:50,000 fire data, administrative boundaries, weather patterns, bioclimatic regions (DEM, fuel map, WUI areas, roads)
2.6 Examples of hazard maps and legends referred to assumed scales

Fire hazard assessment is routinely performed in most develop countries that are affected by forest fires and quite different approaches are used. A review of the most known currently run operational system can be found in San Miguel-Ayanz et al. (2003). Such operational systems are producing and disseminating through internet updated evaluation of fire danger conditions, and they are therefore significantly stressing the dynamic component of the fire risk itself. In Canada the Canadian Wildland Fire Information System (CWFIS) (http://cwfis.cfs.nrcan.gc.ca/en/index_e.php) produces daily fire danger maps; these include maps of the various components of the meteorological Forest Fire Weather Index System (Figure 1) as well as maps calculated with the Forest Fire Behavior Prediction System equations (Figure 2).
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Figure 1: Map from the Fire Weather Index System Source: http://cwfis.cfs.nrcan.gc.ca/en/index_e.php
Figure 2: Map from the Forest Fire Behaviour Prediction System Source: http://cwfis.cfs.nrcan.gc.ca/en/index_e.php
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The maps derived from the Forest Fire Behaviour Prediction System are based on the general scheme depicted in Figure 3:
Figure 3: Scheme of the Canadian FBPS Source: Forestry Canada Fire Danger Group (1992)
In the USA the Forest Service operates the Wildland Fire Assessment System (WFAS) (http://www.fs.fed.us/land/wfas/) which calculates daily maps of various fire danger indices for the continental USA. These maps include fire danger class based on the National Fire Danger Rating System input from local meteorological stations (Figure 4), as well as dead and live fuel moisture, drought indices and Burgans (1998) recently developed Fire Potential Index. In addition, weekly satellite composites of visual greenness, relative greenness, and departure from normal are available.
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Figure 4: Map from the Wildland Fire Assessment System Source: http://www.fs.fed.us/land/wfas/
In Europe The EC - DG JRC operates the European Forest Fires Information System (EFFIS) (http://inforest.jrc.it/effis) which is currently part of the EU Forest Focus regulation (EC-2152/2003) and is meant to support forest fire protection through information at the European level. EFFIS, which includes several modules, has been developed and is implemented by JRC also through collaboration with the relevant services of the Member States, and under the coordination of EC - DG ENV Civil Protection Unit. The currently operational module on fire risk assessment is EFFIS- Risk Forecast, while experimental work is on going and strongly supported in order to improve and further develop new EFFIS modules. The Risk Forecast module computes daily EU maps of 6 different meteorological fire danger indices processed from 1 and 3 days weather forecast data and mapped with a spatial resolution of about 40 km (Figure 5). Fire risk deriving from meteorological conditions is therefore forecasted and mapped into 5 classes, which have been specifically calibrated for the area covered by the Southern European member states. In addition a modified version of Burgans (1998) Fire Potential Index is computed that integrates forecast meteorological data (to estimate dead fuel moisture content), satellite data (to estimate the relative fraction of live fuels) and a fuel map. In this case maps with a spatial resolution of 4.4 km are generated daily (Figure 6).
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Figure 5: Fire risk forecast Map from the European Forest Fire Information System (EFFIS) Source: http://inforest.jrc.it/effis
Fire Potential Index
Figure 6: Fire potential map from the European Forest Fire Information System (EFFIS) Source: http://inforest.jrc.it/effis
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The mentioned operational systems are dynamical, therefore their methods cannot be directly applied to the planning context of ARMONIA. Although in some cases they can be interpreted as static when a long historical series is used (Figure 7).
Figure 7: Average predicted fireline intensity along the fire season Source: http://cwfis.cfs.nrcan.gc.ca/en/index_e.php
After showing briefly examples of fire hazard assessment systems run at global level, we illustrate some of the approaches followed at local level for long term fire hazard mapping. Presently several approaches and methods of risk assessment and mapping can be found in the literature and are applied at local level. It must be also noted the absence of standard or recommended methods for risk assessment, either by the scientific community or by the authorities. For almost every new case, researchers or practitioners elaborate a new way of handling the problem, in order to adapt to the local context, as well as to make with the available data or the budget. Therefore there is at present no unique method for risk assessment and mapping. In what follows we will try to summarize the most common approaches.
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A method for estimating and mapping forest fire hazard involves identifying the potentially contributing variables and integrating them into a mathematical expression, i.e. an index. This index, therefore, quantifies and indicates the level of fire hazard. The main differences among the methods are mainly in the approaches for integrating the fire hazard related variables, i.e. the type of model used for deriving the fire hazard index. The different methods applied so far can be grouped into the following modelling approaches: Empirical combination of GIS layers (derived using more or less consolidated empirical or knowledge based models) Fire behavior (based on the equations of a fire behavior model) Fire statistics (fire statistics used to derive empirical fire hazard maps or local statistical models) An extended analysis with examples of the different methodologies can be found in the analysis carried out by Chuvieco et al. (2002), from which what follows has been mainly extracted and integrated. Since the goal is to obtain a single fire risk index, the component variables (vegetation, topography, climate, etc.) should first be classified in a numerical scale of risk and then combined into a single index. In some cases, the creation of risk levels from the original variables implies changing the nominal-categorical scale to an ordinal scale. For instance, different fuel types or slope ranges should be assigned a numeric value associated with a specific risk level. On the other hand, the integration of these layers in a single risk index requires that a weight be applied to each variable according to its importance on the fire occurrence. Both questions may be approached in a more qualitative-subjective way or by using a quantitativeobjective scheme. The qualitative-subjective schemes often result from the experience of experts who assign risk levels and weights according to their own perception of fire risk in the area. The simplest way to develop this procedure is to create risk tables, where the combinations of two variables are assigned specific danger values (Brass et al., 1983; Gouma and Chronopoulou-Sereli, 1998; Salas and Chuvieco, 1994; Yool et al., 1985). An example of such combinations is given in Table 1.
Ignition Risk Very High High Moderate Low Behaviour Risk Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Low
Very High Very High Very High High Moderate
High Very High High High Moderate
Low Moderate Moderate Low Low
Table 1: Fire risk index proposed by Salas and Chuvieco (1994) This index is a combination of risk associated to fire ignition and fire spreading
Another example of the qualitative-subjective approach followed in fire risk mapping consists in the application of an induction methodology aimed at formalizing the process of expert knowledge extraction and its subsequent B.IV-16
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organization in knowledge trees made up of parameters and functions (Camia and Bovio, 2002). An example of map is given in Figure 8, taken from the results of the EU project Prometheus. The model has been derived from expert knowledge, and the combination of variables is mostly based on ifthen rules.
Figure 8: Variables and derived fire start component maps of presuppression planning diagram of Prometheus system Source: Camia and Bovio (2002)
The main problem of the empirical approaches described so far lies on their subjectivity and local validity. Experts make the decisions, but even assuming their good knowledge of fire events in the study area, the method does not offer a clear rationale for extending the defined criteria to other areas. On the other hand, qualitative categories do not provide a clear image about gradients of risk presented in the field. The quantitative approach to integrate fire-related variables can be achieved in different ways. First, it could be based on the selective weighting of danger variables to create single danger indices (Abhineet et al., 1996; Benvenuti et al., 2000; Chuvieco and Congalton, 1989; Gouma and Chronopoulou-Sereli, B.IV-17
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1998; Lu et al., 1990; Salas and Chuvieco, 1994; Thompson, 2000; Vliegher, 1992). Commonly these weights are based on the knowledge of the authors, in a way similar to the qualitative criterion, but this procedure does offer a gradient of risk levels, which can eventually be classified in different risk categories or used as they are produced. Some examples of such indices (Salas and Chuvieco, 1994) are: Ignition Risk = 4 * H + 3 * V + 2 * I E; where H represents human risk factor, V represents vegetation, I represents illumination factor, and E represents the elevation factor. Propagation Risk = 5 * V + 4 * S + 3 * A - E FB; where V represents fuel models factor, S slope factor, A aspect factor, E elevation factor and FB, the presence of fire-breaks. This kind of indices previously require establishing quantitative risk levels for each input variable. For instance, fuel types should be ranked according to their ignition or behavior risk, following some logic (for instance, rates of propagation from a fire behavior model). They are more objective than the qualitative criteria previously discussed, but they should be interpreted in a relative rather than an absolute way. In other words, they define higher and lower levels of fire risk, but they cannot be used to infer probabilities of fire ignition or fire spread rates. Multicriteria evaluation techniques (MCE) (Barredo, 1996) may be a good alternative to reduce the subjectivity of this assigning process, since the opinion of experts may be quantitatively assessed. Moreover, each expert's opinion may be weighted according to his/her degree of knowledge in the field or the study area. MCE techniques have been used for fire risk mapping, weighing each risk variable after the expert's opinion in two different scenarios (Alczar et al., 1998). As a general comment it must be pointed out that the fire probability is very difficult to quantify, especially at local level, also because the historical series should not go further than 15 years (see paragraph 2.2). In addition data about the location of ignition points of past fire events, or about the fire perimeters delineation, are not known in most cases. Models based on infrastructures or human related features of the landscape are sometimes used, e.g. buffering around roads and settlements. The second mentioned approach for fire hazard assessment and mapping is the use of fire behavior models (Caballero et al., 1994; Radke, 1995; van Wyngaarden and Dixon, 1989; Vasconcelos and Guertin, 1992; Wilson and Baker, 1998; Woods and Gossette, 1992; Camia et al. 2003). Using this approach, the fire hazard maps produced have an explicit physical meaning and therefore can be more easily integrated into a fire management context. However the probability of ignition is less considered in these cases, since the models concentrate on fire behavior once the fire event has started. An example of a fire hazard map derived from a fire simulation model is given in Figure 9.
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Expected fireline intensity
Figure 9: Expected fireline intensity map of Val Grande National Park (Italy) Source: Camia et al. (2003)
The simulations were in this case based on the Rothermel (1972) model, the most widely used fire behaviour model, and enhancements introduced using the FARSITE system (Finney, 1998). The FARSITE system integrates some static raster layers to generate a landscape file (Figure 10), then simulation can be run feeding the model with dynamic data such as meteorological conditions and fuel moisture content. Such an approach for long term fire hazard mapping implies the definition of static scenarios for the dynamic factors. Also in this case the fire behavior was modeled assuming an homogeneous probability of being burned of all cells of the raster layer.
Figure 10: Raster landscape input layers required for FARSITE simulation. Source: Finney. (1998)
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The third mentioned approach to model the risk variables is using statistical analysis based on historical fire data. The most widely used methods are based on local regression analysis techniques. Fire occurrence is the dependent variable, while fire risk variables are the independent ones. Coefficients of multiple regression become the weights of each risk variable for the synthetic risk map. Models proposed in the literature for obtaining these functions range from simple multiple linear regressions (Castro and Chuvieco, 1998), to logistic regression models (Chou, 1992; Chuvieco et al., 1999; Vasconcelos et al., 2001; Vega-Garca et al., 1993) and neural networks (Chuvieco et al., 1999; Chuvieco et al., 1998; Vasconcelos et al., 2001; Vega-Garca et al., 1993). Since these models are produced by statistical fitting procedures, the accuracy can be assessed quantitatively (that is the percentage of original variance explained by the model), and therefore a better understanding of the importance of each variable in fire occurrence can be obtained. However, they should be applied carefully outside the period and study area in which they were produced.
3 Element at risk and exposure

The element at risk are basically the fire prone ecosystems. Therefore the consequences of forest fires are mainly assessed in terms of environmental damage suffered first of all by the vegetation being burned by the fire.

Fire is a natural factor in many ecosystems, and therefore, from the ecosystem point of view, the impact of a given wildfire could be relatively contained, being within the limits of a normal natural disturbance. In some cases, if the fire return interval is long enough, fire effects can even be beneficial for the ecosystem, although in most cases the disturbance induced by the fire has a negative impact. In ecosystems not adapted to fire, or in case of recurrent burnings in the same area, a degradation process can result. The exposure of vegetation to the detrimental effects of a fire with a given intensity depends of the resistance and the resilience of the ecosystem. While the resistance expresses the stability of an ecosystem against the disturbance, e.g. low flammability of species or resistance to the high temperatures, resilience is the ability of the system to recover from the changes induced by the fire, leading back to the original conditions. Vegetation resistance to fire is often of little relevance in front of other ecosystem properties related to recovery capacity. The exposed elements might be also human settlements in the wildland urban interface (WUI). In this case they are normally private homes not conveniently protected through a correct management of the vegetation surrounding the houses.
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As anticipated previously most fire risk studies are not focused on the consequences of the events, therefore concentrating either on the probability of having a fire or on the expected fire behavior, or on both these aspects. Vulnerability expresses the potential consequences of fire on the exposed elements. It depends from the potential fire effects and the value of the affected natural resources. The potential fire effects depend on fire characteristics and ecosystem response while the value of the natural resources is quite difficult to assess even qualitatively. With respect to the values of the affected resources, several aspects need to be considered, such as the recreational and socio-economic value of the burned area, or the intrinsic ecological richness of the landscapes affected. In any case the value is assigned by humans according to some criteria, often according to the expected outcome, or benefit, deriving from the threatened natural resource. In addition to the generally applicable concepts such as nature conservation or biodiversity, local potential benefits that can be threatened by wildfires are for example related to soil protection, hydrological regimes, water quality, wildlife, wood production, landscape, recreational and cultural value and so on. They are quite diverse, hard to quantify and may be more or less represented in every given site. In some cases, there have been attempts to translate such benefits in a common unit, i.e. economic value, but it is true that some elements of the term vulnerability are subject to opinion or land management decisions (as for instance assigning a prevailing recreational and nature protection function to a natural resource through the establishment of a natural park) and in other elements we lack timely standard data (fire characteristics). This explains why there are hardly any global studies on vulnerability, although it is beginning to draw an interest in the scientific community.
Standard methods to assess and map forest fire vulnerability are still in a research phase. No operational examples can be given in this section.
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5 Analysis of risk
Since the vulnerability component is not yet developed, fire risk analysis is limited to the hazard part which has been described in the previous chapters. Attempts to refer to a more extended fire risk framework, that includes also vulnerability can be found in the literature (Bachmann and Allgwer, 1998; Bachmann and Allgwer, 2001; Camia and Bovio, 2002; Chuvieco et al. 2002; San-Miguel-Ayanz, 2002) but operational methodologies have not be fully developed.

See hazard chapter (paragraph 2.1) for a discussion on fire terminology.
5.2 Methodologies for risk assessment

Methodologies are under development at JRC and have been proposed in the SPREAD project, but have not been yet fully designed.
6 Risk management
Fire risk assessment is mostly performed in order to provide forest services and fire protection agencies with information to support their activities, enhance wildfire protection actions and optimise fire management plans. Therefore, in addition to the temporal and spatial scale issues illustrated previously, the specific fire protection activity that has to be supported must also be identified, since this one may strongly influence the approach to the fire risk assessment procedure. In fact the context and the related fire protection tasks for which the information on fire risk is needed can be quite different. All fire risk studies address a specific requirement, the reason why the information on fire risk is needed, and consequently who and for what purpose will have to use the information on fire risk estimation provided, are all relevant issues. The rationale behind is that the different domains of fire management have specific problems to address from which the components of fire risk may result with different emphasis, and also the proper temporal and spatial scales have to be selected accordingly. The following fire management contexts can be considered: Fire prevention Fire pre-suppression Fire detection Fire fighting Post-fire In the context of fire prevention, information about the most fire prone areas and their location are required.
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Long term fire risk estimation is typically needed in order to set up proper fire management plans at the beginning at the fire season. Typical management actions that count on the spatial distribution of fire risk estimates are for example silvicultural interventions, fuel management practices, prescribed fire, location of defence infrastructures such as firebreaks, water reservoirs, look-out towers, optimization of the road network. At global scale, long-term fire risk estimation done as a fire prevention task, can be used to support strategic and political decisions. Both long-term and short-term fire risk estimation are applied to support decisions in the fire pre-suppression context. In fact the allocation of fire fighting personnel, funds and equipment has to be defined also on the base of a long-term fire risk analysis, but these decisions can be changed in the light of short-term risk information (Chuvieco, 2003). The fire pre-suppression activities, concerned with real time allocation of protection resources to optimise the preparedness level of the fire protection organisation following the changing fire danger conditions with time, are typically local ones. At global level the monitoring of fire danger conditions is mostly relevant for the displacement of heavy fire fighting means and pre-alert of protection agencies. While in prevention and pre-suppression both fire occurrence and behaviour estimates are concerned, in fire detection the focus is mostly on the probability of fire occurrence. The applications are basically at local scale. In this case the short-term fire risk evaluation combined with information derived from long-term fire risk assessment, permit to define the areas in which remote cameras are more useful (Arrue et al., 2000). In addition short-term fire risk maps can be used as a criterion to evaluate the alarms given by automatic fire detection systems in order to reduce false alarm. In any case, the focus is basically on fire occurrence, while fire spreading is relatively less important. Fire fighting (suppression) activities require information derived from shortterm fire risk assessment to evaluate the behaviour of the wildfires and define the most appropriated attack strategies and means in real time. Weather conditions and their changing over time are, for example, important data on which suppression decisions must be based on. Within the post-fire context, restoration is the task that is relevant and the main data required are related with long-term fire risk assessment. In particular, it is necessary to consider the structural properties of fuel, topography and climatic conditions of the site in which is applied in order to support the restoration work with guidelines and priorities also based on fire risk criteria. Very little information are available about fire risk perception. Based on recent studies done in Southern France, Spain and Finland through surveys B.IV-23
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on fire risk awareness, it appears that the population tends to consider wildfires firstly as a source of damage to flora and fauna, and not to economic values as one could expect. At least in Spain there seems to be a considerable difference between urban and rural perception of fire risk. While urban people think that most fires are caused intentionally, rural people consider most fires being caused by negligence. In exposed areas a large percentage of people consider that the private forest owners are responsible for applying fire prevention measures.

CROWN FIRE: A fire that advances from top to top of trees or shrubs more or less independent of a surface fire. Crown fires are sometimes classed as running or dependent to distinguish the degree of independence from the surface fire. FIRE DANGER (FAO, 1986; DELFI, 1999): The resultant, often expressed as an index, of both constant and variable danger factors affecting the inception, spread, and difficulty of control of fires and the damage they cause. FIRE FRONT: The part of a fire within which continuous flaming combustion is taking place. Unless otherwise specified, the fire front is assumed to be the leading edge of the fire perimeter. In ground fires, the fire front may be mainly smoldering combustion. FIRE HAZARD (FAO, 1986; DELFI, 1999): A measure of that part of the fire danger contributed by the fuels available for burning (worked out by their relative amount, type and condition, particularly their moisture content. In the USA fire hazard is referred to as a fuel complex, defined by volume, type, condition, arrangement, and location, that determines the degree of ease of ignition and fire suppression difficulty. FIRE RISK FAO (1986): (1) The chance of fire starting, as affected by the nature and incidence of causative agents. An element of fire danger in an area (2) Any causative agent. DELFI (1999): The probability of fire initiation due to the presence and activity of a causative agent. FIRE SEVERITY: Degree to which a site has been altered or disrupted by fire; loosely, a product of fire intensity and residence time. FIRELINE INTENSITY: The product of the available heat of combustion per unit of ground and the rate of spread of the fire, interpreted as the heat released per unit of time for each unit length of the fire front. The units are kW per meter of fire front or kcal per meter per second.
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FLAME LENGTH: The distance between the flame tip and the midpoint of the flame depth at the base of the flame (generally the ground surface), an indicator of fire intensity. GOUND FIRE: Ground fire is a fire that consumes the organic material beneath the surface litter ground, such as a peat fire. RATE OF SPREAD: The relative activity of a fire in extending its horizontal dimensions. It is expressed as rate of increase of the total perimeter of the fire, as rate of forward spread of the fire front, or as rate of increase in area, depending on the intended use of the information. Usually it is expressed in meter per minute or hectares per hour for a specific period in the fire's history. REACTION INTENSITY: It expresses the combustion rate, the rate of heat release, per unit area of the flaming fire front, expressed as heat energy/area/time (such as kcal/m2/sec or kW/m2). RESIDENCE TIME: The time, in seconds, required for the flaming front of a fire to pass a stationary point at the surface of the fuel. The total length of time that the flaming front of the fire occupies one point. SURFACE FIRE: A surface fire is a fire that burns loose debris on the surface, which includes dead branches, leaves, and low vegetation. VULNERABILITY: potential consequences of fire on the exposed elements. It depends from the potential fire effects and the value of the affected natural resources.
8 References
Abhineet, J., Ravan, S.A., Singh, R.K., Das, K.K. and Roy, P.S. (1996), Forest fire risk modelling using remote sensing and geographic information system, Current Science. 70(10): 928-933. Alczar, J., Vega-Garca, C., Grauet, M., Pemn, J. and Fernndez, A., (1998). Human risk and fire danger estimation through multicriteria evaluation methods for forest fire prevention in Barcelona, Spain. In: D.X. Viegas (Editor), III International Conference on Forest Fire Research - 14th Conference on Fire and Forest Meteorology. ADAI, Coimbra, pp. 2379-2387. Arrue B. C., Ollero A., and Martinez de Dios J. R., 2000. An Intelligent System for False Alarm Reduction in Infrared Forest-Fire Detection. IEEE Intelligent Systems. 15(3): 64-73. Bachmann, A. and Allgwer, B., (1998). Framework for wildfire risk analysis. In: D.X. Viegas (Editor), III International Conference on Forest Fire Research - 14th Conference on Fire and Forest Meteorology. ADAI, Coimbra, pp. 2177-2190.
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Bachmann, A. and Allgwer, B. (2001), A consistent wildland fire risk terminology is needed!, Fire Management Today. 61(4): 28-33. Barredo, J.I. (1996). Sistemas de Informacin Geogrfica y Evaluacin Multicriterio en la ordenacin del territorio, RA-MA, Madrid. Benvenuti, M., Conese, C. and Dainelli, N., (2000). ISOLE: An integrated system for the analysis of tourist impact on the insular environment, IX Simposio Latinoamericano de Percepcin Remota, Iguaz, pp. CDROM. Bradshaw L, Deeming J, Burgan RE, Cohen J (1983) The 1978 National FireDanger Rating System: Technical Documentation. USDA, Forest Service, Intermountain Forest and Range Experiment Station, GTR INT -169, pp 44. Brass, J., Likens, W.C. and Thornhill, R.R. (1983). Wildland Inventory and Resource Modeling for Douglas and Carson City Counties, Nevada, Using Landsat and Digital Terrain Data. NASA Technical Paper 2137, NASA , Scientific and Technical Information Branch, Washington, D.C. Burgan RE (1988) 1988 Revisions to the 1978 National Fire-Danger Rating System. USDA, Forest Service, Research Paper SE-273, pp 39. Burgan, R.E., Klaver, R.W. and Klaver, J.M. (1998), Fuel models and fire potential from satellite and surface observations, International Journal of Wildland Fire. 8(3): 159-170. Caballero, D., Martinez-Millan, J., Martos, J. and Vignote, S., (1994). CARDIN 3.0 A Model Forest Fire Spread and Fire Fighting Simulation, 2nd International Conference on Forest Fire Research, Coimbra, pp. 501-502. Camia A., Bovio G., 2002 - Wildfire Risk Potential and Expected Impact Analysis for Sustainable Forest Management. In: Proceedings IUFRO Conference Collecting and Analyzing Information for Sustainable Forest Management. Palermo, Italy, 4.7 Dec. 2001. Camia A., Busti M., Davi M. 2003 - Piano antincendio boschivo del Parco Nazionale della Val Grande. Castro, R. and Chuvieco, E. (1998), Modeling Forest Fire Danger From Geographic Information Systems, Geocarto International. 13: 15-23. Chou, Y.H. (1992a), Management of Wildfires with a Geographical Information System, International Journal of Geographical Information Systems. 6(2): 123-140. Chuvieco E. (ed.) 1999. Remote Sensing of Large Wildfires in the European Mediterranean Basin. Berlin, Springer-Verlag. 212 p. Chuvieco E., Blanchi R., Allgwer B., Koutsias N., Salas J., Camia A. 2002. Fire risk mapping (I): Methodology, selected examples and evaluation of user requirements. Spread Project Deliverable D161. p. 45. Chuvieco E., Allgower B., and Salas J., 2003. Integration of Physical and Human Factors in Fire Danger Assessment. In: Chuvieco E. Ed., 2003 Wildland Fire Danger Estimation and Mapping. The role of remote
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sensing data. Series in Remote Sensing. Vol. 4, Singapore, World Scientific Publishimg Co., 264 p. Chuvieco, E. (ed.), 2003: Wildland Fire Danger Estimation and Mapping: The Role of Remote Sensing Data. Series in Remote Sensing. Vol. 4, Singapore, World Scientific Publishimg Co., 264 p. Chuvieco, E. and Congalton, R.G. (1989), Application of remote sensing and Geographic Information Systems to Forest fire hazard mapping, Remote Sensing of Environment. 29: 147-159. Chuvieco, E., Salas, F.J., Carvacho, L. and Rodrguez-Silva, F. (1999), Integrated fire risk mapping. In: Remote Sensing of Large Wildfires in the European Mediterranean Basin (E. Chuvieco, Ed.) Springer-Verlag, Berlin, pp. 61-84. Chuvieco, E., Salas, J., Barredo, J.I., Carvacho, L., Karteris, M. and Koutsias, N., (1998). Global patterns of large fire occurrence in the European Mediterranean Basin. A G.I.S. analysis. In: D.X. Viegas (Editor), III International Conference on Forest Fire Research - 14th Conference on Fire and Forest Meteorology. ADAI, Coimbra, pp. 24472462. Deeming JE, Burgan RE, Cohen JD (1977) The National Fire-Danger Rating System - 1978. USDA Forest Service, GTR INT-39, pp 63. Deeming JE, Lancaster JW, Fosberg MA, Furman RW, Schroeder MJ (1974) The National Fire-Danger Rating System. USDA, Rocky Mountain Forest and Range Experiment Station, RM-84, pp 53. DELFI (1999) The DELFI vocabulary. CONCERTED ACTION Definition and Creation of a Common Knowledge Base for Forest Fires ENV4-CT980735. FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization) (1986). Wildland fire management terminology. Terminologie de la lutte contre les incendies de fort. Terminologa del control de incendios en tierras incultas. Report n 70, FAO Forestry Paper, Roma. Finney, Mark A. 1998. FARSITE : Fire Area Simulatormodel development and evaluation. Res. Pap. RMRS-RP-4, Ogden,UT: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research Station. 47 p. Flannigan M.D., Stocks B.J., Wotton B.M., 2000 - The Science of the Total Environment 262 (2000) 221-229 Forestry Canada Fire Danger Group. 1992. Development and structure of the Canadian Forest Fire Behavior Prediction System. Forestry Canada, Ottawa, ON. Information Report ST-X-3. Gouma, V. and Chronopoulou-Sereli, A. (1998), Wildland fire danger zoning - A methodology, International Journal of Wildland Fire. 8(1): 37-43. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2002 Climate change and biodiversity. IPCC Technical paper V. Lu, J., Bomba, P. and Kind, T., (1990). A microcomputer-based geographic information system for forest fire management, ACSM-ASPRS Annual Convention, Denver, pp. 180-192.
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McPherson G.R., Wade D. D. and B., P.C. (1990). Glossary of Wildland Fire Management Terms Used in the United States., SAF (Society of American Foresters) 90-05., Washington D.C. Nesterov VG (1949) Combustibility of the forest and methods for its determination. State Industry Press, USSR. Overpeck JT, Rind D, Goldberg R. Climate-induced changes in forest disturbance and vegetation. Nature 1990;343: 51-53. Radke, J. (1995), Modeling Urban/Wildland Interface Fire Hazards within a Geographic Information System, Geographic Information Sciences. 1(1): 9-21. Rothermel, R.C. 1972. A mathematical model for predicting fire spread in wildland fuels. USDA For. Serv. Res. Pap. INT-115. Rothermel, R.C. 1983. How to predict the spread and intensity of forest and range fires. USDA For. Serv. Gen. Tech. Rep. INT-143. Salas, F.J. and Chuvieco, E. (1994), G.I.S. applications to forest fire risk mapping, Wildfire. 3: 7-13. San Miguel-Ayanz, J., Carlson, J.D., Alexander, M., Tolhurst, K., Morgan, G., Sneeuwjagt, R. and Dudley, M. (2003), Current Methods to Assess Fire Danger Potential. In: Wildland Fire Danger Estimation and Mapping. The Role of Remote Sensing Data (E. Chuvieco, Ed.) World Scientific Publishing, Singapore, pp. 21-61 San-Miguel-Ayanz, J., 2002, Methodologies for the evaluation of forest fire risk: from long-term (static) to dynamic indices, in Forest Fires: Ecology and Control, Anfodillo T. and Carraro, V. (Eds), Forest Fires: Ecology and Control, Univesity degli Studi di Padova, pp. 117-132. Thompson, W.A. (2000), Using forest fire hazard modelling in multiple use forest management planning, Forest Ecology and Management. 134: 163-176. Van Wagner CE (1987) Development and structure of the Canadian Forest Fire Weather Index System. Canadian Forestry Service, Technical Report 35, pp 37. van Wyngaarden, R. and Dixon, R., (1989). Application of GIS to model forest fire rate of spread, Challege for the 1990's GIS, Ottawa, pp. 967-977. Vasconcelos, M.J. and Guertin, D.P. (1992), FIREMAP. Simulation of fire growth with a Geographic Information System, International Journal of Wildland Fire. 2(2): 87-96. Vasconcelos, M.J.P., Silva, S., Tom, M., Alvim, M. and Pereira, J.M.C. (2001), Spatial prediction of fire ignition probabilities: comparing logistic regression and neural networks, Photogrammetric Engineering and Remote Sensing. 67(1): 73-83. Vega-Garca, C., Woodard, P.M. and Lee, B.S., (1993). Mapping Risk of Wildfires from Human Sources of Ignition with a GIS, 13th Annual ESRI User Conference, pp. 419-426.
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Vliegher, B.M. (1992), Risk assessment for environmental degradation caused by fires using remote sensing and GIS in a Mediterranean Region (South-Euboia, Central Greece). In: IGARSS'92. INt. Geoscience and Remote Sensing Symposium, Houston, TX., pp. 44-47. Weber MG, Flannigan MD. 1997 - Canadian boreal forest ecosystem structure and function in a changing climate: impact on fire regimes. Environmental Reviews. 5 (3-4):145-166. Wilson, J.S. and Baker, P.J. (1998), Mitigating fire risk to late-successional forest reserves on the east slope of the Washington Cascade Range, USA, Forest Ecology and Management. 110(1998): 59-75. Woods, J.A. and Gossette, F., (1992). A Geographic Information System for brush fire hazard management, ACSM/ASPRS Symposium, Washington, pp. 56-65. Yool, S.R., Eckhardt, D.W., Estes, J.E. and Cosentino, M.J. (1985), Describing the brushfire hazard in southern California, Annals of the Association of American Geographers. 75(3): 417-430.
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Appendix: Operational Standards for Risk Assessment aimed at Spatial Planning

1. Minimum standard (simplified model) for hazard mapping aimed at a legal directive
Several methods of risk assessment and mapping among the most common have been described in the state of the art, providing examples and maps. Many other methods exists, although in the state of the art an attempt has been made to group them identifying common approaches. The main conclusion is that at present no standard or recommended methods for fire risk assessment and mapping can be recognized, either from the scientific community or from the local authorities perspectives. As it has been stated, for almost every new case, researchers or practitioners have elaborated a new way of handling the problem, in order to adapt to the local context, as well as to make with the available data or budget. The most common approaches have been summarized in the report and some guidelines can be drawn, that will be schematically recalled in what follows. Reference has to be made to the state of the art document main body for fully understanding the schemes. Numerous uncertainties still remain and it is felt that a definitive methodology will have to be fully defined only within the harmonization and implementation phases of ARMONIA (WP3 and WP6), when integration with other natural hazards will be attempted. Nevertheless it also appears that a generalized method might be difficult to achieve, since the role and relative weight of the different environmental and human factors affecting forest fire hazard can change locally.
1.1. Various methodologies related to the 3 assumed scales of analysis in the light of a potential harmonisation of hazard maps, based on a multi-hazard perspective
Local Scales (> 1:5,000 and 1:5,000 1:50,000) Modeling approach Fire occurrence: little application at the higher scales. A qualitative estimate (no probability) can be attempted, based on roads and settlements types and location. Fire behavior potential: quantitative estimates using fire simulation models.
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Methods Fire occurrence: buffers of given distances from roads and settlements Fire behavior potential: fire simulation models such as the BEHAVE system (http://www.fire.org/). Basic input data required DEM, fuel model map, settlements, road network, weather patterns, administrative boundaries. If available: fire perimeters of past 5-10 years or fire frequency in the municipalities of past 10-15 years. Data formats Raster (pixel size < 100 m) Map legend If only fire behavior potential is considered (suggested for >1:5.000 scales), a quantitative legend can be foreseen, that shows the estimated potential fire line intensities under given meteorological scenarios. The classes of expected fire line intensity might be the following: 1. 0-50 kW/m 2. 50-350 kW/m 3. 350-1750 kW/m 4. 1750-3500 kW/m 5. 3500 kW/m At the scale 1:5,000 1:50,000, fire behavior classes might be combined with 2-3 expected fire occurrence pattern. Regional Scale (< 1:50,000) Modeling approach Fire occurrence: depending on data availability. Basic is statistical analysis of historical fires (10-15 years) at municipality (commune) level. If fire locations and/or perimeters are available, more sophisticated approaches can be pursued (e.g. with regression over environmental features). Fire behavior potential: fire simulation models or estimates from either past events or from environmental features (fuels, topography, climate). Methods Fire occurrence: kernel density probability based estimates or fire frequency distribution analysis at municipality level. Fire behavior potential: based on fire simulation model (such as the BEHAVE system) or ad hoc empirical methods derived from statistical analysis of local environmental and anthropogenic factors. Basic input data required DEM, land use, fuel types, fire data (last 10-15 years), administrative boundaries, climatic data, bioclimatic regions, WUI (Wildland Urban Interface) areas, (settlements, road network, socio-economic variables) Data formats Raster (pixel size > 100 m) and vector (if administrative boundaries are taken as geographical units. B.IV-31
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Map legend If only fire simulation is considered, a quantitative legend can be foreseen, that shows the average potential fire line intensities under given meteorological scenarios. The classes might be the following: 1. 0-50 kW/m 2. 50-350 kW/m 3. 350-1750 kW/m 4. 1750-3500 kW/m 5. 3500 kW/m If fire simulation is mixed or replaced with other analysis (suggested), i.e. empirical combination of data layer, or statistical analysis of fire data, qualitative classes of fire hazard are more conveniently applied. The suggested number of classes is again 5, e.g. level of fire hazard very low, low, average, high, very high.
2. Minimum standard (simplified model) for risk mapping aimed at spatial planning
Fire risk mapping (sensu probability x consequences) applications still not developed enough for standard operational definitions. As illustrated in the state of the art, only fire hazard could be considered at this stage.
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B.V Volcanic risk

Authors: Andrea Ceudech, Massimiliano Pistucci, UNINA; Giovanni Orsi, Sandro de Vita, Osservatorio Vesuviano
1 Physical definition of volcanic phenomena ...................... 3
1.1 1.2 Typologies ............................................................................... 3 Intensities, Severity, Magnitude ................................................. 6
Hazard assessment.......................................................... 7
2.1 Definition................................................................................. 7 2.2 Current methodologies for analysing and representation of hazard with respect to temporal scales .......................................................... 7 2.3 2.4 2.5 Dynamical hazard climate change effects ............................... 11 Problem of scale..................................................................... 11 Data availability typology, format GIS structure ................... 12
2.6 Examples of hazard maps and legends referred to assumed scales............................................................................................ 13
Elements at risk and exposure....................................... 13

3.1 Typology of elements.............................................................. 15
Analysis of vulnerability ................................................ 19

4.1 Definition of vulnerability and/or consequence ........................... 19 4.2 Methodologies for assessment related to structural and nonstructural elements at risk ............................................................... 20 4.2.1 Functions for vulnerability/consequence analysis.................... 23 4.2.2 Examples of vulnerability maps and legends .......................... 24 4.3 Most common damage potentials ............................................. 24
Analysis of risk .............................................................. 25

5.1 Definition of risk..................................................................... 25 5.2 Methodologies for risk assessment ........................................... 25 5.2.1 Qualitative and quantitative methods, direct and indirect risk .. 26 5.2.2 Functions of risk analysis ..................................................... 28 5.2.3 Examples of risk maps and legends ...................................... 28
6 7 8
Risk management .......................................................... 31 Glossary of all keywords................................................ 37 References..................................................................... 38

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Appendix: Operational Standards for Risk Assessment aimed at Spatial Planning.............................................................. 40

1. Minimum standard (simplified model) for hazard mapping aimed at a legal directive.............................................................................. 40 1.1. Various methodologies related to the 3 assumed scales of analysis in the light of a potential harmonisation of hazard maps, based on a multihazard perspective ......................................................................... 40 2. Minimum standard (simplified model) for risk mapping aimed at spatial planning .............................................................................. 40 2.1. Multi-risk assessment perspective as element of the Strategic Environmental Assessment .............................................................. 41 2.2. Methodologies, functions and outputs ....................................... 41
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1 Physical definition of volcanic phenomena

The words hazard and risk are often used as synonyms although they have very different meanings. Volcanic hazard is the probability of a given area being affected by potentially destructive volcanic processes or products within a given period of time (Fournier dAlbe 1979). Technically, therefore, the actual destructive volcanic processes themselves should be referred to as hazardous volcanic phenomena rather than as volcanic hazards. However, the popular understanding of the word hazard as a source of danger, however, means that potentially dangerous eruptive and posteruptive phenomena such as pyroclastic flows, wind-borne ash, lava flows, volcanic gases and lahars can also be referred to as volcanic hazards when not used in the context of probabilistic assessments. Risk is the possibility of a loss (e.g. of life, property, infrastructure) within the area subject to the hazard(s) (Fournier dAlbe 1979). Risk is evaluated by the relation: risk = value x vulnerability x hazard. Value includes everything threatened by the hazard, whereas vulnerability is the percentage of the value likely to be lost in a given hazardous event. It is important to understand the differences between hazard and risk. Volcanic hazards result from natural phenomena beyond human control and cannot be avoided. However, appropriate land management and risk mitigation actions based on detailed hazards assessments can reduce both exposed value and vulnerability, and thus risk.
1.1 Typologies
Volcanoes can produce a variety of hazardous phenomena with variable frequency. Such phenomena may occur during an eruption (direct hazards) or before or after an eruption (indirect hazards). The latter include the everpresent hazardous phenomena related to the presence of a live volcano, such as volcanic earthquakes and volcanic gases. Crandell et al. (1984) have distinguished two broad categories of hazards: 1) short-term (or intermediate) hazards are those that occur at such high frequency (more than once per century) that inhabitants of the area will likely experience them; and 2) long-term (or potential) hazards are those that occur at such low frequency (less than once per century) that they will not likely be experienced by people alive today. Lava flows - Lava flows are hot streams of molten rock that travel down valleys on the slopes of volcanoes at velocities ranging from a few m/hour to 60 km/hour. Lava flows generally move relatively slowly along relatively predictable paths, and therefore usually do not threaten human life, although they destroy everything in their path and can cause forest fires. Although there are other controlling factors, the speed and distance lava flows travel depends primarily on their viscosity; low-viscosity lava flows can be tens of kilometers long. Lava domes - Because viscous lava cannot flow easily, it tends to form short thick lava flows or pile up around the vent to form a hill, or lava dome. Viscous lava flows and domes can be hazardous as their steep sides often become unstable and can collapse, causing a type of small pyroclastic flow known as a block and ash flow, and associated ash fall. B.V-3
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Pyroclastic fall - Pyroclastic fall refers to the fragments (ash, lapilli, blocks or bombs) produced during an explosive eruption that fall to Earth, usually from an eruption column. Such pyroclasts can land after following a ballistic trajectory, or can rise through the atmosphere within a Plinian eruption column, be entrained into the umbrella cloud, and then fall by gravity. Fall deposits tend to blanket the ground as widespread sheets characterized by thickness and grain size that decrease with distance from the eruption vent. Pyroclastic fall hazard is often subdivided on hazard maps. The hazard from ash fall is usually shown as ash isopachs, derived by measuring ash fall thicknesses from past eruptions either at the volcano in question or a similar volcano. Ash is strongly affected by the direction of the prevailing wind, and isopachs are generally elongated downwind. The areas affected by ballistic blocks and bombs are often depicted as concentric circles surrounding the vent as these are less likely to be affected by wind. Most ballistic ejecta fall within 5 km of the vent, although in extremely explosive eruptions ballistic ejecta may travel > 10 km. Lateral blasts - A lateral blast is a laterally directed volcanic explosion of rock fragments and gas that explodes outwards at high velocity from the side of a volcano. It can affect a 180 sector and extend up to 30 km outward from the volcano. Lateral blasts are not affected by topography and can develop without warning. These types of eruptions are rare but can be triggered by failure of newly erupted lava domes or by the collapse of a large portion of the volcanic edifice. Pyroclastic density currents - A pyroclastic density current is a heavierthan-air, hurricane-like, ground-hugging mixture of volcanic particles, rock fragments and gas. Depending on magma fragmentation dynamics, these currents can be generated by variable mechanisms and their physical properties can vary accordingly. A large spectrum of currents can be generated, mostly characterised by their density. Generally the most dense currents are called pyroclastic flows, while the most dilute are called pyroclastic surges. Pyroclastic flows are hot (100-900C), fast-moving (>100 km/hr) currents, which form ground-hugging mixture of ash, rock fragments and gas. Such flows form when an eruption column or a lava dome collapses. They usually travel down valleys and cause total devastation of the area over which they flow. Small flows travel 5-10 km down topographic lows; large flows can overtop topographic barriers and travel for 50-100 km. Pyroclastic surges are dilute, turbulent clouds of gases and rock that move at great speeds above the immediate ground surface. The pyroclastic surges form in a similar way to pyroclastic flows or in relation to phreatomagmatic eruptions, but their effects are more widespread as they are less confined by topography and may therefore sweep across ridges and hills as well as down valleys. Pyroclastic surges can be either hot (several hundred C) or cold (< 100 C). Cold pyroclastic surges are generally known as base surges, and are commonly generated by phreatic and phreatomagmatic explosions. The hazardous aspects of both types of surges include the destruction of vegetation and structures, impact damage by rock fragments, and burial by ash and rock debris.
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Lahars - Lahars are mudflows formed when volcanic particles and debris mixes with water. The source of the water may be a crater lake, heavy rain, or melted ice or snow. The loose ash and volcanic fragments are transformed into a dense fluid-rock mixture that rushes down the slopes of a volcano and into surrounding valleys. Lahars are destructive to everything in their path, and the threat from rainfall-induced lahars may last for years after an eruption has ended. Debris avalanches - A debris avalanche is a sudden and rapid movement of large volumes (>10-20 million m3) of rock and other debris (e.g., vegetation) driven by gravity. It may result from the collapse of the side of an oversteepened volcano or gravitational collapse of unconsolidated sediments. Depending on their scale, debris avalanches may destroy everything in their path. They may travel over 30 km, and cover an area >1,000 km2. They may produce tsunamis in coastal areas. They can occur during volcanic eruptions or when a volcano is not actively erupting. They are one of the most hazardous but least common volcanic events. Tsunamis - Tsunamis are large seismic sea waves generated by the sudden displacement of water resulting from underwater disturbances such as a large earthquake or submarine volcanic eruption, or material impacting on the sea. Tsunamis travel extremely fast, reaching ~800 km/hr in the deep oceans. When tsunamis reach land they inundate low-lying coastal areas. Tsunami hazard is evaluated through from the effects of past tsunami or from computer modelling for areas to date not yet affected; it is , and depicted as inundation zones on low-lying areas which may be many kilometres away from the source of the tsunami (e.g., an underwater volcano). Volcanic gases - Magma contains dissolved gases that are released into the atmosphere during eruptions. In addition, fumaroles at geothermal systems associated with volcanoes also emit large amounts of gases, even when the volcano itself is quiescent. The most common gases in volcanic areas are water vapour (H2O), carbon dioxide (CO2) and sulphur dioxide (SO2) with smaller amounts of hydrogen sulphide (H2S), carbon monoxide (CO), hydrogen chloride (HCl) and hydrogen fluoride (HF). SO2, CO, CO2 and H2S are present in toxic amounts close to the vent of an erupting volcano and may be emitted from fumaroles. Further away from the vent these gases can become dissolved in atmospheric clouds to produce acid rain and mist, which affect human and animal eyes and respiratory systems and corrode metal building materials. Usually In general, gases are emitted in a continuously fashion; occasionally, though, large quantities of gas are suddenly vented, either during an eruption (e.g., Dieng volcano, Java 1979) or during the sudden overturn of a crater lake (e.g., Lakes Monoun and Nyos, Cameroon 1984 and 1988). One of the most common volcanic gases, carbon dioxide (CO2) is extremely dangerous as breathing air with greater than about 20% CO2 can cause almost instantaneous death. As it is heavier than air, CO2 tends to accumulate in hollows in the topographic lows, displacing the breathable air. People have died in this way at the Boiling Lake in the Valley of Desolation in Dominica, and livestock have been found dead in low-lying areas near Hekla in Iceland).
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Volcanic gas hazard is not usually depicted on volcanic hazard maps, although in some cases, such as if a crater lake is present, this may be warranted. Volcanic earthquakes - A volcanic earthquake is characterised by highfrequency seismic signals thought to be generated by the fracturing of rock in response to the intrusion and migration of magma. Volcanic earthquakes almost always precede the onset of volcanic activity, although they do not always culminate in a volcanic eruption. They often occur in swarms also during or after an eruption. In some cases, they may in themselves be severe energetic enough to cause significant damage, destroying buildings and triggering gravitational mass movements. Lightning strikes - Powerful displays of lightning produced by static electricity can occur during volcanic eruptions. Such lightning results from friction between ash, rock fragments, steam and gases in the eruption cloud and occur to about the radius of the ballistic trajectories. Lightning strikes can pose a threat to life and property and disrupt communication systems. Although not normally depicted on hazard maps, atmospheric effects in the eruption column would generate frequent lightning strikes to about the radius of the ballistic trajectories.

The intensity of an eruption is a measure of the rate at which magma is discharged during an eruption. It is defined as the mass eruption rate and is expressed in kg/s. An intensity scale, based on a logarithmic index of intensity is defined by: Intensity = log10(mass eruption rate, kg/s) + 3 On this scale, an extremely vigorous eruption will have an intensity of 1012, whereas a very gentle eruption might have an intensity of 4 or 5 (Pyle, 2000). The magnitude is the total mass of material ejected during an eruption, expressed in kg. A magnitude scale, based on a logarithmic index of magnitude is defined as follows: Magnitude = log10(erupted mass, kg) 7 According to this scale, a large eruption of a Plinian type is of magnitude 6 or more (Pyle, 2000). Severity has not been defined for volcanic eruptions.
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2 Hazard assessment
2.1 Definition
For the purposes of hazard assessment it is necessary to determine, as best as possible, the time, place and nature of future activity. This is known as the forecasting or predicting of eruptions, depending on the precision possible: A forecast is a comparatively imprecise statement of the time, place, and nature of expected activity; whereas a prediction is a comparatively precise statement of the time, place and, ideally, the nature and size of impending activity. A prediction usually covers a shorter time period than a forecast and is generally based dominantly on interpretations and measurements of ongoing processes and secondarily on a projection of past history (Banks et al. 1989). Forecasts can be further subdivided into long- and short-term forecasts. Long-term forecasts are those that pertain to the coming years, decades or longer. Most hazard assessments are essentially long-term hazard forecasts. Short-term forecasts are those that pertain to the coming hours, days and weeks, and are usually issued when unrest is escalating sharply, or a hazardous eruption has just begun. Long-term forecasting is based on the assumption premise that a given volcano will generate the same eruption phenomena as in the past, if the structure of the volcanic system has not changed. The reliability of a longterm forecast is therefore directly related to the amount and quality of the available data on past eruptive history of a given volcanic system, and the length of time that the data cover. The reconstruction of the past history of a volcanic system through geological investigations and evaluation of historical documents is essential in long-term forecasting. The evolution of a volcanic system from quiescence to an eruption involves magma rising from a certain depth up to the surface, which generates variations in the physical and chemical parameters of both the magma and the surrounding rocks. The evolution of these eruption precursors, which can be detected at the surface via a monitoring system, forms the basis of short-term forecasting. Ideally, all live volcanoes of the world should have a hazards map which reflects the long-term hazard forecast at that volcano, and which should be used by authorities, during times of quiescence, for risk mitigation and land-use planning. Once activity at a volcano escalates towards eruption conditions or a volcano begins erupting, the existing hazards map can be updated and adapted to reflect short-term forecasts of anticipated behaviour during the course of the eruption at the volcano.
2.2 Current methodologies for analysing and representation of hazard with respect to temporal scales
The ideal volcanic hazards assessment at a given volcano includes data from three main sources: geological investigations, volcano monitoring, and comparison with similar volcanoes. Geological investigations of past activity, including evaluation of all prehistoric and historical activity at the volcano. This provides an indication
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of size, style and frequency of past activity.; A monitoring network reflects the current state of the volcano, including observations of actual topography, presence of a crater lake or glaciers and meteorological conditions, such as wind direction profiles above the volcano and annual precipitation variations. The monitoring network provides an indication of when and where future activity may occur, and insights into the likely style of activity and possible areas affected. An evaluation of past and present activity at other similar volcanoes, provides an indication of possible activity that may be either unprecedented or not preserved in the geologic record at the volcano in question. Geological investigations - geological investigations carried out for volcanic hazards assessment, have to be focused at defining the past behaviour of a given volcano. They involves detailed fieldwork accompanied by sedimentological, palaeontological, geochronological, mineralogical and chemical analyses of representative rock samples. Collection of all available data from logs and cores of bore-holes drilled in the area, is of extreme interest. Vast amounts of information may be gleaned through such investigations, giving information on style, size, vent location and timing of past eruptions, as well as on the areas affected by the volcanic and related phenomena. This information is fundamental to perform a long-term forecast of the volcanos activity. Recognition of rock bodies, reconstruction of their geometrical relationships and elaboration of a general stratigraphic sequence, is the first step in the geological mapping. The characterization of the type of deposits is the base on which to hypothesise the possible style of future activity. present around a volcano provides an indication of the possible style of future activity. Radiometric dating of these deposits, together with the identification of erosional surfaces, paleosols and non-volcanic sediments, which often indicate periods of quiescence at the volcano, provides insights into past frequency of activity at the volcano as well as the duration of the current state of the volcano, permitting estimates of when certain activity may occur in the future. Deposits thickness and its areal distribution can be used to evaluate the volume of magma erupted during past eruptions which, together with petrological and geophysical data, give an indication of expected eruption size. Radiometric age dating of these deposits together with the identification of erosional surfaces, paleosols and non-volcanic sediments, which often indicate periods of quiescence at the volcano, provides insights into past frequency of activity at the volcano as well as the duration of the current (quiescent) state of the volcano, permitting estimates of when certain activity may occur in the future. Structural analysis aimed at the identification of the nature and mechanisms of past deformation events, such as caldera collapse and caldera resurgence, provides insight into variations in the stress regime through time which is essential for understanding the behaviour of the volcanic system. The areal distribution of eruption vents through time can also be a good indicator of the structural evolution of the volcano and thus the possible location of future vents.
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Mapping of the areal distribution of pyroclastic flow and surge currents and lavas, and lahar deposits associated with the volcano, combined with an evaluation of paleomorphology and current topography and a an understanding of transport and deposition mechanisms, is necessary to determine the areas likely to be affected by similar future activity. The areal distribution, thickness variations and clast-size characteristics of pyroclastic fall deposits can be used to develop isopach and isopleth maps as well as dispersal indices, which, when combined with knowledge of present-day dominant wind directions, provide an indication of the areas likely to be affected by future pyroclastic fall. On hazard maps pyroclastic fall should be depicted as isopachs or, to simplify risk assessment, as load on the ground. The reconstruction of historical the activity at the a given volcano based on the analysis of historical documentation is absolutely necessary to determine the volcanos most recent past, as this may provide the best indication of style and size of future eruptions at the volcano. The quality, quantity, and reliability of such documentation differ vastly from volcano to volcano, which is a reflection of the time period for which the area has been inhabited by humans, and the cultural level of the inhabitants. The present configuration and state of the magmatic volcanic plumbing system can be deduced by geophysical investigations incorporating for example seismic tomography, and magnetic and magnetotelluric methods. Fluid geochemistry data, collected on fumaroles and well and spring waters, allow to put constraints on the present state of both magmatic and hydrothermal systems. These can be combined with petrological data, which investigations provide information on depth, temperature and composition of the magma chamber feeding system up to the last eruption, needed to reconstruct the behaviour of the magmatic system through time. They also permit estimates of the amount and composition of the magma available for the next eruption. Combination of petrological, fluid geochemistry and geophysical data may be used to place important constraints on the type of future eruptions. A volcanic hazards assessment should needs not necessarily be based on the entire past history of a volcano, rather on its most recent history. The reasons for this are two-fold: firstly, the farther back in time a record the eruptive history is extended, the less complete and reliable it is likely to be; and secondly, the style and type of activity at a volcano usually commonly evolves with time, and the most recent activity, in particular that part following a significant structural change, if any, usually provides the best indication of likely future activity. Thus, if a volcano erupted effusively generating basaltic lava flows between 2 Ma and 1 Ma but became more silicic and explosive over time such that the last 50,000 years have been dominated by andesitic dome-growth and collapse interspersed with period of explosive plinian activity, then it would be appropriate to only include the last 50,000 years of past activity as a reference for likely future activity. The period of time to be taken into consideration will vary from volcano to volcano, and will be largely determined by its reconstructed past behaviour. Evaluation of past-activity at a volcanos past behaviour is extremely important in producing a volcanic hazards assessment, but, for the following several reasons, should be combined with any available information from
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both the monitoring network as well as past and present activity (both past and present) at similar volcanoes elsewhere. Eruptive behaviour at a given volcano may change over time, and the possibility exists for sudden, large-magnitude events that are unprecedented in its eruptive history, such as the debris avalanche and directed blast of 18 May 1980 eruption at Mt. St. Helens. Not all erupted products are preserved in the geologic record, particularly pyroclastic deposits, which are unconsolidated and easily eroded. A comparison with historically active similar volcanoes would highlight this incompleteness. For example, the deposits of the 1902 eruption of the Soufrire of St. Vincent, which killed about 1,600 people, have been almost completely eroded away and presently there is very little geologic record of this major eruption (R. Robertson, pers. comm.). The areas affected by volcanic activity in the past may be different to the areas likely to be affected in the future due to changes in topography over time. The growth of a volcano may fill valleys thus directing future lava and pyroclastic flows, and lahars down previously unaffected valleys. Growth or collapse phases of a volcano may either generate new topographic barriers, thus sheltering areas that were previously affected by activity from the volcano, or expose new areas to the effects of the volcanic activity. Furthermore, climatic conditions (such as wind direction) may also change with time (e.g., before/after the Pleistocene/Holocene boundary), meaning that tephra fall isopachs based on past eruptions may not accurately reflect the expected pattern of a future eruption. This implies that determined eruption frequencies have to be considered as minima. Not all erupted products are preserved in the geologic record, particularly as pyroclastic deposits are unconsolidated and easily eroded. A comparison with historically active similar volcanoes highlights this incompleteness: For example, the 1902 eruption of the Soufrire of St. Vincent killed ~1600 people but the deposits from this major eruption have been almost completely eroded away and there is very little geologic record of the eruption. The areas affected by volcanic activity in the past are usually different to the areas likely to be affected in the future due to changes in topography over time. The growth of a volcano may fill valleys thus directing future pyroclastic flows and lahars down previously unaffected valleys. Growth or collapse of nearby volcanoes may generate new topographic barriers thus sheltering areas that were previously affected by activity from the volcano. Furthermore, climatic conditions (such as wind direction) may also change with time (e.g., before/after the Pleistocene/Holocene boundary), meaning that ashfall isopachs based on past eruptions may not accurately reflect the expected pattern of a future eruption. The monitoring network - Many Some live volcanoes of the world have a monitoring network which provides critical information on the current state of the volcanic system. Ideally each live volcano should have a monitoring system. Scientists should summit projects to reach this goal and urge civil authorities to support them. Various techniques are used to monitor activity at live volcanoes, including seismic, ground deformation, geochemical, remote sensing, and geothermal thermal methods. The locations of B.V-10
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historical seismic swarms, ground deformation and hydrothermal activity may help constrain the location of a future vent as well as the probability of a future eruption. An additional, extremely important aspect of monitoring is actual visual appraisal of the volcano and its surrounds surroundings. This includes evaluating present-day topography (to determine likely flow paths of lavas, pyroclastic density currents and lahars), climate conditions (to determine likely airfall patterns) and hydrology (to determine the likelihood of magma-water interaction and lahar occurrence). If crater lakes or glaciers are present their behaviour and physical conditions also require close observation as they might contribute to the generation of lahars and other lethal phenomena. Comparison with past and present activity at similar volcanoes elsewhere As mentioned above, this can be very useful in countering some of the shortcomings associated with hazards assessment based solely on past activity at the volcano in question. It is of particular value in cases where very little data is available or there have been no historical eruptions at the volcano. Time scale - Active volcanoes can be either quiescent or in persistent activity. Volcanic hazards assessment depends not only upon past history of a given volcano, but also on its present state. As such a state can change, the time scale of the assessment has to be of the order of months/years in case of persistently active volcanoes and of tens of years in case of quiescent volcanoes.

None for volcanic hazards

Volcanoes can produce a variety of hazardous phenomena with variable frequency and variable impact on the territory. Such phenomena may occur during an eruption (direct hazards) or before or after an eruption (indirect hazards). Therefore each kind of hazard has to be evaluated independently and mapped at the most suitable scale. Lava flows - Lava flows generally move relatively slowly along relatively predictable paths, and therefore usually do not threaten human life, although they destroy everything in their path and can cause forest fires. Suggested scale: 1:500 1:5000. Lava domes - Because viscous lava cannot flow easily, it tends to form short thick flows or pile up around the vent to form a hill, or lava dome. Suggested scale: 1:500 1:5000. Pyroclastic fall - Fall deposits tend to blanket the ground as widespread sheets characterised by thickness and grain size decrease with distance from the eruption vent, affecting areas as large as 500 km2. The areas affected by ballistic blocks and bombs usually do not exceed 100 km2, although in extremely explosive eruptions, they can reach 300 km2. Suggested scale: 1:5000 1:50000.
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Lateral blasts - Lateral blasts can affect a 180 sector and extend up to 30 km outward from the volcano. Suggested scale: 1:500 1:5000. Pyroclastic density currents - Dense pyroclastic currents, called pyroclastic flows, usually travel down valleys and cause total devastation of the area over which they flow. Small flows travel 5-10 km down topographic lows; large flows can overtop topographic barriers and travel for several tens of kilometres. Dilute pyroclastic currents, called pyroclastic surges, are more widespread as they are less confined by topography and may therefore sweep across ridges and hills as well as down valleys. Suggested scale: 1:500 1:5000 and 1:5000-1:50000. Lahars - Lahars are mudflows that rushes down the slopes of a volcano and into surrounding valleys. Lahars are destructive to everything in their path, and the threat from rainfall-induced lahars may last for years after an eruption has ended. Suggested scale: 1:500 1:5000. Debris avalanches - Debris avalanches are drive by gravity and usually move down valleys, although in some cases they are able to surmount topographic barriers. They may travel over 30 km, and cover an area >1,000 km2. They may produce tsunamis in coastal areas. They can occur during volcanic eruptions or when a volcano is not actively erupting. Depending on their scale, debris avalanches may destroy everything in their path. They are one of the most hazardous but least common volcanic events. Suggested scale: 1:500 1:5000. Tsunamis - Tsunamis may affect large areas which may be many kilometres (thousands) away from their source. Suggested scale: 1:5000 1:50000. Volcanic gases - The hazard related to volcanic gas emission is usually confined in a limited area around the volcano but further away from the vent these gases can become dissolved in atmospheric clouds to produce acid rain and mist, which affect vegetation and eyes and respiratory systems, and corrode metal building materials. Suggested scale: 1:500 1:5000 and: 1:5000 1:50000. Volcanic earthquakes - Usually volcanic earthquakes are characterised by high-frequency seismic signals generated at shallow depth below a volcano. Although they could be highly energetic, volcanic earthquakes can be felt only at a limited distance from the epicentre. Suggested scale: 1:500 1:5000. Lightning strikes - Although not normally depicted on hazard maps, atmospheric effects in the eruption column would generate frequent lightning strikes to about the radius of the ballistic trajectories. Suggested scale: 1:500 1:5000.

Generally, GIS are planned to set up a decision support system for volcanic risk mitigation (hazard, value, vulnerability and risk map assessing), to provide suitable tools during an impending crisis and to provide a basis for emergency plans.
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The structure of GIS carried out by Pareschi et al. (2000), aimed at mitigating and managing the volcanic hazard and risk of the Vesuvius and Etna, is articulated in five main thematic layers: digital elevation models, digital images from satellite or aircraft, vector data on natural and artificial features, population density, hazard maps. Concerning these latter, the available hazard maps, either simple sketches or based on a quite detailed basis, represent a sub-division of the land affected in the past with various frequencies by destructive volcanic phenomena.

In Europe, the hazard maps for Campi Flegrei caldera (Orsi et al., 2004) are the most recent and advanced products carried out. The volcanic phenomena considered are the tephra fallout (figure 1), articulated in four hazard levels and the pyroclastic currents (figure 2), articulated in two hazard levels. The volcanic hazard map (figure 3) results from the overlapping of these maps at the local scale (1: 5,000 1: 50,000).

We can define elements at risk those threatened by hazardous volcanic phenomena in a definite area and exposure the measurement of structural and non structural (population, properties, economic facilities, public structures, duties) elements at risk.
Figure 1: Tephra fallout hazard map of the Campi Flegrei caldera; Source: Orsi G. et al. (2004)
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Figure 2: Pyroclastic currents hazard map of the Campi Flegrei caldera; Source: Orsi G. et al. (2004)
Figure 3: Volcanic hazard map of the Campi Flegrei; Source: Orsi G. et al. (2004)
Referring to the EU and non-EU examined studies about volcanic risk assessment, two main scales are used: regional scale and local scale.
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At regional scale (1:50.000 1:500.000), most of the studies consider resident population as the main element at risk. In the quantitative approach to assess the risk in Montserrat (MVO, 1998) people is considered as the only element at risk to evaluate individual and societal risk level through a quantitative risk assessment approach. Other studies also include infrastructures (transport lines and terminals and service distribution networks), major economic sectors and economic centres, strategic facilities (hospitals, public rescue teams building, schools, etc), environmental resources and territory. Environmental resources could be considered elements at risk not only for the presence of the main hazard, volcanic hazard, but even for the threat represented by secondary hazards, for example toxic releases or hazardous spills that could occur as result of a volcanic phenomenon (Trople, 2002). Historical and architectural heritage is not generally included among elements at risk. Even if it is not possible to implement mitigation actions for these goods against the majority of the volcanic hazardous phenomena, it could be done against some others (e.g. ash falls) or against secondary minor hazardous events (e.g. toxic releases or hazardous spills).
Figure 4: Facilities vulnerable to volcanic hazards; Source: Trople T.L. (2002)
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Exposure has been differently assessed at regional scale in order to different mapping outputs. Some studies simply aim at overlaying hazard maps with elements at risk without measuring exposure. Applying an overlaying method, Trople (2002) produced a map of the Enumclaw and Buckley area, sited near the Mount Rainer volcano, to identify intersections of critical facilities with risk areas (figure 4). Cronin and Neal (2002) made a risk assessment and mapping for the Taveuni volcano on the homonymous island of the Fiji. A map concerning elements at risk considered for risk assessment has been produced (figure 5). In this map hazard levels are not indicated, but just major infrastructures and the prevalently farmed areas are localized. About the former, main villages, hospitals, schools and tourist accommodations are indicated. About linear infrastructures, roads and water pipelines (existent and in project) are reported. Some other peculiar elements, to be considered in case of emergency, have been directly described on the map like the airport, some water bores, the main fuel storage site and the communication centre. Other studies aim at defining single risk map resulting from joining value of hazard, exposure and vulnerability. In this case it is necessary to relate elements at risk to only one parameter.
Figure 5: Main infrastructural elements on Taveuni ; Source: Cronin S.J. et al. (2002)
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For example, structural and non structural elements could be related to their economic value. In order to work out a volcanic risk map and to forecast the cost of volcanic activity in Guatemala (Green et al., 1995), the number of resident people has been converted in economic value through the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita; the value of the territory has been measured through land use value per hectare. They consider even infrastructures but they do not specify how to measure their value. In figure 6 there are some examples of the maps produced for this study.
Figure 6: Exposure of the Volcano Santa Maria; Source: http://www.geo.mtu.edu/volcanoes/santamaria
About measurement of population at risk, some studies simply consider the number of residents in the threatened area (Trople, 2002) (Baxter et al., 1998). An European study on the Campi Flegrei caldera (Alberico et al., 2001) measure the exposure combining census data about population density and an urbanization index that indicates the ratio between built area and total area of a community (figure 7). Referring to local scale detailed (1:500 1:5.000), volcanic hazardous areas are mostly studied through an emergency approach and just in a few cases through a risk assessment approach. Among those, Lavigne (1999) developed a lahar hazard micro-zonation and risk assessment in Yogyakarta city, Indonesia. Located 25 km south of Mount Merapi, one of the most active volcanoes of the world, Yogyakarta city (> 500,000 people) is a centre exposed at an increasing volcanic risk: the summit dome of Merapi has continuously grown since 1984; the instability of the volcano flanks is potentially growing and they could result in debris avalanche; pyroclastic flow deposits, emplaced during and after the 1994 dome-collapse, could flow away as lahars, through the urban area, even because of hard rainfalls. In spite of all that, the urban area population is growing 2% a year.
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Combined geomorphological investigation, lahar flow simulation were used to delineate areas exposed at volcanic lahar risk in Yogyakarta. The hazard map on which risk assessment has been developed is at 1/2000 scale.
Figure 7: Urbanization index of Campi Flegrei.; Source: Alberico I. et al. (2002)
Elements at risk considered are houses, public buildings (schools, mosques and prayer houses), infrastructure equipment (stores, market, warehouse, asphalt roads and bridges) and hectares of tilled land. The average value (in US dollars) of each element at risk has been used to estimate an approximate value of likely loss. Furthermore, population living in lahar risk prone areas has been simply counted. Produced hazard and risk maps at 1/2000 scale for highly populated areas are available at the Merapi Volcano Observator. The choice of working with 1/2000 scale allow to produce maps clearly understandable by the public, that is able to recognise their own houses. Those kind of maps are very useful even for decision makers (local and regional authorities). In Europe, studies have been developed to assess the vulnerability of structural elements to some volcanic hazardous phenomena (especially about the interaction with pyroclastic flows) (Zuccaro, 2004). Single
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buildings are then considered as elements at risk without considering at least the identification of their value (economical, architectural, etc.).
Most of the experiences carried out on volcanic risk assessment are based on the definition of risk formulated by Fournier dAlbe (1979). This definition was developed by UNDRO (1991) and extended to all natural hazards as follows: Risk = (Element at risk) *(Natural hazard * Vulnerability). Referring to this definition, Vulnerability is interpreted as degree of loss between 0 and 1 of an element at risk, or of a number of such elements, resulting from the occurrence of a natural phenomenon of a given magnitude. Generally, elements at risk are population, buildings and infrastructures, economic activities, public services in a specific area. This definition does not automatically represent a mathematical formula, but it expresses the integration of different dimensions in the risk assessment. Although this definition is the most common interpretation of the vulnerability concept, in some experiences we find some attempts to define vulnerability as the propension of all exposed elements to be damaged by volcanic activity. In such experiences this interpretation is referred to buildings or infrastructures and to territorial or urban systems. Vulnerability will change as the type of volcanic activity changes (i.e. from effusive to explosive). For example, referring to buildings and infrastructures, these experiences define volcanic vulnerability as the propension to the damage due to pyroclastic and lava flows and accumulation of volcanic ashes. Only in few cases vulnerability is linked to territorial and urban systems. In detail, vulnerability is related to the sum of building and infrastructure vulnerability and to the characteristics of the morphology of settlements which can determine functional crisis and difficulty of exodus or help for the population. It is useful to underline that in some cases the vulnerability of buildings and infrastructures is referred to seismic risk, intending the earthquake as the main display of volcanic activity. In this report we will exclude seismic vulnerability because it is treated elsewhere in the ARMONIA Project. Finally, we have to remark that in some cases territorial or urban system vulnerability is analysed referring to the damages due to the unsatisfactory preparation to manage the emergency induced by volcanic activity. In synthesis, we can define volcanic vulnerability of a territorial or urban system as the predisposition of the system to damage due to volcanic phenomena. Referring to the different kind of damages caused by a volcanic eruption, we have different types of vulnerability: vulnerability of building stock, roads, emergency facilities; urban or territorial vulnerability, which expresses the tendency of a city to functional crisis due to an inadequacy of spatial organization of different urban areas (urban textures); B.V-19
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organizational vulnerability referred to the tendency of urban systems towards a functional crisis due to the lack of coordination among different institutional organizations involved in the emergency management.
Vulnerability is effectively a multidimensional characteristic and it depends on many factors (such as environmental, physical, technical, economic, social, political, institutional and cultural). These factors are not independent and interact resulting in a global vulnerability. We will stress our attention only on physical and functional characteristics of the exposed territorial systems and on the damages to population. The few European and international experiences which are focused on volcanic vulnerability assessment are developed at two main scales: territorial and site scale. Besides, volcanic vulnerability is mainly related to the phenomena of lava and pyrochlastic flows, and accumulation of ashes. At regional scale (1:50,000 1:500,000) exposure and vulnerability are not clearly distinguished because all the elements at risk are considered as totally vulnerable. Sometimes vulnerability is calculated upon the population density and the GDP of the regions. At local scale (1:5,000 1:50,000), vulnerability is often expressed as the degree of loss between 0 and 1 of elements at risk. The most important elements exposed to the volcanic risk are: population, buildings and infrastructures, economic activities, public services. At local detailed scale (1:500 1:5,000) we have studies focused on the vulnerability of buildings referring to the impact of pyroclastic flows and to the accumulation of ashes. Referring to the local scale (1:5,000 1:50,000), in the studies carried out for Montserrat Volcano (MVO et al.,1998) after that volcano activity escalated in June 1997, vulnerability is interpreted as the expected damage. The assessment of volcanic vulnerability of the population takes into account that vulnerability may arise from varying circumstances: e.g. daytime or night-time occurrence of the event; any alert or warning leadtime which might be possible (rapidity of event onset, or scientists warning, for instance); proximity or occupation of houses (especially for tephra fall), etc. These vulnerability factors have been set to range from 1.0 to 0.5, depending on the considered scenario, where the higher figure indicates that no effective reduction in vulnerability is allowed. In this study different hazard scenarios and risk assessment were defined using the Monte Carlo event probability trees. For each event scenario carried out in this study, a further estimate includes population vulnerability factor referred to the limited protection which might be gained from buildings etc. The vulnerability factor could be reduced by mitigation measures. For tephra fall hazards, a numerical approach has been adopted for assessing percentage impact on each settlement. Estimates of clast sizes and accumulation rates of tephra from numerical models have been used in conjunction with studies of roof resistance to both loading of material and clast impacts. The number of roof collapses can then be calculated basing B.V-20
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on the knowledge of building stock distribution for each area, and casualty rates can be estimated. A constant vulnerability factor and fatalities factor have been used for all airfall hazard scenarios. Referring to pyroclastic flows, an european research project, Human and Structural Vulnerability Assessment for Emergency Planning in a Future Eruption of Vesuvius using Volcanic Simulation and Casualty Modelling (1998 - 2000), worked out a model to estimate potential impacts on buildings, the likely numbers of deaths and injuries in the hazard zones, using data on a well-defined pyroclastic flow events and data on the resistance of the openings of the buildings (position, size, design and performances). Referring to the accumulation of volcanic ashes, building vulnerability has been defined using the relationship between the different attended ash loads, determined with the historical deposits, and the resistance of building coverages. In some recent experiences, methods for the assessment of building vulnerability to volcanic hazard have been extended to territorial and urban scale and only few of them defined some urban vulnerability parameters. In the study carried out by Spence, Baxter and Zuccaro (2004) referring to the pyroclastic flows, the volcanic vulnerability of the building stock in the Vesuvius area is defined starting from a survey of buildings and urban environment. Pyroclastic flows are a serious threat to life for the inhabitants of settlements near volcanoes with an explosive eruption history. However, buildings can provide protection to people trapped by these flows. This analysis identifies the incidence of characteristics and elements likely to improve building vulnerability, and classifies the building stock, basing on the period of construction, load-bearing vertical structure, floor structure, roof structures, condition of maintenance of structures, factors affecting vulnerability (poor connection between vertical and horizontal structure, openings that are in poor condition, etc.). The survey emphasised particularly the number, location, size and type of openings of the major classes of the local building stock. Subsequently, this survey formed the basis for estimates of the probable impact of the pyroclastic flow on the envelope and internal air conditions of typical buildings. A number of distinct ways in which human casualties would occur were identified, and estimates of the relationship between casualty rates and environmental conditions for each casualty type (due to failure of openings, infiltration of hot gases and ash, being out of doors) were carried out. Casualty rates were used to estimate the proportions of occupants who would be killed or seriously injured for the assumed pyroclastic flow scenario in the Vesuvian villages studied, and their distribution by distance from the vent. Finally, some risk factors for casualties were identified and ranked in order to mitigate their impact in the eruption scenario. Referring to the scale 1:500 1:5,000, a study on the interaction of pyroclastic flows with building structures (Zuccaro and Ianniello, 2004) has been carried out. In this study a fluid-dynamic model has been applyed to simulate pyroclastic flow-urban settlement interactions. The model is based on partial differential equations of mass, momentum and turbulent energy integrated using a finite element method on a 3-D domain. The model was B.V-21
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tested on an urban sector of Torre del Greco, municipality very close to Vesuvius. The results show a partial shielding effect of structures closer to the volcano, on structures behind them as well as a total pressure waning pattern along the mean direction of the pyroclastic flow. The aim of the study is to supply a first investigation of the sheltering effect and of the pyroclastic flows action on tall buildings facing Vesuvius, and also to find an evaluation of possible pressure decay factors. The influence of these factors on the volcanic vulnerability of buildings is crucial to evaluating reliable damage scenarios. Studies and researches performed in the draft of the Vesuvius National Emergency Plan, an advanced experience in the topic of vulnerability assessment, are very interesting because they synthesize many of the mentioned approaches. In a first phase, the study of vulnerability carried out in 1994-1995 for the draft of the Vesuvius Preliminary Emergency Plan defined, within the 18 municipalities of the Vesuvius belt, 120 microzones to which a vulnerability level referred to the concentration of vulnerable buildings was assigned. Besides the parameters connected to the structural characteristics of the buildings, other two parameters were considered: the housing qualitative level and the characteristics of coverages of buildings. The first one was aimed at putting in evidence critical zones from a socioeconomic point of view, the second one was aimed at assessing the resistance of the coverages to the accumulation of volcanic ashes. Besides some factors of urban vulnerability were assessed referring to such areas, such as: population density; relationship between height and width of the buildings; width of the roads; presence of barriers; distance from the life-lines. This survey was enough detailed for the activities of planning connected with the draft of the preliminary of the Vesuvius Emergency Plan, but it was not sufficiently detailed for the draft of the Communal Plans of Civil Protection. At the end of 1998, after a national survey (LSU - DPC Project), the previously analyses have been integrated with analyses of greater detail. All the data and the information have been integrated into a GIS, which in the future will be integrated and modified with further detailed analyses locally produced. In detail, four cartographies have been drawn for each municipality: seismic vulnerability; typological-structural distribution (MSK); height of the buildings; characteristics of the coverages or horizontal building structures. Within Vesuvius National Emergency Plan of the 1995, an investigation was performed on the seismic vulnerability of the urban settlements of the Vesuvius area. The eruptive scenery foresees a seismic activity of middle intensity (maximum magnitudo 4-5 and a degree of damage inferior to the VIII B.V-22
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Mercalli degree). In this hypothesis the damages should interest only masonry buildings. Investigation has almost exclusively been turned to such building typology. In the meanwhile the ability of an urban settlement to face the emergency, called "urban environment vulnerability", has been assessed in a quantitative way. The total number of buildings in the Vesuvius area is very high. Insofar, the National Group for the Defense from the Earthquakes (GNDT), has set a methodology for a quick survey for the assessment of seismic vulnerability of all the building structures of the inhabited centers and the evaluation of the "urban environment vulnerability".
4.2.1 Functions for vulnerability/consequence analysis

Generally, functions used for the vulnerability analysis are simple. In fact vulnerability is interpreted as the degree of loss between 0 and 1 of the elements at risk. At regional scale all the exposed elements are supposed to be totally vulnerable. At local scale (1:5,000 1:5,000) we have some differences referring to the kind of volcanic phenomenon considered. For example, vulnerability of the population exposed to the lava flows (Blong, 1984) is nearly equal to 0, considering the low speed of lava flows and the ability to act with evacuation plans. On the contrary, because of the destructive aftermath of lava flows, it can be assumed a vulnerability value equal to 1 for all land use classes and any man-made structures. Also in the Volcanic Risk Map worked out for Santa Mara, Guatemala, vulnerability measures a percentage (0-100%) of the value likely to be lost in a given event. In this study the percentage of attended loss is related to different kinds of natural phenomena connected to the volcanic activity which can occur in different areas. At local scale (1:5,000 1:5,000) the elements considered in the vulnerability assessment are non structural elements like population, activities (types of land use) and structural, like building stock and infrastructures. Data sources are referred to the cartographical, demographic, economic and land use data provided by national agencies and regional administrations. At local detailed scale (1:500 1:5,000), we find risk assessments which have both demographic and economic data obtained from national, local agencies, both more detailed data on physical and structural characteristics of buildings, mainly derived from direct surveys. At this scale, vulnerability functions are mainly referred to buildings. Vulnerability of buildings (and infrastructure) is mainly expressed through the building age, load-bearing vertical structure, floor structures, roof structures, condition of maintenance of structures, type of connection between vertical and horizontal structure. In particular, for the volcanic vulnerability of buildings to pyroclastic flows the assessment is referred to the number, location, size and type of openings of the major classes of local building stock. In same cases we find a statistical relationship between number of roof collapsed and levels of ash loads for a well-defined typology of building stock. All these functions are carried out in very detailed studies
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and at the present a simplified function useful for the harmonization process is not available.
4.2.2 Examples of vulnerability maps and legends

As mentioned previously, vulnerability is interpreted as the degree of loss between 0 and 1 of an element at risk, resulting from the occurrence of a natural phenomenon linked to volcanic activity. For this reason it is not easy to find vulnerability maps because they coincide partially with the exposure maps. At regional scale (1:50,000 1:500,000) we have maps related to the population density and to the GDP product because all the exposed elements are considered as totally vulnerable. At local scale (1:5,000 1:50,000), we find the exposure maps related to the population density, GDP, land use, infrastructures. However, in some cases maps related to the vulnerability of building stock to volcanic risk have been carried out. For example, results collected for the draft of the Vesuvius National Emergency Plan have been provided both under numerical form and both trough maps. Five levels of seismic vulnerability have been defined (nothing - low - average - high - very high). The investigation has included all the public and strategic buildings. Besides some maps related to the "urban environment vulnerability" have been worked out. These maps define three levels of vulnerability of the urban environment (low, average and elevated). At local detailed scale (1:500 1:5,000) in depth analyses on the vulnerability of urban sectors to the pyroclastic flows or to the accumulation of ashes have been set up but, at the present, well-defined maps are not available.
4.3 Most common damage potentials

The damages to the elements of a territorial system due to the volcanic activity are dependent from the type of natural phenomena considered. For example, lava flow is a relevant threat for buildings and infrastructures and activities but not for people. Other phenomena connected with an explosive volcanic eruption, in particular pyroclastic flows, are a serious threat to people. Pyroclastic flows are the most dangerous of the volcanic hazards because of their rapid onset and potential destructiveness. They can engulf human settlements with little warning, and can cause large numbers of human casualties as well as destruction of buildings and infrastructure. For any particular type of building, the degree of correlation between the nearground characteristics of the flow and the type and degree of damage is defined. Referring to the accumulation of volcanic ashes the damages generally considered are building coverage collapses and road interruptions. However, at the local scale (1:5,000 1:50,000), the main damages are: potential deaths or damage to buildings or infrastructure, rather than to economic activities. At the local detailed scale, the considered damage is mainly referred to deaths, injuries and building and infrastructures damage.
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5 Analysis of risk
Referring to the definition formulated by Fournier dAlbe (1979) and developed and extended to all natural hazards by UNDRO (1991), risk is the result of the integration of different components: hazard, elements at risk and their vulnerability. Thus, volcanic risk is the possibility of harmful consequences, or expected loss (of lives, people injured, property, infrastructure, livelihoods, economic activities, etc.) resulting from interactions between volcanic eruption and anthropic environment. Risk is the quantitative (or qualitative) expression or measure of expected damages and it is evaluated as a result of volcanic hazard which affects a territory exposed to it and its vulnerability. Furthermore, the concept of damage gets wider and wider including, at short and long term, physical damage, social and economical losses and the loss of natural and anthropic resources too which represent the identity of a territory.

Referring to the state of the art of the volcanic risk assessment, till now focus is mainly on hazard assessment and the other components of volcanic risk assessment, exposure and vulnerability, related to the anthropic systems are not investigated in depth. There are only few experiences related to the volcanic risk assessment. These research projects and practices are developed at two main scales: the territorial and the building scale. Volcanic risk assessment can be of course related to different kind of natural phenomena connected with the volcanic activity. For example, risk connected to tephra fallout can be computed as the product of hazard, vulnerability to different ash loads and value. This latter has been sometimes considered as 1 where buildings are present, 0 otherwise. In this case, risk is expressed in terms of number of probable building collapses and people injured or died. At local scale (1:5,000 1:50,000), risk is expressed in terms of loss of lives or people injured, damage to buildings or to economic activity. Sometimes the attended damage is expressed through its economic value. Risk assessments are based on both demographic and economic data obtained from national, local agencies, both on data referred to physical and structural characteristics of buildings. At local detailed scale (1:500 1:5,000), risk assessments consider both demographic and economic data obtained from national, local agencies, both more detailed data on physical and structural characteristics of buildings, mainly derived from direct surveys. At this scale, risk is mainly expressed in terms of deaths, injuries and building damaged or collapsed.
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5.2.1 Qualitative and quantitative methods, direct and indirect risk

Risk assessment is mainly based on quantitative methods and is focused on the direct risk that comes from the volcanic activity to the exposed elements. The most common scale of analysis is the local scale between 1:5,000 and 1:50,000. At regional scale, the study carried out by Cronin and Neal (2001) on Taveuni, Fiji, provides a qualitative assessment of volcanic risk combining hazard information (both from maps and volcanic processes knowledge) with the location and nature of the vulnerable elements. The risk map singles out the areas characterized by the highest combination of vulnerable elements and degree of hazard. The elements considered are population, infrastructures, land use. Risk to population is considered low, due to the period of warning probably afforded by pre-event seismicity and to the low explosivity of most events. By contrast, the risk to infrastructures, buildings and agriculture is high in some parts of the island. Combining hazard information with population and development data highlights these areas. The most relevant impact for Taveuni is the long-term economic impact caused by the combination of: tourism losses, crop destruction, long periods of limited access to arable land, isolation of some areas from transport to markets, and effectively permanent destruction of the agricultural potential of some land. At local scale (1:5,000 1:50,000), the study on volcanic risk assessment in Vesuvius area (Lirer and Vitelli, 1998) considers risk as monetary loss due to lava flow, by extracting the built-up areas (urban and rural areas), classified according to the different house densities and multiplied by a mean economic value, evaluated for each single municipality. Initially, both lava flow hazard and land use maps were combined to single out all areas subjected to risk. The resultant map shows the spatial variation of the economic value, assigning a mean market value for each single municipality in Italian lira per unit area (lira/km2) of the builtup areas exposed to lava flow hazard. The characteristics considered are the housing density and the lack of agricultural and rural zones. The evaluation of long-term volcanic risk from pyroclastic flows in Campi Flegrei (Alberico et al., 2001) considers a relative volcanic risk obtained by the analysis of the value of the population distribution. An urbanization index, articulated into five classes, indicates the ratio between the built area and the total area of the community. Naples area has the highest values and the municipalities of the internal area have a low index. The risk maps have been obtained by the product of fatal impact maps and urbanization map. Researches carried out on the Furnas Volcano in the Azores were focused on built environment. In particular, the studies analysed the relationships between building type, construction quality and tephra fall/seismic hazards, basing on GIS overlay techniques (Chester et al., 2002). Furthermore, they analysed the communications, mainly between scientists, decision makers and civil defence officials (Pomonis et al., 1999). B.V-26
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In the studies carried out for the Montserrat after June 1997 (MVO et al.,1998), the main objective of the risk assessment was the calculation of the probability of fatality figures resulting from the different types of eruptions that could occur within a period of six months after the event. The analysis does not include estimates of injuries (which, for emergency planning purposes, might be inferred from fatality numbers). The number of people impacted depends on the spatial extent of pyroclastic flows and surges, tephra and ash falls etc., which in turn depends on the scale of the eruptive events. In the assessment, experts defined ranges of population impact factors for each identified population by each event scenario, expressed as impact percentages (which are again turned into equivalent Beta probability distribution function). Further additional vulnerability factors have been introduced for taking into account the vulnerability which may arise from varying circumstances (day-time or night-time occurrence; alert or warning lead-time; proximity to or occupation of houses, etc.). For some of these factors the study has carried out semi-deterministic numerical modelling and a detailed probabilistic assessment of consequences. For example, the transport of clasts and the dangers to people of bombardment by clasts have been so modelled. Referring to the non-European experiences, Volcanic Risk Map for Santa Mara, Guatemala combines volcanic hazard zonations with four layers of economic and population data, represented through four thematic maps: Standard of Living (adjusted GDP per capita, based on crowding, housing conditions, basic sanitation, availability of potable water, access to basic education and basic needs); Population Density (number of people/hectare); Infrastructure (kilometres of highways, electrical distribution and transmission lines); Land use (dollar value/hectare of all economic activities contributing to Guatemalan GDP). The risk map is expressed in terms of total cost of the volcanic activity for Guatemalan government: Volcanic Risk = Value * Vulnerability * Hazard. Value is the Standard of Living * Population Density + Infrastructure + Landuse (dollars/hectare); Vulnerability measures a proportion of the value likely to be lost in a given event; Hazard is the probability of a given area being affected by a potentially destructive process within a given period of time. The volcanic risk map for Santa Maria calculated the economic impact of an active volcano in dollar terms.
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Generally, the basic function used to calculate the risk is Volcanic Risk = Value * Vulnerability * Hazard. Well defined functions for risk analysis are not available.

Montserrat Volcano Observatory carried out several volcanic risk maps for Soufriere Hills Volcano (figure 8). In the risk map carried out in September 1997 three Zones have been defined: Exclusion Zone (in green), Central Zone (orange) and Northern Zone (yellow). In the Exclusion Zone entrance is not allowed except for scientific monitoring and National Security Matters. The Central Zone is a residential area only: all residents are on heightened state of alert and are required to have rapid means of exit 24 hours per day. The Northern Zone is an area with lower risk, suitable for residential and commercial activities. The volcanic risk map for Santa Maria (figure 9) defines nine risk classes expressed in economic terms, as mentioned previously. However this map is not very simple to understand.
Figure 8: Volcanic risk map for Soufriere Hills; Source:http://www.geo.mtu.edu/volcanoes/west.indies/ soufriere/govt/miscdocs/rskzone.html
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Referring to the study on the Vesuvius area carried out by Lirer and and Vitelli (1998), a risk map articulated into five levels of risk has been carried out (figure 10): Very High, High, Medium, Low and Very Low. The risk classes are expressed in gray tone. This risk map was produced at the same scale of 1:50.000. The study carried out by Alberico et al. (2001) on the Campi Flegreis area defines a risk map (figure 11) articulated into five risk classes: Very High (red), High (yellow), Medium (orange), Low (Green), Very Low (Gray). The volcanic risk map for Tavenui (figure 12) (Cronin and Neal, 2001) is based on the volcanic hazard and the population distribution and infrastructure on the island. This map is suitable for general disaster management work and public awareness purposes. For detailed land-use planning, building site investigations, and engineering projects, further more-detailed site investigations are required. The map is developed at regional scale and defines four levels of risk: High, Moderate/High, Moderate/Low, Low.
Figure 9: Volcanic risk map for Santa Mara; Source: http://www.geo.mtu.edu/volcanoes/santamaria
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Figure 10: Volcanic risk map for Vesuvius area; Source: Lirer and and Vitelli, 1998.
Figure 11: Volcanic risk map for Campi Flegrei; Source: Alberico et al., 2001.
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Figure 12: Volcanic risk map for Tavenui, Fiji; Source: Cronin and Neal, 2001.
6 Risk management
Taking into account: perception, tolerance, acceptability, mitigation measures, preparedness, response, recovery Risk management includes all the measures aimed at facing a catastrophic event, from preventive mitigation measures to rescue and safety actions. Among the former, we could find regulatory and physical measures to reduce expected losses, people information actions, analysis of risk perception, etc; among the latter, we can find mostly emergency plans. Not for all the volcanoes a complete system of actions for risk management has been developed: in some contests only rescue and safety actions have been carried out, while in others both the aspects have been faced. In the following lines, some peculiar experiences concerning volcanic risk management have been illustrated.
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Vesuvian area, Italy.

Because of its peculiar volcanic hazard conditions, an in-depth risk management system has been developed in the Italian Campania Region, for the Vesuvian area, one of the higher volcanic risk area in the world: an integrated system of actions concerning urban planning, social behaviours and emergency phase programming exists. Concerning the management of rescue and safety phases, the first release of the National emergency Plan for Vesuvio volcanic area has been developed in 1995 and it has been updated in 2001. A further updating is in progress. It is a national emergency plan because the Vesuvian emergency has to be treated with extraordinary means. In fact, the number of people certainly to be evacuated (about 600.000) and the wideness of the area interested (200 km2) requires national resources. The plan defines the expected volcanic eruption. The Vesuvian area is then divided in three different zones (red, yellow and blue) according to the different volcanic hazardous phenomena they are exposed to. The most dangerous zone is the red one (composed by 18 municipalities of the Province of Naples) which spreads immediately around the volcano crater. It is the most dangerous zone, because it potentially could be flood by white-hot pyroclastic flows, running at high speed, destroying everything on their path. The yellow zone is less dangerous than the red one. Potentially ashes and lapillus falls characterize this zone. Because of this phenomena an excessive overload on the roofs up to collapse is expected. The blue zone is a part of the yellow zone, but it has a higher hazard level. It includes the area that could be subject to floods and inundations, as well as ashes and lapillus falls, because of its peculiar hydrogeological characteristics. For the residents of the red zone, the plan describes rules and actions to evacuate. In particular, each Italian Region has been coupled to a municipality of the red zone. This coordination allows a better logistic and administrative management of the crisis. Where necessary, people to be evacuated from the yellow and blue zone, will be allocated in safe areas of the Campania Region itself. The effectiveness of the National emergency Plan for Vesuvio volcanic area would be higher if appropriate administrative actions aimed at modifying urban shape, damping settlements and implementing suitable exodus ways are carried out. To this aim, Campania Region administration issued many acts concerning those topics. The regional Vesuvia project, Vesuvio Risk Mitigation Program, is a whole of initiatives started in 2003 (see also Regional Ordinance n2139, B.U.R.C. n31 14/04/03) involving all the administrative levels in an integrated land use management. Several targets must be pursued in the red zone. Decreasing residential density is one of these targets, especially concerning people who is not living there for many years. To chase this objective, a voluntary movement of the population is required and money incentives are fixed for those who want to buy a house in out from the red B.V-32
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zone (see also Regional Ordinance n2145, B.U.R.C. n31 14/04/03). Another target to pursue is the total blockage of new residence building and the implementation of exodus ways and infrastructures to facilitate people moved in secure areas to come back and work in the red zone. These actions are described in Campania Region Act n21 of the 21/12/2003, Town-planning rules for municipalities of the Vesuvian area prone to volcanic risk (Legge Regionale Campania n21 del 21/12/03, Norme urbanistiche per i comuni rientranti nelle zone a rischio vulcanico dellarea vesuviana). Moreover, a massive repression program has been developed against illegal buildings (see also Regional Ordinance n2149, B.U.R.C. n31 14/04/03). Conversion of existing residential volumes into industrial, touristic, tertiary facilities and public interest facilities is favoured through money incentives from P.O.R. Campania 2000-2006. Success of the Vesuvia project hardly depends from population information. Actions have being carried out to acquaint red zone people and to let them accept the mitigation program.
Popocatepetl Volcano, Mexico.

In Mexico, the General Direction of the Civil Defence developed the Civil Defence Operative Plan of Popocatepetl Volcano (CENAPRED, 1996), a planning tool aimed at helping population exposed to volcanic risk. Popocatepetl Volcano raises in Central Mexico, 55 kilometres east of Mexico City and 45 kilometres west of the Puebla metropolitan area. More than 30 million people live within view of the volcano and hundreds of thousands of people would be endangered by hazards associated with a large explosive eruption of the volcano. This Plan, like the Vesuvian one, is still based on an emergency management approach. It aims at the management of the exodus of people living in the areas at risk indicated by the existing Volcanic risk map, previously elaborated by the CENAPRED. The Emergency planning map (figure 13) is the main document of the plan. It divides each of the three risky zones of the Volcanic risk map in eight sectors considering different eruptive scenarios. The consequent zoning of the risk area in 48 zones allows to communicate opportunely the alert state of the volcano and if evacuation or protection mechanisms have to be implemented. Referring to this, tasks for each of the bodies involved in the emergency phase are clearly defined. Furthermore, the temporal coordination is ruled by a Volcanic alert traffic light managed, at the federal level, by the General Direction of the Civil Defence, supported by CENAPRED, that also monitors the Volcano. The Green colour of the alert system corresponds to the normality time. People can have normal life. This is a preparation time to define the emergency routes and the safe open spaces to recover the population. The Yellow colour means the necessity of strict communications among people, authorities and media to know the right actions to do in case of emergency. Shifting to red colour is followed by acoustic signals that indicate the B.V-33
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population to run immediately to the nearer gathering centre to have instructions from authorities to evacuate. After that, another task of the General Direction is to evaluate operative plans developed by the Federal States belonging to the risk area, trying to harmonizing and to finance them through the National Disaster Found. Concerning the post-disaster phases, a relevant body operating in this plan is the Reconstruction Committee; it is aimed at developing preventive studies to assess damages and elaborating programs to allow a complete rehabilitation of the affected areas. The Plan is structured on the three Mexican government levels (Federal, State and Municipal). The four states involved in the plan at Federal level are Mexico, Morelos, Puebla y Tlaxcala State, and, at State level, a more detailed Operative Plan has been developed for the Mexico State. About maps, at regional scale, the Emergency Planning Map (figure 13) is available on the Operative Plan internet site in which the 48 zones of the entire volcanic risk area are shown. The urban areas and the main road networks are indicated. The number of people at risk in Mexico State is shown in a table coupled with the map.
Figure 13: Emergency Planning Map of Popocatepetl; Source: http://www.edomexico.gob.mx/sgg/planoperativo
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Figure 14: Exodus and rescue roads of Popocatepetl; Source: http://www.edomexico.gob.mx/sgg/planoperativo
Another regional scale map produced for the Mexico State, concerns exodus and rescue roads (figure 14) with the location of hotels to accommodate people evacuated. Related to this map, Popocatepetl Operative Plan also includes tables concerning, for each municipality of the Mexico State, available infrastructures, exodus and rescue roads, temporary accommodations for refugees, hospitals and gathering areas. For 16 municipalities belonging to the Mexico State risk area, easy-to-read maps are available (an example is shown in figure 15). Contents of this maps concern the urban area of a single municipality, the gathering point, the main exodus route and some peculiar existing activities (hospitals, churches and schools). The scale is not specified, but it could be addressed to a local scale, depending from the extension of the urban area.
Risk perception.
Mitigation actions and emergency and rescue operations would be more effective if people perceive the real risk they are prone to and they are aware of the existing means and ways to deal with the problem. From this point of view, risk perception is one of the most important factors in natural risk management. Understanding how risk perception varies allow us to motivate people into react to hazards in a correct way. Not many studies on this topic have been carried out for European volcanoes. One of the most recent research work in Europe (Ricci, 2004) aims at analysing, for the first time in Italy, risk perception among people living nearby the two most important Italian volcanoes, Vesuvio and Etna.
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Figure 15: The first exodus step for San Juan Tlacotompa Ecatzingo village. Source: http://www.edomexico.gob.mx/sgg/planoperativo
The objective of the research work was to point out links between risk perception and some factors as volcanic phenomena knowledge, community sense, auto-efficacy, trust in scientific community and authorities and other socio-demographic aspects. On the 2000 questionnaires delivered, just 516 were filled. In particular, referring to the Vesuvian area, they were distributed to population living in the red zone (the most dangerous as defined in the National emergency Plan for Vesuvio) and population living in four municipalities included into the yellow one, the most damaged during the last eruption; in the Etnean area, questionnaires has been filled by people from the four municipalities exposed to lava flows, ash falls and earthquakes in the recent volcanic events. Living nearby a volcano in constant eruptive activity influences directly risk perception. Research results confirm it. In fact, Vesuvio, quiescent volcano, represents one of the three main problems for the Vesuvian community just for the 7% of people living in the red zone and for no one from the yellow one. On the contrary, Etna, a frequent active volcano, represents the third major problem for the 16% of Etnean people. Moreover, while people from Etna is well informed on the hazardous volcanic phenomena, population from the Vesuvian red zone are concerned for the beginning of a new volcanic activity and they are not aware of the means and ways to deal with problem. Concerning non European countries, many studies have been developed about volcanic risk perception in New Zealand. B.V-36
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Paton et al. (2001) developed a study aimed at assessing community resilience to volcanic hazard consequences resulting from the 1995 and 1996 eruptions at Ruapehu volcano, New Zealand. The eruptions through Crater Lake generated lahars down valleys occupied by ski lifts and down several rivers. Therefore, an interesting objective of the study was to assess the relative contributions of volcanic and economic threat to community risk perception. 550 questionnaires were distributed in June, at the beginning of the 1997 ski season, and again, in September, at the end of the season. Only 92 people filled the June questionnaire and just 52 of them completed the second one. After the success of the sky season, the economic threat decreased while the volcanic threat remained the same. The conclusion of the authors is that respondents perceived economic and volcanic hazard threats differently, and attributed a greater importance to the former. In order to that, we can argue that risk perception is influenced by the relationship between hazard effects and personal businesses rather than by volcanic activity itself. The lesson learnt is that risk communication, to be more effective, has to present mitigation measures not only in relation to risk reduction and to volcanic activity in itself, but even to the safety of the economical activities potentially hit. One of the most recent report about volcanic hazard risk perception studies in New Zealand has been done by Finnis and Johnston (2004). They report analysis carried out about Auckland volcanic field, Mount Taranaki and Mount Ruapehu. Concerning the latter, a useful study confronting risk perception variation before and after the Mount Ruapehu eruption of the October 1995 was possible. Two communities living near the volcano have been investigated, Whakatane and Hastings; only the latter has been involved in the eruption and covered by ashfalls. Questionnaires concerned volcanic phenomena impacts on personal safety and on daily life, the perception of threats and the way to face them. After the eruption, Hastings people enhanced their risk perception while Whakatane people still perceived the same high risk than before. Although that, before and after the eruption, 66% of Whakatane interviewed people take some protective measures, while the number of Hastings people doing that decreased from 63% to 53%. This implies that increased risk perception does not necessarily lead to better preparedness. This means a normalization bias phenomenon in people that, faced a minor volcanic hazard, think to be able to face a more hazardous one.

Hazard
A property or situation that in particular circumstances could lead to harm. More specific, a hazard is a potentially damaging physical event, phenomenon or human activity, which may cause the loss of life or injury, property damage, social and economic disruption or environmental degradation. Hazards can be single, sequential or combined in their origin
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and effects. Each hazard is characterised by its location, intensity and probability.
Exposure
The economic value or the set of units potentially hit by each hazard within a given area. The exposed value is a function of the type of hazard.
Vulnerability
Vulnerability is the propension of a person, a group, a community or an area to be damaged by hazardous events. In a broader sense, vulnerability is defined as a set of conditions and processes resulting from physical, social, economical and environmental factors, which increase the susceptibility of a community to the impact of hazards. Vulnerability is determined by the potential of a community to react and withstand a disaster, e.g. its emergency facilities and disaster organisation structure (coping capacity).
Risk
Risk is the possibility of harmful consequences, or expected loss (of lives, people injured, property, infrastructure, livelihoods, economic activities, etc.) resulting from interactions between volcanic eruption and anthropic environment.
Risk perception
Risk perception is the overall view of risk held by a person or group and includes feeling, judgement and group culture.
8 References
Alberico I., Lirer L., Petrosino P., Scandone R. (2002), A methodology for the evaluation of long-term volcanic risk from pyroclastic flows in Campi Flegrei (Italy), in Journal of Geolgical Society, London, 116, 6378. Blong R.J. (1984), Volcanic hazards: a source book on the effects of eruptions, Academic Press, Orlando. CENAPRED, Centro National De Prevencion de Disastres (1996), Plan Operativo del Volcan Popocatepetl, Mexico, January 1996, [internet] Available from <http://www.edomexico.gob.mx/sgg/planoperativo/principal.html> [accessed, 09/03/2005]; Chester D.K., Dibben C. J.L., Duncan A. M. (2002), Volcanic hazard assessment in western Europe, in Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research, 115, 411-435; Finnis K., Johnston D., Paton D. (2004), Volcanic hazard risk perceptions in New Zeland, in Tephra, June 2004. [internet] Available from <http://www.mcdem.govt.nz> [accessed, 31/01/2005]; Fournier dAlbe E.M. (1979), Objectives of volcanic monitoring and prediction, in Journal of Geolgical Society, London, vol. 136, 321326; Green B. D., Rose W.I. (1995), Volcanic risk map for Santa Maria, Guatemala: What can risk maps contribute to volcanic hazard communications?, in International Union Geodesy and Geophysics XXI General Assembly, 2-4 July 1995, Boulder, Colorado, USA. [internet]. B.V-38
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Available from <http://www.geo.mtu.edu/volcanoes/santamaria/volcrisk/mosaic.html> [accessed 31 January 2005]; Lavigne F. (1999), Lahar hazard micro-zonation and risk assessment in Yogyakarta city, Indonesia, in GeoJurnal n49, pp. 173-183, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000; Lirer L., Vitelli L. (1998) Volcanic Risk Assessment and Mapping in the Vesuvian Area Using GIS, in Natural Hazards, 17, 115, Kluwer Academic Publishers; Montserrat Volcano Observatory (MVO), Baxter P.J., Woo G., Pomonis A. (1998) Preliminary Assessment of Volcanic Risk on Montserrat [internet]. Available from <http://www.geo.mtu.edu> [accessed 20 December 2004]; MVO, Montserrat Volcano Observatory (1998), Preliminary assessment of volcanic Risk on Montserrat, January 1998, [internet] Available from <http://www.geo.mtu.edu/volcanoes/west.indies/soufriere/govt/> [accessed, 09/03/2005]; Orsi G., Di Vito M.A., Isaia R. (2004), Volcanic hazard assessment at the restless Campi Flegrei caldera, Bull Volcanol (2004) 66:514530, Springer-Verlag; Pareschi M.T., Cavarra L., Favalli M., Giannini F., Meriggi A. (2000), GIS and Volcanic Risk Management, in Natural Hazards n21, pp. 361379, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands; Paton D., Millar M., Johnston D. (2001), Community Resilience to Volcanic Hazard Consequences, in Natural Hazards n24, pp. 157169, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands; Pyle D.M. (2000), Size of volcanic eruptions, in Sigurdsson H. (ed.) Encyclopaedia of Volcanoes, Academic Press; Pomonis A., Spence R., Baxter P. (1999), Risk assessment of residential buildings for an eruption of Furnas Volcano, Sao Miguel, the Azores, in Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research, 92, 107-131; Ricci T., Davis M.S., Pacilli M.G. (2004), Percezione del rischio vulcanico al Vesuvio e allEtna, in GNV INGV Civil Defence 200-2003 final assembly, Naples 20th 22nd December 2004, Napoli, Italy, poster session; Spence R. J.S., Baxter P. J., Zuccaro G. (2004), Building vulnerability and human casualty estimation for a pyroclastic flow: a model and its application to Vesuvius, in Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research, 133, 321-343; Trople T.L. (2002), Volcanic hazard vulnerability assessment of the Enumclaw Buckley, Washinghton Community in Minnesota GIS/LIS Consortium 12th Annual Conference & Workshops, 2-4 October 2002, Duluth, Minnesota, USA. [internet]. Available from <http://www.gis.smumn.edu/> [accessed 31 January, 2005]; Zuccaro G., Ianniello D. (2004) Interaction of pyroclastic flows with building structures in an urban settlement: a fluid-dynamic simulation impact model, in Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research, 133, 345-352.
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Appendix: Operational Standards for Risk Assessment aimed at Spatial Planning

1. Minimum standard (simplified model) for hazard mapping aimed at a legal directive
Hazard assessment of a volcano, aimed at mitigating the related risk, is possible only if its past behaviour and present state is known. Furthermore, to forecast the type of eruption in short-mid terms, considering the structural setting of the volcano, all the types of eruptions generated by the volcano have to be known, and the structural conditions in which the activity has occurred, have to be reconstructed. It is also very important to define the compositional evolution of the erupted magmas and their rheology. To assess the volcanic hazards to which an area is exposed, it is essential at least a) to reconstruct the past history of a volcano, b) to define the time of its entire life which can be taken as reference to hypothesise its future behaviour, c) to define the variable type of eruptions, d) to reconstruct the variable phenomenologies of each eruption, e) to determine the physical and chemical characteristics and of the erupted magma of each phenomenology, f) to reconstruct the areal distribution of the erupted products of each phenomenology, g) to identify the transport and deposition mechanisms of the erupted material, h) to evaluate the impact on the territory of each phenomenology; i) to reconstruct stratigraphy and areal distribution of surface gravitational movement deposits and their impact on the territory. These objectives can be pursued by carrying out stratigraphical, sedimentological, structural, geomorphological, volcanological, petrological and geochronological studies, integrated with archaeological investigations and analysis of historical documents.
1.1. Various methodologies related to the 3 assumed scales of analysis in the light of a potential harmonisation of hazard maps, based on a multi-hazard perspective
(See paragraph 2.2 of the main document).
2. Minimum standard (simplified model) for risk mapping aimed at spatial planning
Referring to volcanic risk, we have to underline the needs of spatial planners dealing with volcanic risk. At regional scale, the aims of spatial planning are the definition of priority risk areas for the implementation of the mitigation measures and the definition of Guide-lines for the reallocation of activities and population and for the diction of an Emergency Network. It is also necessary to define the sites useful to allocate new settlements, infrastructures and industrial sites. At local scale (urban level), it is necessary to set up measures for building vulnerability mitigation, urban vulnerability mitigation and local emergency B.V-40
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network organization. It is also necessary to define the best location for new settlements, infrastructures and industrial sites. At local detailed scale (1:500 1:5,000) the most relevant objective is to improve the resistant of residential building, infrastructures and public facilities.
2.1. Multi-risk assessment perspective as element of the Strategic Environmental Assessment

Referring to the EU Directive 2001/42/EC and from a multi-risk analysis point of view, the following aspects have to be considered (Greiving, 2004): probability, duration, frequency and reversibility of the effects; cumulative nature of the effects; risks to human health or environment (e.g., due to accidents); magnitude and spatial extent of the effects; value and vulnerability of the area. The first and the second point of this list are referred to the characterization of the volcanic hazard made in the first part of this report. The third point is referred to the list of potential damages made in the paragraph 4.3. The fourth point concerns the extent of the effects of the plans/programs, object of the SEA; we must consider two aspects: first, potential damage chains due to natural hazard impacts that could improve losses and reduce environmental and human resilience and, second, how the plan/program could interfere with risk management actions (emergency management and mitigation actions). The last point, value and vulnerability of the area affected by volcanic activity is developed in the next paragraph. In fact, according to this point we have set up minimum standards for volcanic risk articulated on exposed value and its vulnerability referring to the different scale of analysis defined in the ARMONIA project. Volcanic risk analysis proposed as minimum standard is interpreted as the definition of expected losses and the vulnerability as the possibility of the exposed elements to face the volcanic impact, according with procedural obligations of SEA.
2.2. Methodologies, functions and outputs

Referring to the general objectives of spatial planning dealing with volcanic risk and to the current methodologies for volcanic risk assessment and mapping we can suggest 3 simplified methodologies and outputs related to the assumed scales of analysis and representation of risk. However, we have to underline that the scale of the analysis is strongly dependent from the extension of areas exposed to volcanic hazard. This area is quite variable: in Italy, for example, the exposed area of Stromboli has an extension of 12 km2, the Vesuvius area of 1400 km2 and the Etnas area of 3850 km2.
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Regional scale (1:500,000 1:50,000)

At this scale, for a quantitative risk analysis we can consider only population density on administrative base and GDP per capita of the regions (50/50 percent relationship), according with the ESPON 2006 Project 1.3.1 Hazards. All the elements in a hazard zone are supposed to be vulnerable. Risk is calculated in a relationship of 50% of hazard level and exposure level. However, sometimes it can be useful to set up a qualitative analysis defining the volcanic risk overlapping the hazard levels with four levels of population density and layers referred to the presence/absence of infrastructures (roads and railways), strategic facilities (hospitals, infrastructure terminals, regional and local administration offices, safety and rescue centres) and main infrastructures (main roads, railways, power and water distribution main lines) and simplified land use (agricultural and urban ranked for number of inhabitants). This kind of hazard map is more useful for emergency planning purposes. We suggest to define four levels of risk (Very High, High, Medium, Low) and a legend of coloured areas corresponding to a black hatch legend, for a simple printing and dissemination of the maps.
Local scale (1:5,000 1:50,000)

At this scale, a useful risk analysis has to consider two levels of assessment and mapping. A first simplified level above all the territory prone to volcanic hazard. It is useful to set up guide-lines and to define priority areas for risk mitigation. A second analysis level for the urban areas. This latter is useful to define actions for reducing urban and building vulnerability and to define a local emergency network. For the first level of analysis we can take into account as exposed elements population and land use activities. For the population, we can consider four levels of people density on municipal base. For land use, we can consider urban, rural, agricultural, forest, and other natural areas. Vulnerability depends on the type of volcanic phenomenon considered. The most common volcanic phenomena considered in the volcanic hazard assessment are lava flow, pyroclastic flows and volcanic ashes and tephra fall. Vulnerability of the population exposed to the lava flows and ashes can be considered equal to 0, but vulnerability of people exposed to pyroclastic flows depends on many experimental factors. In this case we can consider this vulnerability equal to 1. The vulnerability to all volcanic phenomena of all land use classes and any man-made structures can be considered equal to 1. All vulnerable exposed land use classes can be express with the corresponding economic value and classified into four level. For the built-up areas we can classify the urban and rural areas according to the different house densities and multiplied by a mean economic value evaluated for each single municipality. The risk can be defined overlapping the levels of B.V-42
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vulnerable people exposed and the economic value for each kind of volcanic phenomenon considered. Referring to the second level of analysis suggested, we underline the necessity of this level of analysis for the high risk urban areas. Although this level is not until today strongly investigated, we suggest a more detailed risk assessment. First of all, the statistical analysis referred to population and to urban activities can be carried out on census unit administrative base instead of the municipal base. Beyond the population density, other elements considered in the exposure are: economic activities, industrial activities, infrastructures and building stock. For each element we can define a vulnerability level from 0 to 1 referred to a specific volcanic phenomenon. In particular, referring to the pyroclastic flow and to the accumulation of volcanic ashes, we have to consider the different structural typologies for the building stock. According with Spence, Baxter and Zuccaro (2004), we can classify three types of buildings: Rubble stone load-bearing masonry, squared rubble masonry and poor quality reinforced concrete, squared masonry with concrete floors and good-quality reinforced concrete frame structures. For the vulnerability to the pyroclastic flow we have to consider the typologies of openings and the resistances of the structural vertical elements. The study of Spence, Baxter and Zuccaro (2004) defines some relationships between the typology of buildings and their probable resistance to the pyroclastic flow. Also for volcanic ash load it is necessary to link the building typology to the roof resistance. From this point of view, it is useful to set up different vulnerability map referring to the different volcanic phenomena considered. Also at this scale, we suggest to define four levels of risk (Very High, High, Medium, Low) and a legend of coloured areas corresponding to a black hatch legend, for a simple printing and dissemination of the maps.
Local detailed scale (1:500 5,000)

At this scale, until today we have only very deepened studies on single buildings and it is not possible and useful for planning aims to suggest simplified methodologies for the vulnerability of buildings and infrastructures.
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B.VI Meteorological extreme events and climate change

Author: Juergen Kropp, PIK
1 Introduction .............................................................. 3 2 Physical definition of climate change ......................... 4
2.1 2.2 Typology ................................................................................... 4 Intensity and Magnitude of Anthropogenic Climate Change............. 5
2.2.1 Assessment of Extreme Events: Typology, Intensity, Severity and Magnitude ................................................................................. 7
3.1 Definition ................................................................................ 13 3.2 Current methodologies for analysing and representation of risks (hazard) with respect to temporal scales .............................................. 14 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 Dynamical hazard climate change effects................................. 14 Problem of scale ...................................................................... 14 Data availability typology, format GIS structure..................... 14 Examples of hazard maps and legends referred to assumed scales 15
4 Elements at risk and exposure ................................. 15

4.1 Typology of elements ............................................................... 15
5 Analysis of vulnerability .......................................... 15

5.1 Definition of vulnerability .......................................................... 15 5.2 Methodologies for assessment related to structural and nonstructural elements at risk .................................................................. 16 5.2.1 5.2.2 5.3 Functions for vulnerability/consequence analysis ..................... 16 Examples of vulnerability maps and legends ........................... 16
Most common damage potentials............................................... 25
6 Analysis of risk ........................................................ 25

6.1 6.2 Definition of risk ...................................................................... 25 Methodologies for risk assessment ............................................. 25 Qualitative and quantitative methods, direct and indirect risk ... 26 Functions of risk analysis ...................................................... 26 Examples of risk maps and legends ....................................... 26
6.2.1 6.2.2 6.2.3
7 Risk management.................................................... 26 8 Analysis of natural risks in relation to climate change27
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9 Conclusion............................................................... 28 10 Glossary of all keywords .......................................... 28 11 Appendix: Operational Standards for Risk Assessment aimed at Spatial Planning............................................. 31
11.1 Minimum standard (simplified model) for hazard mapping aimed at a legal directive................................................................................. 31 11.2 Various methodologies related to the 3 assumed scales of analysis in the light of a potential harmonisation of hazard maps, based on a multi-hazard perspective .................................................................... 32 11.3 Minimum standard (simplified model) for risk mapping aimed at spatial planning ................................................................................. 33 11.4 Multi-risk assessment perspective as element of the Strategic Environmental Assessment ................................................................. 33 11.5 Methodologies, functions and outputs......................................... 33
12 References .............................................................. 33
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1 Introduction
Climate Change impacts and meteorological extremes are closely interconnected. Therefore, the state of art regarding these two tasks are combined in one single report. With respect to ARMONIAs aims it is planned to provide a harmonized multi-risk mapping for policy advice. This aim is consequent, since for historical times weather and climate play an important role in the daily life of humankind. However, comparing climate related disasters and meteorological extremes with other disasters one have to consider that the scales of planning authorities and climate researchers widely differ in both space and time. This, however, is not the only difficulty for a harmonization. While climate change can be considered as a smooth (long-term) trend (cf. Sects. 2, 2.2) extreme events are (singular) peaks on this trend. One major question of ARMONIA is how influences a possible climate change the local probability and occurrence of (distinct) meteorological extremes. Although major progress in the understanding of climate has been made, it is mainly uncertain how climate change affects local weather variability and the occurrence of extremes. This is the reason why the IPCC provides only more general assertions regarding this issue (cf. Tab. 1, cf. discussion in Sect. 2.2ff, in particular, Sect. 2.2.1.2ff) and has decided that the forthcoming Fourth Assessment Report will have an explicit focus on extreme events. Currently three areas of deficit knowledge are identified: (i) lack of highquality long-term data (cf. Sect. 2.1.1), (ii) climate models are not designed to forecast extremes and their inherent scales are commonly too coarse, and (iii) statistical methods used for extreme value assessment are commonly unsuitable (new approaches, mainly in Europe, are under investigation, cf. Sect. 2.2.1.1). Having this in mind it is clear why, regional extreme value assessment becomes quite difficult, in particular, with respect to a local mapping. Due to these circumstances in climate change research the vulnerability concept is the most prominent concept for assessing climate related risks (cf. Sect. 5). It extends the one-dimensional focus on extreme events, e.g. whether we will have more heavy rains and subsequently floods expected in region X due to climate change or whether heat waves becoming more frequent in e.g. Europe by an additional question: are modern societies sensitive against these changes and if yes, are they prepared to cope with this changes? This extension is consequent, because any weather related adverse/beneficial effect might have impact on societies. However, any strategy to analyse these questions depend on the regional settings, since in certain regions we have a distinct inventory and possibly decision makers may have different scopes (cf. Sect. 5.1, and example in Sects. 5.2.2ff). Regarding ARMONIA this implies that we have to come to a decision which kind of questions should be answered for a case study region. Nonetheless, also in this case the achieved integrated mapping will be exemplary. Before we can start with such a task a systematic stocktaking of the natural and socio-economic inventory must be undertaken for this region, i.e. determine which data are available, which data are useful indicators, how to value assets, what should be the prognostic time horizon? Subsequently, integrated measures can be defined, which might be useful for a multi-hazard risk mapping (regarding B.VI-3
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possible uncertainties and methodological problems, cf. Sect. 2.2.1, 2.2.1.1). This is one the reason, why in climate change research scenarios are used. They allow to derive storylines for distinct regions in the case of a business of usual, worst or best case scenario. Directly related to these problems are the impact of climate change on other natural risks (cf. Sect. 7). It is clear that any natural risk can be enforced and sometimes also mitigated by climate change. An analysis of these impacts must at least fit the preconditions as mentioned above, i.e. for any kind of risk, e.g. landslides, the (local!) natural settings and potential changes have to be examined.
2 Physical definition of climate change

2.1 Typology
By definition weather and climate prediction are mutually exclusive. The atmosphere is a chaotic system which is unstable with respect to small perturbations of initial conditions. This sets a prediction limit of 20 day for weather forecasts. Climate in contrast is defined in terms of statistics of weather, i.e. it is defined as the 30yr average of weather. Therefore, climate prediction and thus climate change concerned with slow changes in the statistical properties of weather beyond the time scale of 20 days. In other words climate change is a process not a singular event (or hazard). Focussing with more details on this process one have to distinguish between natural and anthropogenic climate change. The first is an everlasting process in earths history (paleoclimatic changes, cf. Fig. 1).
Figure 1: Temperature reconstruction from the 18O content obtained from GRIP, NGRIP ice cores (Greenland) for the last 125,000 years. For an assessment of human induced climate change one have to consider time dimension. Source: after NGRIP members (2004).
Short-term cyclic changes can be related to, e.g., cycles within the solar radiation (11 yrs, e.g. CURRIE & OBRIEN 1990; Hale cyle: 22yrs; HALE 1924; Gleissberg cycle 78-80yrs, GLEISSBERG 1955, 200yrs, THOMPSON 1990), which have been detected in many meteorological variables including temperature and rainfall. These short-term cycles are superimposed by several mechanisms of short- to mid-term gravitional forcing (e.g. lunar tidal cycles) which are chronologically interlocked in a commensurable way. Long-term cycles are mainly due to changes of the earths orbit caused by celestial-mechanical disturbances (C ROLL 1875, M ILANKOVITCH 1930: e.g. B.VI-4
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100,000 and 400,000 yrs eccentricity cycle; 41,000 yrs tilt cycle; and the precessional cycle with a periodic component of 19,000 23,000 yrs). All these forcings had and have as shown by paleo-climatic research a strong influence on earths climate (MENDE & STELLMACHER 2001). Discussing climate change in the modern context the maximal time span examined is the Holocene (cf. Fig. 1). During this phase only slight changes in temperature distinguish between favourable and unfavourable climate phases (Fig. 1). Due to increasing temperature at the end of the Weichselian ice age evolution of humankind increases. In a first warm period of the Holocene, for example, agriculture was developed (8000 yrs BP) and the ancient Sumerian culture evolves (5000 yrs BP). During a period which had similar temperatures as at present the Vikings settles on Iceland and Greenland (800-1000 AD). In the Little Ice Age (1350-1850 AD, Maunder Minimum: 1675-1715 AD), where the temperature was approx. 1 C lower than the most episodes during Holocene, migrations from north to south and North-America, crop failures, famines, and epidemics in Europe are documented (cf. LOZAN 2001). If we are discussing human induced climate change we are focussing only the last 150 yrs in which anthropogenic activities have evolved increasing influence on earths atmosphere. During this time the global mean temperature is increasing, with a first maximum about 1940, and with respect to our knowledge from the past this could threaten earths integrity as well as humankind itself to a broad extent.
2.2 Intensity and Magnitude of Anthropogenic Climate Change

The definition of climate change used by the IPCC includes both, natural variability and human induced change (cf. Sect. 5), whilst the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (Fccc) defines that climate change is only that part of the change which is due to human interference. This discrepancy sounds a bit artificial, since it is neither simple to separate both parts, nor both are a one-to-one superposition. In the first assessment report of the IPCC (1990) was asserted that the anthropogenic climate signal could not clearly detected. The second report (IPCC 1995) concludes that a balance of evidence suggests discernible human influence on climate, whilst in the TAR (IPCC 2001) was stated that there is new and stronger evidence that most of the warming observed over the last 50 years is attributable to human activities. Recent progress in the analysis of empirical time series data allows reliable assessments of global climate behaviour since the end of the 19th century. An increase of the global mean temperature of about 0.6 C is likely evident. For the future model outputs imply that the largest warming will concentrated between 40 - 70 N (winter and spring) over the continents (cf. Fig. 2).
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Figure 2: Near surface temperature distributions computed by nine different coupled atmospheric-ocean general circulation modes at time of a doubling of CO2 concentration. Source: Hasselmann (2002), for details regarding the model runs cf. IPCC (2001).
Nevertheless, a question of major interest in climate research is: How large is the influence of humanity on climate? This is difficult to answer, since the detection of anthropogenic interference in observation data is hampered by superimposed natural variability of climate ( detection and attribution problem). In common approaches the verification of human induced climate change is a two-step strategy: (i) first, one have to identify climate change as an anthropogenic signal and (ii) second, one have to examine whether this signal exceeds natural variability to a sufficiently high level of statistical significance or not. For this task several modelling runs are performed by usage of different models including either natural or anthropogenic forcing and both. HASSELMANN (2002) states that the observed climate signal is, indeed, strong enough that a detection and attribution becomes feasible (for methodological details cf. HASSELMANN 1997, B ARNETT et al. 1999). The results of these examinations1 show that only the combination of natural
An example is the current discussion on the so-called hockey stick curve which was introduced by M ANN et al (1998). This most quoted temperature reconstruction implies that the northern hemisphere temperature was not higher during the last 1,000 yrs than today. Some climate sceptics have blamed the Mann group for unsuitable methods and analytical errors and th had presented a curve indicating that the highest temperature already occurred in the 15 century (M C INTYRE & MCKITRICK 2003). MANN et al (2004), however, have applied some corrections which supports his original assertion. In addition, recently presented results based on improved methods show that, indeed, exists some uncertainty, but that northern hemisphere temperature is characterized also by a steeper increase during the last 150 yrs as indicated by the Mann et al. 1998 results (VON STORCH et al. 2004).
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and anthropogenic forcing can explain the observed temperature increase in the 20th century (CUBASCH 2004). In general, the detection of the anthropogenic climate signal is of specific interest, since further concepts, i.e. extreme value definition rely on the idea that extremes are events beyond the normal/natural range of systems variability. However, despite of enormous improvements in our understanding of earths climate, a long history of empirical climate and weather monitoring the exact extent and nature of changes in our climate remains uncertain and is part of the scientific debate, in particular, with respect to their regional expression (cf. Sect. 2.2.1).
2.2.1 Assessment of Extreme Events: Typology, Intensity, Severity and Magnitude

Discussing climate change from the point of view of hazard assessment and under the aims and scope of the ARMONIA project it is quite difficult to provide a useful assessment strategy. Climate change per se is not a hazard (cf. Sect. 3.1). Nevertheless evidence exists that climate change have an influence on the occurrence and magnitude of weather extremes (cf. I PCC 2001, IPCC 2002, STOTT et al. 2003, M EEHL & TEBALDI 2004). The biggest problem in the analysis of extremes is the lack of high-quality longterm data (regarding the methodological problems cf. Sect. 2.2.1.1) which allows to assess the last 100-150yrs. Regarding the prognosis of weather extremes one have to rely on model simulations. This, however, is interconnected with a variety of difficulties. First, climate models are not designed to forecast extreme events, since they calculates climate variables for more or less large grid cells (model resolution) (cf. MC G UFFIE & H ENDERSON -S ELLERS 1996). Second, extreme weather events occur mainly on smaller scales. Thus simulation scenarios must be downscaled, which may be combined with various uncertainties related to both (i) model scenarios and (ii) downscaling algorithms. Thus, although climate models (e.g. development of regional models) have been improved over the time, they have still limitations regarding the simulation of extreme events (NOGUER et al. 1998, MEEHL et al. 2000). Changes in severe weather due to climate change will have particular impacts on society and the natural environment. This, however, is exactly one of the foci of the ARMONIA project. The most robust conclusions of the I P C C are listed in Tab. 1, but the IP C C concluded that the analysis of extreme events faces two major challenges: (i) lack of adequate data and (ii) scale, i.e. the small temporal and spatial scales of extremes mismatch the scales resolved by models and that of validating data (IPCC 2002).
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Change in phenomenon
Higher maximum temperatures and more hot daysa over nearly all land areas Higher minimum temperatures, fewer cold days and frost days over nearly all land areas Reduced diurnal temperature range over most land areas Increase of heat indexb over land areas More intense precipitation eventsc Increased summer continental drying and associated risk of drought
Confidence in observed changes (latter half 20th century) likely
Confidence in projected changes (during 21st century) Very likely
Very likely
Very likely
Very likely Likely, over many areas Likely, over many northern hemisphere mid- to high latitude land areas Likely in a few areas
Very likely Very likely, over many areas Very likely, over many areas
Increase in tropical cyclone Not observed in the few peak wind intensitiesd analyses available Increase in tropical cyclone Insufficient data for Likely, over some areas mean and preak assessment precipitation intensitiesd a hot days refers to a day whose maximum reaches or exceeds some temperature that is considered as critical for nature and humanity. Actual typical values are 32 C, 35 C, 40 C; b heat index refers to a combination of temperature and humidity that measures human comfort; c for other areas there are either insufficient data or conflicting analyses; d past and future changes in tropical cyclone location and frequency are uncertain. Table 1: Estimates of confidence in observed and projected changes in extreme weather and climate events. Source: IPCC (2001) Third Assessment Report, Chapter 9.
Likely, over most mid-latitude continental interiors (lack of consistent projections in other areas) Likely over some areas
Thus, on a workshop on changes in extreme weather and climate events organized in Bejing 2002 had formulated future issues in this context (IPCC 2002). The most relevant for the ARMONIA project are: 1. Definition of extremes2 and useful indicators? The definition of extremes is not only a statistical task, perception partly determines what is an extreme event or a dangerous trend and what is not. 2. Improvement of data availability: up to now globally only 1,2001,400 weather stations report monthly means of minimum and maximum temperature. It is planned to extend these number to approximately 5,000 stations for the Fourth Assessment Report (FAR).
Statistical methods are normally used to assess extreme events (cf. Sect. 2.2.1.1). In climate research an extreme is not only describable by single meteorological variables, e.g. temperature, since a drought, for instance, is characterized by high temperatures and sparse precipitation during a distinct time span. Thus, meteorological extremes are often complex and need an integrated measure as, e.g. established by the U.S. who has developed a so-called Climate Extreme Index combining temperature, drought and precipitation measurements with the size of an affected region (KARL et al. 1996).
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3. How well do models simulate extremes, how confident these projections of severe weather, and can the uncertainties quantified? 4. How can projected changes in extremes most usefully characterized for infrastructure planning? Further, the FAR will have an explicit focus on climate/weather extremes. Current analytical efforts imply an increasing likelihood on both sides the warm and the cold tails of the temperature distribution function (cf. Tab. 1). Of particular interest, however, are also so-called complex extremes (cf. footnote 2). Complex extremes might have a variety of impacts on socioeconomic systems, in particular, in areas which are not able to cope with such events due to an reduced adaptive capacity. Very recently research efforts that try to relate extreme weather situations to changes in large scale circulation pattern adepted growing appreciation.
2.2.1.1 Methodological considerations

In global change research the application of extreme value theory underlies several misconceptions. A statement from the famous statistician Emil G UMBEL (1941) this makes clear in an impressive way: In order to apply any theory we have to suppose that the data are homogeneous; i.e. that no systematical change of climate and no important change in the basin have occurred within the observation period and that no such changes will take place in the period for which extrapolations are made. This statement implies that stationarity and the IID (identically and independently distributed) assumption are essential for any type of extreme value assessment. Two strategies are commonly used. First, the generalized extreme value distribution (GEV) as a limiting distribution for Gumbel, Frechet, and Weibull distributions (three types- or Fisher-Tippett-theorem). Second, the peak over threshold (POT) approach, which is a point process representation and considers a Poisson process for the occurrence of threshold exceedances and uses the generalized Pareto distribution (GPD) for the excesses. In the analysis of empirical data several of the above mentioned assumptions are not given, since the view of climate change includes a trend and, for instance, daily measures of temperature and river run-off are not statistically independent. Therefore, standard theory does not apply under a changing climate and also not to statistical downscaling (IP C C 2002). Thus, it exists the urgent need to develop new techniques, e.g. for fitting of extremal distributions with time varying parameters (K ATZ et al. 2002) or the usage of declustering strategies guaranteeing statistical independence. However, this new approaches are rarely applied up to now and although progress has been made in the recent years the statistics of extremes is still a field of active research (cf. COLES 2001). However, the awareness that trends are likely and that trends influence extreme value statistics is not new. Several approaches were made to separate trends from variability with a sufficiently high level of statistical significance (e.g. KALLACHE et al. 2005). The discovery that river run-off and temperature are long range-correlated has introduced further difficulties in the current methodologies (Fig. 3, 4) (K ALLACHE et al. 2004). But it has also initiated new and unconventional analytical strategies (BUNDE et al 2004, BUNDE et al. 2005). Summing up, research on extreme value assessment is an B.VI-9
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ongoing process. Recent progress sounds promising, but new concepts sometimes are not applicable in practice due lack of data.
Fig. 3: Upper panel: autocorrelation function for the river run-off at Achleiten/Danube, Germany (daily anomalies, 100 yrs) showing that significant correlations can be detected for a time span larger than 1,000 days, the dashed red lines indicate the confidence interval. Lower panel: Monte Carlo simulation studies showing the dependency of estimates for the 0.99 quantile (e.g. 100 yr flood) from the length of time series, type of correlation, and choice of method; left block approach, GEV, right POT/GPD approach . Source: Kropp et al. 2005 (unpublished).
2.2.1.2 Impact of Climate Change: Precipitation, River Run-Off, and Floodings

There is no clear evidence yet of changes in the hydrological cycle that are caused by climate change. Nevertheless, with respect to theoretical considerations there is an evidence that an increase in precipitation can be expected with an ongoing global warming, since the water vapor saturation value of air increases by about 8% for 1 C temperature increase. Increasing temperature also leads to enhanced evapotranspiration and hence intensification of the hydrological cycle. The IPCC (1996) estimates that a global temperature increase of approx. 2 C may increase potential evapotranspiration up to 40%. Recent model runs confirm a general
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increase in precipitation, in particular, in the mid- to high latitudes (MEEHL et al. 2000). Calculations show that a CO2 doubling will increase global mean precipitation of about 4%. At present, however, the data do not allow to answer the question whether the precipitation did increase substantially due to the 0.6 C temperature global mean temperature increase or not. Anyhow, in several regional studies an increase in precipitation during the last 100 yrs were observed (USA, Canada, Northern & Western Europe) (WATSON et al. 1998). Also in the most of west, central and eastern Europe regions the precipitation increased, whilst this is contrasted by a decrease in the Mediterranean region during the second half of the 20th century (FRAEDRICH & SCHNWIESE 2002).
Fig. 4: Trend assessment for the Danube catchment (120 river gauges) by using a new developed trend test (Kallache et al. 2005). It is shown that the trend behaviour shows large differences, but also some clusters can be observed. Source: Kallache et al. 2005b (unpublished).
Recent examinations show a likely increasing trend in river run-offs, but already in a same catchment large difficulties exists (cf. Fig. 4). These differences might be related to local changes in weather regimes or to slow and long-term changes of physical properties in an observed catchment. In addition, in case of persistence common statistical methods could provide misleading results if unsuitable methods are used (see above). The IPCC (2002) mentioned that regarding flood assessment the best statistical methods are not used and that statistics were applied without fundamental understanding of the distributions. Thus, it can be stated that it is at present - difficult to detect the global warning signal in empirical river runoff data. The IPCC (2002) reminds to extend the research efforts for an achievement of consistent analyses, in particular, for gridded analyses and data surveys.
2.2.1.3 Impact of Climate Change: Temperature and Droughts

Regarding the global mean temperature the most relevant statement are already discussed in Sect. 2.2. The global temperature increase is mainly due to an increase in night time and winter temperatures, rather than to an increase in day time and summer temperatures. Regional studies show an B.VI-11
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expansion of areas with warm extremes. Regarding the local expression of temperature trends it will be likely that with an increase of the global mean also the frequency of heat waves will increase (cf. Fig. 2, Fig. 4 upper panel). Several heat waves are well documented, e.g. 1987 (Greece), 1995, 1999 (USA), and 2003 (Western Europe). They were associated with a considerable number of deaths and other consequences in several sectors (yield loss, water scarcity, etc.). Regarding the 2003 heat wave over Europe several research groups have undertaken statistical examinations in order to characterize its properties. SCHR et al. (2004) mentioned that it was the hottest summer since AD 1500 (Fig. 4, lower left panel). STOTT et al. (2004) estimates the human contribution to the summer heat wave 2003. By defining a threshold value for the summer mean temperature, which was exceeded in 2003, but in no other year since 1851, they calculate that human influence has at least doubled the risk of a heat wave exceeding this threshold (confidence > 90%).
Fig. 4. Upper panel: shift in the distribution function for e.g. temperature (estimated from simple statistical considerations. Slight increases increment the probability of hot summers considerably. Lower right panel: distribution of Swiss monthly and seasonal summer temperatures for the time period 18642003 (summer month June, July, August, and aggregated). The fitted Gaussian is indicated in green. Values in the lower left corner of each panel indicate the standard deviation () and the 2003 anomaly normalized by the 18642000 standard deviation (T/). Source: Schr et al.2004.
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Regarding droughts the global pattern is unequivocal. A drought is not a singular event, but a more or less long lasting event with tremendous effects, in particular, on marginal land. Thus, one can understand them as a disaster. For the Sahel region, for instance, D A I et al. (1998) have estimated that in the first half of the 20th century only a quarter of the region was affected by severe droughts, whilst this doubles to 50% since the 1970ties. Nevertheless, currently one cannot provide any evidence that extension and severeness of droughts have been changed. The IPCC (2002) suggests to increase research efforts in this field.
2.2.1.4 Impact of Climate Change: Storminess and Storm Tracks

Regarding storminess a variety of different methods have been used to describe extremes and track cyclones, so that an intercomparison is quite difficult (IPCC 2002, for examples, cf. ALEXANDERSON et al. 2000, LUNKEIT et al. 1998). The storm climate for Europe is closely correlated with the North Atlantic circulation (NAO), i.e. by pressure variations between the Iceland low and the Azores high pressure system, which is often used as an indicator for macro-climatic weather situations (FRAEDRICH & SCHNWIESE 2002). An analysis of air pressure measurements at many stations in Northern Europe has not shown significant changes in the storm climate in the Northeast Atlantic over the last 100 yrs (L ANGENBERG & VON STORCH 1996). Also the German Weather Service has not found any increasing trends in mean wind speeds for the time interval 1969-1999, even though a significant increase in the number of days with gusts above 8 Beaufort was found (OTTE 2000). AL E X A N D E R S O N et al. (2000) have determined very unequivocal situations for Europe, i.e. in Scandinavia, Finland and Baltic Sea area the most recent years, especially the cold and calm year 1996, seem to have brought an end to the stormy period centred on 1990. In the more westerly British Isles, North Sea and Norwegian Sea area, storminess is still at high levels compared with the less intense period between 1930 and 1980. The long-term increasing trend in NW Europe storminess that started in the 1960s seems to have been broken. However, the IPCC (2002) states that observational records of storm events are of insufficient length to reliably determine the statistics of very rare events. The consequence is that trend estimates should be interpreted cautiously for predictive purposes. These examinations show that an extreme value assessment is combined with a variety of problems, in particular, with respect to mappings, which are up to now non-existent.
3 Hazard assessment
3.1 Definition
In the context of the climate change debate hazard is a term which is difficult to use. In particular, if one considers that a hazard is a natural occurrence causing a damage. In other words hazards are defined as threats to a system, comprised of perturbations and stress (and stressors) and the consequences they produce. A perturbation is considered as a major spike in pressure (e.g., a tidal wave or hurricane) beyond the normal range of variability in which the system operates. Stress is a continuous or B.VI-13
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slowly increasing pressure commonly within the range of normal variability. In climate change therefore, hazard assessment focuses mainly on the perturbations inducing extreme events (cf. glossary, Sect. 2.2ff). Thus, hazard assessment can be subsumed under extreme event assessment in climate change research. Questions, whether an extreme (or a hazard) was caused by anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions or not are ill-posed. Relevant questions in climate change research and in the hazard context are twofold: (i) are heavy rain, heat waves, etc. more frequent due to climate change (see, Sect. 2.2ff), and (ii) are modern societies sensitive against these climate extremes? Both together have lead to the definition of the vulnerability concept during the last two decades (cf. Sect. 5ff). Having this in mind hazards in the climate change context are only those events, which are influenced by the long-term process of anthropogenic forcing, i.e. the intensity and magnitude of weather extremes: storms, floods, heat waves etc.
3.2 Current methodologies for analysing and representation of risks (hazard) with respect to temporal scales
A prerequisite for a risk (hazard) assessment is a sound (regional) data base and adequate methodological concept which allow a scientific assessment of climate related hazards. This issue is discussed at length in section 2.2ff.

As already mentioned climate change is a process, which may influence future extreme value distribution (cf. Sect. 2.2).

See, Sect. 2.2 for this issue.

PIK supports are meta-database comprising a lot of empirical time series data of common climate variables obtained from the worldwide weather stations. Similar holds for river run-off data. The length of these time series varies. The longest comprise approximately 200 yrs of daily measures. These data are point measures. Empirical socio-economic data are available on coarser scales, e.g. district or country level. Further, PIK hosts the results of a variety of several model runs (e.g. from global/regional climate, socio-economic, and vegetation models). These data are commonly gridded in varying resolutions. PIK has access to several data distribution centres, mainly for comparison of the own model runs with other model approaches. PIK data are not associated with specific GIS structures, since they commonly used in plain ASCII format. Regarding mapping several mapping tools are used, whose choice depends on the certain questions to be examined.
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Not available in the narrower sense (cf. examples in this report). May be that the ESPON project can provide some progress.

See below, Sect. 5.1: the exposure element depends on the decision makers problem! I hope that we will obtain some insights regarding this issue from the WP1 report.

Depends of the question, see examples below.
5.1 Definition of vulnerability
The assessment of climate risks is a complex undertaking that must support judgements and decisions concerning future courses of action. It requires a combination of scientific not just from climate sciences but from those who understand the consequences of decisions for business, society, economy, institutions, and environment. Therefore, risk assessment in climate research is at best characterised by the term vulnerability assessment. Within the climate research community vulnerability defines the extent to which a system is susceptible to, or unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate change, including variability and extremes. Vulnerability is a function of system's sensitivity, exposure , and its adaptive capacity (IPCC 2001). The sensitivity defines the degree to which an exposure unit would be affected, either adversely or beneficially, by a change of a particular climate variable (e.g. crop yield with respect to precipitation/temperature mean or variability). Different systems may differ in their sensitivity to climate change, resulting in different levels of impact. The adaptive capacity defines the ability of a system to adjust to climate change, e.g. to moderate potential damages. The exposure unit will, in general, defined by the nature of decision-makers problem. It is the responsibility of the decision-maker to specify the location and geographical extent of an exposure unit. In climate research the major aim is to analyse and assess how sensitive modern societies are with respect to climate change. This implicitly takes into account a regional view, but also a transsectoral focus. Nevertheless, currently there has been no systematic methodology to operationalize vulnerability in the context to multiple stressors (cf. Tab. 2). Different stages of vulnerability assessments are more or less ideal prototypes rather than disjunct categories. This is the reason why the approaches to measure vulnerability differ (cf. Sect. 5.2.2) (cf. DOWNING et al. 2001, TURNER et al 2003, FSSEL & KLEIN 2005). Thus, earlier vulnerability assessment strategies are not obsolete.
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Analytical purpose
Main drivers
Main outputs
Consideration of adaptation Little Partial
Impact assessment 1stgeneration vulnerability assessment 2ndgeneration vulnerability assessment Adaptation policy assessment
Positive Positive
GHG emissions GHG emissions, & non-climatic factors Climate change, & non-climatic drivers Climate change, & non-climatic drivers
Climate impacts Pre-adaptation vulnerability
Integration of natural and social sciences Little Low medium
Positive
Post-adaptation vulnerability
Full
Medium high
Normative
Recommended adaptation measures
Full
High
Table 2: Characteristic properties of four different stages of climate change vulnerability assessment Source: after Fssel & Klein (2005).
In its widest context vulnerability concepts do not only consider climate change but try to integrate various aspects of global environmental change including socio-economic aspects of mitigation and adaptation (cf. Tab. 2).
See, the following examples.
5.2.1 Functions for vulnerability/consequence analysis

Depends on the questions which should be answered, cf. Sect. 5.1, 5.2.2
5.2.2 Examples of vulnerability maps and legends

In the following several examples of vulnerability mappings are briefly discussed. Regarding to the above discussion it is consequent that risk assessment in climate change research does not rely on singular events, since it is currently rather impossible to provide likelihoods of occurrence and damage estimates for, e.g., weather extremes. This is the major reason why risk (hazard) mapping strategies play only a minor role in climate impact assessment and almost all presented examples have a more or less broad focus (earth system analysis).
5.2.2.1 Vulnerability against Extreme Events in North-Rhine Westphalia/Germany

The North-Rhine Westphalia (NRW) study differs from the majority of vulnerability studies by focusing explicitly on extreme weather events rather than on smooth modifications of mean values of crucial climate parameters (cf. KROPP et al. 2005). The pace of climate change which may influence the future intensity of extreme weather (see, Sect. 2.2ff) events could push us to the limits of adaptive capacity. In general, it is rather difficult to determine local vulnerability, but there exists sufficient evidence that a variety of assets located in densely populated areas could be affected most B.VI-16
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seriously (MUNICHRE 2003). It is, of course, a formidable scientific task to estimate the possible damages that might arise for ecological and socioeconomic systems by irregular events accompanying climate change in these areas. The associated impacts are generally unevenly distributed among social structures and economic sectors. In the NRW study considered values at stake do not only comprise markets assets, but also to ecosystem functions, human well-being, and socio-political stability. As a basis of the of the vulnerability assessment shown in this subsection a systematic stocktaking of al conceivable types of damage caused by weather extremes was carried out and a set of vulnerability indicators for each category of damage was identified. These 24 indicators (from socioeconomics, society, nature, industry, and infrastructure) are used as measures for the degree of susceptibility of a given sector in the face of climate stimuli, and they are therefore suitable for a comparative risk assessment (Fig. 5).
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Fig. 5: Examples of vulnerability maps for 396 communities of NorthRhine Westphalia indicating susceptibility against weather extremes: (a) susceptibility to heat waves estimated by population density and number of elderly people, (b) vulnerability of forest sector assessed by combining the landscape orography and certain types of trees, (c) susceptibility of local labour market calculated on the basis of the seasonal rate of non-employment, and (d) production loss by traffic collapse through extreme weather conditions on the basis of number of commuting employees for each community. Lower left panel: geographically explicit distribution of integrated vulnerabilities against extreme weather events on a community level. Source Kropp et al. (2005).
Nevertheless, it is difficult to develop a universal acceptable metric defining vulnerability. This incommensurability is due to the inherently normative nature of any vulnerability concept, e.g. valuing impacts under largely unknown probabilities of occurrence (see above). Thus, the vulnerability measure should be only considered in comparison to similar settings and not, for example, with those measured for Angola or Brazil. In order to determine the overall vulnerability measure a neural network algorithm was used for pattern recognition and classification (cf. Fig. 5, bottom left)
5.2.2.2 Agricultural Vulnerability against Climate Change in India

The approach presented in this section tries to assess Indias agricultural vulnerability with respect to two stressors: climate change and economic globalisation. The authors argue that agriculture is already susceptible, in particular, to changes in the monsoon pattern. In there approach the authors apply the IPCC typology to develop measures for adaptive capacity, sensitivity and exposure (OBRIEN et al. 2004). Due to sparse data the defined adaptive capacity profile is based on the conditions in 1991 (Fig. 6, lower left panel). Therefore, the presented analysis is partly static and has a strong diagnostic component. The used data for the measurement of adaptive capacity comprises soil conditions, groundwater availability, human capital (adult literacy rate), social capital (gender equity), presence/lack of alternative economic activities (measures the possibility to shift to other economic activities), irrigation capacity, and quality of infrastructure on the district level. The variety of data they are using to B.VI-18
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construct the integrated indices are amalgamated equal weighted (OBRIEN 2005, personal communication) To measure the sensitivity under exposure to climate change a sensitivity index (CSI) was constructed comprising dryness and monsoon dependence. The dryness was considered as a smoothed representation of drought sensitivity. The authors argue that approx. 80% of the total annual rainfall is provided by the monsoon. If this fails this will have tremendous effects on Indian agriculture. For the period 1961-1990 the CSI is shown in Fig. 6a. The future sensitivity was estimated by using a regionally downscaled climate scenario (used model HadRM2, CO2 doubling) (Fig. 6b).
Fig 6: Vulnerability to climate change in India (in quantiles): to measure sensitivity (upper panel) under exposure to climate change a sensitivity index (CSI) is defined based on a gridded data set. The lower left panel represents the adaptive capacity on a district level for 1991. In lower right panel the integrated vulnerability is shown as a composite of adaptive capacity and climate sensitivity under exposure of climate change. Source OBrien et al (2004).
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The results shown in Fig. 6 comprise only parts of the whole analysis, since OBRIEN et al. (2004) have also examined the vulnerability against globalisation.
5.2.2.3 Vulnerability of Global Water Resources

Regarding the scale assessments of water vulnerability traditionally have been cast at the country or regional scale. VRSMARTY et al. (2000) have extended these approaches by considering individual drainage basins and sub-catchments. The briefly described example tries to assess water vulnerability to future climate change, population growth, and industrial growth between 1985 and 2025 by examining the water infrastructure. The authors investigate the topology of river systems and its use by humans assuming that the mean annual run-off accumulated as river discharge constitutes a sustainable water supply for a local population. The demand is calculated as a ratio of water use to discharge. The industrial, domestic, and agricultural demand was considered. For each region the ratio provides a local index of water stress. The indicator shown in Fig. 7 is
Fig. 7: Maps of future changes in the water reuse index relative to the contemporary situation predicted by a coupling of a GCM and water balance model (Sc1), population and economic development (Sc2) and both (Sc3). A 20% threshold is used to highlight regions of substantial change. Source: Vrsmarty et al. (2000).
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The so-called water re-use index ( DIA/Q) defining the ratio of aggregate upstream water use relative to discharge. For the analysis they had used a water balance model (WBM, 30 grid) and climate change scenarios from two models (HadCM2, CGCM1). For the period from 1961-1990 the river discharge was reconstructed by using the WBM and off-line forcing in the climate models. The future run-off varied in response to climate and used model from < 1mm/yr (HadCM2/WBM) to 17 mm/yr (CGCM1). Focussing on the regional scale more substantial changes for the catchments can be observed. From the World Resources Institute they obtained population projections for the period from 1985-2025 applied to a 1-km scale. Country statistics on water withdrawal were also used in order to calculate water demand. However, the did not consider adaptation of societies to changed situations in 2025. V RSMARTY et al. (2000) found by their grid approach that 400 million people live under conditions of relative water scarcity and approximately a 1.8 billion under severe water stress. This is in contrast to UN studies estimating that on third of the world population lives under conditions of relative water scarcity and only a half billion under severe water stress (UN 1997). These pattern will exacerbate 2025 (cf. Fig. 7). In many regions which are today water-rich population pressure and future climate change will induce changes in the regional constraints.
5.2.2.4 Syndromes of Global Change

The syndrome concept was proposed by the German Advisory Council on Global Change to the Federal Government (WBGU 1994) and worked out, improved and extended by several research groups. It tries to identify hot spots of global change on earth under the assumption that the core problems of global change, e.g. soil erosion, greenhouse gas emissions, loss of biodiversity, etc. cannot analysed and described in a disciplinary and sectoral manner. It is the highly interrelated entirety of these problems, which distinguishes the current development as a crisis unique in mankinds history. Thus, it is the basic idea of the syndrome concept that the overall phenomenon of Global Change shall not divided into regions, sectors, or processes, but be understood as a co-evolution of dynamical partial patterns. These pattern are bundles of interactive processes which appear repeatedly and widely spread in typical combinations, the so-called syndromes of global change (cf. SCHELLNHUBER et al. 1997). Currently 16 of these pattern are defined, e.g. the Sahel Syndrome: Overuse of marginal land (cf. Fig. 8, PETSCHEL-HELD et al. 1999); the Favela Syndrome: Socioecological degradation through uncontrolled urban growth (KROPP et al. 2001); or the Overexploitation Syndrome: Overexploitation of natural ecosystems (CASSEL -G INTZ & PETSCHEL -H ELD 2000). Other syndrome deal with singular anthropogenic environmental disasters (Disaster Syndrome) or with a environmental degradation through an uncontrolled disposal of waste (Waste Dumping Syndrome). For a brief overview confer to LDECKE et al. (2004). The central idea of this approach is to describe each of these syndromatic pattern by a typical combination of so-called symptoms (approx. 80 are defined, for an example, cf. Fig. 8). In the first place symptoms are defined as qualities of Global Change which appear to play a major role in the B.VI-21
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ongoing problematic developments both in the natural environment and in society. In other words they can also considered as trends. Based on the syntax of these trends and possibly interactions pattern specific networks of interrelations can be specified (cf. Fig. 8). Indeed, these networks look like quite complex. Therefore, for each syndrome core elements are identified (kernel) which are a necessary precondition for an occurrence of a syndrome (Fig. 8, red symptoms). The analysis of these pattern follows a two step strategy: (i) syndrome diagnosis and (ii) syndrome prognosis. With respect to this issue the analyst has to compile knowledge from several sectors in a formalized network. For this goal two measures are defined and fuzzy logic concepts (cf. Fig. 9, top) are utilized:
Fig. 8: Syndrome specific network of transectoralinterrelations for the Sahel Syndrome (Overuse of Marginal Land). The arrows indicates a forcing the bullets a mitigation. The red symptoms constitute the Sahel specific kernel which must at least be active in order to detect a syndrome. Source: Schellnhuber et al. 1997.
Disposition : geographically explicit proneness, i.e. the disposition refers to the process of identifying the susceptibility of entire regions towards specific syndromes (cf. Fig. 9, upper and lower left panel). Intensity : measures the possibly outbreak and intensity of a syndrome (Fig. 9, lower right panel).
Note, that disposition and intensity are diagnostic measurements representing only static snapshot for a limited time interval (1990ties). Regarding the dynamic development of a syndrome kernel further methods are applied which allow a prognosis in time in particular (PETSCHEL-H ELD et al. 1999). Due to a variety of uncertainties interconnected with the analysis B.VI-22
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of global developments so-called qualitative differential equations are employed allowing weak projection along the main lines of developments. These projections allows to identify critical and safe developments and the respective constraints. A major advantage is the analysis of concrete policies.
Fig 9: Sahel Syndrome (0.5 x 0.5), upper panel: Decision tree for the natural and socio-economic dimension of the Sahel disposition. The tree is stepwise evaluated by application of different fuzzy logic indicators indicated by the black boxes. Lower left panel: Global distribution of the disposition; lower right panel: Intensity of the Sahel syndrome (grey: syndrome not active). Note, that proneness not automatically implies an occurrence of a syndrome, i.e. several regions of South America are susceptible, but currently the mechanism is not active. Thus, but measure could used as early warning index. Source: Schellnhuber et al (1997), Cassel-Gintz et al. (1997).
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5.2.2.5 Advanced Terrestrial Ecosystem Analysis and Modelling

ATEAMs (European Joint Project, final report available under www.pikpotsdam.de/ateam/) objective was to assess the vulnerability of human sectors relying on ecosystem services with respect to global change. Vulnerability was considered to a function of potential impacts and adaptive capacity to global change (cf. Fig. 10, upper panel). The vulnerability assessment is twofold. First, it is tried to examine the degree to which an ecosystem service is sensitive to global change. Second, it was estimated to which degree a sector which relies on this service is unable to adapt the changes (for details cf. SCHRTER et al. 2005). During the project duration a common spatial scale of 10x10 was used. It was the aim to produce spatially explicit vulnerability maps for the time slices of 1990, 2020, 2050, and 2080. As input data for the ATEAM integrated assessment the following data were used: 17 climate scenarios based of 4 GCMs, 4 SRES scenarios (A1F, A2, B1, B2) CO2 concentration scenarios per used SRES scenario Nitrogen deposition per SRES scenario Terrain data and soil properties data set Land cover and land use data sets Land use scenarios for each of the for SRES scenarios Social indicators for adaptive capacity downscaled to the NUTS2 level
For the combination of the several indicators fuzzy logic methods are employed.
Fig 10: Upper panel: schematic overview of the ATEAM vulnerability assessment framework. Lower panel: ATEAM vulnerability assessment for 2050 (from left to right): Changes in ecosystem services (impacts), changes in societies adaptive capacity, overall vulnerability. Source: Schrter et al (2005).
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The main results are that the provision of essential ecosystem services will change significantly with global change during the 21st century. In particular, based on socio-economic and climatic changes an overall decline in arable land in Europe will be a realistic scenario. In addition, climate change will shift crop suitability in agricultural regions. On the other hand the forest sector will be benefited from climate change, with the exception that in the Mediterranean droughts and fires pose an increasing risk. Regarding water availability climate change tends to increase the number of catchments in southern Europe which will be affected by water scarcity. Touristic seasons in the Alps will be shortened due to a decreasing snow cover and in nature the extinction rate will be accelerated. Comparing the overall vulnerability the Mediterranean regions will be most vulnerable, because in southern Europe the potential multiple impacts are combined with a low adaptive capacity (cf. Fig. 10, lower panel).
5.3 Most common damage potentials

All sectors of the natural environment and anthroposphere could be affected. The damage potential cannot calculated, since regional extend and magnitude of climate change and, in particular, weather extremes are rather uncertain (cf. Sect 2.2ff).
6 Analysis of risk
Formally risk, in general, is defined as the product of the probability/likelihood of occurrence and its magnitude. Thus, information about the frequency of a critical event (often termed as hazard, cf. Sect. 3) and the magnitude of the likely consequences is needed. For climate change as a process this is difficult, but it might be possible for weather related extremes, e.g. heavy storms, flooding, heat waves, etc. With respect to a broader the German Advisory Council on Global Change to the Federal Government has proposed a concept, which allows a qualitative assessment of risk classes (WBGU 2000).

Climate change risk assessment is often used synonymously to impact (hazard) assessments that includes consideration of probability or uncertainty associated with climate change or climate variability. Nevertheless, probabilistic assessments of risks is rather problematic in most cases (cf. Sects. 2.2ff, 3). Therefore, the primary purpose of undertaking risk assessment is: Characterise the nature of risk; Provide qualitative (often) or quantitative (seldom) estimates of the risk; Assess the consequences of uncertainties for decision options; and Compare sources of risk; including climate risks.
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The last point is important, since it allows to compare risks, e.g. with respect to costs, etc.. It allows also derive management options. In general, risk assessment is a tiered strategy, which begins with a risk screening, followed by a generic quantitative risk assessment, and finalized by a specific quantitative risk assessment. Due to inherent uncertainties (see above) in climate and environmental research often scenarios applied. Two strategies are common. The first considers consistent storylines used to force model runs (cf. IPCC SRES scenarios). The obtained results are used to assess future risk. The second is an inverse approach, based on normative borders, i.e. it is considered what is acceptable for a society and what is not. With respect to this tolerable window (or viability domain) developments are checked whether they stay in this domain or not. Subsequently, can be discussed which actions must be taken in order to approach the defined targets (for examples cf. WBGU 1997, PETSCHEL-HELD et al., 1999b, KROPP et al. 2004). Quantitative risk assessment, e.g. by calculation of return period for floods etc. is part of the third stage of risk assessment. As mentioned above this is combined with a variety of methodological problems and a focus of ongoing research (cf. COLES 2001, KATZ et al. 2002, BUNDE et al. 2004, BUNDE et al. 2005). From the current state of the art vulnerability assessments have a greater importance in climate change research.
6.2.1 Qualitative and quantitative methods, direct and indirect risk

Not applicable as stated before.

Not applicable as stated before.

See, examples for vulnerability maps.
7 Risk management
The focus of risk management in the climate change is about making decisions concerning the management of rare and/or uncertain detrimental events, for instance, avoiding the risks of extreme flooding, heavy storms, storm surges etc.. This means climate change risk assessment focuses more on adaptation, rather than on the calculation of an exact quantitative risk measure (cf. risk definition). Although policy makers often ask for these measures the present style of decision making is at least ostensibly based on explicit quantified findings. Given the complexity of the system in question, it is neither possible nor desirable to determine climate change risks as a single figure. The reason for this point of view is rather simple: a given, but apparent safety is always interconnected with a singular and predefined trajectory which may allocate resources. In a case of a misallocation, however, the reaction time for readjustments could be possibly too small. Thus, uncertainty also allows a larger flexibility in decision making (cf. REUSSWIG et al. 2004).
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8 Analysis of natural risks in relation to climate change

An analysis of natural risks can be undertaken only for specific regions, because this is, to some extend, a theoretical task. This means several assumptions regarding potential regional climate change must be made. Regarding landslide risk, for example, soil type characteristic, precipitation pattern and amount and hill slope are relevant indicators for an analysis. This already implies, that such an analysis cannot provided in general, but needs a detailed and sophisticated research strategy. All regions of the planet are potentially at risk from the hazards produced by climate change. The amount of risk at any location will depend on the nature of the changes in weather patterns and the characteristics of the local environment. The Earth's cycles are so dynamic that it is presently not possible to accurately predict the specific effects of climate change for a specific location. It should be noted that "global warming" is not likely to be global. That is, the average temperature of the Earth may increase, but some locations may experience cooling. With regard to natural hazards, climate change (warming or cooling) is the issue of greatest importance, and it is most important at regional and local scales and must be investigated for the distinct meteorological extremes and regions. The climate changes induce the following impacts on regional scales: 1. a change in weather patterns 2. an increase in sea level rise 3. an increase in the number of landslides. Increase in the amount and frequency of rainfall could cause more river flooding, while decreases may cause drought. Land use, such as cropping and forestry may need to change to suit new weather patterns, affecting runoff, hillside and valley drainage as well as increasing fire risks due to vegetation changes. The location of some industries, agriculture, horticulture and tourism may also need to change. Changing weather patterns may also threaten biodiversity, affecting our ecosystems. Species that are already under threat or at the limit of their climatic range may not be able to survive. New diseases and pests may take hold. Tropical pests and tropical diseases like malaria may become established in areas where they currently do not exist. Predicted sea level rise affects low-lying areas and estuaries. This will influence where people live, work and play and put even more pressure on our coastal environment. Landslides may be triggered by heavy rain. In regions with volcanic activity this risk may be very high since sediments from volcanic outbursts are unstable. People relocating inland to avoid coastal hazards such as flooding and erosion may face an increased risk of large scale rock and/or soil slips in marginal areas, due to the effects of changes in rainfall, drainage patterns and land use on hill slopes. All these events may also threaten lifeline services such as water, power, telecommunication infrastructure and transportation networks.
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9 Conclusion
In this report the difficulties regarding an adequate derivation and assessment of extremes are discussed. It was made clear the difference between weather related singular disasters, e.g. flooding, droughts, etc. and the smooth process of climate change. As discussed, there exists a likely evidence that climate change will change probability and occurrence of weather extremes, but up to now it is quite difficult to assess this. This holds, in particular, with respect to small regional scales, e.g. calculation a quantitative risk. Thus, results from examinations trying to do such kind of research must be considered with care. Focussing on risk/hazard/vulnerability assessment the situation is more different. In general, the presented examples (cf. Sect. 5) show that any kind of concrete vulnerability assessment depends on the question which should be solved. This hold for static (diagnostic) purposes and as well as for dynamical ones. Thus, from my point of view and with respect to the above discussion it will be rather problematic to provide an European Hazard Assessment Framework which includes standardized data as well as standardized methodologies, since any kind of strategy depends on the availability of data, decision makers problems, and the natural and anthropogenic inventory. On the other hand it will be possible to provide such an analysis for exemplified regions if one could defined an agreement on time/scale and sectoral issues. The concept of vulnerability assessments in climate/global change research, which has now already a history of approximately two decades, could be a basis for such an approach. Focussing more explicit on meteorological and climate extremes the current problems are discussed in briefly in this report. The lack of knowledge is noted and has caused the IPCC making extreme value assessment to a focal point in the Fourth Assessment Report which is currently under preparation.

Adaptive capacity defines the ability of a system to adjust to climate change, e.g. to moderate potential damages. Climate change: a process including changes in natural variability and anthropogenic induced climate (cf. IPCC and UNFCCC, Sect. 2.2.) Climate adaptation indicates the process or outcome of a process that leads to a reduction in harm or risk of harm, or realisation of benefits, associated with climate variability and climate change (mitigation) Disposition of a syndrome: measures the proneness of an region against a syndromatic pattern. Extreme weather event: an event that is rare within its statistical reference distribution at a particular place. Definitions of rare vary, but an extreme weather event would normally be as rare as or rarer than the 10th or 90th percentile. Extreme value distribution: a particular family of probability density functions (GEV/GPD) used to describe the probability of extremes. Their usage is combined with some a priori assumptions which are partly not given in empirical data sets.
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The exposure unit is defined by the nature of decision-makers problem. It defines the system or parts of the system to be at risk. Risk assessment is used to assist decision-makers to form an opinion of the likely sensitivity of a particular area of responsibility or concern to potential changes in climate. Hazard is a natural occurrence causing a damage (harm), i.e. comprised of perturbations and stress and the consequences they produce. A perturbation is a major spike in pressure (e.g., a tidal wave or hurricane) beyond the normal range of variability in which the system operates. Climate Change is not a hazard. IID : identically and independently distributed data, a precondition for extreme value statistics. Impact means a beneficially or more usually detrimental consequence Intensity of a syndrome: measures to what extend a region is affected by a syndromatic pattern IS92a indicates a business as usual emission scenario, reference point 1992. Climate change risk assessment tries to determine how climate change could affect outcomes in a sector (e.g. economy, ecosphere, etc.) and to evaluate the effectiveness of decision regarding existing or new policies, programmes and projects. Mitigation: In the context of risk management any action that reduces the probability and magnitude of unwanted consequences. In climate change mitigation is a strategy to mitigate the risks associated with future changes in climate. Natural variability causes uncertainties that stem from inherent randomness or unpredictability in the natural world. Variability can be assessed by monitoring programmes etc., but the examined variability under consideration depends also on the time scale (cf. Fig. 1 stationarity) Precautionary principle: Principle defined by the Rio Declaration. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific uncertainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation. Preparedness: The possibility of a society or system to cope with climate change. R i s k is the product of probability of occurrence and magnitude of consequences after a hazard (perturbation or stress) Risk assessment means the structured analysis of hazards and impacts to provide information for decisions. Risk assessment usually relates to an exposure unit which may be individual (e.g. population, infrastructure, environmental assets) and depends on the decision makers problem (exposure unit) Risk management indicates any action or portfolio of actions that aim to reduce the probability and magnitude of unwanted consequences (cf. also mitigation) Scenario : A coherent, internally consistent and plausible description of a possible future state of the world, usually based on specific assumptions (SRES scenarios, IS92a). B.VI-29
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SRES-Marker scenarios: 35 IPCC scenarios (S pecial R eport on E mission S cenarios) describing different story lines used in order to estimate the future development of climate. The scenarios are structured in 4 scenario families: (A1) rapid economic growth and introduction of new an more efficient technologies, sub-scenarios A1FI: fossil intensive, A1T non-fossil future, A1B energy mix; (A2) heterogeneous world with a focus on local traditional values; (B1) renunciation from materialism and introduction of clean technologies; (B2) focal point on local solutions, economic and ecological sustainability. Sensitivity defines the degree to which an exposure unit would be affected, either adversely or beneficially, by a change of a particular climate variable (e.g. crop yield with respect to precipitation/temperature mean or variability). Syndrome of Global Change: transsectorally defined pattern of global change, which can be considered as sub-dynamics of all global change processes. System means the social, economic and natural domain within risks arise, produce consequences and in which risks are managed. Stationarity: statistical concept that is needed as a priori assumption for the statistical analysis of time series data. It indicates that the expected value and variance and are constant over time. In the narrow sense this holds only for stochastic processes. Climate, river-run off have stochastic parts, but not in general. Thus extended assumptions, e.g. weak stationarity, are used. Tolerable climate change: The willingness to live with a particular level of risk, in return for certain benefits, based upon a certain confidence that the risk is being properly controlled or managed. Ex ante it is often defined normative as an outcome of the public debate, ex post it is often unavoidable to live with a specific level of risk ( climate change). In the latter case climate adaptation becomes important. Uncertainty means a characteristic of a system or decision where the probability that certain states or outcomes may occur are not precisely known. Uncertainty may have several sources: lack of process knowledge, lack of data, model uncertainty. Vulnerability defines the extent to which a system is susceptible to, or unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate change, including variability and extremes. It is a function of system's sensitivity, exposure, and its adaptive capacity.
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11 Appendix: Operational Standards for Risk Assessment aimed at Spatial Planning

11.1 Minimum standard (simplified model) for hazard mapping aimed at a legal directive
A setting of standards for hazard mappings from the perspective of climate change on the current state of knowledge is rather impossible (cf. Sect. 2.2), since the scale used by planners are significant smaller than those used in climate research. Nevertheless simple approaches are common and already in use, cf. the Australian Disaster Mitigation Programme (http://www.dotars.gov. au/naturaldisasters/index.aspx). A subprogramme estimates based of historic flood events the necessity of flood plain in river catchments (cf. Fig. 11).
Fig. 11: Map of Perth, Tasmania, Australia provided by the Tasmania floodplain study. Levels of risk are indicated by an in-depth survey of historic gauge levels. Climate Change is not considered.
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With respect to the current knowledge and under consideration of climate scenarios the following approach might be possible: 1. Determine levels of prone areas for river catchments or coastal regions by the help of a terrain model (consider current flood protection buildings!) 2. Perform a systematic stocktaking of the assets and their values in these regions (regarding the problems, e.g. discounting, cf. FANKHAUSER 1995) 3. Use a downscaled climate change scenario, local precipitation-run-off models and build potential future run-off and precipitation scenarios (regarding the difficulties cf. Sect. 2.2.1) 4. By utilization of adequate statistical methods and based on historic measurements and those generated by model outputs probabilities can be calculated for a hundred year flooding (with respect to potential errors cf. Sect. 2.2.1.1) After this procedure the major task is mitigation, e.g. with respect to flooding, to avoid losses by keeping away the water from natural and anthropogenic assets. This a typical structural approach. Currently also non-structural and response modification strategies coming to be modern. This approach recognises that peoples reactions to impending floods and warnings have a substantial effect on the losses that subsequently occur (cf. Tab. 3).
Structural Physical environment e.g. dams, channel improvements, flood plains, flood gates e.g. building regulations, land use planning, zoning, e.g. education programmes, preparedness, early warning systems
Non-Structural
Property Modification/Planning Response Modification
Table 3: Classification of measure to reduce the losses of flood events.
However, from the legal point of view any kind of successful hazard assessment should consider that an adequate warning time is guaranteed and that local authorities must be prepared to acquire land for public purposes if necessary.
11.2 Various methodologies related to the 3 assumed scales of analysis in the light of a potential harmonisation of hazard maps, based on a multihazard perspective
Which three scales? From climate research these scales make no sense, because they are to small. Climate data are only available on coarser scales (model scales!). Regarding history also point measures are common (weather stations, river gauges). If these are available in an adequate coverage interpolation routines can be used to provide maps. For the future B.VI-32
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only scenarios from model runs are available which can be downscaled by various algorithms
11.3 Minimum standard (simplified model) for risk mapping aimed at spatial planning
Strategies to determine climate change risks are discussed above. For singular cases risk assessment may be possible, but the relevance of results depend on the availability of data, used methodology, and quality of model runs. Due to this circumstance the outcomes should be interpreted with care.
11.4 Multi-risk assessment perspective as element of the Strategic Environmental Assessment

Confer the vulnerability section, in the climate change community this is used a standardized and strategic approach to assess environmental and socio-economic risks. Up to now these approaches are slowly migrating into other disciplines. In global change research the question how we can mitigate risk is exactly the underlying idea of the vulnerability concept.
11.5 Methodologies, functions and outputs

A variety is used. Their choice depend on the questions which shall be answered, in particular, to the decision makers problem (cf. discussion of exposure unit, vulnerability). In general these header sounds a bit strange, since the output depends on the definition of e.g. exposure units and last but not least on the available data. In climate change research any kind of vulnerability mapping can be understand as a support for policy making. It is not a planning instrument (cf. to the uncertainty discussion Sect. 2.2.1.1).
12 References
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B.VII Possible secondary effects of natural hazard discussed at the example of groundwater pollution
Authors: Zuzana Boukalov, Radomr Muzikr, Marek Skalicky, CCSS
1 Physical definition of potential secondary hazards of natural hazards ground water pollution ....................... 3
1.1 Impact of natural events on groundwater regime..................3
Floods ..................................................................................3 Earthquakes .........................................................................4 1.1.1 1.1.2
1.1.3 Landslides, erosion, heavy rainfall, forest fires, volcanic activities ..........................................................................................5
1.2 Potential sources of hazard risk for the groundwater originated by the natural disasters ............................................................5
2 Hazard assessment.................................................... 6
2.1 Definition.........................................................................6 2.2 Current methodologies for analysing and representation of hazard ....................................................................................6 2.3 Availability of the required data..........................................6
Required data .......................................................................6 Data source ..........................................................................8 2.3.1 2.3.2
3 Element at risk and exposure................................... 11

3.1 3.2 Typology of elements ...................................................... 11 Definition of exposure ..................................................... 11
4 Groundwater vulnerability and groundwater vulnerability maps ....................................................... 12

4.1 4.2 Definition of groundwater vulnerability .............................. 12 Methodologies for assessment of groundwater vulnerability . 12
Hydrogeological setting........................................................ 12 The parametric methods ...................................................... 15
4.2.1 4.2.2
5 Analogical relations and numerical models............... 17

5.1 Problem of scale ............................................................. 17
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5.2 Examples of groundwater vulnerability maps and legends referred to assumed scales...................................................... 18
5.2.1 5.2.2 Legend of groundwater vulnerability map............................... 18 Examples of groundwater vulnerability maps.......................... 18
5.3 Groundwater vulnerability map production for risk maps of natural hazards...................................................................... 19
6 Analysis of risk ........................................................ 20

6.1 6.2 Definition of risk ............................................................. 20 Methodologies for risk assessment.................................... 20
Identification and characterization of priority pollutants........... 21
6.2.1
6.2.2 Identification of path ways and mechanism for chemical migration ....................................................................................... 21 6.2.3 Quantity and space contamination distribution estimate resulting in natural disasters ............................................................ 21 6.2.4 6.2.5 6.2.6 6.2.7 6.2.8 Identification and description of receptors.............................. 22 Risk characterization estimate .............................................. 22 Evaluation of uncertainties ................................................... 22 Recommended method ........................................................ 23 Conclusion of methodology for risk assessment ...................... 23
7 Risk management.................................................... 23 8 Glossary of all keywords .......................................... 24 9 Bibliography ............................................................ 25

Annex 1: Assessment of groundwater vulnerability according to GOD and drastic Annex 2: Legend for groundwater vulnerability map Annex 3: Categories of aquifer nature assessment of potential contaminant spreading within aquifer Annex 4: Example of groundwater vulnerability map in regional scale (1:100 000) Annex 5: Example of groundwater vulnerability map in regional scale (1:25 000) Annex 6: Operational standards for groundwater vulnerability maps aimed to spatial planning
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1 Physical definition of potential secondary hazards of natural hazards ground water pollution
Groundwater is one of components of hydrological cycle, important source for water supply and important part of environment influencing the status of aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems. During most of natural hazards are disturbed and damaged installations with the potential sources of groundwater regime impact. Especially, the deterioration of groundwater quality is serious. This is mostly no visible, is long-running due to persistence of soluble chemicals arising as a result of our consumptive way of life and occurring in long size contamination plume. The remediation is very expensive and requires a long period of remediation. Qualitative and quantitative impacts on groundwater are originated by of most of natural hazards. Some following examples of the natural hazard impacts are shown.
1.1 Impact of natural events on groundwater regime

1.1.1 Floods
The influence on ground water depends on the location of the area of interest in the catchment. In the upper stream the flood pass over quickly with the destructive power. The flood flow returns after short time back to the riverbed. The floodplain stays longer period in the lower stream, sometimes the weeks. It originates the long running impacts on groundwater. The impacts are both qualitative and quantitative.
Qualitative impacts:
Leachate in contaminated sites and brownfields, Leachate in the areas of the installations with the potentially contaminating activities: e.g. oil, fuel or chemical storage, hazardous chemical waste spills, industry with effluent of organic wastes, inorganic wastes, airfields, landfills, military establishments, slaughterhouses, mines, specially abandoned mines, quarries, animal husbandries, livestock storage, silage, cultivated areas with expected frequent and abundant use of pesticides and fertilizers, etc. Water penetration of flood water: o Mines and quarries o Wells o Drainage pipes and sewages Contamination of abstraction wells
Two pathways of contamination of abstraction wells could be identified. The first is the direct penetration of floodwater into abstraction wells. It could occur in the upper and lower stream. The second results in long-term presence of floodwater over the cone of depression. This affects the primary hazard long-term leachate of pollutants of floodwater into aquifer and the secondary hazard leachate of the contaminant sediments transferred with the floodwater. This is occurs rather in the lower stream. The abstraction B.VII-3
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wells contamination resulted in the floods in the River Moravia Basin (Q100 Q500) in Czech Republic in 1997 and in the River Label and Lava Basin (Q500 Q1 000) in 2002. Organic substances, bacteria and microorganisms polluted the groundwater. In addition, high turbidity and color of water occurred. The presence of hazard substances was not detected. The groundwater contamination was originated by the domestic wastewaters and by the agriculture activities as livestock storage, silage etc.
Qualitative impacts:
Stream recharge to groundwater Interruption of the discharge function of the receiving water course (e.g. drainage, sewer pipes or pluvial pipes) Consequences: o Increase of groundwater level o Increase of the vulnerability of groundwater in Quaternary aquifers o Temporally marshy land Example: Interruption of the drainage discharge to a receiving pond resulted in long term runway inundation at the airport in La Havana (Cuba)
1.1.2 Earthquakes
The earthquakes have a variety of effects on groundwater. Most spectacular are sudden rises of water levels in wells. The earthquake shocks produce small raises and falls of groundwater levels in well penetrating the confined aquifers. It is a sudden and short-lived process. Groundwater level returns usually to the initial level. The short-lived fluctuations of groundwater level were observed at a long distances of the earthquake centers. Examples: The earthquake in Romania occurred the 3rd March 1977 originated the short-lived fluctuation in Slatinice in Czech Republic up to in the range to 0,77 m and in Lithuania to 0,06 m. The earthquake in former Yugoslavia occurred the 15th April 1979 originated the short-lived fluctuation of groundwater level in the range up to 1,25 m in Slatinice in Czech Republic. The impact of earthquakes on piezometric groundwater level is neglected. The other effects on groundwater were observed as follows: Increase of spring discharges (up to several fold) Decrease of spring discharge up to zero discharge Increase of the fissures Disturbance of the protective function of the unsaturated zone Changes of chemical composition in the springs Influence of human activity on the earthquake production Example: Elevated fluid pressures in disposal well of the depth about 3 700 m injecting wastewater from a chemical plant in Rocky Mountain Arsenal (Colorado, USA) participated the occurrence the earthquakes (Freeze, Cherry 1979) Disturbance of pipe network with waste water, water supply or drainage pipes Disturbance of sludge lagoons, waste disposals, etc
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1.1.3 Landslides, erosion, heavy rainfall, forest fires, volcanic activities

The effects on groundwater are similar to the foregoing natural events. The common effect is damage of the installation with the potential sources of groundwater regime impact.
1.2 Potential sources of hazard risk for the groundwater originated by the natural disasters
Two sources of groundwater hazard are distinguished: Natural sources Potentially man induced sources
Natural sources:
Heavy metals o Disturbance of the equilibrium of the system groundwater-rockssoil gas by the flow in the rocks o Influence of the oxidation during the flow and acid rains results in release of the heavy metals into groundwater o Heavy metals release during mining in consequence of oxidation Radionuclides Industry o Industry with effluent of organic biological and inorganic wastes o Oil, fuel and chemical storage o Pipelines with hazardous substances o Contaminated sites (spills), brownfields o Thermoelectric and nuclear power plants Waste disposals Highways, roads, airfields Military establishments Mining Agriculture o Animal husbandries o Livestock storage o Silage o Cultivated areas with expected frequent and abundant use of pesticides and fertilizers o Drainages Municipal o Urban areas without sewerage network o Main sever lines o Treatment plants o Hospitals o Cemeteries
Potential sources of groundwater regime impact:

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2 Hazard assessment
2.1 Definition
A hazard is the intrinsic property of dangerous or physical situation with a potential for creating damage to human health and/or the environment. It does not necessarily led to harm, but there is a possibility of harm occurring. In the context of groundwater hazard it results in damage of the installations with the potential sources of groundwater regime impact. The groundwater hazards could be both qualitative and quantitative. The qualitative hazard is the direct input, percolation or leaching of hazardous substances of damaged installations into groundwater. This affects the deterioration of the status of groundwater body and leads to the exceeding of the drinking water standards and to a potential impact to human health and/or terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems. The quantitative hazard is the impact to groundwater level affecting the temporally land water logging, damage of buildings and also increasing the vulnerability of groundwater in Quaternary aquifers.
2.2 Current methodologies for analysing and representation of hazard

The groundwater hazard assessment resulting in natural disasters belongs to the groundwater protection policy. A very important component of groundwater policy goals are the vulnerability maps and inventory of the potential sources, which are susceptible to affect the groundwater regime (qualitative and quantitative) in consequence of the their damage after natural disasters. A groundwater vulnerability map is a map showing a more or less subjective view of the capacity of the subsurface environment to protect groundwater. The vulnerability maps are used for the groundwater protection planning, decision making, land use planning and serve also as the input data for the delineation of the groundwater source protection zones. The vulnerability maps are modified for every purpose. This influences the scale and content of map but also the availability of adequate data. The vulnerability map with plotted potential sources of groundwater regime impact is the base input data for the assessment of groundwater hazard affected by the natural hazards.
2.3 Availability of the required data

The compilation of the groundwater vulnerability map requires profound knowledge of hydrogeological data and location of the facilities, which are susceptible to affect the groundwater regime (qualitative and quantitative) in consequence of their damage after natural disasters.
2.3.1 Required data

The information on the vulnerability of groundwater is based on: characteristics of soils of unsaturated zone (soils overlying the groundwater level), saturated zone (aquifer) and other factors influencing the groundwater regime. The content of required data is varying on the scale and purpose of the vulnerability map. B.VII-6
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The unsaturated zone is very important element of groundwater protection with the attenuation capacity. The main parameters are its thickness, lithodology relating to the consolidation and stratification of the soil, content of soil organic matter, clay mineral content, permeability etc. The thickness of the unsaturated zone is distance between the land surface and the groundwater level. In case of the subsurface potential source of contamination it should be considered the depth of the groundwater level under its base. The main data on saturation zone are: geological and hydrogeological structure, lithodology, geometry of aquifer, circulation of groundwater (recharge and discharge areas), type of aquifer (unconfined, confined), hydraulic parameters (conductivity, storage and transmisissivity), groundwater flow velocity and direction, range of groundwater level fluctuation, groundwater level contours, water divides, contact with other aquifers, with the streamflows, etc. The affected groundwater regime by the natural hazards can accelerate the migration of contaminated groundwater, both of natural and artificial origin. Hence, the data on groundwater contamination are required. The other factors influencing the groundwater regime are natural and artificial. The natural factor is climatologic data, topography (as slope variability), and vegetative cover, hydrology and water chemistry. The hydrological data are very important factor influencing the groundwater regime in the aquifer adjacent to the streamflow. These consist of the streamflow network and discharge capacity of stream channels, baseflow etc. The artificial factors are following: groundwater abstraction for water supply (location data on source and abstraction), dewatering wells and elements as large drainage pipes, discharge location of large drainage pipes and sewages to the receiving watercourses, impoundments at the streamflows, land use etc.). Besides the vulnerability, are very important data on installation with the potential sources of groundwater regime impact. The first rank occupy the installations relating to the potentially contaminating activities as follows: Industry o Industry with effluent of organic biological and inorganic wastes o Oil, fuel and chemical storage o Pipelines with hazardous substances o Contaminated sites (spills), brownfields o Thermoelectric and nuclear power plants Waste disposals Highways, roads, airfields Military establishments Mining Agriculture o Animal husbandries o Livestock storage o Silage o Cultivated areas with expected frequent and abundant use of pesticides and fertilizers
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o Drainages Municipal o Urban areas without sewerage network o Main sever lines o Treatment plants o Hospitals o Cemeteries
The second rank occupy the facility relating the quantitative impact as follows:
Large drainage pipes Discharge location of large drainage pipes and sewages to the receiving watercourses Abstraction and dewatering wells
2.3.2 Data source

The methods, sources and techniques for the data collection and processing are common for the skilled hydrogeologists. Every country stores the necessary data in another way. But the storing is on principle common. The base input sources are the available maps as follows: Topographic maps Groundwater vulnerability maps Hydrogeological maps Geological maps Soil maps Engineering geological maps
As was above mentioned, many groundwater vulnerability maps were issued in different scales. These cover often only small areas and were drawn up for different purposes and with different content. The systematical published groundwater vulnerability maps are rather the exception. The groundwater vulnerability maps published by the National Rivers Authority in regional scale 1: 100 000 cover the territory of England and Wales (see Annex 4). In other countries, there were issued the groundwater vulnerability maps in different scales and for different purposes. For example, in Czech Republic were issued the following groundwater vulnerability maps: the groundwater protection maps in the scale 1: 200 000 (Olmer, Rezac 1974), in eighties of the last century were issued the groundwater vulnerability maps in the scale 1: 50 000, but this edition was not finished and the maps cover only part of Czech Republic, in nineties the vulnerability maps were produced for the District studies of raw materials. The groundwater vulnerability maps were often compiled for the delineation of the groundwater source protection zones. The mentioned examples show that the purpose of vulnerability maps and corresponding content is different, but the main data groundwater vulnerability are available in every groundwater vulnerability map. Every existing type of groundwater vulnerability map is useful for the natural risk map of natural hazards. The other data sources for the groundwater vulnerability are as follows: Archives: o State (data of geological investigation, e.g. GEOFUND) B.VII-8
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o Geological institutes (State Geological Survey) o Consulting and drilling companies State administration: o Environmental protection authorities, water management authorities o Public health o Regional planning o Institutes responsible for state monitoring network (e.g. Hydrometeorological Institute) o Other monitoring networks o Water Authorities o River Basin Authorities and water supply agencies o Agriculture agencies and farmer organizations
The sources of the installations with the potential source of groundwater regime impact are as follows: The main polluters and potential polluters Regional and Municipal Authorities Environment Inspection Authorities Water Authorities River Basin Authorities
In the EU countries are available other data source relating to the potentially contaminating activities list of installations belonging under two EU Directives: 96/61/EC concerning integrated pollution prevention and control, denominated IPPC 96/82/EC on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances, with acronym Seveso
The purpose of the IPPC Directive is to achieve integrated prevention and control of pollution arising from the activities referring to production or inputs listed in Annex I of IPPC Directive. The mentioned activities refer to the threshold values to production or inputs. IPPC Directive lays down measures designed to prevent or, where that is not practicable, to reduce emissions in the air, water and land from the mentioned activities, including measure concerning waste, in order to achieve a high level of protection of the environment. The main polluting substances to taken out if they are relevant for fixing emission limit values are listed in the Annex III of IPPC Directive. The information on the installations belonging under IPPC can provide the competent authorities responsible under legal provisions of the EU Member States for carrying out the obligations arising from the Directive. The acronym of the second mentioned EC Directive Seveso has origin in the name of an Italian city, in which occurred a major accident with serious damage of the human health and environment. The Seveso Directive is aimed at the prevention of major accidents which involve dangerous substances, and the limitation of the consequences for man and the environment, with a view to ensure high levels of protection in a consistent and effective manner. It is applied in establishments and installations in which dangerous substances are produced, used, handled or stored. The danger substances comprehending a substance, mixture or preparation are B.VII-9
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listed the Annex I, Part 1 and 2 of Seveso Directive. Under Seveso fall the installations in which are present the listed danger substances as a raw material, product, by-product, residue or intermediate exceeding the qualifying qualities for the application mentioned in the Annex I, Part 1 and 2 of the Directive. Operators of the installations falling below the Seveso are obligated to take all the measures necessary to prevent major accidents and to limit the consequences for man and environment. Some of the operators obligations are the drawing up the emergency plans with the objectives of: Controlling the incidents so as to minimize the effects and to limit damages to man, environment and property Implementing the measures necessary to protect man and the environment effects of major accidents Communicating the necessary information to the public and to the services authorities concerned in the area Providing for the restoration and cleaning-up of the environment following a major accidents
The operators submit the document setting out the major prevention policy and emergency plans to the competent authority responsible under legal provisions of Seveso. The objective of preventing major-accidents and the consequences of such accidents are to be taken into account in their land use policies and/or other relevant policies. The information on the installations falling under Seveso can provide the relevant competent authorities responsible for carrying out the duties laid down the legal provisions. Both, the installations falling under IPPC and Seveso Directives have to take in consideration besides the measures considering the hazard resulting in current operations also the hazards resulting in the affects of the natural hazards. The natural risk maps are very important tool in this respect. The inseparable part of the data source is the field reconnaissance. The objectives of it are: Checking of the obtained data Collection of missing data and actualization of the obtained data in the concerned area Collection of data on contaminated sites
The last but not too much used method of data collection is the public participation. The EC Directives encourage the active involvement of all parties in implementation of the EC Directives especially in the environment issues. The public information and consultation is very important tool for the natural risk map production. This concerns all the types of natural hazard. A part on the PHARE project Integrated decision making in environment and support of public participation, solved in Czech Republic in 2000, was focused on public participation in the drawing up of the flood plans. During the public information on the prepared floodplans the participants initiated many useful suggests for flood mitigation measures to be included to the flood plans. The public information meeting preceded the detailed information on the flood plans using the mass media, small exhibitions, poster and leaflet information. B.VII-10
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The volume of the collected information depends on the scale. The regional scale requires less detailed information based especially on the existing map data. The information relating to the installations with the potential groundwater regime impact can be only general, not detailed (for example the installation falling under Seveso and IPPC). The plotted selection depends on grade of the hazard. The skilled hydrogeologist in the groundwater protection and migration of contaminants in unsaturated and saturated zone has to assess the selection of the potential sources to be affected by the natural hazards for the vulnerability maps. The field reconnaissance is very limited. The field reconnaissance takes a substantial part of the work within the data collection for the maps in local scale. The information on the plotted installations with the potential impact on groundwater regime in the vulnerability maps has to contain the data on the installation and hazardous substances. These data have to be shown in the annexes of the vulnerability map.
3 Element at risk and exposure

The risk of the possible secondary effects of natural hazards on groundwater is originated in the damage of the installations with potential sources of groundwater regime impact. The impact of the individual natural events on groundwater regime was described in the paragraph 1.1. The summarized elements at risk could be as follows: Escapes of hazardous substances of the installations with the potentially contaminating activities, where the dangerous substances are produced, used, handled or stored (e.g. oil, fuel or chemical storage industry with effluent of organic wastes, inorganic wastes, airfields, landfills, military establishments, slaughterhouses, mines, specially abandoned mines, quarries, animal husbandries, livestock storage, silage) Leachate of contaminated sites, sites with the hazardous chemical waste spills, brownfields, cultivated areas with expected frequent and abundant use of pesticides and fertilizers, areas with the contaminated soil and groundwater of natural origin Direct migration or infiltration of the inundated floodwater, lahars, etc. Discharge facilities of the drainage, sewer pipes or fluvial pipes in the receiving water course (interruption of the discharge function resulting in increase of the water level in the receiving water course)
3.2 Definition of exposure

Exposure refers to chemicals or elevated groundwater levels by relevant pathways.
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4 Groundwater vulnerability and groundwater vulnerability maps

4.1 Definition of groundwater vulnerability
Groundwater vulnerability is not an absolute property but rather a complex indicator. It is a relative, non-measurable, dimensionless property. The original concept of groundwater vulnerability was based on a simple premise that the physical environment may provide some degree of protection to groundwater with regard to contaminant entering the subsurface. The earth materials has of function of a natural filter with attenuation capacity. Water infiltrating to the unsaturated zone may be contaminated but is naturally purified to the same degree as it percolates through the soil and other fine-grained materials in the unsaturated zone. The vulnerability is an intrinsic property of a groundwater that depends on sensitivity of that system to human and/or natural impacts (Vrba and Zaporozec 1994). The sensibility of aquifer is the intrinsic susceptibility of migration of the contaminant to the aquifer of interest. It is a function of the intrinsic characteristics of the geological material in question and the overlying saturated and unsaturated materials. Two general types of vulnerability are differentiated: Intrinsic vulnerability depending solely on hydrogeological factors Specific vulnerability depending on hydrogeological factors and imposed contaminant load
4.2 Methodologies for assessment of groundwater vulnerability

The approach depends on the quantity and quality of available data, the purpose of the study and scale. The three groups of the groundwater vulnerability assessment methods could be distinguished: hydrogeological setting methods, parametric methods and analogical relation and model methods (Vrba, J., Zaporozec, A. et al. 1994).
4.2.1 Hydrogeological setting

Hydrogeological setting methods are more universal system suitable for large areas with the variety natural features. The methods involve the comparison of a study area to criteria judged to represent vulnerable conditions. They are suitable for the regional scale. Considering the possible universality of the selected information the thematic maps could be plotted. The maps in regional scale (1:100 000 1:500 000) provide the limited information, because the data are more generalized. The groundwater vulnerability assessed for the hydrogeological setting method was presented on the examples of different groundwater vulnerability maps. The regional groundwater vulnerability maps issued by the National Rivers Authority in England and Wells in nineties years of the last century serve as a very instructive example. The maps contain the distribution of aquifers subdivided the permeable strata and aquifer vulnerability assessed according the data on the overlying strata. The National Rivers Authority B.VII-12
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(1992) defined the types of aquifers and of the vulnerability for the groundwater protection policy. The mentioned classification was used in the groundwater vulnerability maps 1:100 000. The colours represent the types of aquifers and the shaded colours of relevant colour of concerned aquifer represent the relevant vulnerability classes. The low vulnerability corresponds to the lightest colour shade. The classification of the types of aquifer considering contaminant spreading within aquifer is shown in Annex 3 and 4 (NRA 1992, Vrba Zaporozec 1994): Major aquifers: Highly permeable formations usually with the known or probable presence of significant fracturing. Highly productive strata of regional importance often used for large potable abstractions Examples: Chalk and Jurassic limestones, Permo-triassic sandstones, Magnesian and Carboniferous limestones Minor aquifers: o Fractured or potentially fractured but with high intergranular permeability. Generally only support locally important abstractions. Examples: Millstone grit, Old Red sandstones, some igneous and metamorphic formations o Variably porous/permeable but without significant fracturing. Generally only support locally important abstractions. Examples: gravels and sands (fluvial and Tertiary) Non-aquifers: Formations with negligible permeability. Only support very minor abstractions, if any. Examples: all clays, shales, marls and siltstones. Most igneous and metamorphic formations.
Groundwater vulnerability according to soil classification of unsaturated zone used in the NRA vulnerability maps is presented in table 1.
Vulnerability class Extremely high High High Nature of unsaturated zone Ineffective and/or insignificantly thick or discontinuous Highly permeable with unsaturated zone < 2 m thick Moderate permeability (k=10-510-3 m/s). Depth of g.w. level 220 m, 250 m in karst with low karstic index Low permeability. Depth of g.w. level > 20 m Practically impermeable and of significant thickness Example Fissured or highly karstic
Intermediate
Commonly unconsolidated formation
Low Low Very low
Clay or shale
Table 1: Classification of groundwater vulnerability according the overlying strata according to NRA (Vrba, Zaporozec 1994)
The regional maps involve a compromise between the representation of natural complexity and ease interpretation of the map. Such compromises place limitations on the resolution and precision of map information. In this case, the variety of soils, geological strata and potential contaminants that have to be covered is wide, and the classification should be generalized. B.VII-13
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Individual sites and circumstances always require further and more detailed assessments to determinate the specific impact on groundwater resources. The content of the groundwater vulnerability maps in the regional scale is very similar and some used methods imply other elements to be plotted in the maps. The Czech maps of groundwater protection 1:200 000 consider the main natures of the aquifer (lithodology, structure or tectonics), which are expressed by the colours and degree of regional protection of the resources are expressed by the ornaments. The following degree of the protection were defined: Areas with the intensive groundwater abstraction and areas with perspective intensive abstraction (within 15 20 years) strong protection Significant hydrogeological areas strong protection Areas with variable vulnerability, not requiring the strong protection partial protection. Individual abstraction well fields protected by the groundwater protection zones Area with a low abstraction yield and very limited aquifers the protection of individual groundwater abstractions Protected recharge areas
The additional elements are plotted as follows: groundwater flow direction, water divide, hydrogeological zone boundary, recharge areas, source protection zones, hydrogeological function of the fractures etc. (Olmer, Rezac, 1974). The method of hydrogeological setting is available also for the vulnerability or groundwater protection maps in local scale. In Czech Republic were used the groundwater protection maps in the scale 1:25 000 (Vrana, 1981). The following elements were plotted: Type of aquifer (expressed by the colour) The transmissivity of the aquifer (expressed by the shaded colours for relevant aquifer colour). Richness of the relevant colour shade: o 100%: more than 100 m2/day o 75%: 11 100 m2/day o 50%: 1 10 m2/day o 25%: less than 1 m2/day Nature of the unsaturated zone (expressed by the ornaments); four classes were defined: high permeable, moderate permeable, low permeable and negligible permeable Other natures: o Potential sources of contamination o Ground and surface water data: groundwater abstraction wells and fields, groundwater flow direction, groundwater contours, groundwater source protection zones o Other elements as: irrigated areas, drained areas, cemeteries, pipelines (petroleum, chemicals, gas), storages (oil, fuel, service stations, chemical storage), waste disposal, hazardous or toxic spills, isolines defining contamination, etc
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4.2.2 The parametric methods

The are based on the vulnerability assessment of the selected parameters using the following systems (Vrba, Zaporozec 1994): Matrix system Rating system Point count system models
The overall procedure for the various parametric systems is the same. It begins selecting the parameters and their attributes representative for the purpose of the study. Each of selected parameters has a given range, which is subdivided into discrete hierarchical intervals. Each interval is assigned a value reflecting the relative degree of vulnerability. The rating points are summed and the final numerical score is divided into four or five segments expressing relative degrees of vulnerability. Matrix system The matrix systems are based on the limited numbers of the estimated parameters.
Vulnerability rating Extreme High Moderate Low Unsaturated zone Nature of strata Outcropping bedrock Soil of intermediate permeability (e.g. sandy till) Soil of low permeability (e.g. clayey till, clay or peat) Sandy till Clayey till, clay or peat Clayey till, clay or peat
L[m] <3 3-10 3-5 > 10 5-10 > 10
Comment: L the thickness of the unsaturated zone (depth of groundwater level below the land surface)
Table 2: Classification of groundwater vulnerability according to the type of the soils of unsaturated zone for different thickens of unsaturated zone (Daley 1995)
The examples of the selected parameters: Flemish region in Belgium (Vrba, Zaporozec 1994): o Three types of soils of unsaturated zone o Two intervals of the thickness of unsaturated zone (table 1) o Four types of aquifer National Rivers Authority in UK (1992): o Three types of soil leaching potential (with 1 3 sub-classes) o Depth of unsaturated zone o Three types of aquifers (chapter 4.2.1, Annex 3) Ireland (Daley 1995), vulnerability rating is shown in the table 2: o Nature of soils of unsaturated zone o Depth of groundwater level
Rating system A fixed range is given to any parameter that is judged necessary and adequate for vulnerability assessment. Many parameters are used in the rating systems. The following parameters are used most often: characteristic of the soils of unsaturated zone, depth of groundwater level, hydrogeological features, soil parameters (thickness, texture) and groundwater level changes. Different rating systems were developed and B.VII-15
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used for groundwater vulnerability map production. Foster (1987) has been proposed a very simple rating system known with the acronym GOD. The acronym expresses the used parameters: G: groundwater occurrence (type of aquifer: artesian confined, confined, semi-confined, semi-confined covered, unconfined O: overlying lithodology D: depth to groundwater level (unconfined aquifer), strike (confined aquifer) The classification of the groundwater vulnerability is assessed by means of a nomogram (see Annex 1). Each step of assessment consists of the estimation of the relevant rate of three mentioned parameters. All the rates are multiplied and resultant product classifies the groundwater vulnerability. Point count system models Every assessed parameter is assessed according to rating, analogically as in the rating system. In addition, weight of the parameter is assessed. The weights reflect the relative importance of the each of selected parameter. Both, ranting value and weight are multiplied and summed to obtain the final numerical score that provides relative measure of the groundwater vulnerability. The most used point count system with acronym DRASTIC was developed for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Aller et al 1987). The higher the score, the greater sensitivity of assessed area. The independent parameter form the acronymic name of the method: D: depth to groundwater level R: recharge (net annual) A: aquifer media S: soil media T: topography (slope) I: impact of vadose zone (water occurring in the unsaturated zone above the groundwater table and bellow the soil horizon) C: Hydraulic conductivity of aquifer The rating assigns each class of parameter a value, based on a scale of 1 (lest contamination potential) to 10 (highest contamination potential). The weight varies in the rate of 1 5. The assigned weights and ranges of rating values for groundwater vulnerability assessment are shown on the table 3.
Parameter Depth to groundwater level Recharge (net annual) Aquifer media Soil media Topographic slope Impact of the vadose zone Hydraulic conductivity Rating 1 10 1,2,4,5 39 4 - 10 1- 5 1- 5 4-8 Weigh 5 4 3 2 1 5 3
D R A S T I C
DR RR AR SR TR IR CR
DW RW AW SW TW IW CW
Table 3: Assigned weights and ranges of rating values for groundwater vulnerability (Aller et al 1987)
DRASTIC index DI qualifying the groundwater vulnerability is calculated by the following equation: B.VII-16
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DI = DR.DW + RR.RW + AR.AW + SR.SW + TR.TW + IR.IW + CR.CW The rating of some parameters is shown in Annex 1. The rating of the parameters is often modified for the relevant hydrogeological conditions. Some examples of application of parameters mentioned Hamerlink and Arneson (1998), Kim and Hamm (1999) and Shahid S. (2000). The examples of rating of the parameters are shown in the Annex 1. Drastic index provides only a relative evaluation tool and is not provide absolute answers. The procedure for implementing the DRASTIC method involves: Collecting of hydrogeological data Standardizing and digitalizing of source data Constructing an environmental geologic database Calculating of the DRASTIC index for the hydrogeological settings within study area Rating these areas as to vulnerability to contamination
Vulnerability assessment and mapping should be based on hydrogeological evaluation, rather than on general, automatic procedures. A combination of aquifer simulation models and geographical information systems offers a unique opportunity to perform this task.
5 Analogical relations and numerical models

Analogical relations and numerical models are based on mathematical symbols resulting in a vulnerability index. The vulnerability index estimated by Marcolongo and Pretto Darcy-derived expression considering hydraulic conductivity of unsaturated zone, its thickness, actual soil moisture and infiltration rate per unit surface. Anderson and Gosk used two factors: cleaning capacity of soils and restoration capability of aquifer. The first factor was evaluated case by case, as a function of soil type and of contaminants. It should be expressed as contaminant quantity removed by the unit volume of soil. The second factor is the inverse of the travel time in an aquifer (Vrba, Zaporozec 1994). The analogical relations and numerical models are not commonly used.

The following vulnerability maps are drawn up in hydrogeology (Vrba, Zaporozec 1994): General over view synoptical (1:500 000 or more): serving for the general planning, decision making and setting policies in groundwater protection on national or international level. The local details are lost. Schematic (1:500 000 to 1:100 000): serving for the regional planning, groundwater protection management and regulation and assessment of the diffuse contamination problems. Most of the local details are still lost. These need to be followed by the specific mapping. Operational (1:100 000 to 1:25 000): serving for the land use planning and design of groundwater protection programme. Specific for special purpose (1:25 000 or less): serving for the single purpose and site-specific maps foe local or city planning and B.VII-17
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abstraction well protection (groundwater source protection zones). The local or site-specific groundwater vulnerability problems are expressed. The vulnerability maps (1: 1 000 to 1:100) are not available for site engineering approach. Whereas the vulnerability maps shall serve for the natural risk maps, the scale is conform to the scale used for the individual natural events: Regional scale: Local scale: Detail scale: 1:50 000 500 000 1:5 000 50 000 1:500 5 000
The vulnerability is common for all the scales. The facilities, which are able to affect the groundwater regime in consequence of their damage after natural disasters and other specifying elements have to be plotted in the maps of local and detail scale.
5.2 Examples of groundwater vulnerability maps and legends referred to assumed scales
5.2.1 Legend of groundwater vulnerability map
The proposed legend adopts the international legend presented as contribution to the International Hydrological Programme IHP IV (Vrba, Zaporozec 1994). The legend is shown in the Annex 2.
5.2.2 Examples of groundwater vulnerability maps

Two examples of vulnerability maps are shown. One in regional scale and one in local scale Regional groundwater vulnerability map The example of the regional vulnerability map was shown at a part of a groundwater vulnerability map issued by the National Rivers Authority (UK) at the scale 1:100 000 (see Annex 4). The maps were issued in conformity with the Practice for the Protection of Groundwater (NRA 1992) as a tool for the protection and management of aquifers, land use planning to protect the groundwater quality. The map contains the information considering the type of aquifer and vulnerability of the unsaturated zone. The classification of the aquifer importance considering the potential spreading of contaminants within aquifer is shown in the Annex 3 and the classification of the vulnerability of the unsaturated zone is shown in the table 1. The map does not contain the information on the potential sources of groundwater regime impact. Local groundwater vulnerability map The example of the local groundwater vulnerability map is a map serving as input data for groundwater source zone of the Podluzi abstraction well field in Czech Republic - see Annex 5 (Muzikar, Vrtek 2000). The map was plotted at the topographic base 1:25 000. The type of aquifer was not plotted, because one type of aquifer occurs at the area interest. The fluvial gravels and sands of high permeability (coefficient of conductivity reaches about 10-3 m/s) form the aquifer. The fluvial clays form the unsaturated B.VII-18
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zone. Three classes of vulnerability were estimated according to thickness of the unsaturated zone High: Moderate: Low: thickness < 2,0 m thickness 2,0 3,5 m thickness > 3,5 m
In addition, there were plotted the following data: Abstraction and monitoring wells Data on groundwater flow (flow direction, water level surface) Potentially contaminating activities
5.3 Groundwater vulnerability map production for risk maps of natural hazards
Production of groundwater vulnerability map is a special hydrogeological task requiring a thorough knowledge of hydrogeological conditions and many detailed data, which are often not available. The above-mentioned required data are optimal for the groundwater vulnerability assessment. The mapmaker has to decide the most effective assessment of the available data to provide reasonable and reliable estimation of groundwater vulnerability using the available data. The regional groundwater vulnerability maps have to contain the data on groundwater vulnerability concerning both the unsaturated zone and type of aquifer the decisive parameters affecting the pollution migration. The assessment of the vulnerability of the unsaturated zone can be based on the nature of unsaturated zone and its thickness (table 1 or 2 or perhaps GOD Annex 1). The definition of type of aquifer can be influenced by the local hydrogeological conditions. The definition used by NRA (paragraph 4.2.1 or Annex 3) is appropriate. The vulnerability assessment according to DRASTIC (see paragraph 4.2.2. and Annex 1) considers also the type of aquifer and the plotting of the aquifer type is not necessary. The elements providing more detailed information on natural conditions such as e.g. groundwater flow direction, water divide and those to be protected such as large groundwater abstraction can be plotted if are available and if the plotting is synoptic in the used scale. The potential sources of groundwater regime impact should be plotted only these the most hazard e.g. these belonging under IPPC and Seveso EC Directive. The local groundwater vulnerability maps have to concern identically to regional maps the decisive parameters affecting the pollution migration vulnerability zone and aquifer type. The local maps have to contain more available data on natural conditions than in regional maps. The other available date on natural conditions should be as follows: water divide, groundwater contours and groundwater flow direction, abstraction well fields, protection zones, etc. The potential sources of groundwater regime impact is to be selected according the weight of impact. The selection of the potentially contaminating activities depends on the nature, properties and volume of hazardous substances in raw material, product, by-product or residue in concerning establishment. Many types groundwater vulnerability of maps has been developed since 1960s. Two methodological guides and revised model legend generalizing B.VII-19
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the long-term researches were elaborated in the frame of the forth phase International Hydrological Programme of UNESCO: Vrba, Zaporozec (1994): Guide on Mapping Groundwater Vulnerability International Contributions to Hydrogeology, Vol. 16, International Association of Hydrogeologists, Verlag Heinz Heise GmbH & Co KG, Hannover, 131 pp Struckmeier, Margat (1995): Hydrogeological Maps: A guide and Standard Legend International Contributions to Hydrogeology, Vol. 17, International Association of Hydrogeologists, Verlag Heinz Heise GmbH & Co KG, Hannover, 178 pp
The both guides will be used for the compilation of groundwater vulnerability resulting in natural disasters. The international standard legend was shown in both guided and this should be used also in the risk map of natural hazards.
6 Analysis of risk
Risk is the potential for inflicting damage upon a receptor. In case of possible secondary effects of natural hazards on groundwater quality it is an approach used to evaluate risk and hazards to human health that are attributable to escapes of hazardous substances of damaged installations. Definition: Risk is an estimation of the probability that an adverse health impact may occur as a result of exposure to hazardous substances in the amount and by the pathways identified.

The methodology of risk assessment of the contaminated industrial sites was developed in hydrogeology jointly with the health authorities. It is widely used. The risk assessment is focused on evaluation of the carcinogenic risks and no carcinogenic hazards to human health. It is one of the input data for the determination of target concentrations for the remediation and assignment of remediation projects. Such risk assessment required mostly very costly investigations and monitoring. The risk assessment of the hazards originated by the natural hazards cannot collect available data for such assessment. The volume of released quantities of hazard substance and space distribution and their concentrations are unknown and other necessary data could not be obtained in process of map compilation. The risk assessment has to be carried out for every installation. Such approach could not be made for maps of natural hazards. However, a brief description of the steps of such risk assessment will provide the image on the mechanism of the origin, migration and hazards of the groundwater pollution after natural hazards. Risk assessment, in general, has a four components including: Identification and characterization of priority pollutants Identification of path ways and mechanisms for chemical migration
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Quantity and space contamination distribution estimate resulting in natural disasters Identification and description of receptors Risk characterization estimate Evaluation of uncertainties
6.2.1 Identification and characterization of priority pollutants

The information on the establishments liable to produce pollution has to contain the list of priority pollutants with their quantity and the properties as toxicity, sorption, solubility, volatility etc. Such data are variable and for that reason have only the informative function on the hazards.
6.2.2 Identification of path ways and mechanism for chemical migration

When are damaged the facilities containing or handling with the hazardous substances, the contaminant releases to groundwater can occur. There are at least four pathways by which groundwater contamination occurs: Infiltration Direct migration Interaquifer exchange Recharge from surface water
Infiltration Two paths of infiltration occur. Liquid released hazard substance slowly infiltrates the soil through pore spaces in the soil matrix. It moves downward under the influence of gravity. Once the saturated zone is contacted, horizontal and vertical spreading of infiltrated substances occurs in the saturated zone in the direction of groundwater flow. A portion of water, which has fallen to the earth, induces the other path. This slowly infiltrates the soil through pore spaces in the soil mix. As the water moves downward, it dissolves materials, which it comes into contact. Water and/or liquid hazard substances percolating downward though a contaminated soil of unsaturated zone can dissolve contaminants, forming leachate. The other movement of leachate is the as was described above. Direct migration The hazardous substances can migrate directly into groundwater from belowground sources (e.g., storage tanks, pipelines), which lie within the saturated zone. Interaquifer exchange Groundwater contaminated after the natural hazards can mix with the uncontaminated groundwater through a process known as interaquifer exchange in which one aquifer unit is in hydraulic contact with another.
6.2.3 Quantity and space contamination distribution estimate resulting in natural disasters
The quantity of hazardous substances released to soil and groundwater is to be estimated. The forecast of the contaminants migration in groundwater means the space distribution (so called contamination plume) and B.VII-21
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contaminant concentrations. The migration depends on many factors such as geochemical processes, biochemical process (decomposition by microorganisms), physical processes (as advection movement of contaminants caused by groundwater flow, filtration, adsorption) etc. The transport models of contaminants are produced, requiring many data. But the accuracy should be very low. In case of the risk assessment of the hazard of groundwater pollution resulting in natural events can be estimated only the probably affected receptors without forecasting of the changes of the groundwater quality. The estimation of the contaminant plume could be based on the groundwater velocity. Such estimation is very approximate. Nevertheless, the data on groundwater flow velocity are mostly not available. The estimation could arrive from very proximately estimation of the contaminant plume.
6.2.4 Identification and description of receptors

The extension of contaminant plume with forecasted contaminant concentrations helps to determinate the receptors. The receptors are population (human health) and environment components. The potential affected populations could be expressed with its number.
6.2.5 Risk characterization estimate

Risk characterization is the process of estimating the incidence of a health under various conditions of human or animal exposure described in the exposure assessment. The soil and groundwater exposure is considered. Soil ingestion, dermal exposure and inhalation of resuspended dust are the potential soil exposure pathways. Factors that affect dermal exposure include surface area, contact time and contact amount. The groundwater used for water supply as drinking water is assessed considering the exposure via ingestion and groundwater used for the bathing is assessed considering the dermal and inhalation exposure. The contaminated groundwater used for irrigation is potential source of contamination of the agriculture products. In such cases the food exposure pathway have to be assessed. The contaminant space distribution and concentration together with the target concentrations affects the remediation proposal. The influence of any remedial action on the migration pathway has to be examined. This requires the transport model solution.
6.2.6 Evaluation of uncertainties

The conceptual model underlying risk assessment is source pathway receptor. The main uncertainty is the inadequate data on source of contamination and following inadequate estimation of the quantity of escaped hazardous substances. Other uncertainty is the low information on hydrogeological data and contaminant concentration.
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6.2.7 Recommended method

The risk of groundwater contamination as possible secondary effects of natural hazards is affected with lack of data and many uncertainties. Hence, the assessment could be greatly simplified. The risk is based on the weigh of the consequences and on the probability of the occurrence of event leading to the considered consequence. Such approach is used in the establishment belonging under Seveso. The risk can be expressed as: Risk = Consequence X Probability Consequence it is considered the weigh of the consequence Probability it is considered the probability the occurrence of the event leading to the relevant consequence The estimation of the consequence can takes in account the following: Number of the people with damaged groundwater supply source Cost of source remediation, cost emergency water supply and/or cost of new water supply system Cost of the restoration of damaged ecosystems
The probability depends on the on the probability of occurrence of individual natural event and then the probability of damage of concerned installation resulting in escape of the hazard substances.
6.2.8 Conclusion of methodology for risk assessment

The risk assessment of the potentially damaged installation has to be drawn up for every installation. It means that every installation require the risk assessment, what is too costly. In addition, the number of uncertainties exceeds the available date. For that reason there are low probability to elaborate the real, credible risk assessment. The best solution for the risk map of natural hazards considering groundwater pollution as secondary effect is the production of the groundwater vulnerability maps. These identify the potential risk receptors.
7 Risk management
The emergency plans are the important tool for the risk management of the accident prevention policy. The plans are required from the operators of the establishments with the sources of groundwater regime impact. The risk management in such establishments requires the operator information that the concerned establishment is located in the risk area of the natural events. The emergency plans are obligated for the establishments belonging under Seveso. Besides other, the emergency plans are established with the following objectives of: Containing and controlling incidents so as to minimize the effects to limit the damages Providing for the restoration and clean-up of the environment following an accident
The operators of the concerned establishments located within the risk area of the natural events have to reassess the emergency plans with the
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consideration of the natural events hazards if these had not considered, when the plans were drawn up.

Abstraction well field: a group of wells pumping the groundwater Aquifer: permeable geologic formation in which occurs groundwater Attenuation: break down or dilution of a contaminant in water Brownfield: relating to the brownfield site. It means real property the expansion, redevelopment or reuse of which may be complicated by the presence or potential presence of a hazardous substance or pollutant (US EPA definition). Catchment: area that collects and drains rainwater Cone of depression: The limit of influence of groundwater abstraction (limit of the groundwater level drawdown) Confined aquifer: aquifer where a substantial depth of impermeable strata covers the permeable strata such that the cover prevents the infiltration Exposure: exposure to chemicals or elevated groundwater levels by relevant pathways Fractures/fissures: natural cracks in rock that enhances rapid water movement Groundwater contour: a line on map connecting the same elevation of groundwater levels relating to the sea level or reference point. Synonym: groundwater surface Groundwater divide: line on water table or piezometric surface across which there is no groundwater flow and from which groundwater moves away in both directions Groundwater regime: characterizes the nature and recharge of groundwater and changes of its quantity and quality in time and space. Groundwater surface: a line on map connecting the same elevation of groundwater levels relating to the sea level or reference point. Synonym: groundwater contour Groundwater vulnerability: intrinsic property of a groundwater that depends on sensitivity of that system to human and/or natural impacts Hazard: the intrinsic property of dangerous or physical situation with a potential for creating damage to human health/or the environment Hydraulic conductivity: measure of the permeability of rock Hydraulic parameters: hydraulic conductivity and transmissivity Infiltration: the flow of water downward from the land surface into soil Leachate: liquor formed by the act of leaching Leaching: removal of soluble substances by action of water percolating through soil, waste or rock Outcrop: where strata are at the surface, even though soil cover may obscure them Percolation: flow of water through earth material
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Plume: spreading of a contaminant in the direction of groundwater flow from the point of origin to the point where contaminant falls bellow the objective limits. The outer boundary is in some cases difficult to detect. Recharge: water, which percolates from the land surface into groundwater Risk: estimation of the probability that an adverse health impact may occur as a result of exposure to hazardous substances in the amount and by the pathways identified Saturated zone: zone of aquifer where all fissures and pores contain water Sensibility of aquifer: the intrinsic susceptibility of migration of the contaminant to the aquifer of interest Source: point of abstraction of groundwater (well, borehole, spring) Thickness of unsaturated zone: distance between land surface and groundwater level Unconfined aquifer: aquifer with the water table forming a free upper surface Unsaturated zone: zone between the land surface and the water table Vadose zone: water occurring in unsaturated zone (soil water, capillary water)
9 Bibliography
Adams D. et all (1994): Conversion of DRASTIC maps from fastcad drawings to ArcInfo coverages. http:/gis.esri.com/library/proc98/PROCEED/TO450/PAP402/P402.HTM Aller L. et all (1987): DRASTIC: A standardized system for evaluation groundwater pollution potential using hydrogeological settings. NWWA/EPA Series EPA-300/2-87-035, US EPA, Ada, Oklahoma Bekesi G., McConchie (2000): Empirical assessment of the influence of the unsaturated zone on aquifer vulnerability, Manawatu Region, New Zealand. Daley D. (1995): The role of geology and hydrogeology in selecting landfill sites. In: Proceedings of symposium The role of geology and hyrogrology in environmental protection, Dublin, Geological Survey of Ireland, p.10 Focazio M.J. et al (2001): Assessing groundwater vulnerability to contamination: providing scientifically defensible information for decision makers. U.S. Geol. Survey, Water Resources Investigations report, 33 p. Foster S.S.D. (1987): Fundamental concepts in aquifer vulnerability, pollution risk and protection strategy. In: Vulnerability of soil and groundwater to pollutants. TNO Committee on Hydrological Research, The Hague, Proceedings and Information No. 38, p. 69 86 Gogu R.C., Dessargues A. (2000): Sensitivity analysis for the EPIC method of vulnerability assessment in a small karstic aquifer, southern Belgium. Hydrogeology Journal, Vol. 8, p.337-345 Freeze R.A., Cherry J.A. (1979): Groundwater. Eagle Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall, 604 p.
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Hammerlinck J.D., Arneson Ch.S. (1998): Wyoming groundwater vulnerability assessment handbook. Volume 1: Background, model development sensitivity analysis. Spatial Data and Visualization Centre, SDVC Report 98-01 Holman I.P. et al (2000): Using soil Quaternary geological information to assess the intrinsic groundwater vulnerability of shallow aquifers: an example from Lithuania. Hydrogeology Journal, Vol. 8, p.636 645 Kim Y.J. Hamm S.Y. (1999): Assessment of the potential for groundwater contamination using the DRASTIC/EGIS technique, Cheongju area, South Korea. Hydrogeology Journal, Vol. 7, p.227- 235 Maxe L. Johansson P.O. (1998): Assessing groundwater vulnerability using travel time and specific surface as indicators. Hydrogeology Journal, Vol. 7, p.441- 449 McBean E.A. (1991): Methodology for introducing risk into the design And operation of landfills. In: Municipal Solid Waste Management. Making Decisions in the face of Uncertainty. Institute for Risk Research, p.105-116 Muzikar R., Vrtek T. (2000): Podluzi groundwater abstraction well field hydrogeological assessment for the source protection zone. Brno, DHV CR, MS NRA (1992): Policy and practice for the protection of groundwater. Bristol, National Rivers Authority, p. 52 Olmer M. Rezac B. (1974): Methodical principles of maps for protection of groundwater in Bohemia and Moravia, scale 1:200 000. In IAH Memoires, Tome X, Congress de Montpellier, 1. Communications, p. 105-107 Shahid S. (2000): A study of groundwater pollution vulnerability using DRASTIC, West Bengal, India, Journal of Environmental Hydrology. Vol. 8 Struckmeier, Margat (1995): Hydrogeological Maps: A guide and Standard Legend International Contributions to Hydrogeology, Vol. 17, International Association of Hydrogeologists, Verlag Heinz Heise GmbH & Co KG, Hannover, 178 pp Vrana M. (1981): Methodology for construction of groundwater protection maps. In: International training course Groundwater protection from pollution and depletion, UNESCO, Moscow, p. 1 19. Vrba J. - Zaporozec A. (1994): Guide on Mapping Groundwater Vulnerability International Contributions to Hydrogeology, Vol. 16, International Association of Hydrogeologists, Verlag Heinz Heise GmbH & Co KG, Hannover, 131 pp
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ANNEX 1
Assessment of groundwater vulnerability according to GOD and drastic
Classification of Groundwater vulnerability according to GOD:
OVERLYING LITHODOLOGY
(Foster 1987, Vrba Zaporozec 1997)
Classification of Groundwater vulnerability according to DRASTIC: (Aller et al. 1987) RATING Rating of the factors is usually adapted to the local hydrogelogical conditions. Some examples are shown bellow.
Depth to water table [m] 0 1,5 1,5 3 39 9 15 15 22 22 30 > 30 Rating 10 9 7 5 3 2 1
Table - factor (Aller et al. 1987)
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D Depth to water table: Rating of depth to water R (recharge, net annual) Net recharge is the effective infiltration of groundwater into groundwater. It is the difference between total precipitation and the cumulative loss by direct runoff and effective evapotranspiration. A (aquifer media) Rating of aquifer-media factor
Aquifer medium Alluvium Gneis Schist Granite (Aller et al. 1987) Rating Range 6-9 3-5 3-5 3-5
Typical 8 5 4 3
S (soil media)
Soil medium Poorly graded gravel and gravel-sand mixture (GP) Poorly graded sand and gravely sand (SP) Silty sand and poorly graded sand-silt mixture (SM) Clayey sand and poorly graded sand-clay mixture (SC) Silt and very find sand, silty or clayey fin sand (ML) Rating of soil -media factor RATING 10 9 8 7 6
T (topographic slope) The rating for the topographic slope factor is range from 1 5. A steeper topographic slope provides lesser opportunity for a pollutant to infiltrate and the rating id lower. I (impact of vadose zone) Rating of vadose zone-media factor
VADOSE ZONE MEDIUM CONFINING LAYER SHALE SILT/CLAY LIMESTONE EOLIAN SILT SANDSTONE BEDDED LIMESTONE, SANDSTONE AND SHALE COAL SEQUENCES (Aller et al. 1987) RATING 1 2-5 2-6 2-7 5-7 4-8 4-8 3-8 VADOSE ZONE MEDIUM SAND AND GAVEL WITH SIGNIFICANT SILT, CLAY METAMORPHIC/IGNEOUS EOLIAN SAND SAND AND GRAVEL VOLCANICLASTICS BASALT CLINKER KARST LIMESTONE RATING 4-8 2-8 7-9 6-9 3-9 2-10 8-10 8-10
C (impact of hydraulic conductivity) Rating of hydraulic conductivity factor (adapted according to Aller et al. 1987 and Freeze, Cherry 1979)
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Aquifer medium
Rating Coefficient of conductivity [m s-1] Unconsolidated deposits Glacial till Silt, Loess Silty sand Clean sand Gravel Rocks Sandstone Limestone and dolomite Fractur. igneous and metamorphic Permeable basalt Karst limestone
3 -9 10
4 -8 10
5 -7 10
6 -6 10
7 -5 10
8 -4 10
9 -3 10
10 -2 10
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ANNEX 2
Legend for groundwater vulnerability map
(Vrba, Zaporozec 1994) Hydrogeological Features
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Objects of Protection
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Potentially Contaminating Activities
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Current Quality Status of Groundwater
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ANNEX 3
Categories of aquifer nature assessment of potential contaminant spreading within aquifer
(NRA 1992, Vrba Zaporozec 1994)
NATURE OF AQUIFER
ORNAMENT
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ANNEX 4
Example of groundwater vulnerability map in regional scale (1:100 000)
Part of the National Rivers Authoritys groundwater vulnerability map of East Kent 1 : 100 000 (Vrba, Zaporozec 1994)
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ANNEX 5
Example of groundwater vulnerability map in regional scale (1:25 000)
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ANNEX 6
Operational standards for groundwater vulnerability maps aimed to spatial planning
Operational Standards for the Groundwater Vulnerability Maps Aimed to Spatial Planning The base for the assessment of the potential secondary effects of natural hazards on groundwater regime (qualitative and quantitative) is the groundwater vulnerability map. Content of map depends on the availability of the representative input data and on the legibility of the map. The groundwater vulnerability map will contain the following data: Groundwater vulnerability Supplementary data Installations with the potential impact on groundwater regime Groundwater vulnerability Two main factors characterizing the groundwater vulnerability will be considered and plotted. The first is vulnerability of the unsaturated zone influencing the vertical impact and second is the aquifer influencing the spreading of the impact in groundwater. The classification of the type of aquifer could be left out if the vulnerability classification considers both the unsaturated zone and the type of aquifer (e.g. using DRASTIC method) or if one type of aquifer occurs at the entire map. In second case the type of aquifer will be presented in the legend. The classes of vulnerability of the unsaturated zone will be presented by colors. The colors are conform with the international legend (Vrba, Zaporozec 1994): Extremely high: red orange High: rose Medium: yellow Low: light olive green Very low: dark olive green High: Medium: Low: red orange yellow olive green
The presentation of three classes of vulnerability:
The ornaments will express the type of aquifer by (see Annex 3). The other recommended presentation of vulnerability is that used in England and Wales (see Annex 4). The type of aquifer is presented with color and the unsaturated zone with its shadow. Supplementary data The supplementary data provide the information on other natural and artificial factors influencing the groundwater regime, which will affect the spreading of the impact originated by the consequences of natural hazards. The supplementary data are as follows: water divide, groundwater
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contours, groundwater flow direction, abstraction well fields, resource protection zones, drained areas, etc. The regional vulnerability maps usually do not plot the supplementary data. The data such as water divide, groundwater flow direction and large groundwater abstraction well fields provide very valuable information to assess the natural events impacts. Installation with potential impact on groundwater regime The installations with potential impact on groundwater regime are both with the qualitative and quantitative impact. The quantitative impact originates these where hazardous substances are present in raw material, product, byproduct and residue. The regional maps will plot only the most hazard installations (e.g. belonging under IPPS and Seveso EU Directives). The selection of the potentially contaminating activities for the local maps will depend on the nature, properties and volume of hazardous substances. The examples of potential contaminating activities were shown in the legend of vulnerability maps (Annex 2). The installations with potential quantitative impact on groundwater regime are as follows: large drainage pipes, location of the discharge of large pipes and sewages to the receiving watercourses, impoundments on watercourses, abstraction and dewatering wells. Scale The scale of the groundwater vulnerability maps will be conform to the scale of the maps of individual natural events: Regional scale: 1:50 000 500 000 Local scale: 1:5 000 50 000 Detail scale: 1:2 000 5 000
The groundwater vulnerability maps with the scale less than 1: 2 000 are not available.
B.VII-40
1 Floods
1.1 Hazard
MAP SCALE CHARACTERISTICS AND USE Provide maps and information that are used at a very detailed level, for example the construction of a new housing development that covers a few hectares. They may cover only a few hundred metres of the river. The characteristics of such maps are dependent on the nature of the risk to be assessed. Such map usually show the extent of flooding but they can also show flood depths and velocities.
(FLOODS HAZARD STATE OF ART)
DATA ACQUISITION MAPPING PROCEDURES
AND
HAZARD METHODOLOGY The hazard methodology is dependent upon the how the risk is to be assessed. It should be possible to map the flood extent, depth and velocity for a range of design flood return periods. An automated process is usually used to convert modelled flood depths to extents and depths within a GIS environment.
LEGEND Hazard expressed in terms of flood extents for a number of annual probabilities or "return periods". The most frequently used return periods tends to be 1 in 100 years (i.e. the flood with the 1% annual probability of occurrence). Other return periods that are some times used include 1 in 5, 1 in 25 1 in 50, 1 in 100, 1 in 200 and 1 in 1000.
Site-specific (<1:1,000)
Local (1:1,000 1:10,000)
Provide maps and information that are used at a detailed level. They may cover only a few kilometres of the river. The characteristics of such maps are dependent on the nature of the risk to be assessed. Such map usually show the extent of flooding but they can also show flood depths and velocities.
Data required includes: detailed hydrological data (including information on historical floods); detailed topographic data of the floodplain and also the watercourse; survey data for relevant hydraulic structures such as weirs and bridges; observed water levels and flow with which to calibrate and verify hydrological and hydraulic modelling. Flood water levels are estimated using a calibrated hydraulic model and flood extents mapped using an accurate digital terrain model of the floodplain. Data required includes: detailed hydrological data (including information on historical floods); detailed topographic data of the floodplain and also the watercourse; survey data for relevant hydraulic structures such as weirs and bridges; observed water levels and flow with which to calibrate and verify hydrological and hydraulic modelling. Flood water levels are estimated using a calibrated hydraulic model and flood extents mapped using an accurate digital terrain model of the floodplain.
C-2
The hazard methodology is dependent upon the how the risk is to be assessed. It should be possible to map the flood extent, depth and velocity for a range of design flood return periods at this scale. An automated process is usually used to convert modelled flood depths to extents and depths within a GIS environment.
Hazard expressed in terms of flood extents for a number of annual probabilities or "return periods". The most frequently used return periods tends to be 1 in 100 years (i.e. the flood with the 1% annual probability of occurrence). Other return periods that are some times used include 1 in 5, 1 in 25 1 in 50, 1 in 100, 1 in 200 and 1 in 1000.
Deliverable 2.1
MAP
SCALE
CHARACTERISTICS AND USE Provide maps and information that are used that are often used at a catchment level for catchment planning. They usually cover the whole of the river catchment. Such map usually show the extent and sometimes the depth of the flooding.
DATA ACQUISITION MAPPING PROCEDURES
AND
HAZARD METHODOLOGY The hazard methodology is dependent upon the how the risk is to be assessed. It should be possible to map the flood extent, depth and possibly velocity for a range of design flood return periods at this scale. An automated process is usually used to convert modelled flood depths to extents and depths within a GIS environment across the entire catchment. The hazard methodology is dependent upon the how the risk is to be assessed. It should be possible to map the flood extent and depth for a range of design flood return periods at this scale. An automated process is usually used to convert modelled flood depths to extents and depths within a GIS environment across the entire country.
LEGEND Hazard expressed in terms of flood extents for a number of annual probabilities or "return periods". The most frequently used return periods tends to be 1 in 100 years (i.e. the flood with the 1% annual probability of occurrence). Other return periods that are some times used include 1 in 5, 1 in 25 1 in 50, 1 in 100, 1 in 200 and 1 in 1000. Hazard expressed in terms of flood extents for a number of annual probabilities or "return periods". The most frequently used return periods tends to be 1 in 100 years (i.e. the flood with the 1% annual probability of occurrence). Other return periods that are some times used include 1 in 5, 1 in 25 1 in 50, 1 in 100, 1 in 200 and 1 in 1000.
Regional (1:10,000 1:50,000)
Data required includes: topographic data covering the whole of the catchment. Cross-sections of the watercourse are also required Flood water levels are estimated using broad scale hydraulic models that cover the whole of the catchment. Flood extents are mapped using the digital terrain model of the catchment. Data required includes: topographic data covering the whole of the country often such a digital terrain model has a low vertical resolution but at a national level this is often acceptable. Flood water levels are estimated using simple methods of converting flood flows to water levels (for example Manning's equation). Flood extents are mapped using the digital terrain model of the catchment.
National (>1:50,000)
Provide a general overview of the areas susceptibility to flooding maps with a relatively low level of detail. Often flood extents are mapped approximately without taking account of flood+C11 mitigation measures (e.g. flood walls)> However, such maps are useful to national policy makers, water management agencies, the insurance industry and the general public.
C-3
MAP SCALE
1.2 Vulnerability
CHARACTERISTICS AND USE Provide detailed characteristics of receptors such as buildings and people to floods. Used in detailed planning of flood mitigation schemes DATA ACQUISITION AND MAPPING PROCEDURES Types of commercial and residential properties, people and their socioeconomic characteristics (for example, wealth, health, age etc) all georeferenced. VULNERABILITY METHODOLOGY Detailed inventory and characteristics of elements that are at risk from flooding. Methodologies are available to assess the vulnerability of people to flooding. The "vulnerability" of buildings to flooding is taken into account of in the floodwater depth versus damage curve. LEGEND Type of properties, type of land use, distribution of people with respect to their vulnerability to flooding. Site-specific (<1:1,000)
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MAP SCALE
CHARACTERISTICS AND USE Provide detailed characteristics of receptors such as buildings and people to floods. Used in planning of flood mitigation schemes Provide characteristics of receptors such as buildings and people to floods. Used in planning of flood mitigation policies at a catchment level. Provide an overview of the characteristics of receptors such as buildings and people to floods. Used in planning of flood policies at a national level.
DATA ACQUISITION AND MAPPING PROCEDURES Types of commercial and residential properties, people and their socioeconomic characteristics (for example, wealth, health, age etc) all georeferenced. Types of commercial and residential properties, people and their socioeconomic characteristics (for example, wealth, health, age etc) all georeferenced. Types of commercial and residential properties, people and their socioeconomic characteristics (for example, wealth, health, age etc) all georeferenced.
VULNERABILITY METHODOLOGY
LEGEND Type of properties, type of land use, distribution of people with respect to their vulnerability to flooding.
Local (1:1,000 1:10,000)
Regional (1:10,000 1:50,000)
Detailed inventory and characteristics of elements that are at risk from flooding. Methodologies are available to assess the vulnerability of people to flooding. The "vulnerability" of buildings to flooding is taken into account of in the floodwater depth versus damage curve.
Type of properties, type of land use, distribution of people with respect to their vulnerability to flooding.
Type of properties, type of land use, distribution of people with respect to their vulnerability to flooding.
C-4
1.3 Risk
MAP SCALE
CHARACTERISTICS AND USE
DATA ACQUISITION AND MAPPING PROCEDURES Data sets required: Commercial and residential properties (including type and location, floor area); information relating to agricultural land use (e.g. crop type, area, crop yield); socio-economic data (e.g. number of people in the floodplain, characteristics of people). At a 1:1,000 scale very detailed data on agriculture and property characteristics will be required to make the most accurate assessment of the damage incurred.
RISK METHODOLOGY
LEGEND
Site-specific (<1:1,000) Local (1:1,000 1:10,000)
Provides a detailed assessment of risks in terms of economic and societal impacts. A risk assessment at this level is often required when assessing a flood mitigation scheme, for example a flood defence wall or a flood relief channel.
Use of flood depth versus economic damage curves for different types of commercial and residential properties and also land use. Assessment of the number of people located in the floodplain and their vulnerability to flooding in terms of their socio-economic status.
Direct economic damage for commercial and residential properties expressed in for each return period and the Average Annualised Damage (AAD) also expressed in . Direct economic damage for agricultural land properties expressed in per hectare for each return period and the Average Annualised Damage (AAD) also expressed in per hectare. Number of people at risk of flooding and an expression of the vulnerability on terms of their age/wealth/health.
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MAP SCALE
CHARACTERISTICS AND USE Provides a catchment wide assessment of risks in terms of economic and societal impacts. A risk assessment at this level is often required when assessing a flood mitigation policies at a river catchment scale.
DATA ACQUISITION AND MAPPING PROCEDURES Catchment wide data sets are required: Commercial and residential properties (including type and location, floor area); information relating to agricultural land use; socio-economic data (e.g. number of people in the floodplain, characteristics of people). At this scale the data on agriculture characteristics required can be quite broad. National data sets required: Commercial and residential properties (including type and location, floor area); information relating to agricultural land use; socio-economic data (e.g. number of people in the floodplain, characteristics of people).
RISK METHODOLOGY
LEGEND
Regional (1:10,000 1:50,000)
National 1:50,000)
(>
Provides a national assessment of risks in terms of economic and societal impacts. A risk assessment at this level is used by national policy makers to formulate national flood management strategies and investment.
Use of flood depth versus economic damage curves for different types of commercial and residential properties and also land use. Assessment of the number of people located in the floodplain and their vulnerability to flooding in terms of their socio-economic status.
Direct economic damage for commercial and residential properties expressed in for each return period and the Average Annualised Damage (AAD) also expressed in . Direct economic damage for agricultural land properties expressed in per hectare for each return period and the Average Annualised Damage (AAD) also expressed in per hectare. Number of people at risk of flooding and an expression of the vulnerability on terms of their age/wealth/health.
C-5
2 Seismic risk
2.1 Hazard
MAP SCALE
(SPATIAL PLANNING)
MAP SCALE
DATA ACQUISITION AND MAPPING PROCEDURES Local effects can be distinguished in: instability effects and site effects, so the local hazard is investigated by using geological and morphological card, that reproduce conditions characterizing a specific area (i. e. topological irregularity, deposits, landslides.
HAZARD METHODOLOGY
LEGEND
Site-specific (< 1:1,000)
The evaluation of landslides hazard (such as slides and flows or as falls) triggered by earthquakes, consists in landslide stability analysis or in slope static condition analysis, both in pseudostatic conditions and, then, in dynamic conditions.
Hazard conditions can be analysed adopting different methodologies, which bring different results: they are quantitative, semi-quantitative and qualitative approaches.
To analyse local effects the detail scale consents to microzone the area. This way it is possible to characterize the individual phenomenon, such as a land subject to landslides or a deposit.
Deliverable 2.1
MAP SCALE
(SPATIAL PLANNING)
MAP SCALE
DATA ACQUISITION AND MAPPING PROCEDURES Having P.G.A. and vulnerability values for each event, it is possible to find out the damages costs expected value for unit of volume, which could be compared to the entity of the physical damage too. Basic Seismic hazard is analysed using deterministic models to investigate attended shock in a selected area.
HAZARD METHODOLOGY
LEGEND
Local (1:1,000 - 1:10,000)
Local scale studies allow to find and analyse in depth the local hazard factors present in one or more municipalities .
Local scale (1:5,000 1:50,000)
Regional (1:10,000 1:50,000)
Regional/Str ategic scale (> 1:50,000)
At the regional scale it is possible to investigate the hazard for areas including a big number of municipalities and it is useful to classify the territory in seismic areas or not (as it happens at the national scale too, but more in detail that in the national scale). This type of classification is of use for draft a more or less hazardous areas list. In this scale of representation it is possible to have a full picture of the national hazard, then it is useful to classify the national territory in seismic areas or not.
Damage scenario evaluation can supply indicators about damage scenario regarding direct costs of buildings damages (physical and economic); number of the buildings expose to collapse risk and number of potential victims and wounded people. At this scale several objectives can be pursued, like identifying source areas and the events characterized by different recurrence periods. In this way it is possible to calculate (using a specific attenuation model) the expected shaking at the site.
Damage level ratio, as cost of damage / value of the new building to investigate the risk.
Expected Maximum Acceleration values (Amax (g)) for different Return Periods.
C-6
Examination and classification of the territory on the basis of detected seismic risk classification.
The Italian legislation foreseen territorial diversification by identifying and classifying seismic zones. The basic criteria for dividing regions are described in the Technical Codes, that indicate different horizontal acceleration values of anchoring of elastic response spectrum and planning and building rules to apply.
Seismic Hazard Map of the national territory with differnt return periods.
Deliverable 2.1
2.2 Vulnerability
MAP SCALE
(SPATIAL PLANNING)
MAP SCALE
DATA ACQUISITION AND MAPPING PROCEDURES It is possible to draw up for the structural typology investigated an appropriate vulnerability card to assess structural seismic vulnerability, based on several information about the constitutive elements. In this way it is possible to obtain a vulnerability index that constitutes a conventional measurement of the propensity to damage. The most direct process to establish the built environment vulnerability is to make use of vulnerability investigations. For the Italian case, the assessment of vulnerability derives from the combined use of two data-sets: ISTAT census data and the data collected in different occasions using vulnerability cards by G.N.D.T. Characterization of areas that need analysis of expected damages, meant to territorial seismic unit of measurement.
HAZARD METHODOLOGY
LEGEND
Analyse the specific site and erify which and how many kinds of bjects and people are present, and ow vulnerable they are depending n the particular local condition vestigated (i.e. slide)
Existent techniques to supply data about vulnerability can be variously divided. They can be based on the results produced, on the measurement method used each time, using the main information source, or depending on the organism to which a building is assimilated
Starting from the results of the survey card it is possible to assign a vulnerability index value to every structural typology and produce vulnerability maps.
C-7
Local scale (1:5,000 1:50,000)
Regional (1:10,000 1:50,000)
Subdivide the patrimony to value on the basis of more factors (such as the structural typology, the age of building, the state of maintenance) and reach at define a vulnerability index for different structures considered.
Vulnerability at the Regional scale is analyzed by using direct methods as vulnerability surveys or by means of approximate evaluations combining different available data.
With the support of a table or using density probability curves derived by data regression it is possible to assign a vulnerability index value to every class and produce vulnerability maps.
Regional/Strat egic scale (> 1:50,000)
Examination of the exposed elents and classification of the territory on the basis of the detected seismic risk classification.
Materials and methods used have been directed to characterize and decrease uncertainty elements, as well as protection of more vulnerable territorial elements.
Damage level ratio, as cost of damage / value of the new building to investigate the risk
Deliverable 2.1
2.3 Risk
MAP SCALE
(SPATIAL PLANNING)
MAP SCALE (FLOODS

HAZARD STATE OF ART)
DATA ACQUISITION AND MAPPING PROCEDURES First, data about the basic seismic hazard are valued, and then local seismic hazard and vulnerability are investigated
HAZARD METHODOLOGY
LEGEND
Local scale (<1:5,000)
Local (1:1,000 - 1:10,000)
Evaluation of site risk is represented by interaction of seismic waves with particular local condition and of instability effects such as collapses or movement of big soil masses, being different depending on present condition in site, interconnected with objects and people present, and how vulnerable they are. To investigate the risk at the local scale: for the hazard component it is concerned to use a deterministic input model, while vulnerable elements are distinct between the ones inferable from ISTAT catalogues and the ones that involved population and buildings or other structures.
Punctual analysis are used both to zoning the region in study and to give indications about the structural protection levels to adopt for different considered elements.
Quantitative risk classes expressed as physical and economical potential damages.
Data available for study earthquakes can be collected under three categories, correlated with three different approaches: a. Damage effect; b. Seismometric registrations; c. Accelerometric registrations. Then, the local vulnerability level must be investigated
The local scale is used both to zoning the region in study and to give indications about the buildings protection levels to adopt.
In the map, the local hazard is represented by P.G.A. values, that decrease getting away from the epicentre.
C-8
Local scale (1:5,000 1:50,000)
Regional (1:10,000 1:50,000)
To investigate the risk at the regional scale: for the hazard component it is concerned to use a deterministic input model, while vulnerable elements are distinct between the ones inferable from ISTAT catalogues. A simplified model for risk mapping needs of two components: 1. a deterministic input to define the hazard; 2. vulnerability data to assess the vulnerability component. It is possible to implement a deterministic model. Minimum data required for increase this model are: 1 Historical recorded events catalogue; 2 Source zones; 3 Attenuation model.
Regional/Strat egic scale (>1:50,000)
Expected Maximum Acceleration values (Amax (g)) for different Return Periods to assess hazard; and Damage level ratio, as cost of damage / value of the new building to investigate the risk Seismic Hazard Map of the national territory with different return periods; and Damage level ratio, as cost of damage / value of the new building to investigate the risk
Deliverable 2.1
3 Landslides
3.1 Hazard
MAP SCALE
(SPATIAL PLANNING)
MAP SCALE
(LANDSLIDE HAZARD STATE OF ART)
DATA ACQUISITION AND MAPPING PROCEDURES Data are related to slope stability modelling parameters (i.e. stratigraphy, geotechnical properties, hydrological data, seismic input). Data collection should support the production of detailed multitemporal landslide distribution maps and provide information about the various parameters required in the adopted methodology.
HAZARD METHODOLOGY
LEGEND
Local (1:1,000 1:10,000)
Provide absolute hazard classes and variable safety factor related to specific triggering factors. The maps are used for implementing and design landslide hazard and risk mitigation projects. Provide an overview of potential unstable slopes for large engineering structures, roads, urban areas, soil protection (detailed studies). Absolute hazard and/or relative hazard should be evaluated according to landslide types occurring in the study area.
Deterministic approaches (i.e. geotechnical modelling).
Hazard classes expressed as failure probability (affected area, return time, intensity) or safety factor range.
Deterministic approaches (i.e. geotechnical modelling coupled with hydrological analysis). Statistical modelling. Geomorphological approach. Indexed maps. Hazard maps are possible only when the geomorphic and geologic conditions, as well as landslide types, are fairly homogeneous over the whole study area.
Local scale (1:5,000 1:50,000)
Regional (1:10,000 1:50,000)
Identify landslide relative hazard or susceptibility maps. The investigations may cover quite large areas and for large areas the required map detail is medium-low. The maps are generally addressed to large projects (feasibility studies) or regional developments.
Detailed data collection for individual factors (i.e. landslide inventory, lithology, structural setting, land use), mostly derived by remote sensing techniques and bibliography in order to delineate homogeneous terrain units.
Statistical modelling. Geomorphological approach based on a detailed landslide inventory. Indexed maps. Hazard maps are possible only when the geomorphic and geologic conditions, as well as landslide types, are fairly homogeneous over the whole study area.
Rarely, when the study area is homogeneous in terms of geological, morphological and landslide types, hazard is possible and can be expressed as landslide probability (affected area, return time, intensity) or safety factor range. Generally, a relative hazard is provided in qualitative scales that depict spatial and/or temporal probability of occurrence (i.e. low, medium, high, very high). A relative hazard is provided in qualitative scales that depict spatial probability of occurrence (i.e. low, medium, high, very high).
C-9
Deliverable 2.1
MAP SCALE
(SPATIAL PLANNING)
MAP SCALE
DATA ACQUISITION AND MAPPING PROCEDURES National summary of regional landslide inventories and map products.
HAZARD METHODOLOGY
LEGEND
Provide a general inventory of landslide areas or susceptibility maps with low level of detail. The maps are useful to national policy makers and the general public.
Susceptibility maps derived from: geomorphological approach based on spatial distribution of landslides, landslide density, landslide activity; indexed maps; descriptive statistical analysis.
A relative hazard is provided in qualitative scales that depict spatial probability of occurrence according to expert judgement (i.e. low, medium, high, very high).
3.2 Vulnerability
MAP SCALE
(SPATIAL PLANNING)
MAP SCALE
DATA ACQUISITION AND MAPPING PROCEDURES Data are related to slope stability modelling parameters (i.e. stratigraphy, geotechnical properties, hydrological data, seismic input). Data collection should support the production of detailed multitemporal landslide distribution maps and provide information about the various parameters required in the adopted methodology.
HAZARD METHODOLOGY
LEGEND
Local (1:1,000 - 1:10,000)
Provide absolute hazard classes and variable safety factor related to specific triggering factors. The maps are used for implementing and design landslide hazard and risk mitigation projects. Provide an overview of potential unstable slopes for large engineering structures, roads, urban areas, soil protection (detailed studies). Absolute hazard and/or relative hazard should be evaluated according to landslide types occurring in the study area.
Deterministic approaches (i.e. geotechnical modelling).
Hazard classes expressed as failure probability (affected area, return time, intensity) or safety factor range.
C-10
Deterministic approaches (i.e. geotechnical modelling coupled with hydrological analysis). Statistical modelling. Geomorphological approach. Indexed maps. Hazard maps are possible only when the geomorphic and geologic conditions, as well as landslide types, are fairly homogeneous over the whole study area. Susceptibility maps derived from: geomorphological approach based on spatial distribution of landslides, landslide density, landslide activity; indexed maps; descriptive statistical analysis.
Provide a general inventory of landslide areas or susceptibility maps with low level of detail. The maps are useful to national policy makers and the general public.
National summary of regional landslide inventories and map products.
Rarely, when the study area is homogeneous in terms of geological, morphological and landslide types, hazard is possible and can be expressed as landslide probability (affected area, return time, intensity) or safety factor range. Generally, a relative hazard is provided in qualitative scales that depict spatial and/or temporal probability of occurrence (i.e. low, medium, high, very high). A relative hazard is provided in qualitative scales that depict spatial probability of occurrence according to expert judgement (i.e. low, medium, high, very high).
Deliverable 2.1
3.3 Risk
MAP SCALE
(SPATIAL PLANNING)
MAP SCALE
DATA ACQUISITION AND MAPPING PROCEDURES Data are related to hazard and vulnerability classes or values and their combination.
HAZARD METHODOLOGY
LEGEND
Local (1:1,000 - 1:10,000)
Local scale (1:5,000 1:50,000) Regional/Strat egic scale (>1:50,000)
Regional (1:10,000 1:50,000) National (>1:50,000)
Provide rigorous risk classes related to probabilistic landslide occurrence and potential damage. Maps are used for implementing and design landslide risk mitigation projects. Provide absolute or relative risk. The maps are used for implementing and design landslide risk mitigation projects. Provide relative risk. The maps are used for depicting landslide risk scenarios at regional levels. Provide relative risk. The maps are used for depicting landslide risk scenarios at regional/national levels.
Quantitative assessment.
analysis:
rig Q ou ra on uts itative risk classes expressed as worth or number of potential losses.
Data are related to hazard and vulnerability classes or values and their combination. Data are related to hazard and vulnerability classes or values and their combination. Data are related to hazard and vulnerability classes or values and their combination.
Quantitative analysis: potential damage, specific risk.
Qualitative analysis: damage propensity or risk susceptibility. Qualitative analysis: damage propensity or risk susceptibility.
Quantitative risk classes expressed as worth or number of potential losses. Qualitative risk classes according to social and economic consequences. Qualitative risk classes according to social and economic consequences. Qualitative risk classes according to social and economic consequences.
C-11
4 Forest fire
4.1 Hazard
MAP SCALE
(SPATIAL PLANNING)
MAP SCALE
DATA ACQUISITION AND MAPPING PROCEDURES NA Basic GIS layers normally required for this kind of map: DEM, fuel model map, settlements, road network, weather patterns, administrative boundaries. If available fire perimeters of past 5-10 years or fire frequency in the municipalities of past 10-15 years might be used.
HAZARD METHODOLOGY
LEGEND
Site-specific (<1:1,000) Local (1:1,000 - 1:10,000)
Normally not used Detailed map produced for site specific design and location of prevention measures e.g. firebreaks, water reservoirs, look out points etc. Also used for setting up management rules for individual settlements and / or specific ecosystems (fuel/forest management etc.)
NA Fire behaviour potential assessment with fire simulation models
NA Quantitative legend that shows the average potential fire line intensities under given meteorological scenarios.
Deliverable 2.1
MAP SCALE
(SPATIAL PLANNING)
MAP SCALE
DATA ACQUISITION AND MAPPING PROCEDURES The following basic GIS layers are normally required for this kind of map: DEM, fuel model map, settlements, road network, weather patterns, administrative boundaries. If available: fire perimeters of past 5-10 years or fire frequency in the municipalities of past 10-15 years. The following basic GIS layers are normally required for this kind of map: DEM, land use, fuel types, fire data (last 10-15 years), administrative boundaries, climatic data, bioclimatic regions, Wildland Urban Interface areas, (settlements, road network, socio-economic variables)
HAZARD METHODOLOGY
LEGEND
Local scale (1:5,000 1:50,000)
Regional (1:10,000 1:50,000)
Typical scale for local fire management plans. The map is aimed to the spatialization of protection priorities, the identification of prevention measure and the setting up of management guidelines at landscape level
Fire occurrence: buffers of given distances from roads and/or settlements. Fire behaviour potential assessed with fire simulation models
Quantitative legend that shows the average potential fire line intensities (in classes) under given meteorological scenarios, combined with 2-3 expected fire occurrence pattern (qualitative).
Scale used for regional fire management plans. It supports the spatialization of general fire protection priorities, the definition of protection strategies, the allocation of protection resources and the setting up of general fire management guidelines
Fire occurrence: kernel density probability based estimates or fire frequency distribution analysis at municipality level. Fire behaviour potential: based on fire simulation models or ad hoc empirical methods derived from statistical analysis of local environmental and anthropogenic factors.
Quantitative legend that shows the average potential fire line intensities (in classes) under given meteorological scenarios. Qualitative classes are more conveniently applied for fire occurrence. The final overall legend would be qualitative, with e.g. 5 classes of fire hazard.
C-12
4.2 Vulnerability
Standard methods to assess and map forest fire vulnerability are still in a research phase. No operational examples can be given in this section.
Deliverable 2.1
5 Volcanic risk
5.1 Hazard
MAP SCALE
CHARACTERISTICS AND USE For a given volcano define the areas which can be interested by volcanic phenomena, characterized by a limited impact on the territory (e.g. some kinds of lava flows, lava domes, some lateral blasts, low mobility pyroclastic density currents, small lahars and debris avalanches, volcanic gases, volcanic earthquakes, lightning strikes). The maps are used for local management of volcanic crisis. For a given volcano, define the areas which can be interested by volcanic phenomena, characterized by a limited extended impact on the territory (e.g. some kinds of lava flows, lava domes, some lateral blasts, low mobility and dilute and turbulent pyroclastic density currents, intermediate scale lahars and debris avalanches, volcanic gases, volcanic earthquakes, lightning strikes, small scale tsunamies). The maps are used for local management of volcanic crisis and have to be inserted in the framework of national emergency plans.
DATA ACQUISITION AND MAPPING PROCEDURES Geological investigations focused at defining the past behaviour and the present state of a given volcano and at evaluating paleomorphology and current topography; volcano monitoring providing an indication of when and where future activity may occur and insights into the likely style of activity and possible areas affected; comparisons with similar volcanoes, providing an indication of possible activity either unprecedented or not preserved in the geologic record at the volcano in question. Geological investigations, focused at defining the past behaviour and the present state of a given volcano and at the evaluation of paleomorphology and current topography; Structural analysis aimed at the identification of the nature and mechanisms of past deformation events, such as caldera collapse and caldera resurgence. Volcano monitoring, which provides an indication of when and where future activity may occur, and insights into the likely style of activity and possible areas affected. Comparisons with similar volcanoes, which provides an indication of possible activity that may be either unprecedented or not preserved in the geologic record at the volcano in question.
HAZARD METHODOLOGY Evaluation of possible phenomenologies; deterministic approach (e.g. dynamic pressure, temperature); statistic approach (probability); numerical modelling. Maps not available. Analysis still experimental. Evaluation of possible phenomenologies; deterministic approach (e.g. dynamic pressure, temperature); statistic approach (probability); numerical modelling
LEGEND Hazard classes expressed as areas at different probability to be affected by the examined phenomenologies. Maps not available. Analysis are still experimental. Hazard classes expressed as areas at different probability to be affected by the examined phenomenologies;
Local (1:1,000 1:10,000)
C-13
Deliverable 2.1
MAP SCALE
CHARACTERISTICS AND USE For a given volcano, define the areas which can be interested by volcanic phenomena, characterized by an extended impact on the territory (e.g. some kinds of lava flows, ash and lapilli fallout, ballistic projectiles, some energetic lateral blasts, high mobility pyroclastic flows and surges, lahars and debris avalanches, debris flows and mud flows, volcanic gases, volcanic earthquakes, intermediate scale tsunamies). Depending on the type of the volcano the maps are used for national planning of volcanic emergencies or regional management of volcanic crisis. In this case these maps have to be inserted in the framework of national emergency plans. For a given volcano, or more than one volcano, define the areas which can be interested by volcanic phenomena, characterized by a very extended impact on the territory (e.g. some kinds of high mobility lava flows, ash and lapilli fallout, high mobility pyroclastic flows and surges, large debris avalanches, volcanic gases, tsunamies). The maps are used for national planning of volcanic emergencies.
DATA ACQUISITION AND MAPPING PROCEDURES
HAZARD METHODOLOGY Evaluation of possible phenomenologies; deterministic approach (e.g. load on the ground, dynamic pressure, temperature); statistic approach (probability); meteorological data on wind strength and direction; numerical modelling
LEGEND
Regional (1:10,000 1:50,000)
Geological investigations, focused at defining the past behaviour and the present state of a given volcano and at the evaluation of paleomorphology and current topography; Structural analysis aimed at the identification of the nature and mechanisms of past deformation events, such as caldera collapse and caldera resurgence. Volcano monitoring, which provides an indication of when and where future activity may occur, and insights into the likely style of activity and possible areas affected. Comparisons with similar volcanoes, which provides an indication of possible activity that may be either unprecedented or not preserved in the geologic record at the volcano in question.
Evaluation of possible phenomenologies; deterministic approach (e.g. load on the ground, dynamic pressure, temperature); statistic approach (probability); meteorological data on wind strenght and direction; numerical modelling
Hazard classes expressed as areas at different probability to be affected by the examined phenomenologies; isopachs and isopleths maps of pyroclastic fallout, related to variable values of load on the ground, depending on buildings typologies.
C-14
5.2 Vulnerability
MAP SCALE
CHARACTERISTICS AND USE Maps are not available. These analyses are still experimental. Maps are not available. These analyses are still experimental.
DATA ACQUISITION AND MAPPING PROCEDURES Data are related to all the characteristics of the exposed elements (i.e. typology, worth, potential damage) at the highest possible resolution. Data are related to the characteristics of the exposed elements which affect their vulnerability.
VULNERABILITY METHODOLOGY Detailed analysis of the vulnerability of buildings for specific volcanic phenomena. Detailed analysis of the vulnerability of buildings for specific volcanic phenomena.
LEGEND
Deliverable 2.1
Site-specific (< 1:1,000) Local (1:1,000 1:10,000)
Maps are not available. These analyses are still experimental. Maps are not available. These analyses are still experimental.
MAP SCALE
CHARACTERISTICS AND USE Provide an overview of homogeneous areas. The maps are used for vulnerability reduction.
DATA ACQUISITION AND MAPPING PROCEDURES Data are related to all the characteristics of the exposed elements (i.e. typology) with resolution related to group of elements. Data are related to categories of the exposed elements (i.e. typology, worth) with low resolution.
VULNERABILITY METHODOLOGY Vulnerability is related to the typology of the exposed elements (population, land use, buildings) and to the type of volcanic hazard considered. Vulnerability indicators: all the elements exposed are supposed to be vulnerable (population and GDP per capita, simplified typology of land use).
LEGEND Qualitative vulnerability classes for each typology of element at risk (i.e. population, structures, economic activities). Qualitative vulnerability classes for each typology of element at risk (i.e. population, structures, economic activities).
Regional (1:10,000 1:50,000)
National (> 1:50,000)
Provide an overview of homogeneous areas. The maps are used for vulnerability reduction.
5.3 Risk
MAP SCALE
(SPATIAL PLANNING)
C-15
MAP SCALE
CHARACTERISTICS AND USE Provide rigorous risk classes related to potential damage of buildings. These kind of analyses are still experimental. Provide absolute and relative risk. The maps are used to define volcanic risk scenarios at regional levels.
RISK METHODOLOGY
LEGEND
Local scale (< 1:5,000) Local scale (1:5,000 1:50,000)
Site-specific (< 1:1,000) Local (1:1,000 - 1:10,000) Regional (1:10,000 1:50,000)
Data are related to single buildings or infrastructure Data are related to hazard, population density and land use.
Quantitative analysis: potential damage. Qualitative analysis: The risk can be defined overlapping the levels of vulnerable people exposed and the economic value for each kind of volcanic phenomenon considered. Quantitative analysis: potential simplified damages. Qualitative analysis:overlapping of layers referred to population density, presence of infrastructures and strategic facilities and simplified land use
Maps are not available. These analyses are still experimental. Qualitative risk classes according to social and economic consequences.
Regional/Strate gic scale (> 1:50,000)
National (> 1:50,000)
Provide relative risk. The maps are used for volcanic risk analyses at regional/national level.
Data are related to hazard, population density, GDP per capita, simplified land use classes.
Qualitative risk classes according to social and economic consequences.
Deliverable 2.1
6 Groundwater pollution
6.1 Hazard
MAP SCALE
(SPATIAL PLANNING)
MAP SCALE
DATA ACQUISITION AND MAPPING PROCEDURES Data related to the characteristics of soils of unsaturated and saturated zone, factors influencing the groundwater regime and data on installations with the potential sources of groundwater regime impact. Assessment and classification of groundwater vulnerability
HAZARD METHODOLOGY
LEGEND
Local scale (<1:5,000) Local scale (1:5,000 1:50,000) Regional/Strategic scale (>1:50,000)
Site-specific (< 1:1,000) Local (1:1,000 - 1:10,000) Regional (1:10,000 1:50,000) National (>1:50,000)
Information on the groundwater vulnerability and potential sources of groundwater regime impact susceptible originate the groundwater regime impact after damage affected by the natural hazards.
Groundwater vulnerability, type of aquifer, elements with detailed information on natural conditions and potential sources of groundwater regime impact.
C-16
6.2 Vulnerability
MAP SCALE
(SPATIAL PLANNING)
MAP SCALE
HAZARD METHODOLOGY
LEGEND
Local scale (< 1:5,000) Local scale (1:5,000 1:50,000) Regional/Strategic scale (>1:50,000)
Site-specific (<1:1,000) Local (1:1,000 - 1:10,000) Regional (1:10,000 1:50,000) National (>1:50,000)
Data related to characteristics of soils of unsaturated and saturated zone, factors influencing groundwater regime and data on installations with potential sources of groundwater regime impact. Assessment and classification of groundwater vulnerability
Deliverable 2.1
6.3 Risk
MAP SCALE
(SPATIAL PLANNING)
MAP SCALE
DATA ACQUISITION AND MAPPING PROCEDURES Data related to the characteristics of soils of unsaturated and saturated zone, factors influencing the groundwater regime and data on installations with the potential sources of groundwater regime impact. Assessment and classification of groundwater vulnerability
HAZARD METHODOLOGY
LEGEND
Site-specific (<1:1,000) Local (1:1,000 - 1:10,000) Regional (1:10,000 1:50,000) National (>1:50,000)
7 Meteorological extreme events

7.1 Hazard
MAP SCALE
(SPATIAL PLANNING)
C-17
MAP SCALE
(METEOROLOGICA L EXTREMES HAZARD STATE OF ART)
HAZARD METHODOLOGY
LEGEND
Local (1:1,000 1:10,000) Regional (1:10,000 1:50,000) National (>1:50,000)
Hazard assessment is not common concept in meteorology and climate research. No common scale are available for "meteorological hazards" since it depends on regional settings and to their relation to other "events" see above see above
Data which can be possibly used are all meteorological variables. A hazard measure will only make sense in the context with other measures (data amalgamation), and has, in particular, also a normative bias see above see above
No common available
methodology
No hazard measures available, since hazards are concrete events and a definition thing. In climate and meteorology the risk and vulnerability concept is preferred
Deliverable 2.1
see above see above
see above see above
see above
see above
see above
see above
7.2 Vulnerability
MAP SCALE
(SPATIAL PLANNING)
MAP SCALE
(METEOROLOGICAL EXTREMES HAZARD STATE OF ART)
CHARACTERISTICS AND USE Provides a grid or regional unit based overview of integrated vulnerability measures, i.e. identify the regions which may be vulnerable against potential weather extremes/climate change
DATA ACQUISITION AND MAPPING PROCEDURES Data characterizing the socioeconomic inventory (political regional structure), data characterizing the natural inventory (gridded, depend on downscaling and quality of source data; point measures). With respect to asked questions all data are used which can be related to the respective exposure units
HAZARD METHODOLOGY Vulnerability is a function of the susceptability (coping/adaptive capacity) against adverse climate effects, sensitivity (degree to which an exposure unit is affected) and of an exposure unit itself (decision maker problem). Methods used for integration are, e.g. fuzzy techniques, belief networks, etc. The outcome is an regional integrated vulnerability measure (depends on the chosen grid scale)
LEGEND Qualitative and quantitative vulnerability assessments are common. They depend on the definition of the concrete exposure unit. Vulnerability assessments in the most cases have a prospective character. Sometimes they are used in order to assess the state of art of a system
Question specific: Useful for any scale. However, commonly any measure is associated with uncertainty, which can be related to the lack of knowledge concerning outcomes, an imprecise knowledge of risk, or to a chosen model concept (e.g. interpolation, downscaling procedure, etc.)
C-18
Deliverable 2.1
7.3 Risk
MAP SCALE
(SPATIAL PLANNING)
MAP SCALE (METEOROLOGICAL

EXTREMES HAZARD STATE OF ART)
Question specific: In climate research a yardstick not a common concept, since data are either point measures (empirical) or grid based (climate models are gridded!). Thus, data values are associated to different grid sizes (if not the same as the model resolution they are interpolated or downscaled), e.g. 1km x 1km, 10'x10' or 0.5 x 0.5 (depends on data quality and downscaling method). Thus, the statements mentioned here are valid for all scales (but clearly associated by various degrees of uncertainties). Local (<1:5,000) scale
CHARACTERISTICS AND USE Retrospective: risk assessments are suitable to some extend, since damages and probabilities of occurrence can be estimated.
DATA ACQUISITION AND MAPPING PROCEDURES Prospective: Quality depends on downscaling methods and used model scenarios. Regional model outputs currently too uncertain. Specific assumptions have to be made, since models are not designed to calculate extremes.
HAZARD METHODOLOGY Retrospective: By utilization of extreme value distributions (GEV/GPD) a forecasting of return periods and extremes of low probability events, such as extreme rainfall, river levels, or temperature is performed. Quality of data and used methods are often not sufficient. Aim of intensive research, utilized methods comprise stochastic modelling which provided suitable extreme value distributions, etc.
LEGEND Quantitative risk assessments based on return intervals of rare events and probability distributions (only for the meteorol. extremes). Damage potentials assessed qualitatively (cf. below)
C-19
Local (1:5,000 1:50,000) scale Regional/Strategic scale (>1:50,000)
Prospective: Difficulties to value the damages in the future, Scenario assessments
Retrospective: Time series data of meteorological variables, point measures obtained from meteorological stations. Interpolations of extremes to a regional scale are problematic. For some meteorological variables regional distributions of extremes are provided sometimes, for example, for monthly maxima either retrospective or prospective, differences are expressed by isolines. Validity of results depend on the quality of underlying data
Prospective: It is tried to reconstruct properties (moments, correlation type and strength) of empirical measurements by more sophisticated methods. Due to the finiteness of measurement uncertainty measures are under development which allows an assessment of the results. Potential damages are estimated qualitatively or semi-quantitatively and depend on inventory of the examined area
Qualitative risk assessment - if quantiles cannot estimated sufficiently - e.g. by expert judgement and elicitation, scenario analysis. Damage costs can be estimated only retrospective (less explanatory power, since assets changes); additionally the exact local/regional occurrence of a weather extreme cannot estimated sufficiently, since their impact depend on large scale circulation pattern, specific orographic settings, and further factors.
Deliverable 2.1

Natural Risk Assessment Methodologies

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Natural Risk Assessment Methodologies

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ARMONIA PROJECT (Contract n 511208) APPLIED MULTI-RISK MAPPING OF NATURAL HAZARDS FOR IMPACT ASSESSMENT DELIVERABLE 2.

Prague, 30 June 2005

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, GLOBAL CHANGE AND ECOSYSTEMS

Project funded by the European Community under the:

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, GLOBAL CHANGE AND ECOSYSTEMS

ARMONIA PROJECT (Contract n 511208)

ARMONIA PROJECT (Contract n 511208)

ARMONIA PROJECT (Contract n 511208)

ARMONIA PROJECT (Contract n 511208)

ARMONIA PROJECT (Contract n 511208)

ARMONIA PROJECT (Contract n 511208)

ARMONIA PROJECT (Contract n 511208)

2.3 Methods for assessing flood hazard .................................... 7

2.4 Assessment of the flood hazard at different spatial scales ..... 8

ARMONIA PROJECT (Contract n 511208)

2.6 Data typology, format and availability .............................. 11

2.7 Examples of flood hazard maps........................................ 12

3 Elements at risk and exposure ............................... 18

4 Analysis of vulnerability ........................................ 19

5 Analysis of risk ...................................................... 25

5.4 Methodologies for risk analysis assessment ....................... 29

ARMONIA PROJECT (Contract n 511208)

6.2 Significance of risk ......................................................... 38

ARMONIA PROJECT (Contract n 511208)

1.2 Flood magnitude, intensity and severity

1.2.1 Annual probability of exceedence

ARMONIA PROJECT (Contract n 511208)

Winter season Summer storms

1 to 500? Major towns and cities may give larger numbers

Prolonged seasons of rainfall

Water mains burst Sewerage

Any time Any time

Small clusters Isolated or Small clusters Isolated or Small clusters Isolated

None? Asset renewal by water service providers None

Storm/ highway drainage Overland flow

Intense storms especially in summer Prolonged heavy rainfall Rare

Monitoring on-site. Risk management by owners

Outside main river floodplain

Inundation damage to buildings and contents

Land use regulation Hard defence measures

ARMONIA PROJECT (Contract n 511208)

1.2.2 Return period

ARMONIA PROJECT (Contract n 511208)

Source Pathway Receptor Consequence conceptual model

2.3 Methods for assessing flood hazard

2.3.1 Information on historical floods

2.3.2 Soil maps

ARMONIA PROJECT (Contract n 511208)

2.3.3 Aerial photography

2.3.4 Satellite imagery

2.3.5 Catchment scale modelling

2.3.6 Detailed hydrological and hydraulic modelling

2.4 Assessment of the flood hazard at different spatial scales

ARMONIA PROJECT (Contract n 511208)

2.4.2 Regional or catchment scale flood hazard assessment

Catchment modelling methods

Simple hydrological routing Enhanced hydrological routing Sparse hydrodynamic modelling

2.4.3 Local scale flood hazard assessment

ARMONIA PROJECT (Contract n 511208)

2.4.4 Assessment of coastal floods

ARMONIA PROJECT (Contract n 511208)

Tidal level Inundation extent Inundation depth Coastal flood dike