FIRST DIVISION STA. LUCIA EAST CORPORATION, Petitioner, - versus COMMERCIAL G.R. No. 162355 Present: PUNO, C.J.

, Chairperson, CARPIO, CORONA, HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND CHICO-NAZARIO,* and EMPLOYMENT and LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ. STA. LUCIA EAST COMMERCIAL CORPORATION WORKERS ASSOCIATION (CLUP LOCAL CHAPTER), Promulgated: Respondents. August 14, 2009 x-------------------------------------------------- x DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case This is a petition for review[1] assailing the Decision[2] promulgated on 14 August 2003 as well as the Resolution[3] promulgated on 24 February 2004 of the Court of Appeals (appellate court) in CA-G.R. SP No. 77015. The appellate court denied Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporations (SLECC) petition for certiorari with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. The appellate court further ruled that the Secretary of Labor and Employment (Secretary) was correct when she held that the subsequent negotiations and registration of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) executed by SLECC with Samahang Manggagawa sa Sta. Lucia East Commercial (SMSLEC) could not bar Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation Workers Associations (SLECCWA) petition for direct certification. The Facts The Secretary narrated the facts as follows: On 27 February 2001, Confederated Labor Union of the Philippines (CLUP), in behalf of its chartered local, instituted a petition for certification election among the regular rank-and-file employees of Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation and its Affiliates, docketed as Case No. RO400-0202-RU-007. The affiliate companies included in the petition were SLE Commercial, SLE Department Store, SLE Cinema, Robsan East Trading, Bowling Center, Planet Toys, Home Gallery and Essentials. On 21 August 2001, Med-Arbiter Bactin ordered the dismissal of the petition due to inappropriateness of the bargaining unit. CLUP-Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation and its Affiliates Workers Union appealed the order of dismissal to this Office on 14 September 2001. On 20 November 2001, CLUP-Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation and its Affiliates Workers Union [CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union] moved for the withdrawal of the appeal. On 31 January 2002, this Office granted the motion and affirmed the dismissal of the petition. In the meantime, on 10 October 2001, [CLUPSLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union] reorganized itself and re-registered as CLUP-Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation Workers Association (herein appellant CLUP-SLECCWA), limiting its membership to the rank-and-file employees of Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation. It was issued Certificate of Creation of a Local Chapter No. RO400-0110-CC-004. On the same date, [CLUP-SLECCWA] filed the instant petition. It alleged that [SLECC] employs about 115 employees and that more than 20% of employees belonging to the rank-and-file category are its members. [CLUP-SLECCWA] claimed that no certification election has been held among them within the last 12 months prior to the filing of the petition, and while there is another union registered with DOLERegional Office No. IV on 22 June 2001 covering the

same employees, namely [SMSLEC], it has not been recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent of [SLECCs] employees. On 22 November 2001, SLECC filed a motion to dismiss the petition. It averred that it has voluntarily recognized [SMSLEC] on 20 July 2001 as the exclusive bargaining agent of its regular rank-and-file employees, and that collective bargaining negotiations already commenced between them. SLECC argued that the petition should be dismissed for violating the one year and negotiation bar rules under pars. (c) and (d), Section 11, Rule XI, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. On 29 November 2001, a CBA between [SMSLEC] and [SLECC] was ratified by its rank-and-file employees and registered with DOLE-Regional Office No. IV on 9 January 2002. In the meantime, on 19 December 2001, [CLUPSLECCWA] filed its Opposition and Comment to [SLECCS] Motion to Dismiss. It assailed the validity of the voluntary recognition of [SMSLEC] by [SLECC] and their consequent negotiations and execution of a CBA. According to [CLUP-SLECCWA], the same were tainted with malice, collusion and conspiracy involving some officials of the Regional Office. Appellant contended that Chief LEO Raymundo Agravante, DOLE Regional Office No. IV, Labor Relations Division should have not approved and recorded the voluntary recognition of [SMSLEC] by [SLECC] because it violated one of the major requirements for voluntary recognition, i.e., non-existence of another labor organization in the same bargaining unit. It pointed out that the time of the voluntary recognition on 20 July 2001, appellants registration as [CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union], which covers the same group of employees covered by Samahang Manggagawa sa Sta. Lucia East Commercial, was existing and has neither been cancelled or abandoned. [CLUP-SLECCWA] also accused MedArbiter Bactin of malice, collusion and conspiracy with appellee company when he dismissed the petition for certification election filed by [SMSLEC] for being moot and academic because of its voluntary recognition, when he was fully aware of the pendency of [CLUPSLECCWAs] earlier petition for certification election. Subsequent pleadings filed by [CLUP-SLECCWA] and [SLECC] reiterated their respective positions on the validity and invalidity of the voluntary recognition. On 29 July 2002, Med-Arbiter Bactin issued the assailed Order.[4]

The Med-Arbiters Ruling In his Order dated 29 July 2002, Med-Arbiter Anastacio L. Bactin dismissed CLUP-SLECCWAs petition for direct certification on the ground of contract bar rule. The prior voluntary recognition of SMSLEC and the CBA between SLECC and SMSLEC bars the filing of CLUP-SLECCWAs petition for direct certification. SMSLEC is entitled to enjoy the rights, privileges, and obligations of an exclusive bargaining representative from the time of the recording of the voluntary recognition. Moreover, the duly registered CBA bars the filing of the petition for direct certification.
CLUP-SLECCWA filed a Memorandum of Appeal of the Med-Arbiters Order before the Secretary.

The Ruling of the Secretary of Labor and Employment

In her Decision promulgated on 27 December 2002, the Secretary found merit in CLUP-SLECCWAs appeal. The Secretary held that the subsequent negotiations and registration of a CBA executed by SLECC with SMSLEC could not bar CLUP-SLECCWAs petition. CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union constituted a registered labor organization at the time of SLECCs voluntary recognition of SMSLEC. The dispositive portion of the Secretarys Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the Order of the Med-Arbiter dated 29 July 2002 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, let the entire records of the case be remanded to the Regional Office of origin for the immediate conduct of a certification election, subject to the usual pre-election conference, among the regular rank-and-file employees of [SLECC], with the following choices: 1. Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation Workers Association CLUP Local Chapter; 2. Samahang Manggagawa sa Sta. Lucia East Commercial; and 3. No Union.

The concepts of a union and of a legitimate labor organization are different from, but related to, the concept of a bargaining unit. We explained the concept of a bargaining unit in San Miguel Corporation v. Laguesma,[8] where we stated that: A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicated to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law. The fundamental factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are: (1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status. Contrary to petitioners assertion, this Court has categorically ruled that the existence of a prior collective bargaining history is neither decisive nor conclusive in the determination of what constitutes an appropriate bargaining unit. However, employees in two corporations cannot be treated as a single bargaining unit even if the businesses of the two corporations are related.[9] A Legitimate Labor Organization Representing An Inappropriate Bargaining Unit CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Unions initial problem was that they constituted a legitimate labor organization representing a non-appropriate bargaining unit. However, CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union subsequently re-registered as CLUP-SLECCWA, limiting its members to the rank-and-file of SLECC. SLECC cannot ignore that CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union was a legitimate labor organization at the time of SLECCs voluntary recognition of SMSLEC. SLECC and SMSLEC cannot, by themselves, decide whether CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union represented an appropriate bargaining unit. The inclusion in the union of disqualified employees is not among the grounds for cancellation of registration, unless such inclusion is due to misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Sections (a) to (c) of Article 239 of the Labor Code.[10] THUS, CLUP-SLECC AND ITS AFFILIATES WORKERS UNION, HAVING BEEN VALIDLY ISSUED A CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION, SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS HAVING ACQUIRED JURIDICAL PERSONALITY WHICH MAY NOT BE ATTACKED COLLATERALLY. THE PROPER PROCEDURE FOR SLECC IS TO FILE A PETITION FOR CANCELLATION OF CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION[11] OF CLUP-SLECC AND ITS AFFILIATES WORKERS UNION AND NOT TO IMMEDIATELY COMMENCE VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION PROCEEDINGS WITH SMSLEC. SLECCs Voluntary Recognition of SMSLEC

Pursuant to Rule XI, Section II.1 of Department Order No. 9, appellee corporation is hereby directed to submit to the office of origin, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, the certified list of its employees in the bargaining unit or when necessary a copy of its payroll covering the same employees for the last three (3) months preceding the issuance of this Decision. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Bureau of Labor Relations and Labor Relations Division of Regional Office No. IV for the cancellation of the recording of voluntary recognition in favor of Samahang Manggagawa sa Sta. Lucia East Commercial and the appropriate annotation of re-registration of CLUP-Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation and its Affiliates Workers Union to Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation Workers Association-CLUP Local Chapter. SO DECIDED.[5] SLECC filed a motion for reconsideration which the Secretary denied for lack of merit in a Resolution dated 27 March 2003. SLECC then filed a petition for certiorari before the appellate court. The Ruling of the Appellate Court The appellate court affirmed the ruling of the Secretary and quoted extensively from the Secretarys decision. The appellate court agreed with the Secretarys finding that the workers sought to be represented by CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union included the same workers in the bargaining unit represented by SMSLEC. SMSLEC was not the only legitimate labor organization operating in the subject bargaining unit at the time of SMSLECs voluntary recognition on 20 July 2001. Thus, SMSLECs voluntary recognition was void and could not bar CLUP-SLECCWAs petition for certification election. The Issue SLECC raised only one issue in its petition. SLECC asserted that the appellate court commited a reversible error when it affirmed the Secretarys finding that SLECCs voluntary recognition of SMSLEC was done while a legitimate labor organization was in existence in the bargaining unit. The Ruling of the Court The petition has no merit. We see no reason to overturn the rulings of the Secretary and of the appellate court. Legitimate Labor Organization Article 212(g) of the Labor Code defines a labor organization as any union or association of employees which exists in whole or in part for the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of employment. Upon compliance with all the documentary requirements, the Regional Office or Bureau shall issue in favor of the applicant labor organization a certificate indicating that it is included in the roster of legitimate labor organizations.[6] Any applicant labor organization shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration.[7] Bargaining Unit

The employer may voluntarily recognize the representation status of a union in unorganized establishments.[12] SLECC WAS NOT AN UNORGANIZED ESTABLISHMENT WHEN IT VOLUNTARILY RECOGNIZED SMSLEC AS ITS EXCLUSIVE BARGAINING REPRESENTATIVE ON 20 JULY 2001. CLUP-SLECC AND ITS AFFILIATES WORKERS UNION FILED A PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION ELECTION ON 27 FEBRUARY 2001 AND THIS PETITION REMAINED PENDING AS OF 20 JULY 2001. THUS, SLECCS VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION OF SMSLEC ON 20 JULY 2001, THE SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS AND RESULTING REGISTRATION OF A CBA EXECUTED BY SLECC AND SMSLEC ARE VOID AND CANNOT BAR CLUP-SLECCWAS PRESENT PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION ELECTION. EMPLOYERS PARTICIPATION IN A PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION ELECTION We find it strange that the employer itself, SLECC, filed a motion to oppose CLUP-SLECCWAs petition for certification election. In petitions for certification election, the employer is a mere bystander and cannot oppose the petition or appeal the Med-Arbiters decision. The exception to this rule, which happens when the employer is requested to bargain collectively, is not present in the case before us.[13] WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision promulgated on 14 August 2003 as well as the Resolution

promulgated on 24 February 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77015. SO ORDERED. Republic SUPREME Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. L-54334 January 22, 1986 KIOK LOY, doing business under the name and style SWEDEN ICE CREAM PLANT, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC) and PAMBANSANG KILUSAN NG PAGGAWA (KILUSAN), respondents. Ablan and Associates for petitioner. Abdulcadir T. Ibrahim for private respondent. of the Philippines COURT

When the case was called for hearing on June 4, 1979 as scheduled, the Company's representative, Mr. Ching, who was supposed to be examined, failed to appear. Atty. Panganiban then requested for another postponement which the labor arbiter denied. He also ruled that the Company has waived its right to present further evidence and, therefore, considered the case submitted for resolution. On July 18, 1979, labor arbiter Andres Fidelino submitted its report to the National Labor Relations Commission. On July 20, 1979, the National Labor Relations Commission rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, the respondent Sweden Ice Cream is hereby declared guilty of unjustified refusal to bargain, in violation of Section (g) Article 248 (now Article 249), of P.D. 442, as amended. Further, the draft proposal for a collective bargaining agreement (Exh. "E ") hereto attached and made an integral part of this decision, sent by the Union (Private respondent) to the respondent (petitioner herein) and which is hereby found to be reasonable under the premises, is hereby declared to be the collective agreement which should govern the relationship between the parties herein. SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)

CUEVAS, J.: Petition for certiorari to annul the decision 1 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated July 20, 1979 which found petitioner Sweden Ice Cream guilty of unfair labor practice for unjustified refusal to bargain, in violation of par. (g) of Article 249 2 of the New Labor Code, 3 and declared the draft proposal of the Union for a collective bargaining agreement as the governing collective bargaining agreement between the employees and the management. The pertinent background facts are as follows: In a certification election held on October 3, 1978, the Pambansang Kilusang Paggawa (Union for short), a legitimate late labor federation, won and was subsequently certified in a resolution dated November 29, 1978 by the Bureau of Labor Relations as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-andfile employees of Sweden Ice Cream Plant (Company for short). The Company's motion for reconsideration of the said resolution was denied on January 25, 1978. Thereafter, and more specifically on December 7, 1978, the Union furnished 4 the Company with two copies of its proposed collective bargaining agreement. At the same time, it requested the Company for its counter proposals. Eliciting no response to the aforesaid request, the Union again wrote the Company reiterating its request for collective bargaining negotiations and for the Company to furnish them with its counter proposals. Both requests were ignored and remained unacted upon by the Company. Left with no other alternative in its attempt to bring the Company to the bargaining table, the Union, on February 14, 1979, filed a "Notice of Strike", with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) on ground of unresolved economic issues in collective bargaining. 5 Conciliation proceedings then followed during the thirty-day statutory cooling-off period. But all attempts towards an amicable settlement failed, prompting the Bureau of Labor Relations to certify the case to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for compulsory arbitration pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 823, as amended. The labor arbiter, Andres Fidelino, to whom the case was assigned, set the initial hearing for April 29, 1979. For failure however, of the parties to submit their respective position papers as required, the said hearing was cancelled and reset to another date. Meanwhile, the Union submitted its position paper. The Company did not, and instead requested for a resetting which was granted. The Company was directed anew to submit its financial statements for the years 1976, 1977, and 1978. The case was further reset to May 11, 1979 due to the withdrawal of the Company's counsel of record, Atty. Rodolfo dela Cruz. On May 24, 1978, Atty. Fortunato Panganiban formally entered his appearance as counsel for the Company only to request for another postponement allegedly for the purpose of acquainting himself with the case. Meanwhile, the Company submitted its position paper on May 28, 1979.

Petitioner now comes before Us assailing the aforesaid decision contending that the National Labor Relations Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in rendering the challenged decision. On August 4, 1980, this Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Upon motion of the petitioner, however, the Resolution of dismissal was reconsidered and the petition was given due course in a Resolution dated April 1, 1981. Petitioner Company now maintains that its right to procedural due process has been violated when it was precluded from presenting further evidence in support of its stand and when its request for further postponement was denied. Petitioner further contends that the National Labor Relations Commission's finding of unfair labor practice for refusal to bargain is not supported by law and the evidence considering that it was only on May 24, 1979 when the Union furnished them with a copy of the proposed Collective Bargaining Agreement and it was only then that they came to know of the Union's demands; and finally, that the Collective Bargaining Agreement approved and adopted by the National Labor Relations Commission is unreasonable and lacks legal basis. The petition lacks merit. Consequently, its dismissal is in order. Collective bargaining which is defined as negotiations towards a collective agreement, 6 is one of the democratic frameworks under the New Labor Code, designed to stabilize the relation between labor and management and to create a climate of sound and stable industrial peace. It is a mutual responsibility of the employer and the Union and is characterized as a legal obligation. So much so that Article 249, par. (g) of the Labor Code makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse "to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours of work, and all other terms and conditions of employment including proposals for adjusting any grievance or question arising under such an agreement and executing a contract incorporating such agreement, if requested by either party. While it is a mutual obligation of the parties to bargain, the employer, however, is not under any legal duty to initiate contract negotiation. 7 The mechanics of collective bargaining is set in motion only when the following jurisdictional preconditions are present, namely, (1) possession of the status of majority representation of the employees' representative in accordance with any of the means of selection or designation provided for by the Labor Code; (2) proof of majority representation; and (3) a demand to bargain under Article 251, par. (a) of the New Labor Code . ... all of which preconditions are undisputedly present in the instant case. From the over-all conduct of petitioner company in relation to the task of negotiation, there can be no doubt that the Union has a valid cause to complain against its (Company's) attitude, the totality of which is indicative of the latter's disregard of, and failure to live up to, what is enjoined by the Labor Code to bargain in good faith. We are in total conformity with respondent NLRC's pronouncement that petitioner Company is GUILTY of unfair labor practice. It has been indubitably established that (1) respondent Union was a duly certified bargaining agent; (2) it made a definite request to bargain, accompanied with a copy of the proposed Collective Bargaining Agreement, to the Company not only once but twice

which were left unanswered and unacted upon; and (3) the Company made no counter proposal whatsoever all of which conclusively indicate lack of a sincere desire to negotiate. 8 A Company's refusal to make counter proposal if considered in relation to the entire bargaining process, may indicate bad faith and this is specially true where the Union's request for a counter proposal is left unanswered. 9 Even during the period of compulsory arbitration before the NLRC, petitioner Company's approach and attitude-stalling the negotiation by a series of postponements, non-appearance at the hearing conducted, and undue delay in submitting its financial statements, lead to no other conclusion except that it is unwilling to negotiate and reach an agreement with the Union. Petitioner has not at any instance, evinced good faith or willingness to discuss freely and fully the claims and demands set forth by the Union much less justify its opposition thereto.10 The case at bar is not a case of first impression, for in the Herald Delivery Carriers Union (PAFLU) vs. Herald Publications 11the rule had been laid down that "unfair labor practice is committed when it is shown that the respondent employer, after having been served with a written bargaining proposal by the petitioning Union, did not even bother to submit an answer or reply to the said proposal This doctrine was reiterated anew in Bradman vs. Court of Industrial Relations 12 wherein it was further ruled that "while the law does not compel the parties to reach an agreement, it does contemplate that both parties will approach the negotiation with an open mind and make a reasonable effort to reach a common ground of agreement As a last-ditch attempt to effect a reversal of the decision sought to be reviewed, petitioner capitalizes on the issue of due process claiming, that it was denied the right to be heard and present its side when the Labor Arbiter denied the Company's motion for further postponement. Petitioner's aforesaid submittal failed to impress Us. Considering the various postponements granted in its behalf, the claimed denial of due process appeared totally bereft of any legal and factual support. As herein earlier stated, petitioner had not even honored respondent Union with any reply to the latter's successive letters, all geared towards bringing the Company to the bargaining table. It did not even bother to furnish or serve the Union with its counter proposal despite persistent requests made therefor. Certainly, the moves and overall behavior of petitioner-company were in total derogation of the policy enshrined in the New Labor Code which is aimed towards expediting settlement of economic disputes. Hence, this Court is not prepared to affix its imprimatur to such an illegal scheme and dubious maneuvers. Neither are WE persuaded by petitioner-company's stand that the Collective Bargaining Agreement which was approved and adopted by the NLRC is a total nullity for it lacks the company's consent, much less its argument that once the Collective Bargaining Agreement is implemented, the Company will face the prospect of closing down because it has to pay a staggering amount of economic benefits to the Union that will equal if not exceed its capital. Such a stand and the evidence in support thereof should have been presented before the Labor Arbiter which is the proper forum for the purpose. We agree with the pronouncement that it is not obligatory upon either side of a labor controversy to precipitately accept or agree to the proposals of the other. But an erring party should not be tolerated and allowed with impunity to resort to schemes feigning negotiations by going through empty gestures. 13 More so, as in the instant case, where the intervention of the National Labor Relations Commission was properly sought for after conciliation efforts undertaken by the BLR failed. The instant case being a certified one, it must be resolved by the NLRC pursuant to the mandate of P.D. 873, as amended, which authorizes the said body to determine the reasonableness of the terms and conditions of employment embodied in any Collective Bargaining Agreement. To that extent, utmost deference to its findings of reasonableness of any Collective Bargaining Agreement as the governing agreement by the employees and management must be accorded due respect by this Court. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued on August 27, 1980, is LIFTED and SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION

ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS and DIVINE WORDUNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES (DWUEU-ALU), Petitioners,

(ALU) UNION-ALU

G.R. No. 15688 Present:

- versus COURT OF APPEALS, THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF PALO,LEYTE, and DIVINE WORDUNIVERSITY OF TACLOBAN, Respondents.

CARPIO MORA Acting Cha AUSTRIA-MAR CORONA,* TINGA, and VELASCO, JR., Promulgated:

October 31, 200 x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION VELASCO, JR., J.: Petitioners Associated Labor Unions and Divine Word University Employees Union-ALU (Union) represented the Union members which prevailed in the labor case entitledDivine Word University of Tacloban v. Secretary of Labor and Employment[1] under G.R. No. 91915 and promulgated on September 11, 1992. A direct consequence of the case was that the Divine Word University of Tacloban (DWUT) ended up owing petitioners over a hundred million pesos for unpaid benefits. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Palo, Leyte (RCAP) is a corporation sole which sold to Societas Verbum Dei (SVD) or the Society of the Divine Word the subject 13 parcels of land, to wit: Lot Nos. 529, 4901, 528, 2067, 498, 507, 497, 506, 508, 2068E, 2068D, 2065, and 2410, the last four of which were untitled when the sale was concluded. The Deed of Sale[2] executed on October 1, 1958 contained the following conditions and restrictions, among others: IV. That the SOCIETY OF THE DIVINE WORD shall use these lands and properties for educational purposes, especially and as far as possible, for the maintenance and further development of the institution known as the ST. PAULS COLLEGE; xxxx VI. That the above described properties and all improvements and any land, buildings or equipment which shall have been later acquired by the ST. PAULS COLLEGE and which are in direct and actual use by the College, as such, shall be turned over to the ownership and possession of the Roman Catholic Bishop of Palo in case there is or are circumstances which will be beyond the control of the contracting parties forcing the abandonment of educational and religious work of the Society of the Divine Word with no hope for its resumption in the foreseeable future, that in this case the terms of the conversion of the property rights shall be determined by the Apostolic [Nunciature] in Manila and/or the Apostolic See in Rome. (Emphasis added.) While the conveying document was not notarized, the SVD was able to secure the corresponding transfer certificates of title (TCTs) over the subject lots, but the deed conditions, restrictions, and reversionary right of the RCAP were not annotated on the new titles. It must be noted that before the sale, the Tacloban Catholic Institute, a school then run by the RCAP, was already standing over some of the properties sold. At the time of the sale, the school had been renamed St. Pauls College. In line with the purpose of the sale, that is, to further educational and religious work, the SVD would later rename St. Pauls College the Divine Word College and then DWUT when the school attained university status. Due to labor unrest, DWUT, run by the SVD, and petitioners engaged in a protracted legal battle from 1988 until the finality of the decision in the Divine Word University of Tacloban case on February 11, 1994, or shortly after the Court denied DWUTs motion for reconsideration on January 19, 1994. By then, DWUTs liability to petitioners amounted to PhP 200 million, more or less.

On April 27, 1995, the RCAP filed a petition[3] before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8 in Tacloban City, docketed as Cadastral Case No. 95-04-08 and entitled In the Matter of the Annotation of Encumbrances on Certain Titles [in the Name of Divine Word University of Tacloban] to Show Restrictions on Use and a Reversionary Interest Therein. In it, the RCAP prayed for an order directing the Registry of Deeds of Tacloban City to register the October 1, 1958 Deed of Sale and annotate on the corresponding SVD titles the conditions, restrictions, and a reversionary interest of the RCAP stipulated in the deed. On May 9, 1995, DWUT issued notices to petitioners members , advising them of the decision of the DWUT Board of Trustees to close the university starting academic year 1995-1996, or on June 16, 1995, and, thus, to consider themselves dismissed effective at the close of business hours of June 15, 1995. Meanwhile, on July 7, 1995, the National Conciliation and Mediation Board ordered DWUT to pay PhP 163,089,337.57 to the members of petitioner Union as partial satisfaction of the January 19, 1994 final resolution of this Court in G.R. No. 91915. Prompted by the closure of DWUT and the resulting termination of its members services, the Union filed a complaint, as later amended,[4] against DWUT, its Board of Trustees, and the RCAP for Unfair Labor Practice, Illegal Dismissal, and Damages before the Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB) No. VIII in Tacloban City, docketed as NLRC Case No. RCB-VIII-7-029995. The Union alleged in its complaint that the sale of the subject properties over which the DWUT is located was incomplete due to the adverted conditions, restrictions, and a reversionary right of the RCAP over the subject properties. What is more, the RCAP did not, despite the sale, sever its employment relations with DWUT which, thus, rendered the RCAP solidarily liable with DWUT for the payment of the benefits of the Union members. On August 3, 1995, petitioners filed their Motion to Intervene in Cadastral Case No. 95-04-08, asserting their legal interest over the subject properties, such interest, according to them, emanating from a judgment lien over the subject properties based on the Entry of Final Judgment dated February 11, 1994 under G.R. No. 91915. And relying on Article 110 of the Labor Code in relation to Arts. 2242, 2243, and 2244 of the Civil Code on concurrence and preference of credits, they asserted preferential rights over the subject properties now owned by and registered under the name of the SVD. On March 8, 1996, the RTC issued an Order[5] dismissing the petition in Cadastral Case No. 95-04-08. The RTC held that it has no jurisdiction over the case for annotation owing to what it considered as petitioners right to a judgment lien referred to earlier. The trial court also held that the RCAP violated SC Circular No. 04-94 on forum shopping on account of the pendency of NLRC Case No. RCB-VIII-70299-95 where he was impleaded. Finally, the trial court deemed as moot the resolution of RCAPs formal offer of evidence and petitioners motion to intervene. Unsatisfied, the RCAP filed a motion for reconsideration faulting the RTC for misappreciating the facts of the case, the evidence adduced, and the applicable laws. He argued that the RTC has jurisdiction over all cadastral cases, like the instant case, in accordance with Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 entitled Amending and Codifying the Laws Relative to Registration of Property and for Other Purposes, as applied in Ignacio v. Court of Appeals[6] and related cases.[7] Continuing, the RCAP contended that he precisely filed the cadastral case because the October 1, 1958 Deed of Sale was not notarized, adding that the registration and annotation process would be ministerial on the part of the register of deeds had the sale been in a public document. Moreover, the RCAP asserted that the reference to the complaint in NLRC Case No. RCB-VIII-7-0299-95 was only made to underscore the fact that the Union duly acknowledged in the complaint the existence and due execution of the October 1, 1958 Deed of Sale. Besides, he pointed out, DWUT, by its manifestation filed before the trial court, did not question the due execution of the deed. Anent the issue of a judgment lien, the RCAP contended that he was never a party in the labor case under G.R. No. 91915 and, hence, could not be bound by the decision in it, much less by its execution. Finally, he denied violating the circular on forum shopping, alleging that the Union filed its complaint in NLRC Case No. RCB-VIII-7-0299-95 two months after he filed the cadastral case for annotation. The RTC by an Order[8] dated June 7, 1996 denied RCAPs motion for reconsideration. While it concurred with the RCAPs arguments set forth in his motion for reconsideration, the trial court still denied the motion on the ground of

laches, noting that it took the RCAP 37 years after the execution of the deed of sale before taking judicial action to assert his rights. Aggrieved, the RCAP timely filed his Notice of Appeal assailing the above orders of the trial court before the Court of Appeals (CA). The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 56482. In the meantime, on February 24, 1997, the RCAP, the DWUT, and the Union entered into a Memorandum of Agreement[9] (MOA) whereby they agreed on the following: (1) the Union would withdraw NLRC Case No. RCBVIII-7-0299-95 against DWUT and the RCAP; (2) DWUT would pay the Union PhP 100 million as final settlement of G.R. No. 91915 (NCMB-RB-80NS-04024-88) and NLRC Case No. RCB-VIII-7-0299-95; (3) DWUT would continue to recognize the Union as the sole bargaining agent for collective bargaining agreement (CBA); and (4) DWUT and the Union would negotiate and enter into a new CBA in lieu of the CBA imposed in G.R. No. 91915. For the payment of the final settlement of PhP 100 million, it was agreed that PhP 15 million should be paid upfront, while payment of the remaining PhP 85 million should be by dacion en pago. Covered by the dacion en pago arrangement were the Imelda Village and a 1,000-sq. meter property known as San Jose land. The MOA signing paved the way for the re-opening of the DWUT. On April 29, 2002, the CA rendered the assailed decision,[10] reversing the March 8, 1996 and June 7, 1996 Orders of the RTC and directed the annotation of encumbrances on the TCTs of the subject properties to show the restrictions on use and reversionary interest of the RCAP. The decretal portion of the CAs decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Orders of the court a quo dated 08 March 1996 and 07 June 1996 respectively are hereby REVERSED. The petition for the annotation of encumbrances on certain titles to show restrictions on use and a reversionary interest therein is GRANTED. SO ORDERED. At the outset, the CA noted that the RTC failed to categorically resolve the Unions motion for intervention under Sec. 2 of Rule 12, as amended by Sec. 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, since the RTC merely stated in its March 8, 1996 Order that the resolution of the motion for intervention was mooted. Noted, moreover, was the fact that said order became final as against the Union on account of its failure to question the order within the reglementary period available to it. Consequently, the CA held that the Unioncannot, on appeal, be considered a proper party in the instant case, as it did not acquire personality to be a party to the proceedings in the case. Thus, the CA treated as mere scrap of paper the Unions appellees brief. In reversing the assailed RTC orders, the CA disagreed with the trial courts finding and application of the equitable remedy of laches. Relying on Eduarte v. Court of Appeals[11] and related cases,[12] where the Court applied laches to bar judicial remedies in the plaintiffs exercise of legal rights, as allowing plaintiff to do so would be inequitable and unjust to the defendant, the CA held that the RCAP was not barred by laches from asserting his legal right to cause the annotation of the pertinent paragraphs of the deed of sale on the TCTs covering the subject properties. It ratiocinated that despite the lapse of 37 years, the annotation would not be inequitable or prejudicial to any party since the SVD, under whose name the TCTs of the subject properties were issued, did not interpose any objection to the annotation. It noted that the June 7, 1996 RTC Order did not specify the party who would be prejudiced by the annotation. The Unions motion for reconsideration was rejected by the CA through the assailed January 20, 2003 Resolution.[13] Hence, we have this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, raising the following issues for our consideration: WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ALLOWING THE ANNOTATION OF ENCUMBRANCE ON CERTAIN [TITLES] TO SHOW RESTRICTIONS ON USE AND REVERSIONARY INTERESTS THEREIN WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN CONSIDERING THE APPELLEES BRIEF OF PETITIONERS AS A MERE SCRAP OF PAPER AND ASSAIL[ING] THE PERSONALITY OF THE PETITIONER[S] IN THE INSTANT CASE[14]

On the first issue, petitioners argue that the appellate court erred in not affirming and applying the equitable remedy of laches. They assert that due to the adjudged substantial liabilities of DWUT pursuant to G.R. No. 91915 and for which it is hard put of meeting, the subject properties over which DWUT stands must be used. Considering that no annotations were made on the TCTs covering the subject properties and considering too the resultant judgment lien attaching on them, the desired annotation is clearly prejudicial and inequitable both for the DWUT and petitioners, for how, petitioners wonder, could the school pay its adjudged obligations without the substantial assets composed of the subject properties? Petitioners contend further that the instant case for annotation was pursued only after they have filed notices of lis pendens over the subject properties for the ultimate satisfaction of their adjudicated monetary claims against DWUT. Clearly, they posit, the RCAP is trying to move the subject properties out of the reach of petitioners through the requested annotation. Thus, they conclude that the principle of laches has attached and the annotation of the encumbrance or reversionary right of the RCAP is properly barred. Corollary to the first issue, petitioners aver under the second issue that the appellate court gravely abused its discretion in holding that petitioners are not prejudiced and will not be affected by the resolution of the instant case for annotation. As petitioners would argue, their rights would greatly be prejudiced since the resolution ordering annotation will not only delay the execution proceedings but will render for naught the final decision of this Court in G.R. No. 91915. Petitioners also take umbrage of the CAs ruling on the issue of personality of the Union in the instant case as the RCAP never questioned its standing in his opposition to the motion to intervene. Besides, they emphasize, the personality issue was not raised in the proceedings before the trial court and, thus, cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. On the other hand, the RCAP argues that petitioners have not sufficiently shown that they will be prejudiced by the annotation of his interest over the subject properties. The RCAP contends: First, the SVD and DWUT, the parties who could be so prejudiced, have not opposed the annotation. Second, petitioners have not shown that the SVD and DWUT have no other properties to answer for the adjudicated liabilities in G.R. No. 91915. In fact, the February 24, 1997 MOA executed by the Union, DWUT, represented by the SVD, and the RCAP envisioned a final settlement of petitioners claim without involving the subject properties. Third, the judgment lien issue is immaterial since there is as yet no levy on execution over the subject properties. Besides, the preference of credit asserted in connection with the perceived lien is only applicable where there is an insolvency proceeding and payment of debts have to be equitably distributed among the creditors. And fourth, the CA can, on appeal, rule on the issue of the Unions personality since an appeal opens the case de novo and the appellate court has discretion to rule on issues which it deems are necessary for the proper adjudication of the case, like the matter of personality which the appellate court resolved motu proprio and not upon the instance of the RCAP. Considering the arguments and counter-arguments earnestly pressed by the parties, the main issues to be determined are first, whether the Union has acquired legal personality to intervene in the instant case; and second, whether laches has set in to bar the RCAPs cause of action. We answer both issues in the negative. As the appellate court aptly noted, the RTC did not resolve the motion for intervention of the Union. It bears stressing that the March 8, 1996 RTC Order held that the dismissal of Cadastral Case No. 95-04-08 mooted the resolution of the Unions motion for intervention. Likewise, the RTC did not allow intervention in its June 7, 1996 Order as it denied the RCAPs motion for reconsideration on the ground of laches. Since it did not question these RTC orders which lapsed into finality later, the Union cannot be said to have acquired any legal personality to intervene or participate in the instant case. Therefore, the appellate court did not gravely abuse its discretion in holding that the Union has no legal personality to participate in the proceedings of the instant case, and consequently, the instant petition of the Union is dismissible on this ground alone. The instant petition will nevertheless fail even if we concede that the Union has legal personality to institute it. The judgment lien over the subject properties is really non-existent as it has not been shown that a levy on execution has been imposed over the subject properties. While the Decision in G.R. No. 91915 is indeed final and executory, such reality does not ipso facto burden all the lands and properties owned by the SVD over which the DWUT is erected, absent proof that the SVD cannot pay its adjudicated obligations and that a levy on execution was indeed made over the subject properties.

We agree with the RCAP that a judgment lien over the subject properties has not legally attached and that Art. 110[15] of the Labor Code, in relation to Arts. 2242, 2243, and 2244 of the Civil Code on concurrence and preference of credits, does not cover the subject properties. Art. 110 of the Labor Code applies only to cases of bankruptcy and liquidation. Likewise, the abovementioned articles of the Civil Code on concurrence and preference of credits properly come into play only in cases of insolvency. Since there is no bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding to speak of, much less a liquidation of the assets of DWUT, the Union cannot look to said statutory provisions for support. Moreover, we note the utter lack of showing that DWUT has no other assets to answer its obligations. DWUT may have liquidity problems hampering its ability to meet its judicially-imposed obligations. The school, however, appears to have other properties it can and in fact did use to settle its obligations as shown in the February 24, 1997 MOA between DWUT, the Union, and RCAP. A scrutiny of the MOA readily shows that the subject properties were not included in the assets or properties earmarked to settle DWUTs obligations. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the Union has judicially admitted the existence, due execution, and validity of the October 1, 1958 Deed of Sale with the conditions, restrictions, and a reversionary right of the RCAP embodied in it. In its complaint before the RAB for Unfair Labor Practice, Illegal Dismissal, and Damages, theUnion impleaded the RCAP as solidarily liable with the DWUT on the Unions monetary claims precisely on the basis of said conditions, restrictions, and a reversionary right of the RCAP. Such averment is a clear admission against the interests of the Union. The Union likewise cannot be permitted to take two opposite positions on the issue of the stipulated reversionary right of RCAP over the subject properties. It cannot invoke such reversionary right of RCAP to render the RCAP solidarily liable with the DWUT in the RAB case while, at the same time, resisting the annotation of that reversionary right in the instant case. On the issue of laches, we agree and so hold that it is inapplicable to the instant case. Estate of the Late Encarnacion Vda. de Panlilio v. Dizon explains the concept of laches in this wise: According to settled jurisprudence, laches means the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that whichby the exercise of due diligencecould or should have been done earlier. Verily, laches serves to deprive a party guilty of it of any judicial remedies. Its elements are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom the defendant claims, giving rise to the situation which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainants rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendants conduct as having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right in which the defendant bases the suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held barred. In Santiago v. Court of Appeals, we explained that there is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances.[16] Of the foregoing elements, the fourth and most important element, that is, injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant or the suit is not held barred, is not present under the premises. As the CA aptly observed, no prejudice can result from the annotation pleaded by the RCAP since the SVD, the property purchaser in the October 1, 1958 transaction, did not oppose the annotation of the conditions, restrictions, and a reversionary right of the RCAP over the subject properties, as evidenced by a manifestation the DWUT filed before the trial court. More so, no prejudice can befall the Union for no judgment lien has attached or been imposed over the subject properties and, as earlier explained, there is no showing that the subject properties are the only properties the DWUT has or that its other assets and properties are insufficient to meet its obligations. Thus, failing to show any actual interest over the subject properties that need judicial protection, the Union will not suffer any damage with the annotation on SVDs titles of the conditions, restrictions, and a reversionary interest of the RCAP. Indeed, there is no dispute as to the existence and due execution of the October 1, 1958 Deed of Sale in question. Its validity is immediately apparent from the fact that the RCAPs titles over the properties covered by the

deed had been canceled and new TCTs issued in the name of the SVD. The fact that the deed is not notarized is of little moment because, for purposes of validity between the parties, a deed of sale need not be in a public document.[17] With the judicial acquiescence of the SVD to the annotation, the subject matter of the instant case, we so hold such to be in order. WHEREFORE, we DENY this petition and AFFIRM IN TOTO the April 29, 2002 Decision and January 20, 2003 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 56482, with costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED. SECOND DIVISION

On January 30, 1998, the NLRC set aside the labor arbiters decision. Citing Article 253-A of the Labor Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 6715,[4] which fixed the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, the NLRC ordered GMC to abide by the CBA draft that the union proposed for a period of two (2) years beginning December 1, 1991, the date when the original CBA ended, to November 30, 1993. The NLRC also ordered GMC to pay the attorneys fees.[5] In its decision, the NLRC pointed out that upon the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 6715, the duration of a CBA, insofar as the representation aspect is concerned, is five (5) years which, in the case of GMC-Independent Labor Union was from December 1, 1988 to November 30, 1993. All other provisions of the CBA are to be renegotiated not later than three (3) years after its execution. Thus, the NLRC held that respondent union remained as the exclusive bargaining agent with the right to renegotiate the economic provisions of the CBA. Consequently, it was unfair labor practice for GMC not to enter into negotiation with the union. The NLRC likewise held that the individual letters of withdrawal from the union submitted by 13 of its members from February to June 1993 confirmed the pressure exerted by GMC on its employees to resign from the union. Thus, the NLRC also found GMC guilty of unfair labor practice for interfering with the right of its employees to self-organization. With respect to the unions claim of discrimination, the NLRC found the claim unsupported by substantial evidence. On GMCs motion for reconsideration, the NLRC set aside its decision of January 30, 1998, through a resolution dated October 6, 1998. It found GMCs doubts as to the status of the union justified and the allegation of coercion exerted by GMC on the unions members to resign unfounded. Hence, the union filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. For failure of the union to attach the required copies of pleadings and other documents and material portions of the record to support the allegations in its petition, the CA dismissed the petition on February 9, 1999. The same petition was subsequently filed by the union, this time with the necessary documents. In its resolution dated April 26, 1999, the appellate court treated the refiled petition as a motion for reconsideration and gave the petition due course. On July 19, 2000, the appellate court rendered a decision the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The NLRC Resolution of October 6, 1998 is hereby SET ASIDE, and its decision of January 30, 1998 is, except with respect to the award of attorneys fees which is hereby deleted, REINSTATED.[6] A motion for reconsideration was seasonably filed by GMC, but in a resolution dated October 26, 2000, the CA denied it for lack of merit. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari alleging that: I THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION VIOLATED THE CONSTITUTIONAL RULE THAT NO DECISION SHALL BE RENDERED BY ANY COURT WITHOUT EXPRESSING THEREIN CLEARLY AND DISTINCTLY THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON WHICH IT IS BASED. II THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY FINDING OF SUBSTANTIAL ERROR OR GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION. III THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN NOT APPRECIATING THAT THE NLRC HAS NO JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT.[7] Thus, in the instant case, the principal issue for our determination is whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in (1) finding GMC guilty of unfair labor practice for violating the duty to bargain collectively and/or interfering with the right of its employees to self-organization, and (2) imposing upon GMC the draft CBA proposed by the union for two years to begin from the expiration of the original CBA. On the first issue, Article 253-A of the Labor Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 6715, states:

[G.R. No. 146728. February 11, 2004]

GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION (GMC-ILU), and RITO MANGUBAT, respondents. DECISION QUISUMBING, J.: Before us is a petition for certiorari assailing the decision[1] dated July 19, 2000, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 50383, which earlier reversed the decision[2] dated January 30, 1998 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. V-0112-94. The antecedent facts are as follows: In its two plants located at Cebu City and Lapu-Lapu City, petitioner General Milling Corporation (GMC) employed 190 workers. They were all members of private respondent General Milling Corporation Independent Labor Union (union, for brevity), a duly certified bargaining agent. On April 28, 1989, GMC and the union concluded a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) which included the issue of representation effective for a term of three years. The CBA was effective for three years retroactive to December 1, 1988. Hence, it would expire on November 30, 1991. On November 29, 1991, a day before the expiration of the CBA, the union sent GMC a proposed CBA, with a request that a counter-proposal be submitted within ten (10) days. As early as October 1991, however, GMC had received collective and individual letters from workers who stated that they had withdrawn from their union membership, on grounds of religious affiliation and personal differences. Believing that the union no longer had standing to negotiate a CBA, GMC did not send any counter-proposal. On December 16, 1991, GMC wrote a letter to the unions officers, Rito Mangubat and Victor Lastimoso. The letter stated that it felt there was no basis to negotiate with a union which no longer existed, but that management was nonetheless always willing to dialogue with them on matters of common concern and was open to suggestions on how the company may improve its operations. In answer, the union officers wrote a letter dated December 19, 1991 disclaiming any massive disaffiliation or resignation from the union and submitted a manifesto, signed by its members, stating that they had not withdrawn from the union. On January 13, 1992, GMC dismissed Marcia Tumbiga, a union member, on the ground of incompetence. The union protested and requested GMC to submit the matter to the grievance procedure provided in the CBA. GMC, however, advised the union to refer to our letter dated December 16, 1991.[3] Thus, the union filed, on July 2, 1992, a complaint against GMC with the NLRC, Arbitration Division, Cebu City. The complaint alleged unfair labor practice on the part of GMC for: (1) refusal to bargain collectively; (2) interference with the right to self-organization; and (3) discrimination. The labor arbiter dismissed the case with the recommendation that a petition for certification election be held to determine if the union still enjoyed the support of the workers. The union appealed to the NLRC.

ART. 253-A. Terms of a collective bargaining agreement. Any Collective Bargaining Agreement that the parties may enter into shall, insofar as the representation aspect is concerned, be for a term of five (5) years. No petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent shall be entertained and no certification election shall be conducted by the Department of Labor and Employment outside of the sixty-day period immediately before the date of expiry of such five year term of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. All other provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement shall be renegotiated not later than three (3) years after its execution.... The law mandates that the representation provision of a CBA should last for five years. The relation between labor and management should be undisturbed until the last 60 days of the fifth year. Hence, it is indisputable that when the union requested for a renegotiation of the economic terms of the CBA on November 29, 1991, it was still the certified collective bargaining agent of the workers, because it was seeking said renegotiation within five (5) years from the date of effectivity of the CBA on December 1, 1988. The unions proposal was also submitted within the prescribed 3-year period from the date of effectivity of the CBA, albeit just before the last day of said period. It was obvious that GMC had no valid reason to refuse to negotiate in good faith with the union. For refusing to send a counter-proposal to the union and to bargain anew on the economic terms of the CBA, the company committed an unfair labor practice under Article 248 of the Labor Code, which provides that: ART. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practice: ... (g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code; ... Article 252 of the Labor Code elucidates the meaning of the phrase duty to bargain collectively, thus: ART. 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively. The duty to bargain collectively means the performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement.... We have held that the crucial question whether or not a party has met his statutory duty to bargain in good faith typically turn$ on the facts of the individual case.[8] There is no per se test of good faith in bargaining.[9] Good faith or bad faith is an inference to be drawn from the facts. [10] The effect of an employers or a unions actions individually is not the test of good-faith bargaining, but the impact of all such occasions or actions, considered as a whole.[11] Under Article 252 abovecited, both parties are required to perform their mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement. The union lived up to this obligation when it presented proposals for a new CBA to GMC within three (3) years from the effectivity of the original CBA. But GMC failed in its duty under Article 252. What it did was to devise a flimsy excuse, by questioning the existence of the union and the status of its membership to prevent any negotiation. It bears stressing that the procedure in collective bargaining prescribed by the Code is mandatory because of the basic interest of the state in ensuring lasting industrial peace. Thus: ART. 250. Procedure in collective bargaining. The following procedures shall be observed in collective bargaining: (a) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall serve a written notice upon the other party with a statement of its proposals. The other party shall make a reply thereto not later than ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such notice. (Underscoring supplied.) GMCs failure to make a timely reply to the proposals presented by the union is indicative of its utter lack of interest in bargaining with the union. Its excuse that it felt the union no longer represented the workers, was mainly dilatory as it turned out to be utterly baseless. We hold that GMCs refusal to make a counter-proposal to the unions proposal for CBA negotiation is an indication of its bad faith. Where the employer did not even bother to submit an answer to the bargaining proposals of the union, there is a clear evasion of the duty to bargain collectively.[12]

Failing to comply with the mandatory obligation to submit a reply to the unions proposals, GMC violated its duty to bargain collectively, making it liable for unfair labor practice. Perforce, the Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding that GMC is, under the circumstances, guilty of unfair labor practice. Did GMC interfere with the employees right to self-organization? The CA found that the letters between February to June 1993 by 13 union members signifying their resignation from the union clearly indicated that GMC exerted pressure on its employees. The records show that GMC presented these letters to prove that the union no longer enjoyed the support of the workers. The fact that the resignations of the union members occurred during the pendency of the case before the labor arbiter shows GMCs desperate attempts to cast doubt on the legitimate status of the union. We agree with the CAs conclusion that the ill-timed letters of resignation from the union members indicate that GMC had interfered with the right of its employees to self-organization. Thus, we hold that the appellate court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding GMC guilty of unfair labor practice for interfering with the right of its employees to self-organization. Finally, did the CA gravely abuse its discretion when it imposed on GMC the draft CBA proposed by the union for two years commencing from the expiration of the original CBA? The Code provides: ART. 253. Duty to bargain collectively when there exists a collective bargaining agreement. ....It shall be the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day period [prior to its expiration date] and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties. (Underscoring supplied.) The provision mandates the parties to keep the status quo while they are still in the process of working out their respective proposal and counter proposal. The general rule is that when a CBA already exists, its provision shall continue to govern the relationship between the parties, until a new one is agreed upon. The rule necessarily presupposes that all other things are equal. That is, that neither party is guilty of bad faith. However, when one of the parties abuses this grace period by purposely delaying the bargaining process, a departure from the general rule is warranted. In Kiok Loy vs. NLRC,[13] we found that petitioner therein, Sweden Ice Cream Plant, refused to submit any counter proposal to the CBA proposed by its employees certified bargaining agent. We ruled that the former had thereby lost its right to bargain the terms and conditions of the CBA. Thus, we did not hesitate to impose on the erring company the CBA proposed by its employees union - lock, stock and barrel. Our findings in Kiok Loy are similar to the facts in the present case, to wit: petitioner Companys approach and attitude stalling the negotiation by a series of postponements, non-appearance at the hearing conducted, and undue delay in submitting its financial statements, lead to no other conclusion except that it is unwilling to negotiate and reach an agreement with the Union. Petitioner has not at any instance, evinced good faith or willingness to discuss freely and fully the claims and demands set forth by the Union much less justify its objection thereto.[14] Likewise, in Divine Word University of Tacloban vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment,[15] petitioner therein, Divine Word University of Tacloban, refused to perform its duty to bargain collectively. Thus, we upheld the unilateral imposition on the university of the CBA proposed by the Divine Word University Employees Union. We said further: That being the said case, the petitioner may not validly assert that its consent should be a primordial consideration in the bargaining process. By its acts, no less than its action which bespeak its insincerity, it has forfeited whatever rights it could have asserted as an employer.[16] Applying the principle in the foregoing cases to the instant case, it would be unfair to the union and its members if the terms and conditions contained in the old CBA would continue to be imposed on GMCs employees for the remaining two (2) years of the CBAs duration. We are not inclined to gratify GMC with an extended term of the old CBA after it resorted to delaying tactics to prevent negotiations. Since it was GMC which violated the duty to bargain collectively, based on Kiok Loy and Divine Word University of Tacloban, it had lost its statutory right to negotiate or renegotiate the terms and conditions of the draft CBA proposed by the union. We carefully note, however, that as strictly distinguished from the facts of this case, there was no pre-existing CBA between the parties in Kiok Loy and Divine Word University of Tacloban. Nonetheless, we deem it proper to

apply in this case the rationale of the doctrine in the said two cases. To rule otherwise would be to allow GMC to have its cake and eat it too. Under ordinary circumstances, it is not obligatory upon either side of a labor controversy to precipitately accept or agree to the proposals of the other. But an erring party should not be allowed to resort with impunity to schemes feigning negotiations by going through empty gestures. [17] Thus, by imposing on GMC the provisions of the draft CBA proposed by the union, in our view, the interests of equity and fair play were properly served and both parties regained equal footing, which was lost when GMC thwarted the negotiations for new economic terms of the CBA. The findings of fact by the CA, affirming those of the NLRC as to the reasonableness of the draft CBA proposed by the union should not be disturbed since they are supported by substantial evidence. On this score, we see no cogent reason to rule otherwise. Hence, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it imposed on GMC, after it had committed unfair labor practice, the draft CBA proposed by the union for the remaining two (2) years of the duration of the original CBA. Fairness, equity, and social justice are best served in this case by sustaining the appellate courts decision on this issue. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the assailed decision dated July 19, 2000, and the resolution dated October 26, 2000, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 50383, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. Republic SUPREME Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-20303 September 27, 1967 of the Philippines COURT

most honest and sincere motive to conserve and protect the interest of the institution and its 200,000 depositors, do hereby, demand the much needed resignation of His Excellency, Mr. Ramon Racelis as President and Member of the Board of Directors of the Bank. Mr. President, you have already, in so many occasions, placed the Bank on the verge of danger, that now we deem it right and justifiable for you to leave this Bank and let other more capable presidents continue the work you have not well accomplished. In the above instance, we are presenting charges which in our humble contention properly justifies incapacity on your part to continue and assume the position as top executive of the huge institution: (1) That you Mr. President, have tolerated and practiced immorality in this Bank. We have been expecting you to do something about this malpractice which is very disgraceful and affects the morale of the hundreds of your employees. But so far, Mr. President, you have just let this thing passed through. As a matter of fact, you have even promoted these women like Misses Pacita Mato and Edita Castro. These women are of questionable characters, Mr. President, and should have had no place in the Bank as managers or even as mere employees. We know Mr. President, because it is an open secret in the Bank, that you have illicit relations with one of them Miss Edita Castro. As top officer and as father of the employees of the Bank, you have shown this bad example to your employees. Mr. President, we are really ashamed of you. (2) That you have allowed the practice of nepotism in this Bank. You have employed relatives of yours like Honorio Ravida; Bienvenido Ravida; Antonio Racelis; Jesus Antonio; and Argentina Racelis. Not only that Mr. President. You have also given those nieces and nephews of yours good positions at the expense of the more capable employees. Mr. President, if we have to mention all of them, one page will not be enough. (3) With regards to promotion, you have given more preferences to your close relatives. When the Bank advocated the sending of pensionados to States, you have only limited your choice among your nieces, nephews, and querida, namely, Miss Argentina Racelis, Mr. Jesus Antonio, Miss Edita Castro, and her brother-in-law, Mr. Pedro Garcia, Jr. In doing this, Mr. President, you have only lowered the reputation and standing of the Republic Savings Bank. There is really no sense in sending high school and B.S.E. graduates to States to study advanced banking. Because of this silly decision, it took one pensionado six months

REPUBLIC SAVINGS BANK (now REPUBLIC BANK), petitioner, vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, ROSENDO T. RESUELLO, BENJAMIN JARA, FLORENCIO ALLASAS, DOMINGO B. JOLA, DIOSDADO S. MENDIOLA, TEODORO DE LA CRUZ, NARCISO MACARAEG and MAURO A. ROVILLOS, respondents. Lichauco, Picaso & Agcaoili G. E. Fajardo for respondents. and R. Santayana for petitioner.

CASTRO, J.: The vital issue in this case is whether the dismissal of the eight (8) respondent employees by the petitioner Republic Bank (hereinafter referred to as the Bank) constituted an unfair labor practice within the meaning and intendment of the Industrial Peace Act (Republic Act 875). The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) found it did and its decision is now on appeal before us. The Bank maintains that the discharge was for cause. The Bank had in its employ the respondents Rosendo T. Resuello, Benjamin Jara, Florencio Allasas, Domingo B. Jola, Diosdado S. Mendiola, Teodoro de la Cruz, Narciso Macaraeg and Mauro A. Rovillos. On July 12, 1958 it discharged Jola and, a few days after (July 18, 1958), the rest of respondents, for having written and published "a patently libelous letter . . . tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt not only of officers and employees of this bank, but also of your employer, the bank itself." The letter referred to was a letter-charge which the respondents had written to the bank president, demanding his resignation on the grounds of immorality, nepotism in the appointment and favoritism as well as discrimination in the promotion of bank employees. The letter, dated July 9, 1958, is hereunder reproduced in full: Mr. President, Manila Ramon Republic Racelis Bank

Savings

"Dear Mr. President: We, the undersigned, on behalf of all our members and employees of the Republic Savings Bank, who have in our hearts only the

and cost the Bank a total of P10,000.00 just to study Christmas savings. That subject is very simple; one need not go to States to study savings; that you know full well, Mr. President. The reason why you sent Miss Castro to States was because you were also there. Are we not right? (4) That you Mr. President, tolerated and still tolerating grave dishonesty in this Bank as evidenced by the following irregularities and anomalies; (a) In one of our branches, around P200,000.00 was mulcted and embezzled by a certain Maximo Donado by doctoring the ledgers and records of that particular office. To the present, the amount is still increasing and some more are being dug up from the records everyday ever since its discovery in February 1957. In this case you dismissed Mr. M. Donado, immediately. But this was all that you did. If you have to go back to the history of the case, you will find out that your beloved nieces and nephews are also involved having been managers of that particular office. Another nephew, the Vice President-Operations, then Vice President, Personnel, was also involved for valid reasons that he did not even shift this particular employee to other branches or departments since the beginning when it has been the policy of the Bank to reshuffle its personnel. If you want to know why your good nephew did not transfer this employee, we will tell you. "Your good nephew has eaten too many baskets of delicious alimango." Mr. President, if there is someone to be blamed in this particular case, it is your good nephews and nieces for their gross negligence. (b) Aside from the one mentioned above, we have also Mr. Rodolfo Francisco, who in April 1955, maliciously withdraw (sic) P970.00 in two withdrawal slips from the account of one depositor in one of our provincial offices, inserting his name as

co-depositor in the savings account ledger. (c) In January 1958, Mr. Jose de los Santos expended and approved representation expense in the amount of P300.00 in one of our provincial offices. (d) Mr. Federico M. Dabu, the ex-cashier and now Personnel Manager, incurred a shortage in the amount of P1,240.00 in the course of the audit on August 3, 1954. (e) Mr. Jose S. Guevara, Vice-President on Personnel have (sic) been accepting bribe moneys. One of these amounts to P4,000.00 which was delivered by a messenger sometime during the last quarter of 1957. Mr. President, the anomalies are only a partial list of the irregularities which so far you have not acted upon. This type of people should have been fired out from the Bank; yet on the contrary, you promoted them to higher and responsible positions, thus, resulting in the demoralization of the more capable employees. Mr. President, we hope that you have still a little sense of decency and propriety left. So, for goodsake and for the welfare of the Bank, DO RESIGN NOW as President and as Member of the Board of Directors of the Republic Savings Bank. Very respectfully yours, (Sgd.) Rosendo T. Resuello President, RSB Supervisors' Union (FFW), (Sgd.) Benjamin Vice-President Supervisors' Union (FFW) Jara RSB

(Sgd.) Florencio Allasas Treasurer, RSB Supervisors' Union (FFW) (Sdg) Domingo B. Jola Chairman, Executive Committee, RSB Employees' Union (FFW) (Sgd.) Diosdado S. Mendiola Vice-President, RSB Employees Union (FFW) (Sgd.) Teodoro de la Cruz Member, Executive Committee, RSB Employees' Union (FFW) (Sgd.) Angelino Quiambao President, RSB Security Guard Union (FFW)

(Sgd.) Narciso Macaraeg Vice-President, RSB Security Guard Union (FFW) (Sgd.) Alfredo Bautista Treasurer, RSB Security Guard Union (FFW) (Sgd.) Pacifico A. Argao PRO, RSB Employees' Union (FFW) (Sgd.) Toribio B. Garcia Secretary, RSB Security Guard Union (FFW) (Sgd.) Mauro A. Rovillos Member, Executive Committee, RSB Supervisors' Union (FFW) Copies of this letter were admittedly given to the chairman of the board of directors of the Bank, and the Governor of the Central Bank. At the instance of the respondents, prosecutor A. Tirona filed a complaint in the CIR on September 15, 1958, alleging that the Bank's conduct violated section 4(a) (5) of the Industrial Peace Act which makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to dismiss, discharge or otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an employee for having filed charges or for having given or being about to give testimony under this Act." The Bank moved for the dismissal of the complaint, contending that respondents were discharged not for union activities but for having written and published a libelous letter against the bank president. The court denied the motion on the basis of its decision in another case1 in which it ruled that section 4(a) (5) applies to cases in which an employee is dismissed or discriminated against for having filed "any charges against his employer." Whereupon the case was heard. In 1960, however, this Court overruled the decision of the CIR in the Royal Interocean case and held that "the charge, the filing of which is the cause of the dismissal of the employee, must be related to his right to selforganization in order to give rise to unfair labor practice on the part of the employer," because "under subsection 5 of section 4(a), the employee's (1) having filed charges or (2) having given testimony or (3) being about to give testimony, are modified by 'under this Act' appearing after the last item." 2 The Bank therefore renewed its motion to dismiss, but the court held the motion in abeyance and proceeded with the hearing. On July 4, 1962 the court rendered a decision finding the Bank guilty of unfair labor practice and ordering it to reinstate the respondents, with full back wages and without loss of seniority and other privileges. This decision was affirmed by the courten banc on August 9, 1962. Relying upon Royal Interocean Lines v. CIR,3 and Lakas ng Pagkakaisa sa Peter Paul v. CIR,4 the Bank argues that the court should have dismissed the complaint because the discharge of the respondents had nothing to do with their union activities as the latter in fact admitted at the hearing that the writing of the letter-charge was not a "union action" but merely their "individual" act. It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this admission of the respondents. Assuming that the latter acted in their individual capacities when they wrote the letter-charge they were nonetheless protected for they were engaged in concerted activity, in the exercise of their right of self-organization that includes concerted activity for mutual aid and protection,5interference with which constitutes an unfair labor practice under section 4(a)(1). This is the view of some members of this Court. For, as has been aptly stated, the joining in protests or demands, even by a small group of employees, if in furtherance of their interests as such, is a concerted activity protected by the Industrial Peace Act. It is not necessary that union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated.6 Indeed, when the respondents complained against nepotism, favoritism and other management practices, they were acting within an area marked out by the Act as a proper sphere of collective bargaining. Even the reference to immorality was not irrelevant as it was made to support the respondents' other charge that the bank president had failed to provide wholesome working conditions, let alone a good moral example, for the employees by practicing discrimination and favoritism in the appointment and promotion of certain employees on the basis of illicit relations or blood relationship with them.

In many respects, the case at bar is similar to National Labor Relations Board v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co.7 The issue in that case was whether an insurance company was guilty of an unfair labor practice in interfering with this right of concerted activity by discharging two agents employed in a branch office. The cashier of that office had resigned. The ten agents employed there held a meeting and agreed to join in a letter to the home office objecting to the transfer to their branch office of a cashier from another branch office to fill the position. They discussed also the question whether to recommend the promotion of the assistant cashier of their office as the proper alternative. They then chose one of their number to compose a draft of the letter and submit it to them for further discussion, approval and signature. The agent selected to write the letter and another were discharged for their activities in this respect as being, so their notices stated, completely unpleasant and far beyond the periphery of their responsibility. In holding the company liable for unfair labor practice, the Circuit Court of Appeals said: A proper construction is that the employees shall have the right to engage in concerted activities for their mutual aid or protection even though no union activity be involved, for collective bargaining be contemplated. Here Davis and Johnson and other salesmen were properly concerned with the identity and capability of the new cashier. Conceding they had no authority to appoint a new cashier or even recommend anyone for the appointment, they had a legitimate interest in acting concertedly in making known their views to management without being discharged for that interest. The moderate conduct of Davis and Johnson and the others bore a reasonable relation to conditions of their employment. It was therefore an unfair labor practice for respondent to interfere with the exercise of the right of Davis and Johnson and the other salesmen to engage in concerted activities for their mutual aid or protection. Other members of this Court agreed with the CIR that the Bank's conduct violated section 4(a) (5) which makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to dismiss an employee for having filed charges under the Act. Some other members of this Court believe, without necessarily expressing approval of the way the respondents expressed their grievances, that what the Bank should have done was to refer the letter-charge to the grievance committee. This was its duty, failing which it committed an unfair labor practice under section 4(a) (6). For collective bargaining does not end with the execution of an agreement. It is a continuous process. The duty to bargain imposes on the parties during the term of their agreement the mutual obligation "to meet and confer promptly and expeditiously and in good faith . . . for the purpose of adjusting any grievances or question arising under such agreement"8 and a violation of this obligation is, by section 4 (a) (6) and (b) (3) an unfair labor practice.9 As Professors Cox and Dunlop point out: Collective bargaining . . . normally takes the form of negotiations when major conditions of employment to be written into an agreement are under consideration and of grievance committee meetings and arbitration when questions arising in the administration of an agreement are at stake.10 Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have allowed the respondents to air their grievances. Good faith bargaining required of the Bank an open mind and a sincere desire to negotiate over grievances.11 The grievance committee, created in the collective bargaining agreements, would have been an appropriate forum for such negotiation. Indeed, the grievance procedure is a part of the continuous process of collective bargaining.12 It is intended to promote, as it were, a friendly dialogue between labor and management as a means of maintaining industrial peace. The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to discipline for what it calls the respondents' libel in giving undue publicity to their letter-charge. To be sure, the right of self-organization of employees is not unlimited,13 as the right of an employer to discharge for cause14 is undenied. The Industrial Peace Act does not touch the normal exercise of the right of an employer to select his employees or to discharge them. It is directed solely against the abuse of that right by interfering with the countervailing right of self-organization.15 But the difficulty arises in determining whether in fact the discharges are made because of such a separable cause or because of some other activities engaged in by employees for the purpose of collective bargaining.16 It is for the CIR, in the first instance, to make the determination, "to weigh the employer's expressed motive in determining the effect on the employees of management's otherwise equivocal act."17 For the Act does not undertake the impossible task of specifying in precise and unmistakable language each incident which constitutes an unfair labor practice. Rather, it leaves to the court the work of applying the Act's general prohibitory language in the light of infinite combinations of events which may be charged as violative of its terms.18 As the Circuit Court of Appeals puts it:

Determining the legality of a dismissal necessarily involves an appraisal of the employer's motives. In these cases motivations are seldom expressly avowed and avowals are not always candid. There thus must be a measure of reliance on the administrative agency knowledgeable in labor-management relations and on the Trial Examiner who receives the evidence firsthand and is therefore in a unique position to determine the credibility of the witnesses. Where Examiner and Board are in agreement there is an increased presumption in favor of their resolution of the issue.19 What we have just essayed underscores at once the difference between Royal Interocean and Lakas ng Pagkakaisa on the one hand and this case on the other. In Royal Interocean, the employee's letter to the home office, for writing which she was dismissed, complained of the local manager's "inconsiderate and untactful attitude"20 a grievance which, the court found, "had nothing to do with or did not arise from her union activities." Nor did the court find evidence of discriminatory discharge in Lakas ng Pagkakaisa as the letter, which the employee wrote to the mother company in violation of the local company's rule, denounced "wastage of company funds." In contrast, the express finding of the court in this case was that the dismissal of the respondents was made on account of the letter they had written, in which they demanded the resignation of the bank president for a number of reasons touching labor-management relations reasons which not even the Bank's judgment that the respondents had committed libel could excuse it for making summary discharges21 in disregard of its duty to bargain collectively. In final sum and substance, this Court is in unanimity that the Bank's conduct, identified as an interference with the employees' right of selforganization, or as a retaliatory action, and/or as a refusal to bargain collectively, constituted an unfair labor practice within the meaning and intendment of section 4(a) of the Industrial Peace Act. ACCORDINGLY, the decision of July 4, 1962 and the resolution of August 9, 1962 of the Court of Industrial Relations are affirmed, at petitioner's cost. Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Angeles, JJ., concur. Bengzon, J.P., J., took no part. Republic SUPREME Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-28223 August 30, 1968 of the Philippines COURT

The petition was opposed by the management as well as by the Mechanical Department Labor Union, the latter averring that it had been previously certified in two cases as sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the employees and laborers of the PNR'S mechanical department, and had negotiated two bargaining agreements with management in 1961 and 1963; that before the expiration of the latter, a renewal thereof had been negotiated and the contract remained to be signed; that the "Samahan" had been organized only in 21 January 1965; that the Caloocan shops unit was not established nor separated from the Mechanical Department unit; that the "Samahan" is composed mainly of supervisors who had filed a pending case to be declared non-supervisors; and that the purpose of the petition was to disturb the present smooth working labor management relations. By an order of 18 August 1967, Judge Arsenio Martinez, after receiving the evidence, made the following findings:.1wph1.t The Court, after a cursory examination of the evidence presented made the following findings: That petitioner union is composed of workers exclusively at the Caloocan shops of the Philippine National Railways charged with the maintenance of rolling stocks for repairs; major repairs of locomotive, engines, etc. are done in the Caloocan shops while minor ones in the Manila sheds; workers in the Caloocan shops do not leave their station unlike Manila shop workers who go out along the routes and lines for repairs; workers both in the Caloocan shops and Manila sheds are exposed to hazards occasioned by the nature of their work; that with respect to wages and salaries of employees, categories under the Job Classification and Evaluation Plan of the company apply to all workers both in the Caloocan Shops and Manila sheds; administration over employees, members of petitioner union as well as oppositor is under the Administrative Division of the company; that from the very nature of their work, members of petitioner union and other workers of the Mechanical Department have been under the coverage of the current collective bargaining agreement which was a result of a certification by this Court of the Mechanical Department Labor union, first in 1960 and later in 1963. Subsequently, when the latter contract expired, negotiations for its renewal were had and at the time of the filing of this petition was already consummated, the only act remaining to be done was to affix the signatures of the parties thereto; that during the pendency of this petition, on June 14, 1965, the aforesaid collective bargaining agreement was signed between the Philippine National Railways and the Mechanical Department Labor Union sa Philippine National Railways (Manila Railroad Company). The main issue involved herein is: Whether or not a new unit should be established, the Caloocan shops, separate and distinct from the rest of the workers under the Mechanical Department now represented by the Mechanical Department Labor Union. The Caloocan Shops, all located at Caloocan City have 360 workers more or less. It is part and parcel of the whole Mechanical Department of the Philippine National Railways. The department is composed of four main divisions or units, namely: Operations, Manila Area and Lines; Locomotive Crew; Motor Car Crew; and the Shops Rolling Stocks Maintenance. (Exhibits "D" and "D-1"). The Locomotive crew and Motor Car Crew, though part of the Mechanical Department, is a separate unit, and is represented by the Union de Maquinistas, Fogoneros Y Motormen. The workers under the other two main units of the departments are represented by the Mechanical Department Labor Union. The workers of the Shops Rolling Stocks Maintenance Division or the Caloocan Shops now seek to be separated from the rest of the workers of the department and to be represented by the "Samahan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa Caloocan Shops." . There is certainly a community of interest among the workers of the Caloocan Shops. They are grouped in one place. They work under one or same working condition, same working time or schedule and are exposed to same occupational risk. Though evidence on record shows that workers at the Caloocan Shops perform the same nature of work as their counterparts in the Manila Shed, the difference lies in the fact that workers at the Caloocan Shops perform major repairs of locomotives, rolling stocks, engines, etc., while those in the Manila Shed, works on minor repairs. Heavy equipment and machineries are found in the Caloocan Shops.

MECHANICAL DEPARTMENT LABOR UNION SA PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA CALOOCAN SHOPS,respondents. Sisenando Villaluz for petitioner. Gregorio E. Fajardo for respondent Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Caloocan Shops. REYES, J.B.L., J.: Petition by the "Mechanical Department Labor Union sa PNR" for a review of an order of the Court of Industrial Relations, in its Case No. 1475-MC, directing the holding of a plebiscite election to determine whether the employees at the Caloocan Shops desire the respondent union, "Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Caloocan Shops", to be separated from the Mechanical Department Labor Union, with a view to the former being recognized as a separate bargaining unit. The case began on 13 February 1965 by a petition of the respondent "Samahan ng mga Manggagawa, etc." calling attention to the fact that there were three unions in the Caloocan shops of the Philippine National Railways: the "Samahan", the "Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Manila Railroad Company", and the Mechanical Department Labor Union; that no certification election had been held in the last 12 months in the Caloocan shops; that both the "Samahan" and the Mechanical Department Labor Union had submitted different labor demands upon the management for which reason a certification election was needed to determine the proper collective bargaining agency for the Caloocan shop workers.

The trial judge then reviewed the collective bargaining history of the Philippine National Railways, as follows: 1wph1.t On several similar instances, this Court allowed the establishment of new and separate bargaining unit in one company, even in one department of the same company, despite the existence of the same facts and circumstances as obtaining in the case at bar. The history of the collective bargaining in the Manila Railroad Company, now the Philippine National Railways shows that originally, there was only one bargaining unit in the company, represented by the Kapisanan Ng Manggagawa sa MRR. Under Case No. 237-MC, this Court ordered the establishment of two additional units, the engine crew and the train crew to be represented by the Union de Maquinistas, Fogoneros, Ayudante Y Motormen and Union de Empleados de Trenes, respectively. Then in 1961, under Cases Nos. 491-MC, 494-MC and 507-MC three new separate units were established, namely, the yard crew unit, station employees unit and engineering department employees unit, respectively, after the employees concerned voted in a plebiscite conducted by the court for the separation from existing bargaining units in the company. Then again, under Case No. 763-MC, a new unit, composed of the Mechanical Department employees, was established to be represented by the Mechanical Department Labor Union. Incidentally, the first attempt of the employees of the Mechanical Department to be separated as a unit was dismissed by this Court of Case No. 488-MC. In the case of the yard crew, station employees and the Engineering Department employees, the Supreme Court sustained the order of this Court in giving the employees concerned the right to vote and decide whether or not they desire to be separate units (See G.R. Nos. L-16292-94, L-16309 and L-16317-18, November, 1965). In view of its findings and the history of "union representation" in the railway company, indicating that bargaining units had been formed through separation of new units from existing ones whenever plebiscites had shown the workers' desire to have their own representatives, and relying on the "Globe doctrine" (Globe Machine & Stamping Co., 3 NLRB 294) applied in Democratic Labor Union vs. Cebu Stevedoring Co., L-10321, 28 February 1958, Judge Martinez held that the employees in the Caloocan Shops should be given a chance to vote on whether their group should be separated from that represented by the Mechanical Department Labor Union, and ordered a plebiscite held for the purpose. The ruling was sustained by the Court en banc; wherefore, the Mechanical Department Labor Union appealed to this Court questioning the applicability under the circumstances of the "Globe doctrine" of considering the will of the employees in determining what union should represent them. Technically, this appeal is premature, since the result of the ordered plebiscite among the workers of the Caloocan shops may be adverse to the formation of a separate unit, in which event, as stated in the appealed order, all questions raised in this case would be rendered moot and academic. Apparently, however, the appellant Mechanical Department Labor Union takes it for granted that the plebiscite would favor separation. We find no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the ruling under appeal as would justify our interfering with it. Republic Act No. 875 has primarily entrusted the prosecution of its policies to the Court of Industrial Relations, and, in view of its intimate knowledge concerning the facts and circumstances surrounding the cases brought before it, this Court has repeatedly upheld the exercise of discretion of the Court of Industrial Relations in matters concerning the representation of employee groups (Manila Paper Mills Employees & Workers' Association vs. C.I.R. 104 Phil. 10; Benguet Consolidated vs. Bobok Lumber Jack Association, 103 Phil. 1150). Appellant contends that the application of the "Globe doctrine" is not warranted because the workers of the Caloocan shops do not require different skills from the rest of the workers in the Mechanical Department of the Railway Company. This question is primarily one of facts. The Industrial Court has found that there is a basic difference, in that those in the Caloocan shops not only have a community of interest and working conditions but perform major repairs of railway rolling stock, using heavy equipment and machineries found in said shops, while the others only perform minor repairs. It is easy to understand, therefore, that the workers in the Caloocan shops require special skill in the use of heavy equipment and machinery sufficient to set them apart from the rest of the workers. In addition, the record shows that the collective bargaining agreements negotiated by the appellant union have been in existence for more than two (2) years; hence, such agreements can not constitute a bar to the determination, by proper elections, of a new bargaining representative (PLDT Employees' Union vs. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., 51 Off. Gaz., 4519).

As to the charge that some of the members of the appellee, "Samahan Ng Manggagawa", are actually supervisors, it appears that the question of the status of such members is still pending final decision; hence, it would not constitute a legal obstacle to the holding of the plebiscite. At any rate, the appellant may later question whether the votes of those ultimately declared to be supervisors should be counted. Whether or not the agreement negotiated by the appellant union with the employer, during the pendency of the original petition in the Court of Industrial Relations, should be considered valid and binding on the workers of the Caloocan shops is a question that should be first passed upon by the Industrial Court. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant Mechanical Department Labor Union sa Philippine National Railways. Republic SUPREME Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 156882 October 31, 2008 of the Philippines COURT

ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU) and DIVINE WORD UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES UNION-ALU (DWUEU-ALU), Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF PALO, LEYTE, and DIVINE WORD UNIVERSITY OF TACLOBAN, Respondents. DECISION VELASCO, JR., J.: Petitioners Associated Labor Unions and Divine Word University Employees Union-ALU (Union) represented the Union members which prevailed in the labor case entitled Divine Word University of Tacloban v. Secretary of Labor and Employment1 under G.R. No. 91915 and promulgated on September 11, 1992. A direct consequence of the case was that the Divine Word University of Tacloban (DWUT) ended up owing petitioners over a hundred million pesos for unpaid benefits. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Palo, Leyte (RCAP) is a corporation sole which sold to Societas Verbum Dei(SVD) or the Society of the Divine Word the subject 13 parcels of land, to wit: Lot Nos. 529, 4901, 528, 2067, 498, 507, 497, 506, 508, 2068E, 2068D, 2065, and 2410, the last four of which were untitled when the sale was concluded. The Deed of Sale2 executed on October 1, 1958 contained the following conditions and restrictions, among others: IV. That the SOCIETY OF THE DIVINE WORD shall use these lands and properties for educational purposes, especially and as far as possible, for the maintenance and further development of the institution known as the ST. PAULS COLLEGE; xxxx VI. That the above described properties and all improvements and any land, buildings or equipment which shall have been later acquired by the ST. PAULS COLLEGE and which are in direct and actual use by the College, as such, shall be turned over to the ownership and possession of the Roman Catholic Bishop of Palo in case there is or are circumstances which will be beyond the control of the contracting parties forcing the abandonment of educational and religious work of the Society of the Divine Word with no hope for its resumption in the foreseeable future, that in this case the terms of the conversion of the property rights shall be determined by the Apostolic [Nunciature] in Manila and/or the Apostolic See in Rome. (Emphasis added.) While the conveying document was not notarized, the SVD was able to secure the corresponding transfer certificates of title (TCTs) over the subject lots, but the deed conditions, restrictions, and reversionary right of the RCAP were not annotated on the new titles. It must be noted that before the sale, the Tacloban Catholic Institute, a school then run by the RCAP, was already standing over some of the properties sold. At the time of the sale, the school had been renamed St. Pauls College. In line with the purpose of the sale, that is, to further educational and religious work,

the SVD would later rename St. Pauls College the Divine Word College and then DWUT when the school attained university status. Due to labor unrest, DWUT, run by the SVD, and petitioners engaged in a protracted legal battle from 1988 until the finality of the decision in the Divine Word University of Tacloban case on February 11, 1994, or shortly after the Court denied DWUTs motion for reconsideration on January 19, 1994. By then, DWUTs liability to petitioners amounted to PhP 200 million, more or less. On April 27, 1995, the RCAP filed a petition3 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8 in Tacloban City, docketed as Cadastral Case No. 95-04-08 and entitled "In the Matter of the Annotation of Encumbrances on Certain Titles [in the Name of Divine Word University of Tacloban] to Show Restrictions on Use and a Reversionary Interest Therein." In it, the RCAP prayed for an order directing the Registry of Deeds of Tacloban City to register the October 1, 1958 Deed of Sale and annotate on the corresponding SVD titles the conditions, restrictions, and a reversionary interest of the RCAP stipulated in the deed. On May 9, 1995, DWUT issued notices to petitioners members, advising them of the decision of the DWUT Board of Trustees to close the university starting academic year 1995-1996, or on June 16, 1995, and, thus, to consider themselves dismissed effective at the close of business hours of June 15, 1995. Meanwhile, on July 7, 1995, the National Conciliation and Mediation Board ordered DWUT to pay PhP 163,089,337.57 to the members of petitioner Union as partial satisfaction of the January 19, 1994 final resolution of this Court in G.R. No. 91915. Prompted by the closure of DWUT and the resulting termination of its members services, the Union filed a complaint, as later amended,4 against DWUT, its Board of Trustees, and the RCAP for Unfair Labor Practice, Illegal Dismissal, and Damages before the Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB) No. VIII in Tacloban City, docketed as NLRC Case No. RCB-VIII-7-0299-95. The Union alleged in its complaint that the sale of the subject properties over which the DWUT is located was incomplete due to the adverted conditions, restrictions, and a reversionary right of the RCAP over the subject properties. What is more, the RCAP did not, despite the sale, sever its employment relations with DWUT which, thus, rendered the RCAP solidarily liable with DWUT for the payment of the benefits of the Union members. On August 3, 1995, petitioners filed their Motion to Intervene in Cadastral Case No. 95-04-08, asserting their legal interest over the subject properties, such interest, according to them, emanating from a judgment lien over the subject properties based on the Entry of Final Judgment dated February 11, 1994 under G.R. No. 91915. And relying on Article 110 of the Labor Code in relation to Arts. 2242, 2243, and 2244 of the Civil Code on concurrence and preference of credits, they asserted preferential rights over the subject properties now owned by and registered under the name of the SVD. On March 8, 1996, the RTC issued an Order5 dismissing the petition in Cadastral Case No. 95-04-08. The RTC held that it has no jurisdiction over the case for annotation owing to what it considered as petitioners right to a judgment lien referred to earlier. The trial court also held that the RCAP violated SC Circular No. 04-94 on forum shopping on account of the pendency of NLRC Case No. RCB-VIII-7-0299-95 where he was impleaded. Finally, the trial court deemed as moot the resolution of RCAPs formal offer of evidence and petitioners motion to intervene. Unsatisfied, the RCAP filed a motion for reconsideration faulting the RTC for misappreciating the facts of the case, the evidence adduced, and the applicable laws. He argued that the RTC has jurisdiction over all cadastral cases, like the instant case, in accordance with Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 entitled Amending and Codifying the Laws Relative to Registration of Property and for Other Purposes, as applied in Ignacio v. Court of Appeals6 and related cases.7 Continuing, the RCAP contended that he precisely filed the cadastral case because the October 1, 1958 Deed of Sale was not notarized, adding that the registration and annotation process would be ministerial on the part of the register of deeds had the sale been in a public document.1avvphi1 Moreover, the RCAP asserted that the reference to the complaint in NLRC Case No. RCB-VIII-7-0299-95 was only made to underscore the fact that the Union duly acknowledged in the complaint the existence and due execution of the October 1, 1958 Deed of Sale. Besides, he pointed out, DWUT, by its manifestation filed before the trial court, did not question the due execution of the deed. Anent the issue of a judgment lien, the RCAP contended that he was never a party in the labor case under G.R. No. 91915 and, hence, could not be bound by the decision in it, much less by its execution. Finally, he denied violating the circular on forum shopping, alleging that the Union filed its

complaint in NLRC Case No. RCB-VIII-7-0299-95 two months after he filed the cadastral case for annotation. The RTC by an Order8 dated June 7, 1996 denied RCAPs motion for reconsideration. While it concurred with the RCAPs arguments set forth in his motion for reconsideration, the trial court still denied the motion on the ground of laches, noting that it took the RCAP 37 years after the execution of the deed of sale before taking judicial action to assert his rights. Aggrieved, the RCAP timely filed his Notice of Appeal assailing the above orders of the trial court before the Court of Appeals (CA). The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 56482. In the meantime, on February 24, 1997, the RCAP, the DWUT, and the Union entered into a Memorandum of Agreement9 (MOA) whereby they agreed on the following: (1) the Union would withdraw NLRC Case No. RCB-VIII-7-0299-95 against DWUT and the RCAP; (2) DWUT would pay the Union PhP 100 million as final settlement of G.R. No. 91915 (NCMB-RB-80NS-04-024-88) and NLRC Case No. RCB-VIII-7-0299-95; (3) DWUT would continue to recognize the Union as the sole bargaining agent for collective bargaining agreement (CBA); and (4) DWUT and the Union would negotiate and enter into a new CBA in lieu of the CBA imposed in G.R. No. 91915. For the payment of the final settlement of PhP 100 million, it was agreed that PhP 15 million should be paid upfront, while payment of the remaining PhP 85 million should be by dacion en pago. Covered by the dacion en pago arrangement were the Imelda Village and a 1,000-sq. meter property known as San Jose land. The MOA signing paved the way for the re-opening of the DWUT. On April 29, 2002, the CA rendered the assailed decision,10 reversing the March 8, 1996 and June 7, 1996 Orders of the RTC and directed the annotation of encumbrances on the TCTs of the subject properties to show the restrictions on use and reversionary interest of the RCAP. The decretal portion of the CAs decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Orders of the court a quo dated 08 March 1996 and 07 June 1996 respectively are hereby REVERSED. The petition for the annotation of encumbrances on certain titles to show restrictions on use and a reversionary interest therein is GRANTED. SO ORDERED. At the outset, the CA noted that the RTC failed to categorically resolve the Unions motion for intervention under Sec. 2 of Rule 12, as amended by Sec. 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, since the RTC merely stated in its March 8, 1996 Order that the resolution of the motion for intervention was mooted. Noted, moreover, was the fact that said order became final as against the Union on account of its failure to question the order within the reglementary period available to it. Consequently, the CA held that the Union cannot, on appeal, be considered a proper party in the instant case, as it did not acquire personality to be a party to the proceedings in the case. Thus, the CA treated as mere scrap of paper the Unions appellees brief. In reversing the assailed RTC orders, the CA disagreed with the trial courts finding and application of the equitable remedy of laches. Relying on Eduarte v. Court of Appeals11 and related cases,12 where the Court applied laches to bar judicial remedies in the plaintiffs exercise of legal rights, as allowing plaintiff to do so would be inequitable and unjust to the defendant, the CA held that the RCAP was not barred by laches from asserting his legal right to cause the annotation of the pertinent paragraphs of the deed of sale on the TCTs covering the subject properties. It ratiocinated that despite the lapse of 37 years, the annotation would not be inequitable or prejudicial to any party since the SVD, under whose name the TCTs of the subject properties were issued, did not interpose any objection to the annotation. It noted that the June 7, 1996 RTC Order did not specify the party who would be prejudiced by the annotation. The Unions motion for reconsideration was rejected by the CA through the assailed January 20, 2003 Resolution.13 Hence, we have this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, raising the following issues for our consideration: WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ALLOWING THE ANNOTATION OF ENCUMBRANCE ON CERTAIN [TITLES] TO SHOW RESTRICTIONS ON USE AND REVERSIONARY INTERESTS THEREIN

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN CONSIDERING THE APPELLEES BRIEF OF PETITIONERS AS A MERE SCRAP OF PAPER AND ASSAIL[ING] THE PERSONALITY OF THE PETITIONER[S] IN THE INSTANT CASE14 On the first issue, petitioners argue that the appellate court erred in not affirming and applying the equitable remedy of laches. They assert that due to the adjudged substantial liabilities of DWUT pursuant to G.R. No. 91915 and for which it is hard put of meeting, the subject properties over which DWUT stands must be used. Considering that no annotations were made on the TCTs covering the subject properties and considering too the resultant judgment lien attaching on them, the desired annotation is clearly prejudicial and inequitable both for the DWUT and petitioners, for how, petitioners wonder, could the school pay its adjudged obligations without the substantial assets composed of the subject properties? Petitioners contend further that the instant case for annotation was pursued only after they have filed notices of lis pendens over the subject properties for the ultimate satisfaction of their adjudicated monetary claims against DWUT. Clearly, they posit, the RCAP is trying to move the subject properties out of the reach of petitioners through the requested annotation. Thus, they conclude that the principle of laches has attached and the annotation of the encumbrance or reversionary right of the RCAP is properly barred. Corollary to the first issue, petitioners aver under the second issue that the appellate court gravely abused its discretion in holding that petitioners are not prejudiced and will not be affected by the resolution of the instant case for annotation. As petitioners would argue, their rights would greatly be prejudiced since the resolution ordering annotation will not only delay the execution proceedings but will render for naught the final decision of this Court in G.R. No. 91915. Petitioners also take umbrage of the CAs ruling on the issue of personality of the Union in the instant case as the RCAP never questioned its standing in his opposition to the motion to intervene. Besides, they emphasize, the personality issue was not raised in the proceedings before the trial court and, thus, cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. On the other hand, the RCAP argues that petitioners have not sufficiently shown that they will be prejudiced by the annotation of his interest over the subject properties. The RCAP contends: First, the SVD and DWUT, the parties who could be so prejudiced, have not opposed the annotation. Second, petitioners have not shown that the SVD and DWUT have no other properties to answer for the adjudicated liabilities in G.R. No. 91915. In fact, the February 24, 1997 MOA executed by the Union, DWUT, represented by the SVD, and the RCAP envisioned a final settlement of petitioners claim without involving the subject properties. Third, the judgment lien issue is immaterial since there is as yet no levy on execution over the subject properties. Besides, the preference of credit asserted in connection with the perceived lien is only applicable where there is an insolvency proceeding and payment of debts have to be equitably distributed among the creditors. And fourth, the CA can, on appeal, rule on the issue of the Unions personality since an appeal opens the case de novo and the appellate court has discretion to rule on issues which it deems are necessary for the proper adjudication of the case, like the matter of personality which the appellate court resolved motu proprio and not upon the instance of the RCAP. Considering the arguments and counter-arguments earnestly pressed by the parties, the main issues to be determined are first, whether the Union has acquired legal personality to intervene in the instant case; andsecond, whether laches has set in to bar the RCAPs cause of action. We answer both issues in the negative. As the appellate court aptly noted, the RTC did not resolve the motion for intervention of the Union. It bears stressing that the March 8, 1996 RTC Order held that the dismissal of Cadastral Case No. 95-04-08 mooted the resolution of the Unions motion for intervention. Likewise, the RTC did not allow intervention in its June 7, 1996 Order as it denied the RCAPs motion for reconsideration on the ground of laches. Since it did not question these RTC orders which lapsed into finality later, the Union cannot be said to have acquired any legal personality to intervene or participate in the instant case. Therefore, the appellate court did not gravely abuse its discretion in holding that the Union has no legal personality to participate in the proceedings of the instant case, and consequently, the instant petition of the Union is dismissible on this ground alone. The instant petition will nevertheless fail even if we concede that the Union has legal personality to institute it. The judgment lien over the subject properties is really non-existent as it has not been shown that a levy on execution has been

imposed over the subject properties. While the Decision in G.R. No. 91915 is indeed final and executory, such reality does not ipso facto burden all the lands and properties owned by the SVD over which the DWUT is erected, absent proof that the SVD cannot pay its adjudicated obligations and that a levy on execution was indeed made over the subject properties. We agree with the RCAP that a judgment lien over the subject properties has not legally attached and that Art. 11015 of the Labor Code, in relation to Arts. 2242, 2243, and 2244 of the Civil Code on concurrence and preference of credits, does not cover the subject properties. Art. 110 of the Labor Code applies only to cases of bankruptcy and liquidation. Likewise, the abovementioned articles of the Civil Code on concurrence and preference of credits properly come into play only in cases of insolvency. Since there is no bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding to speak of, much less a liquidation of the assets of DWUT, the Union cannot look to said statutory provisions for support. Moreover, we note the utter lack of showing that DWUT has no other assets to answer its obligations. DWUT may have liquidity problems hampering its ability to meet its judicially-imposed obligations. The school, however, appears to have other properties it can and in fact did use to settle its obligations as shown in the February 24, 1997 MOA between DWUT, the Union, and RCAP. A scrutiny of the MOA readily shows that the subject properties were not included in the assets or properties earmarked to settle DWUTs obligations. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the Union has judicially admitted the existence, due execution, and validity of the October 1, 1958 Deed of Sale with the conditions, restrictions, and a reversionary right of the RCAP embodied in it. In its complaint before the RAB for Unfair Labor Practice, Illegal Dismissal, and Damages, the Union impleaded the RCAP as solidarily liable with the DWUT on the Unions monetary claims precisely on the basis of said conditions, restrictions, and a reversionary right of the RCAP. Such averment is a clear admission against the interests of the Union. The Union likewise cannot be permitted to take two opposite positions on the issue of the stipulated reversionary right of RCAP over the subject properties. It cannot invoke such reversionary right of RCAP to render the RCAP solidarily liable with the DWUT in the RAB case while, at the same time, resisting the annotation of that reversionary right in the instant case. On the issue of laches, we agree and so hold that it is inapplicable to the instant case. Estate of the Late Encarnacion Vda. de Panlilio v. Dizon explains the concept of laches in this wise: According to settled jurisprudence, "laches" means "the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that whichby the exercise of due diligencecould or should have been done earlier." Verily, laches serves to deprive a party guilty of it of any judicial remedies. Its elements are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom the defendant claims, giving rise to the situation which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainants rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendants conduct as having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right in which the defendant bases the suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held barred. In Santiago v. Court of Appeals, we explained that there is "no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances."16 Of the foregoing elements, the fourth and most important element, that is, injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant or the suit is not held barred, is not present under the premises. As the CA aptly observed, no prejudice can result from the annotation pleaded by the RCAP since the SVD, the property purchaser in the October 1, 1958 transaction, did not oppose the annotation of the conditions, restrictions, and a reversionary right of the RCAP over the subject properties, as evidenced by a manifestation the DWUT filed before the trial court. More so, no prejudice can befall the Union for no judgment lien has attached or been imposed over the subject properties and, as earlier explained, there is no showing that the subject properties are the only properties the DWUT has or that its other assets and properties are insufficient to meet its obligations. Thus, failing to show any actual interest over the subject properties that need judicial protection, the Union will not suffer any damage with the annotation on SVDs titles of the conditions, restrictions, and a reversionary interest of the RCAP. Indeed, there is no dispute as to the existence and due execution of the October 1, 1958 Deed of Sale in question. Its validity is immediately apparent from the fact that the RCAPs titles over the properties covered by the deed had been canceled and new TCTs issued in the name of the SVD. The fact that the

deed is not notarized is of little moment because, for purposes of validity between the parties, a deed of sale need not be in a public document.17With the judicial acquiescence of the SVD to the annotation, the subject matter of the instant case, we so hold such to be in order. WHEREFORE, we DENY this petition and AFFIRM IN TOTO the April 29, 2002 Decision and January 20, 2003 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 56482, with costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED. PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Specialty Health care case

NCLC's Position Responding to an invitation from the NLRB, NCLC filed two briefs urging the Board to hold that where there is no history of collective bargaining, a bargaining unit comprised only of employees performing the same job at a nonacute health care facility is inappropriate under the standard articulated in Park Manor Care. In Park Manor Care, the NLRB ruled against the establishment of small, fragmented bargaining units in both acute and nonacute health care facilities. NCLC argued that Congress did not intend for the proliferation of bargaining units in the health care industry when it enacted amendments to the National Labor Relations Act in 1974. NCLC warned that revising the bargaining unit standard would increase the likelihood of strikes, jurisdictional disputes, and other disruptions to health care operations. Case Outcome The NLRB overruled its 1991 decision in Park Manor, which established a specific standard for determining appropriate bargaining units for nursing homes, rehabilitation centers, and other facilities. In its Specialty Healthcare decision, the NLRB held that non-acute health care facilities employees would be subject to the "community-of-interest" test to determine whether they could constitute an "appropriate bargaining unit." The board found that in this instance, the nursing home Certified Nursing Assistants might be considered an "appropriate bargaining unit" even though the unit excludes other non-professional employees. Dissenting, NLRB board member Brian Hayes criticized the NLRB's activist decision to eliminate the non-controversial, 20year old Park Manor test, particularly where the party seeking NLRB review had never objected to the Park Manor test. DTG OPERATIONS CASE DTG Operations, Inc. (27-RC-8629; 357 NLRB No. 175) Denver, CO, December 30, 2011. A Board majority (Chairman Pearce and Member Becker) reversed the Regional Directors findings that (1) the petitioned-for unit of rental service agents (RSAs) and lead rental service agents (LRSAs) at the Employers Denver International Airport rental car facility was not an appropriate unit for bargaining; and (2) instead, the smallest appropriate unit was a wall-to-wall unit of all 109 of the Employers hourly employees(including its return, lot, service, fleet, and exit booth agents, staff assistants, shutters, courtesy bus drivers, mechanics, and building maintenance technician). Applying the principles set forth in its recent decision in Specialty Healthcare & Rehabilitation Center of Mobile, 357 NLRB No. 83 (2011), the Board found, contrary to the Regional Director, that (1) the RSAs and LRSAs shared a community of interest, and (2) the Employer failed to demonstrate that the additional employees it sought to include shared an overwhelming community of interest with the RSAs and LRSAs. Specifically, the Board found that the petitioned-for RSAs and LRSAs primary job functions and duties, skills and qualifications, uniforms, work areas, schedules, incentives, risks, and supervision were different from all other employees. Accordingly, the Board remanded to the Regional Director to direct an election in the petitioned-for unit of RSAs and LRSAs. Member Hayes dissented, finding that the majoritys result provides further confirmation of the predictable effects of their outcome driven Specialty Healthcare test for determining whether a unit is appropriate for bargaining. Member Hayes concluded that under the relevant precedent and his prior dissents to the Specialty Healthcare test, the Regional Directors decision should be affirmed and the petition dismissed. Petitioner Teamsters Local Union No. 455, International Brotherhood of Teamsters. Regional Director issued the decision on January 28, 2011. Chairman Pearce and Members Becker and Hayes participated. ***