Succession Reviewer Case Digests

SUCCESSION REVIEWER Case Digests (4 Year : 2008-2009
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WILLS & SUCCESSION Case Digests Based on the syllabus of Atty. Lielanie Yangyang Espejo, CPA Succession in General RAMIREZ vs. RAMIREZ 111 SCRA 82 FACTS: Jose Ramirez a Filipino, died in Spain leaving only his widow Marcelle Ramirez, a French. In the project partition, the property was divided into 2 st nd parts: 1 part to the widow, and 2 part to the grandnephews the naked ownership. Furthermore, as to nd the usufruct of the 2 part, 1/3 was given to the widow and 2/3 to Wanda de Wrobleski, an Austrian. The grandnephews opposed on the ground that usufruct to Wanda is void because it violates the constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of lands by aliens. ISSUE: WON the ground for the opposition is correct. HELD: No, it is not correct. The SC held that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. The SC upheld the usufruct in favor of Wanda because although it is a real right, it does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution. ARTICLE 728. Donations which are to take effect upon the death of the donor partake of the nature of testamentary provisions, and shall be governed by the rules established in the Title on Succession. (620) JUTIC vs. CA August 27, 1987 FACTS: Arsenio Seville executed an affidavit in favor of his brother Melquiades. It was stipulated therein that in case the former dies, he would assign all his rights, interest and participation over all his property to Melquiades. Arsenio died intestate and survived by Melquiades, 2 brothers and 2 sisters. Petitioners, children of Arsenio, are now claiming exclusive ownership of the properties of Arsenio on the basis of the affidavit. Private respondents filed a complaint for partition and accounting as relatives also of Arsenio. ISSUE: WON the affidavit was a deed of donation inter vivos in order to validly convey the property to Melquiades. HELD: No, it is not an instrument of donation inter vivos. There was no intention to transfer ownership from Arsenio to Melquiades at the time of the execution of the affidavit. But it is the intention to assign it in case Arsenio would die. Thus, Article 728 of the Civil Code is applicable. GANUELAS vs. CAWED April 24, 2003 FACTS: Celestina Ganuelas executed a deed of donation of real property in favor of her niece Ursulina which provides that it would take effect upon her death. However, the deed was revoked. Thereafter, Celestina died without issue and any surviving ascendants and siblings. After Celestin as death, Ursulina had been sharing the produce of the property with private respondents, other nieces. After 24 years from the execution of the deed, Ursulina secured a tax declaration in her name and refused to share the produce to respondents. Thus, they filed an action to return the possession and ownership of the property contending that the instrument was void because
it was a donation mortis causa and it failed to comply with the formalities of a will. ISSUE: WON the donation is mortis causa. HELD: Yes, it is a donation mortis causa There is nothing in the subject deed which indicates that any right, title or interest in the donated properties was to be transferred to Ursulina prior to the death of Celestina. In fact, it was stipulated that it would take effect after her death. As the subject deed was in the nature of a mortis causa disposition, the formalities of a will should have been complied with, failing which the donation is void and without effect. MAGLASANG vs. CABATINGAN June 5, 2002 FACTS: Conchita Cabatingan executed deed of donation over a house and lot in favor of his brother. Also, she executed 4 other deeds of donation in favor of the petitioners. The deeds provided that it shall take effect upon the donors death. Conchita died. Respondents filed an action to annul the 4 deeds on the ground that it is void for failure to comply with the formalities of a will. ISSUE: WON the deed is a donation mortis causa. HELD: Yes, it is. The nature of the donations as mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that the donations do not contain any clear provision that intends to pass proprietary rights to petitioners prior to Conchitas death. Donations mortis causa must be executed in accordance with the requisites on solemnities of wills and testaments. Though the deeds were acknowledge before a notary public, they were not executed in the manner provided for under Article 805-806 of the Civil Code, thus it is void. TITLE IV Succession CHAPTER 1 General Provisions ARTICLE 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law. (n) ARTICLE 775. In this Title, "decedent" is the general term applied to the person whose property is transmitted through succession, whether or not he left a will. If he left a will, he is also called the testator. (n) ARTICLE 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his death. (659) CONDE vs. ABAYA 13 PHIL 240 FACTS: Casiano Abaya, unmarried, died intestate. Paula Conde alleged that she is the mother of Jose and Teopista, who are natural children of Casiano and she moved for the settlement of Casianos estate. Roman Abaya on the other hand moved that he be declared as the sole heir of Casiano. Trial court ruled that Roman should recognized Jose and Teopista as being natural children of Casiano, and Paula should succeed as the mother of the deceased natural children. ISSUE: WON Paula may bring an action for acknowledgment of the natural filiation of the children. HELD: No, she cannot.

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Article 776 of the Civil Code applies. The right of action that devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy lasts during his whole life, while the right to claim acknowledgment of a natural child lasts only during the life of his presumed parents. The right of action which the law concedes to this natural child is not transmitted to his descendants or ascendants. Since the presumed parents as well as the natural children are already dead, the mother of that natural children can no longer bring an action for acknowledgment. LA HU NIU vs. COLLECTOR 36 PHIL 433 HELD: The right of children of resident foreigner to gain entrance is a purely personal right. Thus, it is extinguished by death and cannot be transferred. GREPALIFE vs. CA October 13, 1999 HELD: Property right in an insurance policy is not extinguished by death only when the designation is irrevocable. The beneficiary has a vested right to the life insurance unless otherwise provided in the policy. ROBLES vs. BATACAN 154 SCRA 644 FACTS: Severino Geronimo worked for 20 years in petitioners land. After his death an ejectment suit was filed against his 2 sons. Atanacio, one of the 2 sons averred that he was entitled to succeed his father as agricultural tenant. ISSUE: WON a son has the right to succeed agricultural tenency of his deceased father. HELD: Atanacio had the right to take over as agricultural tenant in the petitioners land in accordance with RA 1199 and RA 3844. SAN AGUSTIN vs. CA December 4, 2001 FACTS: GSIS sold to Macaria Caiquep, parcel of residential land. A TCT was issued and a provision was provided that the vendee is prohibited to transfer or sell the land within 5 years from the final date of absolute ownership. A day after the issuance of the TCT, Macaria sold the land to Maximo Menez, Jr. Thereafter the petitioner, nephew of Macaria, received a copy of the decision granting the issuance of owners duplicate copy which Menez filed. Petitioner contends that the sale in favor of Menez is void as it is violative of the 5-year prohibitory period under the Public Land Act. ISSUE: WON the sale is valid as to bind petitioner as Macarias heir. HELD: As far as the 5-year restrictive condition imposed by GSIS, it is the latter and not the petitioner who had a cause of action against private respondent. The contract of sale is valid between the parties, unless annulled. Thus, it is binding upon the heirs of Macaria, including petitioner who alleges to be one of her heirs, in line with the rule that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest.
RABADILLA vs. CA June 29, 2000 FACTS: In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of parcel of land. The Codicil provides that Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every year to give Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza dies. Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died. Private respondent brought a complaint, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. ISSUE: WON the obligations of Jorge Rabadilla under the Codicil are inherited by his heirs. HELD: Under Article 776 of the NCC, inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death. ALVAREZ vs. IAC May 7, 1990 FACTS: Aniceto Yanes owned 2 parcels of land Lot 773-A and Lot 773-B. Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. Herein private respondents, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, are the children of Rufino who died in 1962 while the other private respondents, Antonio and Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe. Teodora was survived by her child, Jovita (Jovito) Albib. It is established that Rufino and his children left the province to settle in other places as a result of the outbreak of World War II. According to Estelita, from the "Japanese time up to peace time", they did not visit the parcels of land in question but "after liberation", when her brother went there to get their share of the sugar produced therein, he was informed that Fortunato Santiago, Fuentebella (Puentevella) and Alvarez were in possession of Lot 773. After Fuentebella's death, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella sold said lots for P6,000.00 to Rosendo Alvarez. On May 26, 1960, Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother Rufino filed a complaint against Fortunato Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the "return" of the ownership and possession of Lots 773 and 823. During the pendency of said case, Alvarez sold the Lots for P25,000.00 to Dr. Rodolfo Siason. CFI rendered judgment ordering defendant Rosendo Alvarez to reconvey to plaintiffs the lots. ISSUE: W/N the liability of Rosendo Alvarez arising from the sale of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B could be legally passed or transmitted by operation of law to the petitioners without violation of law and due process. RULING: The doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction is on the general transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the deceased to his legitimate children and heirs. The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the provision of our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate before the residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whatever payment is thus made from the estate is ultimately a payment by the heirs or distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to receive. "Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a party's contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the successors. The rule is a consequence of the progressive 'depersonalization' of patrimonial rights and duties. From the

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Roman concept of a relation from person to person, the obligation has evolved into a relation from patrimony to patrimony, with the persons occupying only a representative position, barring those rare cases where the obligation is strictly personal, in consideration of its performance by a specific person and by no other. . . ." Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal consequences of their father's transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages. PAMPLONA vs. MORETO 96 SCRA 775 FACTS: Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega were husband and wife with 6 children. During their marriage, they acquired adjacent lots Nos. 1495, 4545, and 1496. Monica Maniega died intestate. more than (6) years after, Flaviano Moreto, without the consent of the heirs of his said deceased wife, and before any liquidation of the conjugal partnership, executed in favor of Geminiano Pamplona, the deed of absolute sale covering lot No. 1495 for P900.00. The spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia Onte constructed their house on the eastern part of lot 1496 as Flaviano Moreto, at the time of the sale, pointed to it as the land which he sold to Geminiano Pamplona. Flaviano Moreto died intestate. In 1961, the plaintiffs demanded on the defendants to vacate the premises on the ground that Flaviano Moreto had no right to sell the lot which he sold to Geminiano Pamplona as the same belongs to the conjugal partnership of Flaviano and his deceased wife. The spouses Pamplona refused to vacate hence, this suit was instituted seeking for the declaration of the nullity of the deed of sale as regards one-half of the property subject matter of said deed. ISSUE: Whether petitioners are entitled to the full ownership of the property in litigation, or only one-half of the same. RULING: The three lots have a total area of 2,346 sq. meters. It is therefore, clear that the three lots constitute one big land. They are not separate properties located in different places but they abut each other. And since Flaviano Moreto was entitled to one-half pro-indiviso of the entire land area or 1,173 sq. meters as his share, he had a perfect legal and lawful right to dispose of 781 sq. meters of his share to the Pamplona spouses. Moreover, private respondents, as heirs are dutybound to comply with the provisions of Articles 1458 and 1495, Civil Code, which is the obligation of the vendor of the property of delivering and transferring the ownership of the whole property sold, which is transmitted on his death to his heirs, the herein private respondents. Under Article 776, New Civil Code, the inheritance which private respondents received from their deceased parents and/or predecessors-in-interest included all the property rights and obligations which were not extinguished by their parents' death. LEDESMA vs. MCLACHLIN 66 PHIL 547 FACTS: Lorenzo Mclachlin is indebted to 3 person. But Lorenzo before he was able to pay the debt, he died. But when he died, he had no property. Theoretically, there should have been succession between Lorenzo and Anna. So Anna should have inherited from Lorenzo. But because Lorenzo had no properties, Anna did not inherit anything from Lorenzo. ISSUE: Can the 3 person claim from Anna? RULING: No. He cannot because Lorenzo did not transmit anything to Anna and the inheritance is only to the extent of the value. So, for example, Lorenzo had debts. The value of the inheritance should only be to the value of the debts. But there was no property left. So the value of the inheritance is zero. The debts cannot
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be enforced against Anna because Anna inherited nothing. ARTICLE 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. (657a) RIOFERIO vs. CA January 13, 2004 FACTS: Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will leaving several personal and real properties. He also left a widow, respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom he had seven children who are the herein respondents. Also, the decedent also left his paramour and their children. They are petitioner Teodora Riofero and copetitioners Veronica, Alberto and Rowena. Respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes (legitimate children of the deceased) discovered that petitioner Teodora and her children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of the decedent located in Dagupan City. Respondent Alfonso filed a Petition for Letters of Administration. Respondents filed a Complaint for the Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate. Petitioners raised the affirmative defense that respondents are not the real parties-in-interest but rather the Estate of Alfonso O. Orfinada, Jr. in view of the pendency of the administration proceedings. ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs may bring suit to recover property of the estate pending the appointment of an administrator. HELD: Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt have legal personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance with the provision of Article 777 of the New Civil Code "that (t)he rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." The provision in turn is the foundation of the principle that the property, rights and obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others by his will or by operation of law. Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the proper modality despite the total lack of advertence to the heirs in the rules on party representation. HEIRS OF CALPATURA, SR vs. PRADO January 20, 2004 FACTS: Spouses Patricio Prado Sr. and Narcisa Prado owned a residential land. Subsequently, Patricio died. Narcisa subsequently married Bonifacio Calpatura. In order to support her minor children with her first husband, Narcisa sold to her brother-in-law, Tomas Calpatura, Sr., the northern half portion of the said property. On April 8, 1991, respondents, Prado, et al, filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of sale and delivery of possession of the northern half portion of the subject property against petitioners Calpatura, et al. Respondents alleged among others that Narcisa, as natural guardian of her children, had no authority to sell the northern half portion of the property which she and her children co-owned. ISSUE: WON the sale of Narcisas conjugal share is valid. RULING: YES. The property being conjugal, upon the death of Patricio Prado, Sr., one-half of the subject property was automatically reserved to the surviving spouse, Narcisa, as her share in the conjugal partnership. Patricios rights to the other half, in turn, were transmitted upon his death to his heirs, which includes his widow Narcisa, who is entitled to the same share as that of each of the legitimate children. Inasmuch as Narcisa inherited one-seventh (1/7) of her husband's conjugal share in the said property and is the

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owner of one-half (1/2) thereof as her conjugal share, she owns a total of 9/14 of the subject property. Hence, Narcisa could validly convey her total undivided share in the entire property to Tomas. Narcisa and her children are deemed co-owners of the subject property. While Narcisa could validly sell one half of the subject property, her share being 9/14 of the same, she could not have particularly conveyed the northern portion thereof before the partition, the terms of which was still to be determined by the parties before the trial court. FELIPE vs. HEIRS OF ALDON February 16, 1983 FACTS: Maximo Aldon married Gimena Almosara in 1936. The spouses bought several of pieces of land sometime between 1948 and 1950. In 1951, Gimena Almosara sold the lots to the spouses Eduardo Felipe and Hermogena Felipe. The sale was without the consent of her husband, Maximo. On 1976, the heirs of Maximo Aldon filed a complaint against the Felipes. The defendants asserted that they had acquired the lots from the plaintiffs by purchase and subsequent delivery to them. ISSUES: WON the wife who sold conjugal lands without her husbands consent can bring an action for annulment of the sale even after her husbands death. WON the children-heirs can bring an action for annulment of the sale of the lots in question even after their fathers death. HELD: Anent the first issue, the Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The termination of the marriage and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership by the death of Maximo Aldon did not improve the situation of Gimena. What she could not do during the marriage, she cannot do thereafter. The case of Sofia and Salvador Aldon is different. After the death of Maximo they acquired the right to question the defective contract insofar as it deprived them of their hereditary rights in their Fathers share in the lands. The fathers share is onehalf of the lands and their share is two-thirds thereof, onethird pertaining to the widow. EASTERN vs. LUCERO 124 SCRA 326 FACTS: Capt. Julio J. Lucero, Jr. was appointed by petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines as master/captain to its vessel M/V Eastern Minicon. Under the contract, his employment was good for (1) round trip only, the contract would automatically terminate upon arrival of the vessel at the Port of Manila, unless renewed. It was further agreed that part of the captain's salary, while abroad, should be paid to Mrs. Josephine Lucero, his wife, in Manila. Thereafter, while the vessel was enroute from Hongkong to Manila, the vessels encountered situation which has difficulty to further continue its voyage. Thereafter, the Company paid the corresponding death benefits to the heirs of the crew members, except respondent Josephine Lucero, who refused to accept the same. Mrs. Lucero filed a complaint with the National Seamen Board, for payment of her accrued monthly allotment since March 1980 and for continued payment of said allotments until the M/V Minicon shall have returned to the port of Manila. The Board ruled in favor of Mrs. Josephine Lucero and against petitioner Company. That the presumption of death could not be applied ISSUE: WON Article 39(1) of the CC is applicable in the case at bar. HELD: We are unable to agree with the reasoning and conclusion of the respondent NLRC. There is thus enough evidence to show the circumstances attending the loss and disappearance of the M/V Eastern Minicon and its crew. The foregoing
facts, quite logically, are sufficient to lead us to a moral certainty that the vessel had sunk and that the persons aboard had perished with it. Upon this premise, the rule on presumption of death under Article 391(1) of the Civil Code must yield to the rule of preponderance of evidence. EMNACE vs. CA November 23, 2001 FACTS: Emilio Emnace, Vicente Tabanao and Jacinto Divinagracia were partners in a business concern known as Ma. Nelma Fishing Industry. Sometime in January of 1986, they decided to dissolve their partnership and executed an agreement of partition and distribution of the partnership properties among them. Petitioner failed to submit to Tabanao's heirs any statement of assets and liabilities of the partnership, and to render an accounting of the partnership's finances. Petitioner also reneged on his promise to turn over to Tabanao's heirs the deceased's 1/3 share in the total assets of the partnership. Tabanao's filed against petitioner an action for accounting, payment of shares, division of assets and damages. ISSUE: WON the heirs of Vicente Tabanao Lacks the capacity to sue the petitioner. HELD: No. The surviving spouse does not need to be appointed as executrix or administratrix of the estate before she can file the action. She and her children are complainants in their own right as successors of Vicente Tabanao. From the very moment of Vicente Tabanao's death, his rights insofar as the partnership was concerned were transmitted to his heirs, for rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. Whatever claims and rights Vicente Tabanao had against the partnership and petitioner were transmitted to respondents by operation of law, more particularly by succession, which is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted. Moreover, respondents became owners of their respective hereditary shares from the moment Vicente Tabanao died. IN THE MATTER OF GUARDIANSHIP OF THE LAVIDES vs. CITY COURT OF LUCENA May 31, 1982 FACTS: Upon the death of his wife, petitioner Alberto Lavides instituted a guardianship proceeding with respect to the person and property of their 7 minor children. Said petition alleged that the estate left by the deceased wife and mother of the minors has a total value of P35,000.00 or an amount of P5,000.00 pertaining to each minor wherein petitioner was appointed and qualified as judicial guardian. The City Court authorized petitioner to settle the estate extrajudicially and to sell a portion thereof consisting of shares of stocks. Petitioner filed a motion for confirmation and approval of' a Deed of Exchange Agreement. While this latter motion was still pending consideration, the respondent court, reviewed the records of the case and finding that the undivided estate left by the deceased was worth at least P35,000.00, dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, revoked the appointment of petitioner as guardian and annulled all proceedings taken prior to the issuance of the said order. Hence petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: WON respondent city court's jurisdiction over a petition for general guardianship is based on the total value of the estate or on the value of the individual share of the minors in the estate of their deceased mother? HELD: Respondent city court has jurisdiction over the case. Each of the 7 minor children became owner of a 1/7 share or an amount of P5,000 from the estate left by the deceased mother valued at P35,000.00 upon the death of the latter for Article 777 of the New Civil Code expressly provides that "the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent," and from then on, the

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heir becomes the absolute owner of the decedent's property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent and he cannot be deprived of such right except by methods provided for by law. For what is decisive is not the total value of the estate of the decedent, but the value of the individual share of each of the minor heirs for whom a guardian is sought to be appointed individually not collectively. BONILLA vs. BARCENA FACTS: On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio and Salvacion and wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil action, to quiet title over certain parcels of land located in Abra. On August 4, 1975, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Fortunata Barcena is dead and, therefore, has no legal capacity to sue. Said motion to dismiss was heard on August 14, 1975. In said hearing, counsel for the plaintiff confirmed the death of Fortunata Barcena, and asked for substitution by her minor children and her husband, the petitioners herein; but the court after the hearing immediately dismissed the case on the ground that a dead person cannot be a real party in interest and has no legal personality to sue. ISSUE: Whether or not a dead person can be a real party in interest and has legal personality to sue RULING: While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in court, yet he can be substituted by his heirs in pursuing the case up to its completion. The records of this case show that the death of Fortunata Barcena took place on July 9, 1975 while the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975. This means that when the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975, Fortunata Barcena was still alive, and therefore, the court had acquired jurisdiction over her person. Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law. When Fortunata Barcena died, her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation in the civil case was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became parties in interest in the case.
BORROMEO-HERRERA vs. BORROMEO 152 SCRA 172 FACTS: Vito Borromeo, a widower died without forced heirs but leaving extensive properties in the province of Cebu. Jose Junquera filed a petition for the probate of a one page document as the last will and testament left by the said deceased. The probate court held that the document presented as the will was a forgery. The testate proceeding was converted into an intestate proceeding. Several parties came before the court filing claims . Fortunato Borromeo, filed a motion before the trial court praying that he be declared as one of the heirs. He asserted and incorporated a Waiver of Hereditary Rights. In the waiver, five of the nine heirs relinquished to Fortunato their shares in the disputed estate. The petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the trial court's order declaring respondent Fortunato Borromeo entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo. ISSUE: Whether or not the waiver of hereditary right is valid. HELD: No. The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary rights is that "the properties included in an existing inheritance cannot be considered as belonging to third persons with respect to the heirs, who by fiction of law continue the personality of the former. Nor do such properties have the character of future property, because the heirs acquire a right to succession from the moment of the death of the deceased. The heirs, therefore, could waive their hereditary rights in 1967 even if the order to partition the estate was issued only in 1969. In this case, however, the purported "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" cannot be considered to be effective. For a waiver to exist, three elements are essential: (1) the existence of a right; (2) the knowledge of the existence thereof; and (3) an intention to relinquish such right. The circumstances of this case show that the signatories to the waiver document did not have the clear and convincing intention to relinquish their rights. Thus Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo filed a pleading entitled "Compliance" wherein they submitted a proposal for the amicable settlement of the case. This shows that the "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" was never meant to be what the respondent now purports it to be. DELA MERCED vs. DELA MERCED February 25, 1999 FACTS: Evarista M. dela Merced died intestate, without issue and left (5) parcels of land. At the time of her death, Evarista was survived by three sets of heirs. On April 20, 1989, the three sets of heirs of the decedent, executed an extrajudicial settlement, adjudicating the properties of Evarista to them, each set with a share of (1/3) pro-indiviso. Joselito P. Dela Merced, illegitimate son of the late Francisco, filed a "Petition for Annulment of the Extrajudicial and prayed that he be included to share in the (1/3) proindiviso share in the estate of corresponding to the heirs of Francisco. ISSUE: WON Joselito as an illegitimate child is barred from inheriting from Evaristas estate. HELD: No. Article 992 of the NCC is not applicable because involved here is not a situation where an illegitimate child would inherit ab intestato from a legitimate sister of his father, which is prohibited by the aforesaid provision of law. Rather, it is a scenario where an illegitimate child inherits from his father, the latter's share in or portion of, what the latter already inherited from the deceased sister, Evarista. As opined by the Court of Appeals, the law in point in the present case is Article 777 of the NCC, which provides that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. Since Evarista died ahead of her brother Francisco, the latter inherited a portion of the estate of the former as one of

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her heirs. Subsequently, when Francisco died, his heirs inherited his (Francisco's) share in the estate of Evarista. GAYON vs. GAYON November 26, 1970 FACTS: Pedro Gayon filed said complaint against the spouses Silvestre and Genoveva de Gayon, alleging that said spouses executed a deed whereby they sold to Pedro Gelera, for the sum of P500.00, a parcel of unregistered land. That, said right of redemption had not been exercised by the spouses or any of their heirs or successors despite the expiration of the period. That, said Pedro Gelera and his wife Estelita Damaso had, by virtue of a deed of sale sold the aforementioned land to plaintiff Pedro Gayon. Pedro prays that an order be issued in plaintiff's favor for the consolidation of ownership in and to the aforementioned property. ISSUE: WON The heirs cannot represent the defendant unless there is a declaration of heirship. HELD: NO. Mrs. Gayon as the widow of Silvestre Gayon, she is one of his compulsory heirs and has, accordingly, an interest in the property in question. Succession takes place, by operation of law, "from the moment of the death of the decedent" and "(t)he inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his death." Hence, they may be sued without a previous declaration of heirship, provided there is no pending special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the decedent. PALICTE vs. RAMOLETE September 21, 1987 FACTS: Palicte is among the declared heirs on Spl. Proc. No. 2706-R. However, the lower court ruled that she does not qualify as a successor-in-interest who may redeem the real properties sold at public auction on July 5, 1979 for the satisfaction of the judgment in the amount of P725, 279.00. ISSUE: Whether or not Palicte is a successor-in-interest who may be able to redeem the said properties sold at pubic auction? RULING: YES. The term successor-in-interest includes one who succeeds to the interest of the debtor by operation of law. In this case, Palicte is the daughter of the late Don Filemon Sotto whose estate was levied upon on execution to satisfy the money judgment. As a legitimate heir, she qualifies as a successor-in-interest. Thus the law provides, Art. 777 of the New Civil Code, The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. In the case of Director of Lands vs. Lagniton, the Court has ruled that: the right of a son, with respect to the property of a father or mother, is also an inchoate or contingent interest, because, upon the death of the father or the mother or both, he will have a right to inherit said conjugal property. If any holder of an inchoate interest is a successor-in-interest with right to redeem a property sold on execution, then such son is such a successor-ininterest, as he has an inchoate right to the property of his father.
RODRIGUEZ vs. BORJA 17 SCRA 41 FACTS: In this case, there were 2 proceedings. First was an intestate proceeding instituted meaning, a proceeding to settle the estate of a deceased person who died without a will. But subsequently, a will was found and again another proceeding was instituted, this time, testate proceeding wherein the estate of the deceased person is settled if that person has left a will. We are confronted here of 2 proceedings, one was instituted ahead of the other. ISSUE: Which proceeding should be preferred? RULING: As long as there is a will, even if that will is found later and even if the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a person with a will is filed later, that should be preferred. The will should be probated. The will should be given effect as much as possible in order to give effect to the wishes of the testator. The wishes of the testator must be given such preference first. Probate of the will is needed in order to determine whether or not the will was indeed valid, whether or not the will was executed in observance with the formalities required by law and whether or not the testator executed it with a sound mind. If later on in the probate proceeding, the will is found not to have validly executed, then you go to intestate proceeding. But first you go to testate. BALANAY, JR. vs. MARTINEZ 64 SCRA 452 FACTS: Leodegaria Julian died. She was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and six legitimate children. Felix Balanay, Jr. filed a petition for the probate of his mothers notarial will, which was written in English. In that will, Leodegaria declared that it was her desire her properties should not be divided among her heirs during her husband's lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her properties. She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all owned by her. She disposed of in the will her husband's one-half share of the conjugal assets. Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the will. Thereafter, Felix Balanay, Sr. signed an instrument waiving and renouncing his right in Leodegarias estate in favor of their 6 children. ISSUE: Whether or not the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void. RULING: The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. But the probate court erred in declaring that the will was void and in converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding. The will is intrinsically valid and the partition therein may be given effect if it does not prejudice the creditors and impair the legitimes. The distribution and partition would become effective upon the death of Felix Balanay, Sr. In the meantime, the net income should be equitably divided among the children and the surviving spouse. (Relate to Articles 779 and 780 : In this case, there is testamentary succession because it resulted from the designation of heirs by the testatrix, made in a will executed in the form prescribed by law. It can be considered as a mixed succession because there is partly by will (execution of the will and execution of the waiver) and by operation of law (as to the share of the husband of the conjugal party of which he eventually waived buot buot ni na answer ha ) ARTICLE 780. Mixed succession is that effected partly by will and partly by operation of law. (n)
ARTICLE 778. Succession may be: (1) Testamentary; (2) Legal or intestate; or (3) Mixed. (n) ARTICLE 779. Testamentary succession is that which results from the designation of an heir, made in a will executed in the form prescribed by law. (n)

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ARTICLE 781. The inheritance of a person includes not only the property and the transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death, but also those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession. (n) ARTICLE 782. An heir is a person called to the succession either by the provision of a will or by operation of law. Devisees and legatees are persons to whom gifts of real and personal property are respectively given by virtue of a will. (n) CHAPTER 2 Testamentary Succession SECTION 1 Wills SUBSECTION 1 Wills in General ARTICLE 783. A will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death. (667a) RABADILLA vs. CA June 29, 2000 HELD: A will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a person disposes of his property, to take effect after his death. Since the will expresses the manner in which a person intends how his properties be disposed, the wishes and desires of the testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a will cannot be the subject of a compromise agreement which would thereby defeat the very purpose of making a will. HERREROS vs. GIL 88 PHIL 260 RULING: Will-making is not an inherent act, not an inherent right. It is merely a privilege as evident by the clause Permitted xxx to control to certain degree the disposition of his estate. MONTINOLA vs. HERBOSA ISSUE: Is the poem Mi Ultimo Adios a will? RULING: The poem by Rizal is not a will. Because when he made that poem, he did not think of making a will. There was no animus testandi. It was merely an expression of parting. Actually, he was not giving anything to anybody because at the time when he was executed he has no properties. So what was there to give? Another thing, there was an erroneous translation. It was not actually To give. I give all my parents, my relatives. Can you give your parents, your relatives? Are they properties? No. So the poem is not a will. MERZA vs. PORRAS 93 PHIL 142 FACTS: This case illustrates an indirect disposition of properties. So there was only a disinheritance. ISSUE: Is a will containing only disinheritance, a valid will? RULING: Yes. When you disinherit a person you actually disposed of your property by not letting that person participate in your property. Still, it you who will determine who will get your property and who will not get your property by the act of disinheritance. VITUG vs. CA 183 SCRA 755
FACTS: Dolores Vitug, deceased, during her lifetime together with her husband Romarico Vitug, executed a survivorship agreement with the bank. It provides that after the death of either of them, the fund shall belong exclusively to the survivor. ISSUES: WON the survivorship agreement is a will. WON it is valid. RULING: Because the account was a joint account and they made a will while they were married, so naturally the cash would be their absolute community or conjugal property. The cash is owned in-common by them. When the spouses opened savings account, they merely put what rightly belonged to them in a money-making venture. They did not dispose of it in favor of the other. Since the wife predeceased her husband, the latter acquired upon her death a vested right over the amount under the savings account. ARTICLE 784. The making of a will is a strictly personal act; it cannot be left in whole or in part to the discretion of a third person, or accomplished through the instrumentality of an agent or attorney. (670a) CASTANEDA vs. ALEMANY 3 PHIL 426 FACTS: The appellant contends that the court erred in holding that all legal formalities had been complied with in the execution of the will of Dona Juana as the proof shows that the said will was not written by the testatrix. ISSUE: WON the will is valid. HELD: The mechanical act of drafting the will can be left to a third person. What is important is the testator signs the will or he let another person to sign but under his direction. ARTICLE 785. The duration or efficacy of the designation of heirs, devisees or legatees, or the determination of the portions which they are to take, when referred to by name, cannot be left to the discretion of a third person. (670a) ARTICLE 786. The testator may entrust to a third person the distribution of specific property or sums of money that he may leave in general to specified classes or causes, and also the designation of the persons, institutions or establishments to which such property or sums are to be given or applied. (671a) ARTICLE 787. The testator may not make a testamentary disposition in such manner that another person has to determine whether or not it is to be operative. (n) ARTICLE 788. If a testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred. (n)

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DIZON-RIVERA vs. DIZON 33 SCRA 554 FACTS: The testatrix distributed her properties to her heirs. It turns out that some of the heirs were prejudiced of their legitime because the property actually given to them were not approximate to their correct legitime. So these heirs wanted that to complete their rightful share certain other properties should be given to them. RULING: But it is very clear in the will of the testatrix that she wanted to give certain properties to certain persons and those dispositions or those persons should be respected. If the legitime or the rightful shares of the other heirs are prejudiced, then that should be completed by the delivery of cash in accordance with the wishes of the testator. VDA. DE VILLANUEVA vs. JUICO 4 SCRA 550 FACTS: Don Nicolas Villaflor executed a will in Spanish in his own handwriting, devising and bequeathing in favor of his wife, Dona Faustina of all his real and personal properties giving the other half to his brother Don Fausto. Petitioner filed an action against the administrator contending that upon the widows death, she became vested with the ownership of the properties bequeathed th under clause 7 pursuant to its 8 clause of the will. ISSUE: WON the petitioner is entitled to the ownership of the properties upon the death of Dona Faustina. HELD: The intention of the testator here was to merely give usufructuary right to his wife Doa Fausta because in his will he provided that Doa Fausta shall forfeit the properties if she fails to bear a child and because she died without having begotten any children with the deceased then it means that Doa Fausta never acquired ownership over the property. Upon her death, because she never acquired ownership over the property, the said properties are not included in her estate. Those properties actually belong to Villaflor. That was the intention of the testator. Otherwise, if the testator wanted to give the properties to Doa Fausta then he should have specifically stated in his will that ownership should belong to Doa Fausta without mentioning any condition. ARTICLE 789. When there is an imperfect description, or when no person or property exactly answers the description, mistakes and omissions must be corrected, if the error appears from the context of the will or from extrinsic evidence, excluding the oral declarations of the testator as to his intention; and when an uncertainty arises upon the face of the will, as to the application of any of its provisions, the testator's intention is to be ascertained from the words of the will, taking into consideration the circumstances under which it was made, excluding such oral declarations. (n) ESTATE OF RIGOR vs. RIGOR 89 SCRA 493 FACTS: Father Pascual Rigor died. In his will he devised 44-hectares of Riceland to his nearest male relative who would study for the priesthood. Inasmuch as no nearest male relative of the testator claimed the devise, the parish priest of Victoria claimed the Riceland. ISSUE: How should you interpret the statement in the will, should it refer only to the nearest male relative at the time when the testator died or should it be construed to mean all nearest male relative who would study for priesthood and you have to wait forever until that male relative occurs? RULING: It should be construed to refer to the nearest male relative living at the moment of death of the decedent because that is the time when transmission
occurs. You cannot wait until the nearest male relative who would study for the priesthood occurs long after the priest died. The most reasonable construction is the nearest male relative living at the time of the death of the testator. DEL ROSARIO v. DEL ROSARIO 2 PHIL 321 RULING: The child even if he is not a natural child would still get the property. The fact that he is designated as the natural child is not a condition but merely a description . ARTICLE 790. The words of a will are to be taken in their ordinary and grammatical sense, unless a clear intention to use them in another sense can be gathered, and that other can be ascertained. Technical words in a will are to be taken in their technical sense, unless the context clearly indicates a contrary intention, or unless it satisfactorily appears that the will was drawn solely by the testator, and that he was unacquainted with such technical sense. (675a) ARTICLE 791. The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy. (n) YAMBAO vs. GONZALES 1 SCRA 1157 FACTS: Maria Gonzales executed a will bequeathing to appellees all her properties. Yambao went to appellees to request that he be placed as tenant of the Riceland under the express provision of the said will. The appellees refused as the will merely imposes a moral and not a legal obligation. ISSUE: WON Yambao is entitled to be employed as tenant pursuant to the will. HELD: Analyzing the will, it contains a clear directive to employ Yambao as tenant. The words tungkulin o gampanan mean to do or to carry out as a mandate or directive and imposes a duty upon appellees.
ARTICLE 792. The invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been made. (n) ARTICLE 793. Property acquired after the making of a will shall only pass thereby, as if the testator had possessed it at the time of making the will, should it expressly appear by the will that such was his intention. (n) ARTICLE 794. Every devise or legacy shall convey all the interest which the testator could devise or bequeath in the property disposed of, unless it clearly appears from the will that he intended to convey a less interest. (n) ARTICLE 795. The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time it is made. (n) IN RE: WILL OF RIOSA 39 PHIL 23 FACTS: The testator executed a will in 1908 in accordance with the laws enforced at that time wherein there was no requirement of signing and attestation of the will. In 1917 the testator died wherein the laws enforced at that time already required that the will must be signed by the testator and attested.

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HELD: It does not matter that when he died, the laws required signing and attestation because the extrinsic validity of his will should be measured by the laws enforced at the time of the execution of the will not at the time of the death of the testator. So the legislature by providing certain formalities CANNOT INVALIDATE A WILL VALIDLY MADE at the time when the testator executed his will. ENRIQUEZ vs. ABADIA August 9, 1954 FACTS: In 1923, when holographic wills were not allowed, Abadia executed a holographic will. It was presented in 1946. In 1952, the trial court allowed the will on the ground that under the new Civil Code, holographic wills are now allowed. HELD: The will should not be allowed because under Article 795, the extrinsic validity of a will should be judged not by the law existing at the time of the testators death nor the law at the time of probate, but by the law existing at the time of the execution of the instrument. Although the will becomes operative only after the testators death, still his wishes are given expression at the time of the execution. IBARLE vs. PO February 27, 1953 (not related under this provision) FACTS: Leonard died in June 1946 leaving his surviving spouse, Catalina, and some minor children as his heirs. Catalina sold an entire parcel of land, which is a conjugal property, to spouses Canoy. It was then sold to Ibarle. The Deeds of Sale were not registered. In 1948, Catalina sold of the said land to Po, which portion belongs to the children. HELD: The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance, whether such right be pure or contingent. It is immaterial whether a short or long period of time lapses between the death of the predecessor and the entry into possession of the property of the inheritance because the right is always deemed to be retroactive from the moment of death. When Catalina sold the entire parcel of land to the Canoy spouses, of it already belongs to the children. Thus, the first sale was null and void in so far as it included the childrens share. On the other hand, the sale to the Po having been made by authority of the competent court was undeniably legal and effective. TESTATE ESTATE OF ABADA vs. ABAJA January 31, 2005 FACTS: Abada executed his will in 1932. Abada died in 1940. It was asserted that the will of Abada does not indicate that it was written in a language or dialect known to the testator and that the will was not acknowledged before a notary public, citing Articles 804 and 806 of the New Civil Code. HELD: The law that governs the validity of the will of Abada is the Code of Civil Procedure. Although the laws in force at that time are the Civil Code of 1889 and Act No. 190 or the Code of Civil Procedure (which governed the execution of wills before the enactment of the New Civil Code), the Code of Civil Procedure repealed Article 685 of the Old Civil Code. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, the intervention of a notary is not necessary in the execution of any will. Abadas will does not require acknowledgement before a notary public. Under Article 795, the validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time it is made.
ARTICLE 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. iatdc2005 However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (10a) MICIANO vs. BRIMO 50 PHIL 867 FACTS: A will of an American testator provided that his estate should be disposed of in accordance with the Philippine law. The testator further provided that whoever would oppose his wishes that his estate should be distributed in accordance with Philippine laws would forfeit their inheritance HELD: Even if the testators wishes must be given paramount importance, if the wishes of the testator contravene a specific provision of law, then that provision in a will should not be given effect. A persons will is merely an instrument which is PERMITTED, so his right is not absolute. It should be subject to the provisions of the Philippine laws. The estate of a decedent shall be distributed in accordance with his national law. He cannot provide otherwise. The SC held that those who opposed would not forfeit their inheritance because that provision is not legal. BELLIS vs. BELLIS June 6, 1967 FACTS: A Texan provided in his will that his properties in the Philippines should be distributed in accordance with the Philippine law on succession. HELD: The provision is to be regarded as void because it contravenes Article 16, paragraph 2 provides that with respect to the intrinsic validity of testamentary and intestate succession, the national law of the decedent shall prevail. If the Texan, under the Texan law, has no compulsory heirs, the Philippines law on the legitimes of compulsory heirs cannot be applied. TESTATE ESTATE OF CHRISTENSEN January 31, 1963 FACTS: Christensen is a US citizen and a citizen of California but was domiciled in the Philippines. In his will, he gave to Helen P3,600 who was adopted by him. The rest of his estate was to be given to his daughter Lucy. Helen contended that she is deprived of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child as decreed by the US Court. The California Civil Code requires that the domicile of the decedent should apply. HELD: Philippine law should govern. The national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, which authorizes the reference of the question to the law of the testators domicile. The conflict of law rule in California refers back the case when a decedent is not domiciled in California to the law of his domicile, the Philippine law in this case. This is the proper application of the doctrine of renvoi (referring back).
CAYETANO vs. LEONIDAS May 30, 1984

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FACTS: Adoracion was a citizen and resident of US but died in the Manila. A reprobate of her will was allowed. Hermogenes, her father, contended that he was deprived of his legitime as a result of the reprobate of the will. HELD: The law which governs Adoracions will is the law of Pennsylvania, USA, which is the national law of the decedent. While it would seem that Philippine laws would make the will invalid because there seems to be an omission of a compulsory heir, still, the will was considered to be valid because it was measured in accordance with law of the US wherein no legitimes are recognized. If there are no legitmes, there could be no case of preterition. The will in this case is valid. PCIB vs. ESCOLIN 56 SCRA 266 FACTS: Linnie, a citizen of Texas, died and left a will leaving her estate to her husband Charles. HELD: The distribution of her estate should be governed by the laws of Texas. Foreign laws may not be taken judicial notice and have to be proven like any other fact in dispute between the parties in any proceeding with the rare exception in instances when said laws are already within the actual knowledge of the court. If you allege that this certain provision is what is provided in the national law of the decedent, then you must prove that law as a fact like you prove any other fact in dispute. Exception: 1. If the foreign laws are within the actual knowledge of the court; or 2. When these laws have been considered before by the court in a previous case and the parties do not oppose as to the consideration of the court as to the existence of the foreign law. PCIBs representation in regards to the law of Texas virtually constitutes admissions of fact which other parties and the court are being made to rely and act upon. PCIB is not permitted to contradict them or subsequently take position contradictory to or inconsistent with them. IN RE: ESTATE OF JOHNSON November 16, 1918 FACTS: Johnson was a native of Sweden and naturalized US citizen. He died in Manila. He executed a will in the Philippines but with the formalities prescribed by the laws of Illinois, in which 2 witnesses are allowed. The Philippine laws require 3 witnesses. Petitioner also asserted that she is a legitimate heir of the testator and thus, she cannot be deprived of the legitime to which she is entitled under the law governing testamentary successions here in the Philippines. HELD: This case is an example of an alien testator who executed his will in the Philippines. Under Article 817, he may observe the laws enforced in his country of nationality. Or, under Article 17, the laws of the place where he executes his will, which in this case is the Philippines. The will of Johnson was admitted to probate because even if it did not conform with the laws of the Philippines, it still conforms with the laws of his nationality. As to the alleged deprivation of legitime, it is sufficient to say that the probate of the will does not affect the intrinsic validity of its provisions, the decree of probate being conclusive only as regards the due execution of the will. Nevertheless, the intrinsic validity of the provisions of this will must be determined by the law of Illinois and not by the general provisions here applicable in such matters. The intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will of a US citizen is governed by the laws of the state of which he is a citizen. MALANG vs. MOSON August 22, 2000 FACTS: Abdula contracted marriage with Aida and had 3 sons with her. Adbula then married for a second time with Jubaida and no child was born out of that marriage.
Abdula divorced Aida. Abdula then married Nayo and they also had no child. Thereafter, he contracted another marriage with Mabay and had a daughter with her. Not long after, Abdula married 3 other Muslim women but eventually th divorced them. Abdula then married his 4 wife Neng, excluding the wives he divorced. They were childless. Abdula died without leaving a will. HELD: Abdula died intestate on December 1993. It is the Muslim Code which should determine the identification of the heirs in the order of intestate succession and the respective shares of the heirs. The Muslim Code took effect on February 4, 1977. If a Muslim died before the effectivity of the Muslim Code, the order of succession shall be governed by the Civil Code. The status and capacity to succeed on the part of the individual parties who entered into each and every marriage ceremony will depend upon the law in force at the time of the performance of the marriage rite. If the Muslim marriage took place during the effectivity of the Civil Code and before the effectivity of the Muslim Code, he cannot marry again because under the Civil Code, only one marriage is valid. But when the marriage took place when the Muslim Code has taken effect, subsequent marriages are allowed and valid. The right of the spouses to inherit will depend on whether or not they have been validly married. If they are not validly married, then they do not have successional rights over their partner. The status and capacity to succeed of the children will depend upon the law in force at the time of conception or birth of the child. As to property relations, it is the Civil Code that determines and governs the property relations of the marriages in this case, for the reason that at the time of the celebration of the marriages in question, the Civil Code was the only on marriage relations, including property relations between spouses, whether Muslim or non-Muslim. LLORENTE vs. CA November 23, 2000 FACTS: Llorente, enlisted as a serviceman of the US navy, was married to a Filipina. He was later on admitted as a US citizen. When he went to back to the Philippines, he filed for divorce since he found out that his wife was having an adulterous relationship with his brother. Thereafter, he nd married his 2 wife. In 1981, Lorenzo executed a will and bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their 3 children. HELD: Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issued best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. The will was duly probated. The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children is glaringly shown in the will he executed. The SC does not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity. NB: In this case, it must be noted that Llorente was already an American citizen ***
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SUBSECTION 2 Testamentary Capacity and Intent ARTICLE 796. All persons who are not expressly prohibited by law may make a will. ARTICLE 797. Persons of either sex under eighteen years of age cannot make a will. (n) ARTICLE 798. In order to make a will it is essential that the testator be of sound mind at the time of its execution.
BUGNAO vs. UBAG September 18, 1909 HELD: The following requisite must be present for one to be able to be considered as having soundness of mind or having testamentary capacity: 1. Know the nature of the estate to be disposed of 2. The proper objects of his bounty 3. He must know the character of the testamentary act. It is true that the testimony discloses the fact that the testator at that time of execution of the will was extremely ill, in an advanced stage of tuberculosis complicated with severe attacks of asthma. But all the evidence of physical weakness in no wise establishes his mental incapacity or a lack of testamentary capacity. Mere weakness of mind or partial imbecility from disease of body, or from age, will not render a person incapable of making a will, a weak or feeble minded person may make a valid will, provided he has understanding and memory sufficient to enable him to know what it is about and how or to whom he is disposing of his property. TORRES, LOPEZ DE BUENO vs. LOPEZ February 26, 1926 FACTS: It was contended that the testator lacked mental capacity because at the time of the execution of the will, he had senile dementia and was under guardianship. HELD: The testator may have been of advanced years, may have been physically decrepit, may have been weak in intellect, may have suffered a loss of memory, may have had a guardian, and may have been extremely eccentric, but he still possessed the spark of reason and of life, that strength of mind to form a fixed intention and to summon his enfeebled thoughts to enforce that intention, which the law terms testamentary capacity. Only compete senile dementia will result to testamentary incapacity. SANCHO vs. ABELLA November 13, 1933 FACTS: The opponent claims that, inasmuch as the testatrix was 88 years of age when she made her will, she was already suffering from senile debility and therefore her mental faculties were not functioning normally anymore and that she was not fully aware of her acts. As an indication of her senile debility, she attempted to prove that the testatrix had very poor eyesight and sense of hearing; that she urinated without being aware of it; that she had a very poor memory in connection with her properties and interests; that she could not go downstairs without assistance, and that she could not recall her recent acts. HELD: Neither senile debility, nor deafness, nor blindness, nor poor memory, is by itself sufficient to establish the presumption that the person suffering therefrom is not in the full enjoyment of his mental faculties, when there is sufficient evidence of his mental sanity at the time of the execution of the will and that neither the fact of her being given accommodations in a convent, nor the presence of the parish priest, nor a priest acting as a witness, constitutes undue influence sufficient to justify the annulment of a legacy in favor of the bishop of a diocese made in her will by a testatrix 88 years of age, suffering from defective eyesight and hearing, while she is stopping at a convent within the aforestated diocese. ALSUA-BETTS, et al vs. CA July 30, 1979 FACTS: After executing a holographic will which was later probated during his lifetime, the deceased executed another will, but this second will he did not submit to the court for probate while still alive. HELD: The fact of non-submission to probate during his lifetime of the second will does not indicate any defect in the requisite testamentary capacity. Besides, a will is revocable at any time by the testator was still alive.
DOROTHEO vs. CA 320 SCRA 12 FACTS: Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro and Aniceta. Aniceta died in 1969 without her estate being settled. Alejandro died thereafter. Lourdes, claiming to have taken care of Alejandro before he died, filed a petition for probate of Alejandros will. In1981, the will was admitted to probate but private respondents did not appeal from the said order. In 1983, upon motion of the private respondents, the trial court ruled that the will was intrinsically void and declared private respondents as the only heirs of the late spouses. HELD: Probate proceedings deal generally with the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated particularly on these aspects: Whether the will submitted is indeed the decedents last will and testament Compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of wills The testamentary capacity of the testator And the due execution of the last will and testament Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time of its execution. The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised even after the will has been authenticated. It does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will and testaments is always intrinsically valid. ARTICLE 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause. It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act. (n) BAGTAS vs. PAGUIO March 14, 1912 FACTS: Paguio suffered from paralysis of the left side of his body until his death. In the probation of his will, it was contended that he was not in full enjoyment and use of his mental faculties and was without the mental capacity necessary to execute a will HELD: In this jurisdiction, there is a presumption in favor of mental capacity of the testator and the burden is upon the contestants of the will to prove the lack of the testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the will. In this case, the testator has never been adjudged insane. Paralysis is not equivalent to mental incapacity. It is not necessary that a person must be in full possession of his mental and reasoning faculties to be able to be considered of sound mind. It is not necessary that his mind be unbroken, unshattered by disease, injury or other cause.
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AVELINO vs. DELA CRUZ February 21, 1912 FACTS: It was contended that the will should not have been validated because at the time of the making of the will, the decedent was blind for a number of years beforehand and thus was incompetent to make the will in question. HELD: A blind testator may be competent to make a will. Mere fact of blindness does not render him incompetent. No presumption of incapacity can arise from the mere fact that he was blind. The only requirement of the law as to the capacity to make a will is that the person shall be of age and of sound mind and memory. Blind persons are prohibited from acting as witnesses in the execution of wills, but no limitation is placed upon testamentary capacity, except age and soundness of mind. JOCSON vs. JOCSON June 8, 1922 HELD: Failure of memory is not sufficient unless it be total or extends to the immediate family or property. CUYUGAN vs. BARON January 16, 1936 FACTS: The probate of the will of Silvestra Baron was opposed on the ground that at the time of the execution of the alleged will, Silvestra was mentally and physically incapacitated for the execution of the will. The evidence shows that (1) the same morning when Silvestra signed the alleged will, she suffered a physical collapse of such a serious nature that a physician and a nurse were immediately called in. By reason of her advanced age and the gravity of her illness, she was unable to do anything for herself. (2) As the doctor and the nurse were leaving, Cuyugan (the appointed executor of the will), an attorney and 3 witnesses, entered the house and prepared to obtain the will of Silvestra. Neither the doctor and the nurse were presented as witnesses by the proponent. HELD: Silvestra was not of sound mind at the time of the execution of the will. The oppositor was able to present evidence showing that the deceased was of unsound at the times of the execution of the will. Since Cuyugan failed in affirmatively establishing the testamentary capacity of the deceased, then, the latter was not of sound mind at the time of the execution of the will as approved by the oppositor. CAGUIOA vs. CALDERON 20 PHIL 400 HELD: Insomnia by itself if not indicative that the testator was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will. YAP TUA vs. YAP CA KUAN September 1, 1914 FACTS: A witness testified that that the testator was sick with tuberculosis and was lying in her bed but sat up to sign the will. It was also mentioned that the testator signed the will with great difficulty. HELD: Tuberculosis by itself if not indicative that the testator was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will. The testimony of the doctor as to the mental condition of the deceased was 24 hours before the execution of the will. Several witnesses testified that at the time the will was presented to her for her signature, she was of sound mind and memory and asked for a pen and ink and kept the will in her possession for ten or fifteen minutes and finally signed it. The testator was of sound mind and memory and in the possession of her faculties at the time she signed this will. SAMSON vs. CORRALES TAN QUINTIN 44 PHIL 573
FACTS: It was alleged by the attending physician, as a witness for the opposition, that the deceased was suffering from diabetes and that he had been in comatose for several days prior to his death. It was argued that comatose implies a complete unconsciousness and that the testator therefore could not at that time, have executed a will. However, all the witnesses presented by petitioner testified that the deceased was conscious, could hear and understand what was said to him and he was able to indicate his desires. HELD: The professional speculations of a physician as to mental capacity of the testator cannot prevail over the positive statements of 5 apparently credible witnesses whose testimony does not in itself seem unreasonable. Tan was of sound mind, which renders the will and testament valid. There are varying degrees of comatose. In its lighter forms, the patient may be aroused and have lucid intervals. Such seems to have been in this case. The testimony of the doctor was not given credit because he was not present when the will was executed . GALVEZ vs. GALVEZ 26 PHIL 243 HELD: Although the testator was ill with CHOLERA, since he demonstrated that he had sufficient energy and clear intelligence to execute his last will in accordance with the requirements of the law, his case must be an exception to the general rule that cholera patients in majority of cases become incapacitated. CARRILLO v. JAOCOCO March 24, 1924 HELD: The fact that the vendor, having been declared mentally incapacitated after the execution of the document of sale, does not prove conclusively that she was incapacitated when the contract was executed. HERNAEZ vs. HERNAEZ 1 PHIL 718 HELD: OLD AGE is not sufficient to establish lack of testamentary capacity. NEYRA vs. NEYRA 76 PHIL 333 HELD: The mental faculties of persons suffering from ADDISONS DISEASE remain unimpaired, partly due to the fact that on account of the sleep they enjoy, they necessarily receive the benefit of physical and mental rest. Like patients suffering from TUBERCULOSIS, INSOMNIA or DIABETES, they preserve their mental faculties until the moment of their death. Even if the testator is ill and his hand is guided in signing will, lying down and unable to move or stand up unassisted, the testator is not considered to of unsound mind. Delirium when it beclouds the mind so as not to understand the nature of act, extent of property, and objects of bounty is an indication of an unsound mind.
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ALBORNOZ vs. ALBORNOZ 71 PHIL 414 HELD: Lack of memory and understanding and presenile dementia is an instance where a testator is considered as of unsound mind. Summary of cases with regard to soundness of mind: INDICATIONS OF AN UNSOUND MIND Albornoz VS. Albornoz (71 Phil 414) - Lack of memory and understanding and presenile dementia Neyra VS. Neyra (76 Phil 333) - Delirium when it beclouds the mind so as not to understand the nature of act, extent of property, objects of bounty Torres VS. Lopez de Bueno (48 Phil 772) complete senile dementia will result to testamentary incapacity Samson VS. Corrales Tan (44 Phil 573) - the positive testimony of attesting witnesses which does not in itself seem unreasonable as to the mental condition of the testator must prevail over the professional speculations of a nonattending physician NOT INDICATIVE OF AN UNSOUND MIND Torres VS. Lopez de Bueno (48 Phil 772) Senility, Senile Dementia when not complete Sancho VS. Abella (58 Phil 728) -Senile debility, deafness, poor memory. Alsua-Betts VS. CA (July 30, 1979) Weakness of mind or partial imbecility from disease of body or from age Avelino VS. Dela Cruz (21 Phil 521) Blindness Bagtas VS. Paguio, Jocson VS. Jocson (46 Phil 701), Cuyugan vs. Baron - Failure of memory Caguioa VS. Calderon (20 Phil 400) Insomnia Yap Tua VS. Yap Ca Kuan (27 Phil 579) Tuberculosis Samson VS. Corrales Tan Quintin (44 Phil 573) Diabetes Galvez VS. Galvez (26 Phil 243) Cholera Bagtas VS. Paguio Paralysis and loss of speech Carilio VS. Jaojoco (46 Phil 957) - Cerebral Hemorrhage with hemiplegia Hernaez VS. Hernaez (1 Phil 683) - Old age Neyra VS. Neyra (76 Phil 333) - Delirium; Sleeping Sickness (Addison's disease) Bugnao VS. Ubag (14 Phil 163) - Asthma
The law requires that proponents of the will shall have the burden of proof to show that the testator had soundness of mind if the testator made the will after a judicial determination of his insanity. RAMIREZ vs. RAMIREZ 39 SCRA 147 HELD: Where the statements of the notary public were far from satisfactory, vague, evasive and tend to beg the very issue, as where he could not say, but merely supposed that the testatrix had a recollection of her properties, or of the relatives who would logically inherit from her and when asked to explain his answer to the question concerning her mental state, he simply referred to the certification in the will on that point, and so declined to fully commit himself, such testimony fails to establish testamentary capacity. The evidence showed the definite conclusion that the testatrix was indeed mentally incapacitated to make a will. As early as 1955, she was already suffering from pre-senile dementia, a degenerative mental infirmity that was described as a progressive and irreversible process. JUNQUERA vs. BORROMEO March 30, 1987 FACTS: There were witnesses who testified that the signatures purporting to be that of the testator were forgeries, that they were too good and too perfect signatures and quite impossible for the deceased, an ailing man already 82 years old, to write and the he was found positive for bacillus leprosy. HELD: In this jurisdiction, the subscribing witnesses to a contested will are regarded as best witnesses in connection with its due execution. To deserve full credit, their testimony must be reasonable and unbiased and that their testimony may be overcome by any competent evidence direct or circumstantial. Subscribing witnesses may forget or exaggerate what they really know, saw, heard or did; they may be biased, and therefore, tell only half-truths to mislead the court or favor one party to the prejudice of the court. This can not be said of the condition and physical appearance of the questioned document itself. The SC has carefully examined and considered the physical appearance and condition of the original and 2 copies of the questioned will, particularly the signatures attributed to the testator, and the SC has come to the conclusion that the latter could not have been written by the testator. CUYUGAN vs. BARON January 16, 1936 HELD: An instrument purporting to be a will executed and witnessed in accordance with the formalities required by the statute is entitled to presumption of regularity. But the burden of evidence passes to the proponent when the oppositors submit credible evidence tending to show that the supposed testator did not possess testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the will or that the document was not the free and voluntary expression of the alleged testator of the will, for any other reason, is void law. In this case, the oppositor was able to present evidence showing that the deceased was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will. Hence, the burden of proof passes to the proponent Cuyugan. Since Cuyugan failed in affirmatively establishing the testamentary capacity of the deceased, then, the latter was not of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will as proved by the oppositor.
ARTICLE 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary. The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the validity of the will must prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval. (n) TORRES, LOPEZ DE BUENO vs. LOPEZ February 26, 1926
HELD: If the testator made the will after he had been judicially declared insane, and before such judicial order had been set aside, the testator is presumed insane.
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GONZALES vs. GONZALES November 29, 1951 FACTS: Two separate petitions for probate of the will were filed. One will was executed in 1942. The other was executed in 1945. The latter was the basis of the petition of Manolita. Manuel moved for the revocation presented by Manolita alleging that the testatrix lacked testamentary capacity when she allegedly executed the instrument of revocation. Attesting witnesses of the execution of the will testified that the testatrix was of sound mind at the time the alleged instrument of revocation was executed. But said testimony was contradicted by the attending physician saying that for more than 10 years prior to her death, the testatrix was suffering from hypertension and later on, had aphasia. Private respondent contended that the testimony of the attesting witnesses should be given more credence than the opinion of an expert witness. HELD: The doctors testimony shall prevail. Where the family physician attended the testatrix during her last illness and saw her on the day when the alleged document of revocation was executed, the testimony of the attesting witnesses tending to imply that the testatrix was of sound mind at the time said document was executed, cannot prevail over the contrary testimony of the attending physician. The physicians testimony should be believed because he was constantly near the testator and he actually saw the latter on the date of execution. ARTICLE 801. Supervening incapacity does not invalidate an effective will, nor is the will of an incapable validated by the supervening of capacity. (n) ARTICLE 802. A married woman may make a will without the consent of her husband, and without the authority of the court. (n) ARTICLE 803. A married woman may dispose by will of all her separate property as well as her share of the conjugal partnership or absolute community property. (n) ARTICLE 804. Every will must be in writing and executed in a language or dialect known to the testator. (n) TESTATE ESTATE OF ABADA vs. ABAJA January 31, 2005 FACTS: The probate of the will was opposed on the ground that nowhere in the will can one discern that Abada, the testator, knew the Spanish language. HELD: There is no statutory requirement to state in the will itself that the testator knew the language or dialect used in the will. This is a matter that a party may establish by proof aliunde. LOPEZ vs. LIBORO August 27, 1948 FACTS: Lopez executed a will in Spanish. The probate of his will was opposed on the ground that the will is silent on the testators understanding of the language used in the testament. HELD: There is no statutory requirement that the testators understanding of the language used in the will be expressed therein. It is a matter that may be established by proof aliunde.
FACTS: It is alleged that the records do not show that the testatrix knew the dialect in which the will is written. She executed her will in Cebu. HELD: The circumstances appearing in the will itself that the same was executed in Cebu and in the dialect of this locality where the testatrix was a neighbor is enough , in the absence of any proof to the contrary, to presume that she knew this dialect in which her will was written. ACOP vs. PIRASO January 16, 1929 FACTS: Sixto alleged on appeal that the lower court erred in saying that in order to be valid, the will in question should have been drawn up in the Ilocano dialect. The evidence shows that Piraso knew how to speak the Ilocano dialect, although imperfectly, and could make himself understood in that dialect. It has been proved that the deceased Piraso did not know English. HELD: The will is not valid. The decedents alleged will, being written in English, a language unknown to the decedent, cannot be probated because it is prohibited by the law, which clearly requires that the will be written in the language or dialect known the testator. Nor can the presumption in favor of a will established by the SC in the case of Abangan vs. Abangan to the effect that the testator is presumed to know the dialect of the locality where he resides, unless there is proof to the contrary. First, it was not proven that English is the language of Baguio where the deceased lived and where the will was drawn. The record contains positive proof that the testator knew no other language other than the Igorrote dialect, with a smattering of Ilocano. He did not know the English language in which the will was written. REYES vs. VIDAL April 21, 1952 FACTS: There was nothing in the testimony of the witnesses presented by Juan which indicated that the testatrix knew and spoke the Spanish language used in the preparation of the will in question. The oppositors submitted as evidence letters written in Spanish by the deceased in her own handwriting. HELD: The will can be admitted. The failure of the petitioners witnesses to testify that the testatrix knew and spoke Spanish does not itself alone suffice to conclude that this requirement of law has not been complied with when there is enough evidence of record which supplies this technical omission. Where the evidence of the oppositor to the probate of a will shows that the testatrix possessed the Spanish language, the oppositor cannot later on be allowed to allege the contrary. The fact that the testatrix was a mestiza espaola, was married to a Spaniard, made several trip to Spain and some of her letters submitted as evidence by the oppositor were written in Spanish by the testatrix in her own writing give rise to the presumption that the testatrix knew the language in which the testament has been written, which presumption should stand unless the contrary is proven. Where the attestation clause of the will states that the testatrix knew and possessed the Spanish language though this matter is not required to be stated in the attestation clause, its inclusion can only mean that the instrumental witnesses wanted to make it of record that the deceased knew the language in which the will was written.
ABANGAN vs. ABANGAN November 12, 1919
TESTATE ESTATE OF JAVELLANA vs. JAVELLANA January 30, 1960
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FACTS: The testator was a Visayan who lived in San Juan, Rizal. He executed his will in Manila in the Spanish language. It was contended that the language requirement of the law on wills ahs not been complied with in this case. There was no expression in the body of the will itself or in its attestation clause that the testator knew Spanish, the language in which it is written. HELD: Where there is want of expression in the body of the will itself or in the attestation clause that the testator knew the language in which the will was written, proof thereof may be established by evidence aliunde. Although the lack of such evidence may be cured by presumption of knowledge of the language or dialect used in the will, no such presumption can arise where, as in the case at bar, the will was executed in Spanish, while the testator was a Visayan residing in San Juan, Rizal at the time of his death. SUROZA vs. HONRADO December 19, 1981 FACTS: Marcelinas will was written in English and thumbmarked by her. She was illiterate. It was contended that the will was void because the testatrix was illiterate as shown by the fact that she affixed her thumbmark to the will and that she did not know English, the language in which the will was written. In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a language understood and known to the testatrix. But in its concluding paragraph, it was stated that the will was read to the testatrix and translated into Filipino language. HELD: Probate denied. The fact that the English-written will had to be translated to the testatrix could only mean that the will was written in a language not known to the illiterate testatrix, and therefore, it is void because of the mandatory provision of Article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must be executed in a language or dialect known to the testator. ARTICLE 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another. The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page. The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them. (n) ABANGAN vs. ABANGAN November 12, 1919 FACTS: Abangans will was admitted to probate. The will consists of two sheets: 1. The first contains all of the disposition of the testatrix, duly signed at the bottom by Martin, in the name and under the direction of the testatrix, and by 3 other witnesses. 2. The second contains only the attestation clause duly signed at the bottom by the 3 instrumental witnesses.
Neither of these sheets is signed on the left margin by the testatrix and 3 witnesses, nor numbered by letters; and these omissions, according to the oppositors contention, are defects whereby the probate of the will should be denied. HELD: Such lack of signature and numbering do not make the will invalid. When the dispositions are wholly written on only 1 sheet signed at the bottom by the testator and 3 witnesses, their signatures on the left margin of said sheet would be completely purposeless. The purpose of such requirement is to avoid substitution of any of said sheets, thereby changing the testators disposition. As to the numbering of every page, the object is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. But, when all the dispositive parts of a will are written on 1 sheet only, the object of the statute disappears because the removal of this single sheet, although unnumbered cannot be hidden. As to the signature of the testator on the attestation clause, such is not necessary because said clause appertains only to the witnesses and not to the testator since the latter does not attest, but executes, the will . ICASIANO vs. ICASIANO June 30, 1964 FACTS: The will in this case consists of 5 pages. It had all the formality requirements and was signed at the end of every page, but it does not contain the signature of the one of the attesting witnesses on page 3. But the duplicate copy is signed by the testatrix and her 3 attesting witnesses in each and every page. HELD: The will is not invalid. The inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature to 1 page of a testament, due to the simultaneous lifting of 2 pages in the course of signing, is not per se sufficient to justify denial of probate. Impossibility of substitution if this page is assured not only by the fact that the testatrix and the 2 other witnesses signed the defective page, but also by its bearing the imprint of the seal of the notary public. The law should not be so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she has no control, where the purpose of the law to guarantee the identity of the testament and its pages is sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on record attests to the full observance of the statutory requisites. Otherwise, witnesses may sabotage the will by muddling or bungling it or the attestation clause. BARUT vs. CAGACUNGAN June 30, 1964 FACTS: The signature of the testatrix was written by Severo at the request of the testatrix and in her presence and in the presence of all the other witnesses to the will. The probate of the will was contended on the ground that the handwriting of Severo looked more like the handwriting of one of the 3 other attesting witnesses to the will. HELD: Whether one person or another signed the name of the testatrix in this case is absolutely unimportant so far as the validity of her will is concerned. It is because there were 4 witnesses to the will of the decedent and the law requires only 3 attesting witnesses to the will. It is unimportant whether the person who writes the name of the testatrix signs his own name or not. The important thing is that it clearly appears that the name of the testatrix was signed at her express direction in the presence of 3 witnesses and that they attested and subscribed it in her presence and in the presence of each. That is all the law requires. It may be wise as a practical matter that the one who signs the testators name signs also his own; but that is not essential to the validity of the will
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IN RE: WILL OF TAN DUICO March 19, 1924 FACTS: There were 4 witnesses to the will. The decedents name was signed in his behalf upon his request by one of the subscribing witnesses. The will was questioned on the ground that it was not signed by 3 instrumental witnesses. HELD: Even if one of the subscribing witnesses signs in behalf of the testator when so requested, the requirement of the law of at least 3 witnesses is still complied with. In this case, there were 4 subscribing witnesses to the will. But if there were only 3 witnesses to the will, one of them cannot sign to the will because it would fall short of the requirement of 3 witnesses. The 3 witnesses who signed the will are the ones who must also sign the attestation clause. An instrumental witness is one who takes part in the execution of an instrument or writing. The will thus have been prepared and before it is signed by the testator or the person acting in his stead, or the one directed by him to sign it in his name (in which case the name of the testator is written before that of the signer), in order that said document may have the character of a valid will: 1. The testator gathers 3 or more credible witnesses and tells them that the contents of said document is his will, without informing them of its contents, and 2. The testator or the person directed by him to do so signs it in the presence of the testator and of each other, and 3. The testator or the person acting in his stead, as well as the 3 witnesses sign on the left margin of each page or sheet, which must be numbered correlatively in letters on the upper part of the page. The law does not say that said witnesses must be different form those who signed the attestation clause. It follows that the same witnesses who signed on the left margin of each page of the document presented by the testator to them as his will, must be the ones who should sign the attestation clause, inasmuch as they alone can certify the facts to be stated in said clause, for having taken a direct part therein, as they saw the testator sign the will, or the person requested by him to sign all the sheets of the will. LEANO vs. LEANO March 31, 1915 FACTS: The testatrix placed a cross against her name in the will in the presence of 3 witnesses. HELD: Will is valid. The placing of the cross opposite her name at the construction of the instrument was sufficient compliance with the requirements of the law. The right of a testator to sign his will by mark, executed animus testandi, has been uniformly sustained by the courts of last resort of the US in construing statutory provisions prescribing the mode of execution of wills. GARCIA vs. LACUESTA November 29, 1951 FACTS: Antero died leaving behind a will, which appears to have been signed by Atty. Javier who wrote the name of Antero, followed below by A ruego del testador and the name of Javier. Antero is alleged to have written a cross immediately after his name. It was alleged that the attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Antero caused Atty. Javier to write the testators name under his express direction. The proponent theorized that the cross is as much a signature as a thumb mark. HELD: The will is invalid.
A testator cannot sign a will by only marking a cross against his name if it is not his customary signature . It is not here pretended that the cross appearing on the will is the usual signature of Antero or even one of the ways by which he signed his name. The mere sign of a cross cannot be likened to a thumb mark. The cross cannot and does not have the trustworthiness of a thumb mark. When the testator expressly caused another to sign the formers name, this fact must be recited in the attestation clause. Otherwise, the will is fatally defective and cannot be probated. BALONAN vs. ABELLANA August 31, 1960 FACTS: Anacleta died leaving a will signed in her behalf by Dr. Abello and under his name appears typewritten Por la testadora (for the testator) Anacleta. The oppositors questioned the will because it was not signed in the name of the testator but rather in the name of Dr. Abello HELD: The will may not be admitted to probate. The witness should not have signed in his own name but rather that of the testator. In this case, the name of the testatrix does not appear written under the will by herself or by Dr. Abello. There is failure to comply with the express requirement in the law that the testator must himself sign the will, or that his name be affixed thereto by some other person in his presence and by his express direction. ABAYA vs. ZALAMERO March 12, 1908 FACTS: It was found out that Mariano, who was requested by the testator to write his name and surname at the end of his will, did not affix his own signature below the name and surname of the testator and below the cross placed by the latter and did not write the words by request of the testator. HELD: The will should be admitted to probate. The said will already clearly stated the reasons why it was not signed by the testator himself and the fact that he made a request to the witness to do the signing for him. A repetition thereof by writing by request of the testator was not necessary. JABONETA vs. GUSTILO January 19, 1906 FACTS: There were 3 witnesses as to the execution of the will of Jaboneta. Jena signed first, followed by Jalbuena. At that moment, Jena, being in a hurry to leave, took his hat and left the room. As he was leaving the room, Jena saw rd Javellana, the 3 witness, took the pen in his hand and put himself in position to sign the will as a witness, but did not sign in the presence of Jena. Nevertheless, after Jena had left the room, Javellana signed as a witness in the presence of the testator and of the witness Jalbuena. (pansin ko lang puro J ang surname sa testator ug witnesses .. hehe ) HELD: The will should be admitted to probate. It is not required that the witness must see the actual signing of the other witnesses. The purpose of a statutory requirement that the witness sign in the presence of the testator is said to be that the testator may have ocular evidence of the identity of the instrument subscribed by the witness and himself, and the generally accepted tests of presence are vision and mental apprehension. The true test of vision is not whether the testator actually saw the witness sign, but whether he might have seen him sign, considering his mental and physical condition and position at the time of the subscription . The fact that he was in the act of leaving, and that his back was turned while a portion of the name of the witness was being written, is of no importance. At the moment when the witness Javellana signed the document, he was actually and physically present and in such position with relation to Javellana that he could see everything which took place by
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merely casting his eyes in the proper direction, and without any physical obstruction to prevent his doing so. NERA vs. RIMANDO February 27, 1911 FACTS: There was a dispute as to the circumstances attending the signing of the will on the day of its execution: 1. whether one of the subscribing witnesses was present in the small room where it was executed at the time when the testator and the other subscribing witnesses attached their signatures 2. whether at that time he was outside, some eight or ten feet away, in a large room connecting with the smaller room by a doorway, across which was hung a curtain which made it impossible for one in the outside room to see the testator and the other subscribing witnesses in the act of attaching their signatures to the instrument HELD: The SC admitted the first one and the will was admitted for probate. nd If the 2 circumstance had happened, had the subscribing witness been proven to have been in the outer room at the time when the testator and the other subscribing witnesses attached their signatures to the instrument in the inner room, it would have been invalid as a will, the attaching of those signatures under circumstances not being done "in the presence" of the witness in the outer room. This because the line of vision from this witness to the testator and the other subscribing witnesses would necessarily have been impeded by the curtain separating the inner from the outer one "at the moment of inscription of each signature." The question whether the testator and the subscribing witnesses to an alleged will sign the instrument in the presence of each other does not depend upon proof of the fact that their eyes were actually cast upon the paper at the moment of its subscription by each of them, but that at that moment existing conditions and their position with relation to each other were such that by merely casting the eyes in the proper direction they could have seen each other sign. MARAVILLA vs. MARAVILLA February 27, 1971 FACTS: The probate of the will of Digna was opposed by the brother and sisters of the deceased on the ground that she and the instrumental witnesses did not sign the alleged will, each and every page thereof, in the presence of each other. Only one of the witnesses is alive during the petition for probate. The trial court ruled that Mansueto did not actually see Digna sign the will in question because of the fact that while Mansueto positively identified his own signature, he did not identify that of the testatrix, his answers being "this must be the signature of Mrs. Maravilla". HELD: It was but natural that witness Mansueto should be positive about his own signature, since he was familiar with it. He had to be less positive about Digna Maravilla's signature since he could not be closely acquainted with the same. Records show that the signing of the will was the only occasion that he saw her sign. He had no opportunity to study her signature before or after the execution of the will. He witnessed Digna's signing not less than 14 years previously. To demand that in identifying Digna's signature Mansueto should display a positiveness equal to the certainty shown by him in recognizing his own, exceeds the bounds of the reasonable. The variation in the expressions used by the witness is the best evidence that he was being candid and careful, and it is a clear badge of truthfulness rather than the reverse. A will may be allowed even if some witnesses not remember having attested it, if other evidence
satisfactorily show due execution, and that failure of witness to identify his signature does not bar probate. The tests is not whether a witness did see the signing of the will but whether he was in a position to see if he chose to do so. GABRIEL vs. MATEO December 16, 1927 FACTS: According to the oppositors, the attesting witnesses testified that the decedent signed before they did. However, based on the will, the attesting witnesses signed before the testator since the latters signature tend to rise when it reaches a level with an attesting witnesses signature. The testator had to write her surname upwards in order to avoid interfering with that Felicisimo, one of the witnesses. It was also contended that there were apparently different kinds of ink used by the testatrix in her signature and by the attesting witnesses. HELD: The will is valid. It may be inferred with equal, if not greater, logic that the testatrix signed before him, and when it came to the witness Gabriel's turn, he, finding the space below the testatrix's signature free, signed his name there. On the other hand, it may be noted that the testatrix's other signature at the bottom of the will also shows a more or less marked tendency to rise, notwithstanding the fact that there was no signature with which she might interfere if she continued to write in a straight horizontal line. (According to Maams notes: The witnesses may sign ahead of the decedent and vice-versa as long as it is done in one single, contemporaneous or continuous act. The order of the signing is of no material so long as the execution of the will constitutes only one single transaction.) At all events, even admitting that there is a certain question as to whether the attesting witnesses signed before or after the testatrix, or whether or not they signed with the same pen and ink, these are details of such trivial importance, considering that this will was signed two years before the date on which these witnesses gave their testimony, that it is not proper to set aside the will for this reason alone. GONZALES vs. CA May 25, 1979 FACTS: The oppositor contends that there was no proof that the 3 instrumental witnesses were credible. HELD: Article 820 and 821 provide the qualifications and disqualifications of persons from being witnesses to a will. There is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially or at any time during the trial as to his good standing in the community, his reputation for trustworthiness and reliableness, his honesty and uprightness in order that his testimony may be believed and accepted by the trial court. It is not mandatory that evidence be first established on record that the witnesses have a good standing in the community or that they are honest and upright or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable, for a person is presumed to be such unless the contrary is established otherwise. In other words, the instrumental witnesses must be competent and their testimonies must be credible before the court allows the probate of the will they have attested. A witnesses reputation for trustworthiness and reliableness, his honesty and uprightness are presumed unless the contrary is proved otherwise by the opposing party. Probate of the will must be allowed. NAYVE vs. MOJAL December 29, 1924 FACTS: The defects attributed to the will are: (a) not having been signed by the testator and the witnesses on each and every sheet on the left margin; (b) the sheets of the document not being paged with letters; (c) the attestation clause does not state the number of sheets or pages actually used of the will; and
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(d) the testator does not appear to have signed all the sheets in the presence of the 3 witnesses, and the latter to have attested and signed all the sheets in the presence of the testator and of each other. HELD: (a) As each and every page used of the will bears the signatures of the testator and the witnesses, the fact that said signatures do not all appear on the left margin of each page does not detract from the validity of the will. (b) Paging with Arabic numerals and not with letters is within the spirit of the law, and is just as valid as paging with letters. (c) The last paragraph of the will in question and the attestation clause, coming next to it, are of the following tenor: "In witness whereof, I set my hand unto this will here in the town of Camalig, Albay, Philippine Islands, this 26th day of November, nineteen hundred and eighteen, composed of four sheets, including the next X X X" The number of sheets is stated in said last paragraph of the will. The attestation clause must state the number of sheets or pages composing the will; but when, as in the case before us, such fact, while it is not stated in the attestation clause, appears at the end of the will proper, so that no proof aliunde is necessary of the number of the sheets of the will, then there can be no doubt that it complies with the intention of the law that the number of sheets of which the will is composed be shown by the document itself, to prevent the number of the sheets of the will from being unduly increased or decreased. (d) The attestation clause above set out it is said that the testator signed the will "in the presence of each of the witnesses" and the latter signed "in the presence of each other and of the testator." So that, as to whether the testator and the attesting witnesses saw each other sign the will, such a requirement was clearly and sufficiently complied with. What is not stated in this clause is whether the testator and the witnesses signed all the sheets of the will. The fact of the testator and the witnesses having signed all the sheets of the will may be proven by the mere examination of the document, although it does not say anything about this, and if that is the fact, as it is in the instant case, the danger of fraud in this respect, which is what the law tries to avoid, does not exist.
AVERA vs. GARCIA September 14, 1921 FACTS: The admission for probate of the will of Esteban is being appealed on the grounds that only one of the attesting witnesses was presented and by reason of the fact that the signature of the testator and of the 3 attesting witnesses are written on the right margin of each page of the will instead of the left. HELD: All attesting witnesses must be examined, if alive and within reach of the process of the court. However, this point was not raised by appellant in the lower court, hence deemed waived. So far as concerns the authentication of the will, and of every part thereof, it can make no possible difference whether the names appear on the left or no the right margin, provided they are on one or the other. By the mode of signing here adopted every page and provision of the will is authenticated and guarded from possible alteration in exactly the same degree that it would have been protected by being signed in the left margin ESTATE OF TAMPOY vs. ALBERASTINE February 25, 1960 FACTS: The trial court denied the petition on the ground that the left hand margin of the first page of the will does not bear the thumbmark of the testatrix. st Petitioner contends that although the 1 page of the will nd does not bear the thumbmark of the testatrix, the 2 page however bears her thumbmark and both pages were signed by the 3 testimonial witnesses. HELD: The will is not valid. The law requires that the testator sign the will and each and every page thereof in the presence of the witnesses, and that the latter sign the will and each and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other, which requirement should be expressed in the attestation clause . This requirement is mandatory, for failure to comply with it is fatal to the validity of the will. Since the will in question suffers from the fatal defect that it does not bear the thumbmark of the testatrix on its first page even if it bears the signature of the three instrumental witnesses, we cannot escape the conclusion that the same fails to comply with the law and therefore, cannot be admitted to probate. UNSON vs. ABELLA December 29, 1924 FACTS: The petition for probate of the will of Dona Josefa was opposed on the ground that the supposed will of the deceased was not executed in conformity with the provinces of the law, inasmuch as it was not paged correlatively in letters, nor was there any attestation clause in it, nor was it signed by the testatrix and the witnesses in the presence of each other. It was also contested that the inventory attached thereto is invalid as it has no attestation clause in it. HELD: The will is valid. In view of the fact that the inventory is referred to in the will as an integral part of it, the attestation clause is in compliance with law, which requires this solemnity for the validity of a will, and makes unnecessary any other attestation clause at the end of the inventory. In the case of Aldaba vs. Roque, the validity of the will was upheld though it was paged with the letters A, B, C, etc. instead of with the numbers one, two, three, etc. Since the principal object is to give the correlation of the pages, this object may be attained by writing I, II, III, etc, as in this case. ALDABA vs. ROQUE May 22, 1922 FACTS: The probate of the will was opposed on the ground that each every folio (sheet) of the said testament is not paged correlatively in letters, but only with the letter A, B, C, etc.
IN RE: ESTATE OF SAGUINSIN March 15, 1920 FACTS: The will constituted of 3 pages on 2 sheets. The signatures of the 3 attesting witnesses together with that of the alleged testatrix were written on the left margin of st st rd the 1 page (front of 1 sheet), and the 3 page (front of nd 2 sheet). However, said signatures are absent on the nd st 2 page (back of the 1 sheet), which was on the reverse st side of the 1 page where, as is seen, the manuscript is continued. HELD: The will is invalid. The attestation did not state the number of sheet or pages used upon which the will is nd written. The 2 page, which was written on the reverse side of the first, engenders the doubt whether what is written thereon was ordered written by the alleged testatrix or was subsequently added by the same hand that drew the first page and the date that appears on the third. The English text of the law which require the signing of pages (paginas), and not merely leaves or sheets (hojas) under the Spanish text should prevail. The law requires that both pages of a sheet must be signed . This failure to comply with the law vitiates the will and invalidates it, as the second page is lacking in authenticity.
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HELD: Probate of the will is allowed. The pagination by using A, B, C, etc. is in compliance with the spirit of the law, since either A, B, C, etc. or one, two, three, etc. indicates the correlation of the pages and serves to prevent the loss of any of them. The object of the law in requiring the paging be made in letters is to make falsification more difficult, but it should be noted that since all the pages of the testament are signed at the margin by the testatrix and the witnesses, the difficulty of forging the signatures in either case remains the same. IN RE: PILAPIL June 27, 1941 FACTS: The probate of the will was opposed on the ground that the will was not properly paged as it was st numbered with letters. At the foot of the 1 page appears nd pase ala 2 (pass on to the 2 page). The bottom of the nd rd 2 page also has the phrase pase ala 3 (pass on the 3 page). The third page contains the will is comprised of 2 articles, containing 16 dispositions and written in 3 pages. HELD: The will must be admitted for probate. The paging in this case was a sufficient compliance with the law. It is sufficient that the number of pages can be identified. Indeed, the will in this case, as stated in the rd 3 page, contains no more, no less than 2 articles, containing 16 dispositions and written in 3 pages. FERNANDEZ vs. DE DIOS February 25, 1924 FACTS: The probate of the will was opposed on the ground that the sheet on which the attestation clause was written is not numbered, and it is not stated there that the testator signed on the margin of each sheet of the will in the presence of the three witnesses, or that the latter signed it in the presence of the testator and of each other, and specially because said attestation clause is not signed by the testator either at the margin or the bottom thereof.
FACTS: The will of Lopez comprises 2 pages, each of which is written on one side of a separated sheet. The probate of st the said will was opposed on the ground that the 1 page is not paged either in letters or in Arabic numerals. HELD: The will must be admitted for probate. The unnumbered page is clearly identified as the first page by the internal sense of its contents considered in relation to the contents of the second page. By their meaning and coherence, the first and second lines on the second page are undeniably a continuation of the last sentence of the testament, before the attestation clause, which starts at the bottom of the preceding page. Furthermore, the unnumbered page contains the caption "TESTAMENTO," the invocation of the Almighty, and a recital that the testator was in full use of his testamentary faculty, all of which, in the logical order of sequence, precede the direction for the disposition of the marker's property. As page 2 contains only the 2 lines above mentioned, the attestation clause, the mark of the testator and the signatures of the witnesses, the other sheet can not by any possibility be taken for other than page one. TENAFRANCIA vs. ABAJA November 12, 1919 FACTS: Among the formalities prescribed by law to a valid will is the requirement that the attestation clause should state the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of 3 witnesses. According to the court, this requirement was not complied with in the present case, for the attestation clause fails to state that fact. It was contended that the absence of such statement was cured by oral evidence of the witnesses in court that the testator signed the will in the presence of the 3 witnesses.
HELD: The will must be allowed to be probated. The law does not require that the testator precisely be the person to request the witnesses to attest his will. It was also sufficiently established in the record, besides being stated in the attestation clause, that the testator signed the will in the presence of the three witnesses and that the latter, in turn, signed it in the presence of the testator and of each other, the testator knowing that the witnesses were signing his will; that the witnesses signed the attestation clause before the death of the testator. The will cannot be invalidated because the test of the attestation clause mentions the number of pages of the will. As to the numbering of the sheet containing the attestation clause, it is true that it does not appear on the upper part of the sheet, but it does appear in its text, with the words, having reference to the number of sheets of the will, including the page number of the attestation. If, as stated in this clause, the foregoing document consists of three sheets, besides that of the clause itself, which is in singular, it is clear that such a sheet of the attestation clause is the fourth and that the will, including said sheet, has four sheets. This description contained in the clause in question constitutes substantial compliance with the requirements prescribed by the law regarding the paging. Furthermore, the law does not require that the sheet containing nothing but the attestation clause, wholly or in part, be numbered or paged. Consequently, this lack of paging on the attestation sheet does not take anything from the validity of the will. LOPEZ vs. LIBORO February 25, 1924
HELD: The will is invalid. By the attestation clause is meant "that clause wherein the witnesses certify that the instrument has been executed before them, and the manner of the execution of the same." It is signed not by the testator but by the witnesses, for it is a declaration made by the witnesses and not by the testator. And the law is clear that it is the attestation clause that must contain a statement, among others, that the testator signed the will in the presence of the witnesses. Without that statement, the attestation clause is fatally defective. This defect is not cured by proof aliunde or even by a judicial finding based upon such proof that the testator did in fact sign the will in the presence of the subscribing witnesses. That is a fact required by law to be stated in the attestation clause itself, and it is settled that where it is not so stated it cannot be established by evidence aliunde, and that where such evidence has been admitted, even without opposition, it should not be given the effect intended. LEYNEZ vs. LEYNEZ October 18, 1939 FACTS: The probate of the will was opposed on the ground that the attestation clause of the controverted will fails to state that the testator and the 3 witnesses signed each and every page of the will in the manner prescribed by law because it merely states that it was signed in the presence of one and all and the testator himself. HELD: Probate of the will must be allowed. The requirement is sufficiently complied with, it appearing that the testator and the witnesses signed each and every page of the will according to the stipulation of the parties. An attestation clause is made for the purpose of preserving, in permanent form, a record of the facts attending the execution of the will, so that in case of failure of the memory of the subscribing witnesses, or other casualty, they may still be proved. A will, therefore, should not be rejected where its attestation clause serves the purpose
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of the law. The law-making body, in recognition of the dangers to which testamentary dispositions are apt to be subject in the hands of unscrupulous individuals, has surrounded the execution of the wills with every solemnity deemed necessary to safeguard it. This purpose was indicated when our legislature provided for the exclusion of evidence aliunde to prove the execution of the will. If the surrounding circumstances point to a regular execution of the will, and the instrument appears to have been executed substantially in accordance with requirements of the law, the inclination should, in the absence of bad faith, forger or fraud, lean towards the admission of the probate, although the documents may suffer from some imperfection of language, or other nonessential defect. TABOADA vs. ROSAL November 5, 1982 FACTS: The 1 page of the will contains the entire testamentary dispositions and is signed at the end or bottom of the page by the testatrix alone and at the left nd hand margin by the 3 instrumental witnesses. The 2 page which contains the attestation clause and the acknowledgement is signed at the end of the attestation clause by the 3 attesting witnesses and at the left hand margin by the testatrix. The trial court denied the probate of the will because it is not enough that only the testatrix signs at the end but all the 3 subscribing witnesses must also sign at the same place or at the end, in the presence of the testatrix. HELD: The will must be probated for there is not such requirement. It is enough that only the testator signs in the end. It must be noted that the law uses the terms attested and subscribed. Attestation consists in witnessing the testator's execution of the will in order to see and take note mentally that those things are, done which the statute requires for the execution of a will and that the signature of the testator exists as a fact. On the other hand, subscription is the signing of the witnesses' names upon the same paper for the purpose of Identification of such paper as the will which was executed by the testator. Insofar as the requirement of subscription is concerned, it is our considered view that the will in this case was subscribed in a manner which fully satisfies the purpose of identification. The objects of attestation and of subscription were fully met and satisfied in the present case when the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin of the sole page which contains all the testamentary dispositions, especially so when the will was properly Identified by subscribing witness Vicente Timkang to be the same will executed by the testatrix. There was no question of fraud or substitution behind the questioned order. The SC noticed that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in writing the will. Such is not a fatal defect because the number of pages is easily discernible for there are only 2 pages. The acknowledgement itself states that This Last Will and Testament consists of 2 pages including this page. There is substantial compliance. GARCIA vs. LACUESTA November 29, 1951 FACTS: It was alleged that the attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Antero caused Atty. Javier to write the testators name under his express direction. HELD: Probate denied. When the testator expressly caused another to sign the formers name, this fact must be recited in the attestation clause. Otherwise, the will is fatally defective. PAYAD vs. TOLENTINO January 15, 1936
st
FACTS: The probate of the will was denied on the ground that the attestation clause was not in conformity with the requirements of law in that it is not stated therein that the testatrix caused Atty. Almario to write her name at her express direction. The evidence establishes the fact that Leoncia, the decedent, assisted by Atty. Almario placed her thumb mark on each and every page of the questioned will and that said attorney merely wrote her name to indicate the place where she placed said thumb mark. HELD: Probate of the will must be allowed. Atty. Almario did not sign for the testatrix. She signed for placing her thumb mark on each and every page thereof. "A statute requiring a will to be 'signed' is satisfied if the signature is made by the testator's mark." It is clear, therefore, that it was not necessary that the attestation clause in question should state that the testatrix requested Attorney Almario to sign her name inasmuch as the testratrix signed the will in question in accordance with law. JALLORES vs. ENTERINO L- 42463 HELD: It is not essential to state in the attestation clause that the person delegated by the testator to sign in his behalf did so in the presence of the testator . It is enough that it be proved in court that this was what happened.
UY COQUE vs. SIOCA May 31, 1922 FACTS: The attestation clause does not state the number of pages contained in the will nor does it state that the witnesses signed in the presence of each other. Neither do these facts appear in any other part of the will. HELD: Statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of wills are very strictly construed. A will should not be probated unless in its execution here has been a strict compliance with all the requisites prescribed by law. A statement in the attestation clause will afford more satisfactory evidence of the fact to be proven. The 2 defects noted in the attestation clause of the alleged will renders it null and void and that it cannot be admitted to probate. SAO vs. QUINTANA December 18, 1925 FACTS: In the attestation clause there is no statement that the witnesses to the will have signed on the left margin of each page of the will in the presence of the testatrix. HELD: Such absence nullifies the will. Probate is denied. The requirement that the attestation clause must contain the statement that the witnesses signed in the presence of each other is imperative and non-compliance with it annuls the will. In order to insure the authenticity of a will, which is the object of the law, it is just as important, if not the most important, that the witnesses should sign in the presence of the testator and of each other. GUMBAN vs. GOROCHE March 3, 1927 FACTS: The will did not contain an attestation clause stating that the testator and the witnesses signed all the pages of the will. Sao vs. Quintana and Nayve vs. Mojal were cited. HELD: Probate of the will is denied. In the case of Sao vs. Quintana (citing Uy Coque vs. Sioca), it was decided that an attestation clause which does not recite that the witnesses signed the will and each and every page thereof on the left margin in the presence of the testator is defective, and such a defect annuls the will.
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In the case of Nayve vs. Mojal, it was held that the fact that the testator and the witnesses signed each and every page of the will can be proved also by the mere examination of the signatures appearing on the document itself, and the omission to state such evident fact does not invalidate the will. SC adopted and reaffirmed the decision in the case of Sao vs. Quintana, and to the extent necessary, modified the decision in Nayve vs. Mojal for the following reasons: 1. Nayve was concurred yet Sao only had 1 formal dissent 2. Sao is subsequent in point of time since it was promulgated in 1925, while Nayve was in 1924 3. The Sao decision is believed more nearly to conform to the applicable provisions of the law. Hence, following the case of Sao vs. Quintana, the absence of attestation clause stating that the testator and the witnesses signed all the pages of the will nullifies the will. QUINTO vs. MORATA March 3, 1927 FACTS: The probate of the will was opposed on the following grounds that the attestation clause of said will does not state: 1. the number of pages of the will 2. that each and every page of the will was signed by the testators in the presence of the witnesses 3. that the witnesses signed the same in the presence of the testators and in the presence of each other It was alleged that such defects have been cured by oral evidence. HELD: The disallowance of the will must be affirmed. An attestation clause which does not recite that the witnesses signed the will and each and every page thereof on the left margin in the presence of the testator is defective, and such defect annuls the will. The defects in the attestation clause cannot be cured by oral evidence. The doctrine of the court with reference to statute of frauds is not applicable to wills. The statute of frauds relates to contract and agreements. The subject of wills and testaments and the formalities surrounding their execution are governed by separate and specific provisions of the law. CANEDA vs. CA May 28, 1993 FACTS: The oppositors of the probate of the will asserted that the will in question is null and void for the reason that its attestation clause is fatally defective since it fails to specifically state that the witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. HELD: Article 805 requires that the witness should both attest and subscribe to the will in the presence of the testator and of one another. Attestation is the act of senses, while subscription is the act of the hand. The former is mental, the latter mechanical, and to attest a will is to know that it was published as such, and to certify the facts required to constitute an actual and legal publication; but subscription, on the other hand, is only to write on the same paper the names of the witnesses, for the sole purpose of identification. What is fairly apparent upon a careful reading of the attestation clause herein assailed is the fact that while it recites that the testator indeed signed the will and all its pages in the presence of the three attesting witnesses and states as well the number of pages that were used, the same does not expressly state therein the circumstance that said witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. What is then clearly lacking, in the final logical analysis, is the statement that the witnesses signed the
will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. The absence of that statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection which must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will that is here sought to be admitted to probate. CAGRO vs. CAGRO April 29, 1953 FACTS: In the attestation clause of the will, although the page containing the same is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand margin, is not signed by the attesting witnesses at the bottom. HELD: The will is not valid. The attestation clause is "a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the will" required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their signatures. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at the bottom thereof negatives their participation.
The signatures on the left margin of the will are only in compliance with the legal mandate that the will be signed on the left-hand margin of all its pages. If an attestation clause not signed by the three witnesses at the bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to add such clause to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or all of the witnesses. ABANGAN CASE Facts: A will consisted of 2 st pages. The 1 page is the disposition signed by the testator at the bottom. Second page is the attestation signed by the witnesses. Issue: There were no signatures on the left margin. According to the oppositors the signatures should also appear on the left margin. Ruling: It is enough that the signatures appear on each and every page of the will. The purpose here is to identify that indeed the testator and the witnesses signed the will. No dissenting opinion CAGRO CASE Facts: The signatures instead at the bottom, the signatures were on the margin.
Issue: the signatures should be at the bottom so that there were signatures on the left and at the bottom. Ruling: The main text of Cagro v. Cagro, it was considered a Fatal defect by the Supreme Court. According to the SC, these signatures in order to be in compliance with requirement of the law, aside from signatures on the left margin, you should still sign at the bottom. However, there were strong dissenting opinions to the effect that to require that the signatures of the witnesses aside from the left margin should also appear at the bottom is TOO TECHNICAL. It will not serve the purpose of the law because what is important is that the signature should appear on each and every page and this purpose is accomplished by affixing the signature on the left.
LIM vs. CA February 28, 1996 FACTS: Lim was charged for committing the crime of estafa for defrauding Suarez. Lim maintains that she cannot be
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liable for estate. According to her, the real agreement between her and Suarez was a sale on credit because she did not sign on the blank space provided for the signature of person receiving the jewelry but at the upper portion immediately below the description of the items taken. HELD: The moment she affixed her signature thereon, Lim became bound by all the terms stipulated in the receipt. She opened herself to all the legal obligations that may arise from their breach. There is only one type of legal instrument where the law strictly prescribes the location of the signature of the parties thereto. This is in the case of notarial wills found in Article 805 of the Civil Code. In the case before us, the parties did not execute a notarial will but a simple contract of agency to sell on commission basis, thus making the position of petitioner's signature thereto immaterial.
the testatrix and the witnesses does not affect the validity of the codicil. The new Civil Code does not require that the signing of the testator, witnesses and notary should be accomplished in one single act. While testator and witnesses must sign in the presence of each other, all that is thereafter required is that "every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses" (Article 806); i.e., that the latter should avow to the certifying officer the authenticity of their signatures and the voluntariness of their actions in executing the testamentary disposition. This was done in this case. The subsequent signing and sealing by the notary of his certification that the testament was duly acknowledged by the participants therein is no part of the acknowledgment itself nor of the testamentary act. Hence, their separate execution out of the presence of the testatrix and her witnesses can not be said to violate the rule that testaments should be completed without interruption. CRUZ vs. VILLASOR November 26, 1973 HELD: The last will and testament in question was not executed in accordance with law. The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the will. To acknowledge before means to avow, to own as genuine, to assent, to admit-, and "before" means in front or preceding in space or ahead of. This cannot be done because he cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation. That function would be defeated if the notary public were one of the attesting or instrumental witnesses. For then, he would be interested in sustaining the validity of the will as it directly involves himself and the validity of his own act. It would place him in an inconsistent position. Furthermore, the function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements would be thwarted. GONZALES vs. CA May 25, 1979 FACTS: Respondent court found that Atty. Paraiso was not previously furnished with the names and residence certificates of the witnesses as to enable him to type such data into the document, which the petitioner assails as contradictory and irreconcilable with the statement of that Atty. Paraiso was handed a list (containing the names of the witnesses and their respective residence certificates) immediately upon their arrival in the law office by Isabel Gabriel (deceased) and this was corroborated by Atty. Paraiso himself who testified that it was only on said occasion that he received such list from Isabel Gabriel HELD: Whether Atty. Paraiso was previously furnished with the names and residence certificates of the witnesses on a prior occasion or on the very occasion and date in April 15, 1961 when the will was executed, is of no moment for such data appear in the notarial acknowledgment of Notary Public Cipriano Paraiso, subscribed and sworn to by the witnesses on April 15, 1961 following the attestation clause duly executed and signed on the same occasion, April 15, 1961. And since the document is a notarial will duly acknowledged by the testatrix and the witnesses before a notary public, the same is a public document executed and attested through the intervention of the notary public and as such public document is evidence of the facts in clear, unequivocal manner therein expressed. It has in its favor the presumption of regularity. To contradict all these, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant. There is no such evidence pointed by petitioner in the case at bar. GABUCAN vs. CA January 28, 1980 FACTS: The petition for probate of a will was dismissed on the ground that it does not bear a thirty-centavo documentary stamp.
MAGLASANG vs. CABATINGAN April 24, 2003 FACTS: Cabatingan executed in favor of her brother a Deed of Conditional Donation and 4 other Deeds of Donation. All deeds contained therein that the donation shall be effective upon the death of the donor and that it shall be deemed automatically rescinded if the donor survives the donees. HELD: The fact that the donation was made in consideration of the love and affection of the donor and the stipulation on rescission in case the donee dies ahead of the nature do not confirm the nature of the donation as inter vivos because transfers mortis cause may also be made for the same reason. The donation made by Conchita was mortis causa. For failure to comply with the formalities of wills under Article 805 and 806, the donations cannot be given effect. The deeds in question although acknowledged before a notary public of the donor and the donee, the documents were not executed in the manner provided under Article 805 and 806. The dispositions are void. ARTICLE 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court. (n) GARCIA vs. GATCHALIAN November 25, 1967 FACTS: The allowance of the will of Gatchalian was denied on the ground that the attesting witnesses did not acknowledge it before a notary public as required by law. HELD: An examination of the document shows that the same was acknowledged before a notary public by the testator but not by the instrumental witnesses. Compliance with the requirement contained in Article 806 to the effect that a will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and also by the witnesses is indispensable for its validity. As the document under consideration does not comply with this requirement, it is obvious that the same may not be probated. JAVELLANA vs. LEDESMA 97 PHIL 258 FACTS: The opposition to the probate of the will of Apolinaria is founded on 3 specific issues. One of the issues is whether the acknowledgment clause was signed and the notarial seal affixed by the notary without the presence of the testatrix and the witnesses HELD: Whether or not the notary signed the certification of acknowledgment in the presence of
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HELD: The dismissal of the petition was not proper. What the probate court should have done was to require the petitioner or proponent to affix the requisite thirtycentavo documentary stamp to the notarial acknowledgment of the will which is the taxable portion of that document. After all, the documentary stamp may be affixed at the time the taxable document is presented in evidence.
testified that the vision of the testatrix remained mainly for viewing distant objects and not for reading print. HELD: Against the background of defective eyesight of the alleged testatrix, the appearance of the 1960 will, acquires striking significance. Upon, its face, the testamentary provisions, the attestation clause and acknowledgment were crammed together into a single sheet of paper, so much so that the words had to be written very close to the top, bottom and two sides of the paper, leaving no margin whatsoever; the word "and" had to be written by the symbol "&," apparently to save on space. Plainly, the testament was not prepared with any regard for the defective vision of Doa Gliceria. The typographical errors remained uncorrected thereby indicating that the execution thereof must have been characterized by haste. It is difficult to understand that so important a document containing the final disposition of one's worldly possessions should be embodied in an informal and untidily written instrument; or that the glaring spelling errors should have escaped her notice if she had actually retained the ability to read the purported will and had done so. Where Article 808 is not complied with, the said will suffers from infirmity that affects its due execution. ARTICLE 809. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and influence, defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of article 805. (n) ALVARADO vs. GAVIOLA September 14, 1993 HELD: Substantial compliance is acceptable where the purpose of the law has been satisfied, the reason being that the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills are intended to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery but are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the testamentary privilege. The testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the contents read corresponded with his instructions. Only then did the signing and acknowledgement take place. There is no evidence, and petitioner does not so allege, that the contents of the will and codicil were not sufficiently made known and communicated to the testator. CANEDA vs. CA May 28, 1993 HELD: What is clearly lacking is the statement that the witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. The absence of that statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection which must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will. Such defect in the attestation clause obviously cannot be characterized as merely involving the form of the will or the language used therein which would warrant the application of the substantial compliance rule. Under Article 809, the defects or imperfections must only be with respect to the form of the attestation or the language employed therein. Such defects or imperfections would not render a will invalid should it be proved that the will was really executed and attested in compliance with Article 805. The defect is not only in the form or the language of the attestation clause but the total absence of a specific element required by Article 805 to be specifically stated in the attestation clause of a will. The rule on substantial compliance in Article 809 cannot be invoked or relied on by respondents since it presupposes that the defects in the attestation clause can be cured or supplied by the text of the will or a consideration of matters apparent therefrom which would provide the data not expressed in the attestation clause or from which it may necessarily be gleaned or clearly inferred that the acts not stated in the omitted textual requirements were actually complied with in the execution of the will. In other words, the defects must be remedied by intrinsic evidence supplied by the will itself.
TESTATE ESTATE OF LEDESMA vs. LEDESMA June 30, 1955 HELD: The testator and the instrumental witnesses do not have to make the acknowledgment in the presence of one another. This is required only in attestation, not in the acknowledgment. ARTICLE 807. If the testator be deaf, or a deaf-mute, he must personally read the will, if able to do so; otherwise, he shall designate two persons to read it and communicate to him, in some practicable manner, the contents thereof. (n) ARTICLE 808. If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice; once, by one of the subscribing witnesses, and again, by the notary public before whom the will is acknowledged. (n) ALVARADO vs. GAVIOLA September 14, 1993 FACTS: The testator did not read the final draft of the will himself. Instead, private respondent, as the lawyer who drafted the 8-paged document, read the same aloud in the presence of the testator, the 3 instrumental witnesses and the notary public. The latter 4 followed the reading with their own respective copies previously furnished them. Said will was admitted to probate. Later on, a codicil was executed, and by that time, the testator was already suffering from glaucoma. But the disinheritance and revocatory clauses were unchanged. As in the case of the notarial will, the testator did not personally read the final draft of the codicil. Instead, it was private respondent who read it aloud in his presence and in the presence of the three instrumental witnesses (same as those of the notarial will) and the notary public who followed the reading using their own copies. HELD: Article 808 not only applies to blind testators, but also to those who, for one reason or another, are incapable of reading their wills. Hence, the will should have been read by the notary public and an instrumental witness. However, the spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not. In this case, there was substantial compliance. Substantial compliance is acceptable where the purpose of the law has been satisfied, the reason being that the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills are intended to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery but are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the testamentary privilege. In this case, private respondent read the testator's will and codicil aloud in the presence of the testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. Prior and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the contents read corresponded with his instructions. Only then did the signing and acknowledgement take place. GARCIA vs. VASQUEZ 32 SCRA 490 FACTS: The oppositors challenged the correctness of the admission of the will for probate on the ground that the testatrix eyesight was so poor and defective that she could not have read the provisions of the will, contrary to the testimonies of witnesses. The ophthalmologist
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LABRADOR vs. CA April 5, 1990 CAGRO vs. CAGRO April 29, 1953 FACTS: The signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause, although the page containing the same is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand margin. HELD: An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at the bottom thereof negatives their participation. The signatures on the left-hand margin do no conform substantially to the law. Said signatures are in compliance with the legal mandate that the will be signed on the left-hand margin of all its pages. If an attestation clause not signed by the three witnesses at the bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to add such clause to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or all of the witnesses. TABOADA vs. ROSAL November 5, 1983 HELD: Under Article 805, the attestation clause should state the number of pages used upon which the will is written. Otherwise, the will becomes void. In that case, the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in the will. But the SC upheld the validity of the will because even if it was not stated in the attestation clause because it was cured by the reason that it was stated in the acknowledgment portion of the will. The defect is still cured. VILLAFLOR vs. TOBIAS 53 PHIL 714 FACTS: The Will was questioned because the attestation clause was written on a separate page even if there was still a very big space at the bottom of the last page of the will. At the end of the disposition, there was still a large space. However, the attestation clause was written on a separate sheet. HELD: Liberal interpretation is applied since these are only defects in form. The will is considered valid. ARTICLE 810. A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed. (678, 688a) ROXAS vs. DE JESUS, JR. January 28, 1985 FACTS: The will is dated "FEB./61" and states: "This is my will which I want to be respected although it is not written by a lawyer. . . " HELD: The liberal construction of the will should prevail. As a general rule, the "date" in a holographic Will should include the day, month, and year of its execution. However, when as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and pressure and the authenticity of the Will is established and the only issue is whether or not the date "FEB./61" appearing on the holographic Will is a valid compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of the holographic Will should be allowed under the principle of substantial compliance. FACTS: The 1 paragraph of the 2 page of the holographic will provides: "And this is the day in which we agreed that we are making the partitioning and assigning the respective assignment of the said fishpond, and this being in the month of March, 17th day, in the year 1968, and this decision and or instruction of mine is the matter to be followed. And the one who made this writing is no other than MELECIO LABRADOR, their father." HELD: The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the will. The only requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the testator. These requirements are present in the subject will. The intention to show 17 March 1968 as the date of the execution of the will is plain from the tenor of the succeeding words of the paragraph. The will was not an agreement but a unilateral act of Melecio Labrador who plainly knew that what he was executing was a will. ARTICLE 811. In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be required. In the absence of any competent witness referred to in the preceding paragraph, and if the court deem it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to. (691a) AZAOLA vs. SINGSON August 5, 1960 FACTS: The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the Civil Code, the proponent must present 3 witnesses who could declare that the will and the signature are in the writing of the testatrix, the probate being contested; and because the lone witness presented by the proponent "did not prove sufficiently that the body of the will was written in the handwriting of the testatrix." HELD: Since the authenticity of the will was not contested, he was not required to produce more than one witness; but even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, Article 811 can not be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of 3 witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having the probate denied. Since no witness may have been present at the execution of a holographic will, none being required by law, the existence of witnesses possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the proponent. The 3 witnesses must "know the handwriting and signature of the testator" and can declare "that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator". There may be no available witness acquainted with the testator's hand; or even if so familiarized, the witnesses may be unwilling to give a positive opinion. Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of Article 811 may thus become an impossibility. CODOY vs. CALUGAY August 12, 1999 FACTS: It is contended that the requirement under Article 811 which requires at least 3 witnesses explicitly declaring that the signature in the will is the genuine signature of the testator for the probate of a contested holographic will is permissive. HELD: Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory. The word "shall" denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the
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presumption is that the word "shall," when used in a statute is mandatory." Comparing the signature in the holographic will and the signatures in several documents such as the application letter for pasture permit and a letter, the strokes are different. In the letters, there are continuous flows of the strokes, evidencing that there is no hesitation in writing unlike that of the holographic will. The SC cannot be certain that the holographic will was in the handwriting by the deceased. Maam: Azaola and Codoy are apparently in conflict. Azaola case provides the 3 witnesses not imperative because in the first place no witnesses are required in the execution of the holographic will. On the other hand, Codoy case states that it is mandatory because the word used in Article 811 is shall. It means imperative. If the will is contested, there is a strong possibility that the witness presented might be perjured. CODOY case prevails because it was decided later by the SC. But, if you are presented with facts similar to the case of Azaola vs. Singson in taking the bar exam, there might be a possibility that the examiner wanted you to answer Azaola vs. Singson. To be safe, you can also cite the case of Codoy. ICASIANO vs. ICASIANO June 30, 1964 FACTS: Oppositors introduced expert testimony to the effect that the signatures of the testatrix in the duplicate are not genuine, nor were they written or affixed on the same occasion as the original, and further aver that granting that the documents were genuine, they were executed through mistake and with undue influence and pressure. It was contended that the Court is bound by the expert testimony as to the authenticity of the signature of the testatrix. HELD: NO, the Court is not bound by such expert testimony. The opinion of expert for oppositors that the signatures of the testatrix appealing in the duplicate original were not written by the same hand, leaves the Court unconvinced, not merely because it is directly contradicted by expert Martin Ramos for the proponents, but principally because of the paucity of the standards used by him. There was failure to show convincingly that there are radical differences that would justify the charge of forgery, taking into account the advanced age of the testatrix, the evident variability of her signatures, and the effect of writing fatigue, the duplicate being signed right after the original. These factors were not discussed by the expert. RODELAS vs. ARANZA December 7, 1982 FACTS: The petition was opposed on the ground that the alleged holographic will itself, and not an alleged copy thereof, must be produced, otherwise it would produce no effect. HELD: A photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator. Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court. RIVERA vs. CA December 7, 1982 FACTS: Jose, claiming to be the only surviving legitimate son of the deceased Venancio, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Venancio's estate. It was found that Jose was not the son of the decedent but of a different Venancio Rivera who was married to Maria Vital. The Venancio Rivera whose estate was in question was married to Maria Jocson, by whom he had 7 children, including Adelaido.
As such, it was contended that Jose has no personality to contest the wills, and thus, have the legal effect of requiring the 3 witnesses. HELD: The existence and therefore also the authenticity of the holographic wills were questioned by Jose Rivera. The flaw in this argument is that Jose Rivera is not the son of the deceased Venancio Rivera whose estate is in question. Hence, being a mere stranger, he had no personality to contest the wills and his opposition thereto did not have the legal effect of requiring the three witnesses. ARTICLE 812. In holographic wills, the dispositions of the testator written below his signature must be dated and signed by him in order to make them valid as testamentary dispositions. (n) ARTICLE 813. When a number of dispositions appearing in a holographic will are signed without being dated, and the last disposition has a signature and a date, such date validates the dispositions preceding it, whatever be the time of prior dispositions. (n) ARTICLE 814. In case of any insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will, the testator must authenticate the same by his full signature. (n) KALAW vs. RELOVA January 15, 1990 FACTS: The probate of the will was opposed on the ground that it contained alterations, corrections, and insertions without the proper authentication by the full signature of the testatrix as required by Article 814 of the Civil Code. HELD: Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a holographic will have not been noted under his signature, the will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined. However, when as in this case, the holographic will in dispute had only one substantial provision, which was altered by substituting the original heir with another, but which alteration did not carry the requisite of full authentication by the full signature of the testator, the effect must be that the entire will is voided or revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in the will after that which could remain valid. That change of mind can neither be given effect because she failed to authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her full signature. AJERO vs. CA September 15, 1994 FACTS: The petition for probate of the will was opposed on the ground that it contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by decedent. HELD: Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void. Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814. Unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or on testator's signature, their presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes. VENTURA vs. VENTURA 106 PHIL 1159 (not related to Article 814)
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HELD: The SC held that the will must first be probated and the provisions in the will be followed, otherwise the partition disregarding the will is void, unless the will is contrary to law. The probate of the will is essential because: 1. The law expressly requires it; 2. The probate is a proceeding in rem; 3. The right of a person to dispose of his property by virtue of a will may be rendered nugatory; and 4. The absent legatees and devisees or such of them as may have no knowledge of the will, could be cheated of their inheritance thru the collusion of some of the heirs who might agree to the partition of the estate among themselves to the exclusion of others. There is a need for the probate of the will before partition, otherwise, the partition disregarding the will is void. GUEVARRA vs. GUEVARRA January 31, 1956 (not related to Article 814) HELD: Under section 1 of Rule 74, in relation to Rule 76, if the decedent left a will and no debts and the heirs and legatees desire to make an extrajudicial partition of the estate, they must first present that will to the court for probate and divide the estate in accordance with the will. They may not disregard the provisions of the will unless those provisions are contrary to law. Neither may they do away with the presentation of the will to the court for probate, because such suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy. ARTICLE 815. When a Filipino is in a foreign country, he is authorized to make a will in any of the forms established by the law of the country in which he may be. Such will may be probated in the Philippines. (n) ARTICLE 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes. (n) ARTICLE 817. A will made in the Philippines by a citizen or subject of another country, which is executed in accordance with the law of the country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own country, shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of the Philippines. (n) MICIANO vs. BRIMO November 1, 1924 FACTS: The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality. The will provided that his property be disposed of in accordance with the laws in the Philippines. Otherwise, if relatives does not respect such wish, any disposition favorable tot them shall be annulled. HELD: The Turkish laws should be followed. However, the oppositor did not prove that said testamentary dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines, following the DOCTRINE OF PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION. It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. It should be noted that the condition stated in the will is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions. Said condition is considered unwritten.
TESTATE ESTATE OF SUNTAY July 31, 1954 FACTS: A will was claimed to have been executed in Amoy, China. The issue was whether such will can be probated here in the Philippines. HELD: The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China is a probate court must be proved. The law of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must also be proved. The legal requirements for the execution of a valid will in China in 1931 should also be established by competent evidence. There is no proof on these points. In the absence of proof that the municipal district court of Amoy is a probate court and on the Chinese law of procedure in probate matters, it may be presumed that the proceedings in the matter of probating or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the same as those provided for in our laws on the subject. It is a proceeding in rem and for the validity of such proceedings personal notice or by publication or both to all interested parties must be made. The interested parties in the case were known to reside in the Philippines. The evidence shows that no such notice was received by the interested parties residing in the Philippines. Consequently, the authenticated transcript of proceedings held in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, cannot be deemed and accepted as proceedings leading to the probate or allowance of a will and, therefore, the will referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded by a competent court of this country. ARTICLE 818. Two or more persons cannot make a will jointly, or in the same instrument, either for their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person. (669) DELA CERNA vs. POTOT December 23, 1964 FACTS: Spouses Bernabe de la Cerna and Gervasia Rebaca executed a joint last will and testament whereby they willed that the 2 parcels of land acquired they during their marriage be given to Manuela, their niece. The will of Bernabe was admitted to probate by final order. The will of Gervasia was declared null and void by the CFI for being executed contrary to the prohibition of joint wills. HELD: The final decree of the probate of the will Bernabe has conclusive effect. The error committed by the probate court was an error of law, that should have been corrected by appeal, but which did not affect the jurisdiction of the probate court, nor the conclusive effect of its final decision, however erroneous. A final judgment rendered on a petition for the probate of a will is binding upon the whole world. But the CA should have taken into account that the probate decree could only affect the share of the deceased husband, Bernabe de la Cerna. It follows that the validity of the joint will, in so far as the estate of the wife was concerned, must be, on her death, reexamined and adjudicated de novo, since a joint will is considered a separate will of each testator. Therefore, the undivided interest of Gervasia Rebaca should pass upon her death to her heirs intestate, and not exclusively to the testamentary heir, unless some other valid will in her favor is shown to exist, or unless she be the only heir intestate of said Gervasia. ARTICLE 819. Wills, prohibited by the preceding article, executed by Filipinos in a foreign country shall not be valid in the Philippines, even though authorized by the laws of the country where they may have been executed. (733a) SUBSECTION 4 Witnesses to Wills ARTICLE 820. Any person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf or dumb, and able to read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will mentioned in article 805 of this Code. (n)
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ARTICLE 821. The following are disqualified from being witnesses to a will: (1) Any person not domiciled in the Philippines; (2) Those who have been convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false testimony. (n) CRUZ vs. VILLASOR November 26, 1973 FACTS: Of the 3 instrumental witnesses thereto, Atty. Teves, Jr. is at the same time the Notary Public before whom the will was supposed to have been acknowledged. rd As the 3 witness is the notary public himself, petitioner argues that the result is that only 2 witnesses appeared before the notary public to acknowledge the will. HELD: The last will and testament in question was not executed in accordance with law. The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the will. If the third witness were the notary public himself, he would have to avow, assent, or admit his having signed the will in front of himself. This cannot be done because he cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation in the making of the will. To permit such a situation to obtain would be sanctioning a sheer absurdity. ARTICLE 822. If the witnesses attesting the execution of a will are competent at the time of attesting, their becoming subsequently incompetent shall not prevent the allowance of the will. (n) ARTICLE 823. If a person attests the execution of a will, to whom or to whose spouse, or parent, or child, a devise or legacy is given by such will, such devise or legacy shall, so far only as concerns such person, or spouse, or parent, or child of such person, or any one claiming under such person or spouse, or parent, or child, be void, unless there are three other competent witnesses to such will. However, such person so attesting shall be admitted as a witness as if such devise or legacy had not been made or given. (n) ARTICLE 824. A mere charge on the estate of the testator for the payment of debts due at the time of the testator's death does not prevent his creditors from being competent witnesses to his will. (n) CALUYA vs. DOMINGO March 27, 1914 FACTS: One of the grounds for the denial of the probate of the will is that as to the witness Segundino, the will mentioned and confirmed a sale of land to him by the testator, and he being thereby an interested party his testimony could not be believed. HELD: The judgment refusing its probate must be reversed. Nothing in the will relative to the sale of land to Segundino Asis creates such an interest therein as falls within the provisions thereof. Indeed, no interest of any kind was created by the will in favor of Segundino Asis, nor did it convey or transfer any interest to him. It simply mentioned a fact already consummated, a sale already made. Even if, however, the will had conveyed an interest Segundino Asis, it would not have been for that reason void. Only that clause of the will conveying an interest to him would have been void; the remainder could have stood and would have stood as a valid testament. SUBSECTION 5 Codicils and Incorporation by Reference ARTICLE 825. A codicil is a supplement or addition to a will, made after the execution of a will and annexed to
be taken as a part thereof, by which any disposition made in the original will is explained, added to, or altered. (n) ARTICLE 826. In order that a codicil may be effective, it shall be executed as in the case of a will. ARTICLE 827. If a will, executed as required by this Code, incorporates into itself by reference any document or paper, such document or paper shall not be considered a part of the will unless the following requisites are present: (1) The document or paper referred to in the will must be in existence at the time of the execution of the will; (2) The will must clearly describe and identify the same, stating among other things the number of pages thereof; (3) It must be identified by clear and satisfactory proof as the document or paper referred to therein; and (4) It must be signed by the testator and the witnesses on each and every page, except in case of voluminous books of account or inventories. (n) SUBSECTION 6 Revocation of Wills and Testamentary Dispositions ARTICLE 828. A will may be revoked by the testator at any time before his death. Any waiver or restriction of this right is void. (737a) TESTATE ESTATE OF MALOTO vs. CA February 29, 1988 FACTS: Believing that the deceased did not leave behind a last will and testament, the 4 heirs commenced an intestate proceeding for the settlement of their aunt's estate. They executed an agreement of extrajudicial settlement of Adriana's estate. 3 years later, Adrianas purported will was discovered. It was alleged that such was not Adrianas will since a will was allegedly burned by the househelp of Adriana, Guadalupe Maloto Vda. de Coral, upon instructions of the testatrix. HELD: There is no sufficient basis for the conclusion that Adriana Maloto's will had been effectively revoked. The physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does not per se constitute an effective revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the testator. It is not imperative that the physical destruction be done by the testator himself. It may be performed by another person but under the express direction and in the presence of the testator. In this case, while animus revocandi, or the intention to revoke, may be conceded, for that is a state of mind, yet that requisite alone would not suffice. Animus revocandi is only one of the necessary elements for the effective revocation of a last will and testament. The intention to revoke must be accompanied by the overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the testator or by another person in his presence and under his express direction. There is paucity of evidence to show compliance with these requirements. For one, the document or papers burned by Adriana's maid, Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily established to be the will of Adriana Maloto. The burning was not proven to have been done under the express direction of Adriana. The burning was not in her presence. Both witnesses, Guadalupe and Eladio, stated that they were the only ones present at the place where the stove was located in which the papers proffered as a will were burned. The testimony of such witnesses appears inconclusive.
CUEVAS vs. CUEVAS December 14, 1955 FACTS: Antonina executed a notarized conveyance entitled Donation Mortis Causa, giving to her nephew a parcel of land. Subsequently, Antonia executed another document revoking the one she previously made. She filed an action for the recovery of the land.
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HELD: It is donation inter vivos. Antonina stated in the deed of donation that she will not dispose or take away the land because I am reserving it to him upon my death. When the donor stated that she would continue to retain possession, cultivation, harvesting and all other rights and attributes of ownership, she meant only the right of possession, and not ownership. Antonina cannot revoke the donation. Irrevocability is a characteristic of donation inter vivos because it is incompatible with the idea of disposition post mortem. ARTICLE 829. A revocation done outside the Philippines, by a person who does not have his domicile in this country, is valid when it is done according to the law of the place where the will was made, or according to the law of the place in which the testator had his domicile at the time; and if the revocation takes place in this country, when it is in accordance with the provisions of this Code. (n) ARTICLE 830. No will shall be revoked except in the following cases: (1) By implication of law; or (2) By some will, codicil, or other writing executed as provided in case of wills; or (3) By burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the will with the intention of revoking it, by the testator himself, or by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction. If burned, torn, cancelled, or obliterated by some other person, without the express direction of the testator, the will may still be established, and the estate distributed in accordance therewith, if its contents, and due execution, and the fact of its unauthorized destruction, cancellation, or obliteration are established according to the Rules of Court. (n) ARTICLE 831. Subsequent wills which do not revoke the previous ones in an express manner, annul only such dispositions in the prior wills as are inconsistent with or contrary to those contained in the later wills. (n) ARTICLE 832. A revocation made in a subsequent will shall take effect, even if the new will should become inoperative by reason of the incapacity of the heirs, devisees or legatees designated therein, or by their renunciation. (740a) ARTICLE 833. A revocation of a will based on a false cause or an illegal cause is null and void. (n) ARTICLE 834. The recognition of an illegitimate child does not lose its legal effect, even though the will wherein it was made should be revoked. (741) SUBSECTION 7 Republication and Revival of Wills ARTICLE 835. The testator cannot republish, without reproducing in a subsequent will, the dispositions contained in a previous one which is void as to its form. (n) ARTICLE 836. The execution of a codicil referring to a previous will has the effect of republishing the will as modified by the codicil. (n) ARTICLE 837. If after making a will, the testator makes a second will expressly revoking the first, the revocation of the second will does not revive the first will, which can be revived only by another will or codicil. (739a)
ARTICLE 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court having jurisdiction for the allowance of his will. In such case, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court for the allowance of wills after the testator's death shall govern. i The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules of Court as may be necessary for the allowance of wills on petition of the testator. Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either during the lifetime of the testator or after his death, shall be conclusive as to its due execution. (n) SPS. PASCUAL vs. CA August 15, 2003 FACTS: Consolacion and Remedios are the niece and granddaughter of the late Canuto. Canuto and 11 others were co-owners of a parcel of land. The land was registered in the name of Catalina, Canuto and Victoriano each owned 10/70 share. Canuto and Consolacion entered a Kasulatan where Canuto sold his share in favor of Consolacion. Remedios filed a complaint against Consolacion for the cancellation of TCT. Remedios claimed that she is the owner because Catalina devised these lots to her in Catalinas will. Consolacion sought to dismiss the complaint on the ground of prescription. Consolacion claimed that the basis of the action is fraud, and Remedios should have filed the action within 4 years from the registration of Consolacions title on October 28, 1968 and not some 19 years later. HELD: The action is barred by prescription. The prescriptive period is 10 years counted from registration of adverse title. The four-year prescriptive period relied upon by the trial court applies only if the fraud does not give rise to an implied trust. Remedios does not seek to annul the Kasulatan. Remedios action is based on an implied trust. Remedios is not a real party in interest who can file the complaint. Remedios anchored her claim over the lots on the devise of these lots to her under Catalinas last will. However, the trial court found that the probate court did not issue any order admitting the LAST WILL to probate. Remedios does not contest this finding. Indeed, during the trial, Remedios admitted that Special Proceedings Case No. C-208 is still pending. Since the probate court has not admitted Catalinas last will, Remedios has not acquired any right under the last will. REMEDIOS is thus without any cause of action either to seek reconveyance the lots or to enforce an implied trust over these lots. MANINANG vs. CA June 19, 1982 FACTS: Clemencia executed a holographic will. She declared in her will that she does not consider Bernardo as her adopted son, and thus, the latter cannot inherit from her. Bernardo opposed the probate of the will on the ground that the holographic will was null and void because he, as the only compulsory heir, was preterited and, therefore, intestacy should ensue. HELD: Probate allowed. Generally, the probate of a will is mandatory. The law enjoins the probate of the will and public policy requires it, because unless the will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. Normally, the probate of a Will does not look into its intrinsic validity. The authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of wills. The questions relating to the intrinsic validity remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated. Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot be entertained in probate proceedings because its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of the law.
SUBSECTION 8 Allowance and Disallowance of Wills
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ATILANO MERCADO vs. SANTOS September 22, 1938 FACTS: 3 years after the will was admitted to probate, intervenors filed a petition to re-open the proceedings. Rosario filed a complaint against Atilano for falsification of the will probated. Atilano claimed that the will had already been probated and that the order probating the will is conclusive as to the authenticity and due execution thereof. HELD: The criminal action will not lie. The probate of the a will by the probate court having jurisdiction thereof is considered as conclusive as to its due execution and validity, and that the will is genuine and not a forgery. The ruling of the probate court is binding upon the complainant even if that person was not actually a party to the probate proceeding. Probate proceedings are proceedings in rem. Because there is publication, there is constructive notice to the whole world and judgment or a decree in a probate proceeding is binding upon the entire world, even the state. ALSUA-BETTS vs. CA July 30, 1979 FACTS: Pablo, Fernando and Francisca agreed in writing that their father, Don Jesus, be appointed by the court executor of the will of their mother. Thereafter, Don Jesus cancelled his holographic will and executed a new. After his death, Francisca filed a petition for the probate of the new will. It was opposed by his sons, Pablo and Fernando, on the ground that Don Jesus was not of sound mind at the time of the execution of the will. The will was disallowed. The daughter argued that the other children, Pablo and Fernando, are in estoppel to question the competence of Don Jesus by virtue of the agreement previously entered. HELD: The principle of estoppel is not applicable in probate proceedings. Probate proceedings involve public interest, and the application therein of the rule of estoppel, when it will block the ascertainment of the truth as to the circumstances, surrounding the execution of a testament, would seem inimical to public policy. The controversy as to the competency of Don Jesus to execute his will cannot be determined by the acts of his sons to the will in formally agreeing in writing with Francisca that their father be appointed by the court executor of the will of their mother. The SC allowed the probate of the will upon finding that Don Jesus complied with the requirements of law as to the execution of the will. LIM vs. CA January 24, 2000 FACTS: In the inventory of the estate of Pastor, it included some properties belonging to some business entities. The said corporations filed a motion for the exclusion of their property form the inventory. Rufina argued that Pastor owned the said business entities. It follows that he also own the properties of the corporations. HELD: The issue on the exclusion and inclusion of property from the inventory is within the competence of the probate court. The determination of which court exercises jurisdiction over matters of probate depends upon the gross value of the estate of the decedent. However, the courts determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action which may be instituted by the parties. In this case, the real properties sought to be excluded from the inventory were duly registered under the Torrens system in the name of the private corporations, and as such were to be afforded the presumptive conclusiveness of title. The probate court in denying the motion for
exclusion acted in utter disregard of the presumption of conclusiveness of title in favor of private respondents. A corporation is clothed with personality separate and distinct from that of the persons composing it. Consequently, the assets of the corporation are not the assets of the estate of Pastor Lim. IN RE: ESTATE OF JOHNSON November 16, 1918 FACTS: After 3 months from the time the will was allowed probate, the decedents daughter from the first marriage, claiming to be the sole legitimate heir, noted an exception to the order admitting the will to probate. No petition was filed but her attorneys merely entered an appearance on her behalf. 7 months after the probate order was issued, the same attorneys moved the court to vacate the order admitting the will to probate. HELD: The application to set aside must be denied because it was filed out of time. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, the application for relief must be made within a reasonable time, but in no case exceeding 6 months after such judgment, order or other proceeding was taken. Such judgment, order or other proceedings extends to all sorts of judicial proceedings like probate proceedings. Although the time allowed for the making of such application was inconveniently short, the remedy existed and the possibility of its use is proved in this case by the circumstance that on June 12, 1916, she in fact appeared in court by her attorneys and excepted to the order admitting the will to probate. LEVISTE vs. CA January 30, 1989 FACTS: Leviste received a letter form a client terminating his services in connection with a probate proceeding. Leviste filed a Motion to Intervene to Protect his Rights to Fees for Professional Services. HELD: Leviste cannot intervene. Leviste was not a party to the probate proceeding in the lower court. He had no direct interest in the probate of the will. His only interest in the estate is an indirect interest as former counsel for a prospective heir. One who is only indirectly interested in a will may not interfere in its probate. DOROTHEO vs. CA December 8, 1999 FACTS: Alejandros will was admitted to probate in a petition filed by Lourdes. Nilda files a Motion to Declare the Will Intrinsically Void after 2 years arguing that Lourdes was not the legal wife of the decedent. The order declaring the will intrinsically void was affirmed. Lourdes failed to file her appellants brief. An entry of judgment was made. However, an order was issued by the probate judge setting aside the above order on the ground that it was merely interlocutory; hence, not final in character. HELD: A probated will cannot be given effect if it was later on declared intrinsically void. There is nothing to execute where the testamentary provisions have been declared void in an order that has become final and executory. Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator provides for dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance according to the laws on succession, the unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect. The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised even after the will has been authenticated. A final judgment on probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole world. In setting aside the order declaring the will intrinsically void, the trial court nullified the entry of judgment made by the CA. A lower court cannot reverse or set aside decisions of a superior court.
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MALOLES vs. PHILIPS January 31, 200 FACTS: Dr. de Santos filed a petition for the probate of his will. He alleged that he had no compulsory heirs. The petition was granted. Shortly after, he died. Octavio, his nephew, filed a Motion for Intervention. He argued that as the nearest of kin and creditor of the testator, his interest in the matter is material and direct. HELD: In order for a person to be allowed to intervene in a proceeding, he must have an interest in the estate or in the will or in the property to be affected by it. He must be an interested party or one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor, and whose interest is material and direct. Octavio is not an heir or legatee under the will of the decedent. Neither is he a compulsory heir of the decedent. As the only and nearest collateral relative of the decedent, he can inherit from the latter only in case of intestacy. He can only inherit if the will is annulled. His interest is therefore not direct or immediate. His claim to being a creditor is belated as it has been raised for the first time only in his reply to the opposition to his motion to intervene and is not supported by evidence. A probate proceeding is terminated upon the issuance of the order allowing the probate of a will. In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of the court is limited to ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. Ordinarily, probate proceedings are instituted only after the death of the testator. However, Article 838 of the Civil Code authorizes the filing of a petition for probate of the will filed by the testator himself. NUGUID vs. NUGUID June 23, 1966 FACTS: The parents of the testatrix opposed the petition for probate on the ground of preterition. They contend that they are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line and that the institution of the testatrix of her sister as the universal heir preterited them, and that in consequence the institution is void. HELD: The court's area of inquiry is limited - to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity, and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities by law prescribed, are the questions solely to be represented, and to be acted upon, by the court. However, if it is alleged that the will is void because of preterition, a probate would be useless, if indeed there was preterition. Since the will provides for the institution of the testatrix sister as universal heir and nothing more, the result is the same. The entire will is null and void. PASTOR vs. CA June 24, 1983 FACTS The petition for probate was granted. The hearing on the intrinsic validity of the will was opposed on the ground that there was a pending reconveyance suit over the ownership of shares in Atlas mining. The court resolved the question of ownership of the royalties payable by Atlas mining to the estate of the decedent and ordered the payment of the legacy. HELD: The probate order cannot resolve with finality the questions of ownership of properties involved in the proceeding. The determination is merely provisional. Hence, the legacy should not be given yet. As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality.
Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title. In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to the extrinsic validity of the will. Nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a declaration of ownership of specific properties. On the contrary, it is manifest therein that ownership was not resolved for it confined itself to the question of extrinsic validity of the will, and the need for and propriety of appointing a special administrator. CORONADO vs. CA January 24, 2002 FACTS: Juana claims that a portion of the property in question was inherited by her as provided in the will of her grandfather Melecio. Leonida claims that the property in question was bequeathed to her under a will executed by Dr. Monterola, who was allegedly in possession thereof even before the outbreak of World War II. Said will was probated. Juana opposed the probate. HELD: While it is true that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court, the questioned will, however, may be sustained on the basis of Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1899, which was in force at the time said document was executed by Melecio in 1918. In this case, nowhere was it alleged nor shown that Leonida is entitled to legitime from Melecio. The truth of the matter is that the record is bereft of any showing that Leonida and the late Melecio were related to each other. Juana is not estopped from questioning the ownership of the property in question, notwithstanding her having objected to the probate of the will executed by Monterola under which Leonida is claiming title to the said property. CAYETANO vs. LEONIDAS May 30, 1984 FACTS: Nenita, sister of the testatrix, filed a petition for the reprobate of a will allegedly executed by Adoracion in the US. Adoracion was a US citizen. The petition was granted. Hermogenes, father of Adoracion, maintained that since the reprobate was allowed, he was divested of his legitime which was reserved by law for him. HELD: The probate court can rule upon the issue on preterition, although such issue deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. As a general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law, The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue. Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited Hermogenes, and thus, reprobate should have been denied. But it was sufficiently established that Adoracion, at the time of her death, was a US citizen resident. As regards the intrinsic validity of the will, the national law of the decedent must apply. SOLIVIO vs. CA February 12, 1990 FACTS: Celedonia, maternal aunt of the deceased, was declared as the sole heir. 4 months later, Concordia, sister of the deceaseds father file a MFR claiming that she too was an heir of the deceased. Instead of appealing, Concordia sued Celedonia for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages. The suit was initiated while the
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probate proceedings were still pending. granted Concordias prayers.
Branch 26 ETHEL GRIMM ROBERTS vs. LEONIDAS April 27, 1984 FACTS: Grimm, a US citizen of Manila, executed 2 will in San Francisco, California. One will disposed of his Philippine estate and the other disposed of his estate outside the Philippines. Ethel, Grimms daughter by a first marriage, filed a nd petition for intestate proceeding. Maxine, Grimms 2 wife, opposed on the ground of the pendency of the probate proceedings in Utah. She later filed a petition for probate of the 2 wills, already probated in Utah and prayed that the partition approved by Branch 20, the intestate court, be set aside. This was approved by Branch 38. HELD: Such petition for the probate of the 2 wills and the annulment of the partition approved by Branch 20 can be entertained by Branch 38. A testate proceeding is proper in this case. The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. The intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the 2 cases. VDA. DE KILAYKO vs. JUDGE TENGCO March 27, 1992 FACTS: In the settlement of the estate of Lizares, a project partition was submitted. In accordance with the said project of partition, the heirs executed an agreement of partition and subdivision. Later, a motion was filed to reopen the testate estate proceedings of Lizares. HELD: The testate proceedings cannot anymore be reopened because the Lizares sisters recognized the decree of partition sanctioned by the probate court and in fact reaped the fruits thereof. Hence, they are now precluded from attacking the validity of the partition or any part of it in the guise of a complaint for reconveyance. In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated . A project partition is merely a proposal for the distribution of the hereditary estate which the court may accept or reject. It is the court that makes that distribution of the estate and determines the persons entitled thereto. It cannot be denied that when they moved for the reopening of the testate estate proceedings of Maria, the judicial decree of partition and the order of closure of such proceedings was already final and executory. ARANCILLO vs. PENAFLORIDA 54 OG 2914 HELD: Even if the discovered will has already been probated, if later on a subsequent will is discovered, the latter may still be presented for probate. Even if the discovered will had been made earlier than the probate will, it can still be probated as long as the 2 wills can be reconciled, or if there are portions in the first which have not been revoked in the second. CAIZA vs. CA February 24, 1997 FACTS: Through her guardian, Carmen sued the Spouses Estrada for ejectment from her property alleging that she already had urgent need of the house on account of her advanced age and failing health. The Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them by Carmen clearly denotes her intention that they remain in possession thereof since their ouster be inconsistent with the Carmens holographic will. HELD: A legal guardian can validly sue on behalf of her ward for ejectment where the same property is urgently needed by her ward. A will is essentially ambulatory. At any time prior to the testators death, it may be changed or revoked, and
HELD: Branch 26 was incorrect in taking cognizance of the case because it was the probate court that had the exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate. It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the persons entitled thereto that brings to a close the intestate proceedings. The order declaring Celedonia as the sole heir of the estate did not toll the end of the proceedings. In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedents estate, a court should not interfere with probate proceedings pending in a co-equal court. AJERO vs. CA September 16, 1994 FACTS: The probate of a will was opposed on the ground that the testatrix cannot validly dispose of the house and lot because she shared the property with her fathers other heirs. HELD: As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. However, in exceptional instances, the courts are not powerless to do what the situation constrains them to do, and pass upon certain provisions of the will. In this case, the decedent herself stated in her holographic will that the property is in the name of her late father. Thus, the testatrix cannot validly dispose of the whole property, which she shares with her fathers other heirs. MAGALLANES vs. KAYANAN January 20, 1976 FACTS: Lucena filed a solicitud praying that certain lots be partitioned and distributed among the heirs of the deceased Filomena. The heirs of Eligio filed a motion to dismiss claiming ownership over the parcels of land in question and raising the issue that the trial court is devoid of jurisdiction to resolve the issues raised in the pleadings. The heirs of Eligio filed a petition for summary judgment on the pleadings praying that their absolute right of ownership over the properties in question be recognized and confirmed. It was granted. HELD: The lower court has no jurisdiction to pass finally and definitely upon the title or ownership of the properties involved in the summary settlement of the estate of the deceased Filomena. The probate court may only rule upon the title to property in the following cases: 1. For the purpose of determining whether or not a given property should be included in the inventory of the estate of the deceased. But such determination is not conclusive. 2. If the parties voluntarily submitted to its jurisdiction and introduced evidence to prove ownership. In the case at bar, the action instituted by the petitioner was not for the purpose of determining whether or not a given property should be included in the inventory of the estate of the deceased. The action was for partition and distribution of the properties left by the deceased. Neither have all of the parties voluntarily submitted the issue of ownership for resolution by the court. As a matter of fact, the petitioner opposed the petition of private respondents to have the issue of ownership or title decided in the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. It was therefore erroneous for the lower court to resolve the question of title or ownership over the properties in said proceeding. It could only pass upon such a question in the exercise of its general jurisdiction in an ordinary action.
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until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder. An owners intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing property by his tolerance, is not inconsistent with the formers taking back possession in the meantime for any reason deemed sufficient. In this case, there was sufficient cause for the owners resumption of possession. BALANAY, JR. vs. MARTINEZ June 27, 1975 FACTS: The testatrix said in her will that it was her desire that her properties should not be divided among her heirs during her husbands lifetime. She further stated th at after her husbands death, her paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands should be distributed in the manner set forth in her will. She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if she owned all of them. Thus, she disposed of in the will her husbands share of the conjugal assets. The husband and one of the daughters opposed the probate of the will alleging preterition of the husband and alleged improper partition of the conjugal estate. The husband later withdrew his opposition and expressed conformity with his wifes wishes. The probate court gave effect to the renunciation of the husbands hereditary rights. Later, the probate court dismissed the petition and declared the will void and converted the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding. HELD: The probate court can pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will before ruling on its formal validity in this case. In view of unusual provisions in the will, which are of dubious legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate, the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the wills intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established. The probate court, however, was not correct in declaring the will intrinsically void. The invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been made. The statement of the testatrix that she owned the southern half of the conjugal lands is contrary to law because, although she was a co-owner thereof, her share was inchoate and pro-indiviso. But that illegal declaration does not nullify the entire will. It may be disregarded. The distribution and partition would become effective upon the husbands death. In the meantime, the net income should be equitably divided among the children and the surviving spouse. By reason of the surviving husbands conformity to his wifes will and his renunciation of his hereditary rights, his conjugal share became a part of his deceased wifes estate. His conformity had the effect of validating the partition made in the will, without prejudice to the rights of the creditors and the legitimes of the compulsory heirs. CAMAYA vs. PATULANDONG February 23, 2004 FACTS: Rufina executed a notarized will where she devised a parcel of land to her grandson Anselmo. Later, she executed a codicil which stated that her 4 children and Anselmo would inherit the above parcel of land. Anselmo filed an action for partition against the Patulandongs. It was granted, subject to the result of the probate of the codicil. Anselmo then sold the land to the Camayas. The probate court then issued an order wherein the title issued to the Camayas were declared void and it voided the sale as well. The Camayas contended that the probate court has no power to declare null and void the sale and their title.
HELD: The probate court does not have the power to annul the title to lands subject of a testate proceeding pending before it. The probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it further declared the deed of sale and the titles of the Camayas null and void, it having had the effect of depriving them possession and ownership of the property. A probate court cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that said court could do as regards such properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory. Though the judgment in the partition case had become final and executory as it was not appealed, it specifically provided in its dispositive portion that the decision was without prejudice to the probate of the codicil. The rights of the prevailing parties in said case were subject to the outcome of the probate of the codicil. ARTICLE 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases: (1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with; (2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the time of its execution; (3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats; (4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary or of some other person; (5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud; (6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto. (n) OZAETA vs. CUARTERO 99 PHIL 1041 FACTS: Carlos was married to Cesaria and they had 3 children. After Cesaria died, Carlos lived unmarried with Rosa and they had 8 children. While living with Rosa, Carlos had relations with Maria and they had 6 children. Subsequently, Carlos married Rosa and thereafter made his will. At the time the will was made, Carlos was living with Ramon while his house was being repaired. The will named Pres. Roxas as executor and Ramon as executor in default of Pres. Roxas. Ramon filed a petition for probate joined by Rosa and her children. Maria and her children opposed it on the ground that it was procured by fraud, undue pressure and influence. The lower court allowed probate. The children of the first marriage appealed. HELD: The imputation of blindness has not been substantiated. While witnesses testified that Carlos had to request them to read report and contract to him due to failing eyesight, they could not assure the court that he was in fact blind. The deceased was still signing checks and could read papers by himself. The decedent also appeared to be in full possession of his mental faculties. The claim that the will was obtained through undue influence and improper pressure has no substantial basis but is more matter of conjecture engendered by suspicion which the weight of authority regards as insufficient to sustain a verdict defeating a will on that ground. It is not enough that there was opportunity to exercise undue influence or possibility that it might have been exercised. There must be substantial evidence that it was actually exercised. COSO vs. FERNANDEZ 42 PHIL 596 FACTS: Frederico was a married man and a resident of the Philippines. He met Rosario in Spain and had illicit relations with her for many years. The will of Frederico tercio de libre disposicion to the illegitimate son of the testator with Rosario and to her payment by way of reimbursement for the expenses incurred
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by her in taking care of the testator when he is alleged to have suffered from a sever illness. The CFI set aside his will on the ground of undue influence alleged to have been exercised over the mind of the testator by Rosario. HELD: The mere or reasonable influence over a testator is not sufficient to invalidate a will. The influence must be undue, a kind that so overpowers the mind of the testator as to destroy his free agency and make him express the will of another, rather than his own. The mere fact that some influence exercised by a person sustaining an adulterous relation does not invalidate a will, unless it is further shown that the influence destroys the testators free agency. The testator is an intelligent man, a lawyer by profession. Mere affection, even if illegitimate, is not undue influence and does not invalidate a will. But still under the law, the mistress is incapacitated to inherit. SECTION 2 Institution of Heir ARTICLE 840. Institution of heir is an act by virtue of which a testator designates in his will the person or persons who are to succeed him in his property and transmissible rights and obligations. (n) ARTICLE 841. A will shall be valid even though it should not contain an institution of an heir, or such institution should not comprise the entire estate, and even though the person so instituted should not accept the inheritance or should be incapacitated to succeed. In such cases the testamentary dispositions made in accordance with law shall be complied with and the remainder of the estate shall pass to the legal heirs. (764)
ARTICLE 847. When the testator institutes some heirs individually and others collectively as when he says, "I designate as my heirs A and B, and the children of C," those collectively designated shall be considered as individually instituted, unless it clearly appears that the intention of the testator was otherwise. (769a) NABLE vs. USON March 10, 1914 FACTS: The codicil of Filomena contains the following: "First. I declare that all the property which belongs to me as conjugal property, referred to in my said testament, shall be the property of my aforesaid husband, Don Rafael Sison; in case all or part of said property exists at my husband's death, it is my will that at his death my sisters and nieces hereinafter named succeed him as heirs. "Second. I declare to be my sisters in lawful wedlock the persons named Doa Antonia Uson, now deceased, who has left two daughters called Maria Rosario, widow, of Estanislao Lengson; Ignacia Uson, married to Don Vicente Puzon; Eufemia Uson, now deceased, who is survived by three daughters called Maria Salud, Maria Amparo, and Maria Asuncion; and Maria Pilar Uson; Maria Manaoag Uson, unmarried, issue had by our deceased father Don Daniel Uson with one Leonarda Fernandez, alias Andao de Lingayen, so that they may have and enjoy it in equal parts as good sisters and relatives. HELD: The property should be divided equally between the living sisters and the children of the deceased sisters, share and share alike, a niece taking the same share that a sister receives. The testatrix, in the first paragraph, declares that after her husband's death she desires that her sisters and nieces nd shall succeed him as heirs. In the 2 paragraph, the nieces are referred to in no way different from the sisters. In that final declaration, the testatrix desires that the sisters and nieces shall take and enjoy the property in equal parts. The testatrix's intention is fairly clear. ARTICLE 848. If the testator should institute his brothers and sisters, and he has some of full blood and others of half blood, the inheritance shall be distributed equally unless a different intention appears. (770a) ARTICLE 849. When the testator calls to the succession a person and his children they are all deemed to have been instituted simultaneously and not successively. (771) ARTICLE 850. The statement of a false cause for the institution of an heir shall be considered as not written, unless it appears from the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of such cause. (767a) AUSTRIA vs. REYES February 27, 1970 FACTS: The bulk of the estate of Basilia was destined under the will to pass on to the respondents, all of whom had been assumed and declared by Basilia as her own legally adopted children. Petitioners filed a petition in intervention for partition alleging that they are the nearest of kin of Basilia, and that the respondents had not in fact been adopted by the decedent in accordance with law, rendering these respondents mere strangers to the decedent and without any right to succeed as heirs. The court allowed the intervention. After 3 years after that they were allowed to intervene, petitioners moved to set for hearing the matter on genuineness of the adoption. HELD: The institution of heirs would retain efficacy in the event there exists proof that the adoption of the same heirs by the decedent is false. The petitioners seems to imply, from the use of the terms, "sapilitang tagapagmana" (compulsory heirs) and "sapilitang mana" (legitime), that the impelling reason or cause for the institution of the respondents was the testatrix's
ARTICLE 842. One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed. One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs. (763a) ARTICLE 843. The testator shall designate the heir by his name and surname, and when there are two persons having the same names, he shall indicate some circumstance by which the instituted heir may be known. Even though the testator may have omitted the name of the heir, should he designate him in such manner that there can be no doubt as to who has been instituted, the institution shall be valid. (772) ARTICLE 844. An error in the name, surname, or circumstances of the heir shall not vitiate the institution when it is possible, in any other manner, to know with certainty the person instituted. If among persons having the same names and surnames, there is a similarity of circumstances in such a way that, even with the use of other proof, the person instituted cannot be identified, none of them shall be an heir. (773a) ARTICLE 845. Every disposition in favor of an unknown person shall be void, unless by some event or circumstance his identity becomes certain. However, a disposition in favor of a definite class or group of persons shall be valid. (750a) ARTICLE 846. Heirs instituted without designation of shares shall inherit in equal parts. (765)
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belief that under the law she could not do otherwise. If this were indeed what prompted the testatrix in instituting the respondents, she did not make it known in her will. If she was aware that succession to the legitime takes place by operation of law, independent of her own wishes, she would not have found it convenient to name her supposed compulsory heirs to their legitimes. The decedent's will does not state in a specific or unequivocal manner the cause for such institution of heirs. It cannot be annulled on the basis of guesswork or uncertain implications. Such institution may be annulled only when one is satisfied, after an examination of the will, that the testator clearly would not have made the institution if he had known the cause for it to be false. At all events, the legality of the adoption of the respondents by the testatrix can be assailed only in a separate action brought for that purpose, and cannot be the subject of a collateral attack. ARTICLE 851. If the testator has instituted only one heir, and the institution is limited to an aliquot part of the inheritance, legal succession takes place with respect to the remainder of the estate. The same rule applies, if the testator has instituted several heirs each being limited to an aliquot part, and all the parts do not cover the whole inheritance. (n) ARTICLE 852. If it was the intention of the testator that the instituted heirs should become sole heirs to the whole estate, or the whole free portion, as the case may be, and each of them has been instituted to an aliquot part of the inheritance and their aliquot parts together do not cover the whole inheritance, or the whole free portion, each part shall be increased proportionally. (n) ARTICLE 853. If each of the instituted heirs has been given an aliquot part of the inheritance, and the parts together exceed the whole inheritance, or the whole free portion, as the case may be, each part shall be reduced proportionally. (n) ARTICLE 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation. (814a)
to the opposition to his motion to intervene, and, as far as the records show, not supported by evidence. It has been held that an "interested person" is one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor, and whose interest is material and direct, not merely incidental or contingent. ACAIN vs. IAC October 27, 1987 FACTS: Constantino filed a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio. The will provided that all his shares from properties he earned with his wife shall be given to his brother Segundo (father of Constantino). In case Segundo dies, all such property shall be given to Segundos children. Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. The oppositors Virginia, a legally adopted daughter of the deceased, and the latter's widow Rosa filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited. HELD: Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line. The same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia, whose legal adoption by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner. Adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child. Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance. The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned. The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs - without any other testamentary disposition in the will - amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it. Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee there being no mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual item of personal or real property he is called upon to receive. At the outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir. However, intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent adopted child and the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect not an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left by the deceased. NON vs. CA February 15, 2000 FACTS: Petitioners contended that the late Nilo employed forgery and undue influence to coerce Julian to execute the deed of donation. Petitioner Rebecca averred that her brother Nilo employed fraud to procure her signature to the deed of extrajudicial settlement. She added that the exclusion of her retardate sister, Delia Viado, in the
MALOLES II vs. PHILIPS January 31, 200 FACTS: Dr. de Santos filed a petition for probate of his will. In his petition, Dr. De Santos alleged that he had no compulsory heirs and that he had named in his will as sole legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc. The petition for the allowance of the said will was approved and allowed. Maloles II filed a motion for intervention claiming that, as the only child of Alicia de Santos (testator's sister) and Octavio L. Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos. He likewise alleged that he was a creditor of the testator. HELD: Maloles II is not an heir or legatee under the will of the decedent. Neither is he a compulsory heir of the latter. As the only and nearest collateral relative of the decedent, he can inherit from the latter only in case of intestacy. Since the decedent has left a will which has already been probated and disposes of all his properties the private respondent can inherit only if the said will is annulled. His claim to being a creditor of the estate is a belated one, having been raised for the first time only in his reply
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extrajudicial settlement, resulted in the latter's preterition that should warrant its annulment. HELD: When Virginia died intestate, her part of the conjugal property, the Isarog property included, was transmitted to her heirs her husband Julian and their children. The inheritance, which vested from the moment of death of the decedent, remained under a co-ownership regime among the heirs until partition. Petitioners are vague on how and in what manner fraud, forgery and undue influence occurred. The exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado, alleged to be a retardate, from the deed of extrajudicial settlement verily has had the effect of preterition. This kind of preterition, however, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith, does not justify a collateral attack on the TCT issued. The relief instead rests on Article 1104 of the Civil Code to the effect that where the preterition is not attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid the value of the share pertaining to her. Again, the appellate court has thus acted properly in ordering the remand of the case for further proceedings to make the proper valuation of the Isarog property and ascertainment of the amount due petitioner Delia Viado. NERI vs. ATUKIN May 21, 1943 FACTS: In his will, the testator left all his property by universal title to the children by his second marriage with preterition of the children by his first marriage. HELD: The testator left all his property by universal title to the children by his second marriage, and that without expressly disinheriting the children by his first marriage, he left nothing to them or, at least, some of them. This is a case of preterition governed by Article 814 (Article 854) of the Civil Code, which provides that the institution of heirs shall be annulled and intestate succession should be declared open. The theory is advanced that the bequest made by universal title in favor of the children by the second marriage should be treated as legacy and devise and, accordingly, it must not be entirely annulled but merely reduced. This theory, if adopted, will result in a complete abrogation of Articles 814 and 851 of the Civil Code. In a case of preterition where in which the whole property is left to one or some forced heirs, the total nullity of the testamentary disposition would have the effect, not of depriving totally the instituted heir of his share in the inheritance, but of placing him and the other forced heirs upon the basis of equality. MANINANG vs. CA June 19, 1982 FACTS: Clemencia, left a holographic will which provides that all her properties shall be inherited by Dra. Maninang with whose family Clemencia has lived continuously for the last 30 years. The will also provided that she does not consider Bernardo as his adopted son. Bernardo, as the adopted son, claims to be the sole heir of decedent Clemencia Aseneta, instituted intestate proceedings. HELD: In the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for resolution is whether under the terms of the decedent's Will, private respondent had been preterited or disinherited, and if the latter, whether it was a valid disinheritance. Preterition and disinheritance are two diverse concepts. Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Disinheritance is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heirs of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law. By virtue of the dismissal of the testate case, the determination of that controversial issue has not been thoroughly considered. The conclusion of the trial court
was that Bernardo has been preterited. The SC is of opinion, however, that from the face of the will, that conclusion is not indubitable. Such preterition is still questionable. The Special Proceeding is REMANDED to the lower court TAMAYO vs. TAMAYO August 12, 2005 (Preterition not mentioned in the ruling) FACTS: Petitioners are half-siblings of the respondents. Petitioners filed a complaint for the revocation of the said donation, alleging they were preterited. CA dismissed their appeal for failure to pay the corresponding docket fees. HELD: CA was correct in dismissing the appeal. Failure to pay the required docket fees will result to the dismissal of the appeal. JLT AGRO vs. BALANSAG March 11, 2005 FACTS: Julian married Antonia and they had 2 children. After Antonias death, Julian married Milagros and they had 4 children. A compromise agreement was entered wherein it was to be owned in common by Julian and his 2 children st from the 1 marriage. The 3 of them executed a Deed of Assignment of Assets and Liabilities in favor of JLT Agro. A Supplemental Deed was later executed transferring ownership over the lot in favor of JLT Agro. Meanwhile, Milagros and her children took possession over the subject lot. Balansag also bought the said lot from Milagros. HELD: The appellate court erred in holding that future legitime can be determined, adjudicated and reserved prior to the death of Don Julian. At the time of the execution of the deed of assignment covering the lot in question in favor of petitioner, Julian remained the owner of the property since ownership over the subject lot would only pass to his heirs from the second marriage at the time of his death. Don Julian did not execute a will since what he resorted to was a partition inter vivos of his properties, as evidenced by the court approved Compromise Agreement. It is premature if not irrelevant to speak of preterition prior to the death of Don Julian in the absence of a will depriving a legal heir of his legitime. Besides, there are other properties which the heirs from the second marriage could inherit from Don Julian upon his death. Hence, the total omission from inheritance of Don Julian's heirs from the second marriage, a requirement for preterition to exist, is hardly imaginable as it is unfounded. ARTICLE 855. The share of a child or descendant omitted in a will must first be taken from the part of the estate not disposed of by the will, if any; if that is not sufficient, so much as may be necessary must be taken proportionally from the shares of the other compulsory heirs. (1080a) ARTICLE 856. A voluntary heir who dies before the testator transmits nothing to his heirs. A compulsory heir who dies before the testator, a person incapacitated to succeed, and one who renounces the inheritance, shall transmit no right to his own heirs except in cases expressly provided for in this Code. (766a) SECTION 3 Substitution of Heirs
ARTICLE 857. Substitution is the appointment of another heir so that he may enter into the inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted. (n) ARTICLE 858. Substitution of heirs may be: (1) Simple or common; (2) Brief or compendious; (3) Reciprocal; or (4) Fideicommissary. (n)
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ARTICLE 859. The testator may designate one or more persons to substitute the heir or heirs instituted in case such heir or heirs should die before him, or should not wish, or should be incapacitated to accept the inheritance. A simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to which it refers, shall comprise the three mentioned in the preceding paragraph, unless the testator has otherwise provided. (774) RABADILLA vs. CA June 29, 2000 FACTS: In the codicil of testatrix, Rabadilla was instituted as a devisee of a lot, containing the following provisions: 1. Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every year, to give to Belleza 100 piculs of sugar until Belleza dies; 2. Should Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give the lot shall have to obligation to still give yearly the sugar as specified to Belleza; 3. In the event that the lot is sold, leased or mortgaged, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the obligation to respect and deliver yearly sugar to Belleza. Should the command be not respected, Belleza shall immediately seize the lot and turn it over to the testatrix near descendants. HELD: This is not a case of simple substitution . The codicil did not provide that should Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix near descendants would substitute him. Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution. Here, the instituted heir is in fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate the property provided the negotiation is with the near descendants or the sister of the testatrix. Also, the near descendants right to inherit from the testatrix is not definite. It will only pass to them if the obligation to deliver is not fulfilled. Moreover, a fideicommissary substitution is void if the first heir is not related by first degree to the second degree. In this case, the near descendants are not at all related to Dr. Rabadilla. This is also not a conditional institution. The testatrix did not make Rabadillas inheritance dependent on the performance of the said obligation. Since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the will itself that such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and not conditional. The manner of institution is modal because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without affecting the efficacy of such institution. A mode imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession. In a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does not obligate. The mode obligates but does not suspend. TESTATE ESTATE OF RAMIREZ vs. VDA. DE RAMIREZ February 15, 1982 FACTS: The principal beneficiaries of Jose are his widow, his 2 grandnephews and his companion Wanda. The widow is a French who lives in Paris, while the companion Wanda is an Austrian who lives in Spain. Moreover, the testator provided for substitutions. Jose, a Filipino, died in Spain with only his widow as compulsory heir. A project partition was submitted wherein One part shall go to the widow and the other part or "free portion" shall go to the grandnephews. It was provided that 1/3 of the free portion is charged with the widow's usufruct and the remaining 2/3 with a usufruct in favor of Wanda. The grandnephews opposed the project of partition and one of the grounds was that the provisions for fideicommissary substitutions are invalid because the first
heirs are not related to the second heirs or substitutes within the first degree. HELD: The fideicommissary substitution is void. The substitutes are not related to Wanda. The second heir must be related to and be one generation from the first heir. It follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child or a parent of the first heir. Therefore, 1/2 of the estate which is the free portion goes to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez, the substitutes. Article 860. Two or more persons may be substituted for one, and one person for two or more heirs. Article 861. If heirs instituted in unequal shares should be reciprocally substituted, the substitute shall acquire the share of the heir who dies, renounces, or is incapacitated, unless it clearly appears that the intention of the testator was otherwise. If there are more than one substitute, they shall have the same share in the substitution as in the institution. (779a) ARTICLE 862. The substitute shall be subject to the same charges and conditions imposed upon the instituted heir, unless the testator has expressly provided the contrary, or the charges or conditions are personally applicable only to the heir instituted. (780) ARTICLE 863. A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary or first heir instituted is entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir the whole or part of the inheritance, shall be valid and shall take effect, provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted, and provided further, that the fiduciary or first heir and the second heir are living at the time of the death of the testator. (781a)
PCIB vs. ESCOLIN; PCIB vs. PABLICO March 29, 1974 FACTS: Linnie Hodges died leaving a will which states that at the death of her husband, Charles Hodges, she gives, devises and bequeaths all of the rest, residue and remainder of her estate, both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among her brothers and sisters, share and share alike. Charles died. Before Charles death, he executed an affidavit wherein he ratified and confirmed all that he stated in the estate tax returns as to his having renounced what was given him by his wife's will. PCIB contended that, viewed as a substitution, the testamentary disposition in favor of Mrs. Hodges' brothers and sisters may not be given effect.
HELD: Mrs. Hodges' will provides neither for a simple or vulgar substitution under Article 859 of the Civil Code nor for a fideicommissary substitution under Article 863 thereof. There is no vulgar substitution therein because there is no provision for either (1) predecease of the testator by the designated heir or (2) refusal or (3) incapacity of the latter to accept the inheritance, as required by Article 859; and neither is there a fideicommissary substitution therein because no obligation is imposed thereby upon Hodges to preserve the estate or any part thereof for anyone else. The brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are not substitutes for Hodges because, under her will, they are not to inherit what Hodges cannot, would not or may not inherit, but what he would not dispose of from his inheritance; rather, therefore, they are also heirs instituted simultaneously with Hodges, subject, however, to certain conditions, partially resolutory insofar as Hodges was concerned and correspondingly suspensive with reference to his brothers and sisters-in-law.
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It is partially resolutory, since it bequeaths unto Hodges the whole of her estate to be owned and enjoyed by him as universal and sole heir with absolute dominion over them only during his lifetime, which means that while he could completely and absolutely dispose of any portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other than himself, he was not free to do so mortis causa, and all his rights to what might remain upon his death would cease entirely upon the occurrence of that contingency, inasmuch as the right of his brothers and sisters-in-law to the inheritance, although vested already upon the death of Mrs. Hodges, would automatically become operative upon the occurrence of the death of Hodges in the event of actual existence of any remainder of her estate then. ARTICLE 864. A fideicommissary never burden the legitime. (782a) substitution can
ARTICLE 873. Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good customs shall be considered as not imposed and shall in no manner prejudice the heir, even if the testator should otherwise provide. (792a) ARTICLE 874. An absolute condition not to contract a first or subsequent marriage shall be considered as not written unless such condition has been imposed on the widow or widower by the deceased spouse, or by the latter's ascendants or descendants. Nevertheless, the right of usufruct, or an allowance or some personal prestation may be devised or bequeathed to any person for the time during which he or she should remain unmarried or in widowhood. (793a) ARTICLE 875. Any disposition made upon the condition that the heir shall make some provision in his will in favor of the testator or of any other person shall be void. (794a) ARTICLE 876. Any purely potestative condition imposed upon an heir must be fulfilled by him as soon as he learns of the testator's death. This rule shall not apply when the condition, already complied with, cannot be fulfilled again. ARTICLE 877. If the condition is casual or mixed, it shall be sufficient if it happen or be fulfilled at any time before or after the death of the testator, unless he has provided otherwise. Should it have existed or should it have been fulfilled at the time the will was executed and the testator was unaware thereof, it shall be deemed as complied with. If he had knowledge thereof, the condition shall be considered fulfilled only when it is of such a nature that it can no longer exist or be complied with again. (796) ARTICLE 878. A disposition with a suspensive term does not prevent the instituted heir from acquiring his rights and transmitting them to his heirs even before the arrival of the term. (799a) ARTICLE 879. If the potestative condition imposed upon the heir is negative, or consists in not doing or not giving something, he shall comply by giving a security that he will not do or give that which has been prohibited by the testator, and that in case of contravention he will return whatever he may have received, together with its fruits and interests. (800a) ARTICLE 880. If the heir be instituted under a suspensive condition or term, the estate shall be placed under administration until the condition is fulfilled, or until it becomes certain that it cannot be fulfilled, or until the arrival of the term. The same shall be done if the heir does not give the security required in the preceding article. (801a) ARTICLE 881. The appointment of the administrator of the estate mentioned in the preceding article, as well as the manner of the administration and the rights and obligations of the administrator shall be governed by the Rules of Court. (804a) ARTICLE 882. The statement of the object of the institution, or the application of the property left by the testator, or the charge imposed by him, shall not be considered as a condition unless it appears that such was his intention. That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once provided that the instituted heir or his heirs give security for compliance with the wishes of the testator and for the return of anything he or they may receive, together with its fruits and interests, if he or they should disregard this obligation. (797a) ARTICLE 883. When without the fault of the heir, an institution referred to in the preceding article cannot take effect in the exact manner stated by the testator, it shall be
ARTICLE 865. Every fideicommissary substitution must be expressly made in order that it may be valid. The fiduciary shall be obliged to deliver the inheritance to the second heir, without other deductions than those which arise from legitimate expenses, credits and improvements, save in the case where the testator has provided otherwise. (783) ARTICLE 866. The second heir shall acquire a right to the succession from the time of the testator's death, even though he should die before the fiduciary. The right of the second heir shall pass to his heirs. (784) ARTICLE 867. The following shall not take effect: (1) Fideicommissary substitutions which are not made in an express manner, either by giving them this name, or imposing upon the fiduciary the absolute obligation to deliver the property to a second heir; (2) Provisions which contain a perpetual prohibition to alienate, and even a temporary one, beyond the limit fixed in Article 863; (3) Those which impose upon the heir the charge of paying to various persons successively, beyond the limit prescribed in Article 863, a certain income or pension; (4) Those which leave to a person the whole or part of the hereditary property in order that he may apply or invest the same according to secret instructions communicated to him by the testator. (785a) ARTICLE 868. The nullity of the fideicommissary substitution does not prejudice the validity of the institution of the heirs first designated; the fideicommissary clause shall simply be considered as not written. (786) ARTICLE 869. A provision whereby the testator leaves to a person the whole or part of the inheritance, and to another the usufruct, shall be valid. If he gives the usufruct to various persons, not simultaneously, but successively, the provisions of article 863 shall apply. (787a)
ARTICLE 870. The dispositions of the testator declaring all or part of the estate inalienable for more than twenty years are void. (n) SECTION 4 Conditional Testamentary Dispositions and Testamentary Dispositions With a Term ARTICLE 871. The institution of an heir may be made conditionally, or for a certain purpose or cause. (790a)
ARTICLE 872. The testator cannot impose any charge, condition, or substitution whatsoever upon the legitimes prescribed in this Code. Should he do so, the same shall be considered as not imposed. (813a)
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complied with in a manner most analogous to and in conformity with his wishes. If the person interested in the condition should prevent its fulfillment, without the fault of the heir, the condition shall be deemed to have been complied with. (798a) ARTICLE 884. Conditions imposed by the testator upon the heirs shall be governed by the rules established for conditional obligations in all matters not provided for by this Section. (791a) ARTICLE 885. The designation of the day or time when the effects of the institution of an heir shall commence or cease shall be valid. In both cases, the legal heir shall be considered as called to the succession until the arrival of the period or its expiration. But in the first case he shall not enter into possession of the property until after having given sufficient security, with the intervention of the instituted heir. (805) SECTION 5 Legitime ARTICLE 886. Legitime is that part of the testator's property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for certain heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory heirs. (806) ARTICLE 887. The following are compulsory heirs: (1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants; (2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and descendants; (3) The widow or widower; (4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction; (5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287. Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another. In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved. The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner and to the extent established by this Code. (807a) ARTICLE 888. The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother. The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided. (808a) FRANCISCO vs. FRANCISCO March 8, 2001 FACTS: Respondent Aida is the only daughter of Gregorio and Cirila, both deceased. Petitioners are daughters of Gregorio with his common law wife Julia. Gregorio sold a parcel of land to his illegitimate children. HELD: The kasulatan was simulated. There was no consideration for the contract of sale. Even if it was not i simulated, it still violated the Civil Code provisions insofar as the transaction affected respondents legitime. The sale was executed in 1983, when the applicable law was the Civil Code, not the Family Code. Obviously, the sale was Gregorios way to transfer the property to his illegitimate daughters at the expense of his legitimate daughter. If indeed the parcels of land involved were the only property left by their father, the sale in fact would deprive respondent of her share in her fathers estate. By law, she is entitled to half of the estate of her father as his only legitimate child.
ARTICLE 889. The legitime of legitimate parents or ascendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estates of their children and descendants. The children or descendants may freely dispose of the other half, subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided. (809a) ARTICLE 890. The legitime reserved for the legitimate parents shall be divided between them equally; if one of the parents should have died, the whole shall pass to the survivor. If the testator leaves neither father nor mother, but is survived by ascendants of equal degree of the paternal and maternal lines, the legitime shall be divided equally between both lines. If the ascendants should be of different degrees, it shall pertain entirely to the ones nearest in degree of either line. (810)
ARTICLE 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came. (871) CHUA vs. CFI OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL August 31, 1977 FACTS: During his marriage to his 1 wife, a man had a son st and 2 grandchildren. He married again when his 1 wife died nd and had a son with the 2 wife. When the man died, a nd parcel of land owned by him was inherited by his son and 2 nd wife through intestate succession. Later, the son of the 2 marriage died and his half-share was inherited by his mother nd (2 wife) by operation of law. HELD: After the mothers death, the son and the grandchildren can get the half share of the land that was nd held by the 2 wife by way of reserve troncal. This has nd been inherited by the son of the 2 marriage by gratuitous title and transferred to his mother by operation of law. The rd present claimants are relatives within the 3 degree (reservees). It was really a gratuitous object received from the father, who had not imposed any condition or burden on the lot. The obligation to pay interests, costs and other fees was imposed not by the origin but by the court. The said is therefore reservable. In case of reserve troncal, the reservees right or cause of action accrues only from the moment the reservoir dies. GONZALES vs. CFI OF MANILA May 19, 1981 FACTS: Legarda died survived by 3 groups of heirs who partitioned the real properties among themselves in 3 equal portions: one daughter, another daughter and heirs of a deceased son. The heirs of the deceased son were the sons widow and 7 children. One of the children, Filomena, Jr. died intestate and without any child. Her mother partitioned their 1/3 share in the estate of Legarda with her 6 surviving children and gave the properties she inherited from Filomena, Jr. to her 16 grandchildren by means of a holographic will. HELD: The giving through the holographic will is not lawful because the properties given by such holographic will were reservable properties because they were inherited gratuitously from an ascendant transmitted to a descendant (Filomena, Jr.) then given to another ascendant (Filomena, Sr.) by operation of law. Said properties should rd not have been given to the grandchildren (3 degree nd reservees) but to the children (2 degree reservees). Reservees may be the common descendants of the reservoir and the origin reserve troncal contemplates legitimate relationship. Illegitimate relationship and relationship by affinity are excluded.
st
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DE PAPA vs. CAMACHO September 24, 1986 HELD: The stated purpose of the reserve is accomplished once the property has devolved to the specified relatives of the line of origin. But from this time on, there is no further occasion for its application. ARTICLE 892. If only one legitimate child or descendant of the deceased survives, the widow or widower shall be entitled to one-fourth of the hereditary estate. In case of a legal separation, the surviving spouse may inherit if it was the deceased who had given cause for the same. If there are two or more legitimate children or descendants, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to a portion equal to the legitime of each of the legitimate children or descendants. In both cases, the legitime of the surviving spouse shall be taken from the portion that can be freely disposed of by the testator. (834a) ARTICLE 893. If the testator leaves no legitimate descendants, but leaves legitimate ascendants, the surviving spouse shall have a right to one-fourth of the hereditary estate. This fourth shall be taken from the free portion of the estate. (836a) ARTICLE 894. If the testator leaves illegitimate children, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to one-third of the hereditary estate of the deceased and the illegitimate children to another third. The remaining third shall be at the free disposal of the testator. (n) ARTICLE 895. The legitime of each of the acknowledged natural children and each of the natural children by legal fiction shall consist of one-half of the legitime of each of the legitimate children or descendants. The legitime of an illegitimate child who is neither an acknowledged natural, nor a natural child by legal fiction, shall be equal in every case to four-fifths of the legitime of an acknowledged natural child. The legitime of the illegitimate children shall be taken from the portion of the estate at the free disposal of the testator, provided that in no case shall the total legitime of such illegitimate children exceed that free portion, and that the legitime of the surviving spouse must first be fully satisfied. (840a) ARTICLE 896. Illegitimate children who may survive with legitimate parents or ascendants of the deceased shall be entitled to one-fourth of the hereditary estate to be taken from the portion at the free disposal of the testator. (841a) ARTICLE 897. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or descendants, and acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction, such surviving spouse shall be entitled to a portion equal to the legitime of each of the legitimate children which must be taken from that part of the estate which the testator can freely dispose of. (n) ARTICLE 898. If the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or descendants, and with illegitimate children other than acknowledged natural, or natural children by legal fiction, the share of the surviving spouse shall be the same as that provided in the preceding article. (n) DEL ROSARIO vs. CONANAN March 30, 1977 FACTS: Dorotea is the legitimate surviving wife of the deceased Felix. Marilou is the legally adopted children of Felix and Dorotea. Gertrudes, mother of Felix filed a petition for settlement and partition of estate of Felix who died in a plane crash.
The lower court dismissed the petition holding that the law on intestate succession is clear that an adopted child concurring with the surviving spouse of the adopter excludes the legitimate ascendants from succession. HELD: Gertrudes has a right over the properties sought to be partitioned. It is unjust to exclude the adopters parents from the inheritance in favor of an adopted person. It is unfair to accord more successional rights to the adopted, who is only related artificially by fiction of law to the deceased, than those who are naturally related to him by blood in the direct ascending line. In intestate succession, where legitimate parents or ascendants concur with the surviving spouse of the deceased, the latter does not necessarily exclude the former from the inheritance. An adopted child surviving with legitimate parents of the deceased adopter has the same successional rights as an acknowledged natural child. If legitimate ascendants, the surviving spouse, and illegitimate children are left, the ascendants shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the other half shall be divided between the surviving spouse and the illegitimate children so that such widow or widower shall have one-fourth of the estate, and the illegitimate children the other fourth. ARTICLE 899. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate parents or ascendants and with illegitimate children, such surviving spouse shall be entitled to oneeighth of the hereditary estate of the deceased which must be taken from the free portion, and the illegitimate children shall be entitled to one-fourth of the estate which shall be taken also from the disposable portion. The testator may freely dispose of the remaining one-eighth of the estate. (n) ARTICLE 900. If the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall be entitled to one-half of the hereditary estate of the deceased spouse, and the testator may freely dispose of the other half. (837a) If the marriage between the surviving spouse and the testator was solemnized in articulo mortis, and the testator died within three months from the time of the marriage, the legitime of the surviving spouse as the sole heir shall be onethird of the hereditary estate, except when they have been living as husband and wife for more than five years. In the latter case, the legitime of the surviving spouse shall be that specified in the preceding paragraph. (n) ARTICLE 901. When the testator dies leaving illegitimate children and no other compulsory heirs, such illegitimate children shall have a right to one-half of the hereditary estate of the deceased. The other half shall be at the free disposal of the testator. (842a) ARTICLE 902. The rights of illegitimate children set forth in the preceding articles are transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. (843a) ARTICLE 903. The legitime of the parents who have an illegitimate child, when such child leaves neither legitimate descendants, nor a surviving spouse, nor illegitimate children, is one-half of the hereditary estate of such illegitimate child. If only legitimate or illegitimate children are left, the parents are not entitled to any legitime whatsoever. If only the widow or widower survives with parents of the illegitimate child, the legitime of the parents is one-fourth of the hereditary estate of the child, and that of the surviving spouse also one-fourth of the estate. (n) ARTICLE 904. The testator cannot deprive his compulsory heirs of their legitime, except in cases expressly specified by law. Neither can he impose upon the same any burden, encumbrance, condition, or substitution of any kind whatsoever. (813a) ARTICLE 905. Every renunciation or compromise as regards a future legitime between the person owing it and his
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compulsory heirs is void, and the latter may claim the same upon the death of the former; but they must bring to collation whatever they may have received by virtue of the renunciation or compromise. (816) ARTICLE 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less than the legitime belonging to him may demand that the same be fully satisfied. (815) ARTICLE 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or diminish the legitime of the compulsory heirs shall be reduced on petition of the same, insofar as they may be inofficious or excessive. (817) ARTICLE 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the testator shall be considered, deducting all debts and charges, which shall not include those imposed in the will. To the net value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all donations by the testator that are subject to collation, at the time he made them. (818a) ARTICLE 909. Donations given to children shall be charged to their legitime. Donations made to strangers shall be charged to that part of the estate of which the testator could have disposed by his last will. Insofar as they may be inofficious or may exceed the disposable portion, they shall be reduced according to the rules established by this Code. (819a) ARTICLE 910. Donations which an illegitimate child may have received during the lifetime of his father or mother, shall be charged to his legitime. Should they exceed the portion that can be freely disposed of, they shall be reduced in the manner prescribed by this Code. (847a) ARTICLE 911. After the legitime has been determined in accordance with the three preceding articles, the reduction shall be made as follows: (1) Donations shall be respected as long as the legitime can be covered, reducing or annulling, if necessary, the devises or legacies made in the will; (2) The reduction of the devises or legacies shall be pro rata, without any distinction whatever. If the testator has directed that a certain devise or legacy be paid in preference to others, it shall not suffer any reduction until the latter have been applied in full to the payment of the legitime. (3) If the devise or legacy consists of a usufruct or life annuity, whose value may be considered greater than that of the disposable portion, the compulsory heirs may choose between complying with the testamentary provision and delivering to the devisee or legatee the part of the inheritance of which the testator could freely dispose. (820a) ARTICLE 912. If the devise subject to reduction should consist of real property, which cannot be conveniently divided, it shall go to the devisee if the reduction does not absorb one-half of its value; and in a contrary case, to the compulsory heirs; but the former and the latter shall reimburse each other in cash for what respectively belongs to them. The devisee who is entitled to a legitime may retain the entire property, provided its value does not exceed that of the disposable portion and of the share pertaining to him as legitime. (821) DIZON-RIVERA vs. DIZON JUNE 30, 1970 FACTS: The testatrix died and was survived by 7 compulsory heirs - 6 legitimate children and a legitimate granddaughter. The testatrix left a last will and named beneficiaries in her will the 7 compulsory heirs plus 7 other legitimate grandchildren.
A project partition was filed reducing the share of Marina and Tomas share (children) as they are admittedly considered to have received in the will more than their respective legitime. The other children proposed their own project partition whereby they would reduce the testamentary disposition or partition made by the testatrix to and limit the same, which they would consider as mere devises or legacies to of the estate as the disposable free portion. HELD: The testamentary dispositions made in the testatrix will are not in the nature of devises imputable to the free portion of her estate. It is not subject to reduction. nd The 2 paragraph of Article 912 covers precisely the case of Marina, who admittedly was favored by the testatrix with the large bulk of her estate in providing that the devisee who is entitled to a legitime may retain the entire property, provided its value does not exceed that of the disposable portion and of the share pertaining to the legitime. For diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for making a testament, otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate. ARTICLE 913. If the heirs or devisees do not choose to avail themselves of the right granted by the preceding article, any heir or devisee who did not have such right may exercise it; should the latter not make use of it, the property shall be sold at public auction at the instance of any one of the interested parties. (822) ARTICLE 914. The testator may devise and bequeath the free portion as he may deem fit. (n) SECTION 6 Disinheritance ARTICLE 915. A compulsory heir may, in consequence of disinheritance, be deprived of his legitime, for causes expressly stated by law. (848a) ARTICLE 916. Disinheritance can be effected only through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. (849) ARTICLE 917. The burden of proving the truth of the cause for disinheritance shall rest upon the other heirs of the testator, if the disinherited heir should deny it. (850) ARTICLE 918. Disinheritance without a specification of the cause, or for a cause the truth of which, if contradicted, is not proved, or which is not one of those set forth in this Code, shall annul the institution of heirs insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited; but the devises and legacies and other testamentary dispositions shall be valid to such extent as will not impair the legitime. (851a) ARTICLE 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of children and descendants, legitimate as well as illegitimate: (1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt against the life of the testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants; (2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has been found groundless; (3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage with the spouse of the testator; (4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence causes the testator to make a will or to change one already made; (5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parent or ascendant who disinherits such child or descendant; (6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or descendant; (7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life; (8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction. (756, 853, 674a)
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ARTICLE 920. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of parents or ascendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate: (1) When the parents have abandoned their children or induced their daughters to live a corrupt or immoral life, or attempted against their virtue; (2) When the parent or ascendant has been convicted of an attempt against the life of the testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants; (3) When the parent or ascendant has accused the testator of a crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has been found to be false; (4) When the parent or ascendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage with the spouse of the testator; (5) When the parent or ascendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence causes the testator to make a will or to change one already made; (6) The loss of parental authority for causes specified in this Code; (7) The refusal to support the children or descendants without justifiable cause; (8) An attempt by one of the parents against the life of the other, unless there has been a reconciliation between them. (756, 854, 674a) ARTICLE 921. The following shall be sufficient causes for disinheriting a spouse: (1) When the spouse has been convicted of an attempt against the life of the testator, his or her descendants, or ascendants; (2) When the spouse has accused the testator of a crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment of six years or more, and the accusation has been found to be false; (3) When the spouse by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence cause the testator to make a will or to change one already made; (4) When the spouse has given cause for legal separation; (5) When the spouse has given grounds for the loss of parental authority; (6) Unjustifiable refusal to support the children or the other spouse. (756, 855, 674a)
ARTICLE 927. If two or more heirs take possession of the estate, they shall be solidarily liable for the loss or destruction of a thing devised or bequeathed, even though only one of them should have been negligent. (n) ARTICLE 928. The heir who is bound to deliver the legacy or devise shall be liable in case of eviction, if the thing is indeterminate and is indicated only by its kind. (860) ARTICLE 929. If the testator, heir, or legatee owns only a part of, or an interest in the thing bequeathed, the legacy or devise shall be understood limited to such part or interest, unless the testator expressly declares that he gives the thing in its entirety. (864a) ARTICLE 930. The legacy or devise of a thing belonging to another person is void, if the testator erroneously believed that the thing pertained to him. But if the thing bequeathed, though not belonging to the testator when he made the will, afterwards becomes his, by whatever title, the disposition shall take effect. (862a) ARTICLE 931. If the testator orders that a thing belonging to another be acquired in order that it be given to a legatee or devisee, the heir upon whom the obligation is imposed or the estate must acquire it and give the same to the legatee or devisee; but if the owner of the thing refuses to alienate the same, or demands an excessive price therefor, the heir or the estate shall only be obliged to give the just value of the thing. (861a) ARTICLE 932. The legacy or devise of a thing which at the time of the execution of the will already belonged to the legatee or devisee shall be ineffective, even though another person may have some interest therein. If the testator expressly orders that the thing be freed from such interest or encumbrance, the legacy or devise shall be valid to that extent. (866a) ARTICLE 933. If the thing bequeathed belonged to the legatee or devisee at the time of the execution of the will, the legacy or devise shall be without effect, even though it may have subsequently alienated by him. If the legatee or devisee acquires it gratuitously after such time, he can claim nothing by virtue of the legacy or devise; but if it has been acquired by onerous title he can demand reimbursement from the heir or the estate. (878a) ARTICLE 934. If the testator should bequeath or devise something pledged or mortgaged to secure a recoverable debt before the execution of the will, the estate is obliged to pay the debt, unless the contrary intention appears. The same rule applies when the thing is pledged or mortgaged after the execution of the will. Any other charge, perpetual or temporary, with which the thing bequeathed is burdened, passes with it to the legatee or devisee. (867a) ARTICLE 935. The legacy of a credit against a third person or of the remission or release of a debt of the legatee shall be effective only as regards that part of the credit or debt existing at the time of the death of the testator. In the first case, the estate shall comply with the legacy by assigning to the legatee all rights of action it may have against the debtor. In the second case, by giving the legatee an acquittance, should he request one. In both cases, the legacy shall comprise all interests on the credit or debt which may be due the testator at the time of his death. (870a) ARTICLE 936. The legacy referred to in the preceding article shall lapse if the testator, after having made it, should bring an action against the debtor for the payment of his debt, even if such payment should not have been effected at the time of his death. The legacy to the debtor of the thing pledged by him is understood to discharge only the right of pledge. (871)
ARTICLE 922. A subsequent reconciliation between the offender and the offended person deprives the latter of the right to disinherit, and renders ineffectual any disinheritance that may have been made. (856) ARTICLE 923. The children and descendants of the person disinherited shall take his or her place and shall preserve the rights of compulsory heirs with respect to the legitime; but the disinherited parent shall not have the usufruct or administration of the property which constitutes the legitime. (857) SECTION 7 Legacies and Devises ARTICLE 924. All things and rights which are within the commerce of man may be bequeathed or devised. (865a) ARTICLE 925. A testator may charge with legacies and devises not only his compulsory heirs but also the legatees and devisees. The latter shall be liable for the charge only to the extent of the value of the legacy or the devise received by them. The compulsory heirs shall not be liable for the charge beyond the amount of the free portion given them. (858a) ARTICLE 926. When the testator charges one of the heirs with a legacy or devise, he alone shall be bound. Should he not charge anyone in particular, all shall be liable in the same proportion in which they may inherit. (859)
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ARTICLE 937. A generic legacy of release or remission of debts comprises those existing at the time of the execution of the will, but not subsequent ones. (872) ARTICLE 938. A legacy or devise made to a creditor shall not be applied to his credit, unless the testator so expressly declares. In the latter case, the creditor shall have the right to collect the excess, if any, of the credit or of the legacy or devise. (873a) ARTICLE 939. If the testator orders the payment of what he believes he owes but does not in fact owe, the disposition shall be considered as not written. If as regards a specified debt more than the amount thereof is ordered paid, the excess is not due, unless a contrary intention appears. The foregoing provisions are without prejudice to the fulfillment of natural obligations. (n) ARTICLE 940. In alternative legacies or devises, the choice is presumed to be left to the heir upon whom the obligation to give the legacy or devise may be imposed, or the executor or administrator of the estate if no particular heir is so obliged. If the heir, legatee or devisee, who may have been given the choice, dies before making it, this right shall pass to the respective heirs. Once made, the choice is irrevocable. In the alternative legacies or devises, except as herein provided, the provisions of this Code regulating obligations of the same kind shall be observed, save such modifications as may appear from the intention expressed by the testator. (874a) ARTICLE 941. A legacy of generic personal property shall be valid even if there be no things of the same kind in the estate. A devise of indeterminate real property shall be valid only if there be immovable property of its kind in the estate. The right of choice shall belong to the executor or administrator who shall comply with the legacy by the delivery of a thing which is neither of inferior nor of superior quality. (875a) ARTICLE 942. Whenever the testator expressly leaves the right of choice to the heir, or to the legatee or devisee, the former may give or the latter may choose whichever he may prefer. (876a) ARTICLE 943. If the heir, legatee or devisee cannot make the choice, in case it has been granted him, his right shall pass to his heirs; but a choice once made shall be irrevocable. (877a) ARTICLE 944. A legacy for education lasts until the legatee is of age, or beyond the age of majority in order that the legatee may finish some professional, vocational or general course, provided he pursues his course diligently. A legacy for support lasts during the lifetime of the legatee, if the testator has not otherwise provided. If the testator has not fixed the amount of such legacies, it shall be fixed in accordance with the social standing and the circumstances of the legatee and the value of the estate. If the testator during his lifetime used to give the legatee a certain sum of money or other things by way of support, the same amount shall be deemed bequeathed, unless it be markedly disproportionate to the value of the estate. (879a) ARTICLE 945. If a periodical pension, or a certain annual, monthly, or weekly amount is bequeathed, the legatee may petition the court for the first installment upon the death of the testator, and for the following ones which
shall be due at the beginning of each period; such payment shall not be returned, even though the legatee should die before the expiration of the period which has commenced. (880a) ARTICLE 946. If the thing bequeathed should be subject to a usufruct, the legatee or devisee shall respect such right until it is legally extinguished. (868a) ARTICLE 947. The legatee or devisee acquires a right to the pure and simple legacies or devises from the death of the testator, and transmits it to his heirs. (881a) ARTICLE 948. If the legacy or devise is of a specific and determinate thing pertaining to the testator, the legatee or devisee acquires the ownership thereof upon the death of the testator, as well as any growing fruits, or unborn offspring of animals, or uncollected income; but not the income which was due and unpaid before the latter's death. From the moment of the testator's death, the thing bequeathed shall be at the risk of the legatee or devisee, who shall, therefore, bear its loss or deterioration, and shall be benefited by its increase or improvement, without prejudice to the responsibility of the executor or administrator. (882a) ARTICLE 949. If the bequest should not be of a specific and determinate thing, but is generic or of quantity, its fruits and interests from the time of the death of the testator shall pertain to the legatee or devisee if the testator has expressly so ordered. (884a) ARTICLE 950. If the estate should not be sufficient to cover all the legacies or devises, their payment shall be made in the following order: (1) Remuneratory legacies or devises; (2) Legacies or devises declared by the testator to be preferential; (3) Legacies for support; (4) Legacies for education; (5) Legacies or devises of a specific, determinate thing which forms a part of the estate; (6) All others pro rata. (887a) ARTICLE 951. The thing bequeathed shall be delivered with all its accessions and accessories and in the condition in which it may be upon the death of the testator. (883a) ARTICLE 952. The heir, charged with a legacy or devise, or the executor or administrator of the estate, must deliver the very thing bequeathed if he is able to do so and cannot discharge this obligation by paying its value. Legacies of money must be paid in cash, even though the heir or the estate may not have any. The expenses necessary for the delivery of the thing bequeathed shall be for the account of the heir or the estate, but without prejudice to the legitime. (886a) ARTICLE 953. The legatee or devisee cannot take possession of the thing bequeathed upon his own authority, but shall request its delivery and possession of the heir charged with the legacy or devise, or of the executor or administrator of the estate should he be authorized by the court to deliver it. (885a) ARTICLE 954. The legatee or devisee cannot accept a part of the legacy or devise and repudiate the other, if the latter be onerous. Should he die before having accepted the legacy or devise, leaving several heirs, some of the latter may accept and the others may repudiate the share respectively belonging to them in the legacy or devise. (889a) ARTICLE 955. The legatee or devisee of two legacies or devises, one of which is onerous, cannot renounce the onerous one and accept the other. If both are onerous or gratuitous, he shall be free to accept or renounce both, or to renounce either. But if the testator intended that the two
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legacies or devises should be inseparable from each other, the legatee or devisee must either accept or renounce both. Any compulsory heir who is at the same time a legatee or devisee may waive the inheritance and accept the legacy or devise, or renounce the latter and accept the former, or waive or accept both. (890a) ARTICLE 956. If the legatee or devisee cannot or is unwilling to accept the legacy or devise, or if the legacy or devise for any reason should become ineffective, it shall be merged into the mass of the estate, except in cases of substitution and of the right of accretion. (888a) ARTICLE 957. The legacy or devise shall be without effect: (1) If the testator transforms the thing bequeathed in such a manner that it does not retain either the form or the denomination it had; (2) If the testator by any title or for any cause alienates the thing bequeathed or any part thereof, it being understood that in the latter case the legacy or devise shall be without effect only with respect to the part thus alienated. If after the alienation the thing should again belong to the testator, even if it be by reason of nullity of the contract, the legacy or devise shall not thereafter be valid, unless the reacquisition shall have been effected by virtue of the exercise of the right of repurchase; (3) If the thing bequeathed is totally lost during the lifetime of the testator, or after his death without the heir's fault. Nevertheless, the person obliged to pay the legacy or devise shall be liable for eviction if the thing bequeathed should not have been determinate as to its kind, in accordance with the provisions of Article 928. (869a) ARTICLE 958. A mistake as to the name of the thing bequeathed or devised, is of no consequence, if it is possible to identify the thing which the testator intended to bequeath or devise. (n) ARTICLE 959. A disposition made in general terms in favor of the testator's relatives shall be understood to be in favor of those nearest in degree. (751) CHAPTER 3 Legal or Intestate Succession SECTION 1 General Provisions ARTICLE 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place: (1) If a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has subsequently lost its validity; (2) When the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose of all the property belonging to the testator. In such case, legal succession shall take place only with respect to the property of which the testator has not disposed; (3) If the suspensive condition attached to the institution of heir does not happen or is not fulfilled, or if the heir dies before the testator, or repudiates the inheritance, there being no substitution, and no right of accretion takes place; (4) When the heir instituted is incapable of succeeding, except in cases provided in this Code. (912a) TESTATE ESTATE OF RIGOR vs. RIGOR April 30, 1979 FACTS: Father Rigor bequeathed the ricelands to anyone of his nearest male relatives who would pursue an ecclesiastical career until his ordination as a priest. If there is no qualified devisee or the testator's nephew became a priest and he was excommunicated, the administration of the ricelands would be under the responsibility of the incumbent parish priest of Victoria and his successors.
HELD: The bequest refers to the testator's nearest male relative living at the time of his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter. The parish priest of Victoria could become a trustee only when the testator's nephew living at the time of his death, who desired to become a priest, had not yet entered the seminary or, having been ordained a priest, he was excommunicated. Those two contingencies did not arise. There being no substitution nor accretion as to the said ricelands the same should be distributed among the testator's legal heirs. The effect is as if the testator had made no disposition as to the said ricelands. ARTICLE 961. In default of testamentary heirs, the law vests the inheritance, in accordance with the rules hereinafter set forth, in the legitimate and illegitimate relatives of the deceased, in the surviving spouse, and in the State. (913a) ARTICLE 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes place. Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares, subject to the provisions of article 1006 with respect to relatives of the full and half blood, and of article 987, paragraph 2, concerning division between the paternal and maternal lines. (921a) BAGUNU vs. PIEDAD DECEMBER 8, 2000 FACTS: Augusto died without direct descendants or rd ascendants. Pastora (3 degree) is his maternal aunt, while th st Ofelia (5 degree) is the daughter of the 1 cousin of Augusto. HELD: Ofelia cannot inherit alongside a Pastora. The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the nearest relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and excludes the more distant ones except when and to the extent that the right of representation can apply. Among collateral relatives, except only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed in Article 962, is an absolute rule. Thus, Pastora excludes Ofelia from succeeding ab intestate to the estate of Augusto. In fine, a maternal aunt can inherit equally with a first cousin of the half blood but an rd uncle or an aunt, being a 3 degree relative, excludes the th cousins of the decedent, being in the 4 degree in relationship, the latter in turn would have priority in th succession to a 5 degree relative. SUBSECTION 1 Relationship ARTICLE 963. Proximity of relationship is determined by the number of generations. Each generation forms a degree. (915) ARTICLE 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either direct or collateral. A direct line is that constituted by the series of degrees among ascendants and descendants. A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees among persons who are not ascendants and descendants, but who come from a common ancestor. (916a) ARTICLE 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending. The former unites the head of the family with those who descend from him. The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends. (917) ARTICLE 966. In the line, as many degrees are counted as there are generations or persons, excluding the progenitor. In the direct line, ascent is made to the common ancestor. Thus, the child is one degree removed from the parent, two from the grandfather, and three from the greatgrandparent.
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In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent is made to the person with whom the computation is to be made. Thus, a person is two degrees removed from his brother, three from his uncle, who is the brother of his father, four from his first cousin, and so forth. (918a) ARTICLE 967. Full blood relationship is that existing between persons who have the same father and the same mother. Half blood relationship is that existing between persons who have the same father, but not the same mother, or the same mother, but not the same father. (920a) ARTICLE 968. If there are several relatives of the same degree, and one or some of them are unwilling or incapacitated to succeed, his portion shall accrue to the others of the same degree, save the right of representation when it should take place. (922) ARTICLE 969. If the inheritance should be repudiated by the nearest relative, should there be one only, or by all the nearest relatives called by law to succeed, should there be several, those of the following degree shall inherit in their own right and cannot represent the person or persons repudiating the inheritance. (923) SUBSECTION 2 Right of Representation ARTICLE 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited. (924a) BAGUNU vs. PIEDAD DECEMBER 8, 2000 HELD: By right of representation, a more distant blood relative of a decedent is, by operations of law, raised to the same place and degree of relations as that of a closer blood relative of the same decedent. The representative thereby steps into the shoes of the person he represents and succeeds, not from the latter, but from the person to whose estate the person represented would have succeeded. The right of representation does not apply to other collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree. INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA ROSALES vs. ROSALES FEBRUARY 27, 1987 FACTS: Petra died and was survived by her husband and 2 children Magna and Antonio. Carterio, another child, predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox, and his widow, Irenea. Irenea insisted in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of Carterio, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together with her son. HELD: The widow whose husband predeceased his mother cannot inherit from her mother-in-law. There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) of an intestate heir of her mother-inlaw. The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by Articles 970 and 971 of the Civil Code. ARTICLE 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented but the one whom the person represented would have succeeded. (n)
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA ROSALES vs. ROSALES FEBRUARY 27, 1987 HELD: Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox is called to succession by law because of his blood relationship. He does not succeed his father, Carterio , but Petra whom his father would have succeeded. Irenea cannot assert the same right of representation as she has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law. ARTICLE 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct descending line, but never in the ascending. In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters, whether they be of the full or half blood. (925) ARTICLE 973. In order that representation may take place, it is necessary that the representative himself be capable of succeeding the decedent. (n) ARTICLE 974. Whenever there is succession by representation, the division of the estate shall be made per stirpes, in such manner that the representative or representatives shall not inherit more than what the person they represent would inherit, if he were living or could inherit. (926a) ARTICLE 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions. (927) BICOMONG vs. ALMANZA November 29, 1977 FACTS: Simeon was married to Sisenanda and they had 3 children. When Sisenanda died, Simeon remarried to Silvestra and they had 2 children. The plaintiffs are the grandchildren of Simeon with his children in his first marriage. Respondents are the heirs of the children of Simeon in his second marriage. HELD: It appearing that Maura Bagsic, child of the 2 marriage in which her share is in dispute, died intestate without an issue, and her husband and all her ascendants had died ahead of her, she is succeeded by the surviving collateral relatives, namely the daughter of her sister of full blood and the 10 children of her brother and 2 sisters of half blood in accordance with the provision of Art. 975 of the New Civil Code. By virtue of said provision, the aforementioned nephews and nieces are entitled to inherit in their own right. Nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (that is per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased. Article 975 makes no qualification as to whether the nephews or nieces are on the maternal or paternal line and without preference as to whether their relationship to the deceased is by whole or half blood, the sole niece of whole blood of the deceased does not exclude the ten nephews and 2 sisters of half blood. ARTICLE 976. A person may represent him whose inheritance he has renounced. (928a) ARTICLE 977. Heirs who repudiate their share may not be represented. (929a) SECTION 2 Order of Intestate Succession SUBSECTION 1 Descending Direct Line ARTICLE 978. Succession pertains, in the first place, to the descending direct line. (930) ARTICLE 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants, without
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distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from different marriages. An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the same manner as a legitimate child. (931a) ARTICLE 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares. (932) ARTICLE 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of representation. (934a) ARTICLE 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation, and if any one of them should have died, leaving several heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in equal portions. (933) ARTICLE 983. If illegitimate children survive with legitimate children, the shares of the former shall be in the proportions prescribed by article 895. (n) ARTICLE 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children or descendants, his parents and relatives by consanguinity and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs. (n) SUBSECTION 2 Ascending Direct Line ARTICLE 985. In default of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his parents and ascendants shall inherit from him, to the exclusion of collateral relatives. (935a) ARTICLE 986. The father and mother, if living, shall inherit in equal shares. Should one only of them survive, he or she shall succeed to the entire estate of the child. (936) ARTICLE 987. In default of the father and mother, the ascendants nearest in degree shall inherit. Should there be more than one of equal degree belonging to the same line they shall divide the inheritance per capita; should they be of different lines but of equal degree, one-half shall go to the paternal and the other half to the maternal ascendants. In each line the division shall be made per capita. (937) SUBSECTION 3 Illegitimate Children ARTICLE 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the illegitimate children shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. (939a) ARTICLE 989. If, together with illegitimate children, there should survive descendants of another illegitimate child who is dead, the former shall succeed in their own right and the latter by right of representation. (940a) ARTICLE 990. The hereditary rights granted by the two preceding articles to illegitimate children shall be transmitted upon their death to their descendants, who shall inherit by right of representation from their deceased grandparent. (941a) ARTICLE 991. If legitimate ascendants are left, the illegitimate children shall divide the inheritance with them, taking one-half of the estate, whatever be the number of the ascendants or of the illegitimate children. (942, 841a) ARTICLE 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. (943a) DIAZ, et al vs. IAC, et al JUNE 17, 1987 HELD: Article 992 provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family, there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. PASCUAL vs. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA March 25, 1992 FACTS: Petitioners Olivia and Hermes are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio, the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres. Don Andres was survived by his spouse, the children of his brothers, including the acknowledged natural children of Eligio . HELD: Eligio is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children. Petitioners cannot represent their father Eligio in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres, full blood brother of their father. The term "illegitimate" refers to both natural and spurious. CORPUS vs. ESTATE OF YANGCO OCTOBER 23, 1978 HELD: Legitimate daughter cannot inherit ab intestato from illegitimate daughter of the deceased because of barrier under Article 992. The son of the legitimate daughter cannot participate in the said intestate estate. The rule is premised on the theory that the legitimate family looks down on the illegitimate family, and the latter hates and resents the former. To avoid further grounds of resentment, the law prefers to ignore the existing blood tie. ARTICLE 993. If an illegitimate child should die without issue, either legitimate or illegitimate, his father or mother shall succeed to his entire estate; and if the child's filiation is duly proved as to both parents, who are both living, they shall inherit from him share and share alike. (944a) ARTICLE 994. In default of the father or mother, an illegitimate child shall be succeeded by his or her surviving spouse, who shall be entitled to the entire estate. If the widow or widower should survive with brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, she or he shall inherit one-half of the estate, and the latter the other half. (945a)
HEIRS of SANDEJAS vs. LINA February 6, 2001 HELD: Succession laws and jurisprudence require that when a marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or the wife, the decedents entire estate under the concept of conjugal properties of gains -- must be divided equally, with one half going to the surviving spouse and the other half to the heirs of the deceased. After the settlement of the debts and obligations, the remaining half of the estate is then distributed to the legal heirs, legatees and devices. SUBSECTION 4 Surviving Spouse ARTICLE 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and illegitimate children and their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any, under Article 1001. (946a)
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CALISTERIO vs. CALISTERIO APRIL 6, 2000 FACTS: Teodorico died intestate and was survived by his nd wife, Marietta. Teodorico was the 2 husband of Marietta who had been previously married to James, who disappeared without a trace. Teodorico and Marietta were married without having secured a court declaration that James was presumptively dead. Antonia, surviving sister of Teodorico, claiming to be sole surviving heir of Teodorico, alleged that the marriage between Teodorico and Marieta was bigamous and thus, null and void. HELD: The 2 marriage, having been contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, is valid notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of James. The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, no evidence having been adduced to indicate another property regime between the spouses, pertains to them in common. Upon the dissolution with the death of Teodorico, the property should be divided into 2 equal portions: one portion to the surviving spouse and the other portion to the estate of the deceased spouse. The successional right in intestacy of a surviving spouse over the net estate of the deceased, concurring with the legitimate brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces (the latter by right of representation), is of the inheritance, the brother and sisters or nephews and nieces, being entitled to the other half. Brothers and sisters exclude nephews and nieces except only in representation by the latter of their parents who predeceased or are incapacitated to succeed. ARTICLE 996. If a widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as that of each of the children. (834a) ARTICLE 997. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate parents or ascendants, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to one-half of the estate, and the legitimate parents or ascendants to the other half. (836a) ARTICLE 998. If a widow or widower survives with illegitimate children, such widow or widower shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the illegitimate children or their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, to the other half. (n) ARTICLE 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or their descendants and illegitimate children or their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, such widow or widower shall be entitled to the same share as that of a legitimate child. (n)
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presence of the adopted child does not exclude the legitimate parent or ascendant. ARTICLE 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half. (953, 837a) ARTICLE 1002. In case of a legal separation, if the surviving spouse gave cause for the separation, he or she shall not have any of the rights granted in the preceding articles. (n) SUBSECTION 5 Collateral Relatives ARTICLE 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles. (946a) BARANDA vs. BARANDA MAY 20, 1987 FACTS: Paulina died intestate without leaving any direct descendants, ascendants or compulsory heirs. She was survived by her 2 brothers and several nephews and nieces, including private respondents as well as petitioners who are children of 2 deceased brothers and a sister. HELD: As heirs, petitioners have the legal standing to challenge the deeds of sale purportedly signed by Paulina, for otherwise, property claimed to belong to her estate, will be excluded therefrom to their prejudice. Their claims are not merely contingent or expectant. While they are not compulsory heirs, they are nonetheless legitimate heirs and so, since they stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment or suit, and are thus, entitled to protect their share of a successional right. There being no pending special proceeding for the settlement of the Paulinas estate, the petitioners, as intestate heirs, had the right to sue for the reconveyance of the disputed properties, not to them, but to the estate itself of the decedent, for the distribution later in accordance with law. ARTICLE 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares. (947) ARTICLE 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews and nieces, who are the children of the descendant's brothers and sisters of the full blood, the former shall inherit per capita, and the latter per stirpes. (948) ARTICLE 1006. Should brothers and sisters of the full blood survive together with brothers and sisters of the half blood, the former shall be entitled to a share double that of the latter. (949) BICOMONG vs. ALMANZA NOVEMBER 29, 1977 FACTS: The deceased had a sister of the full blood and a brother and 2 sisters of the half-blood, all of whom had predeceased her. Surviving were: (a) a daughter of her sister of the full blood, and (b) 10 children of her brother and 2 sisters of the half-blood. HELD: The niece of the whole blood gets a share double of that of each of the nephews and nieces of the half-blood. All of them inherit in their own right, and not by the right of representation because the nephews and nieces here do not concur with any brother or sister of the deceased. The relative of the full blood does not exclude the relatives of the half-blood. ARTICLE 1007. In case brothers and sisters of the half blood, some on the father's and some on the mother's side,
ARTICLE 1000. If legitimate ascendants, the surviving spouse, and illegitimate children are left, the ascendants shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the other half shall be divided between the surviving spouse and the illegitimate children so that such widow or widower shall have one-fourth of the estate, and the illegitimate children the other fourth. (841a) DEL ROSARIO vs. CONANAN MARCH 30, 1977 FACTS: The deceased died intestate leaving his wife, his legitimate mother and an adopted daughter. HELD: Wife gets , the adopted daughter gets and the legitimate mother gets . The adopted child gets the rights of an acknowledged natural child (illegitimate), not that of a legitimate child, otherwise, the legitimate ascendant (the mother) would be excluded. The
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are the only survivors, all shall inherit in equal shares without distinction as to the origin of the property. (950) ARTICLE 1008. Children of brothers and sisters of the half blood shall succeed per capita or per stirpes, in accordance with the rules laid down for brothers and sisters of the full blood. (915) ARTICLE 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate. The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood. (954a) ARTICLE 1010. The right to inherit ab intestato shall not extend beyond the fifth degree of relationship in the collateral line. (955a)
(2) That one of the persons thus called die before the testator, or renounce the inheritance, or be incapacitated to receive it. (982a) ARTICLE 1017. The words "one-half for each" or "in equal shares" or any others which, though designating an aliquot part, do not identify it by such description as shall make each heir the exclusive owner of determinate property, shall not exclude the right of accretion. In case of money or fungible goods, if the share of each heir is not earmarked, there shall be a right of accretion. (983a) ARTICLE 1018. In legal succession the share of the person who repudiates the inheritance shall always accrue to his coheirs. (981) ARTICLE 1019. The heirs to whom the portion goes by the right of accretion take it in the same proportion that they inherit. (n) ARTICLE 1020. The heirs to whom the inheritance accrues shall succeed to all the rights and obligations which the heir who renounced or could not receive it would have had. (984) ARTICLE 1021. Among the compulsory heirs the right of accretion shall take place only when the free portion is left to two or more of them, or to any one of them and to a stranger. Should the part repudiated be the legitime, the other coheirs shall succeed to it in their own right, and not by the right of accretion. (985) ARTICLE 1022. In testamentary succession, when the right of accretion does not take place, the vacant portion of the instituted heirs, if no substitute has been designated, shall pass to the legal heirs of the testator, who shall receive it with the same charges and obligations. (986) ARTICLE 1023. Accretion shall also take place among devisees, legatees and usufructuaries under the same conditions established for heirs. (987a) SECTION 2 Capacity to Succeed by Will or by Intestacy ARTICLE 1024. Persons not incapacitated by law may succeed by will or ab intestato. The provisions relating to incapacity by will are equally applicable to intestate succession. (744, 914) ARTICLE 1025. In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens, except in case of representation, when it is proper. A child already conceived at the time of the death of the decedent is capable of succeeding provided it be born later under the conditions prescribed in article 41. (n) TESTATE ESTATE OF RIGOR vs. RIGOR April 30, 1979 HELD: The said bequest refers to the testator's nearest male relative living at the time of his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter. ARTICLE 1026. A testamentary disposition may be made to the State, provinces, municipal corporations, private corporations, organizations, or associations for religious, scientific, cultural, educational, or charitable purposes. All other corporations or entities may succeed under a will, unless there is a provision to the contrary in their charter or the laws of their creation, and always subject to the same. (746a) ARTICLE 1027. The succeeding: following are incapable of
SUBSECTION 6 The State ARTICLE 1011. In default of persons entitled to succeed in accordance with the provisions of the preceding Sections, the State shall inherit the whole estate. (956a) ARTICLE 1012. In order that the State may take possession of the property mentioned in the preceding article, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court must be observed. (958a) ARTICLE 1013. After the payment of debts and charges, the personal property shall be assigned to the municipality or city where the deceased last resided in the Philippines, and the real estate to the municipalities or cities, respectively, in which the same is situated. If the deceased never resided in the Philippines, the whole estate shall be assigned to the respective municipalities or cities where the same is located. Such estate shall be for the benefit of public schools, and public charitable institutions and centers, in such municipalities or cities. The court shall distribute the estate as the respective needs of each beneficiary may warrant. The court, at the instance of an interested party, or on its own motion, may order the establishment of a permanent trust, so that only the income from the property shall be used. (956a) ARTICLE 1014. If a person legally entitled to the estate of the deceased appears and files a claim thereto with the court within five years from the date the property was delivered to the State, such person shall be entitled to the possession of the same, or if sold, the municipality or city shall be accountable to him for such part of the proceeds as may not have been lawfully spent. (n) CHAPTER 4 Provisions Common to Testate and Intestate Successions SECTION 1 Right of Accretion ARTICLE 1015. Accretion is a right by virtue of which, when two or more persons are called to the same inheritance, devise or legacy, the part assigned to the one who renounces or cannot receive his share, or who died before the testator, is added or incorporated to that of his co-heirs, co-devisees, or co-legatees. (n) ARTICLE 1016. take place in a necessary: (1) That two or inheritance, or to and In order that the right of accretion may testamentary succession, it shall be more persons be called to the same the same portion thereof, pro indiviso;
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(1) The priest who heard the confession of the testator during his last illness, or the minister of the gospel who extended spiritual aid to him during the same period; (2) The relatives of such priest or minister of the gospel within the fourth degree, the church, order, chapter, community, organization, or institution to which such priest or minister may belong; (3) A guardian with respect to testamentary dispositions given by a ward in his favor before the final accounts of the guardianship have been approved, even if the testator should die after the approval thereof; nevertheless, any provision made by the ward in favor of the guardian when the latter is his ascendant, descendant, brother, sister, or spouse, shall be valid; (4) Any attesting witness to the execution of a will, the spouse, parents, or children, or any one claiming under such witness, spouse, parents, or children; (5) Any physician, surgeon, nurse, health officer or druggist who took care of the testator during his last illness; a (6) Individuals, associations and corporations not permitted by law to inherit. (745, 752, 753, 754a) ARTICLE 1028. The prohibitions mentioned in article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to testamentary provisions. (n) ARTICLE 1029. Should the testator dispose of the whole or part of his property for prayers and pious works for the benefit of his soul, in general terms and without specifying its application, the executor, with the court's approval shall deliver one-half thereof or its proceeds to the church or denomination to which the testator may belong, to be used for such prayers and pious works, and the other half to the State, for the purposes mentioned in article 1013. (747a) ARTICLE 1030. Testamentary provisions in favor of the poor in general, without designation of particular persons or of any community, shall be deemed limited to the poor living in the domicile of the testator at the time of his death, unless it should clearly appear that his intention was otherwise. The designation of the persons who are to be considered as poor and the distribution of the property shall be made by the person appointed by the testator for the purpose; in default of such person, by the executor, and should there be no executor, by the justice of the peace, the mayor, and the municipal treasurer, who shall decide by a majority of votes all questions that may arise. In all these cases, the approval of the Court of First Instance shall be necessary. The preceding paragraph shall apply when the testator has disposed of his property in favor of the poor of a definite locality. (749a) ARTICLE 1031. A testamentary provision in favor of a disqualified person, even though made under the guise of an onerous contract, or made through an intermediary, shall be void. (755) ARTICLE 1032. The following are incapable of succeeding by reason of unworthiness: (1) Parents who have abandoned their children or induced their daughters to lead a corrupt or immoral life, or attempted against their virtue; (2) Any person who has been convicted of an attempt against the life of the testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants; (3) Any person who has accused the testator of a crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has been found groundless; (4) Any heir of full age who, having knowledge of the violent death of the testator, should fail to report it to an officer of the law within a month, unless the authorities have already taken action; this prohibition shall not apply to cases wherein, according to law, there is no obligation to make an accusation;
(5) Any person convicted of adultery or concubinage with the spouse of the testator; (6) Any person who by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence should cause the testator to make a will or to change one already made; (7) Any person who by the same means prevents another from making a will, or from revoking one already made, or who supplants, conceals, or alters the latter's will; (8) Any person who falsifies or forges a supposed will of the decedent. (756, 673, 674a) ARTICLE 1033. The causes of unworthiness shall be without effect if the testator had knowledge thereof at the time he made the will, or if, having known of them subsequently, he should condone them in writing. (757a) ARTICLE 1034. In order to judge the capacity of the heir, devisee or legatee, his qualification at the time of the death of the decedent shall be the criterion. In cases falling under Nos. 2, 3, or 5 of article 1032, it shall be necessary to wait until final judgment is rendered, and in the case falling under No. 4, the expiration of the month allowed for the report. If the institution, devise or legacy should be conditional, the time of the compliance with the condition shall also be considered. (758a) ARTICLE 1035. If the person excluded from the inheritance by reason of incapacity should be a child or descendant of the decedent and should have children or descendants, the latter shall acquire his right to the legitime. The person so excluded shall not enjoy the usufruct and administration of the property thus inherited by his children. (761a) ARTICLE 1036. Alienations of hereditary property, and acts of administration performed by the excluded heir, before the judicial order of exclusion, are valid as to the third persons who acted in good faith; but the co-heirs shall have a right to recover damages from the disqualified heir. (n) ARTICLE 1037. The unworthy heir who is excluded from the succession has a right to demand indemnity for any expenses incurred in the preservation of the hereditary property, and to enforce such credits as he may have against the estate. (n) ARTICLE 1038. Any person incapable of succession, who, disregarding the prohibition stated in the preceding articles, entered into the possession of the hereditary property, shall be obliged to return it together with its accessions. He shall be liable for all the fruits and rents he may have received, or could have received through the exercise of due diligence. (760a) ARTICLE 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent. (n) ARTICLE 1040. The action for a declaration of incapacity and for the recovery of the inheritance, devise or legacy shall be brought within five years from the time the disqualified person took possession thereof. It may be brought by any one who may have an interest in the succession. (762a) SECTION 3 Acceptance and Repudiation of the Inheritance ARTICLE 1041. The acceptance or repudiation of the inheritance is an act which is purely voluntary and free. (988) ARTICLE 1042. The effects of the acceptance or repudiation shall always retroact to the moment of the death of the decedent. (989) ARTICLE 1043. No person may accept or repudiate an inheritance unless he is certain of the death of the person
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from whom he is to inherit, and of his right to the inheritance. (991) INTESTATE ESTATE OF BORROMEO vs. BORROMEO July 23, 1987 HELD: The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary rights is that the properties included in an existing inheritance cannot be considered as belonging to third persons with respect to the heirs, who by fiction of law continue the personality of the former. Nor do such properties have the character of future property, because the heirs acquire a right to succession from the moment of the death of the deceased. ARTICLE 1044. Any person having the free disposal of his property may accept or repudiate an inheritance. Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their parents or guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by judicial authorization. The right to accept an inheritance left to the poor shall belong to the persons designated by the testator to determine the beneficiaries and distribute the property, or in their default, to those mentioned in article 1030. (992a) ARTICLE 1045. The lawful representatives of corporations, associations, institutions and entities qualified to acquire property may accept any inheritance left to the latter, but in order to repudiate it, the approval of the court shall be necessary. (993a) ARTICLE 1046. Public official establishments can neither accept nor repudiate an inheritance without the approval of the government. (994) ARTICLE 1047. A married woman of age may repudiate an inheritance without the consent of her husband. (995a) ARTICLE 1048. Deaf-mutes who can read and write may accept or repudiate the inheritance personally or through an agent. Should they not be able to read and write, the inheritance shall be accepted by their guardians. These guardians may repudiate the same with judicial approval. (996a) ARTICLE 1049. Acceptance may be express or tacit. An express acceptance must be made in a public or private document. A tacit acceptance is one resulting from acts by which the intention to accept is necessarily implied, or which one would have no right to do except in the capacity of an heir. Acts of mere preservation or provisional administration do not imply an acceptance of the inheritance if, through such acts, the title or capacity of an heir has not been assumed. (999a) ARTICLE 1050. An inheritance is deemed accepted: (1) If the heirs sells, donates, or assigns his right to a stranger, or to his co-heirs, or to any of them; (2) If the heir renounces the same, even though gratuitously, for the benefit of one or more of his coheirs; (3) If he renounces it for a price in favor of all his co-heirs indiscriminately; but if this renunciation should be gratuitous, and the co-heirs in whose favor it is made are those upon whom the portion renounced should devolve by virtue of accretion, the inheritance shall not be deemed as accepted. (1000) ARTICLE 1051. The repudiation of an inheritance shall be made in a public or authentic instrument, or by petition presented to the court having jurisdiction over the testamentary or intestate proceedings. (1008) IMPERIAL vs. CA
OCTOBER 8, 1999 FACTS: Leoncio sold his land to his natural son. But it was alleged that the sale was in fact a donation. 2 years after the donation, Leoncio filed a complaint for annulment of the said Deed of Absolute Sale on the ground that he was deceived into signing the said document. But said dispute was resolved through a compromise agreement. Pending execution of the said judgment, Leoncio died, leaving only 2 heirs his natural son and an adopted son, Victor. In 1962, Victor was substituted in place of Leoncio in the said case and it was he who moved for execution of judgment. 15 years thereafter, Victor died single and without issue, survived only by his natural father, Ricardo. 4 years after, Ricardo died, leaving as his only heirs 2 children, Cesar and Teresa. Both filed a complaint seeking to nullify the Deed of Absolute Sale alleging that the conveyance of said property impaired the legitimate of Victor, their natural brother and predecessor-in-interest. When Leoncio died, it was only Victor who was entitled to question the donation. But instead of filing an action to contest the donation, Victor asked to be substituted as plaintiff and even moved for the execution of the judgment. ISSUE: Whether or not Victor was deemed to have renounced his legitime HELD: No renunciation of legitimate may be presumed from the foregoing acts. At the time of the substitution, the judgment approving the compromise agreement has already been rendered. Victor merely participated in the execution of the compromise judgment. He was not a party to the compromise agreement. Our law on succession does not countenance tacit repudiation of inheritance. It requires an express act on the part of the heir. Victors act of moving for execution of the compromise judgment cannot be considered an act of renunciation of his legitime. He was, therefore, not precluded or estopped form subsequently seeking the reduction of the donation. Nor are Victors heirs, upon his death, precluded from doing so, as their right to do so is expressly recognized. If the heir should die without having accepted or repudiated the inheritance, his right shall be transmitted to his heirs. ARTICLE 1052. If the heir repudiates the inheritance to the prejudice of his own creditors, the latter may petition the court to authorize them to accept it in the name of the heir. The acceptance shall benefit the creditors only to an extent sufficient to cover the amount of their credits. The excess, should there be any, shall in no case pertain to the renouncer, but shall be adjudicated to the persons to whom, in accordance with the rules established in this Code, it may belong. (1001) ARTICLE 1053. If the heir should die without having accepted or repudiated the inheritance his right shall be transmitted to his heirs. (1006) ARTICLE 1054. Should there be several heirs called to the inheritance, some of them may accept and the others may repudiate it. (1007a) ARTICLE 1055. If a person, who is called to the same inheritance as an heir by will and ab intestato, repudiates the inheritance in his capacity as a testamentary heir, he is understood to have repudiated it in both capacities. Should he repudiate it as an intestate heir, without knowledge of his being a testamentary heir, he may still accept it in the latter capacity. (1009) ARTICLE 1056. The acceptance or repudiation of inheritance, once made, is irrevocable, and cannot impugned, except when it was made through any of causes that vitiate consent, or when an unknown appears. (997) an be the will
ARTICLE 1057. Within thirty days after the court has issued an order for the distribution of the estate in accordance with
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the Rules of Court, the heirs, devisees and legatees shall signify to the court having jurisdiction whether they accept or repudiate the inheritance. If they do not do so within that time, they are deemed to have accepted the inheritance. (n) SECTION 4 Executors and Administrators ARTICLE 1058. All matters relating to the appointment, powers and duties of executors and administrators and concerning the administration of estates of deceased persons shall be governed by the Rules of Court. (n) CORONA vs. CA August 30, 1982 FACTS: Dolores died leaving two wills: a holographic will dated October 3, 1980, which excluded her husband as one of her heirs, and a formal will dated October 24, 1980, which expressly disinherited her husband because of concubinage. Rowena, Dolores niece and executrix, filed a petition for probate and for the appointment of Nenita as administrator since she (Rowena) is presently employed in New York City. Romarico, the husband, filed an opposition and prayed that he be appointed as special administrator because the special administratrix is not related to the heirs and has no interest to be protected. HELD: The SC held that Nenita should be appointed as Special Administrator. The executrix's choice of Special Administrator, considering her own inability to serve and the wide latitude of discretion given her by the testatrix in her Will is entitled to the highest consideration. Objections to Nenita's appointment on grounds of impracticality and lack of kinship are over-shadowed by the fact that justice and equity demand that the side of the deceased wife and the faction of the surviving husband be represented in the management of the decedent's estate. It is apropos to remind the Special Administrators that while they may have respective interests to protect, they are officers of the Court subject to the supervision and control of the Probate Court and are expected to work for the best interests of the entire estate, its smooth administration, and its earliest settlement.
FACTS: Tupas Foundation, Inc. being a stranger and not a compulsory heir, alleged that the donation inter vivos made in its favor was not subject to collation. HELD: An inofficious donation is collationable, i.e. its value is imputable into the hereditary estate of the donor at the time of his death for the purpose of determining the legitime of the forced or compulsory heirs and the freely disposable portion of the estate. This is true as well of donation to strangers as of gifts to compulsory hers, although the language of Article 1061 of the Civil Code would seem to limit collation to the latter class of donations. Collationable gifts should include gifts made not only in favor of the forced heirs, but even those made in favor of strangers, so that in computing the legitimates, the value of the property donated should be considered part of the donors estate. Deducting the legitimes from the net value of the hereditary estate leaves the freely disposable portion by which the donation in question here must be measured. If the value of the donation at the time it was made does not exceed that difference, then, it must be allowed to stand. But if it does, the donation is inofficious as to the excess and must be reduced by the amount of said excess. In this case, if any excess be shown, it shall be returned or reverted to the sole compulsory heir of the deceased Tupas. ZARAGOZA vs. CA SEPTEMEBER 29, 2000 FACTS: The father, during his lifetime, partitioned his properties to his children Gloria, Zacariaz, and Florentino, by way of Deeds of Absolute Sale except that in respect to daughter Alberta because of her marriage, she became an American citizen and was prohibited to acquire lands in the Philippines, except by hereditary succession. After the father died without a will, Alberta sued Florentino for the delivery of her inheritance, consisting of Lots 871 and 943. Florentino claimed that Lot 871 is still registered in their fathers name while Lot 943 was sold to him for a valuable consideration. HELD: The partition done during the lifetime of the father is valid as long as it is done without impairing the legitime of compulsory heirs. Such legitime is determined after collation by compulsory heirs of what they received during the lifetime of the deceased by way of donation or any other gratuitous title. In this case, however, collation could not be done because the other compulsory heirs were not impleaded in the case. The SC dismissed the case without prejudice to the institution of a new proceeding where all the indispensable parties are present for the rightful determination of their respective legitime and if the partitioning inter vivos prejudiced the legitimes. ARTICLE 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the donor should have so expressly provided, or if the donee should repudiate the inheritance, unless the donation should be reduced as inofficious. (1036) BUHAY DE ROMA vs. CA JULY 23, 1987 HELD: There is nothing in the provisions expressly prohibiting the collation of the donated properties. The phrase sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli merely described the donation as irrevocable and should not be construed as an expres s prohibition against collation. The fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the subject thereof from the collation required under Article 1061. The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and unequivocally as an exception to the general rule announced in Article 1062. The suggestion that there was an implied prohibition because the properties donated were imputable to the free portion of the decedents estate merits little consideration. Imputation is not the question here, nor is it claimed that the disputed donation is officious. The sole issue is whether or not there was an express prohibition to collate, and there was none. Given the precise language of the deed of donation, the decedent-donor would have
ARTICLE 1059. If the assets of the estate of a decedent which can be applied to the payment of debts are not sufficient for that purpose, the provisions of articles 2239 to 2251 on Preference of Credits shall be observed, provided that the expenses referred to in article 2244, No. 8, shall be those involved in the administration of the decedent's estate. (n) ARTICLE 1060. A corporation or association authorized to conduct the business of a trust company in the Philippines may be appointed as an executor, administrator, guardian of an estate, or trustee, in like manner as an individual; but it shall not be appointed guardian of the person of a ward. (n) SECTION 5 Collation ARTICLE 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition. (1035a) VDA. DE TUPAS vs. RTC OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL OCTOBER 3, 1986
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included an express prohibition to collate, if that had been the donors intention. ARTICLE 1063. Property left by will is not deemed subject to collation, if the testator has not otherwise provided, but the legitime shall in any case remain unimpaired. (1037) ARTICLE 1064. When grandchildren, who survive with their uncles, aunts, or cousins, inherit from their grandparents in representation of their father or mother, they shall bring to collation all that their parents, if alive, would have been obliged to bring, even though such grandchildren have not inherited the property. They shall also bring to collation all that they may have received from the decedent during his lifetime, unless the testator has provided otherwise, in which case his wishes must be respected, if the legitime of the coheirs is not prejudiced. (1038) ARTICLE 1070. Wedding gifts by parents and ascendants consisting of jewelry, clothing, and outfit, shall not be reduced as inofficious except insofar as they may exceed one-tenth of the sum which is disposable by will. (1044) ARTICLE 1065. Parents are not obliged to bring to collation in the inheritance of their ascendants any property which may have been donated by the latter to their children. (1039) ARTICLE 1066. Neither shall donations to the spouse of the child be brought to collation; but if they have been given by the parent to the spouses jointly, the child shall be obliged to bring to collation one-half of the thing donated. (1040) ARTICLE 1067. Expenses for support, education, medical attendance, even in extraordinary illness, apprenticeship, ordinary equipment, or customary gifts are not subject to collation. (1041) ARTICLE 1068. Expenses incurred by the parents in giving their children a professional, vocational or other career shall not be brought to collation unless the parents so provide, or unless they impair the legitime; but when their collation is required, the sum which the child would have spent if he had lived in the house and company of his parents shall be deducted therefrom. (1042a) ARTICLE 1069. Any sums paid by a parent in satisfaction of the debts of his children, election expenses, fines, and similar expenses shall be brought to collation. (1043a) ARTICLE 1071. The same things donated are not to be brought to collation and partition, but only their value at the time of the donation, even though their just value may not then have been assessed. Their subsequent increase or deterioration and even their total loss or destruction, be it accidental or culpable, shall be for the benefit or account and risk of the donee. (1045a) ARTICLE 1072. In the collation of a donation made by both parents, one-half shall be brought to the inheritance of the father, and the other half, to that of the mother. That given by one alone shall be brought to collation in his or her inheritance. (1046a) ARTICLE 1073. The donee's share of the estate shall be reduced by an amount equal to that already received by him; and his co-heirs shall receive an equivalent, as much as possible, in property of the same nature, class and quality. (1047)
ARTICLE 1074. Should the provisions of the preceding article be impracticable, if the property donated was immovable, the co-heirs shall be entitled to receive its equivalent in cash or securities, at the rate of quotation; and should there be neither cash nor marketable securities in the estate, so much of the other property as may be necessary shall be sold at public auction. If the property donated was movable, the co-heirs shall only have a right to select an equivalent of other personal property of the inheritance at its just price. (1048) ARTICLE 1075. The fruits and interest of the property subject to collation shall not pertain to the estate except from the day on which the succession is opened. For the purpose of ascertaining their amount, the fruits and interest of the property of the estate of the same kind and quality as that subject to collation shall be made the standard of assessment. (1049) ARTICLE 1076. The co-heirs are bound to reimburse to the donee the necessary expenses which he has incurred for the preservation of the property donated to him, though they may not have augmented its value. The donee who collates in kind an immovable, which has been given to him, must be reimbursed by his co-heirs for the improvements which have increased the value of the property, and which exist at the time the partition is effected. As to works made on the estate for the mere pleasure of the donee, no reimbursement is due him for them; he has, however, the right to remove them, if he can do so without injuring the estate. (n) ARTICLE 1077. Should any question arise among the coheirs upon the obligation to bring to collation or as to the things which are subject to collation, the distribution of the estate shall not be interrupted for this reason, provided adequate security is given. (1050) SECTION 6 Partition and Distribution of the Estate SUBSECTION 1 Partition ARTICLE 1078. Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of debts of the deceased. (n) NOCEDA vs. CA September 2, 1999 HELD: In this case, the source of co-ownership among the heirs was intestate succession. Partition, in general, is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may belong. The purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership. And one way of effecting a partition of the decedent's estate is by the heirs themselves extrajudicially. The heirs of the late Celestino entered into an extrajudicial settlement of the estate on August 17, 1981 and agreed to adjudicate among themselves the property left by their predecessor-in-interest. The areas allotted to each heir are specifically delineated in the survey plan. There is no co-ownership where portion owned is concretely determined and identifiable, though not technically described, or that said portions are still embraced in one and the same certificate of title does not make said portions less determinable or identifiable, or distinguishable, one from the other, nor that dominion over each portion less exclusive, in their respective owners. A partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him. ARTICLE 1079. Partition, in general, is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may belong. The thing itself may be divided, or its value. (n) HEIRS OF TEVES vs. CA 316 SCRA 632
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HELD: The extrajudicial settlements executed by the heirs of Joaquin Teves and Marcelina Cimafranca are legally valid and binding. The extrajudicial settlement of a decedents estate is authorized by Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. For a partition to be valid, the following conditions must concur: (1) the decedent left no will; (2) the decedent left no debts, or if there were debts left, all had been paid; (3) the heirs are all of age, or if they are minors, the latter are represented by their judicial guardian or legal representatives; (4) the partition was made by means of a public instrument or affidavit duly filed with the Register of Deeds. Although Cresenciano, Ricardos predecessor-ininterest, was not a signatory to the extrajudicial settlements, the partition of Lot 769-A among the heirs was made in accordance with their intestate shares under the law. Oral partition is valid. The non-registration of an extrajudicial settlement does not affect its intrinsic validity when there are no creditors or the rights of the creditors are not affected. HEIRS of SERASPI vs. CA April 28, 2000 FACTS: Marcelino contracted 3 marriages. At the time of his death in 1943, he had 15 children from his 3 marriages. In 1948, his intestate estate was partitioned into 3 parts by his heirs, each part corresponding to the share of the heirs in each marriage. In the same year, Patronicio, representing the heirs of st the 1 marriage, sold the share of the heirs in the estate nd to Dominador, an heir of the 2 marriage. Dominador then sold said share to Quirico and Purficacion Seraspi. They then obtained a loan but failed to pay it. As such, the lands were sold to Kalibo Rural Bank and then subsequently sold to Manuel. Rata allowed Quirico to administer the property. Simeon, Marcelinos child by his thi rd wife, taking advantage of the illness of Quirico, ho had been paralyzed due to a stroke, forcibly entered the lands in question and took possession thereof. The Seraspis purchased the lands from Manuel Rata and afterwards filed a complaint against Simeon for recovery of possession of the lands. HELD: Simeon cannot base his ownership on succession for the property was not part of those distributed to the heirs of the third marriage, to which he belongs. In the partition of the intestate estate of Marcelino, the properties were divided into 3 parts, each part being reserved for each group of heirs belonging to one of the 3 marriages Marcelino entered into. Since the contested parcels of land were adjudicated to the heirs of the first and second marriages, it follows that private respondent, as heir of the rd 3 marriage, has no right over the parcels of land. While, as heir to the intestate estate of his father, private respondent was co-owner of all of his fathers properties, such co-ownership rights were effectively dissolved by the partition agreed upon by the heirs of Marcelino. ARTICLE 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs. A parent who, in the interest of his or her family, desires to keep any agricultural, industrial, or manufacturing enterprise intact, may avail himself of the right granted him in this article, by ordering that the legitime of the other children to whom the property is not assigned, be paid in cash. (1056a) ZARAGOZA vs. CA September 29, 2000 HELD: A partition inter vivos may be done for as long as legitimes are not prejudiced. Article 1080 is clear on this. The legitime of the compulsory heirs is determined after collation. Unfortunately, collation cannot be done in this case where the original petition for delivery of
inheritance share only impleaded one of the other compulsory heirs. The petition must be dismissed without prejudice to the institution of a new proceedings wherein all the indispensable parties are present for the rightful determination of their respective legitime and if the legitimes were prejudiced by the partitioning inter vivos. ARTICLE 1081. A person may, by an act inter vivos or mortis causa, intrust the mere power to make the partition after his death to any person who is not one of the co-heirs. The provisions of this and of the preceding article shall be observed even should there be among the co-heirs a minor or a person subject to guardianship; but the mandatory, in such case, shall make an inventory of the property of the estate, after notifying the co-heirs, the creditors, and the legatees or devisees. (1057a) ARTICLE 1082. Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction. (n)
CRUCILLO vs. IAC 317 SCRA 351 HELD: The heirs of Balbino Crucillo agreed to orally partition the estate among themselves, as evinced by their possession of the inherited premises, their construction of the improvement thereon, and their having declared in their names for tax purposes their respective shares. These are indications that the said heirs agreed to divide the subject estate among themselves. It is certainly foolhardy for the petitioners to claim that no oral partition was made when their acts showed otherwise. Moreover, it is unbelievable that the possession of the heirs was by mere tolerance, judging from the introduction of the improvement thereon and the length of time that such improvements have been in existence. After exercising acts of ownership over their respective portions of the contested estate, petitioners are stopped from denying or contesting the existence of an oral partition. The oral agreement for the partition of the property owned in common is valid, binding and enforceable on the parties. PADA-KILARIO vs. CA January 19, 2000 HELD: The extrajudicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada among his heirs made in 1951 is valid, albeit executed in an unregistered private document. No law requires partition among heirs to be in writing and registered in order to be valid. The requirement in Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court that partition be put in a public document and registered is for the protection of creditors and the heirs themselves against tardy claims. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities is not undermined when no creditors are involved. Without creditors to consider, it is competent for the heirs to enter into an agreement for the distribution of the estate in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by the rules from which nothing can be inferred that a writing or other formality is essential for the partition to be valid. The partition of inherited property need not be embodied in a public document so as to be effective as regards the heirs that participated therein. Statute of Frauds does not apply because partition among heirs is not legally deemed a conveyance of real property but rather a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property that an heir is renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and receives the inheritance. HEIRS OF JOAQUIN TEVES vs. CA October 13, 1999 HELD: An oral partition of a decedents estate is valid and the non-registration of an extrajudicial settlement does
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not affect its intrinsic validity when there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. UNION BANK vs. SANTIBAEZ February 23, 2005 HELD: The probate proceeding already acquired jurisdiction over all the properties of the deceased, including the 3 tractors. To dispose of them in any way without the probate courts approval is tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction which the SC cannot allow. In executing any joint agreement which appears to be in the nature of an extra-judicial partition, court approval is imperative and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over that part of the estate. It is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to determine the identity of the heirs of the decedent. In the instant case, there is no showing that the signatories in the joint agreement were the only heirs of the decedent. When it was executed, the probate court has to determine yet who the heirs of the decedent were. Thus, for Edmund and Florence to adjudicate unto themselves the 3 tractors was a premature act, and prejudicial to the other possible heirs and creditors who may have a valid claim against the estate of the deceased. ARTICLE 1083. Every co-heir has a right to demand the division of the estate unless the testator should have expressly forbidden its partition, in which case the period of indivision shall not exceed twenty years as provided in article 494. This power of the testator to prohibit division applies to the legitime. Even though forbidden by the testator, the coownership terminates when any of the causes for which partnership is dissolved takes place, or when the court finds for compelling reasons that division should be ordered, upon petition of one of the co-heirs. (1051a) SANTOS vs. SANTOS October 12, 2000 FACTS: Ladislao filed a complaint against his brother, Eliseo, and the latters son Phillip. Ladislao averred that when his and Eliseos sister, Isidra, died, they inherited her parcel of land. A parcel of land left by Isidra was conveyed by Eliseo to Virgilio, who from infancy had been under the care of Isidra. Virgilio executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Philip, his brother and a Tax Declaration was issued in favor of Philip. Philip and the heirs of Eliseo aver that acquired Isidras property by acquisitive prescription. HELD: Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have been preceded by repudiation of the co-ownership. The act of repudiation is subject to certain conditions; 1. A co-owner repudiates the co-ownership 2. Such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners 3. The evidence is clear and conclusive 4. He has been in possession through open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the property for the period required by law. There was no showing that Eliseo had complied with these requisites. Acts of possessory character executed in virtue of license or tolerance of the owners shall not be available for the purposes of possession. Filipino family ties being close and well-knit as they are, and considering that Virgilio was the ward of Isidra ever since when Virgilio was still an infant, it was but natural that Ladislao did not interpose any objection to the continued stay of Virgilio and his family on the property and even acquiesced thereto. Ladislao must have assumed too, that his brother, Eliseo, allowed his son to occupy the property and use the same for the time being. Hence, such possession by Virgilio and Philip of the property did not constitute a repudiation of the coownership by Eliseo and of his privies for that matter. Penultimately, the action for partition is not barred by laches. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property.
ARTICLE 1084. Voluntary heirs upon whom some condition has been imposed cannot demand a partition until the condition has been fulfilled; but the other co-heirs may demand it by giving sufficient security for the rights which the former may have in case the condition should be complied with; and until it is known that the condition has not been fulfilled or can never be complied with, the partition shall be understood to be provisional. (1054a) ARTICLE 1085. In the partition of the estate, equality shall be observed as far as possible, dividing the property into lots, or assigning to each of the co-heirs things of the same nature, quality and kind. (1061) ARTICLE 1086. Should a thing be indivisible, or would be much impaired by its being divided, it may be adjudicated to one of the heirs, provided he shall pay the others the excess in cash. Nevertheless, if any of the heirs should demand that the thing be sold at public auction and that strangers be allowed to bid, this must be done. (1062) ARTICLE 1087. In the partition the co-heirs shall reimburse one another for the income and fruits which each one of them may have received from any property of the estate, for any useful and necessary expenses made upon such property, and for any damage thereto through malice or neglect. (1063) ARTICLE 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the coheirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor. (1067a) GARCIA vs. CALALIMAN April 17, 1989 FACTS: Respondents claim that the 30-day period prescribed in Article 1088 for petitioners to exercise the right to legal redemption had already elapsed and that the requirement of Article 1088 that notice must be in writing is deemed satisfied because written notice would be superfluous, the purpose of the law having been fully served when petitioner Garcia went to the Office of the Register of Deeds and was for himself, read and understood the contents of the Deeds of Sale. HELD: The Court took note of the fact that the registration of the deed of sale as sufficient notice of sale under the provision of Section 51 of Act No. 496 applies only to registered lands and has no application whatsoever to a case where the property involved is unregistered land. If the intention of the law had been to include verbal notice or nay other means of information as sufficient to give the effect of this notice, then there would have been no necessity or reasons to specify in Article 1088 that the said notice be made in writing for, under the old law, a verbal notice or information was sufficient. In the interpretation of a related provision (Article 1623) written notice is indispensable, actual knowledge of the sale acquired in some other manners by the redemptioner, notwithstanding. He or she is still entitled to written notice, as exacted by the Code, to remove all uncertainty as to the sale, its terms and its validity, and to quiet any doubt that the alienation is not definitive. The law not having provided for any alternative method of notifications remains exclusive, thought the Code does not prescribed any particular form of written notice nor any distinctive method for written notification of redemption. BAYLON vs. AMADOR February 9, 2004 HELD: The requirement of a written notice is mandatory. The SC has long established the rule that, notwithstanding actual knowledge of a co-owner, the latter is still entitled to a written notice from the selling co-owner in order to remove all
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uncertainties about the sale, its terms and conditions as wells as its efficacy and status. Private respondent was never given such written notice. He thus still has the right to redeem said 1/3 portion of the subject property. On account of the lack of written notice of the sale by the other co-heirs, the 30-day period never commenced. Exception (case where the SC held otherwise): ALONZO vs. IAC 159 SCRA 259 HELD: Actual knowledge was considered an equivalent to a written notice of sale because the right of legal redemption was invoked more than 13 years after the sales were concluded. SC rules that written notice is mandatory, as a general rule: PRIMARY STRUCTURES CORP. vs. SPS. VALENCIA August 19, 2003 HELD: The 30-day period of redemption had yet to commence when private respondent Rosales sought to exercise the right of redemption on March 31, 1987, a day after she discovered the sale from the Office of the City Treasurer of Butuan City or when the case was initiated on October 16, 1987, before the trial court. The written notice is mandatory. The SC has long established the rule that notwithstanding the actual knowledge of a co-owner, the latter is still entitled to a written notice form the selling co-owner in order to remove all uncertainties about the sale, its terms and conditions, as well as its efficacy and status. Even in Alonzo vs. IAC, relied upon by the petitioner in contending that actual knowledge should be an equivalent to a written notice of sale, the SC made it clear that it was not reversing the prevailing jurisprudence. The SC simply adopted an exception to the general rule in view of the peculiar circumstances of this case. In Alonzo, the right of legal redemption was invoked several years, not just days or months, after the consummation of the contracts of sale but more than 13 years after the sales were concluded.
The decedent left no debts, or if there were debts left, all had been paid 3. The heirs are all of age, or if they are minors, the latter are represented by their judicial guardian or legal representatives 4. The partition was made by means of a public instrument or affidavit duly filed with the Register of Deeds Although Cresenciano, Ricardos predecessor-ininterest, was not a signatory to the extrajudicial settlements, the partition of the Lot 769-A among the heirs was made in accordance with their intestate shares under the law. The extrajudicial settlements covering Lot 769-A were never registered. However, an oral partition of a decedents estate is valid and the non-registration of an extrajudicial settlement does not affect its intrinsic validity when there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected.
2.
ARTICLE 1092. After the partition has been made, the coheirs shall be reciprocally bound to warrant the title to, and the quality of, each property adjudicated. (1069a) ARTICLE 1093. The reciprocal obligation of warranty referred to in the preceding article shall be proportionate to the respective hereditary shares of the co-heirs, but if any one of them should be insolvent, the other co-heirs shall be liable for his part in the same proportion, deducting the part corresponding to the one who should be indemnified. Those who pay for the insolvent heir shall have a right of action against him for reimbursement, should his financial condition improve. (1071) ARTICLE 1094. An action to enforce the warranty among co-heirs must be brought within ten years from the date the right of action accrues. (n) ARTICLE 1095. If a credit should be assigned as collectible, the co-heirs shall not be liable for the subsequent insolvency of the debtor of the estate, but only for his insolvency at the time the partition is made. The warranty of the solvency of the debtor can only be enforced during the five years following the partition. Co-heirs do not warrant bad debts, if so known to, and accepted by, the distributee. But if such debts are not assigned to a co-heir, and should be collected, in whole or in part, the amount collected shall be distributed proportionately among the heirs. (1072a) ARTICLE 1096. The obligation of warranty among co-heirs shall cease in the following cases: (1) When the testator himself has made the partition, unless it appears, or it may be reasonably presumed, that his intention was otherwise, but the legitime shall always remain unimpaired; (2) When it has been so expressly stipulated in the agreement of partition, unless there has been bad faith; (3) When the eviction is due to a cause subsequent to the partition, or has been caused by the fault of the distributee of the property. (1070a) SUBSECTION 3 Rescission and Nullity of Partition ARTICLE 1097. A partition may be rescinded or annulled for the same causes as contracts. (1073a) ARTICLE 1098. A partition, judicial or extra-judicial, may also be rescinded on account of lesion, when any one of the co-heirs received things whose value is less, by at least onefourth, than the share to which he is entitled, considering the value of the things at the time they were adjudicated. (1074a) ARTICLE 1099. The partition made by the testator cannot be impugned on the ground of lesion, except when the legitime of the compulsory heirs is thereby prejudiced, or
ARTICLE 1089. The titles of acquisition or ownership of each property shall be delivered to the co-heir to whom said property has been adjudicated. (1065a) ARTICLE 1090. When the title comprises two or more pieces of land which have been assigned to two or more co-heirs, or when it covers one piece of land which has been divided between two or more co-heirs, the title shall be delivered to the one having the largest interest, and authentic copies of the title shall be furnished to the other co-heirs at the expense of the estate. If the interest of each co-heir should be the same, the oldest shall have the title. (1066a) SUBSECTION 2 Effects of Partition ARTICLE 1091. A partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him. (1068) HEIRS OF JOAQUIN TEVES vs. CA October 13, 1999 HELD: The extrajudicial settlements executed by the heirs of Joaquin Teves and Marcelina Cimafranca are legally valid and binding. The extrajudicial settlement of a decedents estate is authorized by Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. For a partition pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 74 to be valid, the following conditions must concur: 1. The decedent left no will
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when it appears or may reasonably be presumed, that the intention of the testator was otherwise. (1075) ARTICLE 1100. The action for rescission on account of lesion shall prescribe after four years from the time the partition was made. (1076) ARTICLE 1101. The heir who is sued shall have the option of indemnifying the plaintiff for the loss, or consenting to a new partition. Indemnity may be made by payment in cash or by the delivery of a thing of the same kind and quality as that awarded to the plaintiff. If a new partition is made, it shall affect neither those who have not been prejudiced nor those have not received more than their just share. (1077a) ARTICLE 1102. An heir who has alienated the whole or a considerable part of the real property adjudicated to him cannot maintain an action for rescission on the ground of lesion, but he shall have a right to be indemnified in cash. (1078a) ARTICLE 1103. The omission of one or more objects or securities of the inheritance shall not cause the rescission of the partition on the ground of lesion, but the partition shall be completed by the distribution of the objects or securities which have been omitted. (1079a) ARTICLE 1104. A partition made with preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall not be rescinded, unless it be proved that there was bad faith or fraud on the part of the other persons interested; but the latter shall be proportionately obliged to pay to the person omitted the share which belongs to him. (1080) NON vs. CA February 15, 2000 HELD: The exclusion of Delia, alleged to be a retardate, from the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement verily had the effect of preterition. This kind of preterition, however, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith, does not justify a collateral attack on the Transfer Certificate of Title. The relief rests on Article 1104 to the effect that where the preterition is not attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid the value of the share pertaining to her. The appellate court has acted properly in ordering the remand of the case for further proceedings to make the proper valuation of the property and the ascertainment of the amount due to Delia. ARTICLE 1105. A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be void only with respect to such person. (1081a) LANDAYAN vs. BACANI September 30, 1982 FACTS: An extra-judicial partition was entered into by Maxima, wife of the deceased Teodoro, and Severino. Petitioners contended that they are the legal heirs of the deceased since they are the children of Guillerma, who was the only child of the deceased and his first wife Florencia. They averred that Severino is an illegitimate child of Guillerma. But Severino alleged that he is the acknowledged natural child of Teodoro and Florencia. Private respondents also alleged that the action of the petitioners had prescribed since it has been more than 18 years after the execution of the document they seek to annul. The lower court ruled that the action is barred by prescription. HELD: The dismissal of the action is erroneous. The question if it is void requires a legal inquiry into the legal status of Severino. Should the petitioners be able to substantiate their contention that Severino is an illegitimate son of Guillerma, he is not a legal heir of Teodoro. The right of
representation is denied by law to an illegitimate child who is disqualified to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father. On this supposition, the subject deed of extra-judicial partition is one that included a person who is not an heir of the descendant whose estate is being partitioned. Such a deed is governed by Article 1105 of the Civil Code. The Supreme Court ordered the respondent judge to try the case on the merits and render the corresponding judgment thereon. MENDOZA vs. IAC July 30, 1987 FACTS: The extra-judicial settlement of the estate of Evaristo executed between Buenaventura and Modesta was sought to be annulled. The lower court ruled that such settlement is void as to as the shares of Modesta are concerned. Nicolasa and Teresa predeceased Buenaventura. Modesta is the illegitimate child of Nicolasa. Buenaventura then died. It was prayed that Modesta be declared the legal heir of Buenaventura. HELD: The only document presented by Modesta to prove that she was recognized by her mother was the certificate of birth and baptism signed by the parish priest. Canonical certificate of baptism is not sufficient to prove recognition. Neither could the alleged continuous possession by Modesta Gabuya of the status of a natural child improve her condition. Modesta Gabuya, not having been acknowledged in the manner provided by law by her mother, Nicolasa, was not entitled to succeed the latter. The extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Evaristo, therefore, null and void insofar as Modesta Gabuya is concerned per Article 1105 of the New Civil Code. AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY vs. CA March 7, 2000 FACTS: Private respondents set up the defense of ownership and questioned the title of Aznar to the subject lot, alleging that the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale upon which petitioner bases its title is null and void for being fraudulently made. Private respondents claim that not all the known heirs of Crisanta participated in the extrajudicial partition and that 2 person who participated and were made parties thereto were not heirs of Crisanta. HELD: Under Article 1104, partition made with preterition shall not be rescinded unless it be proved that there was bad faith or fraud. In this case, there was no evidence of bad faith or fraud. As to the 2 parties to the deed who were allegedly not heirs, Article 1105 is applicable. The participation of nonheirs does not render the partition void in its entirety but only to the extent corresponding them. FERNANDEZ vs. FERNANDEZ August 28, 2001 FACTS: Rodolfo was adopted by the late spouses Jose and Generosa. When Jose died, a Deed of Extra-judicial Partition was executed between Rodolfo and Generosa. After learning the transaction, the nephews and nieces of Jose filed an action to declare the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition void ab initio. HELD: While ones legitimacy can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, this doctrine has no application in the instant case considering that respondents claim was that petitioner Rodolfo was not born to the deceased spouses Jose and Generosa Fernandez. We do not have a situation wherein they (respondents) deny that Rodolfo was a child of their uncles wife. Rodolfo failed to prove his filiation with the deceased spouses Fernandez. Such is a factual issue which has been thoroughly passed upon and settled both by the trial court and the appellate court. There is no record of the birth of Rodolfo. The Application for Recognition of Back Pay Rights is a public document but it was not executed to admit the filiation of Jose with Rodolfo. The public document contemplated in Article 172 of the Family Code refer to the written admission
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of filiation embodied in a public document purposely executed as an admission of filiation and not as obtaining in this case wherein the public document was executed as an application for the recognition of rights to back pay. Possession of status of a child does not in itself constitute an acknowledgment; it is only a ground for a child to compel recognition by his assumed parent. While baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they are evidence only to prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the statements or declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk. Rodolfo is not a child by nature of the spouses Fernandez and not a legal heir of Dr. Jose Fernandez , thus the subject deed of extra-judicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Jose Fernandez between Generosa vda. de Fernandez and Rodolfo is null and void insofar as Rodolfo is concerned.
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SUCCESSION REVIEWER Case Digests (4 Year : 2008-2009