You are on page 1of 4

Neurophilosophy of Mind: Mental Content & Consciousness.

Benjamin D. Young

Course Description The aim of the course is to familiarize upper level philosophy undergraduates with a rudimentary understanding of neuroscience, which is essential in progressing debates within the philosophy of mind regarding the structural nature of thought and consciousness. The course begins with an introduction for philosophers of the basic anatomical structure, functional organization of the brain, and fundamental methods and techniques employed in neuroscience. Following this, the course is split into two parts; one concerning the nature of mental content, and the second regarding the neurobiological realization of consciousness (including phenomenal consciousness). The first half of the course is devoted to introducing the basic debate regarding Psychosyntax (the structural content of cognitive states), by focusing upon the Language of Thought Hypothesis, Concepts, and Nonconceptual Content. The second half of the course develops an understanding of the nature of consciousness and neurobiological theories that are proposed to explain its realization. Additionally, this half of the course will tackle the nature of phenomenological consciousness (qualia) and offer some suggestions of how a neurobiological model of consciousness might explain the qualitative character of experience. An introductory level understanding of philosophy is required for this course, and some background knowledge of philosophy of mind or philosophy of psychology is highly suggested. Aims and Skills - Introduce philosophy students to the basics of neuroscience. - Allow students to develop an appreciation for neuroscientific methodologies. - Equip students with a rudimentary understanding of neuroscience that is applicable to philosophical debates in the philosophy of mind. - Develop students capacity to understand how to develop philosophical theories informed by scientific evidence. Requirements 1. Four short writing assignments (500 words maximum), explaining what data or kinds of studies might be relevant to the philosophical debate covered, or if a neuroscientific theory answers a philosophical problem. 2. One research paper on any topic within the philosophy of mind, either suggesting new avenues of research that could progress the debate using empirical evidence, or presenting the students own theory as supported by neuroscientific research.

Neurophilosophy of Mind: Mental Content & Consciousness.


Benjamin D. Young Texts and Readings: The text will be available on-line and must be downloaded and read before class. Students are expected to be prepared for class and bring with them a copy of the reading for that lecture. Weekly Schedule and Readings

INTRODUCTION TO NEUROSCIENCE
Week 1 Introduction to Neuroscience The Neuron Anatomical Structures of the Brain Functional Pathways Perceptual Systems Week 2 Neuroscientific Techniques and Methods Basic Psychometrics Psychophysics Brain Visualization and Imaging Techniques

PSYCHOSYNTAX
Week 3 - Introduction The Language of Thought Hypothesis
J. Fodor, Why there has to be and how there could be a private language. Why there still has to be a Language of Thought. J. L. Bermdez, selections from Philosophy of Psychology.

Week 4 Introduction Cont. Connectionist Models of Cognition


N. Block, The mind as the software of the brain. W. Bechtel & A. Abrahamsen, selections from Connectionism and the Mind. J. L. Bermdez, selections from Philosophy of Psychology. P. Churchland & T.J. Sejnowski, Neural Representation and Neural Computation

Week 5 Arguments for the LoTH Systematicity and Productivity arguments


K. Aizawa, Explaining systematicity. Cummins, Blackmon, Byrd, et. al., Systematicity and the congition of structured domains. J. Fodor, & Z.W. Pylyshyn, Connectionism and cognitive architecture. J. Fodor & B.P. McLaughlin, Connectionism and the Problem of Systematicity. P. Smolensky, Connectionism, Constituency, and the Language of Thought.

Neurophilosophy of Mind: Mental Content & Consciousness.


Benjamin D. Young

Week 6 Psychosyntax Functional Compositionality


T. van Gelder, Compositionality: a connectionist variation on a classical theme. W. Bechtel & A. Abrahamsen, selections from Connectionism and the Mind. T. Horgan & J. Tienson, Cognition Needs Syntax but not Rules. A. Abrahamsen & W. Bechtel, Phenomena and Mechanisms.

Assignment 1 deadline Week 7 Contemporary debate Concepts Inferring Structure from Cognitive Capacities.
E. Margolis, & S. Laurence, Concepts and Cognitive Science. E.E. Smith, et al., A psychological approach to concepts. J. Prinz, selections from Furnishing the mind T. Horgan, & J. Tienson, selections from Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology

Nonconceptual and Preconceptual Content


G. Evans, selections from The Varieties of Reference. Z. Pylyshyn, selections from Seeing and Visualizing. J. Fodor, The Revenge of the Given. & selections from LOT2. J. Porter, et al. Brain Mechanisms for Extracting Spatial Information from Smell. Mechanisms of scent-tracking in humans.

Week 8 Current and Future steps Olfaction and formative nonconceptual content
B. Young, The Nonconceptual Content of Olfactory Experience.

Optogenetics and Connectomics Assignment 2 deadline

CONSCIOUSNESS
Week 9 - Introduction Philosophical Theories of Conscious Awareness
D. M. Rosenthal, A Theory of Consciousness. W. G. Lycan, The Superiority of HOP to HOT. F. Crick & C. Koch, Consciousness and Neuroscience. N. Block, On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness. Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience. Consciousness and Cognitive Access. Comparing the major theories of consciousness.

Neurophilosophy of Mind: Mental Content & Consciousness.


Benjamin D. Young Week 10 Qualia and Consciousness Phenomenological Consciousness
T. Nagel, What Is it like to Be a Bat? J. Levine, Materlism and Qualia. & On Leaving Out What Its Like. N. Block, Mental Paint. & The Harder Problem of Consciousness. D.M. Rosenthal, How to think about mental qualities.

Assignment 3 deadline Week 11 Neurobiological Theories Centracephalic Theories of Consciousness


B. Merker, Consciousness without a cerebral cortex.

Intermediate-level Processing Theories


R. Jackendoff, selections from Consciousness and the Computational Mind. J. Prinz, A Neurofunctional Theory of Consciousness. The Intermediate-Level Theory of Consciousness. P. Mandik, The Neurophilosophy of Subjectivity. Objective Subjective - Allocentric and Egocentric Representations in Thought and Experience.

Week 12-13 - Neurobiological Theories cont. Crick and Kochs Neurobiological Specificity Model F. Crick,
Function of the thalamic reticular complaex: The searchlight hypothesis. F. Crick, and C. Koch, Towards a neurobiological theory of consciousness. Consciousness and Neuroscience. A framework for consciounsess. What is the function of the claustrum? C. Koch, selections from The Quest for Consciousness.

Global Works Space Theories


B.J. Baars, selections from A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. In the Theatre of Consciousness. The conscious access hypothesis: origins and recent evidence. S. Dehaene, et al., Neural Mechanisms for Access to Consciousness. Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness. Consciousness, preconscious, and subliminal processing.

Information Integration Theories


G. Tononi, & G.M. Edelman, Consciousness and Complexity. G. Tononi, An Information intergration theory of consciousness.

Assignment 4 deadline Week 14 Next Steps Olfactory Consciousness


B. Young, Stinking Consciousness.

Plugging the Gap


B. Young, The Phenomenal Element.

Research Paper deadline. 4

You might also like