Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. No. L-28153 January 28, 1971 UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CAMILO PEA and DOMINGO CAJIPE, respondents. Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Solicitor Ricardo L. Pronove and Special Counsel Perfecto V. Fernandez for petitioner. Camilo V. Pea for and in his own behalf.

REYES, J.B.L., J.: Appeal by certiorari from the Court of Appeals decision (CA-G.R. No. 29903-R) affirming the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Civil Case No. 45953, enjoining respondents therein, the President of the University of the Philippines (hereinafter termed UP), the Board of Regents and the Director of the Philippine General Hospital, from dismissing the petitioners Camilo V. Pea and Domingo Cajipe, respondents herein, from the service as classified civil service employees of the Philippine General Hospital (hereinafter called the PGH) . The Petition for Injunction in Special Civil Case No. 45953 filed by Messrs. Camilo V. Pea and Domingo Cajipe with the Court of First Instance of Manila on 4 January 1961 arose when said petitioners, as Assistant Cashier and Special Disbursing Officer and Collection Officer, respetively, of the PGH, were administratively charged and investigated (with seven others) by a UP-PGH Investigating Committee for "grave misconduct and dishonesty" and "infidelity in the custody of public documents." After fifty-nine hearings, excluding executive sessions, the Committee submitted its report to the authorities of the University of the Philippines, on the basis of which the Board of Regents adopted a resolution approving the report and fixing the penalties, which, with respect to respondents herein, was dismissal. With the filing of the Petition for Injunction, petitioners therein sought to restrain the UP President from dismissing them and to declare as a matter of legal right that they should not be dismissed from the PGH by the UP President but by the Civil Service Commissioner, subject to appeal to the Civil Service Board of Appeals under Republic Act No. 2260, otherwise known as the Civil Service Act of 1959 to declare petitioners who are classified civil service employees as governed by Republic Act No. 2260 and not by the UP Charter in so far as removal, dismissal or separation from the government service are concerned: and to nullify the findings of the Investigating Committee. On 9 January 1961, the trial court issued an order restraining the petitioner herein from carrying out the acts complained of, and on 14 January 1961, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the said court. On 6 February 1961, Pea and Cajipe filed a supplemental petition for injunction,

impleading the Board of Regents of the UP and the Director of the PGH as additional respondent. On 10 July 1961, after trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a decision granting both the original and supplemental petitions for injunction, and making permanent the preliminary writ restraining respondents therein from dismissing petitioners Pea and Cajipe. A motion to have the decision reconsidered was denied. On 15 September 1961, petitioner herein appealed to the Court of Appeals which, in its decision of 29 August 1967, sustained the trial court's judgment. A motion for reconsideration was also filed, but the same was denied. Hence, this instant petition for Review by Certiorari with this Court. The sole issue raised by petitioner in this appeal is whether the dismissal of respondents by the Board of Regents is final, or requires further action by the Civil Service Commission. From its inception, under the Civil Commission of the Philippines, down to the inauguration of the Philippine Republic,1 the Civil Service laws have conferred upon the Director (later Commissioner) of Civil Service exclusive charge of all formal investigations against civil service employees, and his decision or recommendation regarding discipline, removal, separation and suspension of civil service employees was, and is, made final, subject only to appeal first to the Chief Executive or later to the Civil Service Board of Appeals. 2 This authority of the Civil Service Commission was applied to the employees of the Philippine General Hospital, that from 1936 to 1947 was under the administrative jurisdiction of the Office of the President, with the power of removal over the the personnel thereof being exercised by the Commissioner of Civil Service. However, Republic Act No. 51, enacted on 4 October 1946, and entitled "An Act Authorizing the President of the Philippines to Reorganize Within one year the different Executive Departments, Bureaus, Offices, Agencies and Instrumentalities of the Government, including the Corporations owned or controlled by it," provides that SECTION 1. In order to meet the exigencies attendant upon the establishment of the free and independent Government of the Republic of the Philippines, and for the purpose of promoting simplicity, economy and efficiency in its operation, the President of the Philippines is authorized to effect by executive order from time to time, for a period not exceeding one year from the date of the approval of this Act, and within the limits of the total authorized appropriation for the fiscal year nineteen hundred and forty-seven, such reforms and changes in the different executive departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and other instrumentalities of the Government, including the corporations owned or controlled by the Government, as he may deem necessary, with the power to diminish, add to or abolish those existing and create new ones; consolidate related undertakings; transfer functions, appropriations, equipment, property, records, and personnel from one department, bureau, office, agency or instrumentality to another; eliminate duplicated services or authorize new ones not provided for; classify, combine, split or abolish positions; standardize salaries; and do whatever is necessary and desirable to effect economy and promote efficiency in the government service. Pursuant to the authority thus granted, the President, by Executive Order No. 94, series of 1947, section 158, prescribed as follows: The Philippine General Hospital is hereby transferred from the Office of the President to the University of the Philippines, together with its personnel, powers, functions, duties, records, equipment, supplies and unexpended balance of appropriations. The appropriations for the Philippine General Hospital shall continue to be itemized in the annual general appropriations act.

It is the contention of private respondents herein (petitioners below) that, despite the transfer of the Hospital to the U.P., the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commissioner over them, as civil service employees, in matters affecting administrative discipline, suspension, and removal, as provided in the various Civil Service laws, remained unimpaired and did not pass to the University authorities. Petitioner University, upon the other hand, invokes disciplinary power over the private respondents on the basis of the express words of Section 6(e) of the University Charter (Act No. 1870, as amended) couched in the following terms: To appoint, on the recommendation of the President of the University, professors, instructors, lecturers and other employees of the University; to fix their compensation, hours of service, and such other duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant them in its discretion leave of absence under such regulations as it may promulgate, any other provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding, and to remove them for cause after investigation and hearing shall have been had . (Act No. 1870, as amended by Act No. 2759, 23 February 1918, and Act No. 3745, 24 November 1930). (Emphasis supplied) Respondent Hospital employees, Pea and Cajipe, in support of their position, stress the provisions of Section 695 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, to the effect that SEC. 695. Administrative discipline of subordinate officers and employees.The Commissioner of Civil Service shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the removal, separation and suspension of subordinate officers and employees in the Civil Service and over all other matters relating to the conduct, discipline, and efficiency of such subordinate officers and employees, and shall have exclusive charge of all formal administrative investigations against them. He may, for neglect of duty or violation of reasonable office regulations, or in the interest of the public service, remove any subordinate officer or employee from the service, suspend him without pay for not more than two months, reduce his salary or compensation, or deduct therefrom any sum not exceeding one month's pay. From any decision of the Commissioner of Civil Service on administrative investigations, an appeal may be taken by the officer or employee concerned to the Civil Service Board of Appeals within thirty days after receipt by him of the decision. The employees' contention, that the Civil Service Commissioner's statutory jurisdiction excludes that of the UP authorities, would be cogent and tenable were it not for the fact that the Legislature itself has established specific exceptions to the exclusive authority of the Civil Service Commissioner, by lodging in various entities administrative disciplinary power over their employees. One instance is that of the UP Charter, Section 6(e), heretofore quoted. Another exception is found in Section 14 of the Central Bank Charter (Republic Act No. 265) which this Court has ruled to vest in the Monetary Board the power of investigation and removal of Central Bank officials (except the Bank Governor), "though they be subject to the Civil Service Law and Regulations in other respects" as declared in Castillo vs. Bayona, 106 Phil. 1121. The existence of these exceptions to the general jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commissioner is confirmed by the Civil Service Law of 1959 (Republic Act No. 2260), which in its Section 16, defining and enumerating the Commissioner's powers, specified that (i) Except as otherwise provided by law , to have final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all permanent officers and employees in the competitive or classified service and upon all matters relating to the conduct,

discipline, and efficiency of such officers and employees; and to prescribe standards, guidelines and regulations governing the administration of discipline; (Emphasis supplied) Since it must be presumed that the President was cognizant of the administrative disciplinary powers, particularly that of removal, vested by law (the UP Charter) upon its Board of Regents and President, the act of the Chief Executive in transferring the Philippine General Hospital from the Office of the President to the University of the Philippines clearly evinced the intention to place the Hospital employees under the administrative power of the University in matters of their discipline, suspension or removal, on a par with the other employees of the University. Had the intent been otherwise, the 1947 Executive Order No. 94 would have excepted or reserved the disciplinary power of the Commissioner of the Civil Service over the transferred employees, in the same manner that said Executive Order specified that the appropriations for the Hospital "shall continue to be itemized in the annual general appropriations acts" (Executive Order No. 94, Section 158, supra). In this connection, the previous uncontested acts of the Civil Service authorities in endorsing to the University for action the administrative cases of Hospital employees Fernandez and Gorospe, and declaring that "the Bureau had no disciplinary jurisdiction over said employees in view of the provisions of the University charter," constitute contemporary executives interpretation of highly persuasive character. Since the Hospital is intended to serve, and does serve, the academic, training, and research requirements of the students enrolled in the UP College of Medicine, which College is part of the UP and under the administrative control of the University President and Board of Regents, the requisite harmony and cooperation between the Medical College and the Hospital would be greatly impeded by subjecting the two units to different administrative controllers, with one governed by the UP President and Board of Regents and the other by the Civil Service Commissioner and the Civil Service Board of Appeals. The simplicity, economy and efficiency sought to be attained by Republic Act No. 51 in authorizing the reorganization of the Executive branch of the Government would not be achieved by such division of authority; and the maintenance of the dichotomy (which would invite obnoxious comparisons and friction between two sets of employees is not to be implied, absent solid evidence of the existence of any such purpose on the part of the Legislature or the President of the Philippines. We have found no such evidence to exist.
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Ultimately, which is important is that the provisions of Article XII, Section 4, of the Constitution that "no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law," as well as the due process clause of the Bill of Rights, should be fully observed and implemented; and the record is clear that in the case of herein respondents Pea and Cajipe, no deficiency exists on this score. Pursuant to the express precept in the University charter [in its Section 6 (e)] that its employees be removed only "for cause after investigation and hearing shall have been had," the herein respondents were investigated by a committee of the University and the committee recommended their dismissal after mature deliberation. Before the proceedings were closed, these respondents manifested that they had no complaints regarding the procedure adopted, and were satisfied with the way the investigation was conducted; and the Court of Appeals explicitly stated in its decision that: . ... we find that the petitioners-appellees had a fair hearing and full opportunity to defend themselves, and that their substantive right to due process was not violated by the action of the University authorities in adopting the report and recommendation of the UP-PGH investigating committee for the dismissal of petitioners-appellees. Under the circumstances, provided due process is observed, who is to have the final say on the dismissal of these respondents actually becomes of secondary importance. The Constitutional

provisions on the Civil Service (Article XII) are silent on the point, thus emphasizing its trifling weight. Whether the final decision should be made by the Civil Service Commissioner, and on appeal by the Civil Service Board of Appeals (as they contend), or by the President of the University and its Board of Regents, does not in any way impair any of the substantial rights of these respondents. But the autonomy necessary to the fulfillment of the educational and academic mission of the University demands that the administrative decision of its authorities be made final as to its employees, there being no statutory or administrative provision to the contrary. The considerations adopted by this Court in the Castillo v. Bayona case (ante) in support of the administrative and disciplinary authority of the Monetary Board of the Central Bank over its civil service employees apply, mutatis mutandis, to the President and Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines: ... In other words, the Civil Service Law is the general legal provision for the investigation, suspension or removal of civil service employees, whereas Section 14 is a special provision of law which must govern the investigation, suspension or removal of employees of the Central Bank, though they be subject to the Civil Service Law and regulations in other respects. We must not lose sight of the fact that the Central Bank is called upon to administer the monetary and banking business in the country (Section 2, Republic Act No. 265); and its powers and functions are exercised by the Monetary Board. So, it is but just and reasonable that in order to perform the functions assigned to it by law, it be given broad powers in issuing such rules and regulations as it considers necessary to direct and effect the operation and administration of the Central Bank, and with the recommendation of the Governor, the authority to appoint, fix the remunerations, and remove all officials and employees of the Central Bank with the exception of the Governor, which power to remove naturally includes the authority to investigate. PREMISES CONSIDERED, we rule that the President and Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines possess full and final authority in the disciplining, suspension and removal of the civil service employees of the University, including those of the Philippine General Hospital, independently of the Commissioner of Civil Service and the Civil Service Board of Appeals. WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari applied for is granted, and the decisions under appeal are reversed and set aside. Costs against private respondents Camilo Pea and Domingo Cajipe. Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur. Barredo, J., took no part.

Footnotes 1 Act 1407 of the Philippine Legislature, of 29 October 1905; Executive Order No. 5, dated 9 January 1909; Executive Order No. 39, 23 June 1936; Adm. Code, section 695, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 177 (section 23), and Commonwealth Act No. 598. 2 Executive Order No. 39 (23 June 1936), section. 4: Republic Act No. 2260.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. No. 79072 January 10, 1994 RODOLFO ENRIQUE AND JESUS BASILIO, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondents. Martin N. Roque for petitioners. The Solicitor General for respondent Civil Service Commission.

QUIASON, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 05132, entitled "CORAZON PACHECO, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, versus "CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Defendant-Appellee, affirming the CSC Resolution No. 84-411 which ordered the dismissal of petitioners, Rodolfo Enrique and Jesus Basilio. The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows: . . . Corazon Pacheco, Jesus Basilio (petitioner herein), Virgilio Valencia and Rodolfo Enrique (petitioner herein), all employees of the Civil Service Regional Office No. 3, San Fernando, Pampanga, together with Rogelio Maglagui, Eduardo Garcia and Lilia Cunanan, were charged by the CSC motu propio (sic) for DISHONESTY, GRAVE MISCONDUCT, BEING NOTORIOUSLY UNDESIRABLE, RECEIVING FOR PERSONAL USE FOR A FEE, GIFT OR OTHER VALUABLE THINGS IN THE COURSE OF OFFICIAL DUTIES, AND CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE, allegedly committed, as follows:

"That sometime before or during November 1983 and thereafter, the above-named persons, who are employees of the Civil Service Commission, particularly of Recruitment and Examination Division, Region 3, San Fernando, Pampanga and in charge of processing application and assignment of rooms to the 1993 PBET examinees, conspired and confederated with one another in the following manner: For and in consideration of P500.00 to P1,000.00 these employees helped and/or assisted some examinees in answering examination questions by assigning them to particular rooms known as 'chocolate rooms.' In these rooms, they assigned experts known as 'Haligi' supposedly admitted to take the examination, but whose purpose was to help and/or assist said examinees answer the questions. They also assigned room examiners and proctors for a consideration of P250.00 each to cooperate and facilitate the illegal operation" (Rollo, pp. 25-26). An order for their preventive suspension was issued pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 84-052. Petitioners denied the charges against them and moved for an immediate dismissal of the case. They asked for a formal hearing if the dismissal of the case, as well as the lifting of their preventive suspension, was not possible. In its Order dated march 15, 1984, the CSC denied the request for a formal hearing, resolved to proceed summarily against the respondents in accordance with Section 40 of PD 807 and directed them to submit their evidence within ten days from receipt of the order. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration alleging : (a) that Section 40 of P.D. No. 807 was not applicable to their case because of the absence of the circumstances provided therein; and (b) that their constitutional rights would be placed in jeopardy if summary proceedings were held in lieu of formal proceedings, since they opted for a formal investigation. In an order dated April 12, 1984, the motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. Petitioners submitted additional evidence as directed by the CSC. These consisted of the sworn statements of some of their co-employees stating that they were not aware of any examination syndicate operating in the regional office, and attesting to their integrity and honesty ( Rollo, pp. 2527). In its Resolution No. 84-411, the CSC dismissed for lack of merit petitioners' motion for reconsideration. However, the penalty of dismissal previously imposed on the other respondents in the case below, namely, Rogelio Maglagui and Lilia Cunanan was reduced to one year suspension (Records, pp. 38-39). Rodolfo Enrique, Jesus Basilio, Corazon Pacheco and Virgilio Valencia appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (Records, pp. 1-2). On April 9, 1987, the IAC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Civil Service Commission dismissing the respondent-appellants RODOLFO ENRIQUE and JESUS BASILIO is hereby AFFIRMED and is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE with respect to respondents CORAZON PACHECO and VIRGILIO VALENCIA who are hereby ordered to be reinstated (Rollo, p. 37). On July 3, 1987, the motion for reconsideration of Rodolfo Enrique and Jesus Basilio was denied for lack of merit (Rollo, p. 38). Hence, this petition. The issues raised in the petition are: 1. Whether the CSC had original jurisdiction over CSC Case No. 138 against petitioners; 2. Whether petitioners were denied due process of law; and, 3. Whether the dismissal of petitioners from the service through a summary proceeding by the CSC was proper. Petitioners contend that the CSC, its jurisdiction being merely appellate, has no original jurisdiction to hear and to decide disciplinary cases involving officers and employees of the Civil Service. They urge that it is the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), which has the power to hear and to decide administrative cases involving officers and employees of the civil service as provided in Section 5 of P.D. No. 1409 (Rollo, p. 21). The petition is devoid of merit. Section 37 of the Civil Service Decree, P.D. No. 807, provides: xxx xxx xxx (b) The heads of departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. xxx xxx xxx The CSC is an agency within the purview of Section 37 (b) of P.D. No. 807 with respect to its own employees. On June 8, 1978, P.D. No. 1409 created the MSPB, as an office under the CSC, and vested on that board, among other functions, the investigation of administrative cases involving officers and employees of the civil service. Service 5 of P.D. No. 1409 provides: Sec. 5. Powers and Functions of the Board . The Board shall have the following powers and functions, among others: (1) Hear and decide administrative cases involving officers and employees of the civil service.

(2) Hear and decide cases brought before it by officers and employees who feel aggrieved by the determination of appointing authorities involving appointment, promotion, transfer, detail reassignment and other personnel actions as well as complaints against any officers in the government arising from abuses arising from personnel actions of these officers or from violations of the merit system. (3) Hear and decide complaints of civil service employees regarding malpractices of other officials and employees. (4) Promulgate, subject to the approval of the Civil Service Commission, rules and regulations to carry out the functions of the Board. (5) Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, and take testimony in any investigation or inquiry. The Board shall have the power to punish for contempt in accordance with the rules of court under the same procedure with the same penalties provided therein. (6) Perform such other functions as may be assigned by the Civil Service Commission. xxx xxx xxx Petitioners claim that Section 37 (b) of P.D. No. 807 has been impliedly repealed by P.D. No. 1409 (Rollo, p. 21). Repeals by implication are not favored. The first duty of the Court must always be to reconcile the conflicting provisions of the statutes and it is only when the repugnancy is irreconcilable that we can say that the earlier law has been impliedly repealed by the later law (Maceda vs. Macaraig, Jr., 197 SCRA 771 [1991]). A cursory reading of the provisions under Section 37 (b) of P.D. No. 807 shows that the disciplinary jurisdiction given to heads of departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities is limited to officers and employees of the Civil Service under their jurisdiction or who are employed in their respective offices. In the instant case, the petitioners are CSC employees. Hence, disciplinary jurisdiction over them is vested with the head of the CSC, the agency having jurisdiction over them. We held in Government Service Insurance System v. Civil Service Commission, 204 SCRA 826 (1991) that "when the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter." P.D. Nos. 807 and 1409 therefore vest concurrent original jurisdiction over disciplinary matters to both the CSC and the Merit Systems Protection Board with respect to officials and employees connected with the CSC. This concurrent jurisdiction over disciplinary cases is further stressed in Memorandum Circular No. 6, Series of 1978 of the Civil Service Commission, which in pertinent part states:

As provided in Presidential Decree No. 1409, which amended Presidential Decree No. 807, the heads of ministries and agencies, on one hand, and the Merit Systems Board on the other, have concurrent original jurisdiction over disciplinary and nondisciplinary cases, and where the heads of ministries and agencies assume jurisdiction first, their decisions and determinations are appealable to Merit Systems Board. The Civil Service Commission, however, remains the final administrative body in these matters, as provided in Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 1409 . . . . Great weight must be accorded to the interpretation or construction of a statute by the government agency called upon to implement the same (Soriano v. Offshore Shipping and Manning Corporation, 177 SCRA 513 [1989]). Petitioners further contend that they were denied due process of law when they were dismissed from the service through a summary proceeding conducted by the CSC (Rollo, p. 13). The summary proceeding referred to by petitioners is allowed in Section 40 of P.D. No. 807, which provides as follows: Sec. 40. Summary Proceedings. No formal investigation is necessary and the respondent may be immediately removed or dismissed if any of the following circumstances is present; (a) When the charge is serious and the evidence of guilty is strong. (b) When the respondent is a recidivist or has been repeatedly charged and there is reasonable ground to believe that he is guilty of the present charge. (c) When the respondent is notoriously undesirable. Resort to summary proceedings by disciplinary authority shall be done with utmost objectivity and impartiality to the end that no injustice is committed: Provided, that removal or dismissal except those by the President, himself, or upon his order, may be appealed to the Commission. In Abalos v. Civil Service Commission, et al., 196 SCRA 81 [1991], the Court observed: The Court had earlier entertained serious misgivings about the constitutionality of Section 40 as against strong protests that it was violative of due process insofar as it deprived the civil servant of the right to defend himself against the ex parte decision to dismiss him. While it is true that this section had been upheld in earlier decisions (albeit not very categorically), there was a growing sentiment that the law should be re-examined more closely in deference to the right to a hearing that it was foreclosing. Fortunately, the question has been rendered moot and academic by the Congress of the Philippines, which has itself seen fit to remove it from our statute books. The Court [notes that] . . . Section 40 was repealed by Republic Act No. 6654, which was approved on May 20, 1988, and published in the Official Gazette on May 30, 1988. (Emphasis Supplied)

xxx xxx xxx The commission of the acts imputed to petitioners took place on or before November 1983 or long before the repeal of Section 40 of P.D. No. 807. Hence, the operative law is still said Section 40. In Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals, 201 SCRA 661 (1991), we sustained the validity of Section 40 so long as the respondents in the administrative case are duly informed of the charges against them and are given the opportunity to present their side. In the case at bench, petitioners were informed of the charges levelled against them and were given reasonable opportunity to present their defenses. As a matter of fact, petitioners admitted that they filed their answer to the formal charges against them and submitted additional evidence when asked to do so. Petitioners even moved for a reconsideration of the adverse CSC decision. After the denial of their motion, petitioners appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court, which, in turn, considered said appeal. Hence, the supposed denial of administrative due process has been cured. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court dated April 9, 1987 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno and Vitug, JJ, concur. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. No. L-38161 March 29, 1974 JUAN BELLO, FILOMENA C. BELLO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, * HON. FRANCISCO LLAMAS, as Judge of Pasay City Court, and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Martinez and Martinez for petitioners. Office of the Solicitor General, Dept. of Justice, for respondent.

TEEHANKEE, J.:p The Court holds that the court of first instance of Pasay City in an appeal erroneously taken to it from the city court's judgment convicting petitioners-accused of the charge of estafa within the concurrent original jurisdiction of said courts should grant petitioners-accused's timely petition for certifying their appeal to the Court of Appeals as the proper court rather than peremptorily grant the prosecution's motion for dismissal of the appeal and order the remand of the case to the city court for execution of

judgment. The appellate court's decision denying the relief sought by petitioners of compelling the elevation of their appeal to it as the proper court simply because of the non-impleader of the court of first instance as a nominal party notwithstanding that it was duly represented by the respondent People as the real party in interest through the Solicitor General who expressed no objection to the setting aside of the court of first instance's dismissal order is set aside as sacrificing substance to form and subordinating substantial justice to a mere matter of procedural technicality. Petitioners spouses were charged on August 25, 1970 for estafa before the City Court of Pasay 1 for allegedly having misappropriated a lady's ring with a value of P1,000.00 received by them from Atty. Prudencio de Guzman for sale on commission basis. After trial, they were convicted and sentenced under respondent city court's decision of February 26, 1971 to six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional and to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P1,000.00 with costs of suit. Petitioners filed their notice of appeal of the adverse judgment to the Court of First Instance of Pasay City, but the prosecution filed a "petition to dismiss appeal" on the ground that since the case was within the concurrentjurisdiction of the city court and the court of first instance and the trial in the city court had been duly recorded, the appeal should have been taken directly to the Court of Appeals as provided by section 87 of the Judiciary Act, Republic Act 296, as amended. 2 Petitioners opposed the prosecution's dismissal motion and invoking the analogous provision of Rule 50, section 3 directing that the Court of Appeals in cases erroneously brought to it "shall not dismiss the appeal, but shall certify the case to the proper court, with a specific and clear statement of the grounds therefor," prayed of the court of first instance if it should find the appeal to have been wrongly brought before it, to certify the same "to either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court." 3 The court of first instance per its order of October 29, 1971 did find that the appeal should have been taken directly to the Court of Appeals but ordered the dismissal of the appeal and remand of the records to the city court "for execution of judgment." 4 Petitioners aver that they were not notified of the order of dismissal of their appeal and learned of it only when they were called by the Pasay city court for execution of the judgment of conviction. Hence, they filed with the city court their "motion to elevate appeal to Court of Appeals" of December 7, 1971 stating that "through inadvertence and/or excusable neglect" they had erroneously filed a notice of appeal to the court of first instance instead of to the Court of Appeals as the proper court and prayed that the city court, following precedents of this Court remanding appeals before it to the proper court instead of dismissing appeals, "elevate the records ... to the Court of Appeals for proper review." 5 Respondent city court per its order of December 11, 1971 denied petitioners' motion "for having been erroneously addressed to this court" instead of to the court of first instance 6 ignoring petitioners' predicament that the court of first instance had already turned them down and ordered the dismissal of their appeal without notice to them and that as a consequence it was poised to execute its judgment of conviction against them. Petitioners spouses then filed on January 14, 1972 their petition for prohibition and mandamus against the People and respondent city court to prohibit the execution of the judgment and to compel respondent city court to elevate their appeal to the Court of Appeals. 7 The Solicitor General filed respondents' answer to the petition manifesting that "we shall not interpose any objection whichever view point is adopted by this Honorable Court in resolving the two apparently conflicting or clashing principles of law finality of judicial decision or equity in judicial decision," after observing that "(F)rom the view point of equity considering that petitioners' right to

appeal lapsed or was lost through the fault, though not excusable, of their counsel, and compounded by the alleged error of judgment committed by the Court of First Instance to which the appeal was erroneously brought, we sympathize with petitioners' plight." The Court of Appeals, however, per its decision of December 17, 1973 dismissed the petition, after finding that the city court's judgment was directly appealable to it. Although recognizing that the "CFI instead of dismissing appeal, could have in the exercise of its inherent powers directed appeal to be endorsed to this Court of Appeals" it held that since petitioners did not implead the court of first instance as "principal party respondent" it could not "grant any relief at all even on the assumption that petitioners can be said to deserve some equities," as follows: ... therefore, when they appealed to CFI, that was procedurally wrong; of course, CFI instead of dismissing appeal, could have in the exercise of its inherent powers, directed appeal to be endorsedto this Court of Appeals, but when instead of doing so, it dismissed, it also had power to do so, and correction of it is difficult to see to be remediable by mandamus, but ignoring this altogether, what this Court finds is that since it was CFI that dismissed the appeal and according to petitioners, wrongly, it must follow that if CFI was wrong, this plea for mandamus to compel it to act "correctly" should have been directed against said CFI, it should have been the CFI, Hon. Francisco de la Rosa, who should have been made under Rule 65 Sec. 3, herein principal party respondent , but he was not, this being the situation, this Court can not see how it can grant any relief at all even on the assumption that petitioners can be said to deserve some equities. Petitioners moved for reconsideration on January 2, 1974 8 and for elevation of their appeal to the Court of Appeals, stressing the merits of their appeal and of their defense to the charge, viz, that the offended party Atty. de Guzman had represented their son who was a suspect with two others for robbery before the Pasay city fiscal's office and upon dismissal of the charge demanded payment from them as parents the sum of P1,000.00 as attorney's fees, and since they had no money to pay him required them to sign the receipt dated June 25, 1970 in his favor for an imaginary lady's ring to sell "on commission basis" for P1,000.00 (their "commission" to be any overprice) to assure payment of the sum by the stated deadline of July 9, 1970 under penalty, of criminal prosecution for estafa; and that they had then newly met Atty. de Guzman, whose services had been secured not by them but by the family of one of the other suspects, implying the incredibility of his entrusting a lady's ring toboth of them (husband and wife) for sale on commission basis when his only association with them was his demand of payment of his P1,000-attorney's fee for having represented their son-suspect. Reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court "for lack of sufficient merit," petitioners filed the present petition for review. 9 The Court required the Solicitor General's comment on behalf of the People of the Philippines, and upon receipt thereof resolved to consider the case as a special civil action with such comment as answer and the case submitted for decision in the interest of justice and speedy adjudication. The Court finds merits in the petition and holds that the court of first instance acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners-accused's appeal which was erroneously brought to it and ordering remand of the records to the city court for execution of judgment instead of certifying and endorsing the appeal to the Court of Appeals as the proper court as timely prayed for by petitionersaccused in their opposition to the prosecution's motion to dismiss appeal. We find that the Court of Appeals also acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing their petition instead of setting aside the challenged order of the court of first instance peremptorily dismissing the appeal pursuant to which respondent city court was poised to execute its judgment of conviction simply because the court of first instance which is but a nominal party had not been impleaded as party respondent in

disregard of the substantive fact that the People as plaintiff and the real party in interest was duly impleaded as principal party respondent and was represented in the proceedings by the Solicitor General. The appellate court while recognizing that petitioners' appeal taken to the court of first instance was "procedurally wrong" and that the court of first instance "in the exercise of its inherent powers could have certified the appeal to it as the proper court instead of dismissing the appeal, gravely erred in holding that it could not "correct" the court of first instance's "wrong action" and grant the relief sought of having the appeal elevated to it since said court's presiding judge "who should have beenmade under Rule 65, sec. 3 10 herein principal party respondent, but he was not." The Court has always stressed as in Torre vs. Ericta 11 that a respondent judge is "merely a nominal party" in special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus and that he "is not a person "in interest" within the purview (of Rule 65, section 5 12)" and "accordingly, he has no standing or authority to appeal from or seek a review on certiorari" of an adverse decision of the appellate court setting aside his dismissal of a party's appeal and issuing the writ of mandamus for him to allow the appeal. It is readily seen from the cited Rule that the court of first instance or presiding judge who issued the challenged order or decision is but a nominal party, the real parties in interest being "the person or persons interested in sustaining the proceedings in the court" and who are charged with the duty of appearing and defending the challenged act both "in their own behalf and in behalf of the court or judge affected by the proceedings." Hence, the formal impleading of the court of first instance which issued the challenged order of dismissal was not indispensable and could be "overlooked in the interest of speedy adjudication." 13 Since the real party in interest, the People as plaintiff in the criminal proceeding against petitionersaccused was duly impleaded and represented by the Solicitor General to defend the proceedings in the court of first instance and had expressed no objection to the appellate court's setting aside of the court of first instance's dismissal order, in the interest of justice and equity the appellate court's act of dismissing the petition and denying the relief sought of endorsing the appeal to the proper court simply because of the non impleader of the court of first instance as a nominal party was tantamount to sacrificing substance to form and to subordinating substantial justice to a mere matter of procedural technicality. The procedural infirmity of petitioners mis-directing their appeal to the court of first instance rather than to the Court of Appeals, which they had timely sought to correct in the court of first instance itself by asking that court to certify the appeal to the Court of Appeals as the proper court, should not be over-magnified as to totally deprive them of their substantial right of appeal and leave them without any remedy. The Court therefore grants herein the relief denied by respondent appellate court of mandamus to compel respondent city court to elevate petitioners' appeal to the Court of Appeals as the proper court as being within the context and spirit of Rule 50, section 3, providing for certification to the proper court by the Court of Appeals of appealed cases erroneously brought to it, 14 particularly where petitioners-accused have shown prima facie (and without this Court prejudging the merits of their appeal) that they have a valid cause for pursuing in good faith their appeal (as against a manifestly dilatory or frivolous appeal) and to have a higher court appreciate their evidence in support of their defense that they were prosecuted and sentenced to imprisonment (for estafa) for failure to pay a purely civil indebtedness (the attorney's fee owed by their son to the complainant). Here, petitioners-accused's counsel, misdirected their appeal to the court of first instance, confronted with the thorny question (which has confused many a practitioner) 15 of concurrent criminal jurisdiction of city courts andmunicipal courts of provincial and sub-provincial capitals with courts of first instance under sections 44 (f) and 87 (c) of the Judiciary Act where the appeal from the municipal or city court's judgment should be taken directly to the Court of Appeals as held in Esperat

vs. Avila 16 as distinguished however from judgments of ordinary municipal courts in similar cases within the concurrent jurisdiction of the courts of first instance where as held by this Court in People vs. Valencia 17 the appeal should nevertheless be brought to the court of first instance which retains its appellate jurisdiction under section 45 of the Judiciary Act. It certainly was within the inherent power of the court of first instance in exercise of its power to "control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice" 18 to grant petitioners-accused's timely plea to endorse their appeal to the Court of Appeals as the proper court and within the context and spirit of Rule 50, section 3. In a mis-directed appeal to the Court of Appeals of a case that pertains to the court of first instance's jurisdiction, the said Rule expressly provides that the Court of Appeals "shall not dismiss the appeal but shall certify the case to the proper court" viz, the court of first instance in the given example. There is no logical reason why in all fairness and justice the court of first instance in a misdirected appeal to it should not be likewise boundby the same rule and therefore enjoined not to dismiss the appeal but to certify the case to the Court of Appeals as the proper court. The paucity of the language of the Rule and its failure to expressly provide for such cases of misdirected appeals to the court of first instance (owing possibly to the fact that at the time of the revision of the Rules of Court in 1963 section 87 (c) had been newly amended under Republic Act 2613 approved on June 22, 1963 to enlarge the jurisdiction of city courts and municipal courts of provincial capitals and provide for theirconcurrent jurisdiction with the courts of first instance and direct appeal from their judgments in such cases to the Court of Appeals) should not be a cause for unjustly depriving petitioners of their substantial right of appeal. This Court has in many cases involving the construction of statutes always cautioned against "narrowly"interpreting a statute "as to defeat the purpose of the legislator" " 19 and stressed that "it is of the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes so as to avoid such a deplorable result (of injustice or absurdity)" 20 and that therefore "a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results". 21 In the construction of its own Rules of Court, this Court is all the more so bound to liberally construe them to avoid injustice, discrimination and unfairness and to supply the void that is certainly within the spirit and purpose of the Rule to eliminate repugnancy and inconsistency by holding as it does now that courts of first instance are equally bound as the higher courts not to dismiss misdirected appeals timely made but to certify them to the proper appellate court. ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition is hereby set aside and in lieu thereof, judgment is hereby rendered granting the petition for prohibition against respondent city court which is hereby enjoined from executing its judgment of conviction against petitionersaccused and further commanding said city court to elevate petitioners' appeal from its judgment to the Court of Appeals for the latter's disposition on the merits. No costs. Makalintal, C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Fernandez, Muoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

ESGUERRA, J., dissenting: I beg to dissent from the opinion that Section 3 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court may be applied by analogy to this case, considering that the dispositive portion of the draft decision commands the City Court to elevate the case to the Court of Appeals. Under Section 31 of the Judiciary Act (Republic Act No. 296), "all cases erroneously brought to the Supreme Court or to the Court of Appeals shall be sent to the proper court, which shall hear the same, as if it had originally been brought before it." Section 3 of Rule 50 provides that "when the appealed case has been erroneously brought to the Court of Appeals, it shall not dismiss the appeal but shall certify the case to the proper court, with a specific and clear statement of the grounds therefor." These are the only legal provisions governing the handling and disposition of erroneous appeals. Neither the Legislature nor the Rules of Court has provided the rules for erroneous appeal to the Court of First Instance from the judgment of a City Court or the Municipal Court of a provincial or sub-provincial capital in cases falling within their concurrent jurisdiction under the Judiciary Act, as amended. I do not think the Supreme Court, by judicial fiat, can supply the deficiency unless it formally promulgates a rule governing transfer or certification of cases erroneously appealed to the Court of First Instance from judgments of inferior courts in cases directly appealable to the Court of Appeals. The void in the law is in the certification by the Court of First Instance to the Court of Appeals in such cases. We cannot apply Section 31 of the Judiciary Act and Section 3 of Rule 50 by analogy because We have to compel the Court of First Instance to certify the case to the Court of Appeals. We cannot also compel the City Court of Pasay City to do the same because the case was not appealed to it as it was its decision which was erroneously appealed to the Court of First Instance. The proper court to certify and to be commanded to do so by mandamus is the Court of First Instance, but this Court is not a party to this case and cannot be bound by any judgment rendered herein. That the People of the Philippines was impleaded as a party and represented by the Solicitor General is of no significance to me. The People is not the one to be compelled to perform the act but the Judge of First Instance that dismissed the appeal; and neither said Court nor the Judge thereof is a party respondent in these proceedings. The petitioners here should have known, through their counsel, that the People of the Philippines and the Court of First Instance of Pasay City are not one and the same entity, and that the former may not be compelled to perform the act of certifying the case to the Court of Appeals while the latter can be. The respondent-appellate Court was right in dismissing the petition to prohibit the execution of the judgment and to compel the City Court to elevate the case to the Court of Appeals. Petitioners should have known that the Court of First Instance is an indispensable party to these proceedings. For their counsel's fatal error, they should pay the price of having the judgment of conviction become final.

Separate Opinions ESGUERRA, J., dissenting: I beg to dissent from the opinion that Section 3 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court may be applied by analogy to this case, considering that the dispositive portion of the draft decision commands the City Court to elevate the case to the Court of Appeals. Under Section 31 of the Judiciary Act (Republic Act No. 296), "all cases erroneously brought to the Supreme Court or to the Court of Appeals shall

be sent to the proper court, which shall hear the same, as if it had originally been brought before it." Section 3 of Rule 50 provides that "when the appealed case has been erroneously brought to the Court of Appeals, it shall not dismiss the appeal but shall certify the case to the proper court, with a specific and clear statement of the grounds therefor." These are the only legal provisions governing the handling and disposition of erroneous appeals. Neither the Legislature nor the Rules of Court has provided the rules for erroneous appeal to the Court of First Instance from the judgment of a City Court or the Municipal Court of a provincial or sub-provincial capital in cases falling within their concurrent jurisdiction under the Judiciary Act, as amended. I do not think the Supreme Court, by judicial fiat, can supply the deficiency unless it formally promulgates a rule governing transfer or certification of cases erroneously appealed to the Court of First Instance from judgments of inferior courts in cases directly appealable to the Court of Appeals. The void in the law is in the certification by the Court of First Instance to the Court of Appeals in such cases. We cannot apply Section 31 of the Judiciary Act and Section 3 of Rule 50 by analogy because We have to compel the Court of First Instance to certify the case to the Court of Appeals. We cannot also compel the City Court of Pasay City to do the same because the case was not appealed to it as it was its decision which was erroneously appealed to the Court of First Instance. The proper court to certify and to be commanded to do so by mandamus is the Court of First Instance, but this Court is not a party to this case and cannot be bound by any judgment rendered herein. That the People of the Philippines was impleaded as a party and represented by the Solicitor General is of no significance to me. The People is not the one to be compelled to perform the act but the Judge of First Instance that dismissed the appeal; and neither said Court nor the Judge thereof is a party respondent in these proceedings. The petitioners here should have known, through their counsel, that the People of the Philippines and the Court of First Instance of Pasay City are not one and the same entity, and that the former may not be compelled to perform the act of certifying the case to the Court of Appeals while the latter can be. The respondent-appellate Court was right in dismissing the petition to prohibit the execution of the judgment and to compel the City Court to elevate the case to the Court of Appeals. Petitioners should have known that the Court of First Instance is an indispensable party to these proceedings. For their counsel's fatal error, they should pay the price of having the judgment of conviction become final. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. L-45642 February 28, 1978 RAMON SALARIA, petitioner, vs. HON. CARLOS R. BUENVIAJE, Executive Judge, Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch VII, Iriga City and ANTONIO V. MENDIOLA, respondents. Rosario R Rapanut (CLA0), for petitioner. Mendez, Mendez & Associates for private respondent.

GUERRERO, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch VII, Iriga City, dated January 19,1977, in Civil Case No. Ir-431, entitled " Antonio V. Mendiola vs. Ramon Salaria which affirmed with modification the decision of the City Court of Iriga Ramon Salaria, the petitioner herein, had been staying on the land of Eliodoro Cailao situated at San Roque, Iriga City as a lessee since September 18, 1930 when he bought the house of Rufino Llagas constructed thereon. Ramon Salaria and Eliodoro Cailao agreed that the former pay a monthly render total of P6.00, latter raised to P10.00, but they had no agreement regarding its duration. In December, 1972, Cailao advised not to pay anymore and to vacate the land for he was seen it to Ceferina Flores, wife of Antonio Mendiola, private respondent herein. The land was eventually sold to Mr. and Mrs. Antonio Mendiola for P300.00 as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sales We dated June 15, 1974 although the sale was consummated as early as 1973. After December, 1972, no rentals were collected anymore either by Eliodoro Cailao or Antonio Mendiola for which reason petitioner deposited with the Clerk of Court the amount of P200.00 (Exhibits "1" and "2"). Cailao and the wife of Antonio Mendiola several times reminded the petitioner to vacate the premises On May 16, 1974, Ceferina Flores wrote the petitioner a letter asking him to vacate the premises until July, 1974, otherwise, a suit would be filed against the latter. On August 23, 1974, a complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by Antonio Mendiola against Ramon Salaria in Branch II of the City Court of Iriga. Petitioner Ramon, Salaria as defendant below, filed a modification to dismiss dated September 6, 1974 on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action, as Presidential Decree No. 20 suspends the provision of paragraph (1) of Article 1673 of the Civil Code and that the need of the plaintiff (private respondent herein) of the premises for his own use does not fall within the exception provided by the said Decree. Respondent judge issued an Order dated September 26, 1974 denying the defendant's motion to dismiss and setting the case for hearing. In his answer dated October 21, 1974, defendant (petitioner herein) admitted that he has been occupying the residential lot of Eliodoro Cailao as lessee, but that the lease was without a fixed period. He denied the allegation that the lease was on a monthly basis and asserted that it was on a yearly basis. He also admitted that he received a letter from the wife of the plaintiff but denied the rest of the allegations. As special and affirmative defenses, defendant alleged that the complaint states no cause of action against the defendant as the same is suspended by Presidential Decree No. 20, Section 4; and that the City Court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the matter at issue, there being no law to support it. By way of counterclaim, defendant alleged that because of the unwarranted filing of the instant action, plaintiff knowing fully well that it has no basis in fact or in law, defendant was exposed to actual and moral damages for which plaintiff should be held liable. After hearing, the City Court rendered a decision, the positive portion of which reads as follows: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered. 1. Ordering the defendant to vacate the premises in question within three (3) months from receipt of the decision.

2. Considering that the defendant is financialy hard up, he is excused by this Court to pay the back rentals from January, 1973 up to the time he vacates the premises and for which reason the Clerk of Court is directed to deliver to the defendant upon demand the amount of P200.00 as consignation by him. 3. There is no award for damages to plaintiff but the counterclaim is dismissed for lack of merit and defendant ordered to pay the costs of this suit. SO ORDERED. Upon appeal to the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, the decision was affirmed with modification. The defendant was ordered to vacate the premises of the land in question upon finality of said decision and plaintiff was granted authority to withdraw the amount of P200.00 from the Clerk of Court of the City Court. The main issues to be resolved in this petition are: 1. Whether or not under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 20, the private respondent can eject the petitioner from the lot in question on the ground that he needs the lot for his own use; and 2. Whether or not this case is covered by Presidential Decree No. 20. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 20 states that Sec. 4. Except when the lease is for a definite period, the provisions of paragraph (1) of Article 1673 of the Civil Code of the Philippines insofar as they refer to dwelling unit or land on which another's dwelling is located shall be suspended until otherwise provided; but other provisions of the Civil Code and the Rules of Court of the Philippines on lease contracts, insofar as they are not in conflict with the provisions of this Act shall apply. Article 1673 of the Civil Code provides as follows: Art. 1673. The lessor may judicially eject the lessee for any of the following causes: (1) When the period agreed upon, or that which is fixed for the duration of leases under Articles 1682 and 1687, has expired; (2) Lack of payment of the price stipulated; (3) Violation of any of the conditions agreed upon in the contract; (4) When the lessee devotes the thing leased to any used or service not stipulated which causes the deterioration thereof-, or if he does not observe the requirements in No. 2 of Article 1657, as regards the use thereof. It appearing that no fixed period has been agreed upon for the duration of the lease between the original owner of the subject lot and the petitioner, the case comes under the provision of Article 1687 of the Civil Code, which states

Art. 1687. If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is understood to be from year to year, if the rent agreed upon is annually; from month to month, if it is monthly; from week to week, if the rent is weekly; and from day to day, if the rent is to be paid daily. However, even though a monthly rent is paid, and no period for the lease has been set, the courts may fix a longer term for the lease after the lessee has occupied the premises for over one year. If the rent is weekly, the courts may likewise determine a longer period after the lessee has been in possession for over six months. In case of daily rent, the courts may also fix a longer period after the lessee has stayed in the place for over one month. Construing Sec. 4 of Presidential Decree No. 20 in relation to Art. 1673 par. I and Art. 1687 of the Civil Code, it is clear and explicit that Presidential Decree No. 20 suspends paragraph (1) of Article 1673. Hence, the petitioner cannot be ejected at the expiration of the period provided under Article 1687 of the Civil Code. The ground relied upon by the lessor in this case, namely, personal use of the property by the owners or lessors or their families is not one of the causes for judicial ejectment of lessees enumerated in Article 1673 of the New Civil Code in relation to Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6359, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 20. Accordingly, the lessee, petitioner herein, cannot be ordered to vacate the premises of the land in question pursuant to said law. Petitioner cites Memorandum Circular No. 970 issued by the Office of the President on March 15, 1977, clarifying Presidential Decree No. 20, which states: WHEREAS, there have been many reports that many owners or lessors of residential lands and buildings covered by Presidential Decree No. 20 have been ejecting, with the help of certain lower courts, their tenants on the ground that the former or their families will use the leased property; WHEREAS, in a long time of opinions rendered by this Office in the construction and interpretation of Presidential Decree No. 20, personal use by the owners or lessors or their families of covered dwelling units occupied by bona fide tenants is not a recognized cause for judicial ejectment of the latter, and WHEREAS, to allow eviction of lessees for the reason alone that the premises are needed by the owners or lessors or their families will open the floodgates for abuse and circumvention of Presidential Decree No. 20 thereby setting to naught the intent and purpose of the President to protect and assist the low-income families comprising the bulk of rented dwelling place occupants; WHEREFORE, it is hereby made clear for the benefit of all concerned that, except for the causes for judicial ejectment of lessees enumerated in Article 1673 of the New Civil Code in relation to Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6359, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 20, bona fide covenants of dwelling places covered by said decree are not subject to eviction, particularly if the only cause of action thereof is personal use of the property by the owners or their families. By Authority President: of the

(Sgd.) RONALDO B. ZAMORA

Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs The Memorandum quoted above is directly in point to the issue of the case at bar. Although the construction put by the executive branch of the government on a particular law is not necessarily binding upon the courts, it must be given some weight as it comes from that branch of the government caned upon to implement the law. (Gabio vs. Ganzon, No. L-11664, March 16,1961, 1 SCRA 713,718) The construction of the office charged with implementing and enforcing the provision of a statute should be giving controlling weight. (Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Customs, l 9337, Sept. 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 617). Even before the enactment of Presidential PD No. 20, there were previous laws designed to protect the low-income members of our society, namely, Republic Act Nos. 6126 and 6359 suspending the provisions of paragraph (1) of Article 1673 of the Civil Code insofar as they refer to dwelling units or land on which another's dwelling units or on which another's dwelling is located Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6126 states that The provisions of paragraph (1) of Article 1673 of the Civil Code insofar as they refer to dwelling units or land on which another's dwelling is located shall be suspended for the period of one year from the effectivity of this Act; but other provisions of the Civil Code and the Rules of Court of the Philippines on lease contracts, insofar as they are not in conflict with the provisions of this Act, shall apply. Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6359 reads Except when the lease is for definite period, the provisions of paragraph (1) of Article 1673 of the Civil Code insofar as they refer to dwelling unit or land on which another's dwelling is located shall be suspended for two years from the effectivity of this Act; but other provisions of the Civil Code and the Rules of Court of the Philippines on lease contracts, insofar as they are not in conflict with the provisions of this Act, shall apply. Sec. 4 of Republic Act No. 6359 was later amended by Presidential Decree No. 20 which changed the phrase "shall be suspended for two years from the effectivity of this Act" to should be suspended until otherwise provided." In the case at bar, the old and new owners of the lot had refused to receive payment of the rent offered by petitioner who thereupon consigned the money with the Court. The consignation of the rentals due has the effect of payment, thereby releasing the lessee from the obligation to pay the lessor. (Ponce de Leon vs. Santiago Syjuco, Inc., 90 Phil. 311; Art. 1256, New Civil Code). WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed, except with respect to that portion of the decision which authorized Antonio Mendiola to withdraw the amount of P200.00 from the Clerk of Court of the City Court. The petitioner is, however, ordered to pay back rentals for the period of his stay on the land at the rate of P10.00 a month, which is not covered by the deposit. No costs. Judgment reversed. SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, Muoz Palma, and Fernandez, JJ., concur. Teehankee (Chairman), concurs in the result. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-13431 November 12, 1919

In re will of Ana Abangan. GERTRUDIS ABANGAN, executrix-appellee, vs. ANASTACIA ABANGAN, ET AL., opponents-appellants. Filemon Sotto for appellants. M. Jesus Cuenco for appellee.

AVANCEA, J.: On September 19, 1917, the Court of First Instance of Cebu admitted to probate Ana Abangan's will executed July, 1916. From this decision the opponent's appealed. Said document, duly probated as Ana Abangan's will, consists of two sheets, the first of which contains all of the disposition of the testatrix, duly signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban (in the name and under the direction of the testatrix) and by three witnesses. The following sheet contains only the attestation clause duly signed at the bottom by the three instrumental witnesses. Neither of these sheets is signed on the left margin by the testatrix and the three witnesses, nor numbered by letters; and these omissions, according to appellants' contention, are defects whereby the probate of the will should have been denied. We are of the opinion that the will was duly admitted to probate. In requiring that each and every sheet of the will should also be signed on the left margin by the testator and three witnesses in the presence of each other, Act No. 2645 (which is the one applicable in the case) evidently has for its object (referring to the body of the will itself) to avoid the substitution of any of said sheets, thereby changing the testator's dispositions. But when these dispositions are wholly written on only one sheet signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses (as the instant case), their signatures on the left margin of said sheet would be completely purposeless. In requiring this signature on the margin, the statute took into consideration, undoubtedly, the case of a will written on several sheets and must have referred to the sheets which the testator and the witnesses do not have to sign at the bottom. A different interpretation would assume that the statute requires that this sheet, already signed at the bottom, be signed twice. We cannot attribute to the statute such an intention. As these signatures must be written by the testator and the witnesses in the presence of each other, it appears that, if the signatures at the bottom of the sheet guaranties its authenticity, another signature on its left margin would be unneccessary; and if they do not guaranty, same signatures, affixed on another part of same sheet, would add nothing. We cannot assume that the statute regards of such importance the place where the testator and the witnesses must sign on the sheet that it would consider that their signatures written on the

bottom do not guaranty the authenticity of the sheet but, if repeated on the margin, give sufficient security. In requiring that each and every page of a will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of the sheet, it is likewise clear that the object of Act No. 2645 is to know whether any sheet of the will has been removed. But, when all the dispositive parts of a will are written on one sheet only, the object of the statute disappears because the removal of this single sheet, although unnumbered, cannot be hidden. What has been said is also applicable to the attestation clause. Wherefore, without considering whether or not this clause is an essential part of the will, we hold that in the one accompanying the will in question, the signatures of the testatrix and of the three witnesses on the margin and the numbering of the pages of the sheet are formalities not required by the statute. Moreover, referring specially to the signature of the testatrix, we can add that same is not necessary in the attestation clause because this, as its name implies, appertains only to the witnesses and not to the testator since the latter does not attest, but executes, the will. Synthesizing our opinion, we hold that in a will consisting of two sheets the first of which contains all the testamentary dispositions and is signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses and the second contains only the attestation clause and is signed also at the bottom by the three witnesses, it is not necessary that both sheets be further signed on their margins by the testator and the witnesses, or be paged. The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordal ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded.
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As another ground for this appeal, it is alleged the records do not show that the testarix knew the dialect in which the will is written. But the circumstance appearing in the will itself that same was executed in the city of Cebu and in the dialect of this locality where the testatrix was a neighbor is enough, in the absence of any proof to the contrary, to presume that she knew this dialect in which this will is written. For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed with costs against the appellants. So ordered. Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Araullo, Street and Malcolm, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 4963 September 15, 1909

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GO CHICO, defendant-appellant. Gibbs and Gale for appellant. Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey for appellee. MORELAND, J.: The defendant is charged with the violation of section 1 of Act No. 1696 of the Philippine Commission, which reads as follows: Any person who shall expose, or cause or permit to be exposed, to public view on his own premises, or who shall expose, or cause to be exposed, to public view, either on his own premises or elsewhere, any flag, banner, emblem, or device used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate or identify those in armed rebellion against the United States, or any flag, banner, emblem, or device used or adopted at any time by the public enemies of the United States in the Philippine Island for the purpose of public disorder or of rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States in the Philippine Islands, or any flag, banner, emblem, or device of the Katipunan Society, or which is commonly known as such, shall be punished by a fine of not less that five hundred pesos for more than five thousand pesos, or by imprisonment for not less than three months nor more than five years, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court. The defendant was tried in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila on the 8th day of September, 1908. After hearing the evidence adduced the court adjudged the defendant guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him under that judgment to pay a fine of P500, Philippine currency, and to pay the costs of the action, and to suffer subsidiary imprisonment during the time and in the form and in the place prescribed by law until said fine should be paid. From that judgment and sentence the defendant appealed to this court. A careful examination of the record brought to this court discloses the following facts: That on or about the 4th day of August, 1908, in the city of Manila, the appellant Go Chico displayed in one of the windows and one of the show cases of his store, No. 89 Calle Rosario, a number of medallions, in the form of a small button, upon the faces of which were imprinted in miniature the picture of Emilio Aguinaldo, and the flag or banner or device used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate and identify those in armed insurrection against the United States. On the day previous to the one above set forth the appellant had purchased the stock of goods in said store, of which the medallions formed a part, at a public sale made under authority of the sheriff of the city of Manila. On the day in question, the 4th of August aforesaid, the appellant was arranging his stock of goods for the purpose of displaying them to the public and in so doing placed in his showcase and in one of the windows of his store the medallions described. The appellant was

ignorant of the existence of a law against the display of the medallions in question and had consequently no corrupt intention. The facts above stated are admitted. The appellant rests his right to acquittal upon two propositions: First. That before a conviction under the law cited can be had, a criminal intent upon the part of the accused must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Second. That the prohibition of the law is directed against the use of the identical banners, devices, or emblems actually used during the Philippine insurrection by those in armed rebellion against the United States. In the opinion of this court it is not necessary that the appellant should have acted with the criminal intent. In many crimes, made such by statutory enactment, the intention of the person who commits the crime is entirely immaterial. This is necessarily so. If it were not, the statute as a deterrent influence would be substantially worthless. It would be impossible of execution. In many cases the act complained of is itself that which produces the pernicious effect which the statute seeks to avoid. In those cases the pernicious effect is produced with precisely the same force and result whether the intention of the person performing the act is good or bad. The case at bar is a perfect illustration of this. The display of a flag or emblem used particularly within a recent period, by the enemies of the Government tends to incite resistance to governmental functions and insurrection against governmental authority just as effectively if made in the best of good faith as if made with the most corrupt intent. The display itself, without the intervention of any other factor, is the evil. It is quite different from that large class of crimes, made such by the common law or by statute, in which the injurious effect upon the public depends upon the corrupt intention of the person perpetrating the act. If A discharges a loaded gun and kills B, the interest which society has in the act depends, not upon B's death, upon the intention with which A consummated the act. If the gun were discharged intentionally, with the purpose of accomplishing the death of B, then society has been injured and its security violated; but if the gun was discharged accidentally on the part of A, then society, strictly speaking, has no concern in the matter, even though the death of B results. The reason for this is that A does not become a danger to society and institutions until he becomes a person with a corrupt mind. The mere discharge of the gun and the death of B do not of themselves make him so. With those two facts must go the corrupt intent to kill. In the case at bar, however, the evil to society and the Governmental does not depend upon the state of mind of the one who displays the banner, but upon the effect which that display has upon the public mind. In the one case the public is affected by the intention of the actor; in the other by the act itself. It is stated in volume 12 of Cyc., page 148, that The legislature, however, may forbid the doing of an act and make its commission a crime without regard to the intent of the doer, and if such an intention appears the courts must give it effect although the intention may have been innocent. Whether or not in a given case the statute is to be so construed is to be determined by the court by considering the subjectmatter of the prohibition as well as the language of the statute, and thus ascertaining the intention of the legislature. In the case of The People vs. Kibler (106 N. Y., 321) the defendant was charged with the sale of adulterated milk under a statute reading as follows: No person or persons shall sell or exchange or expose for sale or exchange any impure, unhealthy, adulterated, of unwholesome milk.

It was proved in that case that one Vandeburg purchased at the defendant's store 1 pint of milk which was shown to contain a very small percentage of water more than that permitted by the statute. There was no dispute about the facts, but the objection made by the defendant was that he was not allowed, upon the trial, to show an absence of criminal intent, or to go the jury upon the question whether it existed, but was condemned under a charge from the court which made his intent totally immaterial and his guilt consist in having sold the adulterated article whether he knew it or not and however carefully he may have sought to keep on hand and sell the genuine article. The opinion of the court in that case says: As the law stands, knowledge or intention forms no elements of the offense. The act alone, irrespective of its motive, constitutes the crime. xxx xxx xxx

It is notorious that the adulteration of food products has grown to proportions so enormous as to menace the health and safety of the people. Ingenuity keeps pace with greed, and the careless and heedless consumers are exposed to increasing perils. To redress such evils is a plain duty but a difficult task. Experience has taught the lesson that repressive measures which depend for their efficiency upon proof of the dealer's knowledge or of his intent to deceive and defraud are of title use and rarely accomplish their purpose. Such an emergency may justify legislation which throws upon the seller the entire responsibility of the purity and soundness of what he sells and compels him to know and certain. In the case of Gardner vs. The People (62 N. Y., 299) the question arose under a statute which provided that an inspector of elections of the city of New York should not be removed from office except "after notice in writing to the officer sought to be removed, which notice shall set forth clearly and distinctly the reasons for his removal," and further provided that any person who removed such an officer without such notice should be guilty of a misdemeanor. An officer named Sheridan was removed by Gardener, the defendant, without notice. Gardener was arrested and convicted of a misdemeanor under the statute. He appealed from the judgment of conviction and the opinion from which the following quotation is made was written upon the decision of that appeal. Chief Justice Church, writing the opinion of the court, says in relation to criminal intent: In short, the defense was an honest misconstruction of the law under legal device. The court ruled out the evidence offered, and held that intentionally doing the act prohibited constituted the offense. It is quite clear that the facts offered to be shown, if true, would relieve the defendant from the imputation of a corrupt intent, and, indeed, from any intent to violate the statute. The defendants made a mistake of law. Such mistakes do not excuse the commission of prohibited acts. "The rule on the subject appears to be, that in acts mala in se, intent governs but in those mala prohibit a, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated? xxx xxx xxx

The authorities seem to establish that sustain and indictment for doing a prohibited act, it is sufficient to prove that the act was knowingly and intentionally done. xxx xxx xxx

In this case, if the defendants could have shown that they believed that in fact notice had been given to the inspector, although it had not, they would not have been guilty of the

offense, because the intention to do the act would have been wanting. Their plea is: True, we intended to remove the inspector without notice, but we thought the law permitted it. This was a mistake of law, and is not strictly a defense. xxx xxx xxx

If the offense is merely technical, the punishment can be made correspondingly nominal; while a rule requiring proof of a criminal intent to violate the statute, independent of an intent to do the act which the statute declares shall constitute the offense, would, in many cases, prevent the restraining influence which the statute was designed to secure. In the case of Fiedler vs. Darrin (50 N.Y., 437) the court says: But when an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial. In the case of The Commonwealth vs. Murphy (165 Mass., 66) the court says: In general, it may be said that there must be malus animus, or a criminal intent. But there is a large class of cases in which, on grounds of public policy, certain acts are made punishable without proof that the defendant understands the facts that give character to his act. In such cases it is deemed best to require everybody at his peril to ascertain whether his act comes within the legislative prohibition. xxx xxx xxx

Considering the nature of the offense, the purpose to be accomplished, the practical methods available for the enforcement of the law, and such other matters as throw light upon the meaning of the language, the question in interpreting a criminal statute is whether the intention of the legislature was to make knowledge of the facts an essential element of the offense, or to put upon everyone the burden of finding out whether his contemplated act is prohibited, and of refraining from it if it is. In the case of Halsted vs. The State (41 N. J. L., 552; 32 Am. Rep., 247), the question of a criminal intent arose under a statute, under which the defendant was convicted of a crime, providing that if any township committee or other body shall disburse or vote for the disbursement of public moneys in excess of appropriations made for the purpose, the persons constituting such board shall be guilty of a crime. The defendant was one who violated this law by voting to incur obligations in excess of the appropriation. He was convicted and appealed and the opinion from which the quotation is taken was written upon a decision of that appeal. That court says: When the State had closed, the defense offered to show that the defendant, in aiding in the passage and effectuation of the resolution which I have pronounced to be illegal, did so under the advice of counsel and in good faith, and from pure and honest motives, and that he therein exercise due care and caution. xxx xxx xxx

As there is an undoubted competency in the lawmaker to declare an act criminal, irrespective of the knowledge or motive of the doer of such act, there can be of necessity, no judicial authority having the power to require, in the enforcement of the law, such knowledge or

motive to be shown. In such instances the entire function of the court is to find out the intention of the legislature, and to enforce the law in absolute conformity to such intention. And in looking over the decided cases on the subject it will be found that in the considered adjudications this inquiry has been the judicial guide. In the case of Rex vs. Ogden (6 C. & P., 631; 25 E. C. L., 611), the prisoner was indicted for unlawfully transposing from one piece of wrought plate to another the lion-poisson contrary to the statutes. It was conceded that the act was done without any fraudulent intention. The court said: There are no words in the act of Parliament referring to any fraudulent intention. The words of it are, 'Shall transpose or remove, or cause of procure to be transposed or removed, from one piece of wrought plate to another. In the case of The State vs. McBrayer (98 N. C., 623) the court stated: It is a mistaken notion that positive, willful intent to violate the criminal law is an essential ingredient in every criminal offense, and that where is an absence of such intent there is no offense; this is especially true as to statutory offenses. When the statute plainly forbids an act to be done, and it is done by some person, the law implies conclusively the guilty intent, although the offender was honestly mistaken as to the meaning of the law he violates. When the language is plain and positive, and the offense is not made to depend upon the positive, willful intent and purpose, nothing is left to interpretation. In the case of the Commonwealth vs. Weiss (139 Pa. St., 247), the question arose on an appeal by the defendant from a judgment requiring him to pay a penalty for a violation of the statute of the State which provided that any person would be liable to pay a penalty "who shall manufacture, sell, or offer or expose for sale, or have in his possession with intent to sell," oleomargarine, etc. At the trial the defendant requested the court to instruct the injury that if they believed, from the evidence, that the defendant did not knowingly furnish or authorize to be furnished, or knew of there furnished, to any of his customers any oleomargarine, but, as far as he knew, furnished genuine butter, then the verdict must be for the defendant. The court refused to make the charge as requested and that is the only point upon which the defendant appealed. The court says: The prohibition is absolute and general; it could not be expressed in terms more explicit and comprehensive. The statutory definition of the offense embraces no word implying that the forbidden act shall be done knowingly or willfully, and if it did, the designed purpose of the act would be practically defeated. The intention of the legislature is plain, that persons engaged in the traffic so engage in it at their peril and that they can not set up their ignorance of the nature and qualities of the commodities they sell, as a defense. The following authorities are to the same effect: State vs. Gould (40 Ia., 374); Commonwealth vs. Farren (9 Allen, 489); Commonwealth vs. Nichols (10 Allen, 199); Commonwealth vs. Boyton (2 Allen, 160); Wharton's Criminal Law, section 2442; Commonwealth vs. Sellers (130 Pa., 32); 3 Greenleaf on Evidence, section 21; Farrell vs. The State (32 Ohio State, 456); Beekman vs. Anthony (56 Miss., 446); The People vs. Roby (52 Mich., 577). It is clear from the authorities cited that in the act under consideration the legislature did not intend that a criminal intent should be a necessary element of the crime. The statutory definition of the offense embraces no word implying that the prohibited act shall be done knowingly or willfully. The wording is plain. The Act means what it says. Nothing is left to the interpretation.

Care must be exercised in distiguishing the differences between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. The accused did not consciously intend to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and the act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself intent and all. The wording of the law is such that the intent and the act are inseparable. The act is the crime. The accused intended to put the device in his window. Nothing more is required to commit the crime. We do not believe that the second proposition of the accused, namely, that the law is applicable only to the identical banners, etc., actually used in the late insurrection, and not to duplicates of those banners, can be sustained. It is impossible that the Commission should have intended to prohibit the display of the flag or flags actually used in the insurrection, and, at the same time, permit exact duplicates thereof (saving, perhaps, size) to be displayed without hindrance. In the case before us, to say that the display of a certain banner is a crime and that the display of its exact duplicate is not is to say nonsense. The rules governing the interpretation of statutes are rules of construction not destruction. To give the interpretation contended for by the appellant would, as to this particular provision, nullify the statute altogether. The words "used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate or identity those in armed rebellion against the United States" mean not only the identical flags actually used in the insurrection, but any flag which is of that type. This description refers not to a particular flag, but to a type of flag. That phrase was used because there was and is no other way of describing that type of flag. While different words might be employed, according to the taste of the draftsman, the method of description would have to be the same. There is no concrete word known by which that flag could be aptly or properly described. There was no opportunity, within the scope of a legislative enactment, to describe the physical details. It had no characteristics whatever, apart from its use in the insurrection, by which it could, in such enactment, be identified. The great and the only characteristic which it had upon the which the Commission could seize as a means of description and identification was the fact that it was used in the insurrection. There was, therefore, absolutely no way in which the Commission could, in the Act, describe the flag except by reciting where and how it was used. It must not be forgotten that the Commission, by the words and phrases used, was not attempting to describe a particular flag, but a type of flag. They were not describing a flag used upon a particular field or in a certain battle, but a type of flag used by an army a flag under which many persons rallied and which stirred their sentiments and feelings wherever seen or in whatever form it appeared. It is a mere incident of description that the flag was used upon a particular field or in a particular battle. They were describing the flag not a flag. It has a quality and significance and an entity apart from any place where or form in which it was used. Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in more than one sense, and the literal interpretation of a statute may lead to an absurdity or evidently fail to give the real intent of the legislature. When this is the case, resort is had to the principle that the spirit of a law controls the letter, so that a thing which is within the intention of a statute is as much within the statute as if it were within the letter, and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless it be within the intention of the makers, and the statute should be construed as to advance the remedy and suppress the mischief contemplated by the framers. (U. S. vs. Kirby, 7 Wall., 487; State Bolden, 107 La., 116, 118; U.S. vs.Buchanan, 9 Fed. Rep., 689; Green vs. Kemp, 13 Mass., 515; Lake Shore R. R. Co. vs. Roach, 80 N. Y., 339; Delafield vs. Brady, 108 N. Y., 524 Doyle vs. Doyle, 50 Ohio State, 330.) The intention of the legislature and the object aimed at, being the fundamental inquiry in judicial construction, are to control the literal interpretation of particular language in a statute,

and language capable of more than one meaning is to be taken in that sense which will harmonize with such intention and object, and effect the purpose of the enactment. (26 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law., 602.) Literally hundreds of cases might be cited to sustain this proposition. The preamble is no part of the statute, but as setting out the object and intention of the legislature, it is considered in the construction of an act. Therefore, whenever there is ambiguity, or wherever the words of the act have more than one meaning, and there is no doubt as to the subject-matter to which they are to be applied, the preamble may be used." (U. S. vs. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 91 U. S., 72; Platt vs. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 99 U. S., 48; Myer vs. Western Car Co., 102 U. S., 1; Holy Trinity Church vs. U. S., 143 U. S., 457; Coosaw Mining Co. vs. South Carolina, 144 U. S., 550; Cohn vs. Barrett, 5 Cal., 195; Barnes vs. Jones, 51 Cal., 303; Field vs. Gooding, 106 Mass., 310; People vs. Molineaux, 40 N. Y., 113; Smith vs. The People, 47 N. Y., 330; The People vs. Davenport, 91 N.Y., 547; The People vs. O'Brien, 111 N.Y., 1) The statute, then, being penal, must be construed with such strictness as to carefully safeguard the rights of the defendant and at the same time preserve the obvious intention of the legislature. If the language be plain, it will be construed as it reads, and the words of the statute given their full meaning; if ambiguous, the court will lean more strongly in favor of the defendant than it would if the statute were remedial. In both cases it will endeavor to effect substantial justice." (Bolles vs. Outing Co., 175 U. S., 262, 265; U. S. vs.Wiltberger, 5 Wheat., 76, 95; U. S. vs. Reese, 92 U. S., 214) It is said that notwithstanding this rule (the penal statutes must be construde strictly) the intention of the lawmakers must govern in the construction of penal as well as other statutes. This is true, but this is not a new, independent rule which subverts the old. It is a modification of the known maxim and amounts to this -- that though penal statutes are to be construed strictly, they are not be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious purpose of the legislature. (U. S. vs. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat., 76; Taylor vs. Goodwin, L. R. 4, Q. B. Civ., 228.) In the latter case it was held that under a statute which imposed a penalty for "furiously driving any sort of carriage" a person could be convicted for immoderately driving a bicycle. It is presumed that the legislature intends to impart to its enactments such a meaning as will render then operative and effective, and to prevent persons from eluding or defeating them. Accordingly, in case of any doubt or obscurity, the construction will be such as to carry out these objects. (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 106.) In The People vs. Supervisors (43 N. Y., 130) the court said: The occasion of the enactment of a law always be referred to in interpreting and giving effect to it. The court should place itself in the situation of the legislature and ascertain the necessity and probable object of the statute, and then give such construction to the language used as to carry the intention of the legislature into effect so far as it can be ascertained from the terms of the statute itself. (U. S. vs. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 91 U. S., 72, 79.) We do not believe that in construing the statute in question there is necessity requiring that clauses should be taken from the position given them and placed in other portions of the statute in order to give the whole Act a reasonable meaning. Leaving all of the clauses located as they now are in the

statute, a reasonable interpretation, based upon the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used, requires that the Act should be held applicable to the case at bar. The judgment of the court below and the sentence imposed thereunder are hereby affirmed. So ordered. Arellano, C. J., Torres, and Carson, JJ., concur. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 112170 April 10, 1996 CESARIO URSUA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:p This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the conviction of petitioner by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City for violation of Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142, as amended by R.A. No. 6085, otherwise known as "An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases". 1 Petitioner Cesario Ursua was a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer assigned in Kidapawan, Cotabato. On 9 May 1989 the Provincial Governor of Cotabato requested the Office of the Ombudsman in Manila to conduct an investigation on a complaint for bribery, dishonesty, abuse of authority and giving of unwarranted benefits by petitioner and other officials of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. The complaint was initiated by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cotabato through a resolution advising the Governor to report the involvement of petitioner and others in the illegal cutting of mahogany trees and hauling of illegally-cut logs in the area. 2 On 1 August 1989 Atty. Francis Palmones, counsel for petitioner, wrote the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City requesting that he be furnished copy of the complaint against petitioner. Atty. Palmones then asked his client Ursua to take his letter-request to the Office of the Ombudsman because his law firm's messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend to some personal matters. Before proceeding to the Office of the Ombudsman petitioner talked to Oscar Perez and told him that he was reluctant to personally ask for the document since he was one of the respondents before the Ombudsman. However, Perez advised him not to worry as he could just sign his (Perez) name if ever he would be required to acknowledge receipt of the complaint. 3 When petitioner arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City he was instructed by the security officer to register in the visitors' logbook. Instead of writing down his name petitioner wrote the name "Oscar Perez" after which he was told to proceed to the Administrative Division for the copy of the complaint he needed. He handed the letter of Atty. Palmones to the Chief of the

Administrative Division, Ms. Loida Kahulugan, who then gave him a copy of the complaint, receipt of which he acknowledged by writing the name "Oscar Perez." 4 Before petitioner could leave the premises he was greeted by an acquaintance, Josefa Amparo, who also worked in the same office. They conversed for a while then he left. When Loida learned that the person who introduced himself as "Oscar Perez" was actually petitioner Cesario Ursua, a customer of Josefa Amparo in her gasoline station, Loida reported the matter to the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be accordingly charged. On 18 December 1990, after the prosecution had completed the presentation of its evidence, petitioner without leave of court filed a demurrer to evidence alleging that the failure of the prosecution to prove that his supposed alias was different from his registered name in the local civil registry was fatal to its cause. Petitioner argued that no document from the local civil registry was presented to show the registered name of accused which according to him was a condition sine qua non for the validity of his conviction. The trial court rejected his contentions and found him guilty of violating Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085. He was sentenced to suffer a prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccionalminimum as minimum, to four (4) years of prision correccional medium as maximum, with all the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay a fine of P4,000.00 plus costs. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 31 May 1993 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner but modified the penalty by imposing an indeterminate term of one (1) year as minimum to three (3) years as maximum and a fine of P5,000.00. Petitioner now comes to us for review of his conviction as he reasserts his innocence. He contends that he has not violated C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 as he never used any alias name; neither is "Oscar Perez" his alias. An alias, according to him, is a term which connotes the habitual use of another name by which a person is also known. He claims that he has never been known as "Oscar Perez" and that he only used such name on one occasion and it was with the express consent of Oscar Perez himself. It is his position that an essential requirement for a conviction under C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 has not been complied with when the prosecution failed to prove that his supposed alias was different from his registered name in the Registry of Births. He further argues that the Court of Appeals erred in not considering the defense theory that he was charged under the wrong law. 5 Time and again we have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. 6 The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers. 7 For a clear understanding of the purpose of C.A. No. 142 as amended, which was allegedly violated by petitioner, and the surrounding circumstances under which the law was enacted, the pertinent provisions thereof, its amendments and related statutes are herein cited. C.A. No. 142, which was approved on 7 November 1936, and before its amendment by R.A. No. 6085, is entitled An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases. It provides as follows:

Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym for literary purposes, no person shall use any name different from the one with which he was christened or by which he has been known since his childhood, or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames. Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias or aliases shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name. Separate proceedings shall be had for each alias, and each new petition shall set forth the original name and the alias oraliases for the use of which judicial authority has been, obtained, specifying the proceedings and the date on which such authority was granted. Judicial authorities for the use of aliases shall be recorded in the proper civil register . . . . The above law was subsequently amended by R.A. No. 6085, approved on 4 August 1969. As amended, C.A. No. 142 now reads: Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name different from the one with which he was registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry or with which he was baptized for the first time, or in case of all alien, with which he was registered in the bureau of immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court: Provided, That persons whose births have not been registered in any local civil registry and who have not been baptized, have one year from the approval of this act within which to register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames. Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name and no person shall be allowed to secure such judicial authority for more than one alias. The petition for an alias shall set forth the person's baptismal and family name and the name recorded in the civil registry, if different, his immigrant's name, if an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such names other than his original or real name, specifying the reason or reasons for the desired alias. The judicial authority for the use ofalias, the Christian name and the alien immigrant's name shall be recorded in the proper local civil registry, and no person shall use any name or names other than his original or real name unless the same is or are duly recorded in the proper local civil registry. The objective and purpose of C.A. No. 142 have their origin and basis in Act No. 3883, An Act to Regulate the Use in Business Transactions of Names other than True Names, Prescribing the Duties of the Director of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry in its Enforcement , Providing Penalties for Violations thereof, and for other purposes, which was approved on 14 November 1931 and amended by Act No. 4147, approved on 28 November 1934. 8The pertinent provisions of Act No. 3883 as amended follow Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person to use or sign, on any written or printed receipt including receipt for tax or business or any written or printed contract not verified by a notary public or on any written or printed evidence of any agreement or business transactions, any name used in connection with his business other than his

true name, or keep conspicuously exhibited in plain view in or at the place where his business is conducted, if he is engaged in a business, any sign announcing a firm name or business name or style without first registering such other name, or such firm name, or business name or style in the Bureau of Commerce together with his true name and that of any other person having a joint or common interest with him in such contract, agreement, business transaction, or business . . . . For a bit of history, the enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was made primarily to curb the common practice among the Chinese of adopting scores of different names and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such a practice almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious names which for obvious reasons could not be successfully maintained against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a thousand and one names. C.A. No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias name, unless such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil register. 9 In Yu Kheng Chiau v. Republic 10 the Court had occasion to explain the meaning, concept and ill effects of the use of an alias within the purview of C.A. No. 142 when we ruled There can hardly be any doubt that petitioner's use of alias "Kheng Chiau Young" in addition to his real name "Yu Cheng Chiau" would add to more confusion. That he is known in his business, as manager of the Robert Reid, Inc., by the former name, is not sufficient reason to allow him its use. After all, petitioner admitted that he is known to his associates by both names. In fact, the Anselmo Trinidad, Inc., of which he is a customer, knows him by his real name. Neither would the fact that he had encountered certain difficulties in his transactions with government offices which required him to explain why he bore two names, justify the grant of his petition, for petitioner could easily avoid said difficulties by simply using and sticking only to his real name "Yu Kheng Chiau." The fact that petitioner intends to reside permanently in the Philippines, as shown by his having filed a petition for naturalization in Branch V of the above-mentioned court, argues the more against the grant of his petition, because if naturalized as a Filipino citizen, there would then be no necessity for his further using said alias, as it would be contrary to the usual Filipino way and practice of using only one name in ordinary as well as business transactions. And, as the lower court correctly observed, if he believes (after he is naturalized) that it would be better for him to write his name following the Occidental method, "he can easily file a petition for change of name, so that in lieu of the name "Yu Kheng Chian," he can, abandoning the same, ask for authority to adopt the name Kheng Chiau Young." All things considered, we are of the opinion and so hold, that petitioner has not shown satisfactory proper and reasonable grounds under the aforequoted provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 142 and the Rules of Court, to warrant the grant of his petition for the use of an alias name. Clearly therefore an alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A man's name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are known as aliases. 11 Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this

name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. This is so in the case at bench. It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman as "Oscar Perez," which was the name of the messenger of his lawyer who should have brought the letter to that office in the first place instead of petitioner. He did so while merely serving the request of his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which petitioner was a respondent. There is no question then that "Oscar Perez" is not an alias name of petitioner. There is no evidence showing that he had used or was intending to use that name as his second name in addition to his real name. The use of the name "Oscar Perez" was made by petitioner in an isolated transaction where he was not even legally required to expose his real identity. For, even if he had identified himself properly at the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able to get a copy of the complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the Ombudsman could not refuse him because the complaint was part of public records hence open to inspection and examination by anyone under the proper circumstances. While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in business transactions which the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent are not present here as the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences. 12 Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused. 13 The reason for this principle is the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited. 14 Indeed, our mind cannot rest easy on the proposition that petitioner should be convicted on a law that does not clearly penalize the act done by him. WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and petitioner CESARIO URSUA is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. SO ORDERED. Padilla, Vitug, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.