Senate vs. Ermita G.R. No. 169777 (2006) Carpio Morales, J.

FACTS: In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project (NRP) as well as the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued invitations to certain department heads and military officials to speak before the committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the Senate President, excepted the said requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately. EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the presidents approval. The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel attending. For defying President Arroyos order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws. ISSUE/s: 1.) Whether or not E.O. 464 contravenes the Congress power of inquiry; 2.) Whether or not E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern; 3.) Whether or not respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they implemented E.O. 464 prior to its publication BANGSAMORO DIGEST GUILD (AUF JD 2013)
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in a newspaper of general circulation HELD: 1. YES. Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch. Thus, the power of inquiry extends to executive officials who are the most familiar with and informed on executive operations. If the information possessed by executive officials on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, then Congress has the right to that information and can compel its disclosure. Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, however, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of executive privilege. Executive privilege has been defined as the power of the Government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and the Congress. One variety of the privilege is the state secrets privilege invoked on the ground that the information is of such nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial military or diplomatic objectives. Another variety is the informers privilege, or the privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law. Finally, a generic privilege for internal deliberations has been said to attach to intra-governmental documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. The claim of privilege under Sec. 3 in relation to Sec. 2(b) of E.O. 464 is, however, invalid per se. Sec. 3 requires all the public officials enumerated in Sec. 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. Whenever an official invokes E.O. 464 to justify his failure to be present, such invocation must be construed as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a head of office authorized by the President, has determined that the requested information is privileged, and that the President has not reversed such determination. Such declaration, however, even without mentioning the term executive privilege, amounts to an implied claim that the information is being withheld by the executive branch, by authority of the President, on the basis of executive privilege. There is an implied claim of executive privilege. By its very nature, the implied claim authorized by Sec. 3 is not accompanied by any specific allegation of the basis thereof. Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is so, and that the President has not overturned that determination. Such declaration leaves Congress in the dark on how the requested information could be classified as privileged. That the message is couched in terms that, on first impression, do not seem like a claim of privilege only makes it more pernicious. Absent then a statement of the specific basis of a claim of executive privilege, there is no way of determining whether it falls under one of the traditional privileges, or whether, given the circumstances in which it is made, it should be respected.
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2. YES. There are clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials. These powers belong only to Congress and not to an individual citizen. While Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are exercising their right to information. However, to the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern. 3. YES. Although E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it is not exempt from the need for publication. It has a direct effect on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. It is, therefore, a matter of public interest which members of the body politic may question before the Court. Due process thus requires that the people should have been apprised of this issuance before it was implemented. Final Ruling: The petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. Secs. 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464 are declared VOID. Secs. 1 and 2(a) are, however, VALID.

By: Yeen, Katrina Anne L.

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Bermudez vs. Torres G.R. No. 131429 (1999) Vitug, J FACTS: The vacancy in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac impelled the main contestants in this case, petitioner Oscar Bermudez and respondent Conrado Quiaoit, to take contrasting views on the proper interpretation of a provision in the 1987 Revised Administrative Code. Bermudez was a recommendee of then Justice Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr., for the position of Provincial Prosecutor. Quiaoit, on the other hand, had the support of then Representative Jose Yap. On 30 June 1997, President Ramos appointed Quiaoit to the coveted office. Quiaoit received a certified xerox copy of his appointment and, on 21 July 1997, took his oath of office before Executive Judge Angel Parazo of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 65) of Tarlac, Tarlac. On 23 July 1997, Quiaoit assumed office and immediately informed the President, as well as the Secretary of Justice and the Civil Service Commission, of that assumption. On 10 October 1997, Bermudez filed with the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, a petition for prohibition and/or injunction, and mandamus, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of injunction/temporary restraining order, against herein respondents, challenging the appointment of Quiaoit primarily on the ground that the appointment lacks the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice prescribed under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. After hearing, the trial court considered the petition submitted for resolution and, in due time, issued its now assailed order dismissing the petition. The subsequent move by petitioners to have the order reconsidered met with a denial. ISSUE/s: 1. Whether or not the absence of a recommendation of the Secretary of Justice to the President can be held fatal to the appointment of respondent Conrado Quiaoit. HELD: 1. NO. An appointment to public office is the unequivocal act of designating or selecting by one having the authority therefor of an individual to discharge and perform the duties and functions of an office or trust. APPOINTMENT NECESSARILY CALLS FOR AN EXERCISE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE APPOINTING POWER. The power to appoint is essentially discretionary. The appointing power has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have the necessary BANGSAMORO DIGEST GUILD (AUF JD 2013)
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qualifications and eligibilities. It is the prerogative of the appointing power. The RIGHT OF CHOICE IS THE HEART OF THE POWER TO APPOINT. The President, as HEAD OF GOVT has the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices. Control means the authority to alter or modify or even nullify or set aside what a subordinate office has done, as well as to substitute the judgment of the latter, as when the former deems it to be appropriate. Hence, the President has the power TO ASSUME DIRECTLY the functions of an executive department, bureau or office. The recommendation of the DOJ Secretary should be interpreted to be a MERE ADVICE, EXHORTATION, and INDORSEMENT, which is essentially persuasive in character, NOT BINDING, NOR OBLIGATORY, upon the President. The recommendation is nothing really more than advisory in nature. FINAL RULING: WHEREFORE, the PETITION is DENIED.

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Pimentel vs. Ermita G.R. 164978 (2005) Carpio, J FACTS: President Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of their respective departments without the consent of the Commission on Appointments, while Congress is in their regular session. Subsequently after the Congress had adjourned, President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to respondents as secretaries of the departments to which they were previously appointed in an acting capacity. Petitioners who are senators assailing the constitutionality of the appointments, assert that while Congress is in session, there can be no appointments, whether regular or acting, to a vacant position of an office needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, without first having obtained its consent. Respondent secretaries maintain that the President can issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments even while Congress is in session. EO 292, which devotes a chapter to the Presidents power of appointment. Sections 16 and 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 read: SEC. 16. Power of Appointment. The President shall exercise the power to appoint such officials as provided for in the Constitution and laws. SEC. 17. Power to Issue Temporary Designation. (1) The President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch, appointment to which is vested in him by law, when: (a) the officer regularly appointed to the office is unable to perform his duties by reason of illness, absence or any other cause; or (b) there exists a vacancy[.] ISSUE/S: 1. WON the President can issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries while Congress is in session. HELD: BANGSAMORO DIGEST GUILD (AUF JD 2013)
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YES. The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office. The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the Presidents confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a department secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is in session. Ad interim appointments and acting appointments are both effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyos issuance of ad interim appointments to respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year. FINAL RULING: WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the present petition for certiorari and prohibition.

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In Re: Lontok April 7, 1992 Malcolm, J. FACTS: The Attorney-General asks that an order issue for the removal of Marcelino Lontok from his office of lawyer in the Philippine Islands, because of having been convicted of the crime of bigamy. The respondent lawyer, in answer, prays that the charges be dismissed, and bases his plea principally on a pardon issued to him by former GovernorGeneral Harrison. Marcelino Lontok was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Zambales of the crime of bigamy. This judgment was affirmed on appeal to the Supreme Court, while a further attempt to get the case before the United States Supreme Court was unsuccessful. On February 9, 1921, a pardon was issued by the Governor-General. ISSUE/S: 1. Did the executive pardon remove the cause of action for disbarment? HELD: 1. YES. While pardon relieves one of the penal consequences of the act, it does not operate as a bar to the disbarment proceeding. On close examination, however, it will be found that the apparent conflict in the decisions is more apparent than real, and arises from differences in the nature of the charges on which the proceedings to disbar are based. Where preceedings to strike an attorney's name from the rolls are founded on, and depend alone, on a statute making the fact of a conviction for a felony ground for disbarment, it has been held that a pardon operates to wipe out the conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has been granted. But where proceedings to disbar an attorney are founded on the professional misconduct involved in a transaction which has culminated in a conviction of felony, it has been held that while the effect of the pardon is to relieve him of the penal consequences of his act, it does not operate as a bar to the disbarment BANGSAMORO DIGEST GUILD (AUF JD 2013)
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proceedings, inasmuch as the criminal acts may nevertheless constitute proof that the attorney does not possess a good moral character and is not a fit or proper person to retain his license to practice law. FINAL RULING: Therefore, that the petition of the Attorney-General cannot be granted, and that the proceedings must be DISMISSED.

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