At the Intersection: Kant, Derrida, and the Relation between Ethics and Politics Author(s): Marguerite La Caze Source:

Political Theory, Vol. 35, No. 6 (Dec., 2007), pp. 781-805 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20452600 . Accessed: 07/06/2011 15:41
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To elucidate thetensionsin therelation betweenethicsand politics, I construct a dialogue betweenKant, who argues thattheycan be made compatible,and ForDerrida, ethics Derrida,who claims togo beyondKant and his idea of duty. makes unconditionaldemands and politics guides our responses to possible must be a effectsof our decisions. Derrida argues that in politics there I argue that negotiationof the non-negotiablecall of ethical responsibility. Derrida's unconditional ethics cannot be read in precisely Kantian terms Moreover, Derrida expands because his 'impossiblereals' can be destructive. thereachof ethicsbeyondKant bymaking all ethicaldemands unconditional a politics that or perfect, yethe does not articulate would enable us to respond to thesedemands. in theorizing We need to takeaccount of thesedifficulties how ethicsshouldconstrain politicsand how politicscan provide theconditions forethics.

duties Kant; Derrida; ethics; politics; Keywords:

condition) Politics says, 'Be ye wise as serpents';morals adds (as a limiting 'and guileless as doves.'1 It is necessary todeduce a politics and a law fromethics.2 Recent interpretationsof Jacques Derrida's work note a close connection

with themes found in Immanuel Kant's writing.3Nevertheless, most of these discussions have not focused on the specific question of the relation between ethics and politics, which is central toDerrida's thought. In recent years Derrida refers extensively toKant's ethics and political philosophy, for example in The Politics of Friendship and On Cosmopolitanism
Author's Note: I would like to thank the Australian philosophy Research Cox; Council

and

for supporting my the reviewers;

research; audiences at the Society forEuropean Philosophy conference, Reading University; University of New South Wales seminar; Damian two anonymous and the editor of Political Theory for constructive comments on earlier versions of this essay.

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On Forgiveness and in essays on justice and law, democracy, and terrorism.4 to ethics and poli the one hand, Derrida is influenced by Kant's approach tics, and on the other hand, he wants to go furtherthanKant, saying, 'So I am ultra-Kantian. I am Kantian, but I am more thanKantian.'s Derrida's hyperbolic ethics goes beyond political considerations and yet he accepts thatwe must act according to political concerns. In Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas, Derrida's position is that 'it is necessary to deduce a politics and a law from ethics.'6 Like Kant, Derrida concerns himself with questions of ethics and politics within the state, between states, and between individuals and states. Understanding the relationship between Kant and Derrida through an engagement with these questions enables a more productive conception of the intersection between ethics and politics that takes seri ously the tensions involved. Kant argues that ethics, or rathermorality for him, and politics do not come into conflict because ethics places limits on what can be done in poli tics.7Derrida argues similarly that ethics must always take precedence or thatpolitics must be derived from ethics. However, forKant ethics ormoral ity is based on what is possible, and forDerrida ethics is necessarily guided by the impossible. For Derrida, ethics is comprised of unconditional demands, and politics of the strategieswe must develop to respond to possi ble consequences and effects of our decisions. On Kant's account, right (those duties thatcan be enforced) along with virtue (duties that cannot be enforced) comprise morals or ethics. While Kant believes that only those moral constraints thatcan be imposed should be part of politics, Derrida sees Derrida the ethical virtues as being essential to politics as well. I argue that goes beyond Kant, as he claims, but without explicitly acknowledging the difficulties that arise from expanding the influence of ethics on politics in thisway. Moreover, Derrida simultaneously gives up on the acceptance of any principles thatcannot be overridden, as I will demonstrate by examin ing his position on human rights. In this sense, he gives up a very important feature of Kant's position. I construct a dialogue between Kant and Derrida in order to demonstrate what is at stake in the disagreements between them must and to explore the potential conflicts between ethics and politics that be considered in any attempt to produce an ethical politics.

The Intersection of Ethics and Politics

To understand how ethics and politics might intersect, the firstquestion thatneeds to be considered iswhether ethics and politics inevitably come

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into conflict. Iwill briefly sketchKant and Derrida's overall views on their relation and then consider inmore detail the differences between them. In 'Toward Perpetual Peace' Kant argues that morals, in termsof right,should be takenmuch more seriously in political decisions; in fact, it should be the overriding consideration. As he writes, '[A]ll politics must bend its knee before right.'8 It should be noted that it is only the enforceable aspect of ethics that is relevant to politics forKant. The firststep inKant's demonstration that there is no conflict between politics and ethics is the view thatwe are always free to act ethically. He contends thatmorals could not have any authority ifwe could not act on them.9 Kant's furtherargument is that there is

no conflictof politics, as doctrineof right put intopractice,withmorals, as theoretical doctrineof right(hence no conflictof practicewith theory);for if there a general doctrineof were, one would have tounderstandby the latter ofmaxims forchoosing the most suitable prudence, thatis, a theory means toone's purposes aimed at advantage, thatis, todeny thatthereis a [doctrine oflmorals at all.'0 Given thatKant sees politics as the application of morality (that aspect of morality described in the doctrine of right), it follows that any conflict in the application would undermine the idealism of morality and make itego istic or self-interested." Thus, complaints of conflict between politics and ethics are simply complaints of inconvenience. This iswhat Kant means by his claim that a moral politician, who makes political prudence conform to morals, is possible, but a political moralist, who makes morals conform to thepolitical interestsof a statesperson, is not.'2Any attempt to make morals conform to political interests,he argues, undermines the concept of right with force, so that it is no longermorals at all. He altogether and replaces it people's says there is only a conflict between morality and politics subjectively in self-interested inclinations,'3 and he observes that the real danger to acting morally is self-deception thatconvinces us we are justified in fol lowing our own interests rather than duty.Kant is of the view that follow ing our own interests is an unreliable business as it is difficult to calculate whether our actions will have the right results, but in acting according to morals we have a dependable guide. While Derrida also believes thatpolitics should be deduced from ethics, he is not as sanguine as Kant concerning the possibilities of conflict between them.This is due to the strong contrast-indeed, contradiction he findsbetween unconditional ethical concepts and theirconditional pairs. Derrida's account of unconditionality emerges from the deconstruction of

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particular ethical concepts in a series of texts.He does not provide an ethi cal system or give an explicit or detailed answer to the question 'Why be moral?' because he is not addressing themoral skeptic. In addition to jus tice,which for him is undeconstructible, he deconstructs concepts such as hospitality and forgiveness into theirpure and impure or unconditional and conditional forms. For example, pure hospitality involves a complete open ness and welcome of theother independent of any 'invitation,' whereas con ditional hospitality depends on a wide range of criteria concerning identity, Derrida length of stay, and so on."4 In relation to asylum seekers, one of the issues is concerned with, these criteria are often determined by the state

and its laws. Conditions on hospitality may be necessary, but they are not truehospitality. Thus Derrida finds a kind of ethical imperative in the logic of the concepts themselves. Insofar as we aspire topure hospitality and true forgiveness, they provide an ethical demand by highlighting the ethical inadequacy of conditional hospitality and forgiveness. Derrida develops his position concerning the relation between ethics and politics most explicitly in 'Ethics and Politics Today,'15 although he returns to this question in a number of other works, including Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas. What he focuses on is the responsibility tounderstand these concepts: [R]esponsibilityof course requires thatany answer be preceded inprinciple by a slow, patient,rigorouselucidation of theconcepts thatare used in dis cussion. . . .For each of the words ethics andpolitics, but also forall of the words that one immediately associates with them.16 Nevertheless, in spite of this need for seemingly endless elucidation, Derrida says thatall ethical and political decisions are structuredby urgency, precisely because we have to take decisions without any certainty about the rightnessof what we do. He writes that in ethics and politics, this structureof urgency 'is simultaneously the condition of possibility and the condition of impossibility of all responsibility."7For Derrida, ethics and politics also have in common that they are answering the question 'What should I do?' and thatwe should give thoughtful and responsible answers to the question. Nevertheless, ethics and politics appear, at least, to be very different. Derrida characterizes these perceived differences between ethics and politics. Because ethical responsibility appeals to an unconditional that is ruled by pure and universal principles already formalized,thisethical responsibility, thisethical response can and should be immediate,in short,rathersimple, it should make straightfor the goal all at once, straight to its end, without gettingcaught up in an analysis of hypotheticalimperatives,incalculations,

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in evaluations of interests and powers. . . Whereas, . on the contrary, still according to the same appearance, political responsibility, because it takes intoaccount a largenumberof relations, of relations of power,of actual laws, of possible causes and effects, of hypotheticalimperatives, requiresa timefor analysis, requires a gamble, thatis, a calculation that is never sure and that requires strategy.18 This rich description of the fundamental difference between ethics and pol itics reflectsKant's distinction between the dependability of ethics and the unreliability of mere hypothetical imperatives. Ethics is seen as occupying a higher and more impractical realm whose unconditional principles mean that one can respond immediately, whereas politics is seen as concerned with day-to-day practical strategies thatneed to be carefully planned out. However, Derrida immediately notes that these characteristics are only apparent, and thatpolitics can be understood as more urgent than ethics. He argues that theremust be a negotiation of the non-negotiable, so in that sense the political is always inscribed in the ethical.'9 For example, when hostages are taken, a refusal to negotiate is an acceptance of the risk to the hostages on thebasis that it will save others in the future.Similarly, a deci sion to negotiate with the hostage takers is a decision to try to save the hostages in thehope that itwill not be detrimental to others' lives. 'In both cases' Derrida writes, 'the political imperative and the ethical imperative are indissociable.'20 This example is quite convincing as both alternatives can be understood in ethical terms.Those who refuse to negotiate believe it is more ethical to risk these hostages' lives than to allow a practice of hostage taking to go on. Similarly, negotiating with hostage takers does not show thatone has abandoned ethics, unless one takes the extreme view that simply communicating with such people is unethical. Thus political deci sions inevitably involve ethical considerations on Derrida's account. and in cases like this they are difficult tomake because the outcome is uncertain and the risks great. Derrida famously claims in 'Force of Law' that '[j]ustice in itself, if such a thingexists, outside or beyond law, is not deconstructible.'2' He sees justice as primarily an ethical concept and it is contrastedwith law, or right, which is a concept that is deconstructible. InAdieu toEmmanuel Levinas, Derrida the Torah in Jerusalem as an exemplification of the problem of ethics and politics. According to him, the problem is fundamentally one of negotiation between the demands of ethics and the realities of politics. The Torah is read by Levinas in 'Cities of Refuge' as justice: 'The Torah is jus tice, a complete justice . . .because, in its expressions and contents, it is a call for absolute vigilance.'22 Derrida says that theTorah in Jerusalem discusses

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And henceforth must still inscribe the promises in the earthly Jerusalem. of justice, of the command thecomparison of incomparables (thedefinition co-presence, the system,and concession made, out of duty, to synchrony, with thenon-negotiable so as finally,theState.) Itmust enjoin a negotiation to findthe"better"or the least bad.23 The complete justice of ethicsmust be inscribed in concrete politics and law. In general Derrida distinguishes between the formal injunction to deduce politics from ethics, which is absolute and unconditional, and the we have a responsibility to determine forourselves question of content that in each particular case. In this sense we can see thatDerrida agrees with Kant that ethical considerations always have a role in politics, but they do not constrain politics in quite the same way. Rather than providing a limit they set up an impossible injunction that politics can rather than follow. To understand thisdifference between the only aspire to, two on the intersection of ethics and politics more thoroughly,we need to towhat is possible, see the ways in which Kant takes seriously potential conflicts between ethics and politics.

Tensions between Ethics and Politics

Kant's understanding of politics as bending its knee before ethics may suggest thathe has no conception of the reality of politics. Yet in some ways his view shows more awareness of the complexities of politics than Derrida's. Kant notes that following ethical imperatives should be com bined with political wisdom or an understanding of how best to instituteor means to be as wise as a ser work toward perpetual peace.24 This iswhat it pent. Furthermore, Kant sees it as important to explain why there is a per ceived conflict between ethics and politics and tomake some caveats and exceptions to his general view. First, adherence to political maxims must derive from the concept of the Within states, these rights are to freedom, equality, and inde duty of right. pendence, which are the principles upon which states should be estab lished.25 For morals in the form of right to be applied in politics, Kant maintains that rightsmust be able to be made public. His transcendental formula of public right is 'All actions relating to the rights of others are maxim is incompatible with publicity.'26The key idea is that wrong if their actions that affect the rights of others are unacceptable if they need to be kept secret. However, the reverse is not held to be true-actions that are consistent with publicity are not necessarily right,as Kant observes, because

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a very powerful state can be quite open about itsmaxims.27 The power of such a state means it does not have to be concerned about opposition or resistance to itsmaxims. Kant argues for this principle of public right as

follows:

For a maxim thatI cannot divulge without thereby defeating my own pur pose, one thatabsolutelymust be kept secret if it is to succeed and thatI cannotpublicly acknowledgewithoutunavoidably arousingeveryone'soppo sition tomy project, can derive thisnecessary and universal,hence a priori foreseeable,resistanceof everyone to me only fromthe injustice withwhich it threatens everyone.28 This principle is both ethical (part of the doctrine of virtue) and juridical (related to right), and Kant attempts to show how it is relevant to civil, international, and cosmopolitan right. First, civil right concerns right within a state. Kant upholds the right of human beings to respect by the state, saying, 'The right of human beings must be held sacred, however great a sacrifice this may cost the ruling power.'29 Nevertheless, with regard to the rights of people against the state,Kant argues that rebellion is shown to be wrong by the fact thatpublicly revealing a maxim of rebel lion would make it impossible, whereas a head of state can publicly declare their willingness to punish rebels.30 Iwill saymore about thispoint furtheron. Kant's view is that systems of law are justified by their foun dation. Once they are founded, however, they should not be overthrown. In contrast, Derrida believes that a system of law can only be justified by what comes after its institution.3"Second, international right is the right of nations. This right,Kant says, must be an enduring free association between states.32Cosmopolitan right is the right to hospitality or the right to visit all the countries in theworld. On Kant's account, politics can be made commensurable with morality only within a federative union of states that maintains peace: Thus theharmonyof politicswithmorals is possible onlywithin a federative union (which is therefore given a priori and is necessary by principles of right), and all political prudencehas foritsrightful basis theestablishment of such a union in itsgreatestpossible extent, withoutwhich end all its sub tilizingis unwisdom and veiled injustice.33 This point suggests, reasonably, that so long as states are at war or are not willing to pursue peace, political practice and morality are likely to conflict.

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Although Kant believes

morality, he concedes thatpractical circumstances or conditions can make it difficult to bring this ideal into effect and that itmay be brought about gradually. For instance, statesmay have towait to introduce reforms until it can be done peacefully.34 In her book Kant's Politics, Elisabeth Ellis dis cusses the role thatprovisional right,or right that acknowledges the diffi cult circumstances under which we are likely to be applying morals, plays inKant's account of politics.35 She notes thatKant recommends that even in the midst of war, for example, we should act 'in accordance with princi ples that always leave open the possibility of . . . entering a rightfulcon dition.'36 In thisway, Kant provides guidance to thosemaking decisions in less than ideal conditions. While Kant is confident about ethics and politics 'agreeing,' there are some complicated exceptions he mentions in the essay 'On the common may be correct in theory but it is of no use in practice.'37 He saying: that observes that sometimes unconditional or perfect and conditional or imper fect duties might conflict. This sense of imperfection refers to the latitude allowed in fulfilling the duty rather than a state of imperfection in societies thatare not yet governed ideally,which provisional right is concerned with. Kant defines a perfect duty as 'one that admits no exception in favor of inclination' (1996a, 4:422), whereas an imperfect duty is one that is virtu made ous and worthy to fulfill but it is not culpable not to do so unless that is into a principle (1996a, 6: 390). I should note here that this distinc tion between perfect and imperfect duties divides the virtues. Duties of the virtue of respect to others are perfect,whereas duties of love are not, or, in Such other words, we have discretion as towhen we should follow them.38 duties may conflict if it is amatterof preventingsome catastropheto thestateby betrayingaman and son. This pre who might stand in the relationshipto anotherof father whereas preventing ventionof troubleto theformeris an unconditionalduty, misfortune to the latteris only a conditional duty (namely, insofaras he has notmade himself guilty of a crime against the state).One of the relatives with theutmost reluctance, might reporttheother's plans to theauthorities moral necessity).39 but he is compelled by necessity (namely, In this case, the duty to prevent catastrophe to the state clearly trumps the duty to prevent misfortune to a relative provided the relative is acting treacherously. However, Kant does not discuss a case where preventing greatmisfortune to the statewould conflictwith a duty to prevent a violation

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of the rights of the relative or indeed any other person. Although it is a dif ficultpractical problem thathe does not examine in depth, he is quite clear that such rights should never be violated and he does touch on the issue

briefly.
In The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant says that 'there is a categorical imperative, Obey the authoritywho has power over you (in whatever does not conflict with innermorality).'40 Morals can conflict with political prac tice if a leader demands we do something unethical, and when they do we must obey morals. However, here and elsewhere, as I noted, Kant con demns revolutions, a condemnation that seems counter to his own theory. It is rarely observed that Kant had an ingenious caveat to his view on revolu tions. In his notes concerning the 'Doctrine of Right,' he comments, Force,which does not presuppose a judgmenthaving thevalidityof law[,] is against the law; consequently the people cannot rebel except in the cases which cannot at all come forwardin a civil union, e.g., theenforcement of a religion,compulsion tounnaturalcrimes,assassination, etc.41 The implication appears to be that if such acts were generally forced upon a people, they could not properly be in a civil union. Therefore, tyrannical and totalitarian regimes may well not count as civil unions forKant. Then revolution could be ethical in the sense that such a revolution would be cre ating a civil union. Thus such examples of conflict between duties to the state and other duties that could be brought against Kant would be accounted forby this caveat. However, revolution for such reasons as poor government or inequity would still be excluded as they could occur in a civil union. Cases where the state tried to prevent philanthropy provide other exam ples of conflict between politics and morality, this time relevant to the doc trineof virtue. Kant also believes thatpolitics and virtue should agree, but notes thatphilanthropy is an imperfectduty, or in otherwords thathow it is fulfilled is to a great extent a matter of discretion. In any case, his view is thatpolitics easily agrees with this sense of morality 'in order to surrender the rights of human beings to their superiors.'42 What he has inmind here is that 'politics,' or rather those in power, like to pretend thatperfect duties of right are imperfect duties that theybestow only as benevolence and so are very ready to claim they are moral in that sense. This distinction between perfect and imperfect duties, a distinction rejected by Derrida, important to conceiving an ethical politics, I argue. is

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account of the relation between ethics and politics treats these way fromKant, as one might expect, because complications in a different he relies on the idea of negotiation to overcome these complications. One Derrida's of the criticisms of Derrida's deconstructive ethics is that itdoes not give us any guidance as to how tomake decisions. For example, Simon Critchley writes, 'I would claim, with Laclau, that an adequate account of the deci sion is essential to thepossibility of politics, and that it is precisely this that deconstruction does not provide.'43 Derrida's view thatwe must negotiate between ethics and politics leaves us with the question of how far toward each we should tend in our negotiations. Ethics with its unconditional demands is impossible to satisfy forDerrida, and politics must be limited by ethics. They seem to act as constraints on each other such that the deci sion, and the action, will always lie somewhere between the two. There is an in-between position or many in-between positions thatLevinas gestures toward in 'Politics After!': methods between recourse tounscrupulous would be no alternative So there of a care rhetoric byRealpolitik and the irritating whose model is furnished with less idealism, lost inutopian dreams but crumblingintodust on contact which pro realityor turninginto a dangerous, impudentand facile frenzy fesses tobe taking up thepropheticdiscourse.44 Levinas's presentation of a case against ethics in politics often put explic itlyor implicitly highlights its absurdity and the need to sketch out alterna tive in-between positions. This iswhat Derrida attempts to do. Derrida claims that there are no rules to determine what would be the better or least bad alternatives. Another way thatDerrida expresses the problem is by writing 'The hiatus, the silence of this non-response con cerning the schemas between the ethical and the political, remains. It is a fact that it remains, and this fact is not some empirical contingency, it is a Faktum.'4s It is not clear how to deduce politics from ethics. However, he also says that politics and law must be deduced from ethics, in order to determine that 'democracy is "better" than tyranny'and "'political civiliza tion" remains "better" thanbarbarism.'46Derrida's promotion of democracy and respect for international law (as well as reflection on its foundations) parallels Kant's concern with republicanism and establishing a cosmopoli tanworld order.47He accepts with Kant and Hannah Arendt that a world government is not desirable, and yet believes we need to go beyond their views to thinkof a 'democracy to come' (la democratie a' venir) thatwill unite law and justice.48 The reason Derrida is so positive about the concept

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of democracy is that it 'is the only one thatwelcomes the possibility of being contested, of contesting itself,of criticizing and indefinitely improv This democracy to come is not intended to refer to a future state ing itself.'49 of democracy but to a call for 'a militant and interminable political cri tique.'50This democracy is envisioned by Derrida to challenge the author ityand sovereignty of the state and, on an international scale, to emerge in new institutions such as the International Criminal Court. Further on in the essay, Iwill show how Derrida's ideas about democracy stand out fromhis overall account of negotiating between ethics and politics. In the next section, I examine the differences between Kant's regulative ideals and the categorical imperative and Derrida's idea of unconditional motivate his conception of an ethical politics. This dis ethical demands that cussion will clarify theirvery distinctive accounts of unconditionality.

Unconditional Ethics, Regulative

Categorical Imperative

Ideals, and the

The central features of Derrida's ethics, namely, the linking of ethics with politics, the setting up of unconditional ideals, and his concern with cosmopolitanism, make him sound very Kantian. This interpretationhas been both encouraged and resisted by Derrida. For instance, in Limited, Inc., Derrida says thathe uses the term 'unconditionality' 'not by accident to recall the character of the categorical imperative in itsKantian form,' and 'it is independent of every determinate context, even of the determination of a context in general.'51 However, Derrida does not characterize the injunction that recommends deconstruction inKantian terms 'because such characterizations seemed tome essentially associated with philosophemes that themselves call for deconstructive questions' and he has reservations about thinkingof theunconditional as a regulative idea or ideal.52 It is impor tant to clarify this idea because it sheds lighton Kant's and Derrida's under standing of ethical action. One problem with Derrida's disclaimer here is that a regulative ideal in Kant's sense does not appear to relate to unconditionality. As Derrida notes, this term is used too loosely in philosophical discourse.53 Kant discusses the notion of regulative ideas in theCritique of Pure Reason.54 These regulative ideas are thatof the existence of thehuman soul, an independent world, and God. These ideas cannot be proven; nevertheless we should posit them as theyplay an important role in our thinkingby directing our studies of psy chology and physics in the case of our ideas of the soul and theworld. The

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idea of God provides the sense that everything in theworld is part of an organized unity-'as ifall such connection had its source in one single all embracing being, as the supreme and all-sufficient cause.'55 In contrast, Derrida's unconditional concepts are not ideas thatwe posit as useful for theorizing but concepts we take seriously as action guiding, although we cannot fulfill theirdemands. In a detailed discussion of justice and duties in Philosophy in a Time of Terror, Derrida outlines three reservations about aligning what he calls his impossible reals with Kant's possible ideals. First, Derrida says, his impos sible is 'what ismost undeniably real' in itsurgency and its demands.56 This we work toward, likeKant's can be seen as in contrast to a possible ideal that cosmopolitan ideal. Unlike Kant's dictum thatought implies can, Derrida's dictum is that 'ought implies cannot.' This is an important difference between the two.On Derrida's account, one can take imperatives to be real even ifone does not think theycan be reached or satisfied. I would note that ideals can also be real in the sense of being urgent and making demands. At one point, Kant says thatvirtue 'is an ideal and unattainable, while yet con stant approximation to it is a duty.'57 The fundamental difference is that Kant we can fulfillour duty in this approximation, butDerrida holds believes that that such approximation is in no sense a fulfillmentof duty. Like Kant, Derrida sees autonomy as 'the foundation of any pure ethics, of the sovereignty of the subject, of the ideal of emancipation and of free dom,' but unlike Kant he believes that this autonomy will always be imposed on by heteronomy or the imperative of the other, of politics, of the conditional, and theremust be a transaction between these two impera The unconditional imperative demands that we go beyond duty.The tives.58 unconditional imperative of justice contrasts with law, as unconditional hospitality and forgiveness contrast with their conditional pairs.59 In every case the unconditional tempers the conditional and must be taken into account when making decisions. Derrida presents his understanding as an analysis of the 'logic' of these concepts, which, when deconstructed, split into these doubles. The result is that Kant's imperfect duties, which allow some latitude in how we fulfill them, become perfect duties on Derrida's account. They are perfect in the sense thatwe cannot put limits on what it is to fulfill them, although we will inevitably fall short of theirdemands. Second, Derrida says that his notion of responsibility is one of going beyond any rule that determines my actions. Here, Derrida seems to be shifting fromKant's metaphysics, where the regulative ideas or postulates of world, God, and the soul play a role, to his ethics, where the categorical

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imperative and maxims play the central role.60He synonym for "unconditional," the Kantian

says that 'as a quasi

expression of "categorical with some reservations. '61 imperative" is not unproblematic; we will keep it The concern with needing to go beyond a rule thatdetermines actions is one that requires some discussion, and I will return to this issue after briefly

reservation. considering Derrida's third

Derrida's third reservation returns toKant's metaphysics, saying that if 'have to subscribe we were to take up the term 'regulative idea' we would

to the entire Kantian architectonic and critique.'62 This point is rather an exaggeration, yet I believe he is right to reject the notion that he under stands unconditional demands as regulative ideas. As I have pointed out, the concepts function very differently.Finally, I can also see why Derrida rejects a Kantian reading of his unconditional ethics in the case of hospi tality,because whereas Kant's categorical imperative is something we can aim to act on even ifwe cannot be confident of achieving it,Derrida's unconditional hospitality is not only impossible but also positively destructive since ifwe are completely open to any kind of visitation we give up our sovereignty and therefore our capacity to offer hospitality. While it can be held up as an 'impossible real' to improve our politics and ethics, we do not want to come too close to it.Nevertheless, forgiveness and justice seem not to be destructive in the same way as hospitality. And justice, as Derrida says in 'Force of Law,' is not deconstructible. Thus the answer to thequestion ofwhether Derrida's unconditional ethical concepts are like those of Kant's ethical imperatives can only be answered by look ing at particular examples. A furtherdifference is thatKant accepts that hospitality is conditional and that forgiveness is an imperfect duty. So Derrida is going beyond Kant inmaking conditional and imperfect duties intounconditional and perfect ones, albeit duties thathave to be negotiated with their conditional equivalents. What Derrida does not say is how we can or should negotiate between ethics and politics, between unconditionality and conditionality. A consid eration of the issue of rule following,mentioned above, provides some indi cations. He hints that there is a connection with Kant's ethics when he notes we simply apply a rulewhen acting, 'Iwould act, as Kant would say, that if with duty,but not throughduty or out of respect for the law.'63 in conformity Thus, the problem of negotiation appears to become a question of how to make a decision or reach a judgment. Derrida's claim is that

without thehiatus, which is not theabsence of rulesbut the [w]ithoutsilence, moment of ethical,political, or juridical decision, necessity of a leap at the

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we could simply unfoldknowledge intoa program or courseof action. Nothing couldmake us more irresponsible; nothingcould be more totalitarian.64 Derrida sees Kant as both irresponsible and totalitarian in prescribing rules for action as ifwe were nothing more than calculating machines. Furthermore, Derrida criticizes Kant for conflating right and virtue or assuming that politics can be deduced from ethics. One commentator, Olivia Custer, finds this reading of Kant as emerging most clearly in Derrida's discussion of hospitality, where Derrida criticizes Kant for imposing restrictions on hospitality, thereby turningan ethical concept into a juridical one.65However, I interpret Derrida's insistence on hospitality as an ethical concept as one that is not fully adequate to the realities faced by those seeking asylum, a concrete case towhich he believes his account of hospitality is relevant.As I argue in another essay, Derrida's emphasis on hospitality as an ethical concept makes practical measures for asylum seek ers and refugees dependent on goodwill, rather than putting a set of struc tures,based on right, in place.66 This makes his conception of unconditional ethical duties, once negotiated with political realities, atmost ameliorative of theworst excesses of inhospitable or otherwise unethical governments. As I noted earlier, forKant virtue is thatpart of morality or ethics that cannot be enforced or made part of politics. Thus, the accusation that Kant thinks one can deduce politics from ethics, understood as politics deduced fromvirtue, is inaccurate. Kant did not think thatvirtue and right were nec essarily co-implicated but instead had a hope thatpeople would live accord ing to the virtues of love and respect once right restrained politics. In fact, Derrida himself brings virtue into politics by emphasizing the importance of ethical concepts such as unconditional hospitality and forgiveness to pol itics.Yet he avoids suggesting what hospitality would amount to or inwhat circumstances we should forgive.67 Kant's furtherdistinction between perfect and imperfect duties demon strates the problems with Derrida's reading.While perfect duties appear to provide a rule for action, imperfect duties allow leeway concerning what acting out of duty means. When I attempt to act from the duty of benefi cence, for example, I need to consider the time, the context, those who would benefit, and the appropriateness of my action.68Thus Derrida's crit icism of Kant's notion of duty could only apply to the perfect duties of respect. The duties of love do not follow determinate rules. There can also be conflicts between our imperfect conditional duties thatwe would have to resolve for ourselves in the absence of rules. It isDerrida's transforma tion of imperfectduties into perfect ones that makes duties of love seem as

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if they could involve rule following. This is one of the paradoxical aspects of Derrida's thinking. While he makes imperfect duties into perfect ones, their status as such is undermined by his view that they are impossible. They appear to be reminders of our inadequacy as ethical actors. Particular judgments, forDerrida, are always made in relation to an unconditional injunction.While in judging, one must reinterpretand reaf firmexisting rules; the judge is not just ifhe or she doesn't referto any law, to any rule or if,because he doesn't take any rule he suspends his decision, stops forgrantedbeyond his own interpretation, shortbefore theundecidable or ifhe improvisesand leaves aside all rules, all principles.69 Such a process of judgment involves the recognition of the specificity of particular cases, something likeKant's notion of a reflective judgment that begins with the particular, but itdoes not require the creation of new prin ciples. Derrida acknowledges that new judgments can conform to existing laws but they must reaffirmthem.How I understand his point is as theneed to consider each situation afresh even when applying a law or principle. This point is reasonable, but more difficult to accept is Derrida's idea of negotiation and the impossibility of unconditional demands. I would sug gest thatmost ethical choices are not impossible, although political life tends to provide more of such dramatic choices than private life. For Kant, we are able to formulatemoral laws forourselves and act on them.He says that it takes only 'common human reason' towork out our duty and that 'I do not . . .need any penetrating acuteness to see what I have to do in order that my volition be morally good.'70 Kant notes, however, that we can never be completely sure that our motives are pure.71 In the next section I will show how Kant's account fares better in relation to human rights, as an example of true non-negotiability, and how Derrida goes beyond Kant, as he claims, in introducing virtue to politics.

Human Rights Reconstructing

I am critical of both Kant and Derrida and find insights in both their work. On the issue of human rights, Kant's overall framework ismore pro ductive thanDerrida's even though he identifies inconsistencies inKant's account. Kant's argument provides an important step toward an ethical politics, in spite of his unappealing condemnation of revolutions and lack

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of consideration of conflicts between human rights and duties to the state. Such a politics is one where at the very least certain human rights are respected. It should be noted that Derrida refers to the Declaration of Human Rights as a means of challenging the sovereignty of states.72 However, even these rights, which we need, must be subject to negotiation or transactionwith the conditional and must be questioned. He writes, To take this and perfectibility historicity [ofhuman rights]intoaccount inan most radical questioningpossible affirmative way we must neverprohibitthe of all theconcepts atwork here: thehumanityofman (the "properofman" or of thehuman, which raises the whole question of nonhuman livingbeings, as well as thequestion of thehistoryof recentjuridical concepts or perfor matives such as a "crime against humanity"),and then thevery concepts of rights or of law (droit),and even theconcept of history.73 In one sense, what Derrida is saying is thatwe need to reflectmore on all

the concepts related to human rights, and in that sense, there is no problem with thatkind of questioning. However, it is when this idea is combined with Derrida's view thatwe have to negotiate with the unconditional that his position becomes more difficult. If such things as human rights are always potentially negotiable, then they cannot be relied on as principles to guide ethical or political decisions. Questions of the death penalty, denaturalization, treatment of refugees, and conduct of war, forexample, are not subject to any limitations as such. Any unconditional demands are always weighed up against condi tional exigencies. So, for instance, even torture might be justifiable if it can be negotiated or exchanged for some other value or in the light of condi tional considerations. This is the implication of Derrida's claim that the Torah 'must enjoin a negotiation with the non-negotiable,' quoted earlier.74 It is also the implication of unconditional demands, such as hospitality, that comments on democracy are quite useful for thinking about political systems, as he says that democracy is preferable to other systems because it opens onto a future and is per fectible.75These criteriamay enable us to determine preferable courses of are themselves destructive. Derrida's action in some circumstances and could be seen as parallel toKant's sug gestion that in difficult circumstances such as war we should act in such a way as to 'always leave open thepossibility of . . .entering a rightfulcon What Imean by this is that in relation to thepolitical organization dition.'76 of states (at least) Derrida concedes thatdemocracy really is preferable to other forms of government, and we can take the freedom and equality on

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which it is based as guiding principles. However, I do not believe that this exception resolves the problems inDerrida's views on human rights. I am not suggesting that Kant's understanding of human rights is prefer able toDerrida's in every respect. Certainly Kant's account of thedetails of and non-property owners the principles of right leaves much to be desired, particularly thatof inde pendence as a citizen, as he excludes women from the role of active citizens.77Nevertheless, one could extend this prin ciple in an inclusive way. Another problem I see inKant's account of right is his acceptance of capital punishment for the crimes of high treason and murder.78 This acceptance appears to be in conflict with the categorical imperative to treateveryone as ends in themselves and with thewhole tenor of theKantian view thatwe should treatothers with respect. However, as Nelson Potter argues, in both these cases Kant can be revised in a manner thatmakes his view more consistent, particularly since Kant himself was offering a critique of the contemporary cruel punishments often carried out as well as arguing for a limitation on the crimes capital punishment should be applied to.79 These are reconstructions thatwould be necessary for gen uine compatibility between ethics and politics, inmy view. Derrida does not address this question of how important Kant takes the death penalty to be, although he emphasizes Kant's connection of the jus talionis (law of retribution) to the basis of criminal justice.80 I would argue that one could retain this conception of punishment but still maintain an abolitionist stance, although itwould be preferable to have a differentview of punishment as well.8" Kant's ideas of rights need to be reconstructed in a number of ways, some of which they already have been in practice (at leastwidely), to include women as active citizens, and some of which they have not, to exclude capital punishment, for example. An ethical politics should make an explicit commitment to certain rights and work out how theycan be established and upheld. While Derrida is doubtless against cap ital punishment, for example, he does not set out the principles on which thatopposition is based, but says thatboth the death penalty and abolition ist discourse are deconstructible.82 This analysis suggests that the death penalty is negotiable, and that raises an issue about how his view could be made compatible with a commitment to human rights.

Conclusion
This engagement between the two philosophers is interesting in itself, yetmy aim in pursuing this encounter between Kant and Derrida is also to

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illuminate the difficulties that arise in conceiving Derrida's

demanding view of ethics highlights some of the gaps inKant's

vision. Derrida is right to claim thathe goes beyond Kant. I contend that in raising the importance of virtue as well as right to politics, his view is an important advance on Kant's. Derrida's focus on unconditional ethics brings the imperfect duties of Kant to the forefrontof politics. This insis tence on the importance of unconditional ethical demands to politics forces us to thinkmore carefully about the role of these demands and about the responsibility of both ethics and politics to each other. Derrida's work reminds us how significant ethical virtues involved in hospitality, friend ship, and forgiveness, for example, are to public life. Nevertheless, although his account demonstrates the significance of ethics to politics, it does not clarify how important ethics should be or suggest what conditions would facilitate the negotiation between ethics and politics. Precisely because Derrida goes further thanKant by bringing up the importance of thevirtues, he should have more to say about what would make them flour ish.However, Derrida does not account for the conditions thatwill support an ethical politics and make ethical livingmore likely, perhaps because he believes that any specific suggestions would be 'totalitarian.'The idea of a 'democracy to come' involves some important suggestions for international institutions but does not articulate changes thatwould be needed to assist groups and individuals tomeet those demands. His emphasis on uncondi tional ethical concepts such as forgiveness and hospitality places the onus on the individual to try to live up to unconditional demands. Yet a distinc tion should be made between unconditional demands that are necessarily destructive if fulfilled, such as hospitality, and those which are not neces sarily destructive in the same sense, such as forgiveness. While Derrida goes beyond Kant in emphasizing the importance of virtue or imperfect duties, he does not advance beyond Kant by suggesting what kind of political structures would enable the flourishing of these transformation of Kant's imperfect duties into perfect duties also makes thedevelopment of such enabling structureseven more unlikely. Thinking of the virtues as perfect duties sets us on a path to construing eth ical politics as a utopian dream and could justify the careless idealism Levinas warns against or quietism in the face of impossibility. Derrida's emphasis on the impossibility of following unconditional ethical demands Kant was is likely to lead to the undermining of the authority of ethics that concerned about. While Kant was probably a little too confident about the ease with which we act ethically (although without being sure thatwe are doing so), ethical demands need to be within the realms of possibility for virtues. His

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us to be able to cultivate ethical responses and to construct political struc tures that support the ethical life.Kant expresses a vision where one focuses on enforcing what needs to be enforced while leaving the other aspects of ethics to look after themselves, whereas I argue thatwe should also con sider how to at least encourage virtue. These are the problems I believe need to be addressed in conceptualizing an ethical politics. What emerges is that the most credible conception of the relation between ethics and politics is one thatconsiders both thenorms of right that Kant outlines and the virtues, inDerrida's sense, such as forgiveness, gen erosity, and hospitality.What I mean is that the limits to action set up by Kant should be acknowledged (and in some instances extended) and that political organization should take account of the need for practical benevo lence and ethical responses. Understanding the intersection of ethics and politics in thisway requires a sense of what it is to act with respect and benevolence forothers, so thatall decisions have these ethical standards as touchstones to judgment. In order for Derrida's suggestion of an expansion of the ethical realm tomake sense, political lifewould involve creating the best conditions for ethical relations to ourselves and to others, in addition to the constraints Kant believes ethics should place on politics. While we should acknowledge the special circumstances of politics, politics should be ethical inmore than one sense. There are risks here in the possibility of interference in private or ethi cal relations to the self, which Arendt and Foucault, for example, fear.83 However, I disagree with Kant thatwe should simply hope thatvirtue fol lows in thewake of rightor, to thinkof it anotherway, that love will follow respect because every aspect of our lives is affected by political decisions. Such decisions could play a role in ensuring at an institutional and individ ual level that we are able ormore likely to carry out imperfectduties to our selves, such as the duty to perfect ourselves, and the imperfect duties of benevolence to others. To give priority to ethics as Derrida conceives it, the virtues of respect and of love would have to be encouraged and form the basis of politics. These ethical considerations are relevant to the three within states, between states, and spheres thatKant discusses-relations between states and individuals. It is also relevant to relations between indi viduals. Thus, the complexities of including the virtues in an ethical poli ticswould have to be carefully considered with regard to all these relations. These features of an ethical politics involve both basic human rights as advocated by Kant and the cultivation of virtues as suggested by Derrida. Furthermore,pursuit of thevirtues itselfcan facilitate a transformation of pol itics and political conditions, and I take thispoint to be implicit inDerrida's

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focus on unconditional ethical demands. Nevertheless, the freedom implied by thenotion of an imperfectduty, where there is a great deal of discretion as to particular ethical decisions, should be retained. Between Kant's possible ideals and Derrida's impossible reals, there is a possibility of ethical and political action that is not simply ameliorative. Politics must be conceived in a way that makes negotiating with ethics a more promising affair.

Notes
trans.Mary J.Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge 1. Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, University Press, 1996), 8:37. 2. Jacques Derrida, Adieu toEmmanuel Levinas, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1999), 115. 3. See, for example, Christopher Norris, What's Wrong with Postmodernism: Critical (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1990), 194 Theory and the Ends of Philosophy relation to Kant's epistemological 207, for a discussion of Derrida's project; Irene Harvey, Derrida (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), who notion of critique and conception of the limits of rea son; and Philip Rothfield, ed., Kant after Derrida (Manchester, UK: Clinamen, 2003), which is a collection of essays on a range of Kantian themes. trans. George Collins 4. Jacques Derrida, The Politics of Friendship, (London: Verso, trans.Mark Dooley and J. and The Economy ofDiff?rance is concerned with the influence of Kant's

and Forgiveness, 1997); and Jacques Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism Michael Hughes (London: Routledge, 2001). 5. Jacques Derrida, Questioning God, ed. John Caputo, Mark Scanlon (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 66.

Dooley,

and Michael

6. Derrida, Adieu toEmmanuel Levinas, 115. Levinas's influence on Derrida's ethics has been explored more thoroughly than Kant's. This work includes Simon Critchley, The Ethics Derrida and Levinas (West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, of Deconstruction: 1999); Simon Critchley, Ethics, Politics, and Subjectivity: Essays on Derrida, Levinas, and Contemporary French Thought (London: Verso, 1999); Diane Perpich, "A Singular Justice: and Miriam Bankovsky, "Derrida and Derrida," Philosophy Today 42, supp. (1998): 59-70; to Kant: The Welcome, Ethics, and Brings Levinas 156-71, who also considers the Today 49, no. 2 (2005):

Ethics and Politics between Levinas

in Jacques Derrida, Writing and discusses Levinas Difference, trans. Alan Bass (London: Routledge, 2001); and in Derrida, Adieu to Emanuel Levinas. On Kant and Derrida on hospitality, see Marguerite La Caze, "Not Just Visitors: Cosmopolitanism, Hospitality, and Refugees," Philosophy Today 48, no. 3 (2004): 313-24. Beards worth analyses Beardsworth, Derrida the relation between Kant and Derrida and the Political on law and violence inRichard to the 1996), 46-70. (London: Routledge 7.1 prefer the term ethics tomorality as it seems less focused on individual mores contemporary ear. 9. This

Law," Philosophy Cosmopolitical relation of both to Kant. Derrida

8. Immanuel Kant, "Toward Perpetual Peace," inKant, Practical Philosophy, 8:380. position follows from his view that ought to implies can in Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, inKant, Practical Philosophy. Kant says that our awareness of the moral law when we construct maxims Furthermore, our experience of the will leads us to the concept of freedom. confirms this concept of freedom when we remember thatwe

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can act against our strongest desires and even our love of life in order to act ethically (ibid., (in Kant, Practical Philosophy), Kant argues that 5:30). By contrast, in the Groundwork because we are autonomous we are bound by themoral law: 'If, therefore, freedom of thewill is presupposed, morality together with its principle follows from it by mere analysis of its in a review of Schulz's concept' (ibid., 4:447). Elsewhere, '[ajttempt at an introduction to a doctrine of morals,' he asserts thatwithout this possibility of freedom, any imperative is absurd and the only position we can adopt is fatalism (ibid., 8:13). 10. Kant, Practical Philosophy, 8:370. Kant defines right as 'the sum of the conditions under which the choice of one can be united with the choice of another in accordance with a law of freedom' (ibid., 6:230). He further distinguishes between natural or private right,which includes rights to property, rights to contracts, and domestic right, and public or civil right, which concerns the rights of a state, the rights of nations, and cosmopolitan right. The doctrine of virtue includes duties to ourselves and the duties to others of love and respect. universal with Kant's 11. The doctrine of right concerns the a priori basis of ethical laws. One might disagree view that politics is the doctrine of right put into practice and argue, for example, that ethics and politics are two separate spheres, as Arendt does in Hannah Arendt, (New York: Schocken, 2003), 147-58.

Responsibility and Judgment, ed. Jerome Kohn 12. Kant, Practical Philosophy, 8:372. 13. According whereas

to Kant, the aims of moral evil are self-contradictory and self-destructive, those of moral goodness are consistent and conducive to happiness, so evil gives way to themoral principle of goodness (Kant, Practical Philosophy, 8:379). See Kant's discussion of radical evil in Immanuel Kant, "Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone," in Religion Theology, trans, and ed. Allen W Wood and George Ethics: di Giovanni Contemporary (Cambridge: Debates in

and Rational

Cambridge University Press, 1996). 14. Richard Kearney and Mark Dooley, 1999), 70. Philosophy (London: Routledge,

Questioning

15. Jacques Derrida, Negotiations: Interventions and Interviews, 1971-2001, Rottenberg (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2002), 295-314. The given as a talk in 1987. 16. Ibid., 295. 17. Ibid., 298.

trans.Elizabeth essay was first

thatwe have to negotiate between ethics and politics. Robert says thatLevinas is not concerned to resolve conflicts between ethics and politics, yet 'the task of negotiating in practice the conflicting demands under which I find myself, involves the use of reason, that is, the third person perspective'; Robert Bernasconi, "The Third Party: Levinas on the Intersection of theEthical and the Political," Journal of theBritish Bernasconi 30, no. 1 (1999): Society for Phenomenology politics, they are not in opposition for him. 81. In his view, while Levinas 'favors' ethics over

18. Ibid., 301. 19. Levinas also believes

hard to justify a refusal to negotiate as there is not enough order for one to argue that such negotiation would 'create a precedent.' Quaintance, Rosenfeld, 21. Jacques Derrida, "Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundation of Authority,'" trans.Mary in Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, ed. Drucilla Cornell, Michel and David Gray Carlson (London: Routledge, 1992), 14.

"Ethics and Politics Today," in Jacques Derrida, Negotiations 20. Jacques Derrida, (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2002), 305. Both these approaches have been used in response to the taking of foreign hostages in Iraq. In that circumstance, I think itwould be

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Mole

Levinas, Beyond theVerse: Talmudic Readings and Lectures, trans.Gary D. (London: Athlone, 1994), 46. For another reading of Levinas's essay, in relation to the idea of political utopianism, see Oona Eisenstadt, "The Problem of the Promise: Derrida on Levinas on the Cities of Refuge," Cross Currents 52, no. 4 (2003): 474-82. 22. Emmanuel 23. Derrida, Adieu toEmmanuel Levinas, 112. Levinas's idea of justice appears to be very For Derrida, justice is the ultimate ethical ideal, the undecon different from Derrida's. structible, that goes beyond particular laws (Derrida, "Force of Law," 14). For Levinas, justice is the political necessity of weighing different competing claims, contrasted with the infinite responsibility for the particular other that is the ethical relation. In Derrida's outlook, justice takes this concern with singularity. 24. Kant, Practical Philosophy, 8:377. 25. In 'On the common saying: That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in prac tice,' Kant defines the principles of a civil state as (1) thefreedom of every member of the society as a human being, (2) his equality with every other as a subject, and (3) the indepen

and likewise in (ibid., 8:290); and in Immanuel Kant, (in ibid., 6:314), state are freedom, equality, and Perpetual Peace, Kant says that the principles of a Republican 'of all upon a single common legislation (as subjects)' (in ibid., 8:350). A the dependence comparison of Kant's republicanism with Derrida's idea of democracy is one I do not have the Immanuel second transcendental principle of public right is as follows: 'All maxims which need publicity (in order not to fail in their end) harmonize with right and pol itics combined' (ibid., 8:386). Kant's argument for this principle is that if maxims can only be successful through publicity, theymust correspond to the universal public end, which is hap piness, and for him this iswhat politics must do. 27. Ibid., 8:385. 28. Ibid., 8:381. space to pursue here. 26. Ibid., 8:381. The

dence

of every member of a commonwealth Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals

as a citizen

29. Ibid., 8:380. 30. There has been a great deal of interest inKant's condemnation of rebellion here, par ibid., 6:320-23. See, for ticularly since he is a well-known supporter of the French Revolution; 1996), 46; example, Kimberly Hutchings, Kant, Critique, and Politics (London: Routledge, and Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant's Political University of Chicago Press, 1982), 44-51. 31. Derrida, "Force of Law," 35. Philosophy, ed. Ronald Beiner (Chicago:

32. Kant's examples of ethical constraints on politics between states include the non acquisition of existing states, the abolition of standing armies, no national debts with regard to external affairs, non-interference with the governments of other states, and not using duplic itous means inwar; definitive articles recommend republicanism for all states, a federalism of free states, and the cosmopolitan right of hospitality. Kant examines three cases of apparent conflict between politics and morals in international right and presents their resolution: where one nation promises to aid another nation but decides to release itself from the promise

because

of the effects thatkeeping the promise would have on its own well-being, where lesser nations could not make public the idea that they intend to attack a greater power preemptively, and where a large nation could not make it known that itwould absorb smaller nations if it says

thought that necessary to its preservation (Kant, Practical Philosophy, 8:383-84). Third, Kant that cosmopolitan right's maxims work by analogy to those of international right. Cosmopolitan right is interesting since the power imbalance between individuals and states is enormous.

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33. Ibid., 8:385. 34. Another example Kant gives is that it cannot be demanded of a state that it give up its constitution even though this is a despotic one (which is, for all that, the stronger kind in relation to external enemies), so long as it runs the risk of being at once devoured by other states; hence, as for that resolution, itmust also be permitted to postpone putting it into effect until a more favorable time. (Ibid., 8:373) Thus, it is reasonable towait until the state is secure from invasion before rectifying injustice if that injustice is protecting the state. 35. Elisabeth Ellis, Kant's Politics: Provisional Theory for an Uncertain World (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2005), 112-54. 36. Kant, Practical 37. Ibid. 38. Another way Kant puts this point is that although respect 'is a mere duty of virtue, it is regarded as narrow in comparison with a duty of love, and it is the latter that is considered a wide duty'; ibid., 6:450. 39. Ibid., 8:301. 40. Ibid., 6:371. 41. Immanuel Kant, "Doctrine of Right," in The Metaphysics ed. Mary Gregor ofMorals, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), XIX, 594-95, quoted in Robert J. Dostal, "Judging Human Action: Arendt's Appropriation ofKant," Review of Metaphysics 37 (1984): 732. 42. Kant, Practical Philosophy, 8:386. 43. Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction, 200. In a later essay, Critchley presents Derrida's account of the decision more sympathetically by describing it as non-foundational but non-arbitrary and necessarily contextual; Simon Critchley, "Remarks on Derrida and Habermas," Constellations 1, no. 4 (2000): 44. Levinas, Beyond the Verse, 194. 45. Ibid., 116. 461-62. Philosophy, 6:347.

remains, and this fact is not some empirical contingency, it is a Faktum1 (ibid., 116). 47. Quoted inGiovanna Borradori, Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with J?rgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 114-15. 48. Ibid., 120. 49. Ibid., 121.

46. Derrida, Adieu toEmmanuel Levinas, 114-15. Another way thatDerrida expresses this problem is by writing, as shown above in the text, 'The hiatus, the silence of this non-response concerning the sch?mas between the ethical and the political, remains. It is a fact that it

50. Derrida, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005), 86. Critchley has a very good, albeit brief, to come in "Remarks on Derrida and discussion of what Derrida means by democracy Habermas," 463-64. 51. Jacques Derrida, Limited, University Press 1988), 152. 52. Ibid., 153. Inc., ed. Gerald Graff (Evanston, 111.: Northwestern

53. Derrida, Rogues, 83. 54. Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, Macmillan, 1986), A669-704, B697-732.

trans. Norman Kemp

Smith (London:

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55. Ibid.,A686,B714. in a Time of Terror, 134. Derrida also says he hesitates to con 56. Borradori, Philosophy flate his idea of justice with a Kantian regulative idea (Derrida, "Force of Law," 25). He repeats his reservations inDerrida, Rogues (83-85), in a discussion concerning democracy. 57. Kant, Practical Philosophy, 6:409. in a Time of Terror, 131-32. 58. Borradori, Philosophy and Forgiveness. 59. Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism 60. Kant's description of moral ideas in theCritique of Practical Reason also seems helpful:

experience,

[I]f I understand by an idea a perfection to which nothing adequate can be given in themoral ideas, are not, on that account, something transcendent, that is, something of which we cannot even determine the concept sufficiently or of which it

is uncertain whether there is any object corresponding to it at all, as is the case with the ideas of speculative reason; instead, the moral ideas, as archetypes of practical perfection, serve as the indispensable rule of moral conduct and also as the standard of comparison. (Kant, Practical Philosophy, 5:127). Here Kant close is referring tomoral virtues such as wisdom and holiness. This idea seems quite to Derrida's in experience can match in the fact that they are impossible?nothing them?but are not transcendent, and can be used as a standard. 61. to

Invites Jacques Derrida Jacques Derrida, Of Hospitality: Anne Dufourmentelle Respond, trans. Rachel Bowlby (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2000), 81. in a Time of Terror, 135. 62. Borradori, Philosophy

63. Derrida, "Force of Law," 17. 64. Derrida, Adieu toEmmanuel Levinas, 111. 65. Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, 21-22; and Olivia Custer, "Kant after in Rothfield, Kant after Derrida, Derrida: Inventing Oneself out of an Impossible Choice," 171-204. 66. La Caze, "Not JustVisitors." 67. See Marguerite La Caze, "Should Radical Evil Be Forgiven?" in Forensic Psychiatry: (Totowa, N.J.: Humana Press, 2006), 273-93, where I argue Influences of Evil, ed. Tom Mason thatDerrida's view of forgiveness implies that the onus is on the victim to forgive, although he does not argue for it explicitly. 68. See Kant, Practical Philosophy, 6:452-55. that even experts could lack judg

69. Derrida, "Force of Law," 23. 70. Kant, Practical Philosophy, 4:403. Kant observed ment in his essay on theory and practice:

[T]here can be theoreticians who can never in their lives become practical because they are lacking in judgment, for example, physicians or jurists who did well in their school ing but who are at a loss when they have to give an expert opinion. (Ibid., 8:275) He thinks that this is due to a lack of the 'natural talent' of judgment. But, as Kant makes to certain professional fields, not to ethics. clear,

this difficulty in judgment applies 71. Ibid., 4:407-8. 72. Derrida, Rogues, 88.

in a Time of Terror, 133. 73. Borradori, Philosophy 74. Derrida, Adieu toEmmanuel Levinas, 112. 75. Borradori, Philosophy in a Time of Terror, 113-14.

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76. Kant, Practical Philosophy, 6:347. 77. Ibid., 6:314-15. Kant makes a distinction between active citizens, who are independent and can vote, and passive ones, who he argues are dependent on thewill of others. 78. Ibid., 6:320, 6:333. 79. Nelson Potter, "Kant and Capital Punishment Today," Journal of Value Inquiry 36, nos. 2/3 (2002): 267-82. trans. 80. Jacques Derrida and Elisabeth Roudinesco, For What Tomorrow . . .a Dialogue, JeffFort (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2004), 148. 81.1 do not have the space to argue formy position here, but I think it is important to indi cate the points where I thinkKant ismisguided. Of course there are other points, such as his view of the status of wives and servants (Kant, Practical Philosophy, 6:277, 6:315), which are deeply problematic; I have only focused on two important issues. 82. Derrida and Roudinesco, For What Tomorrow, 148. 83. Arendt contends that ethics involves a concern with the self whereas politics involves a concern with theworld; Arendt, Responsibility and Judgment, 153. Michel Foucault believes that subjects must be free to practice ethical relations with themselves and others; Michel Foucault, Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, vol. 1, ed. Paul Rabinow (London: Penguin, 1997), 281-301.

Marguerite

La

Caze

is an Australian

Research

Fellow

(2003-2007)

in philosophy

at the

University of Queensland

working on a major project on "Wonder and Generosity forDifference."

as Guides

to the Ethics and Politics of Respect Analytic Cox Imaginary (Cornell, 2002);

She has research interests and numerous Self, coauthored with Damian Theory (2006).

Her publications include The inEuropeanphilosophy and feminist publications philosophy.

Integrity and the Fragile and Contemporary and Michael Levine (Ashgate, 2003); Today (2004) and recent articles with a focus on thework of Kant Political

and Derrida

in Philosophy