MULLER VS MULLER FACTS Petition for review on certiorari which terminated the regime of absolute community of property between

petitioner and respondent P and R (German) were married in Germany and resided there in a house owned by Rs parents but later permanently resided in the Ph. R had inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he sold and used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo and in the construction of a house. The Antipolo property was registered in the name of P. After they separated, R filed a motion for separation of properties RTC DECISION: terminated the regime of absolute community of property It also decreed the separation of properties between them and ordered the equal partition of personal properties located within the country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. Re Antipolo property, R cannot recover his funds coz it was a violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution which prohibited aliens from procuring private lands.

PACIFIC ACE VS YANAGISAWA FACTS R (Japanese) and Evelyn married. Evelyn then bought a townhouse unit which was registered in her name. R filed a PDN against Evelyn on the ground of bigamy. During the pendency of the case, R filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Restraining Order against Evelyn and an Application for a Writ of a Preliminary Injunction to enjoin her from disposing or encumbering all of the properties registered in her name. Rs petition became moot coz Evelyn committed in open court that she will not dispose of the property during the pendency of the case. Evelyn obtained a loan from P (PAFIN) and executed a REM (real estate mortgage) in favor of P over the townhouse unit. R filed for an annulment of the REM. MAKATI RTC DECISION: (at the time of the mortgage) dissolved the marriage between R and Evelyn and ordered the liquidation of their properties. PQUE RTC DECISION: - a foreign national, cannot possibly own the mortgaged property. - Without ownership, or any other law or contract binding the defendants to him, Eiji has no cause of action that may be asserted against Evelyn and P. CA DECISION: annulled the REM executed by Evelyn in favor of PAFIN. ISSUE

CA DECISION: there is nothing in the Constitution preventing R from procuring land then ordered P to reimburse him said amount. ISSUE

WON pque rtcs decision was improper WON respondent is entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for the acquisition of the Antipolo property? RATIO NO. respondent. Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary succession, respondents disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is allowed. W Where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud. R cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition. HELD Granted. HELD RATIO YES. The issue of ownership and liquidation of properties acquired during the cohabitation of Eiji and Evelyn has been submitted for the resolution of the Makati RTC, and is pending[41] appeal before the CA. The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference dictates that the assumption by the Makati RTC over the issue operates as an insurmountable barrier to the subsequent assumption by the Paraaque RTC. .Jurisprudence holds that all acts done in violation of a standing injunction order are voidable as to the party enjoined and third parties who are not in good faith. The party, in whose favor the injunction is issued, has a cause of action to seek the annulment of the offending actions

ABRENICA VS ABRENICA FACTS P and R were law firm partners. R filed a case against P d to return partnership funds representing profits from the sale of a parcel of land and sought to recover from petitioner retainer fees that he received from two clients of the firm and the balance of the cash advance that he obtained. P filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging that the sheriff had levied on properties belonging to his children and petitioner Joena. Joena filed an Affidavit of Third Party alleging that she and her stepchildren owned a number of the personal properties sought to be levied and that it was under their ACP. A Sheriffs Certificate of Sale was issued on 3 January 2008 in favor of the law firm for the Ps properties. *P has been previously married to another woman but their marriage has already been dissolved. ISSUE WON Joena had the right to the claim? RATIO NO. Two of these stepchildren were already of legal age when Joena filed her Affidavit. As to one of the children, parental authority over him belongs to his parents. Absent any special power of attorney authorizing Joena to represent Erlandos children, her claim cannot be sustained. Art. 92, par. (3) of the Family Code excludes from the community property the property acquired before the marriage of a spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage; and the fruits and the income, if any, of that property. Thus, neither these two vehicles nor the house and lot belong to the second marriage. HELD Petition denied LUZON SURETY CO VS DE GARCIA 30 SCRA 111 FACTS Luzon Surety granted a crop loan to Chavez based on a surety bond executed in favor of Philippine National Bank where Garcia was one of the guarantors of the indemnity agreement. On April 1957, PNB filed complaint against Luzon Surety which subsequently prompted Luzon Surety to file a complaint against the guarantors (one of which was Garcia). The lower court ruled in favor of PNB in the first case and ordered
1

the guarantors in the second case to pay Luzon Surety. CFI DECISION: issued a writ of execution for Garcia to pay the amount of P3,839. On August, the sheriff levied his sugar quedans which were conjugal property of the Garcia spouses. The Garcias filed a suit of injunction which the lower court found in their favor based on Art. 161 of the CC. Luzon Surety appealed to the CA which affirmed the lower courts decision.. ISSUE WON a conjugal partnership, in the absence of any showing of benefits received, could be held liable on an indemnity agreement executed by the husband to accommodate a third party in favor of a surety company? RATIO NO. Art. 163 of the New Civil Code states that as such administrator the only obligations incurred by the husband that are chargeable against the conjugal property are those incurred in the legitimate pursuit of his career, profession or business with the honest belief that he is doing right for the benefit of the family. This is not true in the case at bar for we believe that the husband in acting as guarantor or surety for another in an indemnity agreement as that involved in this case did not act for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Such inference is more emphatic in this case, when no proof is presented that Vicente Garcia in acting as surety or guarantor received consideration therefor, which may redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. In Article 161 of the CC, a conjugal partnership under that provision is liable only for such "debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." There must be the requisite showing then of some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. There is none in this case. HELD CAs decision affirmed. GELANO VS CA 103 SCRA 90 FACTS Insular Sawmill, Inc. leased the paraphernal property of Guillermina M. Gelano (wife) Carlos Gelano (husband) obtained cash advances but refused to pay his unpaid balances. Guillermina M. Gelano refused to pay on the ground that said amount was for the personal account of her husband asked for by, and given to him,

without her knowledge and consent and did not benefit the family. Spouses Gelanos purchased lumber materials on credit for the repair and improvement of their residence, leaving unpaid amounts. Joseph Tan Yoc Su, as accomodating party, executed a joint and several promissory note with Carlos Gelano in favor of China Banking Corporation bank payable in 60 days to help renew the previous loan of the spouses but Carlos only paid a fraction of it. Guillermina refused to pay on the ground that she had no knowledge of such accommodation. Insular filed a complaint for collection against the spouses before the CFI. CFI DECISION: held Carlos liable. CA DECISION: held spouses jointly and severally liable. ISSUE WON the couples conjugal property is liable? RATIO YES. Pursuant to paragraph 1, Article 1408, Civil Code of 1889 which provision incidentally can still be found in paragraph 1, Article 161 of the New Civil Code, The obligation/debt contracted by petitioner-husband Carlos Gelano redounded to the benefit of the family. Hence, the conjugal property is liable for his debt. G TRACTORS INC VS CA 135 SCRA 192 FACTS Luis Narciso is married to Josefina Narciso. He operates a logging concession, Luis Narciso entered into Contract o Hire of heavey Equipment with petitioner G-Tractors where G-tractors leased former tractors. Co tract stipulated payment for rental. However Luis wasnt able to pay. Property of Luis was sold to pay for his debt, one of which was conjugal property of land. WIFES CONTENTIONS: -whatever transpired in the civil case against them could be binding only on the husband Luis R. Narciso and could not affect or bind the plaintiff-wife Josefina Salak Narciso who was not a party to that case that the nature of the Sheriff's sale clearly stated that only the property of the husband may be sold to satisfy the money judgment against him that the conjugal property of the plaintiffs-spouses could not be made liable for the satisfaction of the judgment in the civil caseconsidering that the subject matter of ISSUE

said case was never used for the benefit of the conjugal partnership or of the family WON the judgment debt of private respondent Luis R. Narciso is a conjugal debt for which the conjugal partnership property can be held answerable? RATIO YES. Article 161 of the New Civil Code provides that the conjugal partnership shall be liable for all the debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership. There is no doubt then that his account with the petitioner was brought about in order to enhance the productivity of said logging business, a commercial enterprise for gain which he had the right to embark the conjugal partnership. The obligations were contracted in connection with his legitimate business as a producer and exporter in mahogany logs and certainly benefited the conjugal partnership. The debts contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the industry or profession by which he contributes to the support of the family cannot be deemed to be his exclusive and private debts. FRANCISCO VS GONZALES GR 177667 09.17.08 FACTS Coz of a Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Cleodualdo and Michele have voluntarily agreed to set forth their obligations, rights and responsibilities on matters relating to their children's support, custody, visitation, as well as to the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains in a compromise agreement. Ownership of the conjugal property consisting of a house and lot covered by Transfer Certificate in the name of Cleodualdo M. Francisco, married to Michele U. Francisco shall be transferred by way of a deed of donation to Cleodia and Ceamantha, as coowners, when they reach nineteen (19) and eighteen (18) years old. Respondent ordered Michele and her partner Matrai to vacate the premises leased to them and to pay back rentals, unpaid telephone bill, and attorney's fees. Real property donated to Cleodia and Ceamantha were used as payment. CA DECISION: Michele's obligation was not proven to be a personal debt, it must be inferred that it is conjugal and redounded to the benefit of the family, and hence, the property may be held answerable for it. ISSUE WON the conjugal property of the former spouses may be held accountable?

RATIO NO. The power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone, in the present case to those belonging to Michele and Matrai. *Cleodualdo and Michele married prior to the affectivity of the FC thus their property relations are governed by the Civil Code on conjugal partnership of gains. A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she -purchases things necessary for the support of the family - when she borrows money for that purpose upon her husband's failure to deliver the needed sum -when administration of the conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife by the courts or by the husband -or when the wife gives moderate donations for charity. In this case as the liability incurred by Michele arose from a judgment rendered in an unlawful detainer case against her and her partner Matrai. Michele, who was then already living separately from Cleodualdo rented the house in Lanka Drive for her and Matrai's own benefit. In fact, when they entered into the lease agreement, Michele and Matrai purported themselves to be husband and wife. Both Michele and Cleodualdo have waived their title to and ownership of the house and lot in Taal St. in favor of petitioners. The property should not have been levied and sold at execution sale, for lack of legal basis. BUADO VS CA FACTS Civil case for damages that arose from slander filed by spouses Buado against Erlinda Nicol RTC ruled that Erlinda is liable and ordered her to pay for damages, which was affirmed by CA and SC court issued writ of execution, directing the sheriff to collect the indemnification from Erlinda insufficient, sheriff deigned to issue a notice of levy on real property on execution, and thereafter, a notice of sheriffs sale was issued days prior to the bidding, a Third Party Claim was received at the sheriffs office from one Arnulfo Fulo, prompting spouses Buado to put up a sheriffs indemnity bond. Sale proceeded with the spouses Buado emerging as the highest bidder A year after the sale, Romulo Nicol, husband of Erlinda, filed a complaint for annulment of certificate of sale and damages with preliminary injunction against petitioners and the deputy sheriff, and alleged that the property was directly levied upon without exhausting the personal properties of Erlinda.

ISSUE WON wifes criminal liability is chargeable to the conjugal partnership? RATIO NO. There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Article 122 of the Family Code explicitly provides that payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse. By no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the civil obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. YU BUN GUAN VS ONG 36 SCRA 559 FACTS * Paraphernal property refers to property over which the wife has complete control. This property is not part Yu Bun Guan and Ong are married since 1961 and lived together until she and her children were abandoned by him in 1992, because of his incurable promiscuity, volcanic temper, and other vicious vices. In 1968, out of her personal funds, Ong purchased a parcel of land (Rizal Property) from Aurora Seneris. Also, during their marriage, they purchased a house and lot out of their conjugal funds. Before their separation in 1992, she reluctantly agreed to execute a Deed of Sale of the Rizal Property on the promise that Yu Bun Guan would construct a commercial building for the benefit of the children. He suggested that the property should be in his name alone so that she would not be involved in any obligation. The consideration for the sale was the execution of a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor their children and the payment of the loan he obtained from Allied Bank. However, when the Deed of Sale was executed in favor of Yu Bun Guan, he did not pay the consideration of P200K, supposedly the "ostensible" valuable consideration.

Because of this, the new title was issued in his name was not delivered to him by Ong. Yu Bun Guan then filed for a Petition for Replacement of the TCT, with an Affidavit of Loss attached. Ong, on the other hand, executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim and asked that the sale be declared null and void . RTC ruled in favor of Ong that the lot was her paraphernal property since she purchased it with her personal funds. CA affirmed. ISSUE WON the lot in question was paraphernal property? RATIO YES. The property was the paraphernal property of respondent, because (1) the title had been issued in her name; (2) petitioner had categorically admitted that the property was in her name; (3) petitioner was estopped from claiming otherwise, since he had signed the Deed of Absolute Sale that stated that she was the absolute and registered owner; and (4) she had paid the real property taxes. It was also sufficiently proven that she had means to do so. The testimony of petitioner as to the source of the money he had supposedly used to purchase the property was at best vague and unclear. At first he maintained that the money came from his own personal funds. Then he said that it came from his mother; and next, from his father. * A deed of sale, in which the stated consideration had not in fact been paid, is null and void: DAR VS LEGASTO FACTS Private respondent Nenita Co Bautista filed a case for unlawful detainer against herein petitioners where they were sued as Mr. and Mrs. in the said case. Petitioners were found guilty of failure to comply with the Rule on Certification of Non-Forum Shopping coz while petitioners Ronnie Dar, Randy Angeles, Joy Constantino and Liberty Cruz signed the Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, their respective spouses did not sign the same. PETITIONERS CONTENTION: since what is involved in the instant case is their common rights and interest to abode under the the system of absolute community of property, either of the spouses can sign the petition. * Revised Circular No. 28-91, dated February 8, 1994 applies to and governs the filing of petitions in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals and is intended to prevent the multiple filing of petitions or complaints involving the same issues in other tribunals or agencies as a form of forum shopping. ISSUE

WON The signing of one of the spouses in the certification substantially complies with the rule on certification of non-forum shopping? RATIO YES. The petitioners were sued jointly, or as Mr. and Mrs. over a property in which they have a common interest. Such being the case, the signing of one of them in the certification substantially complies with the rule on certification of non-forum shopping. MATTHEWS VS TAYLOR FACTS Respondent Benjamin A. Taylor (Benjamin), a British subject, married Joselyn C. Taylor (Joselyn), a 17-year old Filipina. While their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn bought a lot Boracay property. The sale was allegedly financed by Benjamin. Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the latters funds, constructed improvements thereon and eventually converted the property to a vacation and tourist resort known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn. Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away with Kim Philippsen. Joselyn executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Benjamin, authorizing the latter to maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract with third parties with respect to their Boracay property Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee, entered into an Agreement of Lease10 (Agreement) involving the Boracay property for a period of 25 years. Petitioner thereafter took possession of the property and renamed the resort as Music Garden Resort. Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by Joselyn without his (Benjamins) consent, Benjamin instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages11 against Joselyn and the petitioner. Benjamin claimed that his funds were used in the acquisition and improvement of the Boracay property, and coupled with the fact that he was Joselyns husband, any transaction involving said property required his consent. RTC DECISION: considered the Boracay property as community property of Benjamin and Joselyn; thus, the consent of the spouses was necessary to validate any contract involving the property. CA affirmed. ISSUE WON Benjamin was the actual owner of the property since he provided the funds used in purchasing the same? RATIO NO. Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire public or private lands in the Philippines, save only in constitutionally recognized exceptions. Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and

petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the designated "vendee" in the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired sole ownership thereto. By entering into such contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the conjugal/community property of the spouses HEIRS OF GO VS SERVACIO FACTS Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land to Protacio B. Go, Jr. (Protacio, Jr.). Twenty three years later Protacio, Jr. executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver, whereby he affirmed under oath that it was his father, Protacio Go, Sr. (Protacio, Sr.), not he, who had purchased the two parcels of land (the property). Marta Barola Go died (wife of Protacio, Sr. and mother of the petitioners). Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito B. Go sold a portion of the property to Ester L. Servacio (Servacio). The petitioners demanded the return of the property, but Servacio refused to heed their demand. They sued Servacio. PETITIONERS CONTENTION: following Protacio, Jr.s renunciation, the property became conjugal property; and that the sale of the property to Servacio without the prior liquidation of the community property between Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null and void. RTC DECISION: affirmed the validity of the sale - declared that the property was the conjugal property of Protacio, Sr. and Marta, not the exclusive property of Protacio, Sr., because there were three vendors in the sale to Servacio (namely: Protacio, Sr., Rito, and Dina) - that the participation of Rito and Dina as vendors had been by virtue of their being heirs of the late Marta - that under Article 160 of the Civil Code, the law in effect when the property was acquired, all property acquired by either spouse during the marriage was conjugal unless there was proof that the property thus acquired pertained exclusively to the husband or to the wife ISSUE WON the sale by Protacio, Sr., et al. to Servacio was void for being made without prior liquidation? RATIO NO. Since Protacio, Sr. and Marta were married prior to the affectivity of the Family Code, their property relation was properly characterized as one of conjugal partnership governed by the Civil Code. Upon Martas death, the conjugal partnership was dissolved, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code, and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending a liquidation following its liquidation. Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Martas

share in the conjugal partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion of Martas share without an actual partition of the property being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract quota in Martas share. NONETHELESS, a co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his coowners. Also, it should not impair vested rights. UGALDE VS YSASI FACTS P and R married and got separated after 6 years. They had a son. Respondent allegedly married another. Petitioner filed a petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with the RTC against respondent but respondent countered that on 2 June 1961, he and petitioner entered into an agreement which provided, among others, that their conjugal partnership of gains shall be deemed dissolved as of 15 April 1957. Pursuant to the agreement, they submitted an Amicable Settlement to CFI. R also said that P already obtained a divorce from him in Mexico. RTC DECISION: dismissed and CA affirmed. the existence of a conjugal partnership of gains is predicated on a valid marriage. Considering that the marriage between petitioner and respondent was solemnized without a marriage license, the marriage was null and void, and no community of property was formed between them. ISSUE WON P and Rs conjugal partnership of gains was dissolved? RATIO YES. P and R were married on 15 February 1951. The applicable law at the time of their marriage was Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of the Philippines. Under ART 175 (4), conjugal partnership terminates in the case of Judicial Separation of Property. The finality of the Order in Civil Case No. 4791 approving the parties separation of property resulted in the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains in accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code. Hence, when the trial court decided Special Proceedings No. 3330, the conjugal partnership between petitioner and respondent was already dissolved. * A judgment upon a compromise agreement has all the force and effect of any other judgment, and conclusive only upon parties thereto and their privies, and not binding on third persons who are not parties to it. HELD

QUIAO V. QUIAO FACTS: Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido). RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal separation thereby awarding the custody of their 3 minor children in favor of Rita and all remaining properties shall be divided equally between the spouses subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities. Brigidos share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children because Brigido is the offending spouse. Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period 270 days later or after more than nine months from the promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification, asking the RTC to define the term Net Profits Earned. RTC held that the phrase NET PROFIT EARNED denotes the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts. It further held that after determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code. The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies because there is no other provision under the Family Code which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation. ISSUES: 1. Whether Art 102 on dissolution of absolute community or Art 129 on dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains is applicable in this case. Art 129 will govern. 2. Whether the offending spouse acquired vested rights overof the properties in the conjugal partnership NO. 3. Is the computation of net profits earned in the conjugal partnership of gains the same with the computation of net profits earned in the absolute community? NO. RATIO: 1. First, since the spouses were married prior to the promulgation of the current family code, the default rule is that In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and wife. Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the spouses marriage the operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. 2. The petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the spouses is governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code, which provides: All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband and wife. While one may not be deprived of his vested right, he may lose the same if there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence. In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he was wellaware that the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be

awarded to her. In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide the community assets between the petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory of all the community properties of the parties. Second, when the decision for legal separation was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial courts ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as net profits, pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to due process. 3. When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife become joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the commo n mass of the couples properties. And when the couples marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may have originally owned. In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable, since it has been established that the spouses have no separate properties, what will be divided equally between them is simply the net profits. And since the legal separationshare decision of Brigido states that the in the net profits shall be awarded to the children, Brigido will still be left with nothing. On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under Article142 of the Civil Code, the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate property and income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage. From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own property and debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals. In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no separate properties, there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties above are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the abovelisted properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs. However, since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty partys favor. Buenaventura VS. CA Facts: Noel Buenaventura filed a position for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated. The RTC in its decision, declared the marriage entered into between petitioner and respondent null and violation ordered the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property; ordered petitioner a regular support in favor of his son in the amount of 15,000 monthly, subject to modification as the necessity arises, and awarded the care and custody of the minor to his mother. Petitioner appealed before the CA. While the appeal was pending, the CA, upon respondents motion issued a resolution increasing the support pendants like to P20, 000.

The CA dismissal petitioner appeal for lack of merit and affirmed in to the RTC decision. Petitioner motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not co-ownership is applicable to valid marriage. Held: Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of article 50 in relation to articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case maybe, do not apply. Rather the general rule applies, which is in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership. Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the RTC and the CA, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been included or involved in said distribution. Dio v Dio Property regime of unions without marriage Facts: On 14 January 1998, Alain M. Dio (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Dio (respondent) got married. On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets. Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and would at times become violent and hurt him. The trial court ruled that petitioner was able to establish respondents psychological incapacity. In short, their marriage was declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code. Issue: Whether or not the property relations of the parties should fall under 147 of the Family Code. Held: Yes. The property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court. Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or

industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation. In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on coownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on coownership.

Delizo v.Delizo Facts: Nicolas Delizos first marriage which produced 3 children lasted 18 years, his second marriage which produced 9children lasted 46 years. After he died, heirs of the first marriage instituted an action for partition of the land but heirs of the second marriage opposed the partition claiming that the said properties were theirs. In the meantime, wife of the second marriage, Dorotea de Ocampo, filed special proceedings. The land in dispute totalled 66 hectares of agricultural land in Caanawan and a150 sq. m lot in Manila. st RTC rendered judgment distributing the properties: to children of 1 marriage to surviving spouse to children of both marriages Petitioner appealed but the CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court with modifications. The defendants appeal stressed that the Original Cert.of Title covering the 66 hectare land was in the name of: ND, married to Dorotea de Ocampo but the CA held that such was not proof that the property was owned by the conjugal partnership and was a mere description of NDs civil status. It thereby ruled that of the conjugal property of the first marriage constituted the nd separate property of the husband during the formation of the 2 conjugal partnership st uponremarriage. of property share of 1 wife of property ND and all his children Issue: WON the partition was equitable. Held/Ratio: Submitted evidence on appeal claims that the property in dispute were actually homestead grants acquired by ND through different other homesteaders and thus could not belong to the conjugal properties of the first wife because they were lands of the public domain. This was adhered to by the SC because prior to the death of the first wife, it was not shown that all the requirements of the Homestead Law to warrant the granting of patents to the homesteader was complied with. The decisive factor in determining whether a parcel of land acquired by way of homestead is conjugal property of the first or the second marriage, is not necessarily the time of the issuance of the homestead patent but the time of the fulfilment of the requirements of the public land law for the acquisition of such right to the patent.

Having neither legal nor equitable title, therefore, what was acquired by ND were not rights of ownership but inchoate rights as applicants over portions of the public domain. Hence the CA erred in holding that the entire Caanawan properties belong with the conjugal partnership of ND and his first wife. Considering however that 20hectares of that land was cultivated from 1905 to 1909, justice and equity demand that the rights to said properties be apportioned to the parties in proportion to the extent to which the requirements of the public land lands had been complied with during the existence of each conjugal partnership. Although some properties were not contested owing to the fact that they were acquired nd during the existence of the 2 marriage, important considerations preclude the SC from accepting whole-sale the statutory presumption of Art 160 of the new CC(or Art. 1407 of the old one) which states that All property of the spouses shall be deemed partnership property in the absence of proof that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife. There is established fact that he produce of the disputed lands have contributed considerably to the acquisition of these properties in dispute and thus the children of the first marriage, as a matter of equity, should be given a share in such properties. Considering the circumstances and since capital of either marriage and contribution of each spouse cannot be determined with mathematical precision, the total mass of these properties should be divided between the two conjugal partnerships in proportion to the duration of each partnership. Thus, the st nd whole estate should be divided accordingly:9/64 Share of 1 wife23/64 Share of 2 wife32/64 Share of ND to bedivided into 13 equal parts