Living with Contradictions: The Taken-for-Granted in Israeli Political Discourse Author(s): William A.

Gamson and Hanna Herzog Source: Political Psychology, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Jun., 1999), pp. 247-266 Published by: International Society of Political Psychology Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3792076 . Accessed: 20/05/2011 03:13
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Political Psychology, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1999

Living with Contradictions: The Taken-for-Granted in Israeli Political Discourse

William A. Gamson
Sociology Department Boston College

Hanna Herzog
Sociology Department Tel Aviv University

Two apparentlycontradictoryideas are closely linkedin Israeli political discourse: Israel is powerfuland independent and Israel is vulnerableand dependent.Thisstudyusedcontent analysis and focus groups, as well as existing survey data analyzed by others, to explore how this paradox has been reflectedin newspapersand conversationsduring six different timeperiodsfrom 1948 to 1996. Thegoal was not to explaintheparadox but to examineits consequencesfor Israeliperceptionsof U.S.policy in the MiddleEast-and, in theprocess, to explore Israeli self-images. The nature of U.S. strategic interestswas originally treated as problematicand in need of political discussion, but in the past 25 years these interests have become takenfor granted. Surprisingly,even after the end of the Cold War,a critical discourse moment in which a reexamination of U.S. interests in the Middle East would seem inevitable, the U.S. role remains takenfor granted and largely unexamined.The paradox explainsthis absence of discussion:ExaminingU.S. intereststoo strong/vulnerable closely upsets the delicate balance that keeps the sense of vulnerabilityin check. KEYWORDS:politicalculture,discourse, Israel,focus groups,mass media,content framing, analysis.

In the Middle East, without the support of a superpower, you're in trouble. But only up to a certain point. We're not another star on the American flag. We don't need their agreement for everything.

-Participant in a 1988 Israelifocus group

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0162-895X ? 1999 International Society of Political Psychology Publishedby Blackwell Publishers,350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford, OX4 1JF,UK.

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Wewill not trustin others any longer, generous as they may be: only us, only ourselves. Wewill protect ourselves. -Prime MinisterYitzhakRabin,in an April 1993 speech commemoratingthe WarsawGhettouprising,commentingon the most lesson of the Holocaust (quotedfrom Arian, 1995, p. 175) important Uttered by a national leader and by ordinarypeople in entirely different situations,these two statementsreveal a deep masterframe interwovenin Israeli discourse. We argue that this frame-with its paradoxicalmessage-shapes the way Israelisjudge many social events andpolicies, includingU.S. involvementin the Middle East. Frame critical analysis typically involves the study of symbolic contests in which sponsorsof differentmeaning systems battle it out over which frame will prevailin the mass mediaor in some otherforum.Such contestsarelegion in Israeli political discourse.Indeed,the conventionalwisdom, which we do not dispute,is thatIsraelis deeply polarizedinto campsthatdrawentirelydifferentmeaningsfrom the same events. We wish to examine a stratumbelow thatof symbolic contests-a domainof shared meanings that are uncontested.The social constructionsin this stratum rarelyappearas such to the readerand may be largely unconsciouson the partof the image's produceras well. They appearas transparent descriptionsof reality, not as interpretations, and sometimesas devoid of politicalcontent.They cut across the cleavage lines dividingthe "national" campandthepeace camp,or thereligious and secularcommunities. Our focus is not on some deeper layer of agreement or common ground underlyingthe battleground,but on a paradox-the presence of two apparently contradictoryideas that are simultaneouslytaken for grantedin Israeli political discourse: Israel is powerful and independent and Israel is vulnerable and dependent.How do these two ideas coexist in the same meaningsystem insteadof competingand creatingcontinualdissonance?1 We explore how this paradoxof strengthand vulnerabilityhelps to explain certain surprisingfeatures of Israeli political discourse about U.S. policy in the Middle East. We argue that these two contradictoryideas are not only deeply embedded in a sharedIsraeli culturalframe, but also function as a mental map (in this case the throughwhich the Israelimedia and public discoursesee "others" United States) and evaluate and interprettheir policy in the region. Althoughthe text is aboutthe other,the subtextturnsout to be a discourseon how Israelisthink aboutthemselves.

1 This paradoxis present only in Israeli Jewish culture. Israeli Palestinian vulnerabilityhas its own historicalroots and requiresa parallelanalysisto what we attempthere.

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Political Discourse on Policy Academic researchhas examined U.S. Middle East policy and regional involvement primarilyin terms of its strategicsignificance. Scholarlyquestions on the subject tend to address the unfolding of events and subsequentpatternsof behavior, decision-makingprocesses entailed by a particularpolicy, analysis of political programs mandated by the policy, and the impact on Israel of U.S. involvement(Ben-Zvi, 1986, 1993;Evron, 1973). Hence, this line of researchtreats political events as objective "social facts." In contrast,the presentstudy attemptsto understand how political events are constructed;it derives from a researchtraditionthatconsiderspublic discourseto be based on interpretiveculturalframes. These frames organize both reality and the social and symbolic meaning conferredupon it (Cohen & Wolfsfeld, 1992; Fiske & Kinder, 1981; Gans, 1979; Tuchman,1978). A frame or organizingidea is an active mechanism that guides people to "see" and interpretan event in a by directingus to perceive particular way. By theirnature,framesareconstraining; and interpretan event in a particularway, they reduce our options of seeing the event in other ways. Yet they are also a liberatingfactor:Withoutthem, it would be impossible to see anything at all throughthe incoherentjumble of facts and events presentedto us. The presentwork attemptsto add anotherlayer of understanding to the series of studies conductedby Gamson, with various colleagues, in an attemptto comprehend the various aspects of political discourse and its place in processes of policy-shapingand social change (Gamson, 1992, 1998; Gamson & Lasch, 1983; Gamson& Modigliani, 1987, 1989). It focuses attentionon the image of the actors involved and theirrelationship.In an earlierstudy,Gamson(1992) consideredthe conflict thatprevailin American images of the actorsinvolved in the Arab-Israeli discourse.Here,we soughta comparable issue for an Israelicounterpart study.The and of discourse on the Arab-Israeli conflict, comparedto the ubiquity centrality more bounded and limited domain in the United States, meant we needed something more comparablein scope. Hence, we chose to focus on how the U.S. role in the Arab-Israeli conflict is understoodand interpreted in Israel. We thoughtinitially that we were merely looking at how Israelisviewed the United States, but we found that we were actually seeing how Israelis look at themselvesthroughthe prismof theirunderstanding of U.S.-Israelirelations.From this perspective,we found a strikingshift in the discourse.Initially,U.S. interests were treatedas problematicand meriting discussion. The interpretation of U.S. intentionsand motives was contested, although(as discussed below) the contest was an uneven one from the beginning.But over time, U.S. interestsmoved into a domainthatis unexamined,self-evident, and takenfor granted.

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Research Methods The Discourse analysis involves two dimensions:substantiveand structural. formerrefersto the totalityof meaningsraisedby thepublicconcerninga particular fromwhich meaningscan be constructed, issue. This is the culturalrepertoire either a new event or to reinterpret When event it to interpret events. an occurs, may past with the use of existing frames and used to reinforce self-evident, be interpreted new patternsof referencemay be created "truths"; alternatively, taken-for-granted to understand what is takingplace. The structural dimension of discourse analysis refers to the relative prominence of the various interpretiveframes. Do certain modes of thought become Do dominantwith respectto social issues and dislodge alternative interpretations? certain modes of interpretation achieve permanence,becoming self-evident descriptions of situations that are unquestionedand unchallenged perceptions of reality?Or,alternatively,do assumptionsthatwere once takenfor grantedbecome objects of contestedinterpretation? Public discourse is conducted in different arenas: in print and broadcast mass media, within the academic community, among decision-makers, and, in a highly politicized society such as Israel, in Friday evening social gatherings as well. The present study focuses on two forums-newspapers and conversations. More specifically, it includes a systematic analysis of frames in the discourse in Israeli newspapers in sample periods between 1948 and 1981; an analysis of frames as these emerged in discussion groups that took place in 1988; and, finally, a returnto media texts, this time in the Israeli press in 1996. Newspapers were chosen as a medium not only because of their practical advantages as a recoverable and continuous source, but also because they offer a broad political range, enabling us to see framing elements that transcendthe political party spectrum. of the society,journalists By drawingtheirframesfrom the culturalrepertoire and reproducersof a broader serve simultaneouslyas progenitors,transmitters, publicdiscourse.Of the variousforumsof publicdiscourse,the massmediaprovide the most generally available and sharedset of culturaltools. They are the major site of contest politically, in part because all the would-be or actual sponsors of meaning-politicians, challengers, and the public-assume pervasive influence (whetherjustified or not). The initial stage of the research entailed choosing four critical discourse moments related to U.S. involvement in the Middle East, events that provoked them (Chilton, 1987; Gamson, 1992, pp. 26-27). We public discourseto interpret no on the critical make judgment importanceof these events in shapingpolitical or in Because the four events occurredin differenttime outcomes changes policy.

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periods, we can sketch, however roughly, the contours of the evolution and/or entrenchment of frames.2 The sampled articles appearedduringthe week in which the event occurred. of the Stateof Israel The criticaldiscoursemomentschosen were the establishment IDF' s withdrawal from Sinaiafterthe Sinai the Defense (Israel Forces) (May 1948), war (January1957), President Nixon's visit to the Middle East after the Yom KippurWar(June 1974), and the enactmentof the GolanHeights Law (December 1981). The discussion groups (see below) met at the end of 1988 and the beginning of 1989. Finally, to update the time period, we added a fifth critical discourse moment to supplement the content analysis of newspaper commentary. The stimulus event (October 1996) was U.S. mediation between PalestinianAuthority Chairman Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu after the opening of the new exit to the Western Wall tunnel in Jerusalem and the violence this act triggered in the West Bank and Gaza between Israelis and Palestinians. The articles selected from newspaperswere commentariesdealing explicitly with the Americanrole in theMiddleEast.We excludednews accountsof the actual events, focusing on editorialsand commentariesfrom a wide variety of Hebrewlanguage dailies,3encompassingpapersthatdefine themselves as politically nonaligned and othersthat are platformsfor political movements.4 Between March 1988 and the end of February 1989, 25 discussion groups were held. Half the groups were established specifically for this purpose; they came into being when one person invited a numberof friends to his or her home to hold a discussion. All of these groups were gender-mixed. The other half consisted of "encountergroups" that met regularly at community centers and were asked to devote one evening to discuss public issues in the news.5 Of these,

2 A movie of the discoursewould be preferableto a series of snapshots,but a continuous samplewould have requiredresourcesbeyond those availableto us. Thatthe stimulusevents differ in their nature has the advantagethatwhen recurrent themes occur, one can have more confidence thatthey are not peculiarto a particular type of event. But the variablenatureof the events themselves confoundsthe comparisonover time by introducingan additionalpossible explanationfor change. 3 Limiting the press to the Hebrew language also limits the discussion to the public discourseamong Jewish Israelis,who constitute82% of the country'spopulation. 4 The daily newspapers chosen for the study were as follows. Nonparty papers: YediotAchronot, Ma'ariv (or its incarnationas YediotMa'ariv in 1948), and Ha'aretz. Left-wing papers:Davar, Al Hamishmar,andLamerhav(only for the second event, 1957). Religious papers:Hatzofe.Communist into Zo Haderekh Partypapers:Kol Ha'am (apartfrom the thirdevent, 1974) and its metamorphosis (for the fourthevent, 1981). Right-wingand centerpapers:Hamashkif(for the first event, 1948) and its reincarnation as Herut (for the second event). For the 1996 event, we used only the threenonparty newspapers. 5 The study also covered additionalissues (attitudestowardIsrael's Arab citizens and towardethnic and class equalityin Israelieducation).

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fourgroupsconsisted of women only, two of menonly, andtheotherswere mixed.6 Each group containedbetween 6 and 10 participants. The use of conversationaldiscourseas well as thatfound in newspapersis an attempt at triangulation.Newspaper commentaryis ultimately a forum of elite it with populardiscourse,we can ask whetherframes discourse.By supplementing identified in one forum are also found in this very differentforum.To maximize the difference, we ensured that the discussion groups were composed of Israelis exams requiredfor the pursuitof who had not passed the bagrut,the matriculation readeitherMa'ariv or Yediot in Most of the Israel.7 participants higher education but mass-circulation dailies, Achronot, Israel's two rarely read editorials and commentaries. In the discussiongroups,we examinedhow people confermeaningon an issue that has been presentedto them and how they negotiate over meanings.The unit of analysis was the conversation.We examined the degree to which the frames from newspaperdiscourse were reflected here as well. We began with a general to introducetheirown ways of framing questionon each issue to allow participants it. After about 10 minutes of open-ended discussion, the facilitator presented competingframesby meansof politicalcartoons,showingthemto the participants, to react.8The discussions explainingtheircentralidea, and askingthe participants were videotapedandtranscribed by the facilitators.The texts of boththe mediaand the conversationswere coded independentlyby two researchers,and in cases of disagreementby an additionalresearcher. Discourse Analysis of Newspapers Following Gamson and Modigliani (1989), we use the term interpretive package to mean an underlyingframe and the set of condensing symbols used to invoke it. We found three competing packages in the media discourse on U.S. Middle Easternpolicy. Each package appearsin differentvariationsfor different events, and not all packages appearfor every event. The firstinterpretive package-Interests-has two variantsthatareimportant to distinguish.The genericframeis the classical Realpolitikof geopoliticalstrategy and nationalinterestsdefined in terms of nationalpower. The United States is a world power, and as such has a continuing interest in the region's strategic the Middle East waterways and oil resources. According to this interpretation,
6 Gendercompositionor othergroupdifferences,however,did notproverelevantfor the issue discussed here.The themesemphasizedappearto applyover the whole rangerather thanbeing limitedto groups with certaincharacteristics. 7 We also soughtto replicatethe U.S. study,whichconducteddiscussionsamongpeople withjobs rather Thatstudyexcludedthosewho werecurrently thanwithcareersrequiring credentials. attending college or had graduated from college. 8 For a more detaileddiscussion of the advantagesand disadvantages of this focus groupmethodology, see Gamson, 1992, pp. 189-196.

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conflict is not self-contained;it is an integralelement in the Cold Warin which the arethe Soviet Union andthe UnitedStates.The statesin the region chief adversaries are portrayedas pawns on a chessboard, at the mercy of extra-regional"players"-the superpowers. in this variationexcludes the domesticinterestsof parties Note that"interests" and politicians.IndividualAmericanpoliticiansmay have an interestin maintaining the supportof Jewish voters, but policies are not governed by the personal interests of politicians, who ultimately must follow the prevailing definition of nationalinterestsandjustify theirpolicies in these terms. Otherwise,these politiaheadof cians will runthe risk of being accusedof puttingpolitical considerations the country'sinterest. The Bargaining variationelevates Israel and other regional powers as coplayers ratherthan pawns, albeit players with less power than the extra-regional protagonists.In the Bargainingframe, the very existence of the conflict permits for leveragebetweenthe superpowers andthe regional negotiationsandbargaining states. Although the Bargaining frame is a variationof the Interestsframe, we distinguishit because of the differentassumptionsabout the role of the regional states vis-a-vis the superpowers. Althoughthe latterremainthe leading actors,the local countriesareperceivedto takean active andinfluentialrole in the articulation and implementation of superpower policy. For example, Now both sides [Israeland the U.S.] will have to ... create procedures for existing harmoniouslyand to clarify the spiritof theirrelations.That has only one meaning: spirit, accordingto the American interpretation, Israel will be able to enjoy Americanaid and supportonly if it behaves properlyand does not sabotage interestsof the United States. (Y. Priel, "Moaningand Hiding TheirAnger,"Davar, 25 December 1981) Domestic political interestsdo matterin this variation.To the extent that any given U.S. administrationis dependent on and concerned about losing Jewish Israelin the bargaining support,this strengthens relationship-especially by weakening the ability of the United States to put pressureon Israel. To the extent that the American Jewish community is divided on policy toward Israel or supports pressureon Israel,this weakens Israelin the bargainingrelationship. In the Bargainingvariation,Israel'sabilityto mobilize domesticsupportin the United States goes beyond the influence of the AmericanJewish community.A 1974 articlein Davar (18 June)emphasizeda "wide coalition of variousforces in the United States, a coalition that no other foreign state could mobilize as Israel does." This coalition includes those Christianswho see in Israelthe realizationof a biblical prophecy and those who admireits militarypower and courage and its loyalty to the United States in the internationalarena, as well as the American Jewish minority. In contrastto the two Interestvariations,the Values package emphasizesthe culturalaffinity between the United States and Israel. Elements here include the

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desire of the United States to assist the only democracy in the Middle East, America's sympathy for the underdog and its efforts to protect the weak and vulnerable, and the presence of the major Christianholy places in Israel, with perhapssome Holocaustguilt thrownin. Forexample, "Whatwill be put to the test in this periodis not only the SecurityCouncilbut also the sincerityof the friendship toward us" (Ha'aretz, 27 May 1948). The American of the U.S. administration Jewish community,in this package, has a special role and interestin articulating these common values, but beyond that,it has no special relevance. Finally,the Lackof Interestpackagechallengesthe assumptionthattheUnited Stateshas centralor enduringinterestsin the Middle East.It sees the United States as treatingArab-Israeli conflict as a fight betweendistantcountriesor peoples who are of little concernto most Americans.The very fact of its local character implies thatit is not dependenton extra-regional elements: The situationthere,on the front,is difficult.And in Washingtonevil winds have begun to blow. Devil's advocates have begun to raise their heads and speak slander:"Is there really any point in the United States and
Britain being envious of each other because of the Jews?" . . . "Because

of the Jews we will become entangledin a war ... Is it worthour while?" (D. Pinnes, "America'sJews Hold Their Heads High," Davar, 30 May 1948) In this frame,the AmericanJewish communityis too weak and vulnerableto matterin the definitionof U.S. interests.A 1948 articlein YediotAchronot (6 May) dismisses the idea that sensitivity to the American Jewish community might influence U.S. policy: "A war againstthe Jews is not dangerousand does not even harmelection [chances]." The localized conflict idea has two versions: one that sees the conflict as a struggle between sovereign states, the other as a strugglebetween nations. Both versionssharethe centralLackof Interestframe:Americansregardthe MiddleEast conflict as secondaryto their majorconcerns, that is, domestic policy and other international theaterssuch as EuropeandAsia. Hence, U.S. involvementis ephemeralandvolatile, dependingon whetherothercore interestsarecurrently occupying its attention.9 The newspapersample (Figure 1) shows the dominanceof the Interestframe with its two variations.The rareappearancesof the Values frame are found only in Hatzofe, the paperof the National Religious Party,and in the liberalHa'aretz.

9 Something very close to this frame is, in fact, the most prominentone in U.S. media and popular discourseon Israel.Gamson(1992) describeda FeudingNeighborsframewith its centralconcernthat the United States not get draggedinto a distantquarrel.Over the entire40-year period, it accounted for half the framedisplays in the U.S. mass media samplewhile its majorcompetitorsaveragedabout one-fifth overall. It was also the most prominentframe in the U.S. focus group conversations.Of course, a StrategicInterestsframedominatesthe discourseof publicofficials andforeignpolicy elites.

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of inapack cont
60% 40%

(bargaining)

1948

1957

1974

1981

1996

size:220 articles in discourse from1948to 1996.Sample (42 in 1948,46 Figure1. Changes pattern

The Interestframe, in contrast,appearswith almost the same prominencein all papers across the party spectrumand across the religious-secularcleavage. The Lack of Interestframe appearsvery rarely and only during the 1948 and 1974 samples. The disappearanceof the Values frame after 1948 probably reflects the of weakerassumptionsaboutvalue affinitythataretakenfor granted incorporation in the Interest packages. One need not make the strong assumption that value affinity is irrelevant,but merely the widely shared weaker assumptionthat it is insufficient.Onecannotcounton the soft coin of value affinities,andto do so would be naive and even dangerouson Israel's part.Hence, one must focus attentionon the underlying interests of states and the nature of the exchange relationship between them. The genericRealpolitikversionof the Interestframe,as we notedabove, leaves of U.S. andIsraeliinterests,andhere we open andproblematicthe correspondence find a significantevolution over time. In the first half of the time period, Israel's role in the Cold War was still unresolvedfor two reasons.First, its clear alliance with the Western bloc was not yet in place. Israel wanted to attend the 1954 Bandungconferenceof nonalignednations,but was excludedwhen Arabcountries Israel'sdecision to choose threatened a boycott if Israelwas allowed to participate. sides in the Cold Warwas morea matterof defaultthanan active choice. Moreover, theUnitedStatessidedwith Egyptandthe Soviet Union in pressuring Israel,against its will, to withdraw from Sinai after the 1956 war. To many Israelis, the geopolitical interests of the United States and the inclination of its professional

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diplomatssuggestedthatWashingtonwould have liked to concludea U.S. alliance with Arabcountriesin the Middle East. In the secondhalf, the perceptionof U.S. geopoliticalinterestsshifted.Increasingly, Arab countries(albeit with importantexceptions) became Soviet clients, a development that more neatly aligned the Arab-Israeliconflict with the broader Cold War dispute.Middle Easterncountriesappearedas superpower proxies, and Israel's militaryvictory in 1967 establishedit as a valuable strategicasset in the eyes of its citizens: It is hardto believe thatthe U.S. move in the MiddleEast [anundertaking to build a nuclearplantin Egypt]will weakenits supportfor Israel,which rests not only on a moral commitment,and not only on the pressureof American Jewry, but mainly on American interests. A strong Israel merges well with the basic principles of American foreign policy. (A. Shapira,Al Hamishmar,14 June 1974) With this change,U.S. supportfor Israelwas perceivedas havingbecome less problematicand more takenfor grantedas self-evident;it no longer needed to be explained or examined,having become partof the naturalorderof the Cold War. The United States and Israel were assumedto share an obvious common interest in preventingthe Soviet Union from obtaininga strongerfoothold in the region. But as the reasons for U.S. involvement disappeared from the discourse,the natureof the bargainingrelationshipbetween the United States and Israelloomed conflict is not larger.In the generic version of the Interestframe,the Arab-Israeli self-containedbut an integralelementin the Cold War,wherethe chief adversaries are the Soviet Union and the United States. U.S. policy was described by the mainstream newspapersas an effortto stem Soviet imperialism(Ma'ariv,6 January and as an attemptto create a balance of power between the superpowers in 1957) the Middle East (Ma'ariv, 16 June 1974). The CommunistPartypaper in Israel offeredan alternative "TheMiddleEastcountriesarenot threatened interpretation: 'Communist which was inventedin Washington,but by American by aggression,' would which make our an American colonial region" (Kol area imperialism, 7 such Ha'am, January1957). Despite differences, the idea that the countriesin the region were pawns on a chessboardof superpower playersappearedacrossthe political spectrum. The more the Middle East became a majortheaterof Cold War conflict, the more American interests were taken for granted in the discourse. As Figure 1 shows, the Bargaining variation emerges only in the later time period, with discourse focusing on whetherthere is a fair quid pro quo in this relationship.Is the United States demandingmore from Israel than it gives in return?Is Israel giving the United States enough in returnfor what it gets? "TheUnited Stateshas scored a tremendousdiplomaticachievement[thanksto Egypt], and it must give something in return;apparentlySadat is expecting a rewardin the form of U.S.

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notedMa 'ariv(12 June 1974) supportfor the legitimaterightsof the Palestinians," in the languageof the Bargainingvariation. remainedthe leading actors,exchange andinterdeAlthoughthe superpowers pendence replaceddependenceas the basic currencyof the relationshipbetween regional states and superpowers.Regional states can provide their sponsorswith strategicassets in the broaderdisputeand thus enhance theirbargainingposition. The Cold Warwas generallyseen as enhancingwhat Israelcould offer the United States, lessening the one-sidednessof a dependencerelationship. The BargainingvariationtreatsUnited Nations vetoes, sanctions,embargoes, threats, and military or economic aid as resources to be used in the exchange. Although the relationshipis not one of equals, economic, strategic,security,and andthe local diplomaticbenefits areneverthelessascribedto both the superpowers countries.The distinctive element of this variationis that it does not question or attemptto explain the superpowerinterests in the region; instead, it accepts the Cold War framing of superpowerinterests as self-evident, implying that such involvementand interventionis unavoidableand will persist.The generic version of the frame emphasizes Israel's dependence on the United States and Israel's whereasthe Bargainingversionunderscores Israel's strengthandthe vulnerability, underlyingmutualdependenceof the two parties. In the Bargainingversion,a discourseon the natureof U.S. interestsis replaced by a discourse on the terms of the U.S.-Israeli exchange. No longer need one wonder whether the powers have regional interests or what they might be; so self-evident are those intereststo the carriersof this frame that their stabilityand substanceis never questioned.As attentionshifts to a considerationof the means for negotiating, bargainingtactics by which a particularside advances its own interests become the focus. The substance of U.S. interests becomes so deeply unexaminedthat even afterthe United States has become the only superpowerin the region, no one questionsthe natureof its interests: The Israelis expect the United States to exert pressure and solve the problem.(Y. Esteron,Ha'aretz, 6 October 1996) The Arabshave graduallylearnedthatIsraelis a powerfulstatewhich will not easily be destroyed. Sadat made the Arab world understandthat concessions from Israel can be extractedonly throughWashington.(E. Inbar,"TheProcess Will Continue,"Ha'aretz, 3 October 1996) Nothing in the contemporary newspapersample challenges the idea thatU.S. policy is motivated by geopolitical interests as traditionally defined. On the than contrary,this perceptionis reasserted,thoughat a higherlevel of abstraction duringthe Cold War.The United Statesis the preeminentglobalpower andas such has interests everywhere, hence also commitments that must be honored. An editorialin Ha'aretz capturesthe spirit:

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Clintonhas a majorrole in bringingthe [peace] process to fruition.He is the godfatherof the Oslo agreement,he is a signatoryas a guarantor of its implementation, and he, as the head of the world's strongestpower, is concerned about the regional implications liable to ensue should the process collapse. (2 October 1996) The most surprising findingin the analysisof the 1996 discourseis thatdespite the considerable press reportage of President Clinton's mediation efforts, no commentariesaddressthe underlyingrationaleof U.S. policy. That America has strong interestsin the region is assumed, with no one asking why, or what these interests might be in a post-Cold War world. When U.S. interests arise in the discourseat all, the writersspeculateabouthow domesticAmericanpolitics affects the intensityand timing of U.S. interventionor constrainsthe ability of the United States to apply pressurein bargaining: The presidenthas provedthat"hehas gone the extramile."The American people are not about to change the thrustof their vote on foreign policy issues unless a galling failure occurs, which directly involves American soldiers or civilians. Clintongot throughNetanyahuwith a smile, but he will makehis realmove in the arenaafterthe [presidential election on the] 5th of November.(H. Shibi, "HeDidn't Get the Goods,"YediotAchronot, 4 October 1996) Like others, this journalist is certain that it is in the United States' interest to interveneand thatthe sides to the conflict can at best delay such intervention. The unexaminednatureof U.S. interestsis all the more remarkable because it survives the end of the Cold War, a watershedevent that would have seemed to make discussion of the issue unavoidable. The strategic interest of containing Soviet influence in the Middle East has faded.If Israelwas clearlya strategicasset to Washingtonin its pursuitof thatgoal duringthe Cold War,the situationnow is that both U.S. strategicgoals and the ways in which Israel can abet them are no longer obvious. The failure of Israeli discourse to address this puzzle is highly significant-a case of the dog thatdidn't barkin the night. We suggest that, given the paradoxof strengthand vulnerability,to examine the underlyingnatureof U.S. strategicinterestswould be discomfiting. It would again force an explorationof the truenatureof the power-dependence relationship between the United StatesandIsrael.How muchdoes the United Statesreallyneed Israel?Domestic politics aside, how much would it have to lose by withdrawing its diplomatic supportand cultivatingties with Arab nations?Even to raise such questions-however they might be answered-heightens anxiety by threatening the delicatebalancebetween "Israelis strong"and"Israelis vulnerable," resolving the paradoxin favor of the second assertion.

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The Strength and Vulnerability Paradox The two conceptual elements that form the paradoxare located in different layers of political culture.The vulnerabilitytheme, we contend, lies in a stratum of political culturebelow that of symbolic contests. It remainslargely untouched over the meaning of political and uncontested in the competing interpretations stratum of Jewishculture, in the taken-for-granted events. It is so deeply entrenched evidence. bothin Israelandthe Diaspora,thatit is, in this sense, immuneto contrary or assimilated a Jewish how No matter communitymay be, apparentlyrespected no matter how many stunning military victories Israel achieves, the lesson of remains.It is an identitybelief, partof what it means to be Jewish. In vulnerability of the words the classic "Jewish"telegram:"Startworrying.Letterfollows." This paradoxis expressedin Israeliculturein variousways: the ethos of "the conflict (Ben-Yehuda, few againstthe many,"invokedto describethe Arab-Israeli 1995; Zerubavel, 1995), and the commemorationof the tragedy that befell the Jewish people in the Second World War on "Holocaust and Heroism Day" (Liebman & Don-Yehiya, 1983). The well-known Israeli writer Amos Oz described "the Israeli who wins battles by day and dreamsof Auschwitz by night" (cited in Weitz, 1979). Of course,the paradoxmay be reinforcedby unfoldingevents, andevents that contributeto such reinforcementassume special salience in Israeli culture. The sense of vulnerabilityand dependence was dramaticallyreinforcedby the 1973 Yom KippurWar,when the IDF came perilouslyclose to runningout of ammunition and needed to be urgentlyresuppliedby the United States. The "Jewishfate" was again evoked bitterlyduringthe 1991 Gulf War,when almost every day for 6 weeks air raid sirens sent the entirepopulationof Israel scurryingto enter"sealed rooms"and to carrygas masks with them everywhere.The feeling of helplessness as Scud missiles fired by Iraq slammed into Israeli cities was only partially assuagedby the comfortingnotion-which laterprovedto have been illusory-that salvation was at hand in the form of U.S. Patriotmissiles. During the Gulf War scare of February1998, worriedIsraelisflocked to gas mask centersin near-panic despitethe effortsof governmentofficials to downplaythe dangerof attack.Events such as these weave the threadsof vulnerability anddependenceinto a single fabric. This theme has always been prominentin Israeli political discourse: "The presidentof a persecutedand tortured people is meeting with the presidentof the richestand mightiestof nations,"says a Ha'aretz editorialof May 1948, referring to a meetingbetween ChaimWeizmannandHarryTruman. Or,"Theprospectsfor the future are bad, not only for us but for the entire nation, which has placed its trustin America.... Yearswill pass beforethe conscience of JeffersonandLincoln will againhover over the Statueof Liberty"(Hamashkif, 29 May 1948). Or,in less pictoriallanguage:

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This move [the U.S. threatto impose economic sanctions] is proof that for a country like Israel to conduct an independentpolicy . . . is an extremelydifficulttask,which entanglesIsraelandplaces it in diplomatic isolation such as it has never before experienced.(Hatzofe,25 December 1981) Cantriland Free (1962), in a cross-nationalstudy of 13 countriesin the early 1960s, describedIsraelis' pervasivefear of war with the Arabsbut noted that"this fear was not intense enough to be a source of dissatisfactionwith the presentor of anxiety about the future."Antonovsky and Arian (1972), writing a decade later, suggested that "in an overall sense there is greater self-assurancetoday than a decade ago, [but]we would also expect to find greaterconcernin a morepersonal sense about the danger of war with the Arabs." Similarly, Kimmerling (1993) observedthatIsraelisaredeeply distrustful of theiradversaries'ambitions,arewary of wars and obsessed with the security threat, yet at the same time are quite optimistic aboutthe country'sability to overcome the dire situation. This dual attitudewas reexploredby Arian (1995) in an analysis of public a opinion surveys that were conductedbetween 1962 and 1994. He demonstrated recurrentpattern:Israelis perceive (in varying degrees) that the country faces threats,but at the same time they profess confidence thatIsraelcan overcome the security risks. The most compelling evidence concerns the persistentbelief that Israel exists in a deeply hostile world. As recently as 1991, more than two-thirds of IsraeliJews believed that "worldcriticism of Israelipolicy stems mainly from anti-Semitism." As recentlyas 1987, more thanhalf agreedwith the statementthat "thewhole world is againstIsrael." Not all Israelis who held such beliefs were immune from evidence to the contrary.After the Oslo accords, internationalcriticism of Israeli policies was muted almost to the point of nonexistence, and many previously unfriendly countriesestablisheddiplomaticrelations.PrimeMinisterRabincalled on Israelis to stop thinkingthat "the whole world is againstus." The numberof Israeliswho agreedwith such statementsin nationalsurveys declined significantly.Still, more than one-third(35%) continuedto think that "the whole world is againstIsrael," and more than half (51%) agreed that "criticism of Israel stems mainly from anti-Semitism"(Arian, 1995). But if many still refusedto heed Rabin'sadvice on thispoint,they overwhelmingly acceptedhis admonitionthatIsraelisultimatelyshouldtrustonly themselves. When asked to identify their main guardianfrom the list provided,most Israelis named the IDF (60%); about 20% picked God, and fewer than 5% put their trust in the United States.Moreover,therewas very little changeover time in the answer to this questionin the surveys thatAriananalyzed. Our findings, though stemming from different kinds of data, support the saliency of the simultaneousexistence of attitudesof strengthand vulnerability. Althoughthe studiesquotedabove presentedintervieweeswith the two options,in

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our case the dual attitudesemerged spontaneouslyfrom the conversations.Moreover, these conversationswere not ostensibly aboutthe self-image of Israelisbut aboutthe perceptionof "others" (in this case, of the United States). Israeli dependence on the United States-expressed sometimes with acceptance, at other times with resentment-is a strong, recurrenttheme in the focus group discussions. We did not ask the participants specifically aboutthe paradox of strengthand vulnerability,but both themes emerged spontaneouslyin response to an open-endedquestion:"Whydo you thinkthe United Statesis involved in the Middle East?"10 The strongrules the weak. (Group#12) We are their clients. (Group#25) The United States ... is the masterthattells the dog what to do, when it may and when it may not [do something].(Group#1) He who pays the piper calls the tune. If we don't heed the tune, we will get nothing. (Group#1) They hold us by the hands,and if we don't do as they say-(Group #3) We have to dance to theirtune. (Group#2) We rely on them, they are our support.(Group#3) Withoutthem, we could not exist. (Group#19) In all groups, Israeli dependenceon the United States was a leading idea. But in most groups,the degree of dependencewas a matterof debate,especially in terms of whetherit allowed Washingtonto impose its views on Israel,and how far Israel could resist this. Our media sample from the past suggests that the paradoxof strengthand vulnerabilitywas muted in the early days of the state, with the dependencetheme ratherweakly balancedby confidence.The countriesof the MiddleEast, including Israel, are portrayedas pawns on a chessboard, at the mercy of extra-regional of the State players-the superpowers.Accordingto this frame,the proclamation of Israel, in common with otherpolitical events in the region, was made possible international fortunate, by the existence of a particular, constellation,andthe future of the nascent state is equally intertwinedwith the international context. In 1948, the leading actors are Britain and the United States, which have conflictinginterestsin the divisionof spheresof influence,strategicconsiderations, andcontrolover oil sources.As aneditorialin YediotMa'ariv(A. Carlebach, "From
10Afterthe open-ended discussion, participantswere shown a series of cartoons,each expressing a differentframe.One of these showedthe UnitedStatesas a fishmongerwrappinga fish labeled"Israel for sale," directlyinvoking the dependencetheme. But the idea had alreadybeen expressed spontaneously in most groupsduringthe open-endeddiscussion.

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the Campaign-A GreatDifference,"26 May 1948) puts it, "Thepeace negotiations in the Land of Israel are not being conductedbetween Arabs and Jews but between Britainand the United States, thatis, between Bevin and Marshall." In the analysisof Israel'swithdrawal from Sinai in 1957, realityis constructed in Cold Warterms.The portrayal of the principalsinvolvedhas changed:No longer is the United StatespittedagainstBritainbut, explicitly, againstthe Soviet Union. This redefinitionof the key playershas occurredeven thoughin the Suez crisis that precededthe war,the United Statesandthe Soviet Union were alignedon the same side againstBritainand France.The perceptionof the event thus emphasizesthe decline of the "oldempires"andthe emergenceof the new international superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union. A dependentIsrael is presentedas leave Sinai. having no choice otherthanto follow the dictatesof the superpowers: It is only after the 1967 Six-Day War that the paradoxemerges full-blown. Israelismay have thoughtof themselves as a fiercely independent David bringing down the ArabGoliath,butthe mediaimages of a formidableregionalpowercome later. Compared to the vulnerabilitytheme, the theme of Israeli strength and lies closerto the surface,moreheavilyaffectedby competinginterpreindependence tationsof an unfoldingsequenceof pertinent events.The dramatic decisivenessof the Israelimilitaryvictoryin 1967 and the development of U.S.-Israelirelationsduring this phaseof the Cold Warprovided the growthmediumfor its emergence. It did not themebutgrew in the topsoilabove it. replacethe vulnerability In the 1974 and 1981 media samples, the paradoxhas emerged, and Israelis seen as having choices, some of which may-perhaps unwisely-displease its Americanally. Nixon, the first Americanpresidentto visit the Middle East, was warmly welcomed by the Israeli media in 1974, at the height of Watergate. Nevertheless,a deep anxietywas expressedin light of U.S. intentionsto help Egypt build nuclearreactors.Nixon was describedas "a friend of two rivals [Israeland the Arabs]"(YediotAchronot,14 June 1974). "Thetwo sides, Israelandthe United States, sing in differentvoices thatdo not always blend into full harmony.... The U.S. presumesthatas a friend,it gives Israelgood advice thatIsraelshouldaccept. In otherwords,the U.S. seeks to determinewhat's good for Israel.Maybe the U.S. does not see this as a 'dictate,'but fromthe Israeliprimeminister'scommentsone shouldunderstand thatonly Israelwill decide the natureof its security"(Ma'ariv, 15 June 1974). The enactmentof the Golan Heights Law in December 1981 is describedas a "slap in the face" to the superpowerthat supportsIsrael (Hatzofe, 25 December 1981). "We are definitely 'a vassal state' of the United States. We are dependent on Americaneconomic and securityaid. This is the big cardthey hold ... we live on borrowedtime, and the clock is in Americanhands, 'our feudal masters.'The popularfeeling is thatthanksto Israel's strongposition, and especially because of what our primeministersaid to the Americanambassador, we can hold our heads up once again"(YediotAchronot,24 December 1981).

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By the time of the 1988-1989 focus group discussions, there are increasing assertionsof Israelistrengthand independence: We are the muscle of the U.S. (Group#3) We are strong.(Group#4) We safeguardAmericaninterests.(Group#17) We controlthe Middle East. The U.S. can count on us. (Group#3) We give [the U.S.] a foothold in the Middle East. Throughus it controls the Middle East. If they need us, it should be a matterof give and take. Just as we give to the U.S., it should give to us. That is a position of strength.(Group#8) We are the only stable countryin the Middle East. (Group#4) We are the heartof the Middle East, a strategicasset. (Group#2) Throughus they know what is going on in the Arab states. (Group#10) We also contribute:combat experience, intelligence informationthat no otherarmyin the world can give them. (Group#16) Assertions of Israeli independencefrequentlyhave a resentful tone in the focus groups: We are not anotherstaron the Americanflag. (Group#1) Israel is truly strong, [but] the U.S. wants to portrayIsrael as weak and wretchedbecause that serves its interests.(Group#4) We are grown-up children . . . with all due respect to that big daddy. (Group#16) They allow themselves too much. We should listen to them but only up to a certainpoint. (Group#22) Whatdo you want from the U.S.? If you turnyourself into a fish in water and you are ready to send all kinds of emissaries to beg, then you are asking for pressureand they will pressurefor sure. (Group#4) [America's]love can crushus. (Group#11) The closeness of the ideas of strengthand vulnerabilityare underlinedin our focus groupsby the existence of a "yes-but"dialogue. The expressionof one idea often stimulatesthe expressionof the other-not in the form of disagreementbut to roundoff an incomplete thought."We need them"invokes the response "Yes, but they need us" and vice versa. "We are dependent"evokes "Yes, but we are

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engendersthe reminder,"Yes, but we need them." strong.""We are independent" The following exchange is typical: Boaz: "Theyaren'tgoing to runourcountry.It's not a matterof money here, my life is here. And they can't come with money to stick theirnose in here." Shuki:"Ithinkthatwe're looking for themto interveneon our side, we need their supportin the world." In sum, these are not simply two independentor parallelthemes; they are so closely linked thatthe expressionof one often provokesthe expressionof the other of to complete the thought.They are held in delicatebalance,with the reassurance of "we are and discomfort the "we are strongand independent" mitigating anxiety vulnerableand dependent." Implications historicalmoment. By the time these This article was writtenat a particular wordsareread,the U.S.-Israelirelationship may well have undergonesome shifts. Affection for the United States and the desire for its embraceare likely to follow of the peace camp wantingmore lines, with supporters pro- and anti-government active U.S. interventionfrom a presidentwho sharestheirviews and the "national camp"wantingless. is correct,however, If our analysisof the paradoxof strengthandvulnerability is to structural that has a built-in the peace camp likely workincreasingly advantage will with Israel in its favor politically. U.S. displeasure trigger the "Israel is of the culture.It will threaten to move the theme in the deepest stratum vulnerable" into a contested natureof U.S. interestsin the Middle East from taken-for-granted realm in Americanpolitical discourse. Intimations of such a contest could be heard in the remarks of Patrick nominationin 1992 and Buchanan,candidatefor the RepublicanPartypresidential 1996, when he suggested duringthe 6-monthpreambleto the 1991 Gulf Warthat "there are only two groups that are beating the drums for war in the Middle East-the IsraeliDefense Ministryand its amen corer in the United States"(New YorkTimes, 14 September1990). The mere existence of a contested discourseis more importanthere than the relative prominenceof one or anotherframe within it. What must be defendedis no longer safely takenfor granted. To the extent that policies of the presentIsraeli governmentprovoke such a contesteddiscoursein the United States, they will upset the balance and stimulate the vulnerabilitytheme-with an attendant loss of political support.The fear that Israeli policies and their manner of implementationwill provoke a full-scale reexamination of U.S. strategicinterestsin the MiddleEast, possibly even leading

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is powerfulbecauseit resonatesat the deepest to an Israeli-American estrangement, the polarizedcamps. stratumof Israelipolitical culture,transcending Conclusions We offer here a geographyof political culture.At the deepest level arebeliefs thatare so culturallyembeddedthatthey go essentiallyuntouchedby the meaning of passing events. These bedrock culturalbeliefs are exposed by events and the symbolic contests aroundthem but are not alteredby anythingshortof a cultural thatfundamentally shakesworldviews.In this layer,we place the belief earthquake that Israel is vulnerable. It may not be voiced, but it is beyond challenge and refutationwithin the culture. Above this, andcloser to the surface,is a layer in which ideas move in andout of the contestedand taken-for-granted domains.At this level, some ideas aretaken for granted for a while but become contested later. For example, Gamson and Modigliani(1989) arguedthaton the nuclearpower issue in the United States,the dualism of atoms for peace versus atoms for war was taken for granteduntil the 1970s, when nuclearpower became controversialand heavily contestedin public discourse.Ourcase reversesthis process:The natureof U.S. interestsin the Middle fromthe discourseintothe realm East,once a matterof some discussion,disappears of the taken-for-granted, where it remainsto this day, despite the demise of the Cold War. Criticaldiscoursemomentscreateperturbations at this level-they force some frame sponsorsto defend taken-for-granted assumptionsand others to drop their to beliefs that now move into the realm of the uncontested.This contest challenge over meaning determineswhich beliefs at the deeper level will be activatedand broughtinto the discussion and which will remainpresentbut dormant.Changes in the taken-for-granted sometimes expose and sometimes shield and insulatethe below. The failure of Israelipolitical discourseto examine the natureof U.S. layer in interests the aftermath of the Cold War is an example of the latter:To strategic do so threatensto activatethe idea of Israelivulnerability,allowing it to trumpthe idea thatIsraelis strongand independentinsteadof balancingit. Finally, the concept of a "yes-but"dialoguecan be appliedin analyzingother discoursein which contradictory beliefs are held togetherin a delicate balance.It offers a means of flagging and identifying this balancing act. Symbolic contests can then be analyzed in terms of their potentialfor disruptingthe balance, as the domainsof the taken-for-granted and the contested are rearranged. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This paper is jointly authoredwith names listed in alphabeticalorder. The authorsareindebtedto the U.S.-IsraelBinationalScience Foundation for providing

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researchsupport, to AdrianaKempandGili Droriwho servedas researchassistants, to Charlotte in the Boston College MediaResearchand Ryanandotherparticipants Action Project,and to the anonymousreviewersfor providinghelpful criticismon an earlier draft of this paper. Correspondenceconcerning this article should be addressed to William A. Gamson, 5 Boston Hill Road, Chilmark,MA 02535. E-mail:gamson@bc.edu REFERENCES
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