[Classification]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) New York Air Route Center
Type of event: Interview
Date: Tuesday, September , 2003
Special Access Issues: None
Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown
Team Number: 8
Location: FAA New York Air Route Center, Rokonkomo, New York
Participants - Non-Commission: Alfred , FAA General Consul
Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown

NOTE: Unless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases the response and opinion of
the interviewee. Please refer to the interview transcript for a complete account.

David LaCates

Hired 1983 ATC Pontiac Michigan/ was a military controller. Hired direct post military.
Transferred to New York Tracon 1984. Controller there 8 or 9 years, training specialist
1.5. Went back to controller. Then Islip tower as manager. Went to resources, then back
to New York Tracon as op manager. Then tm officers. Then TMU assistant manager.
Then New York center on detail. Then ZNY deputy for four years. Was a military
controller for about 2.5 of 3 years. Hill air force base, Utah. Assistant air traffic manager
slag is deputy.

Officially works 8 to 430. But comes in at 730 for eastern region Telcon. Ray Holland
starts it. During course of day is not in controller area but in an office.

9/11. Was in traffic management office. Charlie Bailey's office (TMO). Wears a portable
and a pager. Got a call from mike McCormack asking him to come to the floor
immediately. McCormack tells him confirmed hijacking. Says got page from Ron
Rejerrie confirming. Both went to area b and looked for a hijacking. Started to get reports
of smoke coming from Manhattan. Reports also that WTC was on fire. Told by
McCormack to go turn on CNN. Went to cafe to do so. Could only see smoke and the
black. Wasn't positive it was AAl 1. Went back and told McCormack. Went back to area
b and checked for the missing primary. Bittiglia told of suspicion transmission from
AAl 1 that UAL 175 heard and waited to inform of. Then transponder code change on
UAL 175. Went and told mike that 175 had changed codes and was turning. 175 climbed
to get above some traffic. But then descended and lost radar below 2200 ft. went and told
McCormack they had lost radar. Mainly in area b but went back and forth to watch desk
to give information to McCormack. McCormack's pattern was roughly the same.
Division of labor that McCormack was coordinating and making calls, on conference
calls, and LaCates was feeding McCormack information from area b.

ZNY knew that the hijack had been confirmed from QA manager Ron rejery for eastern
region from the pager. Impression at the time was "confirm" based on information from
the page from the region. Had heard nothing of the hijack before that.

Perspective is have confirmed hijack. Information come to LaCates from region to mike
to LaCates. Found out a some point thereafter that the information had come down
through Boston. When looking at scopes at area b believes AAl 1 was still fairly close to
Manhattan. Look for altitude was already ongoing when LaCates arrived. His contact
with AAl 1 only began two or three minutes before primary was lost. From a terminal
background depending on altitude primaries are easy to loose track of. But when heard
about smoke and possible fire at trade center that's when goes to tell McCormack and
then checks CNN. Range of possibilities on AAl 1 when lost primary below radar didn't
immediately think crash. Thought it might have been routed to land somewhere. Notion
of airplane used of weapon had never crossed his mind. Cafeteria only place with CNN
available. Kevin Delaney started monitoring CNN after that point. Delaney might have
saw it as it occurred. At moment when he saw the CNN report he assumed it was the
hijacked AAl 1. Heard rumors and question of it being a plane from pequibski, a small
airplane. Didn't stay long enough to continue monitoring CNN. Went back to floor and
continued search for AAl 1. Even though thought it was AAl 1 still went back to look for
primary. Believes he did see target on Dave Bittiglia's screen believed to be AAl 1.
Target gone, then mike says go look at CNN. Believes he heard reports of 1) smoke, and
2) the world trade center might have been on fire. When came back does not remember
specifically telling McCormack that it WAS AAl 1 that hit WTC. Sure he did convey that
thought to McCormack.

According to Bittiglia's transcript, Bittiglia received reports from other airplanes of

smoke. Went to McCormack with that information. By 851 mike had information on
smoke and had sent LaCates to cafeteria.

UAL 175: searching for primary AAl 1 despite. Bittiglia tells McCormack UAL 175
waited to get on ZNY frequency before reporting overheard strange transmission. Saw
the transponder change, then continued to turn. Was watching screen 42. When aircraft
started to turn aircraft in conflict climbed above him, and then UAL 175 started to
descend. Then went and informed McCormack that UAL 175 had transponder change,
was descending and had started to turn. McCormack doesn't remember where Thumser
was. McCormack and Barrett were at the watch desk. Right then LaCates is watching
airplane and trying to figure out what was going on. Observations are indicating to
LaCates that something serious is wrong. Thought process leading to more than
equipment problem with UAL 175: knew there was something wrong. Hadn't put together
hijack or emergency, knew something was dreadfully wrong. Never had a hijack in career
with FAA. So thought that there would be another one didn't necessarily enter mind, had
a gut instinct that something was wrong.

No doubt that 3321 was united. Had some situational awareness from the AA11. Code
probably changed before turn and descent. By the time UAL 175 take a north eastern turn
goes to tell McCormack he was headed to Manhattan.

Also far as remember LaCates was still trying to range him (856 -858 time frame).

BREAK IN RECORD

Lacates does not remember Thumser in area.

Now two impacts of towers. Something amiss with airplanes. The equation of two planes
into two towers was clear at that point. The assumption was that

Then started to close the sector down.

Factors: events with both planes. Rumors over pikipsi. Doesn't remember delta 1989. Not
aware of Cleveland or Indy center issues until well after second hit. Bob Ocon - support
specialist - told him Indy or Cleveland had hits. Now thinking of third impact.

AA11 rebirth: no knowledge.

Rumor of small twin engine aircraft from pikispi heading towards dc got translated to
first WTC hit and persisted for over an hour. McCormack was aware of this rumor.
Barrett and Thumser doesn't know if they were aware. No knowledge of how this rumor
began.

Pentagon: monitoring floor and McCormack was on a Telcon in the conference room.
Discovered that an aircraft had hit the pentagon. No equation in LaCates mind no
knowledge that Bittiglia thought perhaps AA11 had hit pentagon. Shut down departures
and accepting aircraft.

Area b conference. McCormack had asked a tape be made so there was certainty that all
statements were recorded. McCormack does not report to anyone in this building. The
gathering of information was routine. Usually you watch SATORI, listen to tape, and
write down statement. Since this was an unusual situation wanted an accurate recording
of what had happened. Believes it was bob Ott that gathered that. Lacates gave a written
statement but not a verbal one. Because of significance of event wanted to make sure all
information was kept. Lacates understanding is that the QA destroyed the tape.
Understanding came to Lacates information after his (Kevin Delaney's) interview with
us. Delaney had spoken to McCormack and McCormack told Lacates. Destination that
the recording was official needs to be made on the recording. Understanding was that the
tape was not official. But understanding also is that it still existed. Believes that as air
traffic manager made official request to Ott to make recording. Does not know if it was
mandatory or optional for staff to make the verbal statement. Lacates does not have
knowledge of that tape.

Official policy that in the case of an accident written statements are made. Was worried
that they would go out on workers comp and then you wouldn't have any information for
two weeks. Purpose was to have an accurate memorialized so that later they could make
written statements. Standard practice of making a tape would be union reps, official way
of introducing tapes, process of making them not a defined FAA process. Tape made on
fly.

For sake of argument, assume Delaney did destroy that, is it within Delaney's authority to
do that without consulting anyone else? As a QA manager can make decisions on what to
retain and what not to retain.

Duties of QA people part of document that covers duties of FAA.

Trying to find the tape when knew commission was coming. Asked around but no one
had asked Kevin yet, before found out about interview. Did not try himself to contact
Delaney. To Lacates knowledge no one knew where it was. At some point this week
learned that the tapes weren't around. Someone asked George Leonard to look for them.
Lacates not part of putting together package for commission. Would assume George
Leonard was the one who put that together. Were individual controllers allowed to review
those according before making written statements? Would assume so.

Performance of center that day? Just about everyone did an extraordinary job. Focus was
on the operation. Directed everyone to look for primaries and suspicious activity - three
people jumped off a plane at Kennedy, all kinds of reports. Purpose with a hijacking is
always to get them to land.

Nature of threat to aircraft. Does have capability to store classified data. Military office
and flight records. Military missions type information. Warning areas and military use of
airspace.

Relationship between FAA and military over use of airspace? No relationship problems.
Occasionally they don't want to give up a space for civilian use, but procedures for
mitigating this are adequate. Practices and procedures in place for knowledge on how to
scramble? Not aware of steps beyond reaching out and contacting the military. Ability to
reach out to specifically NEADS? Not aware at his level of procedures to contact specific
air defenders.

McGuire controllers were here for a bit while ZNY assumed their airspace. It is an
approach control. Not until after 9/11 was aware that NEADS or customs can read
altitude on primary only. Tracon can not as of 4 years ago when Lacates left Tracon.

Pre 9/11 not aware of specific procedures from a technical specialist point of view.
Hotline could get hold of giant killer. Prior 9/11 knowledge of who could obtain fighter
pilot assistance in response to a hijack. Understanding that it was not responsibility to
direct getting the military. It would be OMIC who would have responsibility and
operational knowledge on what channels to go through to get military assistance.

No concrete knowledge as to AMIS. AMIS position may have existed here, might have
been area f.

DOCUMENTS:
Shows three copies of FAA documents. Never seen the documents. Purpose of
documents to deal with "air piracy" incidents. Second document shown never seen. After
9/11 saw the chapter 7 escort of hijack document. Became aware of it within the last
three to six months. Brought to his attention after "knew commission was coming."

Chapter 40 crisis management handbook - national system shut down - no.

chronology of events - construction worker Richard Knowles - aea505 - branch in eastern

region that deals with quality assurance. No knowledge of Richard Knowles/n phone
numbers slightly different. Frank Sherat - security in the region. Never seen the timeline
before. Chronology of events was not created in ZNY.

Data radar dump - McCormack confirmed hit - no knowledge.

Maybe not AA11 per McCormack - no knowledge.

RECOMMENDATIONS.
Never had an aircraft accident/crisis drill. Evacuations and drills on shutting down
airspaces are drilled. No one had fed threat information that would lead to approaching
9/11 differently.
Need dedicated military specialists that have been on the books. Only have three
specialists and two are only traffic management coordinators. FAA cookie cutter
approach doesn't work on this. Every facility has same amount of military specialist.
ZNY is different. Manager for military specialists on books and might be overkill, but
need dedicated military specialist.
DEN hotline is good as is set up now. CONAR phone is good. Need to stay since the
make sense in this environment.