THE

CONSULTERS CONCEIT
HOW PHONY PUBLIC CONSULTATIONS UNDERMINE DEMOCRACY AND THE MARKET

BRIANNA HEINRICHS SEPTEMBER 26, 2013

KEY POINTS
Public consultations aim to discover public preferences, but seldom consult representative samples. Consultations generally consider only those options that are presently describable, whereas innovations in the market place are often completely unforeseen. Special interest groups have the ability and incentive to dominate the public consultation process. In the market place people constantly use prices to weigh up the value of different options, but consultations do not deal well with trade-offs. Cities should rely less on planning by consultation and allow development to take place through the market, which allows people to have a direct input proportionate to their level of investment and risk.

LACK OF COMPLETE INFORMATION ON WHICH TO BASE DECISIONS IS A CONDITION SO BASIC TO HUMAN LIFE THAT IT INFLUENCES THE STRUCTURE OF ALMOST EVERY SOCIAL INSTITUTION.
Anthony Downs, 1957

INTRODUCTION
Write on the walls*. Eat a cookie. Marvel at the view. Ponder the funny boardroom names. Youll have a blast. *Yes. With dry erase markers. Its incredible. Youll feel like youre five years old! But you wont get in trouble and we wont send you to your room (City of Calgary, n.d.a). Have you ever attended one of The Citys many public engagement events and thought to yourself, Wow this event could really use some LEGO bricks? (Hall, 2013)

SECTION I:

Since implementing the engage! Policy in 2003, visioning and public engagement exercises have been fashionable at Calgarys City Hall. The purpose of a consultation is to engage with others and receive knowledge and advice. The City of Calgary states that it makes better decisions when it consults with citizens and stakeholder groups (City of Calgary, 2003). Following is a table listing some of Calgarys recent public consultations.

TABLE 1 - SAMPLING OF CALGARY CONSULTATIONS

CONSULTATION imagineCALGARY Plan It Calgary RouteAhead New Central Library Our City. Our Budget. Our Future. $52-million/ Dragons Den Multi-family Recycling Strategy Continue the Conversation Transforming Planning 8th Street SW Improvement STATED PURPOSE Create a long-range urban sustainability plan for Calgary Plan to accommodate another 1.3 million people over the next 60 years Create a strategic plan for transit in Calgary Identify key expectations and priorities for libraries Development of business plans, budget and priorities for 2012 to 2014 Decide how council should use $52-million in tax room vacated by the provincial government Review three potential recycling service options Learn how to make it easier for citizens to provide input into City decisions Design and deliver a high-performance planning system for Calgary Develop a Public Realm Master Plan for the 8th St. SW Corridor NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS 18,000 6,000 4,000 16,500 23,000 DATES January 2005 to 2006 2007 to 2009 Spring and summer 2012 June to October 2012 Winter/spring 2013, (Web site launched June 2012) Spring 2013

Over 10,000

Ongoing Ongoing/370 responses to survey question Ongoing

Launched fall 2011 Launched early 2012 Launched June 2012

Ongoing/200 at March 20, 2013 Open House

Launched September 2012

Over 18,000 citizens participated in imagineCALGARY, culminating in the Citys Plan for Long Range Urban Sustainability. The project asked Calgarians five questions: What do you value about Calgary? What is it like for you to live here? What changes would you most like to see? What are your hopes and dreams for the next 100 years? How can you help make this happen? The City boasts that imagineCALGARY represents the largest community visioning and consultation process of its kind anywhere in the world (City of Calgary, 2013a).
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Subsequent public consultations were to be aligned with the goals and vision of imagineCALGARY. Plan It Calgary focused on setting out a long-term direction for sustainable growth to accommodate another 1.3 million people over the next 60 years, and the consultation engaged over 6,000 Calgarians in public hearings, open houses, round table talks and workshops to discuss the transit system and urban development (City of Calgary, 2013b). Another city-wide consultation was Our City. Our Budget. Our Future. This resulted in Calgarys 2012 to 2014 business plans and budgets. The project reportedly included more than 23,000 participants in its engagement

process. The City advertised in several places, including Facebook, local news Web sites and public transit. The electronic newsletter list reached 2,012 contacts (Dialogue Partners, 2011).

The Act gives city councils the broad authority to control development, make decisions about infrastructure and establish fees for licences, permits and approvals. City planning is believed to be essential. The

The Continue the Conversation project takes a fresh look at how Calgarys consultations take place so that the City can improve its engagement process and make it more accessible. Calgarians are encouraged to fill out surveys, participate in live or tweet chats and provide input through a discussion forum or by calling 3-1-1 (City of Calgary, n.d.b). The City also recently launched Transforming Planning, a project that engages industry, communities and citizens in revising the Citys planning system, in order to build a vibrant, prosperous and sustainable city for everyone (City of Calgary, 2013c).

rationale is that if cities are not carefully planned and their development is constrained by only market forces, cities will become inefficient and chaotic. Some worry that proper infrastructure will not be developed in time to support a growing population and that lowerincome communities will suffer if resources are not distributed fairly. People are concerned that without planning and regulation, urban sprawl will do unacceptable environmental damage. However, small, central groups cannot possibly plan well or make good decisions on behalf of a large group of citizens. This is because of the knowledge problem. The knowledge problem, as Friedrich Hayek put it, is a problem of the utilization of knowledge which is not given to anyone in its totality (1945). In other words, no single mind or small group of minds has all the details or knowledge necessary to organize a society at least not in a way that will be in everyones best interests (Hayek, 1945). Like most cities, Calgarys current planning regime depends on a small number of people making decisions for a much larger number of people. Calgarys population was 1,096,833
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PLANNING AND THE KNOWLEDGE PROBLEM

Section 632(1) of Albertas current Municipal Government Act requires that municipalities with a population greater than 3,500 adopt a development plan (Province of Alberta, 2010).

people in 2011 (Statistics Canada, n.d.), and its Planning Commission consists of two administrators, two council members, six citizen members and two staff (City of Calgary, 2012). The Planning Commission makes recommendations to City council on land-use planning matters, and it acts as Approving Authority on all subdivision matters and Development Authority on some development matters (City of Calgary, n.d.c). The Citys Planning, Development and Assessment (PDA) department seeks to fulfill Calgarys vision for a great city by stewarding the creation, redevelopment and valuation of vibrant, sustainable communities by dealing with land-use planning and policy as well as development and building approvals (City of Calgary, 2013d). The Citys PDA department currently consists of 740 core staff and 83 contingent employees (City of Calgary FOIP [Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy] Office, personal communication, June 11, 2013). In an attempt to mitigate the knowledge problem, City planners consult with stakeholders and citizens to gain knowledge of their needs and preferences. When community involvement is emphasized in the urban planning process, this is participatory planning and can fall under the theory of deliberative democracy.

Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson see deliberative democracy as a form of government in which free and equal citizens (and their representatives), justify decisions in a process in which they give one another reasons that are mutually acceptable and generally accessible, with the aim of reaching conclusions that are binding in the present on all citizens but open to challenge in the future (2004, p. 7). Gutmann and Thompson explain that some deliberative democrats believe more direct participation by ordinary citizens in policymaking is the best or only way to foster values such as mutual respect. Furthermore, [g]reater participation not only gives more citizens the chance to enjoy the benefits of taking part in deliberation, it also can help develop the virtues of citizenship, encouraging citizens to consider political issues in a more public-spirited mode (2004, p. 30). Seen in a positive light, participatory planning is a mutually beneficial endeavour. Planners gain knowledge and make better policy decisions, and citizens become educated and more public-spirited in the process. Furthermore, it satisfies the democratic right of people to be involved in decisions affecting their lives.

PURPOSE OF THIS REPORT

Winston Churchill said: No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time; but there is the broad feeling in our country that the people should rule, continuously rule, and that public opinion, expressed by all constitutional means, should shape, guide, and control the actions of Ministers who are their servants and not their masters (1947). Democracy may be the best system of governance we have, but public consultations may do more to amplify the imperfect parts of democracy than to enhance the good. Looking deeper into the mechanics of public consultations reveals flaws in the process that are logically impossible to overcome. Important questions Calgarians need to ask themselves include the following: Do public consultations help to keep governments in check and ensure politicians are servants and not masters? How well do the City of Calgarys visioning

exercises and community consultations reflect what Calgarians want from development? First, this paper will discuss the mechanics of facilitating meaningful and equitable consultations in Calgary and elsewhere. It will then consider some alternatives if people were to determine that the Citys current methods for planning a city are inadequate or inappropriate.

DEMOCRACY MAY BE THE BEST SYSTEM OF GOVERNANCE WE HAVE, BUT PUBLIC CONSULTATIONS MAY DO MORE TO AMPLIFY THE IMPERFECT PARTS OF DEMOCRACY THAN TO ENHANCE THE GOOD

WHO IS CONSULTED?
To learn whether organizing a city through consultations is reasonable, one must look at who is consulted and whether the groups are representative of the greater population. The number of participants and their backgrounds and motivations all affect the findings of a consultation. On the other hand, the imagineCALGARY project boasts about having more than 18,000 participants. Still, in a city of one million people, this means not even 2 per cent of Calgarians participated in creating a shared vision for our city and a detailed plan for how to get there (City of Calgary, 2013a). The imagineCALGARY targets drive development plans and regulations affecting 100 per cent Municipal election voter turnouts in Calgary ranged from 19.8 per cent to 53.2 per cent from 2001 to 2010 (Alberta Municipal Affairs, 2012). People are encouraged to vote, because government decisions affect them regardless of whether they vote or not. The percentage of people who can or do participate in public consultations is much lower. For example, only 18 people responded to an online poll seeking feedback from businesses
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SECTION II:

and property owners on proposed changes to Calgarys on-street parking rates (Howell & Zickefoose, 2013).

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS

of Calgarians, not merely the 2 per cent who participated. In practice, the vast majority of the population cannot take a direct part in public deliberations, due to the impossibility of finding a forum where millions of participants can have their say about the countless decisions that affect their lives (Pennington, 2010, p. 165).

MISREPRESENTATION
Given that not everybody can participate directly in every decision a government makes, most democratic governments work by electing a smaller number of representatives. Similarly, people who attend public consultations become representatives of the wider population, since not everyone attends or can be involved (Pennington, 2010, p. 165). however dispassionate [members of One can neither avoid nor ignore the possibility of inaccurate representation. For example, a person who is neither low-income nor female will have trouble representing the perspective of a low-income female (Pennington, 2002, p. 165). Consultations run the risk of certain groups of people or perspectives dominating the process, intentionally or unintentionally. the middle class] may be, or however much they may perceive their interests as lying outside those of the middle class, it is unlikely that they will be able completely to overcome the effects of their background or of their current social status (Goodin & Le Grand, 1987, p. 153). For example, Robert E. Goodin and Julian Le Grand argue that the middle class is more likely to try to influence policy, because its members have greater faith in their power to change their environment. They also have more resources and are more articulate than is the working class (1987, p. 153). This is a problem, because

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SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS

Members of the middle class may be unable to represent those of different backgrounds, but most of the middle class is likely not represented properly in consultations, either. When members of the public act as participants in central decision making, more-specialized interest groups have an advantage. To understand the difference between a small, organized group and the unorganized public, consider a disciplined, coordinated army taking an undisciplined, leaderless mob by surprise (Olson, 1971, pp. 128-29). Special interest groups have different motivations to participate in the political process. One example of how powerless the political majority can be in the face of an organized, motivated minority is the infamous taxi cartel. In city after city, a small number of taxi licence holders maintain a monopoly on taxi services at the expense of other voters. It happens this way: A taxi company can become rich by getting the government to establish a cap on the number of taxi licences. Such a policy restricts new taxi drivers from joining the industry as the population grows, resulting in a taxi shortage (Seymour, 2009). In Calgary in 2011, the people who owned the taxi
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plates brought in $300,000 a week by renting them out for $200 each per week to drivers (Seymour, 2011). Meanwhile, consumers pay more to ride because of the taxi shortage, and potential new taxi drivers who cannot obtain a plate must seek work elsewhere. Such a policy significantly benefits those running the taxi industry. Because the regulations make them wealthy, they have an incentive to see that the regulations remain in place, and they are willing to invest their time and resources to maintain the policy. On the other hand, though members of the public would benefit from seeing the regulations go, they would spend more time, money and effort organizing against the taxi empire than they would save if they were successful in their efforts. An individual member of a large, latent group does not have an incentive to voluntarily push for the large groups goal when he will not in any case be decisive in seeing that the group goal is achieved, and when he would be as likely to get the benefits from the attainment of the goal whether he had worked for its attainment or not (Olson, 1971, p. 129). Because it is hard to solve this free rider problem in a large group, where small groups with common interests are concerned, then, there is however a surprising tendency for the exploitation of the great by the small (Olson, 1971, p. 3). Often the public is not even aware of policies in place that support special interests.

It should be clear that a consultation on the issue of taxi regulation would have unbalanced dynamics, and similar dynamics spill into consultations on other policy topics. Lobbyists are eternally on the job, (Olson, p. 128) and consumers and the public are disadvantaged because they constantly need to protect their interests on all fronts. We should expect that when individuals decide to join a consultation, some among them would have motives and preformed groups that would give them an advantage over the average constituent.

David Ryfe notes that a passive recruitment method usually produces a snowball sample, that is to say, interested individuals recruit from their social networks, and these individuals recruit from their social networks, and so on, until the group is composed (2005, p. 51). Consider the special interest group Bike Calgary. It states on its Web site, We work with other cycling and active transportation organisations as well as with the City of Calgary to shape policy and implement projects that benefit Calgarians who ride bicycles (Bike Calgary, n.d.).

THE SAMPLE SELECTION DILEMMA

Organizers of citizen engagement initiatives have two basic options when inviting public participation: They can advertise and allow individuals to self-select, or they can take active recruitment steps (Ryfe, 2005, p. 51). Choosing a representative sample may mean having to reject people who would like to be consulted, but allowing self-selection may not produce a representative sample. Citizens of Calgary typically self-select for the Citys engagement programs, as participation is not compulsory. Citizens can learn how to get involved through the Citys Web site and other advertising.

Calgarians who are unable to or do not commute by bicycle may see transportation needs differently from members of Bike Calgary, but Bike Calgary can mobilize and coordinate its members to show up at relevant City consultations. The City will not turn people away; this would be seen as undemocratic. Even if the City could reject people on the basis that the group would cease to be representative, how would the City know beforehand what a person represents? The very reason that cities consult with citizens is that they do not know where citizens stand. Therefore, the City would be unable to avoid the potential overrepresentation of special interest groups at its consultations where citizens self-select.

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CONSULTATIONS ARE BIASED TOWARDS BIGGER GOVERNMENT

A possible defence against the misrepresentation charges and the low participation rate is that consultation must simply be tried harder. The excuse is that if only more people were brought into the process, the sample would become more representative. However, providing additional opportunities may only succeed in supplying additional chances for special interest groups to gain access (Pennington, 2002, p. 61). Those in favour of the consultation model may further argue that people who do not take the initiative to give feedback cannot complain about the results that affect them. However, this seems to imply that people only have rights to the extent they are able to defend them through consultative processes. Gutmann and Thompson argue, for most people, the freedom not to spend a major part of ones time deliberating about politics is part of what it means to live the life of a free citizen (2004, p. 31).

Public consultations are biased toward government activity. Government initiates them, and they generally occur when government would like to take some kind of action. People who want to see government intervention, therefore, have a natural advantage in consultations, and, ironically, those who desire government to stay out of their neighbourhood must get involved in politics to avoid political intervention. The City recently launched a consultation with the intention of developing a multi-family recycling strategy. However, residents of multifamily dwellings, such as apartments and condominiums, can already drop off recyclables at about 50 community recycling depots, and a number of companies provide collection services (City of Calgary, 2013e). The Blue Cart service, $7.40 a month in 2013, is not optional for single-family residences (City of Calgary, 2013f). Just as residents of single-family dwellings may have disliked the imposition of the Blue Cart program, residents of multi-family dwellings may dislike the government taking control of their recycling practices.

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PUBLIC INTEREST VS. SELFISH MOTIVES

Some people may carry an assumption that people involved in representation or consultation are basing their actions upon achieving what they believe to be in the public interest. People seek government regulations because of market failures, situations where if each person acts according to self-interest, everybody ends up being worse off than if they had all acted in a more centrally coordinated way (Friedman, 2004, p. 7). However, it is important to recognize that the consultation process and the private market both rely on human nature. Consultations are not an antidote to self-interest, but rather a different medium for it. Public consultations may serve vested interests as much as or even more than private market interactions would, because people who will benefit personally from government regulations are more likely to attend public consultations. The alternative to an unregulated private market is not wise and benevolent regulators. The true alternative is another kind of market:

the political market, a collection of people interacting under the rules of democratic politics, each, just as in the private market, trying to achieve their own objectives (Friedman, 2004, p. 11).

...IT IS IMPORTANT TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE CONSULTATION PROCESS AND THE PRIVATE MARKET BOTH RELY ON HUMAN NATURE. CONSULTATIONS ARE NOT AN ANTIDOTE TO SELF-INTEREST, BUT RATHER A DIFFERENT MEDIUM FOR IT.

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CHALLENGES IN GROUP DYNAMICS

Section II highlights problems with consultations based on the composition of the groups consulted. But even if a group were representative of Calgarys entire population and were seeking the public good, in comparison with the private market, the consultation process is an ineffective mechanism to receive and process peoples knowledge. Citizens are intelligent and can participate in Calgarys development in many ways, but the structure of public consultations provides incentives for people to remain rationally ignorant or rationally irrational. Moreover, people are often guided when giving their input, partly because they are not experts in the consultations topic. But the validity of making laws based on consultation results depends on the participants independence. Even if people were knowledgeable of the trade-offs and costs involved, communicating and explaining preferences in a consultation can also be difficult. People may not even know their own opinions until confronted with a real situation, and people do not know what will occur in the future. In public consultations, people are not effectively encouraged to make calculated decisions, because they are not paying a direct cost for them. Consultations, therefore, have more difficulty handling trade-offs than does the private market.

SECTION III:

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THE DILEMMA OF QUALIFICATIONS

A concern with the public consultation process stems from the specialist nature of the topics. Typically, people are not experts in the consultations topic. This leads to a further dilemma for municipal consultations: To what extent should the publics input be guided and interpreted by experts, and to what extent should experts yield to the publics desires? By their very nature, public consultations value the opinions of the public because they are members of the public. Yet, transport engineering, for example, is a large and complex body of knowledge where experts have an advantage over lay people. Combining public and expert opinion presents a difficult challenge, when one opinion or the other has to prevail. Former B.C. Liberal leader Gordon Gibson once remarked, I would never ride in an airplane designed by a citizens assembly. They are not qualified to do that kind of thing (Cayo, 2013). If conclusions reached by members of the public were binding on city council, the outcomes have the potential to be damaging to the city. This is because most Calgarians are not, by trade, urban planners or developers.

On the other hand, dogmatically putting expert opinions first would defeat the purpose of public consultation.

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RATIONAL IGNORANCE
Public consultations carry with them an incentive to be rationally ignorant. Rational ignorance means that a rational person will ignore a decision when the effort required to be informed is greater than the value of getting the decision right. Anthony Downs writes that ignorance of politics is not the result of unpatriotic apathy; rather it is a highly rational response to the facts of political life in a large democracy (1957, p. 147). Learning all there is to know about any given topic in order to provide valuable input may be noble, but rational people do not invest more in a task than they will gain. The rational ignorance of consultation participants is largely the result of doubt that their contributions will be taken seriously. When Our City. Our Budget. Our Future. asked respondents why they did not look for information about the Citys 2013 to 2014 business plans and budget, some verbatim responses suggested how strong apathy about the consultation really was. One responder wrote, what does it matter? They will do what they are going to do without me. Another response was, I have no control over it so I have little to no interest in it (City of Calgary, 2012). A Continue the Conversation survey question asked respondents how they wanted the City to
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demonstrate that their input in consultations was heard. The options included a community newsletter, the Citys Web site or a Community Association presentation (City of Calgary, n.d.d). Showing the participants input was valued through the actual policy decisions made was not listed as an option. Mark Pennington asserts that a rationally civic minded person may be better off spending time and effort where her own contribution can have a demonstrable effect by helping an elderly neighbor, for example, rather than trying to become politically informed (Pennington, 2000, p. 119). J. Barry Cullingworth agrees that people may withdraw from the engagement process because participation is a sham. L. ChristiansenRuffman and B. Stuart (as cited in Cullingworth, 1984, p. 6) muse that because expert opinions dominate the process, this domination may be the telling blow that sends the once fledgling convert to participatory democracy back to apathy. Yet, as noted earlier, if expert opinions do not prevail, a group unqualified to plan a city could lead it to disaster.

RATIONAL IRRATIONALITY
Despite needing to invest time or effort in gaining knowledge, most people do hold opinions on political and policy questions. Because no decision-maker can afford to know everything that might possibly bear on his decision before he makes it (Downs, 1957, p. 145), individuals take information shortcuts when developing their views. They typically rely on some subset of information to make a judgment and discard the rest of the relevant information. Researchers have found this process at work in every level of choice making. Research on mass opinion shows that citizens make snap judgments on the basis of party identification, their liking for a candidate, group affiliation, personal ideology, media frames, elite cues, perceptions of likely winners and losers, and a host of other cues (Ryfe, 2005, p. 55). Bryan Caplan further developed rational ignorance into the counterintuitive theory of rational irrationality. He argues that people do not change their minds once they are convinced of a political position, even after they are presented with the facts. He says that people get a psychological benefit out of believing the world is the way they like to see it. Moreover, carrying unpopular beliefs often makes a

person unpopular, so people choose to believe what their friends do (2007, pp. 100, 115). Downs argues that people are rational in choosing not to become informed, and Caplan argues that rational people (those people who maximize their happiness) will similarly choose not to discard cherished beliefs. He writes, If ignorance were the sole cause of error [y]0u could fix any misconception with enough facts. A few thought experiments show how implausible this is (2007, p. 101).

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GUIDED CONSULTATIONS
An important moral consideration is that factors such as ideology or the media may influence the reasoning of consultation participants. In the same way that it would be wrong for a jury to make its decisions based on emotional pleas and biased data, conclusions reached by guided consultations are not trustworthy. The appropriateness of Calgarys citizen engagement initiatives is contingent on the independence of the participants. The imagineCALGARY consultation involved the City putting forward ideas to guide thinking. These were the concepts of sustainability, the Melbourne Principles to provide a sustainability filter, systems thinking theory, the human needs framework, and the community asset-based approach (2013a, p. 186). Similarly, Plan It Calgary was grounded in principles of SMART growth and sustainability principles for land use and mobility (City of Calgary, 2013b). Regarding Calgarys chief planner, Rollin Stanley, City manager Owen Tobert said, We need someone whos strong-minded, has leadership capabilities and is persuasive in arguments, and I think weve found such a person in Rollin (Markusoff, 2012). A city seeking citizen input should not need to hire people persuasive in arguments unless there is
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an agenda involved. Democratic governments are meant to serve the public, not manipulate it. Civil servants and members of the government have the right to share their views, but they must also allow people to disagree with them. Canadian Home Builders Association president Charron Ungar made critical comments about the Citys planning and suggested there was a suburban development freeze in place. In response, Calgarys Mayor, Naheed Nenshi, suspended the Association from City Hall proceedings and sent a reprimanding letter to Ungar demanding an apology (Zickefoose, 2013). People questioned whether the actions taken were appropriate. Richard Truscott, director of provincial affairs for the Canadian Federation of Independent Business, said, That [behaviour] sends a very worrisome signal in our mind about their approach working with external groups (Zickefoose, 2013). If stakeholders get punished for providing feedback that the City does not want to hear, the City is denying itself potentially valuable insight from citizens and stakeholders the very thing it supposedly desires. Cullingworth writes, There is a real conflict of view between those who see the inquiry in narrow terms and those who refuse to accept predetermined battle lines (1984, p. 8).

UNLIKE THE ADVICE GIVEN IN CONSULTATIONS, DECISIONS MADE IN PRIVATE MARKETS INVOLVE PEOPLE PAYING A DIRECT COST FOR THEIR ACTIONS, SO PEOPLE WILL NATURALLY REASON DIFFERENTLY.

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SPREAD-OUT COSTS AND TRADE-OFFS

Because the costs associated with public consultation decisions are spread out among a large number of people, people in consultations often fail to consider or address trade-offs and can simply state what they want. Unlike the advice given in consultations, decisions made in private markets involve people paying a direct cost for their actions, so people will naturally reason differently. Consider that a broad range of sizes and types of televisions are available in the market. It is easy (or rational) for people to say they desire a bigger and higher-quality TV, but people still buy smaller and lower-quality TVs, due to price. If people buy cheaper TVs, they will have money left over to spend on something else. They pay the entire cost of their decision themselves. RouteAhead is a plan for transit development in Calgary, and its first phase included extensive public engagement. On July 20, 2012, someone suggested, [m]aking transit cheaper, buses should run more often (City of Calgary, n.d.e). While it is easy to understand why both cheaper transit and more frequent buses are desirable,

addressing both of these desires simultaneously is not so simple. Running buses more often costs more money, but how does the transit system get more money if they make transit cheaper? This is merely one example of how people may accidentally leave trade-offs out of the equation. Similarly, Beckerman (as cited in Pennington, Sustainable Development and British Landuse Planning, 2006, p. 79) notes that the insistence of some environmental activists that irreplaceable assets should be conserved, as a matter of principle, requires that increases in living standards be sacrificed in order to maintain the absolute integrity of habitats and ecological systems. Limiting suburban development to conserve land is a significant trade-off when housing prices rise because of high land prices. High housing costs hurt low-income people the most. Peter Shawn Taylor writes, Density requirements limiting access to new green field suburban developments are meant to artificially push up the price of existing single family homes under a planning doctrine known as Smart Growth (2013). Pennington asserts that this deep green view is unlikely to find support from those still lacking access to the benefits of economic growth. Notably, a City that enforces this view is making people adhere to a particular worldview something fundamentally at odds with the

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stated emphasis on public participation, local control and the acceptability of diverse views (2006, p. 79). But, if asked whether one would like land to be conserved, most people would likely answer yes without realizing that their response may be used to justify higher housing prices, which may or may not affect them. Even if consultation organizers are not guiding results, they cannot be sure participants understand the implications of their suggestions.

responsible, they would be less likely to participate in the policy-making process a telling sign that perhaps consultations should not be held in such high regard. Discussion participants on the Citys Web site can remain anonymous, and the Transforming Planning privacy policy states, Workshop participant comments and feedback provided directly to Transforming Planning will remain unattributed (anonymous) (City of Calgary, 2013g). If one can anonymously give feedback, citizens will not know who is advocating for certain policies, and there is a lack of ownership and accountability. Gutmann and Thompson see deliberative democracy as a process requiring citizens to justify their actions or decisions, but anonymous opinions, not justifications, are usually being sought.

NEEDS VS. DESIRES

In the case of consultations, people are typically asked about spending decisions where the cost will be spread across a much wider range of people than the individual or consultation attendants. Consultations typically ask people hypothetical questions such as Would you like this? or What would be your preferred method of transportation? Saying what one wants is helpful to a point, but making a purchase or private transaction is a more useful signal to others of what people actually want and need and is realistically an option. The market effectively determines needs, while consultations determine desires. The risks of policies are not concentrated on the individuals who are engaged in consultations. That is to say, they are not held responsible if the City implements bad policies. If people were held

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COMMUNICATION DIFFICULTIES
Even if people are aware of the trade-offs involved, it is still difficult for them to properly communicate their values to each other. An individuals knowledge of the kinds of things he or she wants may not be conveyed properly in verbal form (Pennington, 2002, p. 52). Consider the statement I love you. Anyone who replies, How much do you love me? is usually teasing. Some values and sentiments are beyond the English language. In a market place, people can choose products and places for reasons that they cannot articulate. A person may prefer chocolate ice cream to cherry cheesecake, but giving a waitress justification for the decision is not worth the effort. Consultations can only deliver or explain the describable. Policies based upon verbalized descriptions will have questionable results when consultations such as imagineCALGARY ask questions such as What is it like for you to live here? In the private market, prices and the amount people are willing to pay serve as a signal of value. People value the same things differently at different times. For example, Kirk may be willing to spend $7 for a sandwich in the middle of his workday, but if he leaves work early the next day, he may only be willing to spend up to $5 on the sandwich, because he is not yet too hungry and can eat something else at home.
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Prices serve a purpose beyond relieving people of their money; they are a communication mechanism within society. When something goes up in price, people know there is a demand for it. When something loses its value and becomes cheaper, people value it less or too much of it is being supplied. Prices are more easily able to express trade-offs and value than are government-run consultations.

THE FUTURE AND INNOVATIVE SOLUTIONS

Sometimes people cannot share input simply because they do not know what they would want or would do. Economist Thomas Sowell writes: I might think that, if faced with the stark prospect of bankruptcy, I would rather sell my automobile than my furniture, or sacrifice the refrigerator rather than the stove, but unless and until such a moment comes, I will never know even my own tradeoffs, much less anybody elses. There is no way for such information to be fed into a computer, when no one has such information in the first place (1980, p. 218). Planners and those participating in surveys or consultations are working with existing knowledge, but they are unsure of what the future looks like and how they will respond.

Many consumers love the iPhone, but no one was demanding iPhones before Apple invented them. Once confronted with the option of buying an iPhone, consumers realized their desire for the product and re-evaluated their original opinions. Imagine if 100 years ago, consumers dictated and regulated what the development of the telecommunications industry would be and discouraged experimentation. Now, we are envisioning Calgary over the next 100 years and making our development plans accordingly. One hopes that 100 years from now, cities planned by consultations are not the equivalent of rotary phones. Something may be invented soon, or knowledge will be obtained that will change development options and the current understanding of the land-use problems faced. Moreover, if a person were to innovate, this would likely take place within the private market where profit is a possibility.

CONSULTING ON CONSULTATIONS
The consultation process is an inadequate mechanism to receive and process peoples knowledge. The City apparently wants to learn how to improve the process and make it easier for more citizens to give input, so it launched Continue the Conversation. But the City begs the question when learning through its public consultation process how to improve its public consultation process. The City of Ottawa also held public consultations to learn where and how the public wanted to be consulted. David Reevely noted ironically, [The City of Ottawa] will be relying on its usual means with an online survey planned for the citys ottawa.ca website and four evening sessions (2013).

PEOPLE ARE EFFECTIVELY DECLARING EVERY DAY THROUGH THE PRIVATE MARKET WHAT THEY LIKE AND WHAT IS PRACTICAL FOR THEM THROUGH THEIR CHOICES AND PURCHASES.

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IS PLANNING BY CONSULTATION APPROPRIATE?

Whom the government consults and how a consultation process receives feedback affect the validity of a consultations outcome. Questioning the validity of consultation results is important, because policies made as a result of the findings have the potential to do harm. Participating in public consultations should not be seen as automatically virtuous, despite the City encouraging everyone to get involved. Consultations cannot achieve consensus, but if they could, subjective matters achieved by consensus should not be imposed on others. Consultations can restrict the choices available to consumers as well as their ability to decide what is right for them. Moreover, participating in consultations may simply give a government the perceived legitimacy it needs to do what it wants.

SECTION IV:

CONSENSUS AND SUBJECTIVITY IN PUBLIC CONSULTATIONS

Public consultations like to discover majority opinions or even consensuses, but using consultations to achieve a consensus is futile, because there is no consensus in a population of one million people.
26

If a community was to pursue a particular course of action based on a perceived consensus or majority opinion and it turned out to be a big flop, greater harm would result than if a variety of actions were attempted. We are not a smart city if we put all of our eggs in one basket. Moreover, majority opinions shift. For example, in the second half of the 1900s, people argued that the market process did not lead to a proper geographical division of functions that is to say, housing, leisure, work and shopping were all mixed together. A division was seen as desirable, and people believed planning towns as a whole

was needed to see their vision come to fruition (Davies, 2002, p. 20). This very mix of functions within a city is what many people are advocating for now, yet they believe deliberate government action is needed to provide walkable cities or sustainable growth. Regardless, some matters do not concern everybody and should not be regulated by government, because the types of development that constitute an improvement in the quality of life are subjective. People have different preferences and priorities. Some people may prefer to raise their family in Cochrane and drive into Calgary for work every day; others prefer to live in an apartment downtown and walk to work. In many cases, consultation participants are merely trying to impose their tastes on others. Nevertheless, in democracies, citizens are allowed some privacy and independence. Consultations serve no practical purpose, however, if they only show that everyone has a different opinion. Ironically, an imagineCALGARY target is [b]y 2036, 100 per cent of Calgarians report that they feel respected and supported in their pursuits of meaning, purpose and connectedness, and that they extend respect and support to others who meet this need in ways different from their own (City of Calgary, 2006, p. 94).

MORAL RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE

At least one theorist questions whether public participation is always right and moral, even when the topic concerns the greater public. In The Ethics of Voting, Jason Brennan challenges the folk theory that any vote in good faith is morally acceptable and that each citizen has a civic duty to vote (2011, pp. 1-3). People argue that voting, regardless of how a person votes, tends to preserve stable democracy, yet when the public fails to vote, this destabilizes democracy (Brennan, 2011, p. 21). It may be that citizens engaging in elections or public consultations are doing more harm than good, especially if the outcomes of the process in which they engage has greater ramifications than they are aware of. Arguably, it is irresponsible to impose decisions on others, especially when one is not informed about the decision. Brennan writes, Even though individual votes almost never have a significant impact on election results in any large-scale election, I argue that this does not let individuals off the hook. Individual voters have moral obligations concerning how they vote (2011, pp. 2-3).

27

WHAT IF THE GOVERNMENT DOES A BAD JOB?

If public consultation results do not accurately convey the needs and interests of the public and the government makes poor decisions, the costs are spread among the entire city and mistakes may not even be realized. There is no institution competing with a governments attempts at city planning; there is nobody to provide an alternative that may be better. Citizens must take what they get or leave the city. Monopolies can be harmful, but competition encourages better performance. In the private market, consultations are kept in check by the fact that actors in the private market face competition, and the public is not bound to the private decisions of others. If a consultation is done poorly, the people who carried it out will be unsuccessful in their initiatives. Moreover, those conducting market research may have results that are more accurate because they do not face the same obstacles that politicians do.

THERE IS NO INSTITUTION COMPETING WITH A GOVERNMENTS ATTEMPTS AT CITY PLANNING; THERE IS NOBODY TO PROVIDE AN ALTERNATIVE THAT MAY BE BETTER. CITIZENS MUST TAKE WHAT THEY GET OR LEAVE THE CITY.

28

CONSULTATION CAN RESTRICT CHOICES IN THE MARKETPLACE

Public consultation and participation may bring with it connotations of inclusiveness and the ability of all people to have a hand in shaping their destinies and ensuring sustainability. However, the downside to public consultations is that they can be used to justify rules, regulations and expenditures that remove choices from citizens. The Citys Municipal Development Plan (MDP) seeks to guide Calgary toward the imagineCALGARY vision (City of Calgary, 2009, p. 1.6). The MDP has led to a wide range of strategies, goals and policies that restrict the choices Calgarians have when it comes to land use. They are summarized in table form in the MDP (overleaf).

...[T]HE DOWNSIDE TO PUBLIC CONSULTATIONS IS THAT THEY CAN BE USED TO JUSTIFY RULES, REGULATIONS AND EXPENDITURES THAT REMOVE CHOICES FROM CITIZENS.

29

No.

Core Indicators

Metric

Baseline

60-year target 50%

Urban Expansion

Per cent of population growth accommodated within developed area (2005 boundary area) People per hectare

In 2005, the developed area of the city was losing 5 % of population to greenfield area. In 2005, Calgary had a population density of 20 people per hectare. In 2005, Calgary had employment density of 11 jobs per hectare. In 2005 the population/ jobs East/West Ratio was 2.7 In 2005 the population/ jobs North/South Ratio was 1.9 In 2008, land use mix diversity index was 0.53 In 2008, residential diversity index was 0.19. 0.72 (42% Roads and 58% Streets) LRT is the only transit service approaching Primary Transit levels of service in Calgary today LRT is the only transit service approaching Primary Transit levels of service in Calgary today

Density

27

Jobs per hectare

18

Population/Jobs Balance

Population/Jobs East/ West Ratio Population/Jobs North/ South Ratio

1.7

1.7

4 5 6

Mix Land Use Residential Mix Road and Street Infrastructure Accessibility to Primary Transit Network

Land Use Diversity Index Residential Diversity Index Roads to Streets ratio

0.7 0.4 0.57 (36% Roads and 64% Streets) 45%

Per cent of population within 400m of Primary Transit Network Per cent of jobs within 400m of Primary Transit Network

67%

8 9

Transit Service Goods Access

Annual transit service hours per capita Per cent of intermodal and warehousing facilities within 1600m (actual) of Primary Goods Movement Network Currently, 73% of intermodal and warehousing facilities are located within 1600m of Primary Goods Movement Network

30

10

Transportation Mode Split

Walking and Cycling Mode Split (all purpose trips, 24 hours, city-wide) Transit Mode Split (all purpose trips, 24 hours, city-wide) Auto Mode Split (all purpose trips, 24 hours, city-wide)

In 2005, walk and bike trips contributed to 14% of all trips made In 2005, 9% of all trips were made by transit In 2005, 77% of all trips were made by car In 2006, 18% of all population was located within Major and Community Activity Centres and 600m of Urban and Neighbourhood Corridors In 1998, 32% of land cover was impervious (made up of roadways, parking and buildings) Canopy cover was 7% in 1998 In 2005, only 0.3% of land area had densities supportive of district energy systems

20% - 25%

15% - 20%

65% - 55%

11

Accessibility to Daily Needs

Per cent of population within Major and Community Activity Centres and 600m of Urban and Neighbourhood Corridors Per cent of impervious surface

30%

12

Watershed Health

10% - 20%

13 14

Urban forest District Energy

Per cent of tree canopy Per cent of land area with densities supportive of district energy systems

14% - 20%

1.7%

Table 2: Core Indicators for Land Use and Mobility (City of Calgary, 2009, p. 5.10)
People who like to drive, have lots of space and live in a quiet residential neighbourhood may find that its supply is artificially restricted. Goal two of the MDP calls for an increase in density, while goal 10 calls for a decrease in trips by car and an increase in trips by transit. However, these are just a couple examples, since the Citys consultations cover a broad range of topics. Choices made through consultations are not without a cost; they reduce the available choices in the market place. They also seem frustratingly arbitrary and not really connected with the consultation process. For example, it is difficult to see what logical process led to a target of 27 residents per hectare, why not 26 or 28?

31

PRE-MADE DECISION SEEKS LEGITIMACY...

Because government decisions bind everybody, politicians cannot rightly decide an issue simply by claiming that they know that their preferred policies are right for their fellow citizens (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004, pp. 22-23). Governments need to demonstrate that every decision made reflects the public interest. Public consultation is seen as part of the governments solution to dealing with public scrutiny. Put another way, public participation is simply public relations: providing the public with information and, possibly, reassurance (Cullingworth, 1984, p. 7). Arguably, people are less likely to complain about a government decision they dislike if they believe it was made through a democratic process. In Calgary, some citizens are questioning whether the recent consultation over how to spend $52-million was appropriate, not simply because it was done in the style of the Dragons Den game show, but because of claims that the province intended the money to be returned to taxpayers. Licia Corbella writes: The provincial government overtaxed Calgarians by $52 million, and as a result, it is returning the money. Thats
32

the right thing to do. Mayor Naheed Nenshi and city council, however, are now going through some pretty imaginative, if not bizarre, exercises to determine what to do with the found loot (2013). A scientific poll showed 39 per cent of Calgarians supported the option of returning the money to taxpayers and 25 per cent opted to cut the Citys debt. The transit option, believed to be favoured by the mayor, was supported by 17 per cent (Bell, 2013). The City reports, however, that their own consultation was a qualitative study and no numbers were collected (City of Calgary, 2013h). Marc Henry of ThinkHQ says, It seems like council in their public consultation was looking for forgiveness, not permission (Bell, 2013). Some argue that consultations do more to influence public opinion than policy (Ryfe, 2005, p. 61). Additionally, a number of people see the results of some Calgary consultations as quite obvious, causing them to wonder whether the City is merely going through the motions of public participation. For example, RouteAhead received comments from 4,000 people, and the top five priorities were identified: buses should be scheduled to arrive at stops more often, routes should go where people need them to go, fares should stay affordable, vehicles should be comfortable and

vehicles should arrive on time (City of Calgary, n.d.f, p. 25). City council should not need to spend taxpayer money and seek out citizens in order to know that most transit riders want comfortable seats and their buses to arrive on time; this is intuitive. To learn how Calgarians would like their money

to be spent, the City dispensed nearly $1-million on public consultations before creating its budget. Perhaps Calgarians did not want a million of their dollars spent on the public consultation. Moreover, Alderman Andre Chabot pointed out that the consultation results did not heavily influence amendments in the budget that council passed (Gandia, 2012).

33

NEW APPROACHES
If Calgarians decide the Citys current practice of public consultations is inappropriate and non-beneficial, they may consider promoting more transparency, introducing a more scientific method to the process, restricting the scope of public consultations to truly public matters or call for an end to public consultations entirely in favour of other decision making methods.

SECTION V:

GREATER TRANSPARENCY
If the public consultation process is to continue, the City should be more open and honest with citizens about the benefits of the process. The engage! Policy states as a principle, The promise, purpose and limitations on engaging stakeholders will be made clear and understandable (City of Calgary, 2003, p. 3). The City should state whether the members of the In practice, this should mean the City is required to educate the public on the difficulties in achieving fair and useful results when the public participates in consultations. The City should be required to clearly describe the constraints within which the consultation takes place and to share the fundamental assumptions, if any, that independent bodies discover. The City needs to be clear about how it will use the feedback it receives. Are the conclusions reached in the consultation binding? Is the City seeking to learn the state of public opinion, or is the City using the consultation as a means to educate the public of its plans?
34

Following the consultation, the City should report on the composition of the group sample. It can state the gender balance, areas where the participants reside, levels of income, levels of education, ethnicity and ages, all factors that determine whether the group is a true representation of the city as a whole.

group were requested to participate or if they had selected themselves. The City must tell the public where it advertised the initiative and which external groups were invited or were not allowed to participate. To encourage accountability, participants could also agree to be named. Rather than simply receiving composed reports, the public should have access to all of the Citys materials, feedback, and data for each of its consultations.

RANDOM SAMPLE SELECTION

The City of Calgary asked Dialogue Partners to organize the consultation process for Our City. Our Budget. Our Future. Dialogue Partners did share demographic information on the participants, but declared: The project was not intended to be market research where a statistically valid opinion is provided as a snapshot in time. The engagement process has multiple goals, which reach far beyond the gathering of opinions, and is not statistically valid (2011, p. 32). A meaningful reform would be to ensure that consultation research results are statistically Such a reform might also be likely to remove the difficulty of low turnout. By going to the people rather than waiting for them to come, the City would be able to ensure the sample size is large enough to be statistically meaningful. All consultations could be done, as a rule, with randomly selected rather than self-selected participants. This would sacrifice the ability of any citizen to have his or her say, but it would remove the snowball sample selection and the presence of interest groups. valid. One may wonder what the engagement process is about if it is meant to go far beyond gathering opinions.

35

RESTRICT CONSULTATIONS TO PUBLIC SPACES

Governments have already established a set of environmental standards and regulations within which the market is allowed to operate. Because these standards exist, consultations could be used only where public property is concerned. Citizens may participate in consultations for the revitalization of a street or matters concerning a public park, but the public should refrain from dictating the development of private property. In these cases, those who participate in consultations are meddling in other peoples affairs. Richard White calls for an end to the consensus model, referring to the process of seeking consensus among all stakeholders, ranging from developers to nearby residents. He asserts that the consensus model is too time-consuming and inhibits the adoption of innovative ideas. He writes, Any development is always too much for some and too little for others very few think it is just right. There is no perfect plan or policy (2010). If politicians were to restrict consultation to matters concerning public properties, this would limit the scope of potential for special interest groups to take advantage of government power. However, there is still the potential that these groups will influence the overarching policies and regulations for private properties so that these will be in their favour.

36

DO AWAY WITH PUBLIC CONSULTATIONS IN FAVOUR OF MARKET AND OTHER DEMOCRATIC DECISION MAKING
Another option is for politicians and public officials to relinquish control and allow development to take place through the market or private covenants. Sometimes a commoditys value is contingent on being part of a package deal. Private shopping malls are an example of this concept. Shopping centre merchants who fail to supply parking or who do not collect garbage may be able to charge less for their goods, but they will also lose clients or customers who value these services (Pennington, 2002, p. 92). Similarly, a housing developer that fails to provide amenities, adequate infrastructure, and aesthetic touches will lose to its competitors who do so (Pennington, 2002, p. 92). A person may not want his or her neighbours to replace their home with a 10-storey building, because it will ruin ones view and block sunlight. People should be able to voluntarily associate with organizations that restrict their personal freedom, and they will do so because it benefits them. In places where people have the right to do with their property as they like, others may find some decisions distasteful. However, those who find a decision distasteful have equal rights to do with their property what they like or can bargain with the other property owner. The rights people desire for themselves must also be granted to others. If that person became part of a private covenant when moving into the neighborhood, he or she and the neighbours would face restrictions on what they can do with their land. Most likely, the neighbours are unable to replace their house with a taller building. If a private covenant restricts too much, however, people who seek more freedom can buy a house elsewhere, where the stipulations of the covenant are different.

37

CONCLUSION
Kenneth Minogue writes: Consultations necessarily carry underlying assumpOur rulers are theoretically our representatives, but they are busy turning us into the instruments of the projects they keep dreaming up. The business of governments, one might think, is to supply the framework of law within which we may pursue happiness on our own account (2010, p. 2).

SECTION VI:

tions or have constraints, so this is a problem for people who are unaware of a consultations limitations or disagree with the methodology used. Lastly, in cities with tens of thousands of people, consensus cannot be reached. Preferences are subjective, and often the government even if at the word of others can impose moral decisions on citizens when it has no right.

Calgary can move away from a system where policies favouring the few are seemingly legitimized through public consultations. Insight into how the political process works shows that the outcomes of consultations are not so fair and praiseworthy, after all. As explained earlier, not everyone can or will participate in public consultations, and special interest groups or activists dominate the process. Some people enjoy participating, but many people do not have the time to be constantly defending their interests. Moreover, the quality of input received in public consultations is questionable. The majority of people do not have expertise in city planning. Participants do not pay a direct cost for their decisions, and consultations have difficulties accommodating trade-offs.
38

Every person should be able to take part in the development process directly, rather than a small group of consultation participants deciding the path for everyone. Interactions within the private market are better indicators than consultations of what Calgarians want. If consultations are merely used as a public relations tool to push agendas, citizens should demand that money be better spent elsewhere.

RECOMMENDATIONS
POLICY CURRENT STATUS DESCRIPTION BENEFIT

SECTION VII:

LESS AMBITIOUS REFORM

Greater Transparency

Raw data from consultations not always available

City makes raw data from all consulations public as soon as available Ensure sampling is proportionate to population as per public opinion research best practice Public consultation used only for matters where there is an established public interest, for example redeveloping an established street Reject the current consultation paradigm in favour of private choices in the market place and conventional democracy through elected representatives

Greater trust in process if robust, healthy skpeticism if not Results of consultations more reflective of population

Introduce Random Sample Selection

Samples tend to be self selecting, unlikely to reflect population Public consultations used to set global goals that affect future development and the use of private property

MORE AMBITIOUS REFORM

Restrict Scope of Public Consultation to Truly Public Spaces

Great choice in private matters, consultation retained for truly public spaces

Consultation is Do Away with Public Consultation widely used policy in Favour of Market and Other Democratic Decision Making

Greater choince in market place, easier to identify representative responsible for decisions and hold them to account

39

APPENDIX: SELECTED CITY OF CALGARY CONSULTATION LINKS

City of Calgary. (2013). What is imagineCALGARY? Retrieved July 2, 2013, from imagineCALGARY http://www.imaginecalgary.ca/what-imaginecalgary City of Calgary. (2013). Plan It Calgary. Retrieved May 7, 2013, from http://www.calgary.ca/PDA/LUPP/Pages/Municipal-Development-Plan/Plan-It-Calgary/Plan-ItCalgary.aspx. City of Calgary. (2013). RouteAhead: What We Heard. Retrieved July 4, 2013, from http://www.routeahead.ca/397-2/what-we-heard/ City of Calgary. (2013, February 7). News Release: 16,500 Calgarians Voice Opinions on New Central Library. Retrieved July 4, 2013, from http://calgarynewcentrallibrary.ca/news-release-16500-calgarians-voice-opinions-on-new-central-library/ City of Calgary. (2013). Our City. Our Budget. Our Future. Retrieved July 4, 2013, from http://ocobof.blogspot.ca City of Calgary. (2013). How Should the City Use $52 Million? Retrieved July 4, 2013, from http://www.calgary.ca/52million City of Calgary. (2013). Multi-family Recycling Project Status. Retrieved July 2, 2013, from http://www.calgary.ca/UEP/WRS/Pages/Recycling-information/Residential-services/The-3rsreduce-reuse-recycle/MultiFamily-Recycling-Status.aspx City of Calgary. (2013). Continue the Conversation. Retrieved July 4, 2013, from http:// www.calgary.ca/getinvolved/Pages/Continue-the-Conversation.aspx City of Calgary. (2013). Next City: Transforming Planning. Retrieved July 4, 2013, from http://www.calgary.ca/PDA/Pages/Transforming-Planning/Transforming-Planning.aspx City of Calgary. (2013). 8 Street S.W. Corridor Public Realm Plan. Retrieved July 4, 2013, from http://www.calgary.ca/Transportation/TP/Pages/Planning/Centre-City/8-Street-S.W.-Corridor-Public-Realm-Plan.aspx

40

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Caplan, B. (2007). The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Cayo, D. (2013, March 29). Direct Democracy: For Better or Worse, Referendums Give Power to People. Retrieved May 7, 2013, from The Vancouver Sun at http://www.vancouversun.com/business/ bc2035/Direct+Democracy+better+worse+referendums+give+power/8171051/story.html. Churchill, W. (1947, November 11). UK Parliament Bill. Retrieved May 27, 2013, from Hansard at http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1947/nov/11/parliamentbill#S5CV0444P0_19471111_HOC_312. City of Calgary. (n.d.a). Continue the Conversation: Eventbrite Invitation. Retrieved May 7, 2013, from http://continuetheconversation.eventbrite.ca. City of Calgary. (n.d.b). Continue the Conversation: What Weve Heard. Retrieved May 7, 2013, from http://www.calgary.ca/getinvolved/Documents/What_weve_heard_Continue_the_Conversation.pdf. City of Calgary. (n.d.c). Calgary Planning Commission: What You Need to Know. Retrieved June 4, 2013, from http://www.calgary.ca/PDA/DBA/Documents/brochures/calgary_planning_commission.pdf. City of Calgary. (n.d.d). Continue the Conversation: Survey Results. Retrieved May 7, 2013, from http://www.calgary.ca/getinvolved/Documents/Continue_the_Conversation_Online_Survey_ Results.pdf. City of Calgary. (n.d.e). Calgary Transits Challenges. Retrieved May 7, 2013, from http://www. routeahead.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Challenges.pdf. City of Calgary. (n.d.f). A Strategic Plan for Transit in Calgary. Retrieved May 27, 2013, from http://www.routeahead.ca/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/2013-0118StrategyAheadWeb1.pdf.
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 City of Calgary. (2003, May 28). engage! Policy. Retrieved July 2, 2013, from http://www.calgary.ca/_layouts/cocis/DirectDownload.aspx?target=http%3a%2f%2fwww.calgary.ca%2fCS%2fOLSH% 2fDocuments%2fEngage-Policy.pdf&noredirect=1&sf=1. City of Calgary. (2006, June). Calgarys Plan for Long Range Urban Sustainability. Retrieved July 4, 2013, from http://www.imaginecalgary.ca. City of Calgary. (2009, September). Municipal Development Plan. Retrieved May 30, 2013, from http://www.calgary.ca/PDA/LUPP/Documents/Publications/mdp-municipal-development-plan.pdf. City of Calgary. (2012, June). 2013 & 2014 Business Plan and Budget Adjustments: June Engagement Results. Retrieved May 7, 2013, from http://www.calgary.ca/_layouts/cocis/DirectDownload.aspx?target=http%3a%2f%2fwww.calgary.ca%2fCA%2ffs%2fDocuments%2fPlans-Budgets-and-Financial-Reports%2fBusiness-Plans-and-Budgets-2012-2014%2fAdjustments%252020132014%2f2013%2520and%25202014%2520Business%2520Plans%2520and%2520Budget%2520Adjust ments%2520June%2520Engagement%2520Results.pdf City of Calgary. (2012, November). Calgary Planning Commission Members for 2012/2013. Retrieved May 7, 2013, from http://www.calgary.ca/PDA/DBA/Documents/development/calgary_planning_commission_members_list.pdf. City of Calgary. (2013a). What is imagineCALGARY? Retrieved July 2, 2013, from http://www.imaginecalgary.ca/what-imaginecalgary. City of Calgary. (2013b). Plan It Calgary. Retrieved May 7, 2013, from http://www.calgary.ca/ PDA/LUPP/Pages/Municipal-Development-Plan/Plan-It-Calgary/Plan-It-Calgary.aspx. City of Calgary. (2013c). What is Transforming Planning? Retrieved May 7, 2013, from http:// www.calgary.ca/PDA/Pages/Transforming-Planning/What-Is-Transforming-Planning.aspx. City of Calgary. (2013d). Planning, Development and Assessment. Retrieved June 4, 2013, from http://www.calgary.ca/PDA/Pages/home.aspx. City of Calgary. (2013e). Apartment and Condo Recycling Options. Retrieved July 3, 2013 from http://www.calgary.ca/UEP/WRS/Pages/Recycling-information/Residential-services/The-3rs-reducereuse-recycle/Apartment-Condo-Recycling.aspx. City of Calgary. (2013f). Blue Cart Recycling. Retrieved July 3, 2013 from http://www.calgary. ca/UEP/WRS/Pages/Recycling-information/Residential-services/Blue-cart-recycling/Blue-Cart-Recycling-FAQ.aspx. City of Calgary. (2013g). Transforming Planning: Privacy Policy. Retrieved July 2, 2013, from http://www.calgary.ca/PDA/Pages/Transforming-Planning/ONLINE-workshop-for-a-New-PlanningSystem.aspx. City of Calgary. (2013h). How Should the City Use $52 Million? Retrieved July 4, 2013, from http://www.calgary.ca/52million. Corbella, L. (2013, May 31). Citys Tax Grab is not Finders Keepers, Its Stealing. Retrieved June 7, 2013, from Calgary Herald at http://www.calgaryherald.com/business/Corbella+City+grab+finders+

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Howell, T. and Zickefoose, S. (2013, May 21). ParkPlus Looks at Making Rates Fairer. Retrieved May 22, 2013, from Calgary Herald at http://www.calgaryherald.com/news/calgary/ParkPlus+looks+mak ing+rates+fairer/8410728/story.html. Markusoff, J. (2012, June 11). Calgarys New Chief Planner, Rollin Stanley, Wants Calgary Growing Up, not Out. Retrieved May 8, 2013, from Calgary Herald: http://www.calgaryherald.com/news/Ca lgary+chief+planner+Rollin+Stanley+wants+Calgary+growing/6761825/story.html#ixzz2QCMJ805j. Minogue, K. (2010). The Servile Mind: How Democracy Erodes the Moral Life. New York: Encounter Books. Olson, M. (1971). The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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 Pennington, M. (2000). Planning and the Political Market: Public Choice and the Politics of Government Failure. London: Athlone Press. Pennington, M. (2002). Liberating the Land: The Case for Private Land-use Planning. Institute of Economic Affairs. Pennington, M. (2006). Sustainable Development and British Land Use Planning. Town Planning Review , 77 (1), 75-97. Pennington, M. (2010). Democracy and the Deliberative Conceit. Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society, 22 (2-3), 159-184. Province of Alberta. (2010, November 24). Municipal Government Act. Revised Statutes of Alberta 2000, 632, 1. Edmonton: Alberta Queens Printer. Reevely, D. (2013, March 1). City Plans Public Consultations on Improving Public Consultations. Retrieved June 12, 2013, from Ottawa Citizen at http://www.ottawacitizen.com/news/City+pla ns+public+consultations+improving+public/8037270/story.html. Ryfe, D. (2005). Does Deliberative Democracy Work? Annual Review of Political Science, 8, 49-71. Seymour, D. (2009, April 20). Thank You for Our Taxi Monopoly. Retrieved May 7, 2013, from Frontier Centre for Public Policy at http://www.fcpp.org/publication.php/2742. Seymour, D. (2011, February 11). Calgarys Taxis: With the Right Expectations, Everybody can be Happy. Retrieved May 7, 2013, from Frontier Centre for Public Policy at http://www.fcpp.org/publication.php/3600 Sowell, T. (1980). Knowledge and Decisions. New York: Basic Books, Inc.

Statistics Canada. (n.d.). Population and Dwelling Counts, for Canada, Provinces and Territories, and Census Subdivisions (Municipalities), 2011 and 2006 Censuses. Retrieved May 7, 2013, from Statistics Canada at http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2011/dp-pd/hlt-fst/pd-pl/ Table-Tableau.cfm?LANG=Eng&T=302&SR=1&S=51&O=A&RPP=9999&PR=48&CMA=0. Taylor, P. S. (2013, April 10). Smart Growth makes consumers housing aspirations irrelevant. Retrieved May 8, 2013, from Financial Post at http://opinion.financialpost.com/2013/04/10/ smart-growth-makes-consumers-housing-aspirations-irrelevant/. White, R. (2010, December 11). Dear Mayor: Lets Cut the Red Tape. Retrieved May 10, 2013, from Calgary Herald at http://www2.canada.com/calgaryherald/news/newcondos/story. html?id=14a2c5ce-8c2f-4272-8d39-a6705eb82d15. Zickefoose, S. (2013, February 25). Calgary Councillor Pulls City Planner Into Row Over Suburban Development. Retrieved July 2, 2013, from Global News at http://globalnews.ca/news/397420/ calgary-councillor-pulls-city-planner-into-row-over-suburban-development/.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

BRIANNA HEINRICHS is a Masters student at the University

of Calgary. She holds a Bachelor of Arts (Honours) degree in Political Science from the same institution and currently coordinates the radio and internship programs at the Frontier Centre for Public Policy. Her next project for the Manning Foundation focuses on transparency at City Hall.

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MUNICIPAL REPORT SERIES

The Manning Foundation is building intellectual capital for municipal governance in five streams of public policy enquiry. Each stream will include a series of public policy reports designed to stimulate new thought about the role of municipal government in society. Manning Foundation research reports are placed in the public domain via the Foundations website and are available for review, debate, criticism and support by Canadians regardless of their political affiliation.

1. ORGANIC CITIES
An enquiry into how cities grow and what role government should play in regulating growth and providing infrastructure, with the goals of economic efficiency and liveability. Much of the debate around municipal development is based around what urban forms are desirable, with sprawlers and smart growthers alike arguing that land-use regulation and infrastructure provision should favour their optimal urban form. The Organic Cities project takes a different perspective: that what is important is not the urban form that emerges, but the processes that are in place, particularly the role of government. On this view, it is more important that the market is left free to serve consumer demand, with the important constraints being property rights and the real costs of infrastructure provision rather than land-use regulations. Upcoming reports include enquiries into the effects of future advances in vehicle technology.

2. APPROPRIATE ACTIVITIES
An enquiry into the optimal role of government, with a positive analysis of what municipal government currently does and a normative analysis of what roles government is best equipped to fill. These roles broadly divide into an ownership role, a regulatory role and an expenditure role, each of which can be over or under played. This stream builds on concepts such as market failure, public goods and subsidiarity to identify which activities municipal government does or does not have a comparative advantage over other levels of government. Upcoming reports include enquiries into the proper role of municipal government as a regulator and as a distributor of wealth.

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3. CITIZEN SOVEREIGNTY
An enquiry into how well citizens can hold government to account, including monitoring of its activities and protecting their natural rights. This stream investigates standards of municipal accounting and performance reporting, open government, public safety and intergenerational equity. It considers concepts such as open government and open data, and property rights. Future reports in this series include enquiries into the quality of performance reporting, intergenerational equity with respect to municipal government and open data projects.

4. THE OPEN SOCIETY

Open societies share power among a range of different institutions, unlike closed societies where it is vested in just one. The Open Society is an enquiry into the role of different institutions in the city, including the church, charities and associations. This stream has a historical element, it considers how these different elements have interacted in the past and may do so in the future.

5. MUNICIPAL ISSUE PAPERS

This stream covers basic elements of public policy, including an introduction to the role of government at municipal level, briefings on areas of municipal policy and issue papers framed in terms of values, facts and ideas of conservatism applied to municipal policy. Particularly salient policy areas include public safety, mobility and affordability.

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