Spouses Badua vs Cordillera Bodong Administration Constitutional Law Judicial Power Spouses Badua were occupying a parcel of land

d in Abra. The said land is being claimed by Quema. Quema said he sold the land to a certain Dra. Valera but then he was able to repurchase the land later from the same doctor. The Baduas however contend that they were the ones who bought the land from Valera but that they cannot produce the deed of sale because it was with the vice governor. Quema sued the Baduas not before the regular courts but rather before the Maeng Tribal Court. The MTC is composed of elders respected in the community and that it is alleged that their decision is likewise respected. It is likewise a branch of the Cordillera Bodong Administration. Non-compliance to the MTC decision would result to community ostracism. The MTC resolved the issue by granting the land to Quema. The Baduas were then ordered to vacate the land. The Baduas refused. Thereafter the Baduas received a warning order from the CPLA the military branch of the MTC. This brought fear t the couple which led to Leonors running away and Rosas arrest. They were threatened by the CPLA hence they appeal before the SC. ISSUE: Whether or not the Maeng Tribal Court is a competent court. HELD: No, the MTC is not a competent court. The Cordillera AUTONOMOUS Region never came into existence. Hence, the Cordillera Bodong Council which would have received judicial power, granted CARs autonomy never possessed judicial power. Hence, the MTC its supposed branch likewise never received judicial power. Therefore, it cannot validly decide on cases neither can it enforce its decision. Josue Javellana vs Executive Secretary Constitutional Law Political Question Validity of the 1973 Constitution Restriction to Judicial Power In 1973, Marcos ordered the immediate implementation of the new 1973 Constitution. Javellana, a Filipino and a registered voter sought to enjoin the Exec Sec and other cabinet secretaries from implementing the said constitution. Javellana averred that the said constitution is void because the same was initiated by the president. He argued that the President is w/o power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed constitution. Further, the election held to ratify such constitution is not a free election there being intimidation and fraud. ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must give due course to the petition.

HELD: The SC ruled that they cannot rule upon the case at bar. Majority of the SC justices expressed the view that they were concluded by the ascertainment made by the president of the Philippines, in the exercise of his political prerogatives. Further, there being no competent evidence to show such fraud and intimidation during the election, it is to be assumed that the people had acquiesced in or accepted the 1973 Constitution. The question of the validity of the 1973 Constitution is a political question which was left to the people in their sovereign capacity to answer. Their ratification of the same had shown such acquiescence. De La Llana vs Alba Constitutional Law Political Question if there is no question of law involved BP 129 In 1981, BP 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes, was passed. De la Llana was assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be one of the judges that would be removed because of the reorganization and second, he said such law would contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts, He averred that only the SC can remove judges NOT Congress. ISSUE: Whether or not Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature by such statute (BP 129). HELD: The SC ruled the following way: Moreover, this Court is empowered to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal. Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest

consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred. Almario vs Alba Political Law Amendment to the Constitution As provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 643, the Filipino electorate will go to the polls on January 27, 1984 to either approve or reject amendments to the Constitution proposed by Resolution Nos. 104, 105, 110, 111, 112, and 113 of the Batasang Pambansa. The proposed amendments are embodied in four (4) separate questions to be answered by simple YES or NO answers. Petitioners herein seek to enjoin the submission on January 27, 1984 of Question Nos. 3 (grant as an additional mode of acquiring lands belonging to the public domain) and 4 (the undertaking by the government of a land reform program and a social reform program), which cover Resolution Nos. 105 and 113, to the people for ratification or rejection on the ground that there has been no fair and proper submission following the doctrine laid down in Tolentino v. COMELEC. The petitioners do not seek to prohibit the holding of the plebiscite but only ask for more time for the people to study the meaning and implications of Resolution Nos. 105 and 113 until the nature and effect of the proposals are fairly and properly submitted to the electorate. ISSUE: Whether or not Questions 3 and 4 can be presented to the people on a later date.

HELD: The necessity, expediency, and wisdom of the proposed amendments are beyond the power of the courts to adjudicate. Precisely, whether or not grant of public land and urban land reform are unwise or improvident or whether or not the proposed amendments are unnecessary is a matter which only the people can decide. The questions are presented for their determination. Assuming that a member or some members of this Court may find undesirable any additional mode of disposing of public land or an urban land reform program, the remedy is to vote NO in the plebiscite but not to substitute his or their aversion to the proposed amendments by denying to the millions of voters an opportunity to express their own likes or dislikes. The issue before us has nothing to do with the wisdom of the proposed amendments, their desirability, or the danger of the power being abused. The issue is whether or not the voters are aware of the wisdom, the desirability, or the dangers of abuse. The petitioners have failed to make out a case that the average voter does not know the meaning of grant of public land or of urban land reform. Pablito Sanidad vs COMELEC Political Law Amendment to the Constitution On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies (barangays) to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers. Twenty days after, the President issued another related decree, PD No. 1031, amending the previous PD No. 991, by declaring the provisions of PD No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in barangays applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its whereas clauses that the peoples continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendumplebiscite of October 16. On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding

and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. The Soc-Gen contended that the question is political in nature hence the court cannot take cognizance of it. ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the Constitution. HELD: The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a judicial question. This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the interim National Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the interim National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the new Constitution provides: All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten

Members. . . .. The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits. This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose amendments to the Constitution and he was able to present those proposals to the people in sufficient time. Josue Javellana vs Executive Secretary Constitutional Law Political Question Validity of the 1973 Constitution Restriction to Judicial Power In 1973, Marcos ordered the immediate implementation of the new 1973 Constitution. Javellana, a Filipino and a registered voter sought to enjoin the Exec Sec and other cabinet secretaries from implementing the said constitution. Javellana averred that the said constitution is void because the same was initiated by the president. He argued that the President is w/o power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed constitution. Further, the election held to ratify such constitution is not a free election there being intimidation and fraud. ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must give due course to the petition. HELD: The SC ruled that they cannot rule upon the case at bar. Majority of the SC justices expressed the view that they were concluded by the ascertainment made by the president of the Philippines, in the exercise of his political prerogatives. Further, there being no competent evidence to show such fraud and intimidation during the election, it is to be assumed that the people had acquiesced in or accepted the 1973 Constitution. The question of the validity of the 1973 Constitution is a political question which was left to the people in their sovereign capacity to answer. Their ratification of the same had shown such acquiescence. Taada and Diosdado Macapagal vs Cuenco Constitutional Law Political Question After the 1955 elections, members of the Senate were chosen. The Senate was overwhelmingly occupied by the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo. Diosdado on the other hand was a senatorial candidate who lost the bid but was contesting it before the SET. But prior to a decision the SET would have to choose its members. It is provided that the SET should be composed of 9 members; 3 justices, 3 senators from the majority party and 3 senators from the minority party. But since there is only one minority senator the other two SET members supposed to come from the minority were filled in by the NP.

Lorenzo assailed this process. So did Diosdado because he deemed that if the SET would be dominated by NP senators then he, as a member of the Liberalista will not have any chance in his election contest. Cuenco et al (members of the NP) averred that the SC cannot take cognizance of the issue because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the members of the SET is vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for Lorenzo and Diosdado is not to raise the issue before judicial courts but rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion. ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question. HELD: The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled in favor of Lorenzo and Diosdado. The term Political Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. Gonzales vs COMELEC ** Consolidated with PHILCONSA vs COMELEC Constitutional Law Political Question vs Justiciable Question One of the issues raised in this case was the validity of the submission of certain proposed constitutional amendments at a plebiscite scheduled on the same day as the regular elections. Petitioners argued that this was unlawful as there would be no proper submission of the proposal to the people who would be more interested in the issues involved in the election. It was contended that such issue cannot be properly raised before the courts because it is a political one. ISSUE: Whether or not the issue involves a political question. HELD: Pursuant to Art 15 of the 35 Constitution, SC held that there is nothing in this provision to indicate that the election therein referred to is a special, not a general election. The circumstance that the previous amendment to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections. The SC also noted that if what is placed in question or if the crux of the problem is the validity of an act then the same would be or

the issue would be considered as a justiciable question NOT a political one. Fernando Lopez vs Gerardo Roxas Constitutional Law Judicial Power Defined Lopez and Roxas were the candidates for VP in the 1965 elections. Lopez won the election. Roxas appealed his lost before the PET. The PET was created by RA 1793. It is provided in the law that There shall be on independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal . . . which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the president-elect and the Vice-president elect of the Philippines. In effect, a losing candidate would have the right to appeal his loss. Lopez assailed the law and he sought to enjoin Roxas and the PET from proceeding with the case. Lopez averred that the PET is unconstitutional for it was not provided for in the constitution. Also, since the PET is composed of the Chief Justice and the other ten members of the SC any decision of the PET cannot be validly appealed before the SC or that there may be conflict that may arise once a PET decision is appealed before the SC. ISSUE: Whether or not the PET is a valid body. HELD: Pursuant to the Constitution, the Judicial power shall be vested in one SC and in such inferior courts as may be established by law This provision vests in the judicial branch of the government, not merely some specified or limited judicial power, but the judicial power under our political system, and, accordingly, the entirety or all of said power, except, only, so much as the Constitution confers upon some other agency, such as the power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the Senate and those of the House of Representatives, which is vested by the fundamental law solely in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal, respectively. Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights. The proper exercise of said authority requires legislative action: (1) defining such enforceable and demandable rights and/or prescribing remedies for violations thereof; and (2) determining the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide said controversies or disputes, in the first instance and/or on appeal. For this reason, the Constitution ordains that Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the

jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to the limitations set forth in the fundamental law. The SC ruled that the PET is not in conflict with the constitution. RA 1793 merely added the courts jurisdiction and such can be validly legislated by Congress. It merely conferred upon the SC additional functions i.e., the functions of the PET. This is valid because the determining of election contests is essentially judicial. Ricardo Santiago vs Commissioner Bautista of Immigrations Constitutional Law Judicial Power Justiciable Controversy Citizenship Santiago was considered an alien as evidenced by his alien certificate of registration. He averred that this is erroneous. He was born of a Filipino mother and a Chinese father here in the Philippines. He was sent to China when he was 4 years old by his dad. He returned in 1925 and in his Landing Certificate he was already labeled as a Filipino. Hence, he would like to cancel the alien certificate that was issued by the Bureau of Immigrations. In his original petition however in the lower court he was praying for a declaratory relief for him to be declared as a Filipino. He was favored by the court. The fiscal appealed averring that a declaratory relief is not the proper remedy. The lower court amended the decision not stating the declaratory statement but rather focusing on the cancellation of the alien certificate. The fiscal appealed before the SC. ISSUE: Whether or not declaratory relief is a proper remedy to have a judicial declaration of citizenship. HELD: The SC ruled against Santiago. Although amended, the proceeding initiated and originally prayed for is a declaratory relief to have him be declared as a Filipino. Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist for the settlement of justifiable controversies, which imply a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an accident only of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to, their status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power. Thus, for instance, no action or proceeding may be instituted for a declaration to the effect that plaintiff or petitioner is married, or single, or a legitimate child, although a finding thereon may be made as a necessary premise to justify a given relief available only to one enjoying said status. At times, the law permits the acquisition of a given status, such as naturalization,

by judicial decree. But, there is no similar legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is part of our citizenry. RADIOWEALTH, INC. VS AGREGADO (1950) FACTS: 1. A Webster Teletalk and Webster Telephone Speaker were bought for Pho 585 and installed in the second and third floor of the Malacanang Annex which houses the Supreme Court. 2. The Chairman of the Property Requisition Committee (appointed by the President) disapproved of the purchase and its installation invoking EO 302 which discontinues open market purchases. 3. Petitioners also contend that Judicial functions do not include purchase of property. 4. Radiowealth, Inc. (vendor) is now requesting that the payment be approved however, the Auditor of the SC refused to countersign the warrant for payment. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the Judicial Dept can make purchases without the prior approval of the Executive? HELD: YES, they can. RD: Found in a ruling in Tarlac VS Gale All three departments are co-equal and co-important, each is independent from the other and cannot control or interfere with each other in the exercise of special functions. Judiciary has the power to maintain its existence and do whatever is necessary to preserve their integrity, maintain their dignity and ensure effectiveness in the administration of justice. Officials of the government who owe duty to the court under the law cannot deprive the courts of anything vital to their functions. Officials and boards are duty-bound to construct or purchase offices or court rooms and furnish them. They also have to insure that the character of these rooms would permit the court to exercise its functions in a reasonably effective manner. In case of conflict to, the court shall overpower the officials as they will be the ultimate judge in determining what is necessary for its efficiency.

Officials have the power to assign a particular room or court room to the Court of First Instance and change the assignments provided that the new rooms are reasonable adequate. Courts have the power to refuse dispossession of the room if they deem that the new room would be inadequate in the exercise of their duties. If board refuses to furnish the articles mentioned by law, then the court would have the power either to purchase things directly or by proper proceedings to compel the officials to perform their duties to the law. Executive does not have power over the purchase of books and other office equipment needed for the convenient transaction of its business. Court could not maintain its independence and dignity if it executive could determine what the courts should have. They are of equal footing when it comes to the requisition of for fixtures, equipment and supplies. NOBLEJAS VS. TEEHANKEE Noblejas was the commissioner of land registration. Under RA 1151, he is entitled to the same compensation, emoluments, and privileges as those of a Judge of CFI. He approved a subdivision plan covering certain areas that are in excess of those covered by the title The Secretary of Justice, Teehankee, sent a letter to Noblejas, requiring him to explain. Noblejas answered, arguing that since he has a rank equivalent to that of a Judge, he could only be suspended and investigated in the same manner as an ordinary Judge, under the Judiciary Act. He claims that he may be investigated only by the Supreme Court Nevertheless, he was suspended by the Executive Secretary (ES) Noblejas filed this case claiming the lack of jurisdiction of the ES and his abuse of discretion. ISSUE: Whether the Commissioner of Land Registratoin may only be investigated by the Supreme Court (in view of his having a rank equivalent to a judge)? SC: NO. If the law had really intended to include the general grant of rank and privileges equivalent to Judges, the right to be investigated and be suspended or removed only by the Supreme Court, then such grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the doctrine

of separation of powers because it would charge the Supreme Court with an administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials, simultaneously reducing pro tanto, the control of the Chief Executive over such officials. There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislative to charge the Judiciary with administrative functions except when reasonable incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties. The judiciary cannot give decisions which are merely advisory, nor can it exercise or participate in the exercise of functions which are essentially legislative or administrative. The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administration of judicial functions. As such, RA 1151 while conferring the same privileges as those of a judge, did not include and was not intended to include, the right to demand investigation by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon the Courts recommendation. Said rights would be violative of the Constitution. The suspension of Noblejas by the ES valid. Also, the resolution of the consulta by a Register of Deeds is NOT a judicial function, but an administrative process. It is conclusive and binding only upon the Register of Deeds, NOT the parties themselves. Even if the resolution is appealable, it does not automatically mean that they are judicial in character. Still, the resolution of the consultas are but a minimal portion of the administrative or executive functions. LINA VS. PURISIMA Lualhati Lina was a bookkeeperat PVB. Petitioner files for mandamus to compel Cabanos (President of Phil. Veterans Bank) to restore Lina to her position. Lina claims she was removed from office by Cabanos who acted in gadalej. It appeared from the annexes of the amended petition that Lina was dismissed by Cabanos pursuant to LOI # 13 / LOI # 19 for being notoriously undesirable. The RTC dismissed the petition because: o Since the removal of Lina was pursuant to LOI issued by the President pursuant to Proclamation 1081, the validity or legality of said act is beyond the power of the courts to review, much less modify, or reverse. This is one of the express limitations upon the power of the Courts in GENERAL ORDER # 3 by President Marcos.

The General Order provides that the courts cannot rule upon the validity or legality of any decree order or act issued by President Marcos, pursuant to Proclamation 1081.

SC: The petitioners right to redress is beyond dispute. When the RTC invoked General Order #3, it was nothing short of an unwarranted abdication of judicial authority. The judge was apparently unaware that the Court has always deemed General Order # 3 as practically inoperative even in the light of Proclamation 1081. There is unanimity among Us in the view that it is for the Court rather than the Executive to determine whether or not We make take cognizance of any given case involving the validity of the acts of the Executive purportedly under the authority of martial law proclamations. Also, the President has publicly acknowledged that even if there was martial law, it is still subject to the authority and jurisdiction of the SC. Thus, the RTC committed grave error in not taking jurisdiction over the case. Ordinarily, the case should be remanded to the judge to be tried on the merits. Yet, this Supreme Court, whose power and duty to do justice are inherent, plenary and imperative, extends to all instances where it appears that final resolution of the parties involved full opportunity to be heard. Thus, the SC may at its option, whenever it feels the best interest of justice would be thereby subserved, dispense with the usual procedure of remanding the case to the court of origin for its own judgment, and instead, the SC may already resolve the issues and rended the final judgment on the merits. SC reinstated Lina to work. Garcia vs Macaraig Jr Political Law Separation of Powers Judge Macaraig took his oath as Judge of the CFI of Laguna and San Pablo City on June 29, 1970. The court, being one of the 112 newly created CFI branches, had to be organized from scratch. From July 1, 1970 to February 28, 1971, Macaraig was not able to assume the duties and functions of a judge due to the fact that his Court Room can not be properly established due to problems as to location and as to appropriations to make his Court up and running. When Macaraig realized that it would be sometime before he could actually preside over his court, he applied for an extended leave (during the 16 years he had worked in the Department of Justice, respondent had, due to pressure of duties, never gone on extended leave, resulting in his forfeiting all the leave benefits he had earned beyond the maximum ten months allowed by the law). The Secretary of Justice, however, prevailed upon respondent to forego his leave and instead to assist him, without being

extended a formal detail, whenever respondent was not busy attending to the needs of his court. Paz Garcia on the other hand filed a complaint alleging that Macaraig is incompetent, dishonest and has acted in violation of his oath as a judge. Garcia said that Macaraig has not submitted the progress of his Courts as required by law. And that Macaraig has received salaries as a judge while he is fully aware that he has not been performing the duties of a judge. ISSUE: Whether or not Macaraig has acted with incompetence and dishonesty as Judge. HELD: Macaraigs inability to perform his judicial duties under the circumstances mentioned above does not constitute incompetence. Respondent was, like every lawyer who gets his first appointment to the bench, eager to assume his judicial duties and rid himself of the stigma of being a judge without a sala, but forces and circumstances beyond his control prevented him from discharging his judicial duties. On the other hand, none of these is to be taken as meaning that the Court looks with favor at the practice of long standing, to be sure, of judges being detailed in the DOJ to assist the Secretary even if it were only in connection with his work of exercising administrative authority over the courts. The line between what a judge may do and what he may not do in collaborating or working with other offices or officers under the other great departments of the government must always be kept clear and jealously observed, lest the principle of separation of powers on which our government rests by mandate of the people thru the Constitution be gradually eroded by practices purportedly motivated by good intentions in the interest of the public service. The fundamental advantages and the necessity of the independence of said three departments from each other, limited only by the specific constitutional precepts on check and balance between and among them, have long been acknowledged as more paramount than the serving of any temporary or passing governmental conveniences or exigencies. It is thus of grave importance to the judiciary under our present constitutional scheme of government that no judge of even the lowest court in this Republic should place himself in a position where his actuations on matters submitted to him for action or resolution would be subject to review and prior approval and, worst still, reversal, before they can have legal effect, by any authority other than the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as the case may be. Needless to say, the Court feels very strongly that it is best that this practice is discontinued. LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC

Facts:During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law RA 9009 amending Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million to restrain the mad rush of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence. Prior to its enactment, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in Congress. Congress did not act on 24 cityhood bills during the 11th Congress. During the 12th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29. This Resolution reached the Senate. However, the 12th Congress adjourned without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29. During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the unapproved Joint Resolution No. 29 filed between November and December of 2006, through their respective sponsors in Congress, individual cityhood bills containing a common provision, as follows: Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. - The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009. These cityhood bills lapsed into law on various dates from March to July 2007 after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign them. Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code. Issue: Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and the equal protection clause Held: Yes, the Cityhood Laws violate both the Constitution and the equal protection clause Ratio: Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied) The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code. The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws. Section 450 of the Local Government Code provides: Section 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has a locallygenerated average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least One hundred million pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites: (i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Land Management Bureau; or (ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office. The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein. (b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands. (c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million toP100 million. Section

450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not provide any exemption from the increased income requirement. The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification under the following conditions: 1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions; 2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law; 3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and 4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class. Limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly,as worded the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. VARGAS VS. RILLORAZA Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Sec 14 of the Peoples Court Act. Section 14 provides: SEC. 14. Any Justice of the Supreme Court who held any office or position under the Philippine Executive Commission or under the government called Philippine Republic may not sit and vote in any case brought to that Court under section thirteen hereof in which the accused is a person who held any office or position under either or both the Philippine Executive Commission and the Philippine Republic or any branch, instrumentality and/or agency thereof. "If, on account of such disqualification, or because of any of the grounds of disqualification of judges, in Rule 126, section I of the Rules of Court, or on account of illness, absence or temporary disability the requisite number of Justices necessary to constitute a quorum or to render judgment in any case is not present, the President may designate such number of Judges of First Instance,Judges-at-large of First Instance, or Cadastral Judges, having none of the disqualifications set forth in said section one hereof, as may be necessary to sit temporarily as Justices of said Court, in order to form a quorum or until a judgment in said case is reached." They claim that:

(a) It provides for qualifications of members of the Supreme Court, other than those provided in section 6, Article VIII of the Philippine Constitution. "(b) It authorizes the appointment of members of the Supreme Court who do not possess the qualifications set forth in section 4, Article VIII, of the Philippine Constitution. "(c) It removes from office the members of the Supreme Court by means of a procedure other than impeachment, contrary to Article IX, of the Philippine Constitution. "(d) It deprives the' Commission on Appointments of Congress of its constitutional prerogative to confirm or reject appointments to the Supreme Court. "(e) It creates two Supreme Courts. "(f) It impairs the rule making power of the Supreme Court, contrary to section 13, Article VIII, of the Philippine Constitution. "(g) it is a Bill of Attainder, for it punishes by disqualification members of the Supreme Court who rendered said public service during the Japanese occupation. "(h) it denies the equal protection of the laws "(i) It is an ex post pacto legislation. "(j) it amends the Constitution by a procedure not sanctioned by Article XV, of the Philippine Constitution. "(k) It destroys the independence of the Judiciary, and it permits the 'packing' of the Supreme court in certain cases, either by Congress or by the President." The Solgen countered that: "1. Power of Congress to enact section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682. "2. Section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 does not and is not intended to provide an additional qualification :for members of the Supreme Court, much less does it amend section 6, Article VIII, of the Constitution of the Philippines. "3. Qualifications of members of the Supreme Court prescribed in section 6, Article Vill of the Constitution 'apply to permanent "appointees"--not to temporary 'designees.' "4. Section 5, Article Vill of the Constitution is not applicable to temporary designations under section 14, commonwealth Act No. 682. "5. It does not remove but merely disqualifies the members of the Supreme Court affected to sit and vote in the particular class of cases therein mentioned.

"6. It does not create an additional 'Special Supreme Court,' "7. It does not impair the rule-making power of the - Supreme Court but merely supplements the Rules of Court. "8. It is not a bill of attainder. "9. It is not an ex post pacto law. "10. It does not deny equal protection of the laws either to the Justices of the Supreme Court affected or to the treason indictees; concerned. "11. It does not amend any constitutional provision. "12. It does not destroy the independence of the judiciary or curtail the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court." ISSUES: 1) Whether the Congress had power to add to the pre-existing ground for disqualification of a Justice. 2) Whether a person may act as Justice of the SC who has not been duly appointed by the President and not confirmed by the CA, even only as DESIGNEE 3) Whether the manner of designation by the President can constitutionally sit temporarily as Justice of the SC. SC: 1. NO. If section 14 were to be effective, such members of the Court who held any office or position under the Philippine Executive Commission, would be disqualified from sitting and voting in the instant case, because the accused herein is a person who likewise held an office under the PEC. In other words, what the constitution ordained as a power and a duty to be exercised and fulfilled by said members of the Court, the challenged law would prohibit them from exercising and fulfilling. IN short, what the constitution directs, the section 14 prohibits. This is a clear repugnancy to the fundamental law. Whatever modification the legislature may propose must not contravene the provisions of the constitution. Thus, the disqualification added by Sec 14 to those already existing at the time of the adoption of the Constitution is arbitrary, irrational and violative of the constitution. 2. NO. No person not so appointed by the President WITH the consent of the CA, may act as Justice of the SC. The designation made by Section 14 does not comply with the requirement of appointment. An additional disqualifying circumstance of the designee is the lack of confirmation

or consent by the CA. So, it may happen that a designee under Sec 14 sitting as a substitute Justice of the SC, and participating therein in the deliberations and functions of the SC, does not possess the qualifications of regular members of the SC. NO temporary composition of the SC is authorized by the Constitution. The phrase unless otherwise provided for by law does NOT authorize any legislation that would alter the composition of the SC, no matter how brief a time it may be imagined. In principle, what matters is not the length or shortness of the alternation of the constitutional composition of the Court, but the very permanence and unalterability of that constitution so long as the constitution which ordains it remains permanent and unaltered. 3. NO. No matter how brief or temporary the participation of the judge, there is no escaping that he would be participating in the deliberations of the the SC, and his vote would count as much as that of any regular Justice. A temporary member thereof is a misnomer, for that is not a position contemplated by the constitution. The Constitution is clear that the CJ and the Justices who compose the SC have to be appointed by the President and confirmed by the CA. Mere designation under Sec 14, does not satisfy said requirement. The designees cannot be such members in view of the fact that they have not been appointed nor confirmed. SEC 14. NULL AND VOID. VirJen Shipping and Marine Services vs. NLRC Facts: Certain seamen entered into a contract of employment for a 12-month period. Some three months after thecommencement of their employment, the seamen demanded a 50% increase of their salaries and benefits. Theseamen demanded this increase while their vessel was on route to a port in Australia controlled by the InternationalTransport Federation (ITP) where the ITF could detain the vessels unless it paid its season ITF rates.The agent of the owner of the vessel agreed to a 25% increase, but when the vessel arrived in Japan shortly afterwards, the seamen were repatriated to Manila and their contract terminated.Two motions for reconsideration filed with Second Division were denied by said Division. Another motion forreconsideration was filed with the Supreme Court en banc which gave its due course, after finding that there was aneed to reconcile the decision of the Second Division with that of the First Division with the Wallen Decision. In thatdecision, the First Division had ruled that the termination of the seamen was illegal.

Issue: Whether or not the termination of the seamen was illegal. Held: The termination of the contract of the seamen was illegal. A manning contract involves the interests not only of the signatories thereto, such as the local Filipino recruiting agent, the foreign owner of vessel and the Filipinoseamen in general as well as the country itself. Conformably to the power vested in the NSB, the law requires that allmanning contracts shall be approved by said agency. The stringent rules governing Filipino seamen abroad foreignships are dictated by national interest. GREGORIO JANDUSAY, EUSEBIO JANDUSAY, DEMETRIA JANDUSAY and LEONILA FABRO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, EMETERIA SALVA, ESPERANZA SALVA, PEDRO LAZO, PAULA LAZO BRIGIDO LAZO, JULIO LAZO, ARCADIA LAZO, and MACARIA LAZO, respondents. Vicente M. Macabidang, Sergio Angeles & Associates for petitioners. R. Estrella and P. Funelas for respondent Macaria Lazo. NARVASA, J.: The controversy at bar concerns the ownership of one of two pieces of land embraced in a Torrens title: Parcel No. 1 of Original Certificate of Title No. 61 of the Registry of Deeds of Oriental Mindoro, issued on August 7, 1911 in the name of Jorge Lingon, married to Arcadia Ganibo The lot is situated in Barrio Catiningan Pola Oriental Mindoro and has an area of 84,964.25 square meters, more or less. 1 [As regards the other parcel covered by the certificate of title, the record shows that Lingon had been selling portions thereof to different individuals from 1938 to 1947, a period of nine years, all said sales having been annotated on the title .] 2 The protagonists are 1) on the one hand, the collateral relatives of Jorge Lingon, herein private respondents, who after the death of Lingon on February 16, 1949 without issue (his wife, Arcadia Ganibo having died earlier) adjudicated unto themselves the property covered by OCT No. 61 in virtue of a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition executed on January 14, 1956 and thereafter caused cancellation of said title and the issuance of a new one in their names, TCT No. T-5420 ; 3 and 2) on the other, the petitioners herein, the heirs of Dominga Marquez, who claim that in January, 1915 Jorge Lingon had sold the land

embraced in OCT No. 61 to a certain Mariano Lontok for P500 by a deed allegedly thumb-marked by Lingon before the Justice of the Peace of Pola, Oriental Mindoro, which deed was not however registered; that by a deed entitled "Escritura de Compraventa" executed on April 30, 1917 and another entitled "Transfer of Real Property" executed on July 24, 1918, Mariano Lontok had conveyed the same property to Dominga Marquez; and that Dominga Marquez and her children had thereafter taken possession of the land and declared it for taxation purposes since 1918. 4 Litigation over said Parcel No. 1 of OCT NO. 61 began with the filing of a complaint for recovery of possession thereof in the Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro by herein private respondents, the heirs of Jorge Lingon, hereafter collectively referred to simply as the SALVAS. 5 The petitioners, hereafter collectively referred to simply as the JANDUSAYS, instituted their own separate action in the same Court, for annulment of title and reconveyance of property. 6 The cases were consolidated and jointly tried and decided. The verdict of the Trial Court 7 went against the SALVAS, the dispositive portion thereof being as follows: WHEREFORE, a decision is hereby rendered in favor of the JANDUSAYS and against the SALVAS: 1. Dismissing the action of the SALVAS against the JANDUSAYS in Civil Case No. R-667, with costs against the former in favor of the latter; 2. Declaring the annulment and the consequent cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-5420 in the name of the SALVAS over the land in question, as to Parcel No. 1 described therein which is the land in litigation; 3. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Oriental Mindoro to issue a new Transfer Certificate of Title on the same Parcel No. 1 of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-5420 in the name of JANDUSAYS, specially, Gregorio Jandusay, Demetria Jandusay, Eusebio Jandusay and Leonila Fabro, pro-indivisoin equal parts; and 4. Condemning the SALVAS in Civil Case No. R-668 to pay the costs thereof to the JANDUSAYS in said case. No pronouncement as to damages in both cases, R-667 and R668. Both the SALVAS and the JANDUSAYS appealed to the Court of Appeals. 8 There, their appeals ran an uncertain course; there was no little divergence of views among the magistrates regarding the merits of

their appeals; first, judgment was rendered in favor of the JANDUSAYS; but in the end, the SALVAS prevailed. The three (3) justices of the division to which the appeal was initially assigned could not agree on a unanimous verdict; 9 hence, a special division of five (5) had to be constituted. The special division's joint judgment on the appeals was pronounced on November 8, 1976, on a vote of three to two: the ponente was Agcaoili, J., with whom concurred Fernandez and Domondon, JJ., and San Diego and MelencioHerrera, JJ., dissented. Said judgment affirmed the decision of the Trial Court in toto. The SALVAS moved for reconsideration on November 29, 1976. 10Their motion remained unresolved for about eight (8) months. In the interim Mr. Justice Fernandez was appointed to the Supreme Court and Mr. Justice Domondon retired; and Messrs. Justices Hugo Gutierrez, Jr. and Ricardo C. Puno were selected to take their place, by a reraffle. 11 Thereafter the special division ("Former Special Fourth Division") deliberated on the SALVAS' motion for reconsideration. Mr. Justice Agcaoili voted to deny the motion for reconsideration. However, the four (4) others, Mme. Justices San Diego and Melencio-Herrera, and Messrs. Justices Gutierrez and Puno, voted to grant the motion. On this basis, a Resolution was drawn up by the Justice Melencio-Herrera; but at the time of its promulgation on February 28, 1978, Messrs. Justices Agcaoili and Puno had already presented their candidacies for the Interim Batasang Pambansa and consequently ceased to be members of the Court of Appeals; hence, the Resolution was signed only by the three (3) remaining Justices composing the special division of five, it being pointed out that this number was, by the way, sufficient for the pronouncement of a judgment in accordance with Section 2, Rule 51 of the Rules of Court. 12 The Resolution overturned the Decision of November 8, 1976 and disposed of the appeals as follows: WHEREFORE, granting the Motion for Reconsideration, the judgment appealed from is hereby set aside, and another one entered 1) dismissing Civil Case No. 668-R, the suit for Annulment of Title; and 2) ordering Gregorio Jandusay et al. to surrender possession of Parcel No. I covered by TCT No. T-5420, to Emeterio Salva et al., upon this Decision becoming final. No costs in both instances. A motion for reconsideration was in due time submitted by the JANDUSAYS, and one for amendment of the resolution, by the SALVAS. The motions were disposed of by a Resolution dated August 3, 1978, 13 as follows:

WHEREFORE, 1) the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the JANDUSAYS is hereby denied for lack of merit; 2) In respect of the Motion for Amendment of our Resolution dated February 28, 1978, Bled by the SALVAS, the Court resolves: a) The SALVAS are hereby authorized to withdraw the owner's duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T5420 attached to the records of this case, under proper receipt; b) The petition to include compensatory damages in favor of the SALVAS is denied, their entitlement to them not having been indubitably established. The JANDUSAYS are now before this Court, having timely filed a petition for review on certiorari, 14 seeking review and reversal of the Appellate Court's aforementioned Resolutions of February 28, 1978 and August 3, 1978. Their appeal was given due course by Resolution dated November 27, 1978. Withal, their appeal must fail. The JANDUSAYS argue that the challenged resolutions should be set aside because they are tainted by several serious errors. Their first contestation is that the resolutions reversing, and sustaining reversal of, a special decision of five (5) having been rendered when there were only three (3) members of that special division, the other two (2) having in the meantime ceased to be members of the Court of Appeals are "contrary to the letter and spirit of Paragraph 3, of Section 2, Article X of the 1973 Constitution" which in part states that "no decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc." The theory is palpably unmeritorious. A reading of the cited paragraph in the context of the others in the Section at once discloses that it can have no reference except to the Supreme Court, and that indeed it cannot possibly apply to the Court of Appeals since, in the exercise of adjudicatory powers, that Court never sits en banc but only in divisions of three justices (or special divisions of five). The next point that the JANDUSAYS try to make is that the resolutions (a) wrongly concluded that they had failed to establish by preponderance of evidence: (i) the due execution and delivery of the deed of sale of the lot in question by Jorge Lingon in 1915 in favor of Mariano Lontok, and the deed of sale by the latter in 1917 of the same property to Dominga Marquez; and (ii) "the loss and contents of the deed of sale executed in 1915 by Jorge Lingon in favor of Mariano Lontok over the litigated property," and (b) wrongly applied "the survivorship disqualification rule and .. (disregarded) the rules on admission by privy and declaration

against interest made by Jorge Lingon" testified to by Demetria Jandusay. 15 In the proceedings before the Trial Court the JANDUSAYS could not present in evidence the original of the deed of sale allegedly executed in 1915 by Jorge Lingon in favor of Mariano Lontok (from whom, in turn, the Jandusays' predecessor-in-interest had acquired the land in question). It apparently had been lost. They therefore submitted secondary evidence to establish the sale, consisting of the sworn declarations of Mariano Lontok, Severo Geronimo (bilas of Lingon), Enrique Morente, Demetria Jandusay and Gregorio Jandusay. 16 Whether or not this evidence satisfactorily proved the existence of the deed of sale, its due execution, loss, and contents has been subject of considerable disagreement and extensive analysis among the parties, of course, as well as the Trial Court and, as already narrated, the Honorable Justices of the Court of Appeals themselves. The correctness of those conclusions has also still been subject of debate among the parties before this court. What is not subject of disputation is the proposition that whatever deductions are drawn from the evidence are conclusions of fact, and not of law. Now, the findings in the Resolution of February 28, 1978 to the effect that the evidence had not satisfactorily established "the loss of the deed of sale between JORGE and LONTOK," 17 or the contents of the lost document,18 or that it was "the LITIGATED PROPERTY (which) was, indeed, sold by JORGE to LONTOK, and that it was the (same) LITIGATED PROPERTY which the latter had sold to DOMINGA," 19 and that, "(i)n the last analysis," the body of proofs adduced by the JANDUSAYS was not so clear and convincing as to defeat the rights of the registered owner 20 are conclusions of fact. These findings are quite clearly reasoned conclusions, reached only after study and assessment of the proofs, an appraisal of testimonial credibility of witnesses, and a weighing of probabilities regarding the conduct and reaction of the parties to the alleged sales on the basis of proven past acts and in light of human experience. They cannot thus be said to be grounded "entirely on speculation or conjecture," or to have been arrived at whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily. Therefore, by established doctrine, they are binding on this Court and may not be reviewed by it, as the petitioners would wish, absent, as here, any of the recognized exceptions to the doctrine. 21 The appealed Resolution correctly applied the so-called Surviving Party Rule or the Dead Man's Act to exclude the testimony of Demetria Jandusay relative to the statement ascribed to Jorge Lingon that the Jandusays should "not .. insist in having the deed of sale registered or annotated .. as according to him before he dies he would sell his property

and that in all probability we might as well but his remaining property." 22 The rule is found in Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and reads as follows: SEC. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship. The following persons cannot testify as to matters in which they are interested, directly or indirectly, as herein enumerated: (a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, .. upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person .. cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person .. ; xxx xxx xxx There can be no doubt that the JANDUSAYS' suit in the Trial Court had for its essential object the enforcement of a deed of sale allegedly executed by the deceased Jorge Lingon during his lifetime; so that in truth, and adapting the language of the Dead Man's Act, the JANDUSAYS were parties or persons in whose behalf a case was being prosecuted upon a claim or demand against the estate of Jorge Lingon. For that sale, supposedly executed about 40 years prior to the institution of the action, was the definitive foundation of the JANDUSAYS' asserted cause of action, i.e., the cancellation of the title of the collateral heirs of the vendor and the reconveyance of the property to them by said heirs, the theory obviously being that at the time of the vendor's death, the property no longer formed part of his estate and therefore could not possibly have been inherited by his heirs. Nor can there be any doubt that the suit was being prosecuted against representatives of the deceased person, i.e., Lingon's collateral relatives, who had adjudicated the property to themselves as intestate heirs and who, in the action were asserting a defense (denial of the sale) which the deceased might have himself set up if living. 23 The heirs of Lingon were not asserting their status as such heirs to defeat the JANDUSAYS' action, that not being the chief issue, but were basically contending that the property in question still formed part of the estate of the decedent at the time of his death and had not been segregated therefrom by sale to the JANDUSAYS' predecessor-in- interest. It is not amiss to state in this connection that the challenged Resolution refusal to accord veracity to the statement attributed to Jorge Lingon supposedly asking for deferment of registration of the sale in favor of the JANDUSAYS because it "runs counter to the fact that the partial sales

made by JORGE of Parcel No. 2 were all registered," and because the failure of the JANDUSAYS for an unreasonably long period to resort to readily available legal remedies to compel the delivery of the certificate of title and have the sale to them annotated thereon militated against their averment that Lingon had indeed sold the land to them had refused to lend them the title so that the sale could be registered. 24 The JANDUSAYS also argue that the failure of Jorge Lingon to dispossess them and their predecessors-in-interest from the litigated property for a period of thirty-four (34) years, and a like failure by the SALVAS to do so for seven (7) years, justify the application of the equitable doctrine of laches in their (the JANDUSAYS') favor, as well as the ruling in Mejia de Lucas v. Gamponia, 100 Phil. 277; Pabalate v. Echavari, Jr., 37 SCRA 518; and Heirs of Lacamen vs. Heirs of Laruan, "65 SCRA 605." 25 The argument is effectively confuted by the following disquisition in the Resolution of February 28, 1978 to which this Court hereby confers sanction: If JORGE's inaction in dispossessing the JANDUSAYS of the LITIGATED PROPERTY can be alleged against him in a question of title, the inaction of the JANDUSAYS or their predecessors-in-interest in not compelling JORGE to formally transfer the title to the LITIGATED PROPERTY to them for several years can also be alleged against the JANDUSAYS in this controversy over title. Further, if, as alleged, inaction of the SALVAS from 1949 when JORGE Lingon died, up to 1956 when they executed the extrajudicial partition, betrayed their hesitancy in taking such step knowing too well the weakness of their claim by the same token, the legal inaction, the failure to take remedial steps of the JANDUSAYS from 1930 when they learned of the existence of the title, up to JORGE Lingon's death in 1949, and thence up to 1956 when they filed their counter-suit against the SALVAS only after the latter had instituted their action for recovery of possession, could also be interpreted as an awareness on their part of the weakness of their claim of title. In other words, 'Laches' and inaction imputed to the SALVAS may likewise be laid at the feet of the JANDUSAYS. The 'laches' of one nullifies the 'laches' of the other. One who seeks equity must himself be deserving of equity. When parties are in culpability similarly situated in eodem loco it is a general principle of law that one may claim no

advantage over the other a principle consistently applied in the 'pari delicto' rule imbedded in our legal system (Arts. 1411, 1412, 100, 453, Civil Code). The cases of Mejia de Lucas v. Gamponia, 100 Phil. 277 (1956), that of Pabalate v. Echavari, Jr., .. 37 SCRA 518, which applied it, as well as that of Heirs of Lacamen v. Heirs of Laruan, .. 65 SCRA 605 cannot be invoked herein to justify a judgment in favor of the JANDUSAYS on the ground of laches, due to fundamental differences: 1) the first two cases involved the prohibition against the sale of free patents where under the pertinent law, an original patentee is given seven years from conveyance within which to bring an action to recover the property. Plaintiffs therein failed to exercise that right within the reglementary period but allowed 37 years (in the Mejia Case) and 32 years (in the Pabalate Case) to lapse; hence, the Supreme Court ruling that the original owners' right to recover the possession of the property and the title thereto from the defendants had, by patentee's inaction and neglect, been converted into a stale demand. In contrast, an action to recover possession of aregistered land, such as that brought by the SALVAS, never prescribes in view of Section 46 of the Land Registration Act to the effect that no title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. In fact, as held in J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc. vs. Macalindong, L-15398, December 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 938, the right to file an action to recover possession based on a Torrens Title is imprescriptible and is not bared under the doctrine of laches. And even if laches were invocable, and that plaintiffs had 'slept on their rights', with equal vigor can it be said that defendants themselves are chargeable with 'Laches. 2) In the three mentioned cases, the fact of sale of the litigated properties was admitted unlike in this case where such sale has been challenged, nor has it even been proven. 3) In addition, the sale in this case to the JANDUSAYS was not made by the original registered owner himself. It is merely alleged that he had sold it to LONTOK who, in turn sold it to the JANDUSAYS.

The JANDUSAYS next attack the very title of the SALVAS. They contend that the property covered by OCT No. 61 was conjugal property of the spouses Jorge Lingon and Arcadia Ganibo that upon the latter's death, the widower, Jorge Lingon, inherited only one-half thereof in usufruct "while the naked ownership could be inherited" by the decedent's collateral relatives; that the SALVAS are "not collateral relatives by blood of Jorge Lingon," and could not therefore have validly inherited from him and in truth acquired nothing by their execution of a deed of extrajudicial partition of Lingon's estate, the execution thereof being, in addition, attended by fraud. 26 The attack is pointless. Even if consistent with the demonstrated facts, a doubtful proposition at best, it would not enhance the petitioners' cause one whit Absence of title over the property in question in Jorge Lingon, or substantial defect thereof, would not in any manner whatever show valid acquisition of ownership of said property by the JANDUSAYS. On the contrary, it would demonstrate invalidity or defect in their own claim of title. Similarly, absense of the status of heirship in the SALVAS vis-a-vis Jorge Lingon is utterly inconsequential as far as concerns the JANDUSAYS' claim of conveyance by Lingon to their predecessor-in-interest. Moreover, being heirs of neither Jorge Lingon nor Arcadia Ganibo they have no personality or standing to question the succession to the state of either. In any event, the Court is satisfied that the Appellate Court has properly upheld the SALVAS' title to the property in question. WHEREFORE, finding no error in the Resolutions subject of appeal, dated February 28, 1978 and August 3, 1978, the same are hereby AFFIRMED in all respects. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED. Maniago v. CA Facts: Petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of shuttle buses which were used in transporting employees of the Texas Instruments, (Phils.), Inc. from Baguio City proper to its plant site at the Export Processing Authority. In 1990, one of his buses figured in a vehicular accident with a passenger jeepney owned by private respondent Alfredo Boado. As a result of the accident, a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple physical injuries against petitioners driver, Herminio Andaya. A month later, a civil case for damages was filed by private respondent Boado against petitioner Maniago. Petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings in the civil case against him, citing the pendency of the criminal case against his driver and because no reservation of the right to bring it (civil case) separately had

been made in the criminal case. But the lower court denied petitioners motion on the ground that pursuant to the Civil Code, the action could proceed independently of the criminal action. Issue: whether or not despite the absence of reservation, private respondent may nonetheless bring an action for damages against petitioner under the following provisions of the Civil Code: Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. Held: No. The right to bring an action for damages under the Civil Code must be reserved as required by Rule 111, 1, otherwise it should be dismissed. To begin with, 1 quite clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute separately all civil actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will be deemed to have been instituted with the criminal case. Such civil actions are not limited to those which arise from the offense charged. In other words the right of the injured party to sue separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from quasi delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will be deemed instituted with the criminal action. On the basis of Rule 111, 1-3, a civil action for the recovery of civil liability is, as a general rule, impliedly instituted with the criminal action, except only (1) when such action arising from the same act or omission, which is the subject of the criminal action, is waived; (2) the right to bring it separately is reserved or (3) such action has been instituted prior to the criminal action. Even if an action has not been reserved or it was brought before the institution of the criminal case, the acquittal of the accused will not bar recovery of civil liability unless the acquittal is based on a finding that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist because of Art. 29 of the Civil Code. Disomangcop v. Datumanong (Tinga, 2004) Facts: On Aug. 1, 1989, RA 6734 was passed (Organic Act of ARMM). Four provinces voted for inclusion in ARMM, namely: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. In accordance with it, EO 426 was issued by Pres. Cory Aquino

on Oct. 12, 1990. The same devolved to the ARMM the power of the DPWH. On May 20, 1999, DO 119 was issued by DPWH Sec. Vigilar. It created a DPWH Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which shall have jurisdiction over all national infrastructure projects and facilities under the DPWH within Marawi City and Lanao del Sur. On Jan. 17, 2001, RA 8999 which created a new Engineering District in the first district of Lanao del Sur was passed by Pres. Estrada. On March 31, 2001, RA 9054 which amended RA 6734 was passed. The province of Basilan and the City of Marawi voted to join ARMM through said law. Petitioners Disomangcop and Dimalotang in their capacity as OIC and Enginer II respectively of the First Engineering District of DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur filed a petition questioning the constitutionality and validity of DO 119 and RA 8999 on the ground that they contravene the constitution and the organic acts of the ARMM. Issue: WON DO 119 and RA 8999 are both invalid and constitutionally infirm. Held and Ratio: On RA 8999 RA 8999 never became operative and was superseded or repealed by a RA 9054. By creating an office with previously devolved functions, RA 8999, in essence sought to amend RA 6074, which is an organic act which enjoys affirmation through a plebiscite. Hence, the provisions thereof cannot be amended by an ordinary statute such as RA 8999. The amendatory law needs to be submitted also to a plebiscite which is lacking in the case of RA 8999. RA 6734 devolved the functions of the DPWH to ARMM which includes Lanao del Sur. Moreover, RA 8999 is patently inconsistent with RA 9054 which is a later law. RA 9054, which is anchored on the 1987 Constitution advances the constitutional grant of autonomy by detailing the powers of the ARMM which covers among others Lanao del Sur. However, RA 8999 ventures to reestablisht he National Government's jurisdiction over the infrastructure programs in Lanao del Sur. RA 8999 is patently inconsistent with RA 9054, and it destroys the latter law's objective of

devolution of the functions of DPWH in line with the policy of the Constitution to grant LGUs meaningful and authentic regional autonomy. On DO 119 - DO 119 creating the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which has jurisdiction over infrastructure projects within Marawi City and Lanao del Sur is violative of the provisions of EO 426 which implements the transfer of control and supervision of the DPWH to the ARMM in line with RA 6734. The office created under DO 119 having essentially the same powers with the District Engineering Office of Lanao del Sur as created under EO 426, is a duplication. The DO in effect takes back powers which have been previoulsy devolved under EO 426. RA 9054 however has repealed DO 119 because the former seeks to transfer control and supervision of DPWH offices to ARMM. FERNANDEZ VS. TORRES FACTS: Petitioners seek certiorari and prohibition to prohibit and restrain the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment ("DOLE") and the Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration ("POEA") from enforcing and implementing Item No. 1 of DOLE Circular No. 01-91 entitled "Prescribing Additional Requirements, Conditions and Procedures for the Deployment of Performing Artists." The promulgation of DOLE Circular No. 01-91 was preceded by public agitation for a total ban on deployment of Filipino entertainers abroad, in response to the growing number of documented reports and complaints from entertainers and their relatives about the exploitative working conditions, harassment, forcible detention, physical injuries, rape and even death suffered by female performing artists and entertainers abroad. The First National Tripartite Conference for the Protection of Overseas Entertainers was convened on 18 November 1991 to evaluate a Government proposal for a complete interdiction of overseas deployment of Philippine entertainers and performing artists. At the end of the Conference, the consensus among the management and labor representatives which emerged was that Government should adopt a policy of selective (rather than comprehensive) prohibition of deployment abroad of Philippine entertainers, to avoid the adverse effects which complete prohibition would impose on the country's manpower export program. The labor representative recommended that the minimum age for performing artists seeking overseas deployment be raised from eighteen (18) years to twenty-three (23) years.

Through counsel, they challenge the constitutional validity of Item No. 1 of DOLE Circular No. 01-91. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have an actual cause or controversy to challenge the constitutionality of the DOLE Circular. HELD: The Court finds that the petition does not present a justiciable controversy. In actions involving constitutional issues, the firmly settled rule is that a constitutional question will not be heard and resolved by the courts unless the following requirements of judicial inquiry are met: (1) the existence of an actual case or controversy;(2) the party raising the constitutional issue must have a personal and substantial interest in the resolution thereof;(3) the controversy must be raised at the earliest reasonable opportunity; and(4) that the resolution of the constitutional issue must be indispensable for the final determination of the controversy. In the first place, Item No. 1 of the challenged DOLE Circular does not establish an absolute and comprehensive prohibition of deployment abroad of entertainers below twenty-three (23) years of age. Item No. 1 itself provides that "the Secretary of Labor and Employment may, for justifiable reasons, exempt from performing artists from coverage hereof." The discretionary authority here asserted by the DOLE Secretary does not purport to be unlimited and arbitrary in nature. To the contrary, fairly explicit and precisely drawn grounds for exempting particular performing artists from the coverage of Item No. 1 are set out in a set of "Administrative Guidelines Implementing Department Circular No. 0191." Secondly, petitioners have failed to allege or have refrained from alleging, that they had previously applied to public respondent officials for exemption from the minimum age restriction imposed by Item No. 1 of DOLE Circular No. 01-91. Necessarily, therefore, petitioners also do not allege that public respondent officials have arbitrarily denied their applications for exemption from the minimum age requirement or from any other requirement establishment by Item No. 1. Neither have petitioners alleged that public respondents have continually threatened to deny all and sundry applications for exemption, so as to create a reasonable expectation that their applications would be immediately and arbitrarily denied, should they in fact file them. Petitioners do assert that

the exemption clause of DOLE Circular No. 01-91 is "practically useless and [constitutes] empty verbiage." They have not, however, attempted to support this assertion. The Court is not compelled to indulge in speculation that public respondent would deny any and all applications for exemption from coverage of DOLE Circular No. 01-91. Two (2) important presumptions are here applicable. The first is that administrative orders and regulations are entitled to the presumption of constitutionality. The second is that official duty has been or will be regularly performed. Santos vs Northwest Airlines Judicial Review Warsaw Convention Santos III is a minor represented by his dad. In October 1986, he bought a round trip ticket from NOA in San Francisco. His flight would be from San Francisco to Manila via Tokyo. His scheduled flight was in December. A day before his departure he checked with NOA and NOA said he made nor reservation and that he bought no ticket. The next year, due to the incident, he sued NOA for damages. He sued NOA in Manila. NOA argued that Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to the Warsaw Convention w/c provides that complaints against international carriers can only be instituted in: 1. the court of the domicile of the carrier; 2. the court of its principal place of business; 3. the court where it has a place of business through which the contract had been made; 4. the court of the place of destination. The lower court ruled in favor of NOA. Santos III averred that Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the case. ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the matter to conduct judicial review. HELD: The SC ruled that they cannot rule over the matter for the SC is bound by the provisions of the Warsaw Convention which was ratified by the Senate. Until & unless thered be amendment to the Warsaw Convention, the only remedy for Santos III is to sue in any of the place indicated in the Convention such as in San Francisco, USA. It is wellsettled that courts will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination; the constitutional question must have been opportunely

raised by the proper party and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself. Angara vs Electoral Commission Judicial Review Electoral Commission In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for the said district. On November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a Motion of Protest against the election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the NA, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming that EC proclamation governs and that the EC can take cognizance of the election protest and that the EC cannot be subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC. ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter. Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the election protest. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the SC as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries. That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority. That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the government.

That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly. Dumlao vs COMELEC Judicial Review Requisites Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has retired from his office and he has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom. He filed for reelection to the same office for the 1980 local elections. On the other hand, BP 52 was passed providing disqualification for the likes of Dumlao. Dumlao assailed the BP averring that it is class legislation hence uncons titutional. His petitioned was joined by Atty. Igot and Salapantan Jt. These two however have different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayers suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign and the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office. ISSUE: Whether or not the there is cause of action. HELD: The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case would never have been merged. Dumlaos cause is different from Igots. They have separate issues. Further, this case does not meet all the requisites so that itd be eligible for judicial review. There are standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case. In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met. The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office as null and void. National Economic Protectionism Association vs Ongpin Judicial Review Requisites After the lifting of martial law in 1981, Marcos issued PD 1789 and some other PDs. The said PD was issued in order to suspend for one year the requirement that in order for companies to validly operate in the country it must be compose of at least 60% Filipino. NEPA assailed the said PD averring that as taxpayers and Filipinos they will be greatly

adversed by such PD. The Sol-Gen commented that NEPA et al have no personality and standing to sue in the absence of an actual controversy concerning the enforcement of the PD in question. ISSUE: Whether or not the requisites for judicial review are met. HELD: NEPA et al question the constitutionality of Secs 1 and 3 of PD 1892 in relation to PD 1789, the 1981 Investment Priorities Plan and EO 676, as being violative of the due process and equal protection clauses of the 1973 Constitution as well as Secs 8 & 9 of Article 14 thereof, and seek to prohibit Ongpin from implementing said laws. Yet, not even one of the petitioners has been adversely affected by the application of those provisions. No actual conflict has been alleged wherein the petitioner could validly and possibly say that the increase in foreign equity participation in non-pioneer areas of investment from the period of Dec 2, 1983 to Dec 4, 1984 had any direct bearing on them, such as considerable rise in unemployment, real increase in foreign investment, unfair competition with Philippine nationals, exploitation of the countrys natural resources by foreign investors under the decrees. Petitioners advance an abstract, hypothetical issue which is in effect a petition for an advisory opinion from the SC. The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interests of litigants require the use of that judicial authority for their protection against actual interference, a hypothetical threat being insufficient. Bona fide suit. Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies. The authority to pass on the validity of statutes is incidental to the decision of such cases where conflicting claims under the Constitution and under a legislative act assailed as contrary to the Constitution are raised. It is legitimate only in the last resort, and as necessity in the determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between litigants. Allied Broadcasting vs Republic of the Philippines Judicial Review Declaratory Relief Not Among the SCs Original Jurisdiction In January 1960, RA 3001 was passed granting ABC to operate its broadcasting stations. ABC subsequently established 10 radio stations. In November 1974, PD 576-A was passed delineating and restricting radio station ownership. It basically regulated ABCs ownership of some of its stations. One of the laws provisions is that a broadcasting station should only own one radio station per municipality or city. This made ABC lose 7 of its radio stations. ABC complained alleging that the law is arbitrary.

ISSUE: Whether or not there exists a controversy between ABC and the government by virtue of the law. HELD: The SC ruled that a petition for declaratory relief is not among the petitions within the original jurisdiction of the SC even if only questions of law are involved. Further, there is no actual case or controversy involving the law sought to be nullified. ABC does not allege that it has filed an application for a license to operate a radio or television station in excess of the authorized number and that the same is being denied or refused on the basis of the restrictions under PD. 576-A. ABC does not also allege that it had been penalized or is being penalized for a violation under said PD. There is, likewise, no DIRECT allegation that any of the petitioners stations had been confiscated or shut down pursuant to PD 576-A. Obviously, the constitutional challenge is not being raised in the context of a specific case or controversy wherein ABC has asserted its rights. All that ABC seeks is the nullification of PD 576-A and the reinstatement of its rights under RA 3001. Judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. Judicial power is the right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants. The function of the courts is to determine controversies between litigants and not to give advisory opinions. The power of judicial review can only be exercised in connection with a bona fide case or controversy which involves the statute sought to be reviewed. Lagmay vs Court of Appeals Judicial Review Legitimizing Function Proper Raising of Questions of Law Tuason is the owner of a parcel of land. She leased the same to Lagmay and 2 others. Tuason got sick and she needed to sell her land. She then sent letters to each of her lessees advising them of her intention to sell the land and that she is giving them the option to buy what they are occupying. Lagmay et al did not bother to reply. Tuason thereafter did not collect the rentals of each. Lagmay et al bothered not to pay. After 2 years, Tuasons sisters politely advised Lagmay et al to vacate the land so that Tuason could sell the same. Lagmay et al did not reply not until 3 months and this time they agree to buy the parcel of land. Tuason however did not reply. Lagmay et al the filed a complaint asserting their right over the land theyve been occupying for quite some time now as guaranteed by PD 1517 or the Urban Land Reform Law. The lower court ruled that Lagmay et al waived their right under the said PD when they refused to reply to Tuasons initial offer. Lagmay et al appealed before the CA. The CA upheld the lower court. The CA additionally pointed out that the parcel of land in question is not declared as an urban land under PD 1967. Lagmay et al filed a motion for reconsideration

assailing the constitutionality of PD 1967. The CA denied the motion ruling that Lagmay et al cannot raise a question of law since they did not raise the same during the trial of merits. ISSUE: Whether or not to settle the case by virtue of the question of law raised by Lagmay et al. HELD: The SC ruled that they must avoid the issue of constitutionality in this case because the controversy can be decided by other means. The issue of constitutionality of a statute, executive order or proclamation must be the very lis mota presented in a case. The Court does not decide questions of a constitutional nature unless that question is properly raised and presented in an appropriate case and is necessary to its determination. Although the Court may deem it best for public policy to resolve the constitutional issue considering that numerous persons are affected by the questioned proclamation there are other grounds by which this case may be resolved on a non-constitutional determination. MDREYES.Salonga vs. Cruz-Pano J.:FACTS:Jovito Salonga was charged with the violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act after he wasimplicated, along with other 39 accused, by Victor Lovely in the series of bombings in Metro Manila. Hewas tagged by Lovely in his testimony as the leader of subversive organizations for two reasons (1)because his house was used as a contact point ; and (2) because of his remarks during the party of RaulDaza in Los Angeles. He allegedly opined about the likelihood of a violent struggle in the Philippines if reforms are not instituted immediately by then President Marcos.ISSUE:Whether or not Salonga s alleged remarks are protected by the freedom of speech.HELDYes. The petition is dismissed.RATIOThe petitioner s opinion is nothing but a legitimate exercise of freedom of thought andexpression. Protection is especially mandated for political discussions. Political discussion is essential tothe ascertainment of political truth. It cannot be the basis of criminal indictments. The constitutionalguaranty may only be proscribed when such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminentlawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. In the case at bar, there is no threat againstthe government.In PD 885, political discussion will only constitute prima facie evidence of membership in asubversive organization if such discussion amounts to conferring with officers or other members of suchassociation or organization in furtherance of any plan or enterprise thereof. In the case, there is noproof that such discussion was in furtherance of any plan to overthrow the government through illegalmeans. Lovely also declared that his bombing mission was not against the government, but directedagainst a particular family. Such

a statement negates any politically motivated or subversive assignment.OBITER DICTUM:To withhold the right to preliminary investigation, it would be to transgress constitutional dueprocess. However, it is not enough that the preliminary investigation is conducted to satisfy the dueprocess clause. There must be sufficient evidence to sustain a prima facie case or that probable causeexists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused.

Evelio Javier vs COMELEC & Arturo Pacificador Due Process impartial and competent court Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos, were rivals to be members of the Batasan in May 1984 in Antique. During election, Javier complained of massive terrorism, intimidation, duress, votebuying, fraud, tampering and falsification of election returns under duress, threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed men of Pacificador. COMELEC just referred the complaints to the AFP. On the same complaint, the 2nd Division of the Commission on Elections directed the provincial board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. On June 7, 1984, the same 2nd Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case before the Commission. On certiorari before the SC, the proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set aside as premature, having been made before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal, which the Javier had seasonably made. Javier pointed out that the irregularities of the election must first be resolved before proclaiming a winner. Further, Opinion, one of the Commissioners should inhibit himself as he was a former law partner of Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was made by only the 2nd Division but the Constitute requires that it be proclaimed by the COMELEC en banc. In Feb 1986, during pendency, Javier was gunned down. The Solicitor General then moved to have the petition close it being moot and academic by virtue of Javiers death. ISSUE: Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of Pacificador. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gens tenor. The SC has repeatedly and consistently demanded the cold neutrality of an impartial judge as the indispensable imperative of due

process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect. Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law. Province of Batangas vs. Romulo FACTS: In 1998, then President Estrada issued EO No. 48 establishing the Program for Devolution Adjustment and Equalization to enhance the capabilities of LGUs in the discharge of the functions and services devolved to them through the LGC. The Oversight Committee under Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora passed Resolutions No. OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006 and OCD-99-003 which were approved by Pres. Estrada on October 6, 1999. The guidelines formulated by the Oversight Committee required the LGUs to identify the projects eligible for funding under the portion of LGSEF and submit the project proposals and other requirements to the DILG for appraisal before the Committee serves notice to the DBM for the subsequent release of the corresponding funds. Hon. Herminaldo Mandanas, Governor of Batangas, petitioned to declare unconstitutional and void certain provisos contained in the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 1999, 2000, and 2001, insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of P5billion for the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) & imposed conditions for the release thereof.

ISSUE: Whether the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD resolutions infringe the Constitution and the LGC of 1991. HELD: Yes. The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD resolutions constitute a withholding of a portion of the IRA they effectively encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by LGUs and must be struck down. According to Art. II, Sec.25 of the Constitution, the State shall ensure the local autonomy of local governments. Consistent with the principle of local autonomy, theConstitution confines the Presidents power over the LGUs to one of general supervision, which has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. Drilon v. Lim distinguishes supervision from control: control lays down the rules in the doing of an act the officer has the discretion to order his subordinate to do or redo the act, or decide to do it himself;supervision merely sees to it that the rules are followed but has no authority to set down the rules or the discretion to modify/replace them. The entire process involving the distribution & release of the LGSEF is constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or just share of the LGUs in the national taxes. Sec.6, Art.X of the Constitution mandates that the just share shall beautomatically released to the LGUs. Since the release is automatic, the LGUs arent required to perform any act to receive the just share it shall be released to them without need of further action. To subject its distribution & release to the vagaries of the implementing rules & regulations as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 19992001 and the OCD Resolutions would violate this constitutional mandate. The only possible exception to the mandatory automatic release of the LGUs IRA is if the national internal revenue collections for the current fiscal year is less than 40% of the collections of the 3rd preceding fiscal year. The exception does not apply in this case. The Oversight Committees authority is limited to the implementation of the LGC of 1991 not to supplant or subvert the same, and neither can it exercise control over the IRA of the LGUs. Congress may amend any of the provisions of the LGC but only through a separate lawand not through appropriations laws or GAAs. Congress

cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be more properly enacted in a separate legislation. A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited to specified sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit any provision therein which is intended to amend another law is considered an inappropriate provision. Increasing/decreasing the IRA of LGUs fixed in the LGC of 1991 are matters of general & substantive law. To permit the Congress to undertake these amendments through the GAAs would unduly infringe the fiscal autonomy of the LGUs. The value of LGUs as institutions of democracy is measured by the degree of autonomy they enjoy. Our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions in local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which these provisions are based. Panfilo Lacson vs Sandiganbayan, Executive Secretary, et al Equal Protection KBG Cases Before the Sandiganbayan On 18 May 1995, alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang were shot to death. The incident was later sensationalized as a rub out. This implicated Lacson among others as guilty for multiple murder. The case was raised before the Sandiganbayan. In 1996, Lacson et al filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Sec 2 (par a and c) of RA 7975 An Act To Strengthen The Functional And Structural Organization Of The Sandiganbayan, Amending For That Purpose Presidential Decree 1606, As Amended. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the principal accused are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27. In 1997, RA 8249 was passed which basically expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The law was authored by Lagman and Neptali Gonzales. Lacson assailed the law as it was introduced by the authors thereof in bad faith as it was made to precisely suit the situation in which petitioners cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereover to it, thereby violating his right to procedural due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, from the way the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9) months the resolution of a pending incident involving the transfer of the cases to the Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law

may have been timed to overtake such resolution to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of petitioners vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975). ISSUE: Whether or not the right to equal protection by Lacson et al has been violated with the passage of RA 8249. HELD: The SC ruled that RA 8249 did not violate the right of Lacson et al to equal protection. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements, namely: (1) it must rest on substantial distinction; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class The classification between those pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commenced and whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real differences. In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs, examined witness and presented documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to provide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. Thus, Lacson et al cannot claim that Secs 4 and 7 placed them under a different category from those similarly situated as them. Precisely, par A of Sec 4 provides that it shall apply to all cases involving certain public officials and, under the transitory provision in Sec 7, to all cases pending in any court. Contrary to petitioner and intervenors arguments, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover

cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in any court. It just happened that the Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Sec 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249). CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP and SR. SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioners-appellants, vs. HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice, and SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR JUDE ROMANO, in his capacity as the Director of the Government's Witness Protection Program; SPO2 EDUARDO DELOS REYES and SPO2 CORAZON DELA CRUZ, respondents-appellees. RESOLUTION AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Chief Supt. Romeo M. Acop and Sr. Supt. Francisco G. Zubia seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision dated July 30, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) which dismissed this petition for injunction. The factual antecedents leading to the present petition are as follows: On May 18, 1995, eleven (11) suspected members of the criminal group known as the Kuratong Baleleng gang were killed along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City in an alleged shootout with the Anti-Bank Robbery Intelligence Task Group of the Philippine National Police (PNP). SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) of the PNP and who was one of the officers assigned to conduct an investigation of the May 18, 1995 incident, made a public disclosure of his findings that there was no shootout and the eleven suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang were instead summarily executed. SPO2 Corazon dela Cruz, also a member of the CIC, made the same statement corroborating the claim of SPO2 delos Reyes. The Senate conducted hearings to determine the circumstances surrounding the subject incident. SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz testified before the Senate hearings. On June 2, 1995, former Senator Raul Roco, who was then the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights, recommended that SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz be admitted to the government's Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Program. Accordingly, SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz were admitted into the said Program.

On March 12, 1996, herein petitioners, in their capacity as taxpayers, but who are among the PNP officers implicated in the alleged rubout, filed before the court a quo a petition for injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order questioning the legality of the admission of SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz into the Program. Petitioners contend that under Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6981, law enforcement officers, like SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz, are disqualified from being admitted into the witness protection program even though they may be testifying against other law enforcement officers. On July 30, 1998, the trial court rendered the herein assailed decision. Hence, the petition anchored on a sole assignment of error, to wit: "THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENTS SPO2 EDUARDO DELOS REYES AND SPO2 CORAZON DELA CRUZ ARE QUALIFIED TO BE ADMITTED INTO THE WITNESS PROTECTION PROGRAM DESPITE THEIR CLEAR DISQUALIFICATION FROM THE PROGRAM UNDER SECTION 3(D) OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6981, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE 'WITNESS PROTECTION, SECURITY AND BENEFIT ACT'." Petitioners pray that the decision of the RTC be reversed and set aside and instead "a) An Injunction be issued enjoining the Department of Justice from continuing to provide the benefits accruing under the Witness Protection Program to respondents SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz; "b) Order the immediate discharge of respondents SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz from WPP and for the latter to be ordered to cease and desist from accepting the benefits of the WPP; and "c) Order respondents SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz to return whatever monetary benefits they have received from the government as a consequence of their wrongful and illegal admission into the WPP."[1] In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that the petition lacks merit and that the same has been rendered moot and academic because the coverage of SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz under the Program was already terminated on December 3, 1997 and August 23, 1998, respectively, as evidenced by the letter of the Director of the Program addressed to the OSG, dated February 10, 1999.[2] In their comment, private respondents SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz agree with the OSG. Indeed, prayers a) and b) above had been rendered moot and academic by reason of the release of SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz from the coverage of the Program. However, we find it necessary to resolve the merits of the principal issue raised for a proper disposition of prayer c) and for future guidance of both bench and bar as to the application of

Sections 3(d) and 4 of R.A. No. 6981. As we have ruled in Alunan III vs. Mirasol,[3]and Viola vs. Alunan III,[4] "courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is 'capable of repetition, yet evading review.'" Petitioners' main contention is that Section 3 of R.A. No. 6981 lays down the basic qualifications a person must possess in order to be admitted into the Program and that Section 4 of the same statute is not an exception to Section 3 but, it simply adds requirements for witnesses before they may become eligible for admission into the Program in case of legislative investigations. We do not agree. Section 3(d) provides: Sec. 3. Admission into the Program. - Any person who has witnessed or has knowledge or information on the commission of a crime and has testified or is testifying or about to testify before any judicial or quasijudicial body, or before any investigating authority, may be admitted into the Program: Provided, That: xxx (d) he is not a law enforcement officer, even if he would be testifying against the other law enforcement officers. In such a case, only the immediate members of his family may avail themselves of the protection provided for under this Act. Section 4 provides: Sec. 4. Witness in Legislative Investigations. - In case of legislative investigations in aid of legislation, a witness, with his express consent, may be admitted into the Program upon the recommendation of the legislative committee where his testimony is needed when in its judgment there is pressing necessity therefor: Provided, That such recommendation is approved by the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be. A careful reading of Sections 3 and 4 readily shows that these are distinct and independent provisions. It is true that the proviso in Section 3(d) disqualifies law enforcement officers from being admitted into the Program when they "testify before any judicial or quasi-judicial body, or before any investigating authority." This is the general rule. However, Section 4 provides for a specific and separate situation where a witness testifies before a legislative investigation. An investigation by a legislative committee does not fall under the category of "any investigating authority" referred to in Section 3. Section 4 contains only a proviso that the witness' admission to the Program must be recommended by the legislative committee when in its judgment there is a pressing necessity therefor and said recommendation is approved by

the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be. Section 4 does not contain any proviso similar to Sec. 3(d) as quoted above, nor does Section 4 refer to the application of the proviso under Section 3. In other words, Section 4 did not make any qualification or distinction. It is basic under the law on statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish.[5] The operation of a proviso is usually and properly confined to the clause or distinct portion of the enactment which immediately precedes it or to which it pertains, and does not extend to or qualify other sections or portions of the statute, unless the legislative intent that it shall so operate is clearly disclosed.[6] In the present case, it is clear that the legislative intent that the proviso under Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6981 does not apply to Section 4. The trial court did not err in concluding that if the framers of the law intended otherwise, they could have easily placed the same proviso of Section 3(d) or referred to it under Section 4. Hence, in the absence of a clear proviso or reference to Section 3(d), a witness in a legislative investigation whether or not he is a law enforcement officer, may be admitted into the Program subject only to the requirements provided for under Section 4. It is not disputed that the Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights, chaired by then Senator Raul Roco, had recommended the admission of SPO2 delos Reyes and dela Cruz into the Program and was duly indorsed by then Senate President Edgardo J. Angara. WHEREFORE, we DENY DUE COURSE to the petition and AFFIRM the assailed decision. SANLAKAS Vs. Executive Secretary Facts: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for the government, demanding the resignation of the President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers went back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued. In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA VS.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that there is no factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that the proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that there was usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion. Issue: Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional? Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit? Held: The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive powers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the President acted without factual basis. The issue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit as there was no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts or that military authorities have taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation of the legislative power of the Congress is of no moment since the President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief

powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any person may be subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid warrantless arrest is present. Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of Issue upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Based on the foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members have no legal standing to sue. Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing to challenge the subject issuances. It sustained its decision in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution. ALAN F. PAGUIA, Petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, and HON. HILARIO DAVIDE, JR. in his capacity as Permanent Representative of the Philippines to the United Nations, Respondents. RESOLUTION CARPIO, J.: At issue is the power of Congress to limit the Presidents prerogative to nominate ambassadors by legislating age qualifications despite the constitutional rule limiting Congress role in the appointment of ambassadors to the Commission on Appointments confirmation of nominees.1 However, for lack of a case or controversy grounded on petitioners lack of capacity to sue and mootness,2 we dismiss the petition without reaching the merits, deferring for another day the resolution of the question raised, novel and fundamental it may be. Petitioner Alan F. Paguia (petitioner), as citizen and taxpayer, filed this original action for the writ of certiorari to invalidate President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyos nomination of respondent former Chief Justice

Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (respondent Davide) as Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) for violation of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7157 (RA 7157), the Philippine Foreign Service Act of 1991. Petitioner argues that respondent Davides age at that time of his nomination in March 2006, 70, disqualifies him from holding his post. Petitioner grounds his argument on Section 23 of RA 7157 pegging the mandatory retirement age of all officers and employees of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) at 65.3 Petitioner theorizes that Section 23 imposes an absolute rule for all DFA employees, career or non-career; thus, respondent Davides entry into the DFA ranks discriminates against the rest of the DFA officials and employees. In their separate Comments, respondent Davide, the Office of the President, and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (respondents) raise threshold issues against the petition. First, they question petitioners standing to bring this suit because of his indefinite suspension from the practice of law.4 Second, the Office of the President and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (public respondents) argue that neither petitioners citizenship nor his taxpayer status vests him with standing to question respondent Davides appointment because petitioner remains without personal and substantial interest in the outcome of a suit which does not involve the taxing power of the state or the illegal disbursement of public funds. Third, public respondents question the propriety of this petition, contending that this suit is in truth a petition for quo warranto which can only be filed by a contender for the office in question. On the eligibility of respondent Davide, respondents counter that Section 23s mandated retirement age applies only to career diplomats, excluding from its ambit non-career appointees such as respondent Davide. The petition presents no case or controversy for petitioners lack of capacity to sue and mootness. First. Petitioners citizenship and taxpayer status do not clothe him with standing to bring this suit. We have granted access to citizens suits on the narrowest of ground: when they raise issues of "transcendental" importance calling for urgent resolution.5 Three factors are relevant in our determination to allow third party suits so we can reach and resolve the merits of the crucial issues raised the character of funds or assets involved in the controversy, a clear disregard of constitutional or statutory prohibition, and the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest to bring the suit.6 None of petitioners allegations comes close to any of these parameters. Indeed, implicit in a petition seeking a judicial interpretation of a statutory provision on the retirement of government personnel occasioned by its seemingly ambiguous crafting is the admission that a "clear disregard of constitutional or

statutory prohibition" is absent. Further, the DFA is not devoid of personnel with "more direct and specific interest to bring the suit." Career ambassadors forced to leave the service at the mandated retirement age unquestionably hold interest far more substantial and personal than petitioners generalized interest as a citizen in ensuring enforcement of the law.1avvphi1 The same conclusion holds true for petitioners invocation of his taxpayer status. Taxpayers contributions to the states coffers entitle them to question appropriations for expenditures which are claimed to be unconstitutional or illegal.7 However, the salaries and benefits respondent Davide received commensurate to his diplomatic rank are fixed by law and other executive issuances, the funding for which was included in the appropriations for the DFAs total expenditures contained in the annual budgets Congress passed since respondent Davides nomination. Having assumed office under color of authority (appointment), respondent Davide is at least a de facto officer entitled to draw salary,8 negating petitioners claim of "illegal expenditure of scarce public funds."9 Second. An incapacity to bring legal actions peculiar to petitioner also obtains. Petitioners suspension from the practice of law bars him from performing "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience."10 Certainly, preparing a petition raising carefully crafted arguments on equal protection grounds and employing highly legalistic rules of statutory construction to parse Section 23 of RA 7157 falls within the proscribed conduct. Third. A supervening event has rendered this case academic and the relief prayed for moot. Respondent Davide resigned his post at the UN on 1 April 2010. WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. ON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY vs. SOUTHWING HEAVY INDUSTRIES, INC. CASE This instant consolidated petitions seek to annul the decisions of the Regional Trial Court which declared Article 2, Section 3.1 of Executive Order 156 unconstitutional. Said EO 156 prohibits the importation of used vehicles in the country inclusive of the Subic Bay Freeport Zone. FACTS On December 12, 2002, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Executive Order 156 entitled "Providing for a comprehensive industrial policy and directions for the motor vehicle development

program and its implementing guidelines." The said provision prohibits the importation of all types of used motor vehicles in the country including the Subic Bay Freeport, or the Freeport Zone, subject to a few exceptions. Consequently, three separate actions for declaratory relief were filed by Southwing Heavy Industries Inc, Subic Integrated Macro Ventures Corp, and Motor Vehicle Importers Association of Subic Bay Freeport Inc. praying that judgment be rendered declaring Article 2, Section3.1 of the EO 156 unconstitutional and illegal. The RTC rendered a summary judgment declaring that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 constitutes an unlawful usurpation of legislative power vested by the Constitution with Congress and that the proviso is contrary to the mandate of Republic Act 7227(RA 7227) or the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which allows the free flow of goods and capital within the Freeport. The petitioner appealed in the CA but was denied on the ground of lack of any statutory basis for the President to issue the same. It held that the prohibition on the importation of use motor vehicles is an exercise of police power vested on the legislature and absent any enabling law, the exercise thereof by the President through an executive issuance is void. ISSUE Whether or not Article2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 is a valid exercise of the Presidents quasi-legislative power. YES. Police power is inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare of society. It is lodged primarily with the legislature. By virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power, it may also be exercised by the President and administrative boards, as well as the lawmaking bodies on all municipal levels, including the barangay. Such delegation confers upon the President quasi-legislative power which may be defined as the authority delegated by the law-making body to the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the provisions of the law and implement legislative policy provided that it must comply with the following requisites: (1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;

(2) It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; (3) It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; and (4) It must be reasonable. The first requisite was actually satisfied since EO 156 has both constitutional and statutory bases. Anent the second requisite, that the order must be issued or promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure, the presumption is that the said executive issuance duly complied with the procedures and limitations imposed by law since the respondents never questioned the procedure that paved way for the issuance of EO 156 but instead, what they challenged was the absence of substantive due process in the issuance of the EO. In the third requisite, the Court held that the importation ban runs afoul with the third requisite as administrative issuances must not be ultra vires or beyond the limits of the authority conferred. In the instant case, the subject matter of the laws authorizing the President to regulate or forbid importation of used motor vehicles, is the domestic industry. EO 156, however, exceeded the scope of its application by extending the prohibition on the importation of used cars to the Freeport, which RA 7227, considers to some extent, a foreign territory. The domestic industry which the EO seeks to protect is actually the "customs territory" which is defined under the Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7227 which states: "the portion of the Philippines outside the Subic Bay Freeport where the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines and other national tariff and customs laws are in force and effect." Regarding the fourth requisite, the Court finds that the issuance of EO is unreasonable. Since the nature of EO 156 is to protect the domestic industry from the deterioration of the local motor manufacturing firms, the Court however, finds no logic in all the encompassing application of the assailed provision to the Freeport Zone which is outside the customs territory of the Philippines. As long as the used motor vehicles do not enter the customs territory, the injury or harm sought to be prevented or remedied will not arise. The Court finds that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 is VOID insofar as it is made applicable within the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area but is declared VALID insofar as it applies to the customs territory or the Philippine territory outside the presently secured

fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area as stated in Section 1.1 of EO 97-A (an EO executed by Pres. Fidel V. Ramos in 1993 providing the Tax and Duty Free Privilege within the Subic Freeport Zone). Hence, used motor vehicles that come into the Philippine territory via the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area may be stored, used or traded therein, or exported out of the Philippine territory, but they cannot be imported into the Philippine territory outside of the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area. Petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED provided that said provision is declared VALID insofar as it applies to the Philippine territory outside the presently fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area and VOID with respect to its application to the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area. Pascual vs Secretary of Public Works Political Law Appropriation For Private Use Not Allowed In 1953, RA 920 was passed. This law appropriated P85,000.00 for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals. Pascual, then governor of Rizal, assailed the validity of the law. He claimed that the appropriation was actually going to be used for private use for the terminals sought to be improved were part of the Antonio Subdivision. The said Subdivision is owned by Senator Zulueta who was a member of the same Senate that passed and approved the same RA. Pascual claimed that Zulueta misrepresented in Congress the fact that he owns those terminals and that his property would be unlawfully enriched at the expense of the taxpayers if the said RA would be upheld. Pascual then prayed that the Sec of Public Works be restrained from releasing funds for such purpose. Zulueta, on the other hand, perhaps as an afterthought, donated the said property to the City of Pasig. ISSUE: Whether or not the appropriation is valid. HELD: The donation of the property to the government to make the property public does not cure the constitutional defect. The fact that the law was passed when the said property was still a private property cannot be ignored. In accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only, money raised by taxation can be expanded only for public purposes and not for the advantage of private individuals. Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose, and, hence, was null and void. Sanidad vs COMELEC Constitutional Law Definition of Political Question

On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies (barangays) to res olve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers. 20 days after, the President issued another related decree, PD 1031, amending the previous PD 991, by declaring the provisions of PD 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in barangays applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD. 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on Oct 16, 1976. The PD recites in its whereas clauses that the peoples continued opposition to the convening of the interim NA evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16. On Sep 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on Oct 16; to declare without force and effect PD Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as PD 1031, insofar as it directs the COMELEC to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on Oct 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on Oct 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. The Sol-Gen contended that the question is political in nature hence the court cannot take cognizance of it. The Sol-Gen principally maintains that petitioners have no standing to sue; the issue raised is political in nature, beyond judicial cognizance of the SC; at this state of the transition period, only the incumbent President has the authority to exercise constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization. ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question. HELD: The SC ruled that the issue is not a political question but rather a justiciable one. This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the legality of a particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is

definitely justiciable or non-political. What is confronting the SC is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly. Whether the amending process confers on the President that power to propose amendments is therefore a downright justiciable question. Should the contrary be found, the actuation of the President would merely he a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or the authority assumed was valid or not. This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose amendments to the Constitution and he was able to present those proposals to the people in sufficient time. Pablito Sanidad vs COMELEC Political Law Amendment to the Constitution On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies (barangays) to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers. Twenty days after, the President issued another related decree, PD No. 1031, amending the previous PD No. 991, by declaring the provisions of PD No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in barangays applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its whereas clauses that the peoples continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendumplebiscite of October 16. On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite

scheduled on October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. The Soc-Gen contended that the question is political in nature hence the court cannot take cognizance of it. ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the Constitution. HELD: The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a judicial question. This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the interim National Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the interim National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the new Constitution provides: All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members. . . .. The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits.

This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose amendments to the Constitution and he was able to present those proposals to the people in sufficient time. Dumlao vs COMELEC Judicial Review Requisites Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has retired from his office and he has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom. He filed for reelection to the same office for the 1980 local elections. On the other hand, BP 52 was passed providing disqualification for the likes of Dumlao. Dumlao assailed the BP averring that it is class legislation hence uncons titutional. His petitioned was joined by Atty. Igot and Salapantan Jt. These two however have different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayers suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign and the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office. ISSUE: Whether or not the there is cause of action. HELD: The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case would never have been merged. Dumlaos cause is different from Igots. They have separate issues. Further, this case does not meet all the requisites so that itd be eligible for judicial review. There are standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case. In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met. The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office as null and void. Case Title: Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato Ref.: 246 SCRA 540 and 250 SCRA 150 Doctrines/Terms Explanation Sec 5. Of The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, Article 2 liberty and property, and promotion of general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy Mere guidelines

I.

II.

Facts (chronologically arranged) a. Result of GR 113375 (KIlosbayan vs. Guingona)invalidated contract of lease between Phil. Charity Sweepstake Office (PCSO) and Phil. Gaming Management Corp. (PGMC) i. To be in violation of the charter of PCSO b. Jan 25, 1995- parties signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) for lease of online lottery equipment and accessories i. Rental is 4.3% of gross amount of ticket sales by PCSO at which in no case be less than an annual rental computed at P35,000 per terminal in commercial operation. ii. Rent is computed bi-weekly iii. Term is 8 years iv. Upon expiration of term, PCSO can purchase the equipment at P25M c. Petitions declared ELA as invalid i. Amended ELA is null and void being the same with the old lease contract ii. Assuming ELA is materially different from the old lease contract, it is still inconsistent with the PCSOs charter iii. Amended ELA is null and void for being violative of the law on public bidding, it has not been approved by the President and it is not most advantageous to the govt. d. PCSO and PGMC filed separate comments: i. ELA is a different lease contract with none of the vestiges in the prior contract ii. ELA is not subject to public bidding because it fell in the exception provided in EO No. 301 iii. Power to determine if ELA is advantageous vests in the BOD of PCSO iv. Lack of funds of PCSO cannot purchase the its own online lottery equipment v. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade vi. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they were not parties to the contract Issue a. Do the petitioners have legal standing. b. Is the ELA valid.

III.

Held/Ratio a. NO. Petitioners do not have a legal standing. i. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a departure from the settled rulings on real parties in interest because no constitutional issues were actually involved. ii. LAW OF THE CASE (opinion delivered on a former appeal) cannot also apply. Since the present case is not the same one litigated by the parties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as the law of this case. The parties are the same but the cases are not. iii. RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT cannot still apply. An issue actually and directly passed upon and determine in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties involving a different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved. When the second proceeding involves an instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form separable from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding to make an independent examination of the legal matters at issue. iv. Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does not preclude determination of the petitioners standing. v. STANDING is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually involved. The more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are REAL PARTIES in INTEREST. Standing: maybe brought by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who sue in public interest - Whether such parties have alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy xxx - Valmonte v. PCSO: 1) direct and personal interest; 2) has sustained or is in immediate danger

of sustained some direct injury and 3) has bee or is about to be denied some right or privilege. -In the case at bar, there is no showing of particularized interest or an allegation of public funds being misspent to make the action of public interest. Real party in interest: Whether he is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment or the party entitled to the avails of the suit -Petitioners invoke Sec. 5, 7 and 12 of the Constitution. But they do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation. They cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts vi. QUESTION of CONTRACT LAW: The real parties are those who are parties to the agreement or are bound either principally or subsidiarily or are prejudiced in their rights with respect to one of the contracting parties and can show the detriment which would positively result to them from the contract. vii. Petitioners do not have such present substantial interest. Questions to the nature or validity of public contracts maybe made before COA or before the Ombudsman b. YES. ELA is valid. i. It is different with the prior lease agreement: 1. PCSO now bears all losses because the operation of the system is completely in its hands ii. Fixing the rental rate to a minimum is a matter of business judgment and the Court is not inclined to review. iii. Rental rate is within the 15% net receipts fixed by law as a maximum. (4.3% of gross receipt is discussed in the dissenting opinion of Feliciano, J.) iv. In the contract, it stated that the parties can change their agreement. Petitioner states that this would allow PGMC to control and operate the on-line lottery system. The Court held that the claim is speculative. In any case, in the construction of statutes, the presumption is that in making contracts, the government has acted in good faith. The doctrine

that the possibility of abuse is not a reason for denying power. v. It was held in Kilosbayan Vs. Guingona that PCSO does not have the power to enter into any contract which would involve it in any form of collaboration, association, or joint venture for the holding of sweepstakes activities. This only mentions that PCSO is prohibited from investing in any activities that would compete in their own activities. vi. It is claimed that ELA is a joint venture agreement which does not compete with their own activities. The Court held that is also based on speculation. Evidence is needed to show that the transfer of technology would involve the PCSO and its personnel in prohibited association with the PGMC. vii. E.O. 301 (on law of public bidding) applies only to contracts for the purchase of supplies, materials and equipment and not on the contracts of lease. Public bidding for leases are only for privately-owned buildings or spaces for government use or of govt owned buildings or spaces for private use. Petitioners have no standing. ELA is a valid lease contract. Petition for prohibition, review and/or injunction is dismissed. Kilosbayan Inc vs Teofisto Guingona, Jr. 232 SCRA 110 Business Organization Corporation Law PCSOs Charter In 1993, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office decided to put up an on-line lottery system which will establish a national network system that will in turn expand PCSOs source of income. A bidding was made. Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) won it. A contract of lease was awarded in favor of PGMC. Kilosbayan opposed the said agreement between PCSO and PGMC as it alleged that: 1. PGMC does not meet the nationality requirement because it is 75% foreign owned (owned by a Malaysian firm Berjaya Group Berhad); 2. PCSO, under Section 1 of its charter (RA 1169), is prohibited from holding and conducting lotteries in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity; 3. The network system sought to be built by PGMC for PCSO is a telecommunications network. Under the law (Act No. 3846), a

franchise is needed to be granted by the Congress before any person may be allowed to set up such; 4. PGMCs articles of incorporation, as well as the Foreign Investments Act (R.A. No. 7042) does not allow it to install, establish and operate the on-line lotto and telecommunications systems. PGMC and PCSO, through Teofisto Guingona, Jr. and Renato Corona, Executive Secretary and Asst. Executive Secretary respectively, alleged that PGMC is not a collaborator but merely a contractor for a piece of work, i.e., the building of the network; that PGMC is a mere lessor of the network it will build as evidenced by the nature of the contract agreed upon, i.e., Contract of Lease. ISSUE: Whether or not Kilosbayan is correct. HELD: Yes, but only on issues 2, 3, and 4. 1. On the issue of nationality, it seems that PGMCs foreign ownership was reduced to 40% though. 2. On issues 2, 3, and 4, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity, whether domestic or foreign. There is undoubtedly a collaboration between PCSO and PGMC and not merely a contract of lease. The relations between PCSO and PGMC cannot be defined simply by the designation they used, i.e., a contract of lease. Pursuant to the wordings of their agreement, PGMC at its own expense shall build, operate, and manage the network systemincluding its facilities needed to operate a nationwide online lottery system. PCSO bears no risk and all it does is to provide its franchise in violation of its charter. Necessarily, the use of such franchise by PGMC is a violation of Act No. 3846. Francisco Tatad vs Jesus Garcia, Jr. 243 SCRA 436 Business Organization Corporation Law Corporate Nationality Public Utility Nationality Requirement in Nationalized Areas of Activity In 1989, the government planned to build a railway transit line along EDSA. No bidding was made but certain corporations were invited to prequalify. The only corporation to qualify was the EDSA LRT Consortium which was obviously formed for this particular undertaking. An agreement was then made between the government, through the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC), and EDSA LRT Consortium. The agreement was based on the Build-OperateTransfer scheme provided for by law (RA 6957, amended by RA 7718). Under the agreement, EDSA LRT Consortium shall build the facilities, i.e., railways, and shall supply the train cabs. Every phase that is

completed shall be turned over to the DOTC and the latter shall pay rent for the same for 25 years. By the end of 25 years, it was projected that the government shall have fully paid EDSA LRT Consortium. Thereafter, EDSA LRT Consortium shall sell the facilities to the government for $1.00. However, Senators Francisco Tatad, John Osmea, and Rodolfo Biazon opposed the implementation of said agreement as they averred that EDSA LRT Consortium is a foreign corporation as it was organized under Hongkong laws; that as such, it cannot own a public utility such as the EDSA railway transit because this falls under the nationalized areas of activities. The petition was filed against Jesus Garcia, Jr. in his capacity as DOTC Secretary. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition shall prosper. HELD: No. The Supreme Court made a clarification. The SC ruled that EDSA LRT Consortium, under the agreement, does not and will not become the owner of a public utility hence, the question of its nationality is misplaced. It is true that a foreign corporation cannot own a public utility but in this case what EDSA LRT Consortium will be owning are the facilities that it will be building for the EDSA railway project. There is no prohibition against a foreign corporation to own facilities used for a public utility. Further, it cannot be said that EDSA LRT Consortium will be the one operating the public utility for it will be DOTC that will operate the railway transit. DOTC will be the one exacting fees from the people for the use of the railway and from the proceeds, it shall be paying the rent due to EDSA LRT Consortium. All that EDSA LRT Consortium has to do is to build the facilities and receive rent from the use thereof by the government for 25 years it will not operate the railway transit. Although EDSA LRT Consortium is a corporation formed for the purpose of building a public utility it does not automatically mean that it is operating a public utility. The moment for determining the requisite Filipino nationality is when the entity applies for a franchise, certificate or any other form of authorization for that purpose. Bugnay Construction v. Laron Digest Facts: 1. A lease contract between the City of Dagupan and P & M Agro was executed for the use of a city lot called the Magsaysay Market Area. Subsequently, the City filed a case to rescind the contract due to the failure of P&M to comply with the lease contract conditions. 2. Thereafter, the City issued a resolution granting the lease of said lot to

the petitioner Bugnay COnstruction for the establishment of a Magsaysay Market building. As a result, respondent Ravanzo filed a taxpayer's suit against the City assailing the validity of the lease contract between the petitioner and the city. Ravanzo was the counsel of P&M Agro in the earlier case. Issue: Whether or not the respondent is the real party in interest NO. 1. The Court held that the respondent has no standing to file the case. There was no disbursement of public funds involved in this case since it is the petitioner, a private party which will fund the planned construction of the market building. Restituto Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court Police Power Not Validly Exercised There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos. ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid. HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A ctreated a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear

encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. Norton vs Shelby County, 118 US 425 Sheppard vs Barron, 194 US 553 DE AGBAYANI VS. PNB effects of constitutionality Agbayani obtained a loan P450 from PNB secured by a REM, which was to mature 5 years later. 15 years later, PNB sought to foreclose the REM. Agbayani filed a complaint claiming that it was barred by prescription. She also claims that she obtained an injunction against the sheriff. PNB argued that the claim has not yet prescribed if the period from the time of issuance of EO32 to the time when RA 342 was issued should be deducted. o E0 32 was issued in 1945 providing for debt moratorium o RA 342 was issued in 1948 - extension of the debt moratorium The RA 342 was declared void and since it was an extension of EO 32, EO 32 was likewise nullified. Here, RA 342 (the debt moratorium law) continued EO 32, suspending the payment of debts by war sufferers. However RA 342 could not pass the test of validity. (I think what Justice Fernando was saying is that the law was later declared unconstitutional because it violates the non-impairment of contractual obligations clause in the constitution). PNB claims that this period should be deducted from the prescriptive period since during this time the bank took no legal steps for the recovery of the loan. As such, the action has not yet prescribed. ISSUE: Has the action prescribed? SC: NO. The general rule is that an unconstitutional act because it suffers from infirmity, cannot be a source of legal rights or duties. When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.

However, prior to the declaration of nullity of such challenged legislative act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Such legislative act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted that prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect the awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether a legislative act is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would e to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication. The past cannot always be erased by judicial declaration. (OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE). The existence of a statute prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal consequences are attached. During the 8 year period that EO 32 and RA 342 were in force, prescription did not run. Thus, the prescriptive period was tolled in the meantime prior to such adjudication of invalidity. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JULIO HERIDA, defendant-appellant. Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Emeterio Y. Villanueva for defendant-appellant. RELOVA, J.: This case was certified to Us by the Court of Appeals on the ground that the issue in the decision sought to be reviewed involves purely a question of law. The decision of the lower court, dated February 27, 1962, reads: When this case was called for hearing, the defendant and his counsel failed to appear despite the fact that counsel was duly notified. Counsel for the plaintiff prayed that he be allowed to present his evidence in the absence of the defendant which was granted. It appears that from May 10, 1943, defendant Julio Herida issued a promissory note in favor of the Bank of Taiwan, Ltd. the sum of P750.00 payable on May 10, 1944; on June 8, 1943, defendant issued again another promissory note for the amount of P750.00 payable on June 8, 1944; on June 10, 1943, defendant issued again another promissory note for the amount of P280.00 payable on June 10, 1944. All the promissory notes bear

interest at the rate of 6% per annum compounded quarterly (Exhibits A, B and C). To secure the prompt and full payment of the loans, defendant Julio Herida executed two real estate mortgages affecting six parcels of land, namely: Lots Nos. 305, 502, 259, 303 and 235, an of the cadastral survey of Murcia and Lot No. 1085 of the cadastral survey of Talisay, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 26613, 26612, 26611, 26614, 26615 and 28079, respectively. (Exhibits D, E, and F). Said mortgages were duly registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental as shown by the annotations found in said contracts, Exhibit D-1, E-1, and F-1, respectively. The contract further provides that upon failure of the mortgagor to comply with the terms and conditions stipulated in the contract, defendant win pay 10% of the total indebtedness but not less than P200.00 as attorneys's fees and to pay the costs (Exhibits G-1 and H-1). Statement of account of the defendant was prepared on August 2, 1961, showing the total amount of P1,392.30 as reduced to peso equivalent under Ballantine schedule of value, plus interest in the sum of P2,327.25 or a total of P3,720.55 (Exhibit H). Another statement of account was issued as of December 31, 1960, showing a balance of P3,948.83 (Exhibit H-1). On September 22, 1954, the plaintiff address a letter to the defendant Julio Herida demanding payment of his account due (Exhibit I) which letter was sent by registered mail on September 30, 1954, (Exhibit I-1 Despite the said demand, defendant failed and refused to pay the above-mentioned amount. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the defendant Julio Herida to pay the plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines, the sum of P3,948.83 plus 6% interest, compounded quarterly, from December 31, 1960 up to complete payment. Defendant is further ordered to pay attorney's fees in the sum equivalent to 10% of the amount due said to pay the costs. Ninety days after the decision has become final and defendant fails to pay the judgment amount, the mortgage properties shall be sold at public auction in accordance with law and the proceeds thereof shall be applied to the liquidation of the judgment amount plus expenses.

The reason this action was filed by the Republic of the Philippines and not by the Bank of Taiwan, Ltd. from which the loans were obtained by the defendant, is alleged in the complaint as follows: xxx xxx xxx 6. That pursuant to the Transfer Agreement dated July 20, 1954, as supplemented by Transfer Agreement, dated June 15, 1957, the Attorney General of the United States, as successor of the Philippine Alien Property Administration, the agency which took over the functions and authority of the Alien Property Custodian, transferred, conveyed and assigned in favor of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, all the rights, title and interest of the United States Government in and to the property mentioned in the preceding paragraph; 7. That among the assets of the Bank of Taiwan, Ltd., which by virtue of the aforecited Vesting Order No. P-4 were vested in the government of the United States and in pursuance of the abovementioned Transfer Agreement were transferred to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, are the loans secured by the said mortgages referred to in paragraph 3 hereof, which are among others, now Administered by the Board of Liquidators, a government agency under the Office of the President, created under Executive Order No. 372, dated November 24, 1950, and in accordance with Republic Acts Nos. 477 and 8, and other pertinent laws in connection with said mortgages reffered to in paragraph 3 hereof which are among others,now Administered by the Office of the president,created under Executive Order No. 372, dated November 24, 1950, and in accordance with Republic Acts Nos. 477 and 8 and other pertinent laws in connection with said Executive Order No. 372 xxx xxx xxx Dissatisfied with the decision of the lower court, the defendant appealed, setting forth the following assignment of errors: 1. The lower court erred in not taking into consideration that the cause of action of the plaintiff against the defendant was already barred by the statute of limitations.

2. The lower court erred in not taking into consideration that the chattel upon which the chattel mortgage of standing crops were executed was totally destroyed by "caso fortuito." 3. The lower court erred in ordering the defendant Julio Herida to pay the plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines, the sum of P3,948.83 plus 6% interest, compounded quarterly, from December 31, 1960 up to complete payment. The question presented is whether or not the moratorium laws, to wit: Executive Order No. 25 of November 10, 1944; Executive Order No. 32 of 1945, amending the former; and, Act No. 342 are applicable to the loans at bar. Appellant contends that: From 1948 to November 27, 1961 almost thirteen (13) years, had expired and as such the right of the Republic of the Philippines to bring the present action against the defendant has already prescribed in accordance with the above cited Art. 1144, New Civil Code. Before Nov. 27, 1961, the nature of the indebtedness of the defendant is a property of patrimonial in character as it relates to the Philippine Government. As such it is subject to prescription. All things are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription. (Art. 1113, New Civil Code.) On the other hand, appellee maintains that the above cited moratorium laws suspended temporarily the enforcement of the payment of all debts and other monetary obligations payable within the Philippines, except those contracted in areas after they have been declared liberated and, therefore, the present action was not barred by the statute of limitations when the complaint was filed on November 27, 1961. Appellee further explains that: ... For purposes of prescription, the period during which a law is in force is excluded from the computation of the prescriptive period (P.N.B. vs. Osena, et al., January 31, 1958). Since the moratorium laws were declared unconstitutional only on May 18, 1953, the ten-year period within which to bring the action against the appellant began the next day or, to be precise, on May 19, 1953. Appellee's cause of action will, therefore,

prescribe only on May 19, 1963. The complaint in this case was filed on November 27, 1961. Consequently, the ten-year period within which to bring the action has not yet prescribed. The appeal must be dismissed. The promissory notes executed by the appellant in favor of the Bank of Taiwan, Ltd. were due for payment on May 10, 1944, June 8, 1944 and June 10, 1944, respectively. Ordinarily,the counting of the prescriptive period should be reckoned from said dates when appellant's debts became due and demandable. However, the moratorium decrees supervene suspending the enforcement of payments of all debts and other monetary obligations contracted during the war, although in the case of Royal L. Rutter vs. Placido J. Esteban, 93 Phil. 68, the moratorium laws (Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32 and Republic Act No. 342) were declared unconstitutional: The continued operation and enforcement of Republic Act No. 342 at the present time is unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer, and, therefore, the same is declared null and void and without effect. And what is said here with respect to said Act holds true as regards Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32, perhaps with greater force and reason as to the latter, considering that said Orders contain no limitation whatsoever in point of time as regards the suspension of the enforcement and effectivity of monetary obligations. And there is need to make this pronouncement in view of the revival clause embodied in said Act if and when it is declared unconstitutional or invalid. Nonetheless, said laws were in effect from the time of their respective promulgations until May 18, 1953. As a consequence, before they were declared unconstitutional, they suspended the running of the prescriptive period during their effectivity. Thus, the 10-year period within which to institute the action against herein appellant began the day after the moratorium laws were declared unconstitutional or, to be precise, on May 19, 1953. Appellee's cause of action will therefore prescribe only on May 19, 1963. The complaint in this case was filed in November 1961, which is within the 10 year period and, therefore, the action has not yet prescribed. ACCORDINGLY, the decision, dated February 27, 1962 of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. With costs against the defendantappellant. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant vs.

THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, BRANCH III, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, and DOLORES INFANTE, defendants-appellees. The Solicitor General for plaintiff appellee. Villanueva & Villanueua Law Offices for defendants-appellees. RELOVA, J.: In 1943 defendant Dolores Infants obtained loans from the Bank of Taiwan, Ltd., payable at its office in Bacolod City in the total amount of P683.10 with interest at the rate of six percent per annum, compounded quarterly. On September 15, 1961, plaintiff Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint in the Justice of the Peace Court of Villadolid, Negros Occidental, to collect from the defendant the said amount of P683.10. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of prescription. The Justice of the Peace of Villadolid, after hearing, dismissed the case on the ground that the action had prescribed. The plaintiff appealed to the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental and, on October 28, 1963, the case was dismissed on the ground that plaintiff's action had already prescribed. Plaintiff appealed directly to this Court contending that the lower court erred (1) in holding that this action had prescribed, and (2) in dismissing the complaint. In the case of Republic of Philippines vs. Grijaldo 15 SCRA 681, We ruled that " ... pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended, and Executive Order No. 9095 of the United States; and under Vesting Order No. P-4, dated January 21, 1946, the properties of the Bank of Taiwan, Ltd., an entity which was declared to be under the jurisdiction of the enemy country (Japan), were vested in the United States Government. Pursuant, further, to the Philippine Property Act of 1946 and Transfer Agreements dated July 20, 1954 and June 15, 1957, between the United States Government and the Republic of the Philippines, the assets of the Bank of Taiwan, Ltd. were transferred to and vested in the Republic of the Philippines. The successive transfer of the rights over the loans in question from the Bank of Taiwan, Ltd. to the United States Government and from the United States Government to the government of the Republic of the Philippines, made the Republic of the Philippines the successor of the rights, title and interest in said loans, thereby creating a privity of contract between the appellee and the appellant. . . . As successor in interest in, and transferee of, the property rights of the United States of America over the loans in question, the Republic of the Philippines had thereby become a privy to the origin,- 1 contracts of loan between the Bank of Taiwan, Ltd. and the appellant. It

follows, therefore, that the Republic of the Philippines has a legal right to bring the present action against the appellant Jose Grijaldo " In the same aforecited case, the borrower contended that the action had prescribed, pointing out that the loan became due on June 1, 1944 and that the complaint was filed on January 17, 1961, or after more than 16 years had elapsed far beyond the period of ten years when an action based on a written contract should be brought to court. The Court did not find merit in the above cited argument and further ruled that: Firstly, it should be considered that the complaint in the present case was brought by the Republic of the Philippines not as a nominal party but in the exercise of its sovereign functions, to protect the interests of the State over a public property. Under paragraph 4 of Article 1108 of the Civil Code prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, does not run against the State. This Court has held that the statute of limitations does not run against the right of action of the Government of the Philippines (Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Monte de Piedad, etc., 35 Phil. 738-751). Secondly, the running of the period of prescription of the action to collect the loan from the appellant was interrupted by the moratorium laws (Executive Orders No. 25, dated November 18, 1944; Executive Order No. 32, dated March 10, 1945; and Republic Act No. 342, approved on July 26, 1948). In the case at bar, the loans which had no maturity dates were contracted in 1943, or during the period of the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. Ordinarily, the counting of the prescriptive period should be reckoned from the date the debt became due and demandable. However, the moratorium decrees supervene suspending the enforcement of payments of all debts and other monetary obligations contracted during the war, although in the case of Royal L. Rutter vs. Placido J. Esteban, 93 Phil. 68, the moratorium laws (Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32 and Republic Act No. 349) were declared unconstitutional. (Republic vs. Herida G.R. No. L-34486, December 27, 1982). Nevertheless, said laws were in effect from the time of their respective promulgations until May 18, 1953. As a consequence, before they were declared unconstitutional, they suspended the running of the prescriptive period during their effectivity. Thus, the 10-year period within which to institute the action against herein appellee began the day after the moratorium laws were declared unconstitutional or, to be precise, on

May 19, 1953. It was on September 27, 1954 when plaintiff (appellant) made extra-judicial written demand on defendant (appellee). As the loans in question did not have any maturity dates and, therefore, payable on demand, prescription could have accrued, if at all, only on September 27, 1954 when petitioner made the extra-judicial demand. Plaintiff's cause of action will therefore prescribe only on September 27, 1964. And, since the complaint in this case was filed on September 15, 1961, which is within the 10-year period, the action has not yet prescribed. ACCORDINGLY, the order of the lower court, dated October 28, 1963, dismissing the complaint is hereby SET ASIDE and the case remanded to the court below for further proceedings. With costs against the appellee. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. MARIO J. GUTIERREZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, CAMILO PILOTIN, FRANCISCO PIANO, DELFIN PIANO PEDRO PATAO, VINCENT CRISOLOGO, CAMILO PIANO, CAMILO PATAO, PEDRING PIANO, ISIDRO PUGAL, ANTONIO TABULDO, LORENZO PERALTA, VENANCIO PACLEB ANTONIO PIANO, FERMIN PUGAL, CARLITO PUGAL, FLOR PIANO, ERNING ABANO and EIGHTY-TWO (82) JOHN DOES, respondents. REYES, J.B.L., J.: Petition for writs of certiorari and mandamus, with preliminary injunction, filed by the Solicitor General and State Prosecutors, to annul and set aside the order of Judge Mario J. Gutierrez of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur (respondent herein), dated 20 July 1970, denying the prosecution's urgent motion to transfer Criminal Case Nos. 47-V and 48-V of said Court of First Instance, entitled "People vs. Pilotin, et al.," to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District; to direct the respondent Judge to effectuate such transfer; and to restrain the trial of the cases aforesaid in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, sitting in Vigan, capital of the province. In the morning of 22 May 1970, a group of armed persons descended on barrio Ora Centro, municipality of Bantay, Province of Ilocos Sur, and set fire to various inhabited houses therein. On the afternoon of the same day, in barrio Ora Este of the same municipality and province, several residential houses were likewise burned by the group, resulting in the destruction of various houses and in the death of an old woman named Vicenta Balboa. After investigation by the authorities, the provincial fiscal, with several state prosecutors assigned by the Department of Justice to collaborate with him, on 10 June 1970 filed in the Court of

First Instance of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, two informations (Criminal Cases 47V for arson with homicide and 48-V for arson) charging that the seventeen private respondents herein, together with 82 other unidentified persons, "confederating, conspiring, confabulating and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously burn or cause to be burned several residential houses, knowing the said houses to be occupied" and belonging to certain persons named in the filed informations in barrios Ora Este and Ora Centro, Bantay, Ilocos Sur (Petition, Annexes B and B-1). Accused Camilo Pilotin and Vincent Crisologo furnished bail, and on 15 June 1970 voluntarily appeared before respondent Judge Gutierrez, were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Trial was then set for 27, 28 and 29 July 1970. It appears that on the same day, 15 June, the Secretary of Justice issued Administrative Order No. 221, authorizing Judge Lino Anover, of the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, with official station at San Fernando, La Union, to hold a special term in Ilocos Sur, from and after 1 July 1970. Three days thereafter, on 18 June 1970, the Secretary further issued Administrative Order No. 226, authorizing Judge Mario Gutierrez to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V to the Circuit Criminal Court, "in the interest of justice and pursuant to Republic Act No. 5179, as implemented by Administrative Order Nos. 258 and 274" of the Department of Justice. On 22 June 1970, the prosecution moved the respondent judge for a transfer of cases 47-V and 48-V to the Circuit Criminal Court, invoking the Administrative Orders just mentioned and calling attention to the circumstance that they were issued at the instance of the witnesses seeking transfer of the hearing from Vigan to either San Fernando, La Union, or Baguio City, for reasons of security and personal safety, as shown in their affidavits. The accused vigorously opposed such transfer, and on 20 July 1970, the respondent judge declined the transfer sought, on the ground that Administrative Order No. 258 only provided for transfer of cases to the Circuit Criminal Court where the interest of justice required it for the more expeditious disposal of the cases, and in the cases involved the accused had already pleaded; that if the objective of the proposed transfer was to subsequently obtain a change of venue from the Supreme Court under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 5179 the same should have been done right at the very inception of these cases. In view of the lower court's denial of the motion to transfer the cases to the Circuit Criminal Court, the prosecution resorted to Us for writs of certiorari and mandamus, charging abuse of discretion and praying this Court to set aside the order of denial of the transfer and to compel the respondent Court of First Instance to remand the cases to the Circuit

Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, as well as to authorize the latter to try the cases (47-V and 48-V) at either San Fernando, La Union, or Baguio City. Respondents in their answer denied any abuse of discretion in view of the fact that the Administrative Order No. 226 merely authorized the court below, but did not require or command it, to transfer the cases in question to the Circuit Criminal Court, and likewise denied that the circumstances justified any such transfer. At petitioners' request this Court enjoined the respondent Judge Gutierrez from proceeding with the trial of the cases until further orders. We agree with respondents that the present laws do not confer upon the Secretary of Justice power to determine what court should hear specific cases. Any such power, even in the guise of administrative regulation of executive affairs, trenches upon the time-honored separation of the Executive and the Judiciary; and while not directly depriving the courts of their independence, it would endanger the rights and immunities of the accused or civil party. It could be much too easily transformed into a means of predetermining the outcome of individual cases, so as to produce a result in harmony with the Administration's preferences. The creation by Republic Act No. 5179 of the Circuit Criminal Courts for the purpose of alleviating the burden of the regular Courts of First Instance, and to accelerate the disposition of criminal cases pending or to be filed therein, nowhere indicates an intent to permit the transfer of preselected individual cases to the circuit courts. Neither do Administrative Orders Nos. 258 and 274 evidence any such intention; particularly since Administrative Order No. 258, Series of 1968, in Section 2 of its Part V, as confirmed by Administrative Order No. 274 of the same year, in Section 3 of Part III thereof, provides that the transfer to Circuit Criminal Courts of cases pending in the regular Courts of First Instance should be effected by raffle, chance here operating to nullify any executive arbitration of what particular cases should be apportioned to either tribunal. The very terms of Administrative Order No. 226, issued on 18 June 1970 by Secretary of Justice Makasiar, relied upon by the petitioners, in merely authorizing, and not directing, Judges Arciaga and Gutierrez of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 44-V and 47-V (People vs. Pilotin, et al.) to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, reveals that the Secretary himself was aware of the impropriety of imperatively directing transfer of specified cases. Respondent Judge Gutierrez, therefore in construing Administrative Order No. 226 as permissive and not mandatory, acted within the limits of his discretion and violated neither the law nor the Executive Orders heretofore mentioned.

It is unfortunate, however, that in refusing to consider Department Administrative Order No. 226 of the Secretary of Justice as mandatory respondent Judge Gutierrez failed to act upon the contention of the prosecuting officers that the cases against private respondents herein should be transferred to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District because a miscarriage of justice was impending, in view of the refusal of the prosecution witnesses to testify in the court sitting in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, where they felt their lives would be endangered. This claim was buttressed by the affidavits of the injured parties and prosecution witnesses, reaffirming their fear to appear in Vigan to testify in cases 47-V and 48-V and expressing their willingness to testify if the cases are heard outside of Ilocos Sur, where they can be free from tension and terrorism (Petition, Annex J). The fear thus expressed can not be considered fanciful and unfounded when account is taken of the circumstances that the informations filed in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur show that of the one hundred armed participants in the burning of the houses at barrios Ora Este and Ora Centro, Municipality of Bantay, some eighty-two (82) are still unidentified and at large; that one of the accused, private respondent Vincent Crisologo, belongs to an influential family in the province, being concededly the son of the Congressman for the first district of Ilocos Sur and of the lady Governor that the reluctant witnesses are themselves the complainants in the criminal cases, and, therefore, have reasons to fear that attempts will be made to silence them; that it is not shown that the Executive branch is able or willing to give these witnesses full security during the trial and for a reasonable time thereafter, that even if armed security escorts were to be provided, the same would be no guarantee against the possibility of murderous assault against the affiant witnesses, as recent events have proved; that Constabulary reports (Annex H) show that between 1 January and 31 May 1970 no less than 78 murders have been reported committed in said province, of which number only 21 were solved; and, finally, that the promotion and confirmation of respondent Judge Mario Gutierrez from Clerk of Court to Judge of the Court of First Instance of the Second Judicial District, Branch III, was actively supported by Congressman and Governor Crisologo, parents of accused Vincent Crisologo (Annexes H, H-1, and K to N-2 to petitioner's supplemental memorandum). This just refusal to testify in Ilocos Sur manifested by the complaining witnesses, who had on a previous occasion freely given evidence before the investigators in Manila, renders manifest the imperious necessity of transferring the place of trial to a site outside of Ilocos Sur, if the cases are to be judicially inquired into conformably to the interest of truth and

justice and the State is to be given a fair chance to present its side of the case. The respondents vigorously contend that a transfer of the trial site can not be made, because it is a long standing rule of criminal procedure in these Islands that one who commits a crime is amenable therefor only in the jurisdiction where the crime is committed, for the reason pointed out in U.S. vs. Cunanan, 26 Phil. 376, and People vs. Mercado, 65 Phil. 665, that the jurisdiction of a Court of First Instance in the Philippines is limited to certain well-defined territory and they can not take jurisdiction of persons charged with one offense committed outside of that limited territory, and they invoke Rule 110, Section 14 (a), of the Revised Rules of Court providing that "in all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredient thereof took place." It is well to note that this Court has explained in Beltran vs. Ramos, 96 Phil. 149, 150, that the purpose of the rule invoked by accused respondents herein was "not to compel the defendant to move to and appear in a different court from that of the province where the crime was committed, as it would cause him great inconvenience in looking for his witnesses and other evidence in another place." Where the convenience of the accused is opposed by that of the prosecution, as in the case at bar, it is but logical that the court should have power to decide where the balance of convenience or inconvenience lies, and to determine the most suitable place of the trial according to the exigencies of truth and impartial justice. In the particular case before Us, to compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to make a mockery of the judicial process, and to betray the very purpose for which courts have been established. Since the rigorous application of the general principle of Rule 110, Section 14 (a), would result here in preventing a fair and impartial inquiry into the actual facts of the case, it must be admitted that the exigencies of justice demand that the general rule relied upon by accused respondents should yield to occasional exceptions wherever there are weighty reasons therefor. Otherwise, the rigor of the law would become the highest injustice "summum jus, summa in juria." The respondents accused can not complain that to transfer the trial to a site where the prosecution's witnesses can feel free to reveal what they know would be equivalent to railroading them into a conviction. Because regardless of the place where its evidence is to be heard, the prosecution will be always obligated to prove the guilt of the accused beyond

reasonable doubt. The scales of justice clearly lean in favor of the prosecution being given full opportunity to lay its case before a proper arbiter: for a dismissal of the charges for lack of evidence is a verdict that the prosecution can neither challenge nor appeal. We must thus reject the idea that our courts, faced by an impasse of the kind now before Us, are to confess themselves impotent to further the cause of justice. The Constitution has vested the Judicial Power in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law (Article VIII, Section 13), and such judicial power connotes certain incidental and inherent attributes reasonably necessary for an effective administration of justice. The courts "can by appropriate means do all things necessary to preserve and maintain every quality needful to make the judiciary an effective institution of government" (Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil. 322). One of these incidental and inherent powers of courts is that of transferring the trial of cases from one court to another of equal rank in a neighboring site, whenever the imperative of securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice, so demands. This authority was early recognized in England as inhering in the courts of justice even prior to the eighteenth century. The opinion in Crocker vs. Justices of the Superior Court,208 Mass. 162, 21 Ann. Cases 1067, has shown how the eminent Lord Chief Justice Mansfield, in Rex vs. Cowle(Eng.) 2 Burr 834, decided in 1759, said that, in this respect, "the law is clear and uniform as far back as it can be traced." And in Reg. vs. Conway, 7 Jr. C. J. 507, the question was fully discussed, and all the judges appear to have agreed as to the power of the court, Cramption, Jr., saying at page 525: There is another common-law right, equally open to defendants and prosecutors, ... that where it appears that either party cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial in the proper county, then this court ... has jurisdiction to take the case out of the proper county, as it is called, and to bring it into an indifferent county ... This jurisdiction to change the venue ... has been exercised by this court from a very early period. We have reported cases, where the doctrine is laid down in emphatic language; we have the practice of the Court of Queen's Bench in England independently of any practice of our own court ... The general jurisdiction of the court, in a proper case, to change the venue from one county to any other, cannot be the subject of doubt.

This power to transfer trial of criminal cases in furtherance of justice, exercised through writs of certiorari, has, according to the weight of authority, passed to the State Supreme Courts of the American Union. 1 In Cochecho R. Co. vs. Farrington, 26 N.H. 428, at page 436, it was held that the power to transfer the place of holding trials became thoroughly engrafted upon the common law, long before the independence of this country; and from that time forth, not only has the practice prevailed in the courts of England, but the power is now exercised by the Courts of very many if not all of our states, either by force of express statute or the adoption of the common law in the jurisprudence of the same. That such inherent powers are likewise possessed by the Philippine courts admits of no doubt, because they were organized on the American pattern with the enactment of the first judicial organic law, Act 136, on 11 June 1901, by the Philippine Commission, then composed by a majority of able American lawyers, fully familiar with the institutions and traditions of the common law. In Alzua and Arnalot vs. Johnson, 21 Phil. 300, 333, this Court stated: And it is safe to say that in every volume of the Philippine Reports, numbers of cases might be cited wherein recourse has been had to the rules, principles and doctrines of the common law in ascertaining the true meaning and scope of the legislation enacted in and for the Philippine Islands since they passed under American sovereignty. Among the earliest measures of the Philippine Commission, after the establishment of Civil Government under American sovereignty, was the enactment on June 11, 1901, of Act No. 136, "An Act providing for the organization of courts in the Philippine Islands." This Act in express terms abolished the then existing Audiencia or Supreme Court and Courts of First Instance, and substituted in their place the courts provided therein. It sets out in general terms the jurisdiction, duties, privileges, and powers of the new courts and their judges. The majority of the members of the body which enacted it were able American lawyers. The spirit with which it is informed, and indeed its very language and terminology would be unintelligible without some knowledge of the judicial systems of England and the United States. Its manifest purpose and

object was to replace the old judicial system, with its incidents and traditions drawn from Spanish sources, with a new system modeled in all its essential characteristics upon the judicial systems of the United States. It cannot be doubted, therefore, that any incident of the former system which conflicts with the essential principles and settled doctrines on which the new system rests, must be held to be abrogated by the law organizing the new system. While not expressly conferred by Act 136, We find it difficult to believe that the framers' intent was to deny, by silence, to the Philippine Courts, and particularly upon this Supreme Court, the inherent jurisdiction possessed by the English and American courts under their common law heritage to transfer the place of trial of cases in order to secure and promote the ends of justice, by providing fair and impartial inquiry and adjudication. Like the exemption of judges of courts of superior or general authority from liability in a civil action for acts done by them in the exercise of their judicial functions, upheld in the Alzua case as essentially inherent in the courts established by Act 136, even if not expressly provided for, the power to transfer the place of trials when so demanded by the interest of justice is equally essential and possesses no inferior rank. To it apply, mutatis mutandis, the words of this Court in the Alzua case just cited: The grounds of public policy and the reasoning upon which the doctrine is based are not less forceful and imperative in these Islands than in the countries from which the new judicial system was borrowed; and an examination of the reasons assigned ... leaves no room for doubt that a failure to recognize it as an incident to the new judicial system would materially impair its usefulness and tend very strongly to defeat the ends for which it was established. (21 Phil. 333-334) Not only has there been since then no proof of any specific pronouncement, by Constitution or Congress, against the exercise by our Courts of the power discussed heretofore: on the contrary, the law establishing the Circuit Criminal Courts, Republic Act No. 5179, in its Section 4, provides express legislative recognition of its existence: SEC. 4. The Circuit Criminal Courts may hold sessions anywhere within their respective districts:Provided, however, that cases shall be heard within the province where the crime subject of the

offense was committed. And provided further, that when the interest of justice so demands, with prior approval of the Supreme Court, cases may be heard in a neighboring province within the district ... (Emphasis supplied) Since the requirements for proper jurisdiction have been satisfied by the filing of the criminal case in question with the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, in which province the offenses charged were committed, according to the informations; since the holding of the trial in a particular place is more a matter of venue, rather than jurisdiction; since the interests of truth and justice can not be subserved by compelling the prosecution to proceed to trial in the respondent court in Ilocos Sur, because its witnesses, for just and weighty reasons, are unwilling to testify therein, and the respondent court, ignoring their safety, has abusively denied the motion to have the case transferred to another court, this Supreme Court, in the exercise of judicial power possessed by it under the Constitution and the statutes, should decree that the trial of cases 47-V and 48-V should be heard and decided by the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, either in San Fernando, La Union, or in Baguio City, at the earlier available date. This arrangement would have the advantage that the same trial judge could later be authorized to hear the defense witnesses in Vigan, if circumstances so demanded. Furthermore, the adjudication of the case by a judge other than respondent Gutierrez, if resulting in acquittal, would remove any doubt or suspicion that the same was in any way influenced by the trial Judge's being beholden to the Crisologo family. The solution thus adopted is in harmony with the ideals set by this Court in Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney General, 20 Phil. 523, where We said: ... The most perfect procedure that can be devised is that which gives opportunity for the most complete and perfect exercise of the powers of the court within the limitations set by natural justice. It is that one which, in other words, gives the most perfect opportunity for the powers of the court to transmute themselves into concrete acts of justice between the parties before it. The purpose of such a procedure is not to restrict the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter but to give it effective facility in righteous action. It may be said in passing that the most salient objection which can be urged against procedure today is that it so restricts the exercise of the court's power by technicalities that part of its authority effective for

justice between the parties is many times in inconsiderable portion of the whole. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best adapted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end. It is the means by which the powers of the court are made effective in just judgments. When it loses the character of the one and takes on that of the other the administration of justice becomes incomplete and unsatisfactory and lays itself open to grave criticism. (Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney-General, 20 Phil. 523, 529 [1911]. Emphasis and paragraphing supplied.) In resume, this Court holds, and so rules: (1) That Republic Act No. 5179 creating the Circuit Criminal Courts did not, and does not, authorize the Secretary of Justice to transfer thereto specified and individual cases; (2) That this Supreme Court, in the exercise of the Judicial Power vested by the Constitution upon it and other statutory Courts, possesses inherent power and jurisdiction to decree that the trial and disposition of a case pending in a Court of First Instance be transferred to another Court of First Instance within the same district whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand, and there are serious and weighty reasons to believe that a trial by the court that originally had jurisdiction over the case would not result in a fair and impartial trial and lead to a miscarriage of justice. (3) That in the present case there are sufficient and adequate reasons for the transfer of the hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, in the interest of truth and justice. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the writs of certiorari and mandamus prayed for are granted; the order of the respondent Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, dated 20 July 1970, is sustained in so far as it holds that the Administrative Order No. 221 of the Department of Justice is not mandatory, but only directory; nevertheless, said order is declared in grave abuse of discretion and set aside in so far as it declines to transfer

the trial of its cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V to another court within the district; and said respondent Court is accordingly directed and ordered to remand the two criminal cases aforesaid to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District for hearing of the evidence for the prosecution either in Baguio or San Fernando, La Union, at the earliest available date, and such other proceedings as the Circuit Criminal Court may determine in the interest of justice. The accused are required to file bail bonds to answer for their appearance at the trial and sentence by the Circuit Criminal Court for the Second Judicial District, in the same amount, and under the same terms and conditions as their present bail bonds, which will be replaced by those herein ordered, all within fifteen (15) days from finality of this decision. No special pronouncement as to costs. People vs. Sola The primordial aim and intent of the Constitution must ever be kept in mind. In case of doubt, it should be resolved in favor of a change of venue. The prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail. Facts: CFI Negros Occidental issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of the deceased bodies of 7 persons believed in the possession of the accused Pablo Sola in his hacienda at Sta. Isabel, Kabankalan, Negros Occidental. On September 16, 1980 armed with the above warrant, the 332nd PC/INP Company proceeded to the place of Sola. Diggings made in a canefield yielded two common graves containing the 7 bodies. Seven (7) separate complaints for murder were thus filed against Pablo Sola and 18 other persons. The municipal court found probable cause against the accused and ordered their arrest. However, without giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, the court granted them the right to post bail for their temporary release. Pablo Sola and two others have since been released from detention. The witnesses in the murder cases informed the prosecution of their fears that if the trial is held at the CFI Himamaylan which is but 10 kilometers from Kabankalan, their safety could be jeopardized. At least 2 of the accused are official with power and

influence in Kabankalan and they have been released on bail. In addition, most of the accused remained at large. There have been reports made to police authorities of threats made on the families of the witnesses. Issues: 1. Whether or not change of venue is proper 2. Whether or not the bail bond should be cancelled for failure to abide by the basic requirement that the prosecution be heard in a case where the accused is charged with a capital offense, prior to bail being granted. Held: Change of venue Change of venue has become moot and academic with the transfer of the case to Bacolod City. However, the case proceeds with this discussion: To compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to make a mockery of the judicial process, and to betray the very purpose for which courts have been established. The witnesses in the case are fearful of their lives. They are afraid they would be killed on their way to or from Himamaylan during any of the days of trial. Because of this fear, they may either refuse to testify or testify falsely to save their lives. Right of bail The bail bonds must be cancelled and the case remanded to the sala of Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio for such hearing. Whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process, and the order of the court granting bail should be considered void on that ground. Justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true. This norm which is of the very essence of due process as the embodiment of justice requires that the prosecution be given the opportunity to prove that there is strong evidence of guilt. It does not suffice, as asserted herein, that the questions asked by the municipal judge before bail was granted could be characterized as

searching. That fact did not cure an infirmity of a jurisdictional character. (People vs. Sola, G.R. No. L-56158-64 March 17, 1981) People v. Pilotin, 65 SCRA 635 (1975) Contention c/o Crisologo His life would be in jeopardy if he were to be confined in the Vigan municipal jail during the trial because there are many political enemies of the Crisologo family in that vicinity.

which warrant was issued for the arrest of the accused. The motion was denied and that denial is the subject matter of this proceeding.

According to the memorandum submitted by the petitioners attorney to the Court of First Instance in support of his motion, the accused, assisted by counsel, appeared at the preliminary investigation. In that investigation, the justice of the peace informed him of the charges and asked him if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon which he entered the plea of not guilty. Then his counsel moved that the complainant Held & Ratio The Constitution expressly empowers the Court to order a change of venue orpresent her evidence so that she and her witnesses could be examined and cross-examined in the manner and form provided by law. The fiscal place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice. What is involved in the case at bar is not and the private prosecutor objected, invoking section 11 of rule 108, and the objection was sustained. In view thereof, the accuseds counsel merely a miscarriage of justice but the personal safety of Crisologo. It would be absurdannounced his intention to renounce his right to present evidence, and the justice of the peace forwarded the case to the court of first instance. to compel him to undergo trial in a place where his life would be imperiled. Issue: Dispositive whether the respondent judge did not act in excess of his The municipal court of Vigan is directed to transfer the record of Crisologos jurisdiction or in abuse of discretion in refusing to grant the accuseds Criminal Case motion to return the record for the purpose set out therein to the city court of Quezon City where it should be redocketed and raffled to any Judge. The case may be tried at Camp Crame. The usual precautions and securityHeld: measures No. Section 11 of Rule 108 does not curtail the sound should be adopted in bringing Crisologo to Crame on the occasion of the discretion of the justice of the peace on the matter. While section 11 of hearing. Rule 108 defines the bounds of the defendants right in the preliminary investigation, there is nothing in it or any other law restricting the Notes in class Applies to criminal cases (civil cases inhibition venue can be transferred but authority, inherent in a court of justice, to pursue a course of action reasonably calculated to bring out the truth. not jurisdiction.) Jurisdiction Defendant cannot, as a matter of right, compel the complaint Subject matter and his witnesses to repeat in his presence what they had said at the Person preliminary examination before the issuance of the order of arrest. The Territory constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the witnesses Bustos v. Lucero against him does not apply to preliminary hearings nor will the absence Facts: of a preliminary examination be an infringement of his right to confront The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a witnesses. As a matter of fact, preliminary investigation may be done motion with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga after he had been away with entirely without infringing the constitutional right of an bound over to that court for trial, praying that the record of the case be accused under the due process clause to a fair trial. remanded to the justice of the peace court of Masantol, the court of Rufino Nuez vs Sandiganbayan & the People of the Philippines origin, in order that the petitioner might cross-examine the complainant Equal Protection Creation of the Sandiganbayan and her witnesses in connection with their testimony, on the strength of

Nuez assails the validity of the PD 1486 creating the Sandiganbayan as amended by PD 1606. He was accused before the Sandiganbayan of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several cases. It is the claim of Nuez that PD1486, as amended, is violative of the due process, equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution. He claims that the Sandiganbayan proceedings violates Nuezs right to equal protection, because appeal as a matter of right became minimized into a mere matter of discretion; appeal likewise was shrunk and limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the facts and trial evidence; and there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the SC, instead of the traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal as a matter of right covering both law and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the CA and thereafter to the SC. ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of Sandiganbayan violates equal protection insofar as appeals would be concerned. HELD: The SC ruled against Nuez. The 1973 Constitution had provided for the creation of a special court that shall have original jurisdiction over cases involving public officials charged with graft and corruption. The constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, the classification therein set forth met the standard requiring that it must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class. Further still, decisions in the Sandiganbayan are reached by a unanimous decision from 3 justices - a showing that decisions therein are more conceivably carefully reached than other trial courts. In Re Cunanan Facts: Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953. In accordance with the said law, the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75 percent.

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while other motions for the revision of their examination papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972. Issue: Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid. Held: RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial. On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative departments of the government. It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license. Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional.

Enrique Zaldivar vs Raul Gonzalez 166 SCRA 316 Legal Ethics Contemptuous Language Duty of a Lawyer Zaldivar was the governor of Antique. He was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Gonzales was the then Tanodbayan who was investigating the case.

Zaldivar then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the authority of the Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases under the 1987 Constitution. The Supreme Court, acting on the petition issued a Cease and Desist Order against Gonzalez directing him to temporarily restrain from investigating and filing informations against Zaldivar. Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and he filed criminal informations against Zaldivar. Gonzalez even had a newspaper interview where he proudly claims that he scored one on the Supreme Court; that the Supreme Courts issuance of the TRO is a manifestation theta the rich and influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme Court, [while] it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due course. Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez. The Supreme Court then ordered Gonzalez to explain his side. Gonzalez stated that the statements in the newspapers were true; that he was only exercising his freedom of speech; that he is entitled to criticize the rulings of the Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error. He also said, even attaching notes, that not less than six justices of the Supreme Court have approached him to ask him to go slow on Zaldivar and to not embarrass the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt. HELD: Yes. The statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. His statements necessarily imply that the justices of the Supreme Court betrayed their oath of office. Such statements constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for the Supreme Court. Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system of administration of justice in the country. Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. What Gonzalez seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a Special Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to the Supreme Court as the embodiment and the repository

of the judicial power in the government of the Republic. The responsibility of Gonzalez to uphold the dignity and authority of the Supreme Court and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice is heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer. Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but his criticisms must be bona fide. In the case at bar, his statements, particularly the one where he alleged that members of the Supreme Court approached him, are of no relation to the Zaldivar case. The Supreme Court suspended Gonzalez indefinitely from the practice of law. In re Edilion Facts: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues to the IBP since the latters constitution notwithstanding due notice. Edilion contends that the provision providing for the IBP dues constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect. Issue: WON the payment of IBP dues suffers constitutional infirmity? NO Held: All legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State the administration of justice as an officer of the court. When the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to

require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns. To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6 Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the States legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers. Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. Why? The right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. CASE: CSC VS ANDAL FACTS: Herminigildo L. Andal, respondent, holds the position of Security Guard II in the Sandiganbayan. He filed an application to take the Career Service Professional Examination-Computer Assisted Test (CSPE-CAT), was admitted to take the examination, and the result showed that he passed with the rate of 81.03%. However, when Arlene S. Vito who claimed to have been authorized by respondent to secure the results of the examination went to do so, verification and comparison of the pictures attached to the Picture Seat Plan and the identification card of Andal brought by Vito showed dissimilarity in the facial features. Civil Service Commission National Capital Region (CSC-NCR) rendered judgment finding the respondent guilty of dishonesty and imposing upon him the penalty of dismissal from the service. Aggrieved, the respondent appealed, however, it was denied. He then elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA), in which the CA ruled in favor of the respondent. The CSC filed a motion for reconsideration in the CA but was denied. Hence, the present petition for reversal of the decision of the CA. ISSUE: Does the CSC's disciplinary jurisdiction extend to court personnel?

HELD: The Court recognizes the CSC's administrative jurisdiction over the civil service. Section 3, Article IX-B of the Constitution declares the CSC as the central personnel agency of the Government shall establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. But the the CA ruled that the CSC encroached upon the Supreme Courts power of administrative supervision over court personnel. In reversing the CSC resolutions, the CA cited Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the SC shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. The CA further stated that what the CSC should have done was to refer the administrative case for dishonesty against respondent to the Office of the Court Administrator for appropriate action instead of resolving the case. The CSC's authority and power to hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases are not in dispute. In the present case, it cannot be said that Andal was estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the CSC. This notwithstanding, the Court reiterates that it will not and cannot tolerate dishonesty for the judiciary expects the highest standard of integrity from all its employees. The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice is circumscribed with a heavy burden or responsibility. The Court will not hesitate to rid its ranks of undesirables. The instant petition is DENIED. The Court orders CSC to refer the case of Andal to the Office of the Court Administrator, for the filing of the appropriate administrative case against him. Maceda v. Vasquez Facts: Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Antique, seeks the review of the following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman: (1) the Order dated September 18, 1991 denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the Supreme Court filed by petitioner; and (2) the Order dated November 22, 1951 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and other controverting evidences. In his affidavit-complaint dated April 18, 1991 filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, respondent Napoleon A. Abiera of the Public Attorneys Office alleged that petitioner had falsified his Certificate of Service 1 dated February 6, 1989, by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before

January 31, 1998, when in truth and in fact, petitioner knew that no decision had been rendered in five (5) civil and ten (10) criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera further alleged that petitioner similarly falsified his certificates of service for the months of February, April, May, June, July and August, all in 1989; and the months beginning January up to September 1990, or for a total of seventeen (17) months. On the other hand, petitioner contends that he had been granted by the Supreme Court an extension of ninety (90) days to decide the aforementioned cases.

Supreme Court has the necessary records to make such a determination. The Ombudsman cannot compel the Supreme Court, as one of the three branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the Supreme Court for determination whether said Judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties. ARTURO DE GUZMAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents. Augusto S. Jimenez for petitioner. Solicitor General for respondents. MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: An appeal by certiorari from the Decision of respondent Sandiganbayan 1 in Criminal Case No. 190 convicting petitioner, Arturo de Guzman, of Malversation of Public Funds. We resolved to "(a) give due course to the petition and (b) require the parties to file their respective Memoranda on the constitutional questions raised." 1. Petitioner assails the rule-making power of the Sandiganbayan as violative of Article X, section 5(5) of the Constitution, which vests on the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all Courts. It is true that Section 9 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, the law creating the Sandiganbayan vests it with rule-making power, thus: Sec. 9. Rule-making Power. The Sandiganbayan shall have the power to promulgate its own rules of procedure and, pending such promulgation, the Rules of Court shall govern its proceedings. However, since the Sandiganbayan is a Court, its rule-making power must be construed, out of "constitutional necessity" as being subject to the approval of the Rules by the Supreme Court. Mr. Justice Antonio Barredo had expressed this view in his Concurring Opinion in "Nuez vs. Sandiganbayan 111 SCRA 433, 455 (January 30, 1982), when he said:

Issue: whether the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain a criminal complaint for the alleged falsification of a judges certification submitted to the Supreme Court, and assuming that it can, whether a referral should be made first to the Supreme Court Held: In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Supreme Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Courts power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and court personnels compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioners certificates of service to the Supreme Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the

... the rule-making power granted to it (the Sandiganbayan) by P.D. 1606 must of constitutional necessity be understood as signifying that any rule it may promulgate cannot have force and effect unless approved by the Supreme Court, as if they have originated therefrom. The "Rules of the Sandiganbayan" were promulgated on January 10, 1979, and Rule XVIII thereof expressly provides that they "shall take effect upon approval." The approval referred to can only refer to approval by the Supreme Court. The Sandiganbayan has submitted its Rules to this Court. In the absence of any action of approval or disapprobation from this Court the Sandiganbayan has to be guided by the Rules of Court. 2 We have reviewed the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and we have not found any indication therein of contravention of the Rules of Court. 2. Petitioner also impugns the authority of the First Division of the Sandiganbayan to hear and decide his case contending that inasmuch as it was the only division which had been constituted, it could not legally function as a judicial body and, consequently, he was placed in a "precarious predicament". This argument must also fail. Although the Sandiganbayan is composed of a Presiding Justice and eight Associate Justices 3, it does not mean that it cannot validly function without all of the Divisions constituted. Section 3 of PD 1606 provides that "the Sandiganbayan shall sit in three divisions of three Justices each". While Section 5 thereof provides that "the unanimous vote of the three justices in a division shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a judgment." Thus, the Sandiganbayan functions in Divisions of three Justices each and each Division functions independently of the other. As long as a Division has been duly constituted it is a judicial body whose pronouncements are binding as judgments of the Sandiganbayan. The judgment convicting petitioner was a unanimous Decision of the First Division duly constituted. It thus met the requirement for the pronouncement of a judgment as required by Section 5 of PD 1606 supra. We find no substance to the argument that no member could be expected to dissent because no special Division of five Justices could then be formed, considering that the Decision was a unanimous one and there was no indication that any one of the three Justices had intended to dissent. 3. Petitioner's contention that there is a dilution of his right to appeal inasmuch as Decisions of the Sandiganbayan are subject to review by

this Court only by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court 4 and, consequently, he is deprived of his right to appeal on questions of fact, is neither meritorious. On this point, this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, stressed in the Nuez case: Even from the standpoint then of the American decisions relied upon, it cannot be successfully argued that there is a dilution of the right to appeal. Admittedly, under Presidential Decree No. 1486, there is no recourse to the Court of Appeals, the review coming from this Court. ... Would the omission of the Court of Appeals as an intermediate tribunal deprive petitioner of a right vital to the protection of his liberty? The answer must be in the negative. In the first place, his innocence or guilt is passed upon by the three-judge court of a division of respondent Court. Moreover, a unanimous vote is required, failing which 'the Presiding Justice shall designate two other justices from among the members of the Court to sit temporarily with them, forming a division of five justices and the concurrence of a majority of such division shall be necessary for rendering judgment. Then if convicted, this Court has the duty if he seeks a review to see whether any error of law was committed to justify a reversal of the judgment. Petitioner makes much, perhaps excessively so as to the wont of advocates, of the fact that there is no review of the facts. What cannot be sufficiently stressed is that this Court in determining whether or not to give due course to the petition for review must be convinced that the constitutional presumption of innocence has been overcome. In that sense, it cannot be said that on the appellate level there is no way of scrutinizing whether the quantum of evidence required for a finding of guilt has been satisfied. The standard as to when there is proof of such weight to justify a conviction is set forth inPeople vs. Dramayo. 5 Justice Barredo, in his Concurring Opinion also observed: ... I believe that the accused has a better guarantee of a real and full consideration of the evidence and the determination of the facts where there are three judges actually seeing and observing the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses. It is Our constant jurisprudence that the cases where pivotal points are shown to have been

overlooked by them. With more reason should this rule apply to the review of the decision of a collegiate trial court. Moreover, when the Court of Appeals passes on an appeal in a criminal case, it has only the records to rely on, and yet the Supreme Court has no power to reverse its findings of fact, with only the usual exceptions already known to all lawyers and judges. I strongly believe that the review of the decisions of the Sandiganbayan whose three justices have actually seen and observed the witnesses as provided for in P.D. 1606 is a more iron-clad guarantee that no person accused before such special court will ever be finally convicted without his guilt appearing beyond reasonable doubt as mandated by the Constitution. 6 4. Petitioner's argument that he was deprived of his right to a preliminary investigation as the same was conductedex parte has much less to recommend it. Petitioner failed to appear at said investigation despite notice thereof received by a member of his family, in the same way that the formal administrative investigation against him for dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and for violation of civil service rules and regulations was similarly conducted ex parte because of petitioner's failure to appear despite due notice served upon and received by his wife, where he was found guilty as charged and dismissed from the service effect following his last day of service, with pay (Exhibit "C"). Besides, an ex parte preliminary investigation is authorized under section 11 of PD 911, reading: ... If respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed he does not appear before the investigating fiscal or state prosecutor, the preliminary investigation shall proceed without him. ... It should also be recalled that the statutory right to a preliminary investigation may be waived expressly or impliedly. Petitioner waived it when he failed to appear for such investigation despite notice. The denial of his petition for reinvestigation by the Tanodbayan was a matter of discretion with the latter. 5. Finally, petitioner's contention that his conviction is not in accord with the law and jurisprudence is unmeritorious. The judgment against petitioner sentenced him as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Arturo de Guzman guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Malversation of Public

Funds, as defined and penalized in Article 217, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code; and in default of any modifying circumstance in attendance, sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty ranging from Twelve (12) Years and one (1) Day, as minimum, to Eighteen (18) Years, Eight (8) Months and One (1) Day, as maximum, both ofreclusion temporaral, with the accessories provided by law and with credit for preventive imprisonment undergone, if any, in accordance with the provision of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 6127; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; to pay a fine in the amount of Seventy Six Thousand Five Hundred Twenty One and 37/100 Pesos P 76,521.37); to indemnify the City of Manila, Republic of the Philippines, in the same amount of Seventy Six Thousand Five Hundred Twenty One and 37/100 Pesos (P76,521.37) representing the amount malversed and, to pay the costs. We find that the Sandiganbayan has not committed any error of law in convicting petitioner. For the period from May 22, 1978 to June 7, 1978, petitioner, as Travelling Collector and an accountable officer, collected the total amounhat his conviction is not in accord with law and jurisprudence is unmeritorious. The judgmt of P 204,319.32 from various agencies (Veterinary Inspection Board, Public Health Laboratory, North Cemetery, among others) but remitted to the General Teller (Mr. Gerardo Verder now retired), Cash Division Department of Finance, City of Manila, only P 127,797.95, thus resulting in a shortage of P 76,521.37. Said shortgage pertained to collections of petitioner from the Veterinary Inspection Board (Exhibits "H-1-i" to "H-1-n"). Petitioner's contention that his accountability was not proven considering that the audit examination was conducted in his absence and after he had signed the Report of Examination (Exhibit "H") in blank presented to him by Auditing Examiner Maximo Pielago, thus making said procedure irregular, is neither persuasive. If he was not present during the audit examination, petitioner himself was to blame for he should have known that when he received a demand letter from Pielago to produce his accountabilities (Exhibit "G") on June 5, 1978 an examination would be forthcoming. Upon petitioner's assurance that he had no more existing accountabilities as he had ceased to make collections due to his expected promotion, and his promise to produce his accountabilities on June 7 or 8, 1978, Pielago presented said Report of Examination to petitioner for

signature. On this point, we are in full agreement with the findings of respondent Court: Neither is there any merit in the accused's asseverations that his accountability has not been proved. It is true that as candidly admitted by Auditing Examiner Pielago himself, he made the accused sign the Report of Examination (Exhibit H) in blank even before any examination could be conducted. But, this rather irregular procedure is not altogether without any reasonable explanation. As uncontradictedly explained by Pielago, he resorted to that course of action because, upon his first demand to the accused for the production of his cash and cash items, the latter already told him that he had nothing to account for anymore because he had since ceased making collection in anticipation of his then supposed pending promotion. Evidently, because of this assurance from the accused, Pielago may have thought that the projected examination would be merely proforma and could not possibly result in anything but a zero-zero balance as far as the accounts of the accused were concerned. 7 It must be emphasized that petitioner did not report - for work anymore beginning June 9, 1978, despite a demand from Pielago for the production of his accountabilities (Exhibit "M"), a reminder of his criminal liability, and the fact that administrative charges had been filed against him for violation of civil service rules and regulations and conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the service (Exhibit "F"). Pielago thus proceeded with the audit examination of petitioner's accountability from the official records available namely: ... Official Receipts issued by him to collection agents from whom he received public funds (Exhibits H-1-a to H-1-n); Daily Statements of Collections Exhibits I, I-1 to I-7) and Official Receipts (Exhibits L, L-1 to L-8) covering remittances made by him of his collection to the General Teller, the Ledger reflecting entries of collections made by him from the Veterinary Inspection Board (Exhibits Q, Q-1, Q-1-a to Q-1-f, Q-2, Q-2-a to Q-2-e); and the Cashbooks also recording his remittances of his collections to the General Teller (Exhibits J, J-1, J-1-a, J-2, J-2-a, K, K-1, K-I-a K-2-a, and K-2-b)8

As against the above documentary evidence, petitioner's posture that he had turned over his collections everyday to Mr. Gerardo Verder the General Teller then, who had assured him that he would do the explaining, is lame, indeed. Besides, he could not but admit his accountability for receipts, with serial nos. 155901 to 155990, issued by him, but under the accountability of Gregorio Sano a travelling collector, because of petitioner's own pending request for transfer of accountability. 9 In the face of the evidence presented, petitioner failed to overcome the presumption under Art. 217 of the Revised Penal Code that the failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any public officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds to personal use. In Malversation, all that is necessary to prove is that the defendant received in his possession public funds, that he could not account for them and did not have them in his possession and that he could not give a reasonable excuse for the disappearance of the same. An accountable public officer may be convicted of Malversation even if there is no direct evidence of misappropriation and the only evidence is that there is a shortage in his accounts which he has not been able to explain satisfactorily. 10 Neither do we find tenable petitioner's contention that his accountability was not established as the Report of Examination was denominated by Pielago as "preliminary". As held by respondent Court: True, the report of the audit aforesaid was denominated as 'preliminary'. But, this does not imply that the same may not be taken as basis for determining the extent of the accountability of the accused as of the date of said audit. If there was anything tentative about the finding made, it was only because collections of the accused under official receipts known to be still in his possession and the stubs of which had not yet been submitted, were not yet accounted for. Hence, the only meaning that the term 'preliminary' had in the premises was that the amount of shortage could still be increased if all said receipts are eventually found and taken into account. But, on the basis of the records available to the auditor, the amount of shortage established could not but be considered final. All told, we are convinced that the constitutional presumption of innocence in petitioner's favor has been overcome and his guilt established beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from, convicting petitioner of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds, is hereby affirmed. Costs against petitioner, Arturo de Guzman. Chavez vs JBC seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. At present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase a representative of Congress. It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory components of Congress, such that the absence of either divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of a representative from Congress, it should mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress. Respondents further argue that petitioner has no real interest in questioning the constitutionality of the JBCs current composition. The respondents also question petitioners belated filing of the petition. Issues: (1) Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been met in this case; and

(2) Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution. Held: (1) Yes. The Courts power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when these conditions sine qua non are present, especially when the constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch of government is put in issue. The Court disagrees with the respondents contention that petitioner lost his standing to sue because he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a personal stake on the case is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say that only official nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and question the JBC composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and nominates other members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the JBCs duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in the land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all over the country may be affected by the Courts ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy. The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.

(2) Yes. The word Congress used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. The sevenmember composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting. It is evident that the definition of Congress as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in government to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term Congress must be taken to mean the entire legislative department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified. Perfecto v Meer 85 Phil 552 GREGORIO PERFECTO vs. BIBIANO L. MEER [G.R. No. L-2348. February 27, 1950.] Facts: In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay income tax upon his salary as member of this Court during the year 1946. After paying the amount (P802), he instituted this action in the Manila Court of First Instance contending that the assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason that

imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the Constitution. Issue: Does the imposition of an income tax upon this salary amount to a diminution thereof? Held: Yes. As in the United States during the second period, we must hold that salaries of judges are not included in the word "income" taxed by the Income Tax Law. Two paramount circumstances may additionally be indicated, to wit: First, when the Income Tax Law was first applied to the Philippines 1913, taxable "income" did not include salaries of judicial officers when these are protected from diminution. That was the prevailing official belief in the United States, which must be deemed to have been transplanted here ; and second, when the Philippine Constitutional Convention approved (in 1935) the prohibition against diminution of the judges' compensation, the Federal principle was known that income tax on judicial salaries really impairs them. This is not proclaiming a general tax immunity for men on the bench. These pay taxes. Upon buying gasoline, or cars or other commodities, they pay the corresponding duties. Owning real property, they pay taxes thereon. And on incomes other than their judicial salary, assessments are levied. It is only when the tax is charged directly on their salary and the effect of the tax is to diminish their official stipend that the taxation must be resisted as an infringement of the fundamental charter. Judges would indeed be hapless guardians of the Constitution if they did not perceive and block encroachments upon their prerogatives in whatever form. The undiminishable character of judicial salaries is not a mere privilege of judges personal and therefore waivable but a basic limitation upon legislative or executive action imposed in the public interest (Evans vs. Gore). Endencia vs. David Separation of Powers Saturnino David, the then Collector of Internal Revenue, ordered the taxing of Justice Pastor Endencias and Justice Fernando Jugos salary pursuant to Sec 13 of RA 590 which provides that SEC. 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment

of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law. According to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of appellant Collector of Internal Revenue, our decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not received favorably by Congress, because immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590. To bring home his point, the Solicitor General reproduces what he considers the pertinent discussion in the Lower House of House Bill No. 1127 which became Republic Act No. 590. ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 13 of RA 590 is constitutional. HELD: By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act No. 590, Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation. This is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office, found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term. ** The reason behind the exemption in the Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Federal Supreme Court and this Court, is to preserve the independence of the Judiciary, not only of this High

Tribunal but of the other courts, whose present membership number more than 990 judicial officials. The independence of the judges is of far greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries. The doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, to the effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution. The interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, especially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land.

JUDGE AYSON VS RTC JUDGES OF BAGUIO CITY

OCAMPO VS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE Garcia vs Macaraig Jr Political Law Separation of Powers Judge Macaraig took his oath as Judge of the CFI of Laguna and San Pablo City on June 29, 1970. The court, being one of the 112 newly created CFI branches, had to be organized from scratch. From July 1, 1970 to February 28, 1971, Macaraig was not able to assume the duties

and functions of a judge due to the fact that his Court Room can not be properly established due to problems as to location and as to appropriations to make his Court up and running. When Macaraig realized that it would be sometime before he could actually preside over his court, he applied for an extended leave (during the 16 years he had worked in the Department of Justice, respondent had, due to pressure of duties, never gone on extended leave, resulting in his forfeiting all the leave benefits he had earned beyond the maximum ten months allowed by the law). The Secretary of Justice, however, prevailed upon respondent to forego his leave and instead to assist him, without being extended a formal detail, whenever respondent was not busy attending to the needs of his court. Paz Garcia on the other hand filed a complaint alleging that Macaraig is incompetent, dishonest and has acted in violation of his oath as a judge. Garcia said that Macaraig has not submitted the progress of his Courts as required by law. And that Macaraig has received salaries as a judge while he is fully aware that he has not been performing the duties of a judge. ISSUE: Whether or not Macaraig has acted with incompetence and dishonesty as Judge. HELD: Macaraigs inability to perform his judicial duties under the circumstances mentioned above does not constitute incompetence. Respondent was, like every lawyer who gets his first appointment to the bench, eager to assume his judicial duties and rid himself of the stigma of being a judge without a sala, but forces and circumstances beyond his control prevented him from discharging his judicial duties. On the other hand, none of these is to be taken as meaning that the Court looks with favor at the practice of long standing, to be sure, of judges being detailed

in the DOJ to assist the Secretary even if it were only in connection with his work of exercising administrative authority over the courts. The line between what a judge may do and what he may not do in collaborating or working with other offices or officers under the other great departments of the government must always be kept clear and jealously observed, lest the principle of separation of powers on which our government rests by mandate of the people thru the Constitution be gradually eroded by practices purportedly motivated by good intentions in the interest of the public service. The fundamental advantages and the necessity of the independence of said three departments from each other, limited only by the specific constitutional precepts on check and balance between and among them, have long been acknowledged as more paramount than the serving of any temporary or passing governmental conveniences or exigencies. It is thus of grave importance to the judiciary under our present constitutional scheme of government that no judge of even the lowest court in this Republic should place himself in a position where his actuations on matters submitted to him for action or resolution would be subject to review and prior approval and, worst still, reversal, before they can have legal effect, by any authority other than the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as the case may be. Needless to say, the Court feels very strongly that it is best that this practice is discontinued. De La Llana vs Alba Constitutional Law Political Question if there is no question of law involved BP 129 In 1981, BP 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes, was passed. De la Llana was assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be one of the judges that would be removed because of the reorganization and

second, he said such law would contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts, He averred that only the SC can remove judges NOT Congress. ISSUE: Whether or not Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature by such statute (BP 129). HELD: The SC ruled the following way: Moreover, this Court is empowered to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal. Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by

either of the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred.

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, applicant-appellee, vs. PASAY TRANSPORTATION CO., oppositor-appellant. Rivera and Bonifacio for appellant. Ross, Lawrence and Selph and Federico Agrava for appellee. Villareal, J.: This is an appeal taken by the Pasay Transportation Company from a decision of the Public Service Commission granting the application of the Manila Electric Company to establish a supplementary and additional

autobus service along the lines already being served by its street and electric cars and issuing to it a certificate of public convinience therefor. In support of its appeal the appellant assigns the following alleged errors committed by the Public Service Commission in its decision, namely: 1. The Public Service Commission erred in holding that there is evidence of public necessity and convenience to support the granting of the application. 2. The Public Service Commission erred in not denying the application as a duplication of service prejudicial to public interest. 3. The Public Service Commission erred in not denying the application on the ground that it would promote ruinous and destructive competition among operators. 4. The Public Service Commission erred in denying the motion for reconsideration and new trial filed by the oppositor-appellant. The first question to be decided in the instant appeal, raised in the first assigned error, is whether or not the Public Service Commission erred in holding that there is evidence of the existence of a public necessity and convenience justifying the granting of the application of the Manila Electric Company. The evidence adduced by the applicant Manila Electric Company in support of its application shows the following proven facts: The applicant Manila Electric Company at present possesses several certificates of public convenience to operate autobuses in the following lines: Azcarraga and Avenida Rizal; F. B. Harrison and Mabini; General Solano and Echague; Tanduay and Quinta Market; Legarda; Santa Mesa, from Valenzuela Street until Rotonda, and Azcarraga. The applicant company has at present 96 motor cars which are sufficient for its present service and for the additional service applied for, but alleges that it needs six more autobuses to have a reasonable number in

reserve. The certificate applied for includes only the lines already covered by its street cars, save that of Pasig. The additional service will be for every thirty minutes along the same street car lines. The purpose of the additional service is avoid the interruption of the service where there is damage to or defect in the rails or in the wires, and to remedy the situation where a street car is filled with passengers desirous or reaching their destination without loss of time, but are prevented from doing so by other street cars ahead of it along the same line. At curves where no connecting tract and switches exist, the bus can go straight ahead, avoiding thereby transfer from one car to another car or trolleybus and vice versa; it can park by sidewalk when there is need to wait; it can help pick up passengers in parts where single tracks are used for both directions which renders one through service difficult due to encounters. The line can be easily extended, when the occasion so demands, because there will be no need to install tracks and wires. The autobus likewise solves the problem when the electric current is interrupted and during typhoons when the railways systems is paralyzed; and when there is flood the autobuses are more easily operated. It also responds to emergencies, as for instance, defective street car axles, obstructions on the tracks, etc. During holidays when there are parades attended by a great number of people, and when traffic is congested, the autobus can pick up passengers and change its route. Passengers of autobuses are entitled to transfer to street cars and vice versa, because said autobuses will be operated on the same basis as the street cars and trolley-buses as to the fare and transfer privilege. Undoubtedly the additional autobus service applied for by the Manila Electric Company will be beneficial to the public because passengers ordinarily taking the street and electric cars of said company will be subjected to less inconvenience resulting from transfer and the delays in going from one place to another where there is no continuous and direct street car service and when, for one reason or another, the street car service is paralyzed.

There is, therefore, sufficient evidence of a public necessity and convenience justifying the granting of the permit applied for. As to the second alleged error assigned, that the Public Service Commission did not deny the application as the service applied for is merely a duplication detrimental to the public interest, in view of our holding that the additional service applied for by the Manila Electric Company answers a public need and convenience, said second assigned error is untenable. As to the third alleged error assigned, that the Public Service Commission did not deny the application as the additional service applied for would bring ruinous and destructive competition among land carriers, there is no evidence of record demonstrative of this result. Inasmuch as the applicant-appellee Manila Electric Company, in the additional service applied for, could not pick up passengers outside the lines traversed by its street and electric cars, and inasmuch, furthermore, as to the oppositor-appellant could not pick up passengers along the routes of the street and electric cars of the Manila Electric Company, there could be no ruinous competition between the two operators because each has its own territory of operation which the other could not invade without violating the conditions of its certificate. Of course, to a certain extent, there will be competition in those parts where the routes of both companies are parallel, when the distance between them is not such that it would not pay to make the crossing to avail of a better service, but this competition is not ruinous and is of the nature of those which make rival land transportation operators improve their service for the benefit of the public which they serve. For the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold, that an additional autobus service operated by a company along the same lines traveled by its street and electric cars, for the benefit of the street car riding public, saving in the inconveniences resulting from transfers and delays, is permissible and does not constitute ruinous competition

against other land carries whose certificates do not permit them to pick up passengers in said routes. Wherefore, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby affirmed in all its parts, with the costs to the appellant. So ordered. Malcolm, Imperial, Butte, and Goddard, JJ., concur. Fernando Lopez vs Gerardo Roxas Constitutional Law Judicial Power Defined Lopez and Roxas were the candidates for VP in the 1965 elections. Lopez won the election. Roxas appealed his lost before the PET. The PET was created by RA 1793. It is provided in the law that There shall be on independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal . . . which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the president-elect and the Vice-president elect of the Philippines. In effect, a losing candidate would have the right to appeal his loss. Lopez assailed the law and he sought to enjoin Roxas and the PET from proceeding with the case. Lopez averred that the PET is unconstitutional for it was not provided for in the constitution. Also, since the PET is composed of the Chief Justice and the other ten members of the SC any decision of the PET cannot be validly appealed before the SC or that there may be conflict that may arise once a PET decision is appealed before the SC. ISSUE: Whether or not the PET is a valid body. HELD: Pursuant to the Constitution, the Judicial power shall be vested in one SC and in such inferior courts as may be established by law This provision vests in the judicial branch of the government, not merely some specified or limited judicial power, but the judicial power under our political system, and, accordingly, the entirety or all of said powe r,

except, only, so much as the Constitution confers upon some other agency, such as the power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the Senate and those of the House of Representatives, which is vested by the fundamental law solely in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal, respectively. Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights. The proper exercise of said authority requires legislative action: (1) defining such enforceable and demandable rights and/or prescribing remedies for violations thereof; and (2) determining the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide said controversies or disputes, in the first instance and/or on appeal. For this reason, the Constitution ordains that Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to the limitations set forth in the fundamental law. The SC ruled that the PET is not in conflict with the constitution. RA 1793 merely added the courts jurisdiction and such can be validly legislated by Congress. It merely conferred upon the SC additional functions i.e., the functions of the PET. This is valid because the determining of election contests is essentially judicial. In Re: Rodolfo Manzano Facts: Judge Manzano filed a petition allowing him to accept the appointment

by Ilocos Sur Governor Rodolfo Farinas as the member of Ilocos Norte provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to a Presidential Order. He petitioned that his membership in the Committee will not in any way amount to an abandonment to his present position as Executive Judge of Branch XIX, RTC, 1st Judicial region and as a member of judiciary. Issue: What is an administrative agency? Where does it draw the line insofar as administrative functions are concerned? Ruling: The petition is denied. The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the Judiciary to any agency performing Quasi-Judicial or Administrative functions (Sec.12, Art.VIII, 1987 Constitution). Quasi-Judicial has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can confidently refrain from participating in the work of any Administrative Agency which adjudicates disputes & controversies involving the rights of parties within its jurisdiction. Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct & affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the Legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence. Administrative functions as used in Sec. 12 refers to the Governments executive machinery and its performance of governmental acts. It refers to the management actions, determinations, and orders of executive officials as they administer the laws and try to make government effective. There is an element of positive action, of supervision or control. In the dissenting opinion of Justice Gutierrez: Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the

policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence we can readily see that membership in the Provincial or City Committee on Justice would not involve any regulation or control over the conduct and affairs of individuals. Neither will the Committee on Justice promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise any quasi-legislative functions. Its work is purely advisory. A member of the judiciary joining any study group which concentrates on the administration of justice as long as the group merely deliberates on problems involving the speedy disposition of cases particularly those involving the poor and needy litigants-or detainees, pools the expertise and experiences of the members, and limits itself to recommendations which may be adopted or rejected by those who have the power to legislate or administer the particular function involved in their implementation. Air France v. Rafael Carrascoso + CA Facts Rafael Carrascoso was part of a group of pilgrims leaving for Lourdes. Air France, through PAL, issued to Carrascoso a first class round trip ticket. From Manila to Bangkok, he traveled in first class but at Bangkok, the manager of Air France forced him to vacate his seat, because a "white man" had a "better right" to it. He refused and even had a heated discussion with the manager but after being pacified by fellow passengers, he reluctantly gave up the seat. Air France asserts that the ticket does not represent the true and complete intent and agreement of the parties, and that the issuance of a first class ticket did not guarantee a first class ride (depends upon the availability of seats). CFI and CA disposed of this contention. Issue and Holding WON Carrascoso was entitled to the first class seat he claims. YES Ratio On CA's decision Air France charges that CA failed to make complete findings of fact on all issues presented. SC says that so long as CA's decision contains the

facts necessary to warrant its conclusions, there is nothing wrong in withholding any specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence for the defense.

On the seat issue If a first-class ticket holder is not entitled to a corresponding seat, what security can a passenger have? It's very easy to strike out the stipulations in the ticket and say that there was a contrary verbal agreement. There was no explanation as to why he was allowed to take a first class seat before coming to Bangkok if indeed he had no seat or if someone had a better right to it.

On contract to transport, QD, etc. This is different in kind and degree from any other contractual obligation because of the relation which an air carrier sustains with the public. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation as they have a right to be treated by the employees with kindness, respect, courtesy, consideration. What happened was a violation of public duty by Air France--a case of QD, so damages are proper. A case was cited wherein it was said that although the relation of passenger and carrier is contractual in origin and nature, the act that breaks the K may be also a tort. On the issue of award of damages Air France assails CA's award of moral damages, claiming that since Carrascoso's action is based on breach of contract, there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith in order to avail of said award. While there was no specific mention of "bad faith," it may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth. Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by evidence.

Allegations in the complaint on this issue: 1. There was a K to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering the Bangkok-Teheran leg 2. This K was breached when Air France failed to furnish first class transpo at Bangkok 3. There was bad faith when the manager compelled Carrascoso to leave his seat after he was already seated and to

transfer to the tourist class, thereby making him suffer inconvenience, embarrassment, humiliation, etc. bad faith - state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes See NCC 21. Upon the provisions of NCC 2219 (10), moral damages are recoverable. Exemplary damages are well awarded also, since NCC gives the court power to grant such in K and QK, with the condition that the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. VDA DE ESPIRITU VS CFI Facts: Sometime in 1948 the defendants verbally sold to her the two parcels of land in question for P3,000.00 Pesos and, inconsequence, delivery thereof together with the corresponding transfer certificates of title (TCT) was made to her, but no deed of sale was executed at the time because private respondents promised they would do so as soon as the titles which were then in the name of their predecessor in interest were transferred to their names, and that despite demands made by her for the execution of such deed, said respondents, "without justifiable cause therefore adamantly failed and refused to comply with (such) just and valid demand." In their answer, defendants denied that the transaction was a sale and alleged that it was merely a contract of antichresis whereby petitioner had loaned to them P1, 500.00, for which she demanded the delivery of the lands in question and the titles thereto as security, with the right to collect or receive the income there from pending the payment of the loan. And by way of affirmative defenses, respondents interposed (1) unenforceability by action of the alleged sale, under the statute of frauds, and(2) prescription of petitioner's action, the same having allegedly accrued in 1948. Subsequently, respondents reiterated their said affirmative defense of prescription in a formal motion to dismiss and as no opposition thereto was filed by petitioner, on July 31,1967, respondent court issued the impugned order of dismissal reading as follows: Submitted for resolution is a motion to dismiss filed counsel for the defendants to which no opposition has been filed despite the fact that the plaintiff was furnished with a copy thereof. Finding the said motion to dismiss to be well-taken for the reasons stated therein, this Court grants the same and the complaint, dated October 16, 1964, is hereby dismissed with costs against the plaintiff. SO ORDERED. Petitioner filed the complaint of October 20, 1964 Issue: Whether petitioners right to demand the execution of the TCTs already prescribed.

Held/Ruling: The right to demand the execution of the document required under Article 1358 is not imprescriptibly. The nature of petitioners action may be said to be one founded on an oral contract, which, to be sure, cannot be considered among those rendered unenforceable by the statute of frauds, for the simple reason that it has already been, from petitioners own point of view, almost fully consummated by the delivery of the lands and the corresponding titles to her. X X X. The petitioners action, based as it is upon oral contract, prescribes in 6 years according to Article 1145 of the Civil Code. Assuming otherwise, the only other possibility is that petitioners case comes under Article 1149 and the action prescribes in 5 years. In either case, since the cause of action of petitioner accrued in 1948 and the present suit was instituted in 1964 or sixteen years later, and none interrupting circumstances enumerated in Article 1155 has been shown to have intervened, it is unquestionable that petitioners action filed in the court below has already prescribed. ART. 1357 . If the law requires a document or other special form, as in the acts and contracts enumerated in the following article,the contracting parties may compel each other to observe that form, once the contract has been perfected. This right may be exercised simultaneously with the action upon the contract. (1279a) BUSCAYNO VS ENRILE MANGACOP MANGCA, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ALINADER DAGAR BALINDONG, respondents.

ABAD SANTOS, J.: This petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction seeks to set aside: (1) COMELEC resolution dated March 31, 1981 which: (a) revived the effects of COMELEC Minute Resolution No. 9520 (thus allowing Alinader Dagar Balindong and all of those who were proclaimed on March 18, 1980, by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Sultan

Gumander, Lanao del Sur, as winners in the January 30, 1980, local elections to sit as officials of that municipality); (b) dismissed PP Case No. 426 without prejudice to the filing of an election protest or quo warranto, whichever is proper, in the appropriate forum for ventilation and (c) declared said resolution as immediately executory and (2) COMELEC resolution dated September 16, which denied for lack of merit the motion for reconsideration of the March 31, 1981, resolution. After the January 30, 1980, local elections were held, Alinader Dagar Balindong, the private respondent, and Mangacop Mangca, the petitioner, who were the official candidate for mayor of Sultan Gumander, Lanao del Sur, filed pre-proclamation cases with the Commission on Elections. PP Case No. 158 for the immediate counting of votes, canvass of election returns and proclamation of winning candidates was filed by Alinader Dagar Balindong (NP) on February 4, 1980, while PP Case No. 426 for the annulment of elections in Sultan Gumander was filed by Mangacop Mangca (KBL) on February 13, 1980. On March 10, 1980, the COMELEC issued in PP Case No. 158 Resolution No. 9520 ordering the counting and canvassing of votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates. Pursuant thereto, the votes cast for Sultan Gumander were counted and canvassed and on March 18, 1980, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Sultan Gumander proclaimed respondent Balindong, who obtained a plurality vote of 2,057, as Mayor-elect, and issued its certificate of canvass of the votes cast and proclamation of the winning Candidates. The next day, Balindong took his oath of office before Acting Municipal Circuit Judge Guimba Anan Mandi. Meantime, petitioner Mangca filed with the COMELEC on March 13, 1980, a motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. 9520 praying that the COMELEC suspend implementation of the resolution and the proclamation of winning candidates, declare a failure of elections in Sultan Gumander, and order a special election when peace and order conditions allow. He also prayed that PP Case No. 158 and PP Case No. 426 be heard j jointly. On March 26, 1980, the COMELEC ordered the suspension of the effects of Resolution No. 9520. On April 18, 1980, respondent Balindong filed a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC order dated March 26, 1980, and on May 21, 1980, he filed a motion to intervene in PP Case No. 426 and an

answer to the petition in said case. On May 22, 1980, the COMELEC issued a resolution admitting Balindong's intervention and answer and ordering an immediate raffle and hearing on the merits of the two cases. On March 31, 1981, the Third Division of the Commission on Elections issued the contested resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, this Division resolves: 1. That the effects of COMELEC Minute Resolution No. (9520) be revived thus allowing Alinader Dagar Balindong and all of those who were proclaimed on March 18, 1980 as winners in the local elections in Sultan Gumander by the Municipal Board of Canvassers, headed by Atty. Zaman M. Marohomsar to sit as municipal officials of Sultan Gumander; 2. That this decision shall be immediately executory pursuant to Sec. 175 of the Revised Election Code; 3. That PP Case No. 426 be dismissed without prejudice to the filing of an election protest or quo warranto, whichever is proper, in the appropriate forum for ventilation. On April 27, 1981, petitioner Mangca filed a motion for reconsideration of the March 31, 1981, resolution claiming that the same did not express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based and, therefore, null and void for being contrary to Art. X, Sec. 9 of the Constitution. He further contended that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in failing to consider his evidence in PP Case No. 426 and the report of Regional Election Director Mamasapunod Aguam that there was failure of election in Sultan Gumander and that a special election should be held therein. On May 7, 1981, the COMELEC issued an order holding in abeyance the implementation of the March 31, 1981, decision and temporarily restraining Balindong from assuming the position of mayor of Sultan Gumander pending resolution of Mangca's motion for reconsideration.

On September 16, 1981, the COMELEC issued the other contested resolution denying Mangca's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit, lifting the May 7, 1981, restraining order, and ordering the immediate execution of the March 31, 1981, resolution. The COMELEC likewise emphasized that it did not pass upon the merits of PP Case No. 426 since the pre-proclamation controversy should no longer be viable after the proclamation of Balindong and the other winning candidates in Sultan Gumander and that the issue of whether or not there was a valid election in said municipality can best be ventilated in an election protest or quo warranto, whichever is proper. Hence, the present petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction. The petitioner contends that the Commission on Elections gravely abused its discretion in issuing the resolution dated March 31, 1981, and September 16, 1981, on the following grounds: (1) That the March 31, 1981, resolution did not express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based in violation of Sec. 9, Art. X of the Constitution, which reads: No decision shall be rendered by any court of record without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. and Sec. 26, Rule XV of COMELEC Resolution No. 1450 dated February 26, 1980, which reads: In deciding contests, the Commission shall follow the procedure prescribed for the Supreme Court in Secs. 8 and 9, Art. X of the Constitution of the Philippines. (2) That the COMELEC did not consider petitioner's evidence, particularly the Memorandum Report of Atty. Mamasapunod Aguam, Regional Election Director for Region XII, to the effect that there was failure of election in Sultan Gumander. Petitioner's contention that the March 31, 1981, resolution is null and void for being violative of Sec. 9, Art. X of the Constitution and Sec 26, Rule XV of COMELEC Resolution No. 1450 is untenable. Firstly, both cited provisions are inapplicable to the case at bar since the constitutional

requirement applies only to courts of justice which the COMELEC is not (Lucman vs. Dimaporo, L-31558, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 387) while COMELEC Resolution No. 1450, per Sec. I thereof, applies only to "election contests" and "quo warranto proceedings" which the preproclamation cases are not. Secondly, the questioned resolution has clearly and distinctly expressed the facts and the law on which it is based. The factual basis of the dismissal of PP Case No. 426 is the proclamation of Balindong and the other winning candidates of Sultan Gumander on March 18, 1980; while the legal basis thereof is the settled judicial doctrine that once a proclamation has been held, a preproclamation case should no longer be viable. Finally, the questioned resolution need not express factual findings relative to the issue of whether or not there was failure of election in Sultan Gumander since the COMELEC did not pass upon said issue and reserved resolution of the same in the election contest or quo warranto, whichever is proper, which petitioner Mangca may thereafter file. We likewise hold as untenable the petitioner's contention that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it did not resolve his claim that there was a failure of election in Sultan Gumander. In the first place, the report of Regional Election Director Mamasapunod Aguam that there was a failure of election in Sultan Gumander was not presented in evidence. In the second place, even if it had been preserted the COMELEC had no duty to act on it considering that under the circumstances, the alleged failure of election was not a proper issue in a pre-proclamation case. It should be recalled that the COMELEC dismissed the pre-proclamation petition for annulment of the election (PP Case No. 426), without prejudice to the filing of an election protest or quo warranto, whichever is proper, in the appropriate forum for ventilation. The COMELEC's action is logical because settled is the doctrine that once a proclamation has been made, as in this case, a preproclamation controversy is no longer viable. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED. Valladolid vs. Inciong, 121 SCRA 205 (1992) Facts: JRM owned Tropicana and Copacabana hotels. However, it only had controlling interest in Tropicana, as Copacabana wasmanaged by its

owners (siblings Yu). The two hotels became direct competitors. Pertinent financial and businessinformation was being leaked from Copacabana to Tropicana. Ricardo Valladolid (pet) was employed by JRM in 1977 as atelephone switchboard operator. He was subsequently transferred to the position of clerk-collector. He was suspected to bethe leak who sends important information to the competitor.Order of May 2, 1979 (December 26, 1979)In response to the application for clearance and Valladolids complaint for Illegal Dismissal, the Regional director issued this order. The Deputy Minister of Labor, in a succinct Order, dismissed both appeals after finding no sufficient justification or valid reason to alter, modify, much less reverse the Order appealed from. Contention c/o JRM The order of Hon. Amado Inciong (resp) failed to state the facts and conclusion of law upon which it is based, thusunconstitutional. Memorandum decision Only dispositive portion is authored by the SC. The rest is copied from the decision of the lower court. Not prohibited, stillvalid, but it is not encouraged. Held & Ratio: The fact that the Order of the Deputy Minister of Labor issued on December 26. 1979 lacks a statement of facts and conclusions of law does not equate to the violation of the constitutional requirement set forth in Article 8, section 14, whichis required of decisions or courts of record. However, the assailed order is not a decision of a court of record. The Ministryof Labor is an administrative agency with quasijudicial functions, with rules of procedure mandated to be nonlitigious,summary, and non-technical. As the Deputy Minister was in full accord with the findings of fact and the conclusions of lawdrawn from shoes facts by the Regional director, there was no necessity of discussing anew the issues raised therein. notes in class: Only cases that are submitted for decision shall require a full-blown decision.Facts and law must be clearly distinguished Police Commission vs Lood 127 SCRA 757 Facts: Petitioner Police Commission seeks the setting aside of the decision of the defunct Court of First Instance (respondent court) of Rizal, Branch VI, which declared null and void its decision in Administrative Case No. 48 dismissing private respondent SimplicioC. Ibea and instead ordered then Municipal Mayor Braulio Sto. Domingo of

San Juan,Rizal to reinstate said respondent to his former position as policeman of the same municipality with back salaries from the date of his suspension up to the date of his actual reinstatement. Petitioner contends that the lower court erred in holding that respondent Simplicio C.Ibea was deprived of due process of law because the Police Commission decided Administrative Case No. 48 even without stenographic notes taken of the proceedings of the case. Ruling: Respondent court's ruling against petitioner's decision as falling short of the legal requirements of due process, because it decided the subject administrative case without stenographic notes (which were not taken by the Board of Investigators) of the proceedings of the case, was in error. Rep. Act No. 4864 does not provide that the Board of Investigators shall be a "board of record," and as such it does not provide for office personnel such as clerks and stenographers who may be employed to take note of the proceedings of the board. The proceeding provided for is merely administrative and summary in character, in line with the principle that "administrative rules of procedure should be construed liberally in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their respective claims and defenses." The formalities usually attendant in court hearings need not be present in an administrative investigation, provided that the parties are heard and given the opportunity to adduce their respective evidence. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Nunal vs. COA, 169 SCRA 356 (1989) Contention c/o pet The Resolution of the SC under date of May 11, 1998 is not in accordance with Article 8, Section 14 of the Constitution. Article 8, Section 14 No decision shall be rendered by any Court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. Held & Ratio Constitutional. The assailed Resolution was not a Decision within the meaning of the Constitutional requirement. This mandate is applicable only in cases submitted for decision, i.e., given due course and after the filing of Briefs or Memoranda and/or other pleadings, as the case may be. It is not applicable to an Order or Resolution refusing due course toa Petition for certiorari. The assailed Resolution does state the legal basis for the dismissal of the Petition and thus complies with the Constitutional provision. MANGELEN VS CA

SAMSON B. BEDRUZ and EMMA C. LUNA v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN Case Digest The omission of the trial court to state the factual and legal bases of its decision is not violative of the constitutional requirement if the same can be inferred from the discussion of the decision. FACTS: Petitioners Tagaytay City Engineer Samson B. Bedruz and City Administrator Emma C. Luna were held administratively liable for violation of the Constitution, the Civil Service Rules and Regulations, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials, and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in manifesting arrogance, bias, abuse and crystal personal interest in connection with the issuance of a permit to fence a lot. Resolving in the affirmative, the Deputy Ombudsman fined them in an amount equivalent to One (1) Month Salary. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Ombudsman. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not Court of Appeals committed grave error and mistake in denying the petition for certiorari HELD: A review of the records of the case shows that the following factual findings of the Ombudsman, upon which its decision of May 8, 1999 was based, and which were cited by the appellate court in arriving at its assailed decision, are supported by the evidence on record. Clearly, the appellate court did not err in finding that the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion. As for Bedruz and Luna's complaint that the Ombudsman did not express in a clear manner the law on which its decision was based, thereby violating Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which provides that [n]o decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, the same fails. A trial courts omission to specify the offense committed, or the specific provision of law violated, is not in derogation of the constitutional requirement that every decision must clearly and distinctly state the factual and legal bases for the conclusions reached by the trial court as

long as the legal basis can be inferred from the discussion in the decision. From the Ombudsman's decision, it can be gathered that Bedruz and Luna violated Sections 19 of R.A. No. 6770 (THE OMBUDSMAN ACT OF 1989) in relation to Section 4, paragraphs A(b) & (c) of R.A. No. 6713, as amended (THE CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES), requiring public officials and employees to perform and discharge their duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill, act with justness and sincerity and not [to] discriminate against anyone, especially the poor and the underprivileged. German machineries Corp vs Endaya CORPUS VS CA MALACORA VS CA Marcelino vs Cruz Constitutional Law Period to Resolve a Case from Date of Submission On 04 Aug 1975, Marcelino was convicted for rape. On the same date, the attorneys of both parties in the criminal case moved for time within which to submit their respective memoranda. On the date set for promulgation of the decision in its finality, Marcelinos counsel moved for postponement. The court ignored his motion. ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Cruz had resolved the case within the allotted period. HELD: The date of promulgation of a decision could not serve as the reckoning date because the same necessarily comes at a later date. Section 11 (1), Art 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides that upon the effectivity of this constitution, the maximum period within which case or

matter shall be decided or resolved from the date of its submission shall be; 18 months for the Supreme Court, 12 months for the inferior courts and 3 months for lower courts. In practice, the Supreme Court is liberal when it comes to this provision. It had various stands depending upon proper application and for valid or meritorious reasons which are provided for by judges of the lower courts in which extension may be given to resolve such cases. Buhay De Roma v. CA (July 23, 1987) Facts: Candeleria De Roma adopted two daughters, Buhay and Rosalinda. She died intestate. When administration proceedings was ongoing, Buhay was appointed administratrix and filed an inventory of the estate. Opposed by Rosalinda on the ground that certain properties donated by their mother to Buhay and fruits thereof had not been included. The Parcels of Land totaled P10,297.50 and the value is not disputed. The TC issued an order in favor of Buhay because when Candelaria donated the properties to Buhay she said in the Deed of Donation sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na din a mababawing muli which the TC interpreted as a prohibition to collate and besides the legitimes of the two daughters were not impaired. On appeal, it was reversed as it merely described the donation as irrevocable not an express prohibition to collate. Issue: Whether or not these lands are subject to collation. Held: The pertinent Civil Code provisions are: Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition. (1035a) Art. 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the donor should have so expressly provided, or if the donee should repudiate the inheritance, unless the donation should be reduced as inofficious. (1036)

The SC affirmed the appellate courts decision and that it merely described the donation as irrevocable. The Fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the donated properties from collation as required under the provisions of the NCC. Given the precise language of the deed of donation the decedent donor would have included an express prohibition to collate if that had been the donors intention. Absent such indication of that intention, the rule not the exemption should be applied