GenderDifferencesintheU.S.

andCanadianSupremeCourts

MatthewE.Wetstein DepartmentofPoliticalScience DeltaCollege 5151PacificAvenue Stockton,CA95207 mwetstein@deltacollege.edu C.L.Ostberg DepartmentofPoliticalScience UniversityofthePacific 3601PacificAvenue Stockton,CA95211 costberg@pacific.edu

PaperpresentedattheannualmeetingoftheMidwestPolitialScienceAssociation,Chicago,IL, April1215,2007

Introduction OverthelastcoupleofdecadestherehasbeenagrowingbodyofliteratureintheUnited StatesthathasexaminedtheimpactfemalejudgeshavehadontheAmericanjudiciary.Since thenumberoffemalejudgesonappellatehasbeenontherise,ithasbecomemorefeasibleto examinepossiblegenderdifferencesonappellatecourtsandtodevelopgeneralizationsfrom suchresearchforthelegalfieldandotherpoliticalinstitutions.Attheheartofthesejudicial studiesliesthequestion:Dofemalejudgesapproachthelawdifferentlythantheirmale colleagues?Or,asthepsychologistCarolGilligan(1982)eloquentlystated,dowomen"speakin adifferentvoice"thanmen?Theanswertothisquestioniscriticaltoexaminebecause,if substantivedifferencesdoexistbetweenthegenders,theymayhaveimportantramificationsfor thedevelopmentoflawandpoliciesinthefutureaswomenareelevatedingreaternumbersto appellatecourtsandotherelitepolicymakinginstitutions. Overall,thisstudyexaminestheimpactof femalejusticesontwohighcourtsthroughtwo distinctconceptuallenses:1)atthemacrolevelbylookingathowtheyimpacttheirworkgroup environmentasmeasuredthroughpatternsofunanimityand,2)atthemicrolevelintermsof howtheyinfluencejudicialoutcomesinalltypesofdiscriminationclaims.Ourstudyanalyzes thesequestionsintwohighcourtsofadvanceddemocraciessharingacommonlawheritage, namelyCanadaandtheUnitedStates.Whatmakesthisstudyuniqueisthatitutilizestwonew methodologicaltechniques,namelytimeseriesanalysisandlogisticregression,while simultaneouslycontrollingfornumerousfactors,includingspecificcasefacts,tohelpexamine whethergenderdifferencesoccuracrosstwodifferenthighcourtsindiscriminationcases.We knowofnostudytodatethathasappliedtimeseriesanalysistoassesspossiblegender differencesinjudicialvotingbehavior,andonlyonestudyonthelowerU.S.federalcourtsthat

analyzedgenderdifferencewhilecontrollingforcasefacts(Songeret.al.1994).Ourstudy buildsonthepriorworkbySongeret.al.(1994)byanalyzingtheimpactofgenderdifferencesin multipletypesofdiscriminationcasesamongjusticesservingontwonationalhighcourts.We alsomakeanewtheoreticalcontributiontothefeministliteraturebyadvancingthenotionthata strandof"mediatedfeminism"iscurrentlyemergingineliteinstitutions,suchascourts,because therearenumerousfactorsendemictotheseinstitutionsthatoperatetomitigatetheappearance ofstrongfeministtendenciesinthepolicymakingprocess. WechosetostudygenderdifferenceontheU.S.andCanadianSupremeCourtforseveral reasons.First,justicesonhighcourts,unlikethosefoundonlowerappellatecourt,arefarmore likelytovoteaccordingtotheirownpersonalvaluessimplybecausetheysitatthepinnacleof thejudicialhierarchy.Sincetheyarenotseekinghigheroffice,donotseethemselvesas primarilynormenforcers,anddonotfearappellatereview,theyarefarmorelikelytoexpress genderdifferencesintheirvotingbehaviorthanjudgeswhoserveonlowerappellateorState SupremeCourts(seeSegalandSpaeth1993,2002).Second,wechosetostudytheimpactof womenonthesetwohighcourtsbecausefourfemalejusticescurrentlyserveontheCanadian SupremeCourtandChiefJusticeBeverleyMcLachlinhasoccupiedthehelmofthatcourtsince 2000.Asaresult,weareabletotakeaquantitativesnapshotofwhetherChiefJustice McLachlin'sleadershipstylehasproducedchangesatthemacrolevelthatdifferfromhertwo malepredecessors,asthefeministliteraturewouldsuggest.Third,wechosetostudythese courtsbecauseitwillallowustoexaminepossiblesimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweenthe genderinfluencesfoundonthetwoeliteinstitutions,andshedlightonwhethergender differences,asfeministscholarswouldhaveusbelieve,doindeedtranscendculturalboundaries. Lastly,wechosetostudyfeministinfluencesinthejudicialareabecausewebelievethatsome

researchershavesetthebartoohighintheirexpectationoffindingwholesalefeministimpacton policymakingineliteinstitutions.

Theory&LiteratureReview

ThegroundbreakingworkofCarolGilligan(1982)providesatheoreticalfoundationfor understandingwhymenandwomenmightapproachthefieldoflawandpoliticsfromdifferent perspectives.Gilligan'sresearchledhertoconcludethatmenviewtheworldinamorelinear, hierarchical,abstractandindividualistmanner.Assuch,theyaremuchmorelikelytoresolve moralconflictsaccordingtoabstractidealizedrulesthatareincorporatedinthelanguageof rightsandareultimatelyappliedinazerosum,allornothingfashion(Gilligan1982,Palmer 2001b,92).AccordingtoGilligan,women,incontrast,seetheworldintermsofawebof interconnectedrelationshipsthatmakeupalargerinterdependentcommunity.Assuch,theyare morelikelytoresolvemoralconflictsinamoreconciliatoryfashionbyutilizingthelanguageof reconciliationandresponsibilitytothelargercommunity(Gilligan1982).Ultimately,Gilligan's researchsuggeststhatwomenwillviewtheworldthroughdifferentlensesandwilltendtospeak with"adifferentvoice"becausetheyarebiologicallydifferentandhavedifferentlifeand culturalexperiencesthantheirmalecounterparts.Needlesstosay,Gilligan'sresearchhas motivatedpoliticalscientiststoexaminewhethergenderdifferencesexistinthepoliticalarena, and,ifso,todeterminethedegreetowhichsuchdifferencesmatterinthepolicymakingprocess. Forexample,publicopinionscholarshipsuggeststhatwomenhaveconsistentlydifferent attitudesthanmenonawiderangeofpolicyissues,suchascrime,thedeathpenalty, rehabilitation,guncontrol,drugenforcement,obscenity,warandforeignpolicyissues(see HurwitzandSmithey,1998).ResearchonfemalepolicymakersinCongressandstate

legislatureshavealsoshownthatfemalelegislatorsaremorelikelytosupportliberaland feministpositionsthanmalecolleaguesonissuessuchastheEqualRightsAmendment,defense spending,abortionrights,socialwelfareissuesandthedeathpenalty(seeLeader1977and MandelandDodson1992). Moreover,femalerepresentativestendtoapproachlegislative problemsandconducthearingsdifferentlythantheirmalecolleagues(seeDuerstLahti2002 DuerstLahtiandKelly1995Kathlene1994).Manyofthestudiesfromthelegislativeliterature reinforcethefeministtheorythatfemalesineliteleadershiprolesdoapproachtheirpositionsand policymakingresponsibilitiesfromadifferentvantagepointthantheirmalecolleagues. Gilligan'sresearch,alongwithothers,hasgeneratedahostoflegalstudiesaimedat assessingthedegreetowhichgenderdifferenceshaveemergedinthelegalrealm.Thebulkof theresearchtodatehasprimarilyfocusedonlowerfederalandstatecourts,whichis understandablegiventhatmorewomenhavebeenelevatedtothesecourts.Still,theliteraturein thisareahasyieldedmixedresultsatbest.AnearlystudybyKritzerandUhlman(1977)found nosignificantdifferencesamongmaleandfemalejudgesintheirsentencingpatternsincriminal cases(seealsoGruhl,Spohn,andWelch,1981,forsimilarfindingsinthefederalcourtof appeal).AsweepingstudybyWalkerandBarrow(1985)foundfemaledistrictjudgeswereless supportiveofminoritypolicyclaims,moresupportiveofgovernmentaleconomicregulations, andvotednodifferentlyfrommenonwomen'srightsissues,anareawherethefeministliterature wouldexpectacleardifferentiationbetweenthesexes.Twootherstudies,byDavis(1986)and Gotschall(1983),ontheU.S.CourtsofAppealrevealedonlyslightdifferencesinthejudicial behaviorofmenandwomenonthebench(seealsoSongeretal.1994,427Davis,1993). Collectively,thesestudiesseemtosuggestthatnocogentorcohesivegeneralizationscanbe madeabouttheimpactofwomenonlowerappellatecourts.

Eventhoughempiricalscholarshiphasfailedtoshowthatwomenapproachthelawina fundamentallydifferentwaythantheirmalecounterpartsacrossawidespectrumoflegalissues, eitherintermsofvotingbehaviorortheprocessofdecisionmaking,numerousstudieshave indicatedthatgenderdifferencesdoemergein particulartypesoflegaldisputes.Forexample, studieshaveshownthatfemalejusticesonvariouscourtsvotemoreliberallythanmalejustices onissuesthataresignificantforwomen(AllenandWall1987MartinandPyle2000Gryskeet al.,1986SongerandCrewsMeyer2000Peresie2005),andinemploymentdiscrimination cases(Songeretal.1994Davisetal.1993).Martin(1993a,128),inaJudicaturesymposium, providedthebestoverallassessmentoftheresearchtodatewhensheconcludedthatalthough recentempiricalscholarshipfailstosupportGilligan'scontentionthatfemalejudges"speakwith adifferentvoice,"thereisclearevidencethat"womenjudgesaremakingadistinctive contributiontoourlegalsystem...mostevident(ly)inareasinvolvingissuesofgenderfairness." ThefewstudiesthathaveexaminedgenderdifferencesontheU.S.SupremeCourthave yieldedmixedfindingsaswell,althoughtwojusticesappointedtotheU.S.andCanadiantop courtshavefoundGilligan'sargumentintuitivelyappealing(seeMartin1993aWilson1990).In oneearlystudyonJusticeO'Connor,Sherry(1986)claimedJusticeO'Connor'searly jurisprudencereflectedacontextualizedfeminineperspective(1986,592616seealso BehuniakLong1992SullivanandGoldzwig1996).Yet,laterscholarshiponjudicialvoting patternsshowlittleevidencethatJusticeO'Connor'svoteddifferentlythanmenbecauseofher gender(seeDavis1993bAliotta1995Maveety1996VanSickel1998).Recentscholarshipby SongerandClark(2002),indicatesthatthevotingbehaviorofbothJusticeO'Connorand Gingsburgisbetterexplainedbytheirpartyaffiliationthangender.However,O'Connorand Segal(1990)foundthatJusticeO'Connordidvotemoreliberallythenhermalecolleaguesinsex

discriminationcases,andhermerepresenceonthecourtencouragedthecourtasawholetobe moresupportiveofsuchclaims. TherehasbeenmuchlessscholarshipexamininggenderdifferencesontheCanadian SupremeCourttodate,whichissurprisingsincefourfemalejusticescurrentlysitonthehigh court,andoneofthem,JusticeMcLachlin,hasservedaschiefjusticesince2000.Arecent comparativestudybySongeret.al.(2003)revealedlittledifferencesinthemaleandfemale votingrecordsamongCanadianSupremeCourtjusticesineithercivillibertiesorcriminalcases. Indeed,theirstudywentontoconcludethatthattherewerenostrongoverallgenderdifferences amongappellatecourtjudges,attheSupremeCourtorlowerappellatecourtlevel,inthree commonlawnationstheyanalyzed,Canada,U.S.andAustralia(Songer2003,17).Yet, scholarshipbyWhite(1998,8788)suggeststhatthefirstthreewomenontheCanadianSupreme Courtwerefarmorelikelytosupportfundamentalfreedomsandequalityrightsclaimsthantheir malecounterparts. GiventhelimitedresearchdoneongenderdifferencesintheCanadianSupremeCourt andtheplethoraofwomencurrentlyservingonthatbench,scholarshaveauniqueopportunityto assessgenderdifferencesinapivotalpolicymakinginstitutionofanadvancedindustrial democracy.Moreover,itallowsscholarstocomparethosefindingswithgenderdifferences foundintheU.S.SupremeCourtoverapproximatelythesametimeperiod.SinceU.S.studies showrelativelyconsistentgenderdifferencesindiscriminationcasesaddressingwomen'sissues, itseemsobvioustobeginourcomparativeanalysisinthatareaoflaw.Theoneuniquefeatureof thisstudyisthatitfocusesonalltypesofdiscriminationclaims,insteadofjustthoseaddressing women'sissues.Attheheartofourinquiry,weaskwhetherfemalejusticesvotedifferently than theirmalecounterpartsinalltypesofdiscriminationclaims.Second,weareinterestedtoseeif

thesedifferencesarecrossculturalinnature.Ifso,weareinterestedinwhatthispossible differencesmightsuggestfortheoriesofjudicialbehaviorintheUnitedStatesandinotherelite institutions. Lookingattheresearchholistically,onemightquestionwhystudiesongender differences,bothintheU.S.andCanada,haveyieldedsuchmixedresults.Thedifferencesfound intheliteraturecanbeexplainedbyanumberoffactors.First,sinceresearchershaveutilized differentmethodologicalapproachesandhaveanalyzedgenderdifferencesinavarietyoflegal issueareasonahostofdifferentcourtsthatadheretodifferentinstitutional andstructuralnorms, itisnotsurprisingthattheirfindingshaveyieldedmixedresults.Moreover,itisourcontention thatmanyresearchershavesetexceedinglyhighexpectationsintheirquesttoassesswhether therehasbeenafeministimpactinthejudicialfield.Itisourbeliefthatmuchofthefeminist theoryiscorrectinsuggestingwomenwillvoteandwriteaboutsomeareasoflawinadifferent manner,orvoice,thantheirmalecolleagues.However,itiscriticaltorealizethatthefeminist impactwillnotnecessarilyoccurinaholisticmanner.Rather,wearguethattheimpactof feministtheoryinthejudicialfieldwillbepiecemealandfragmentedatbestbecausetherearea multitudeofforcesthatworktomitigateordampentheimpactofgenderdifferencesinthelegal arena.Thus,"strongfeminism"isoftenmediatedbythecontext,rules,andpoliticalsettingsthat femalejusticesencounterindifferentcourts.Considerforexample,theimpactofafemale justicejoiningaparticularlymasculinebenchwithtraditionalmodesofindividualizedopinion expressionandvotingbehavior.Inthissetting,afemalejusticemighthaveherdistinctive feministvoicemediatedbythatinstitutionallymasculinizedsetting(seeAliotta2003.Other femalejusticesmightseetheirfeminineperspectiveorviewsovershadowedbytheideological polarizationevidentwithinacourt,somuchsothatideologicalvotingpatternsmaysupersedeor

trumpanygendercleavagesthatmightexistonthatcourt.Instillotherinstances,afemalejudge with"masculine"tendenciesmayjoinacourtandhavenoproblemhandingdowndissenting opinionsonherownandadvancinganaggressivestyleofopinionwritinginanalready masculineenvironment.Inothercourts,wheredistinctivenormsofcollegialityexist,the feministvoicemaybemorereadilyacceptedandadoptedintothemainstreamofmajority opinions.Overall,thetheoreticalargumentthatisbeingadvancedhereisthat"strongfeminism" istoofrequently expectedbyresearchers,wheninsteaditshouldbeacknowledgedthatthe institutionalidiosyncrasiesofcourtsandthedistinctivepoliticaldynamicsofhowtheyoperate oftenworktomediatetheimpactofgenderdifferencesfromemerginganda"strongfeminist voice"fromtakingshapeondifferentcourts.Thus,wepositthatresearchersshouldexpectless fromtheirempiricalresultsinthewayof"strongfeminism,"andbegintoappreciatethemore fragmented,piecemeal,or"mediatedfeminism"thatisemerginginthelegalfieldandinother elitepolicymakinginstitutionsasmorewomenareelevatedtokeypoliticalposts.Inthepages thatfollow,weexploretheextenttowhichstrongormediatedfeministinfluenceshaveappeared inthemodernU.S.andCanadianSupremeCourts.

DataandMethods

Theempiricalportionofthisstudyproceedsintwodistinctphases,thefirstanalyzingthe U.S.andCanadianSupremeCourtsataninstitutionallevelandthesecondfocusingonthe votingpatternsofindividualjusticesatthecaselevel.Theinstitutionalanalysisisdesignedto testhypothesesabouttheimpactoffemalejusticesonaggregatepatternsofdecisionmakingin eachcourt.Wefirstexaminewhetherthearrivaloffemalejusticesalterstherateofconsensus withineachcourt.Theexpectationfroma"strongfeminist"perspectiveisthatratesof

consensusshouldincreasewithwomenonthecourtbecausetheyhaveagreatertendencyto encouragecollaborationandcollegiality,andarelessinclinedtoexhibitindividualisticbehavior thantheirmalecolleagues.Thisstudymeasuresconsensusbyanalyzingthepercentageof unanimousrulingsincasesarguedineachtermoryear.IntheU.S.,unanimityismeasuredfrom the1973to2005terms,usingdatafororallyarguedcasesfromtheupdatedSpaeth(2007) databaseofdecisions.Thistimeframewaschoseninordertomatchacomparabledataset compiledbytheauthorsonCanadiandecisionsspanningtheLaskin,Dickson,Lamer,and

1 McLachlinCourts(19732005). Thetimeframeofanalysiswasalsochosenbecauseitallows

onetoassessthedegreeofunanimitybothbeforeandaftertheappointmentofthefirstfemale justicestotheU.S.andCanadianSupremeCourts(JusticeSandraDayO'Connorin1981and JusticeBerthaWilsonin1982).Thisinstitutionallevelanalysisreliesontimeseriestechniques totestwhethertherateofunanimityisalteredinanysubstantivewaywhenfemalejusticesare elevatedtotheSupremeCourts,andwhetherthatrateincreasesasmorefemalesareappointedto thetopbench. Thesecondlevelofanalysisexaminesthevotingpatternsofmaleandfemalejusticesina specificsetofcaseswheredifferencesaremostlikelytoappearbetweenthesexes,namely discrimination disputes.Foreachcourt,weanalyzepatternsofliberalorconservativevotingin awidearrayofcases,includingallegationsofunequaltreatmentonthebasisofage,race, religion,sex,sexualorientation,citizenship,disability,indigence,ormaritalstatus.Each justice'svoteservesasthedependentvariableintheequation.Weuselogisticregression techniquestoexplorethe"strongfeminist"hypothesisthatfemalejusticesvotemoreliberally thantheirmalecounterparts,whilesimultaneouslycontrollingforavarietyofotherfactorsthat mightinfluencejudicialvotingbehavior.Bothmodelsincludecontrolvariablesthattapthe

ideologyofthejustices(asmeasuredinnewspaperreportsatthetimeoftheirappointment),and thefactpatterns,legalclaimsandlitigantsappearingineachcase(explainedinmoredetail below).ThisresearchmimicsearlierworkontheCanadianCourtbyOstbergandWetstein (2007),butexpandsthediscussionbycomparingittodiscriminationclaimsarguedin theU.S. SupremeCourt,whichhasyettobeanalyzedusingacomprehensiveattitudinalmodel. Attheinstitutionallevel,ratesofunanimityareanalyzedusingtimeseriesmodelsthat controlforotherfactorsthatmightexplainhigherorlowerratesofagreementonthetwocourts. Forexample,sinceideologicaldifferencesamongthejusticesmightdriveconflictonthebench, weintroduceacontrolvariablethatmeasuresthepercentofpartisanagreementonthecourtsin eachyearorterm.Obviously,whenmorejusticesonacourtarefromthesamepoliticalparty, thereisagreaterlikelihoodthatunanimitywillprevail.Asaresult,ourequationscontrolforthe percentageofjusticeswhowereappointedbypresidentsorprimeministersofthesamepolitical party,andweexpectedapositivecoefficientforthisindicator.Asecondcontrolvariable measurestheworkloadofthecourtsbytabulatingbythenumberofcasesarguedinagiventerm oryear.Thepresumptionhereisthatinyearswherecaseloadsarehigher,justiceswillfeelmore pressuretoresolvecasesinamoreefficientmanner.Assuch,itisexpectedthatjusticeswillpen fewerconcurringanddissentingopinionsandgreaterunanimitywillemergeonthecourtinthese years.Athirdcontrolvariableaccountsfortheaveragepanelsizeineachyearorterm.This variablewasincludedintheanalysisbecause,intheCanadiancontext,thecourttypicallyhears casesinpanelsoffive,seven,orninejustices.IntheU.S.context,controllingforpanelsizeis importantbecauseitcanaccountforcourttransitionperiodswheretheSupremeCourtmightbe shorthanded.Inyearswheretheaveragepanelsizeislower,itislogicaltoexpecthigherratesof unanimity,simplybecauseitiseasiertogetconsensusinagroupofseventhanagroupofnine.

10

Wereportthedataresultsusingordinaryleastsquares(OLS)regression,butreadersshouldbe awarethatweinitiallyusedtimeseriesmodelsthatappliedARIMAtechniquestotestfor autocorrelationinthedata(seeMcDowelletal.1980Ostrom1978).WechosetoreportOLS regressionresultsbecausetheyaremorereadilyunderstoodbyawidersetofreaders,andthe ARIMAmodelsdemonstratedthattherewasnosignificantautocorrelationamongtheerror

2 termsinourdatasets.

Thekeyindependentvariableatthecaselevelofanalysiswasthesexofajustice(female =1,male=0).Inlightofourcodingschemeandfeministtheory,weexpectedthatliberalvotes wouldbecastmorefrequentlybyfemalejustices,allotherthingsbeingequal.Thestatistical controlsbuiltintobothmodelsincludedameasureofjudicialideologydrawnfromtheworkof SegalandCover(1989)ontheU.S.SupremeCourt,andreplicatedsuccessfullyinCanada (OstbergandWetstein2007,chapter3).Thesemeasuresrepresentamorenuancedmeasureof ideologythanpartyidentificationbecausetheyaredrawnfromjournalisticcommentaryand editorialsacrossavarietyofnewspapersatthetimeofajustice'snominationtothecourt. AlthoughbothmeasuresofSupremeCourtjusticesrankthenomineesalongaliberal conservativespectrum,theSegalCoverscoresrangefromahighof+1forthemostliberal justicesto1forconservativejusticeswhilethescoresfortheCanadianjusticesrangeacrossa +2to2spectrumofpossiblerankings.Itwasexpectedthatjusticeswithhigherscoresonthese measureswouldcastagreaterpercentageofvotesinfavorofrightsclaimantsindiscrimination cases,resultinginapositivecoefficient. Severalcasespecificindicatorswereincludedinthestatisticalmodelstocontrolfor certainfactualscenariosandcasecharacteristicsthatwereprominentinequalitycasesdecided bythetwocourts.Forexample,bothequationsincludedavariablemeasuringwhetherthe

11

appellantlostajoborwasforcedtoretire(1iftrue,0ifnot).Thisvariabletestswhetherjustices wouldbemoresympathetictotheextremeeconomicharmsufferedbylitigantswholostajob. Anothertypeofinjurythecourtsaddressedindiscriminationcasespertainstotheallegeddenial ofvariousbenefits(seeOstbergandWetstein2007,129).Thesewereclassifiedintoathree tieredhierarchy,withcasesallegingthedenialofgovernmentbenefitsatthetop(scoredas2), followedbythedenialofprivatebenefits,suchasinsurance(scoredas1),andcasesfeaturingno benefitsatall(0).Giventhisclassificationscheme,itwasexpectedthatjusticeswouldbemost supportiveofclaimantsseekingequalaccesstogovernmentalbenefitsfollowedbybenefit complaintsagainstprivateentitiesandthatthejusticeswouldprovidetheleastsupportwhereno denialofbenefitsoccurred.Thelogicbehindthiscategorizationisthatjusticeswouldbemore tolerantinsituationswherebenefitsweredeniedintheprivatemarketplacethaninthe governmentalspherebecausegovernmentaldiscriminationisanathematothefundamental valuesfoundinademocraticsociety.Wealsoexpectedthejusticeswouldbemoreinclinedto protectindividualsfromharmscausedbyprivateentitiesthanwhennodirecteconomicharm appearedinthecase. Thestatisticalmodelsalsocontrolforthetypeofdiscriminationallegedineachcase,and ourcodingschemeforeachcourtfollowedconstitutionaldoctrinesetoutincaselawinboth countries.IntheU.S.model,wetestedwhetherjusticesvoteaccordingtothethreetiered judicialhierarchyofstrictscrutiny,intermediatescrutinyandreasonablenessindifferenttypesof equalprotectioncases(Ducat2004,1251).Ourexpectationwasthatthisdoctrinewouldyield distinctivevotingpatternsandresultinregressioncoefficientsofdifferingmagnitudeinlinewith thehierarchy.ManyreadersfamiliarwithU.S.caselawunderstandthatraceandreligionenjoy apreferredstatusinthehierarchy,andgovernmentsmustadvanceacompellinginterestinorder

12

toinfringeontheserights(Ducat2004,1251).Assuch,claimsofracialandreligious discriminationshouldenjoyaheightenedprofileandproducealargernumberofliberalvotes thanotherformsofdiscrimination,suchasindigence,sex,age,anddisabilities.OurU.S.model excludedagediscriminationfromtheanalysisforcomparisonpurposesbecauseitisfoundinthe lowestrungofthehierarchy.Ifjusticestrulyadheredtothislegaldoctrine,weexpectedthe strongestpositivecoefficientsforcasesallegingracialorreligiousdiscrimination(foundinthe toptier),asmallerpositivecoefficientforsexdiscrimination (foundintheintermediatescrutiny category),andnorealdifferencesfortheremainingtypesofequalityclaimsinthemodel (allegationsbasedondisabilityorindigence). InCanada,ouranalysisofdifferentformsofdiscriminationclaimsfollowedthelanguage ofSection15oftheCharterofRightsandFreedoms,recognizingthatsomeformsof discriminationareexplicitlyoutlawedinthetextofthedocument,whileothersarenot.Five keyequalityguaranteesenjoytextualsupportintheCharter:age,sex,religion,disability,and noncitizenship.Inadditiontotheseclasses,sexualorientationhasbeen"readinto"theCharter bytheCanadianSupremeCourt,elevatinggayrightstoaquasiconstitutionalprofileof protectedstatus(seeEganv.Canada[1995]2S.C.R.513).Eachoftheseformscanbe distinguishedfromthecategoryofmaritalstatusdiscrimination,whichdoesnotenjoya constitutionalprofilebuthasbeenafrequentlylitigatedsourceofcontentioninCanada.Given thislowerprofile,weexpectedtheCanadianjusticestovotelessfrequentlyforlitigantswhen theyraisedmaritalstatusclaims.Assuch,weexpectedpositivecoefficientsfortheother discriminationvariablesintheCanadianmodel,andomittedmaritalstatuscasesfromthe equationasacomparisongroupforanalysis.

13

ThemodelsincludedcontrolsforthenumberofconstitutionalorCharterissuesraisedby thelitigants(2=twoormoresubstantiveissues,1,or0constitutionalclaims).Afteradetailed readingofthecases,weanticipatedthatwhenclaimantsbroughtmultipleconstitutionalissues intotheirargument,theywouldbeusingascattershotapproachtothelawbytryingtoextend CharterandConstitutionalprinciplesbeyondreasonableandcustomarybounds(seeOstbergand Wetstein2007,135).Assuch,weexpectedthejusticestobelesslikelytosidewithrightsbased argumentswhenmultipleconstitutionalissueswereraised,resultinginanegativecoefficientfor thisvariable.IntheU.S.model,wealsocontrolledforthedirectionofthelowercourtruling(1 =liberal,0=conservative)anticipatingthatthejusticeshavediscretionarycontroloftheir docketandaremorelikelytotakecasesfororalargumentinordertovoteagainsttheideological leaningofthelowercourt.IntheCanadianmodel,wereliedonameasurethattappedthe ideologicaldirectionofaHumanRightCommission(HRC)ruling,andexpectedthejusticesto voteintheoppositedirectionofthesecommissions,becausethejusticesfeelcapabletoreach conclusionsaboutequalitylawwithoutdeferringtotherulingsofthesespecializedtribunals (OstbergandWetstein2007,135). Ourmodelstestforthepossibleideologicalimpactthatspecificpartiesandinterveners mighthaveonthejusticesintheareaofequalitylaw.Inbothcourts,wecontrolfortheimpact ofgovernmentattorneyswhoarefightingthechargesofdiscrimination(1=government,0=for allothercases).Weexpectedthatgovernmentattorneyswouldbemoresuccessfulinfighting discriminationcomplaintsbecauseoftheir"repeatplayer"statusbeforetheSupremeCourtof eachcountry(seeGalanter1974,2003Kritzer2003FlemmingandKurtz2002a,2002b, Femming2004).Inotherwords,thelitigationexperienceofgovernmentattorneysmaygenerate morefrequentvictoriesfortheirside,andthus,moreconservativevotesthaninothercases.If

14

thishypothesisheldtrue,weexpectednegativecoefficientsineachmodel.Wealsointroduced controlsintoeachmodelforkeyintervenerswhofilelargenumbersofamicuscuriaebriefsin equalitycases.InCanada,wecontrolledfortheparticipationofaprominentfeministcivilrights group,theWomen'sLegalEducationandActionFund(LEAF),oneofthemostsuccessful interestgrouplitigantsinthatcountry(seeManfredi2004Brodie2002).Weexpectedthat LEAF'sparticipationinacasewouldfosterahigherpercentageofliberalvotes,allotherthings beingequal.IntheU.S.,ourmodelcontrolledforthepresenceoftheNAACP,asimilarly prominentinterestgrouplitigatorwithalongrecordofsuccessinthefederalcourts.Wealso controlledfortheimpactoftheEqualEmploymentOpportunityCommission(EEOC),because manyofthecasesfeaturedEEOCsupportofalitigant,eitherthrougha"lettertosue"orother formofsupport(perhapsasanamicusbrieffiler).Insuchinstances,wecodedthecasewitha +1,whereasEEOCoppositionwascodedwitha1,whilecaseslackinganyEEOCparticipation receivedazeroscore.OurexpectationwasthatEEOCsupportwouldspurjusticestobemore supportiveoftherightslitigant,thusgeneratingapositivecoefficientintheequation. AfinalcontrolvariableincludedintheCanadianmodelassessedwhetherthe contemporaryMcLachlinCourtvotedmoreliberallyinequalitycasesthanthecourtsledbyher twomalepredecessors(ChiefJusticesDicksonandLamer).Feministtheorywouldsuggestthat sincefemalesaremoresympathetictoequalityclaims,onceawomaniselevatedtothehelmof thecourt,itmightbemorepronetohanddownliberalrulingsinsuchcases.Thisargumentis enhancedintheCanadiancontextbecauseChiefJusticeMcLachlincannotonlystructure conferencedeliberationsandinfluencethedirectionofvotingbyotherjustices,butalsocan wieldthepowerofpanelassignmenttohelpfosteramoreliberaloutcome.Thus,weanticipated apositivecoefficientforthevariabletappingherleadershiptenureontheCanadianCourt.

15

Results

FemaleJusticesandAggregatePatternsofInstitutionalChange Attheaggregatelevel,thetwotimeseriesregressionequationsproducedmodelresults thatdoanimpressivejobofexplainingthevaryingdegreesofunanimityinthetwoSupreme Courts(seeTable1).BothequationsproducedcomparableFTestscoresandwerestatistically significantatthe.001levels.TheadjustedRSquarevaluesindicatethattheU.S.contextand 50.8intheCanadiansetting,whichmeansthattheU.S.modelwasabletoaccountfor41percent ofthevarianceinthedependentvariable,whiletheCanadianmodelaccountedfor51percentof thevariance.TheDurbinWatsonstatisticsindicatethereisnoserialautocorrelationintheerror termsofthetwoequations,althoughalaggedvariablewasintroducedintotheCanadianmodel tocorrectforfirstorderautocorrelation(seeOstrom1978). Turningtotheindividualvariablesintheequations,thedatarevealthattheintroduction ofwomentotheU.S.SupremeCourtdidsignificantlyincreasethenumberofunanimousrulings handeddownbytheCourt(seetheleftsideofTable1).Indeed,whenthepercentageoffemales ontheU.S.SupremeCourtincreasedby11percent(comparabletoanincreaseofonejustice), therateofunanimousrulingsincreasedby4.6percent,andtheimpactissignificantatthe99 percentconfidencelevel(b=.417x11=4.6).Thisfindinglendscredencetothe"strong feminist"argumentthatwhenwomenjoinacourtthereisagreaterlikelihoodthattheyareable tofostergreatercooperationandcohesiononthebench.Havingsaidthis,theadditionofwomen totheCanadianhighcourtdidnothaveastatisticallysignificantimpactonthedegreeof unanimityreachedonthatcourt,althoughthecoefficientisintheexpecteddirection(b=.049, seetherightsideofTable1).Herewehaveevidenceofa"mediatedfeminist"impact.Perhaps

16

oneexplanationforthedisparityinthetwoequationsisthatsincetheCanadianCourt,asan institution,hasamuchhigherpropensitytohanddownunanimousrulingsthantheU.S.Courtto beginwith,theintroductionofwomentothehighcourtdoesnotdramaticallyincreasethelevel ofunanimityonanalreadyhighlycohesivecourt(anaverageof76and38percentrespectively

3 overthelastthreedecades). Asecondexplanationforwhywomendonothaveasignificant

impactonratesofunanimityontheCanadianCourtmightbeexplainedwhenonestudiesthe votingbehaviorofthefirstthreefemalejusticesingreaterdetail.Indeed,theirvotingbehavior indiscriminationcases,aswellasothercivilrightsandlibertiescasesrevealsthatthesejustices hadnotroublearticulatingtheirownviewsandwritingconcurringanddissentingopinions. Indeed,twostudiesofcourtauthorshippatternsrevealedJusticesL'HeureuxDubeand McLachlinwerethetwogreatestdissentersontheLamerCourt(seeOstbergetal.2004 McCormick1994).Thesefindinghelprefutethecontentionbysomefeministscholarsthatthe firstwomenelevatedtocourtsmaybelikelytoconformtothedominantmasculinevoting patternsofatraditionallymasculineinstitution.ThisiscertainlynotthecaseontheCanadian highcourt,wherepioneeringfemalejusticeswerewillingtospeaktheirownmindon"socalled" women'sissues.Indeed,wefinditsurprisingthatthecoefficientforwomenjusticesonthe CanadianCourtisinthepositivedirectiongiventhepropensityoftheinitialfemaleappointees todissent.Overall,ourdataonratesof unanimityatthemacrolevelreflectasurprising"strong feminist"impactontheU.S.SupremeCourt,buta"mediatedfeminist"impactontheCanadian SupremeCourt.

INSERTTABLE1HERE

17

Theestimatesforaveragepanelsizeindicatethatthisfactorsignificantlyinfluencesrates ofunanimityonbothcourts.Asexpected,inyearswhenanaverageofonemorejusticehears casestherateofunanimityontheCanadianCourtdropbysixpercent,whileintheU.S.settingit goesdownby15percent(seeTables1).Thesefindingssupportthecontentionthatthemore justiceswhohearacasethegreaterthelikelihoodthatconflictwillemergeoneachcourt.Asa result,theseresultshighlightanimportantinstitutionalpowerthatisuniquetotheCanadian chiefjustice,namelythepowertocreatesmallerpanelsizesandinreduceconflictamongthe justices.ThisisapowerthattheU.S.chiefcannotwield.AlthoughCanadianscholarsand justicesarequicktopointoutthatconcertedeffortsaremadetoevenlydistributetheworkload (seeGreeneetal.1998,119),thetimesseriesanalysisclearlyshowsthatpanelsizedoes influencetheoveralldegreeofconsensusobtainedonayearlybasis. ThetwoothervariablesthatprovedtobestatisticallysignificantinTable1arethe percentofChartercasesheardandworkloadoftheCanadianCourtinagivenyear,althoughthe latterwasintheunexpecteddirection.Notsurprisingly,themoreChartercasesthatareheardby theCourtperyear,thegreaterthelikelihoodthatdisagreementwillemergeonthebench(b= .30,significantatthe95percentconfidencelevel).SinceChartercasesaremorelikelytodeal withcontroversialdisputesrelatingtocivilrightsandlibertiesissues,wearenotsurprisedthat theyarelikelytogeneratemoredisagreementonthebench.However,wedidnotanticipatethat inyearswheretheCanadianCourthandsdownmorerulingstherewouldbelesslikelihoodthat agreementwouldemerge(b=.22,significantatthe99percentconfidencelevel).Thisfinding suggeststhatworkloadpatternsdonotencourageCanadianjusticestojoinmajorityopinionsata greaterrate.Asmentionedearlier,sincehighratesofunanimityalreadyexistontheCanadian Court,thereisnotasubstantialburdenimposedonjusticeswhentheydecidetoauthoradissent.

18

EventhoughtheworkloadintheU.S.contextdoesnothaveastatisticalimpactonratesof unanimityreachedperyearonthecourt,theestimateisintheexpecteddirection(b=.028). Thevariabletabulatingthepercentofjusticesfromthesamepartydidnotachieve statisticalsignificanceineithermodel,anditwasintheincorrectdirectionintheCanadian context.Thefindingssuggestthatwhenthepercentageofjusticesfromthesamepartyincreases by11percent(theadditionofonejustice),unanimityinCanadaactuallydeclinesbyroughlytwo percentagepoints(b=.17x11=1.87,seeTable1).Yet,asimilarincreaseinjusticesfromthe samepartyintheU.S.contextincreasesconsensusbytwopercent(b=.20x11=2.2,seeTable 1).Thedisparityinthesignsofthetwocoefficientsmightbeattributedtothefactthatthe appointmentprocessisfarmoreideologicallymotivatedintheU.S.thanitisinCanada,andthus whenmorejusticescomefromthesameparty,ideologicalagreementandproclivitiesmatterthat muchmore.SincetheU.S.justicesaremorelikelytobefoundattheideologicalextremesthan thoseappointedinCanada,theadditionofonemorememberoftheU.S.Courtwhoisofthe samepoliticalpartywillbemorelikelytoincreaseratesofunanimityonthatbench. Themostimportantfindingtotakeawayfromthetimesseriesanalysisisthatwhilethe introductionoffemalejusticestotheU.S.Courthasincreasedtheratesofunanimityonan aggregatelevel,surprisingly,ithasnotdonesointheCanadiansetting.First,mostreaderswill besurprisedthattheappointmentofsevenfemalejusticesinCanadahasnotproduceda significantpositiveimpactonoverallratesofunanimity.Asmentionedearlier,themajorreason forthisdiminishedfindingisthedistinctivedissentingvoicethatseveralearlyfemalejustices displayed,mostparticularly,JusticeL'HeureuxDube.Second,mostreaderswouldbesurprised thattheadditionofJusticesO'ConnorandGinsburgtotheU.S.Courthasfosteredmore collegialityandcooperationonthehighcourtinawaythatsetsthemapartfromtheirmale

19

predecessors.Thisfindingissignificantbecauseitillustratesthe"strongfeminist"contention thattheintroductionofmorewomentotheSupremeCourtcouldhaveaprofoundimpactonthe votingbehaviorofthecourt,atleastonanaggregatelevel.Thequestionremainswhetherthese feministtendencieswillholdtrueattheindividualcaselevel.

FemaleJusticesandEvidenceofDifferentVotingBehavior

ThetworegressionequationslaidoutinTable2assessvotingbehaviorattheindividual levelandbothmodelsproducedstatisticallysignificant,robustresults.Thefindingsontheleft sideofTable2providelogisticregressionmaximumlikelihoodestimatesforasampleof692 discriminationvotescastbytheU.S.SupremeCourtbetween19812005,alongwithmodelfit statisticsfoundatthebottomofthetable.Theresultsindicatethatourfourteenvariablemodel producedaChiSquarestatisticof781.63andaNagelkerkeRSquareof.30.Sincethemodal frequencyforthedependentvariableis52.5percentandthemodelexplainedfully69percentof thevotescorrectly,thereisa34percentimprovementoverthemodalguessingstrategy.Onthe rightsideofthetable,thefifteenvariablemodelintheCanadianCourtproducedanevenmore robustmodelfitstatisticfeaturingatotalof611discriminationvotescastbythejusticesbetween 19842005.TheCanadianmodelcorrectlypredicts71percentofthejudgevotes,andwasable toimproveuponthemodalguessingstrategyby38percent.ThisequationfeaturedaChiSquare of694.084andaNagelkerkeRSquareof.292. TurningtothejudgelevelvariablesinTables2,thefindingsrevealintriguing,andin somesensecounterintuitivefindings.NotsurprisingtomostAmericanscholars,themost importantvariableinthemodelofU.S.discriminationcasesisideology,whichisstatistically significantatthehighestlevelandisinthecorrectdirection(b=1.49,significantatthe99.9

20

percentconfidencelevel).Thefindingsinthesecondcolumnofdatasuggestthatliberaljustices are60percentmorelikelytoruleinfavorofdiscriminationclaimantsthantheirconservative counterparts.Ironically,thekeyvariablethatdrivesvotingbehaviorintheU.S.contextdoesnot appeartomattermuchinCanadiandiscriminationcases(seetherightsideofTable2).Although theestimateisintheexpecteddirectionandindicatesthatliberaljusticesarefifteenpercentmore likelythanconservativestoruleinfavorofequalityclaims,thefindingsarenotstatistically significant(b=.15).Asmentionedearlier,oneexplanationforthisdiscrepancybetweenthetwo coefficientsisthattheappointmentprocessinCanadaisnotasideologicallydrivenasitisinthe UnitedStates.AlthoughthePrimeMinister,likethePresident,hasthepowerof appointment, thelackofmeaningfulparliamentaryoversighthasensuredthattheappointmentprocesslacks
4 thebitterpartisanwranglingthatoccursintheU.S.Senate. Consequently,modernCanadian

PrimeMinistershaveconsideredamyriadoffactorswhenmakingappointmentstothebench asidefromideologicalproclivitiesofthenominee.Asjournalistshavepointedout,Prime Ministershaveconsideredavarietyoftraitsintheirselectionofappointmentstothecourt,such asbilingualism,regionalbalance,legalexpertise,gender,andjudicialexperience(forexamples, seeLeBlancandClark2003Tibbetts1999).Needlesstosay,thefactthatideologyfailstobe statisticallysignificantintheCanadianmodelwillsurprisemostU.S.scholarsbecauseitremains themostimportantfactorinexplainingjudicialvotinginvirtuallyeveryareaoflawintheU.S. court,especiallyincivilrightsandlibertiesdisputes.

INSERTTABLE2HERE

Thecriticalvariableinthispaper,namelythevotingbehaviorofwomenonthehigh court,alsoyieldscounterintuitiveresults.Indeed,theimpactofwomenonthetwocourtsisthe

21

exactoppositeofthatfoundattheaggregatelevel.Contrarytoexpectations,Table2indicates thatwhenJusticeO'ConnorandGinsburgparticipateindiscriminationcasesintheU.S.Court theyare22percentlesslikelytoruleinfavoroftheequalityclaimantthantheirmale counterparts,allotherthingsbeingequal(b=.89).Althoughonemustbecautiousabout reachinganydefinitiveconclusionsregardingthefeministhypothesisbasedonthevoting behaviorofonlytwojustices,itwouldappearthatthefirsttwofemalesappointedtotheU.S. highcourtdonotvotemoreliberallyinequalitycasesthantheirmalecolleagues,atleastwhen controllingfortheirideologyandfactpatternsinthecases.Thisfindingisimportantbecauseit isatoddswiththemajorityofscholarshiponlowerappellatecourts,andcastsdoubtonthe abilitytoassertthatastrongfeministhypothesisprevailsindiscriminationcasesattheSupreme Courtlevel.Onlytimewilltelltheveracityofthisclaimasmorefemalesareappointedtothe U.S.SupremeCourt. IncontrasttothesurprisingfindingintheU.S.context,femalejusticesontheCanadian SupremeCourtare24percentmorelikelytohanddownaliberalrulingindiscriminationcases thantheirmalecolleagues(b=1.02,statisticallysignificantatthe99.9percentconfidencelevel). Thefactthatthefindingsforthefemalevariableareatoddsinthetwomodelsisintriguing. Onepossibleexplanationforthedisparityintheresultsmaybeattributedtotherelativeimpact thatideologyplaysonthetwoCourts,asmentionedabove.SincetheCanadianjusticesarenot ideologicallydrivenwhenresolvingdiscriminationclaims,othervariables,suchasgender,have cometoplayamorepivotalroleinstructuringconflictinthisareaoflaw.Incontrast,since ideologyissodominantintheU.S.context,itspowermaymediatetheeffectofgender differenceandothervariablesinsuchdisputes.

22

TheCanadianCourttreatedfourofthesixtypesofdiscriminationthatareprotectedin thelanguageoftheCharterintheexpectedmanner,witheachfeaturingastatisticallysignificant positivecoefficient(seeTable2).Asanticipated,theCourttreatedequalityargumentsbasedon gayrights,religion,citizenshipanddisabilitymorefavorablythandiscriminationbasedon maritalstatus,whichisleftoutofSection15oftheCharter.Movingfromhightolow,the coefficientsforeachofthesevariablesisb=1.47(gayrights),b=.77(fordiscriminationbased onreligionandcitizenship),andb=.56(disabilityrights),andthechangesinprobabilityfor thesevariablessuggestthatCanadianjusticesare31percentmorelikelytoruleinfavorofgay rightslitigants,atthehighend,and14percentmorelikelytosidewithdisabilityassertions,at thelowend,incomparisontomaritalclaims.However,weweresurprisedtofindthatthe Canadianjusticestreatedsexandagediscriminationnodifferentlythanmaritalstatusarguments, sincethesetwoformsofequalityareprotectedundertheCharter.Infact,bothcoefficientsare intheunexpecteddirection,althoughtheresultsdonotallowustorejectthenullhypothesis.It isonlyafterlookingmorecloselyatthesexdiscriminationcasesthatonerealizesthatinalmost athirdofthem,thejusticesaredividedalonggenderlines,withthemalesvotingconservatively andthefemalesvotingliberally.5 Theseresults,inconjunctionwiththeunanimouscases handeddownintheconservativedirection,helpexplainwhythecoefficientforthesex discriminationcasesisnegativewhiletheindicatorforthefemalejusticevariableispositive. ThenegativeresultfortheagediscriminationvariablemakessensegiventhattheCanadian justicesthemselvesfaceforcedretirementfromthetopcourtattheageof75.Assuch,itisnot surprisingthattheywouldbemorereticenttosidewithequalityargumentsthatarebasedon retirementmandates.Overall,itseemsthatmembersoftheCanadianhighcourtareindeed protectingabulkofthedifferenttypesofequalityrightsenshrinedintheCharteratalevelthat

23

issignificantlyhigherthanthatfoundformaritalstatusrightsprotectedinfederalandprovincial laws. Unlikeitsnortherncounterpart,membersoftheU.S.Courtdonottreatfourofthefive typesofdiscriminationinaccordancewiththethreetieredhierarchicalstructuredevelopedin constitutionalcaselaw.Contrarytoexpectationsfromthelegalmodel,thejusticesaretheleast supportiveofracialdiscriminationinrelationtoagecases(theomittedcategory),followedby disability,religious,sex,andindigentdiscriminationinthatorder(b=2.07, 1.47,1.20, .67, and.36respectively,seeTable2).Thesefindingsarealmosttheexactoppositeofwhatone wouldexpectgiventhethreetieredlegalframeworkestablishedbytheCourt.Ultimately,one wouldexpectthehighestlevelofscrutinytobegiventoraceandreligionclaims,followedby immediatescrutinyforsexualinequality,andthereasonablenessstandardtobeappliedto discriminationbasedondisability,ageandindigency.Thedatarevealthatonlythecoefficient forindigentstatuslinesupwiththehypothesissetoutinthelegalmodel.Theothercoefficients suggestthatmembersoftheU.S.SupremeCourt,atleastinthediscriminationarea,donot adheretolegalprinciplesinthemannerthattheysuggestintheirwrittenopinions.Rather,they votefollowingthelinesoftheirownattitudinalpredilections,whichhelpsexplainwhythe ideologyvariableissooverwhelminglypowerfulintheU.S.equation.Ourfindingsonthis scorereinforcetheextensivescholarshipbySegalandSpaeth(1993,2002)illustratingthaton thecaselevelanyway,attitudinalbehavioriswritlargeintheU.S.context. Thetwomeasurestappinglowercourtinfluences,namelylowercourtliberalism(inthe U.S.) andhumanrightscommissions(inCanada),havecoefficientsintheexpecteddirectionand arestatisticallysignificantforbothcourts(seeTable2).Asexpected,bothcourtstendedtohear casesfromthelowercourtthattheywereapttooverturn.Thefindingsindicatethatwhilethe

24

U.S.Courtis15percentmorelikelytoruleagainstrightsclaimantswhowoninthelower appellatecourt,theCanadianjusticesare20percentmorelikelytovoteintheoppositedirection oftheHumanRightsCommission. Inshort,bothcourtsusetheirdiscretionarypowersofdocket controltotakecasesthattheyaremostlikelytooverturn. ThetwovariablesmeasuringCharterandconstitutionalissuesarebothintheexpected direction,althoughonlytheCanadian Chartervariableisstatisticallysignificantatthe99.9 percentconfidencelevel(.93,seeTable2).Thisvariablesuggeststhatwhentwoormore Charterissuesareraisedinacase,thejusticesare43percentlesslikelytoruleinfavorofthe rightsclaimant,whencomparedagainstcaseswithnoCharterissues.Althoughthisfindingmay seemcounterintuitivetosomereaders,onemustrememberthatanextensivereadingofcases thatraisemultipleCharterclaimsledustohypothesizethejusticeswouldperceivelitigantsas "pushingtheCharterenvelope"beyondthejustices'comfortzone.Assuch,wearenotsurprised thatthejusticestendedtorejectthelitigants'argumentsatahigherrateinthesecases(Ostberg andWetstein2007,135). Inbothcourts,thejoblossvariablehasanegligibleimpactonthejustices'voting behavior,althoughthecoefficientintheCanadianmodelisintheexpecteddirection(b=.12). Ontheotherhand,thepresenceofbenefitsdisputesinbothcourtshasanunexpectednegative impact,andinbothmodels,thecoefficientisstatisticallysignificantatthe99percentconfidence level(seeTable2).Thus,whileCanadianjusticesare17percentlesslikelytoruleinfavorof rightsclaimantswhengovernmentbenefitsareatissue,theU.S.justicesare24percentless likelytodoso.Thesefiguresareincontrasttocaseswherebenefitsarenotinplay,andthe resultsindicatethatthejusticesareleastlikelytoruleinfavorofrightsclaimantswhen governmentbenefitsareatissue.Althoughthesefindingsarenotintunewithequalityprinciples

25

presumedbydemocratictheory,theymakesenseinlightofGalanter's(1974)contentionthat repeatgovernmentplayersacquireaprivilegedstatusinthelegalsystembecausetheydevelop criticalexpertiseandenjoyresourceadvantagesinthelegalsystem(seealsoKritzer2003).This themeisreinforcedbythenegativecoefficientsforthegovernmentlitigantvariableinboth models,althoughtheresultisonlystatisticallysignificantintheCanadiansetting(b=.65, significantatthe95percentconfidencelevelinCanada,b=.14intheU.S.model).As expected,Canadianjusticesare16percentlesslikelytosidewithindividualswhoallege discriminationbythegovernment,whileU.S.justicesare3percentlesslikelytodoso. Thethreeintervenervariableshighlightedinthetwomodelsprovidecoefficientsthatare allinthecorrectdirection,suggestingapositiveimpactforrightsclaimantswhentheyare supportedbyprominentinterveners.IntheU.S.model,whentheNAACPorEEOCsupportthe litigant,thejusticesare25and29percentmorelikelytosidewiththoseraisingequalityclaims (b=1.08forNAACP,b=.60forEEOC,seeTable2).AlthoughCanadianjusticesarenine percentmorelikelytosidewithrightsclaimantswhenLEAFisinvolvedinthecase,weare unabletorejectthenullhypothesisforLEAFparticipation(b=.35).Collectively,thesefindings demonstratethatinterestgroupsdotendtoencourageprogressivedecisionmakingbythe justices,althoughmoresointheU.S.settingthantheCanadiancontext. ThelastvariableincludedintheCanadianequation,namelytheMcLachlinCourtcontrol variable,indicatesthatthehighCourtdoeshandsdownmoreliberalrulingsinequalitycases duringthefirstfiveyearsofJusticeMcLachlin'stenurethanduringthetenuresofeitherofher twomalepredecessors(b=.85,statisticallysignificantatthe99.9percentconfidencelevel). Indeed,McLachlinCourtjusticesare20percentmorelikelytohanddownaliberalrulinginthe equalityareathanjusticesontheearliercourts.Thisfindinghelpsreinforcethevitalityofthe

26

feministargumentintheCanadiancontextbecauseitshowsthatwhenafemaleleadstheCourt, ithasdecisivelyhandeddownmoreliberalrulingsinequalitycases.Thefactthatthecourt controlvariableisstatisticallysignificantintheequalityareaalsosuggeststhatjustice McLachlinmightapproachherleadershiproleinadifferentmannerthanhertwomale predecessors.However,onlytimeandfurtherresearchontheMcLachlinCourtwilldetermine thestrengthandviabilityofthisfeministcontention.

Conclusion

Thereareseveraloverarchingconclusionsthatcanbedrawnfromthisstudy.First,ona macroleveltheadditionofwomentotheU.S.SupremeCourthassignificantlyincreasedratesof unanimityonthatbench.Inotherwords,thepresenceofbothJusticesO'ConnorandGinsburg hasfosteredgreatercohesionandconsensusinthedecisionshandeddownsince1982.This findinglendscredencetothe"strongfeminist"argumentthatwomenbringagreaterdegreeof collegialityandcollaborationtothecourtregardlessoftheirrespectivepartyaffiliations. AlthoughthemacrolevelfindingsoffeministeffectdidnotpanoutintheCanadianhighCourt, theresultswereintheexpecteddirection.Ultimately,webelievethisvariabledidnot significantlyaltertherateofunanimitybecausethefirstthreefemalesappointedtotheCanadian Court,mostnotablyJusticeL'HeureuxDube,wereprolificdissentersonthepostCharter CanadianCourt.However,webelievethattheseinitialresults,exhibitingwhatsomewould label"masculine"opiniontendenciesduringthesejustices'tenure,maybetransformedwiththe passageoftimewhenthecurrentcadreoffemaleappointeeshavehadsufficienttimetomake theirmarkontheCourt.Thus,onamacrolevel,itseemsthefindingsontheU.S.Courtprovide

27

somestrongsupportforthefeministargumentfromanaggregateperspective,althoughsuch conclusionsmaybesubjecttochangeasmorewomenareappointedtotheU.S.SupremeCourt. Webelievetherearetwoimportantconclusionsthatcanbedrawnatthemicrolevel regardingtheresolutionofequalitydisputesonthesetwocourts.First,notsurprisingly, ideologyplaysaparamountroleinthevotingbehaviorofU.S.SupremeCourtjusticesin discriminationcases.Yet,acriticalfinding,andonethatmanyU.S.courtwatchersmayfind shocking,isthatideologyplaysaninsignificantroleinCanadianequalitycases.Thisstark contrasthighlightstheimportanceofdoingcomparativeresearchinthejudicialfield,becauseit notonlyprovidesinsightintohowhighcourtsoperatinginsimilaradvancedindustrialsocieties differ,butalsopointstothefactthatlongheldbeliefsaboutwhatfactorsinfluencejudicial decisionmakingintheU.S.maynotdrivejudicialbehavioralpatternselsewhere.Theweakness oftheideologyvariableinCanadacastsdoubtontheassumptionthatattitudinaldecision making,whichisthedrivingforceintheU.S.,willplayaroleatall,muchlessapivotalone,in otherhighcourtsofadvancedindustrialdemocracies. Asecondsurprisingfindingfromouranalysisisthatthefemalevariablehastheopposite impactonthetwohighcourtsatthemicrolevel,andthesefindingsstandincontrasttothe resultsattheaggregatelevel.Putsimply,althoughfemalejusticesinCanadahavenotincreased ratesofunanimityataninstitutionalleveltodate,atanindividualleveltheydocastmoreliberal votesinequalitydisputesthantheirmalecounterparts.TheU.S.resultsrunintheexactopposite direction,withunanimityhavingincreasedwiththearrivalofJusticesO'ConnorandGinsburg, butfromanindividualperspective,theirvotingbehaviorhasactuallybeenmoreconservative thanmalejusticesintheequalityarea.Webelievetheresultsattheindividuallevelmakesense whenconsideringtheideologicallypolarizednatureoftheU.S.SupremeCourt,andthe

28

overwhelmingpowerthisvariablewieldsovertheotherjudgelevelvariableintheequation.In Canada,themorenuancedappointmentprocessdampenstheimpactofideologicalvoting,andin theequalityarea,feministcleavagesareallowedtoemergeasasalientfactorinfluencing individualvotingbehavior.Thus,wereachasomewhatsurprisingconclusion:intheU.S.high court,judicialideologytrumpsgenderandmediatesitsimpactintheequalityrealm,whilein Canada,gendereffectstrumpideology.Again,thesefindingspointtotheimportanceof conductingcomparativeresearchonhighcourt,notonlybecausetheycantellussomething aboutthemorenuancedwaysthatideologyoperatesinotherhighcourts,butalsobecausethey canshedlightontheidiosyncraticnatureanddominanceofideologicalvotingbehaviorinthe U.S.highCourt. Fromanevenbroaderperspective,thefindingsfromthisresearchillustratethedistinctive impactthatfemalescanhaveontwodemocratichighcourts,andsuggeststhatthereissome validitytothecontentionthatwhenwomenrisetoeliteleadershippositionstheywillapproach theirworkingenvironmentandtheresolutionofcasesfromadifferentperspectivethantheir malecolleagues.Althoughthescopeandveracityofthefeministargumentadvancedby Gilliganandothersdoesnottakeplaceintheholisticfashiononeithercourt,thepiecemealor "mediatedfeminist"impactthatemergesfromthisstudyismorerealistic,andnolessimportant, insettingswherevariousinstitutionalfeatureswilldampentheimpactthatfemalesmakeonthe bench.Althoughwebelievethatmediatingfactorswillcontinuetooperatein thesetwohigh courts,webelievethatgenderdifferenceswillbecomeincreasinglyimportantatboththemicro andmacrolevelasmorewomenareappointedtothebench.

29

TABLE1 PredictingAnnualRatesofUnanimityinthe U.S.andCanadianSupremeCourts,19732005

UNITEDSTATES SUPREMECOURT Statistical significance .010 ** .074 .013 * .314

CANADIAN SUPREMECOURT Statistical significance .386 .070 .000 *** .010 ** .013 * .130

Variable PercentFemaleJustices PercentJusticesSameParty AveragePanelSize NumberofCasesArgued PercentofDocketCharter PercentUnanimousPriorYear Constant NumberofObservations AdjustedRSquare FTest DurbinWatsonStatistic

b .417 .198 15.051 .028

b .049 .173 6.368 .216 .304 .151

150.802 33 .408 6.520*** 2.138

139.609 32 .508 6.330 *** 2.316

30

TABLE2 LogisticRegressionEstimatesofLiberalVotesinaSampleof U.S.SupremeCourtEqualityCasesandCanadianEqualityCases,19812005 UNITEDSTATES SUPREMECOURT Changein Probability WhenX b isLow&High CANADIAN SUPREMECOURT Changein Probability WhenX b isLow&High

Variable JudgeLevelVariables Ideology FemaleJustice CaseCharacteristics RacialDiscrimination DisabilityDiscrim. ReligiousDiscrim. SexDiscrim. IndigentDiscrim. GayRightsCase CitizenshipDiscrim. AgeDiscrim. Benefits JobLoss ConstitutionalIssues LowerCourtRuling HRCommissionRuling

1.487 *** .889 ***

.599 .218

.153 1.022 ***

.151 .242

2.069 *** 1.472 *** 1.203 *** .667 * .362

.468 .347 .289 .165 .091 1.471 *** .771 * .511 .311 .180 .127 .170 .031 .433 .559 * .772 * .406 .136 .182 .101

.495 *** .119 .145 .617 ***

.243 .030 .072 .150

.343 ** .124 .930 ***

.399 *

.195

31

TABLE2Continued LogisticRegressionEstimatesofLiberalVotesinaSampleof U.S.SupremeCourtEqualityCasesandCanadianEqualityCases,19812005 UNITEDSTATES SUPREMECOURT Changein Probability WhenX b isLow&High CANADIAN SUPREMECOURT Changein Probability WhenX b isLow&High

Variable Parties&Interveners Govt.isaParty NAACPIntervener EEOCParticipation LEAFIntervener CourtControlVariable McLachlinCourt Constant&ModelFitData Constant 2LLRChiSquare NagelkerkeRSquare PercentCorrect ReductioninError NumberofVotes

.137 1.081 *** .595 *

.034 .245 .287

.649 **

.157

.351

.086

.852 ***

.204

2.658 781.630 *** .300 68.6% 33.9% 692

.734 694.084 *** .292 70.7% 37.8% 611

*significantatp<.05**significantatp<.01***significantatp<.001 Note:IntheU.S.regressionmodel,agediscriminationcasesareomittedforcomparison purposes,whileintheCanadianmodel,maritalstatusclaimsaretheexcludedclassofcases.

32

References

Allen,DavidW.,andDianeE.Wall.1987.TheBehaviorofWomenStateSupremeCourt Justices:AreTheyTokensorOutsiders? TheJusticeSystemJournal12:232244. Aliotta,JildaM.2003.GenderandJudging:SomeThoughtsTowardaTheory.Paperpresented attheannualmeetingof theMidwestPoliticalScienceAssociation,April36,Chicago, IL. ______.1995.JusticeO'ConnorandtheEqualProtectionClause:AFeminineVoice? Judicature78:232235. BehuniakLong,Susan.1992.JusticeSandraDayO'ConnorandthePowerofMaternalLegal Thinking. ReviewofPolitics54:417444. Brodie,Ian.2002. FriendsoftheCourt:ThePrivilegingofInterestGroupLitigantsinCanada. Albany:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress. Davis,Sue.1993a.DoWomenJudgesSpeak"inaDifferentVoice?"CarolGilligan,Feminist LegalTheoryandtheNinthCircuit. WisconsinWomen'sLawJournal8:14373. ______.1993b.TheVoiceofSandraDayO'Connor. Judicature77(3):13439. ______.1986.TheImpactofPresidentCarter'sJudicialSelectionReforms:AVotingAnalysis oftheUnitedStatesCourtsofAppeals. AmericanPoliticsQuarterly14:320344. Davis,Sue,SusanHaire,andDonaldR.Songer.1993.VotingBehaviorandGenderontheU.S. CourtsofAppeals. Judicature77(3):12933. Ducat,CraigR.2004. ConstitutionalInterpretation:RightsoftheIndividual(Volume2),8th ed.Belmont,CA:ThomsonWest.

33

DuerstLahti,Georgia.2002.KnowingCongressasaGenderedInstitution:Manlinessandthe ImplicationsofWomeninCongress. InRosenthal,CindySimon,ed.Women TransformingCongress.Norman:Oklahoma. DuerstLahti,GeorgiaandRitaMaeKelly,ed.1995. Gender,Power,Leadershipand Governance.AnnArbor:Michigan. Flemming,RoyB.2004. TournamentofAppeals:GrantingJudicialReviewinCanada. Vancouver:UBCPress. Flemming,RoyB.,andGlennS.Kurtz.2002a."SelectingAppealsforJudicialReviewin Canada:AReplicationandMultivariateTestofAmericanHypotheses." Journalof Politics64:23248. _______.2002b."RepeatLitigatorsandAgendaSettingontheSupremeCourtofCanada." CanadianJournalofPoliticalScience35:81133. Galanter,Marc.1974."WhytheHaves'ComeOutAhead:SpeculationsontheLimitsofLegal Change."In InLitigationDothe"Haves"StillComeOutAhead,editedbyHerbert KritzerandSusanSilbey,1381.Stanford,CA:StanfordUniversityPress. Gilligan,Carol.1982. InaDifferentVoice:PsychologicalTheoryandWomen'sDevelopment, Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress. Gotschall,Jon.1983.Carter'sJudicialAppointments:TheInfluenceofAffirmativeActionand MeritSelectiononVotingontheU.S.CourtsofAppeals. Judicature67:164173. Greene,Ian,CarlBaar,PeterMcCormick,GeorgeSzablowski,andMartinThomas.1998. FinalAppeal:DecisionMakinginCanada'sCourtsofAppeal. Toronto:James Lorimer.

34

Gruhl,John,CassiaSpohn,andSusanWelch.1981.WomenasPolicymakers:TheCaseof TrialJudges. AmericanJournalofPoliticalScience25(2):30822. Gryski,GerardS.,EleanorC.MainandWilliamJ.Dixon.1986.ModelsofStateHighCourt DecisionMakinginSexDiscriminationCases. JournalofPolitics48(1):14355. Hurwitz,JonandShannonSmithey.1998.GenderDifferencesonCrimeandPunishment. PoliticalResearchQuarterly51(1):89115. Kathlene,Lyn.1994.PowerandInfluenceinStateLegislativePolicymaking:TheInteraction ofGenderandPositioninCommitteeHearingDebates. AmericanPoliticalScience Review 88(3):56076. Kritzer,Herbert.2003.TheGovernmentGorilla:WhyDoesGovernmentComeOutAheadin AppellateCourts?In InLitigationDothe"Haves"StillComeOutAhead,editedby HerbertKritzerandSusanSilbey,34270.Stanford,CA:StanfordUniversityPress. Kritzer,Herbert,andThomasUhlman.1977.SisterhoodintheCourtroom:SexoftheJudge andDefendantinCriminalCaseDisposition. SocialScienceQuarterly14:7788. Leader,ShelahGilbert.1977.ThePolicyImpactofElectedWomenOfficials.InJoseph CooperandLouisMaisel,eds.,TheImpactoftheElectoralProcess.BeverlyHills,CA: SagePress. LeBlanc,DanielandCampbellClark.2003.QuebecAnglophoneJoinsSupremeCourt. TorontoGlobeandMail1August2003,A1. MandelRuthandDeborahDodson.1992.DoWomenOfficeHoldersMakeaDifference?In TheAmericanWoman,SaraE.Rix,ed.NewYork:Norton. Manfredi,ChristopherP.2004. FeministActivismintheSupremeCourt.Vancouver:UBC Press.

35

Martin,Elaine.1993a.WomenontheBench:ADifferentVoice? Judicature77(3):12628. ______.1993b.TheRepresentativeRoleofWomenJudges. Judicature77(3):16673. Martin,Elaine,andBarryPyle.2000.Gender,Race,andPartisanshipontheMichiganSupreme Court. AlbanyLawReview 63:12051236. Martin,PatriciaYancey,JohnR.Reynolds,andShelleyKeith.2002.GenderBiasandFeminist ConsciousnessamongJudgesandAttorneys:AStandpointTheoryAnalysis. Signs27 (3):665701. Maveety,Nancy.1996. JusticeSandraDayO'Connor:StrategistontheSupremeCourt.New York:RowmanandLittlefield. McDowell,David,RichardMcCleary,ErrolE.Meidinger,andRichardA.Hay,Jr.1980. InterruptedTimeSeriesAnalysis.SageUniversityPaperseriesonQuantitative ApplicationsintheSocialSciences,seriesno.07021.NewburyPark,CA:Sage Publications. O'ConnorKaren,andJeffreySegal.1990.JusticeSandraDayO'ConnorandtheSupreme Court'sReactiontoItsFirstFemaleMember. WomenandPolitics10(2):95103. Ostberg,C.L.andMatthewE.Wetstein.2007. AttitudinalDecisionMakingintheSupreme CourtofCanada.Vancouver:UBCPress. Ostberg,C.L.,MatthewE.Wetstein,andCraigR.Ducat.2004.Leaders,Followers,and Outsiders:TaskandSocialLeadershipontheSupremeCourtofCanadaintheEarly Nineties. Polity36:50528. Ostrom,CharlesW.1978. TimeSeriesAnalysis:RegressionTechniques.SageUniversity PaperseriesonQuantitativeApplicationsintheSocialSciences,seriesno.07009. NewburyPark,CA:SagePublications.

36

Palmer,Barbara.2001a."ToDoJustly:"TheIntegrationofWomenintheAmericanJudiciary. PS:PoliticalScience&Politics34(June):23539. ______.2001b.WomenintheAmericanJudiciary:TheirInfluenceandImpact. Women& Politics23(3):8999. ______.1990.MenandWomenontheBench:VivelaDifference? Judicature73(4):204208. Peresie,JenniferL.2005.FemaleJudgesMatter:GenderandCollegialDecisionmakinginthe FederalAppellateCourts. YaleLawJournal114:175990. Segal,JeffreyA.andAlbertD.Cover.1989.IdeologicalValuesandVotesofU.S.Supreme CourtJustices. AmericanPoliticalScienceReview 83:55765. Segal,JeffreyA.,andHaroldJ.Spaeth.1993. TheSupremeCourtandtheAttitudinalModel. Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. ______.2002. TheSupremeCourtandtheAttitudinalRevisited.Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress. Sherry,Suzanna.1986.CivicVirtueandtheFeminineVoiceinConstitutionalAdjudication. VirginiaLawReview 72(3):543616. Songer,DonaldR.,AnnClark,andRebeccaWood.2003.TheEffectsofJudgeGenderin AppellateCourts:AComparativeCrossNationalTest.Paperpresentedattheannual meetingoftheAmericanPoliticalScienceAssociation,Philadelphia,PA,September30, 2003. Songer,DonaldR.,andAnnClark.2002.JudgeGenderandVotinginAppellateCourts:A CrossNationalandCrossInstitutionalAnalysis.Apaperpresentedatthe2002meeting oftheSouthernPoliticalScienceAssociation.Savannah,GA,November8,2002.

37

Songer,DonaldR.,andKelleyA.CrewsMeyer.2000.DoesJudgeGenderMatter?Decision MakinginStateSupremeCourts. SocialScienceQuarterly81(3):75062. Songer,DonaldR.,SueDavis,andSusanHaire.1994.AReappraisalofDiversificationinthe FederalCourts:GenderEffectsintheCourtsofAppeal. JournalofPolitics56(2):425 39. Spaeth,Harold.J.2006. UnitedStatesSupremeCourtJudicialDataBase,19532005Terms. Computerfile.EastLansing,MI:MichiganStateUniversity.DistributedbytheS. SidneyUlmerProjectforResearchinLawandJudicialPolitics,UniversityofKentucky, DepartmentofPoliticalScience.Availableonlineat http://www.as.uky.edu/polisci/ulmerproject/sctdata.htm(20February2007). Sullivan,Patricia,andStevenGoldzwig.1996.AbortionandUndueBurdens:JusticeSandra DayO'ConnorandJudicialDecisionMaking. WomenandPolitics16(3):2754. Tibbetts,Janice.1999.ChretienMakesSurpriseChoice:FrancophoneQuebecJudgetoFill Vacancy. CalgaryHerald23December1999,A4. VanSickel,Robert.1998. NotaParticularlyDifferentVoice.NewYork:PeterLangBooks. Walker,ThomasG.,andDeborahJ.Barrow.1985.TheDiversificationoftheFederalBench: PolicyandProcessRamifications. JournalofPolitics47(2):596617. White,CandaceC.1998.GenderDifferencesintheSupremeCourt.In Law,Politics,andthe JudicialProcessinCanada,3rd.ed.,editedbyF.L.Morton.Calgary:Universityof CalgaryPress,8590. Wilson,Bertha.1990.WillWomenJudgesReallyMakeaDifference? OsgoodeHallLaw Journal28:50722,aspublishedin Law,Politics,andtheJudicialprocessinCanada, 2nded.,editedbyF.L.Morton,9297.Calgary:Universityof CalgaryPress.

38

Notes
1

ThetabulationofratesofunanimityfortheU.S.SupremeCourtfocusedoncasesthatwere

orallyarguedbeforetheSupremeCourtandresultedineitherapercuriamopinion,asigned opinion,oratievotethatupheldthelowercourtdecision.Theunitofanalysiswasthecase citation(seeSpaeth2007).InCanada,ratesofunanimityweretabulatedfromorallyargued casesfeaturingwrittenopinionsaspublishedintheSupremeCourtReports.Omittedfromthe analysiswereoraljudgmentswithoutanyformalwrittenopinion.OneshouldnotethatJustice LaskindidnotgetelevatedtothepositionofchiefjusticeuntilDecemberof1973.Thus,the datasetalsocapturesthelastyearoftheFauteauxCourtinCanada.

2

WedidfindautocorrelationintheCanadiantimeseries,butcontrolledforthatbyintroducinga

laggedindicatorofthedependentvariableinthatmodel(seeOstrom1978).Sincewedidnot findautocorrelationintheU.S.setting,wedidnotintroducealaggedindicatorinthatequation.
3

Epsteinetal.(1996,93)reportthattherateofunanimityacrossallU.S.casesacross1975and

1994is38percent,whileOstbergandWetstein(2007,116)reporta76percentunanimityrateon theCanadianCourtbetween1984and2003.
4

Itshouldbenotedthatinrecentyearstherehavebeeneffortstoinstigateanoversightfunction

fortheCanadianParliamentintheSupremeCourtappointmentprocess,althoughthelasttwo appointmentshaveprovidedonlyatokeninformationalroleforaParliamentarycommittee.
5

SeeGouldv.YukonOrderofPioneers,[1996]1S.C.R.571 Symesv.Canada,[1993]4

S.C.R.695 SEPQAv.Canada[1989]2S.C.R.879 VancouverSocietyv.MinisterofNational Revenue,[1999]1S.C.R.10andQuebec(AttorneyGeneral)v.Quebec[2001]S.C.R. (althoughinthislastcaseonlyoneofthetwofemalesvoteliberally).

39