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Territoriality Nicholas vs. Romulo Facts: 1. Respondent Lance Corporal (L/CPL) Daniel Smith is a member of the US Armed Froces.

He was charged with the crime of rape committed against a Filipina, petitioner herein, sometime in November 1, 2005. 2. On December 4, 2006, the RTC of Makati, following the end of the trial, rendered its Decision, finding defendant Smith guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua together with the accessory penalties provided for under Article 41 of RPC. 3. Pending agreement on facilities where he will be detained, he was temporarily committed to the Makati City Jail. He was also further sentenced to indemnify complainant Suzette Nicolas in the amount of P50,000 as compensatory damages plus P50,000 as moral damages. 4. On December 29, 2006, however, defendant Smith was taken out of the Makati City jail by a contingent of the Philippine law enforcement agents and brought to a facility for detention under the control of the US government, provided for under new agreements between the Philippines and the US, referred to as the Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December 19, 2006. Based on that agreement, he is to be returned to US military custody at the US Embassy in Manila. Issue: 1. Whether the Romulo-Kenney Agreement regarding the detention or confinement of Lance Corporal Daniel Smith in the US Embassy is unconstitutional? Ruling: 1. Visiting Forces Agreement is not unconstitutional and is binding upon the Philippines in accordance with International Law. VFA provides for the provisions on custody and detention. Article V paragraph 6 provides that the custody of any US personnel over whom the Philippiens is to exercise jurisdiction shall immediately resides with US military authorities, if they so request, from the commission of the offense until the completion of all proceedings. This provision does not violate the constitution on the exclusive power of the Court to adopt rules of procedures and it also do not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. The equal protection clause is not violated, because there is a substantial basis for a different treatment of a member of a foreign military armed forces allowed to enter our territory and all other accused. The rule in international law is that a foreign armed forces allowed to enter ones territory is immune from local jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon. The principle is that the receiving State can exercise jurisdiction over the forces of the Sending State only to the extent agreed upon by the parties.

As a result, the situation involved is not one in which the power of this Court to adopt rules of procedure is curtailed or violated, but rather one in which, as is normally encountered around the world, the laws (including rules of procedure) of one State do not extend or apply except to the extent agreed uponto subjects of another State due to the recognition of extraterritorial immunity given to such bodies as visiting foreign armed forces. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits such agreements recognizing immunity from jurisdiction or some aspects of jurisdiction (such as custody), in relation to long-recognized subjects of such immunity like Heads of State, diplomats and members of the armed forces contingents of a foreign State allowed to enter another States territory. On the contrary, the Constitution states that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. 2. However, the Court finds that there is a different treatment when it comes to detention as against custody. The moment the accused has to be detained (e.g. after conviction), the rule that govern is Article V Section 10 which provides that the confinement or detention shall be carried out in the facilities agreed upon by the Philippines and the US. But the detention shall be by the Philippine Authorities. Therefore, the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006, which are agreements on the detention of the accused in the US Embassy, are not in accord with the VFA itself because such detention is not by Philippine Authorities. People vs. Garcia Facts: 1. That on or about the 22nd day of May 1998, in Quezon City, Philippines, appellant Renato Garcia y Romano, driving an Isuzu Jeepney hit the deceased Sanily Billon on the let side of the body when the latter was crossing from the street from the center island. 2. Sanily fell and was thrown to the ground a member away from the vehicle. The jeepney stopped, but as Bentley was running towards his sister, the vehicle suddenly accelerated with its front tire running over Sanilys stomach. Bentley and appellant brought the deceased to the Sta. Lucia Hospital which was later transferred to the Quezon City General Hospital due to lack of medical facilities. 3. After operation, she died four days later. Medico-legal of the SPD testified and found that the cause of the death was the lacerations in SAnilys liver and spleen which was caused by a blunt/strong force on the victims body resulting to her death due to internal bleeding. 4. Appellant admitted having ran over the victim, but claimed that it was an accident. 5. On May 2, 2002, the trial court rendered judgment and finds the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered him to indemnify the heirs of Sanily Billon the sum of P123, 500 as actual damages including attorneys

fees P50,000 as civil indemnity for the death of Sanily and P500,000 as moral damages. Issue: 1. Whether the trial court erred in holding the appellant guilty of murder instead of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide? Ruling: 1. No. The trial court erred in convicting appellant of the crime of murder qualified by evident premediation. The elements of evident premediation are: (1) a previous decision by the appellant to commit the crime; (2) an overt act/acts manifestly indicating that the appellant clung to his determination; and (3) a lapse of time between the decision to commit the crime and its actual execution sufficient to allow appellant to reflect upon the consequences of his acts. IN this case, the court found no sufficient time elapsed for appellant to decide to commit the crime and reflect on its consequences. Moreover, there was no showing that the appellant performed other overt acts to show that he was determined to commit murder. The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent, during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. 2. Appellant could have reacted on instinct and relied on sheer impulse to respond to the situation at hand. IT is probable that the vehicle moved forward because appellant failed to control its momentum since jeepney had no handbrake. Furthermore, appellants act of bringing the victim to the hospital despite numerous opportunities to flee from the scene is more compatible with a state of mind devoid of criminal intent. Therefore, the appellant had not intention to kill the victim. AS such he cannot be held liable for an intentional felony. All reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate negligence, and not criminal intent. Decision is therefore modified to Reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. In intention crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. Article 365 states that reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing such act. Compared to intentional felonies, such as homicide or murder, what takes the place of the element of malice or intention to commit a wrong or evil is the failure of the offender to take precautions due to lack of skill taking into account his employment, or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time, and place. Appellant showed an inexcusable lack of precaution when he disregarded a traffic sign cautioning motorists to slow down10 and drove his vehicle in full

speed despite being aware that he was traversing a school zone and pedestrians were crossing the street. He should have observed due diligence of a reasonably prudent man by slackening his speed and proceeding cautiously while passing the area. Manuel vs. People Facts: 1. July 28, 1975, Eduardo married Rubylus Gaa: a. Sometime in 1975, Rubylus was charged with Estafa and thereafter was imprisoned. b. Eduardo only visited 3 times and never saw her again (for 21 years). 2. In January 1996, Eduardo met Tina Gandalera, 21 years old and a computer secretarial student in Dagupan and courted her until he has successfully made sexual intercourse with her in a motel. 3. After having assured her that he is single and having introduced her to his parents who assures her that Eduardo is single, they were married on April 22, 1996 in Baguio City. 4. The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. Through their joint efforts, they were able to build their home. However, starting 1999, Manuel their relationship turns sour and Manuel made himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Sometime in 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return. Worse, he stopped giving financial support. 5. Tina became curious and made inquiries from the NSO where she discovered that Eduardo contracted a previous marriage. Embarrassed, she sue Eduardo for bigamy. 6. Eduardo testified that he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid and that he was not aware that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage. He also insisted that he believed that his first marriage was no longer valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years. 7. Trial Court rendered a decision finding Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy. 8. CA affirmed the decision of the trial court, hence, the petition. Issue: 1. Whether accused willfully and with deceit contracted a second marriage and whether his defense of not being aware for a need of judicial declaration excuses him? Ruling: 1. The accused is guilty. The law is clear that before one can contract a second marriage validly and not held guilty for bigamy, there must first be a judicial declaration of nullity or judicial declaration of presumptive death in a proper proceedings. Prosecution was able t proved that the petitioner has a subsisting marriage when he contracted the second marriage. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; Such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is

not an excused because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. People vs Mariacos Facts: 1. ON October 26, 2005, in the evening, the San Gabriel Police Station conducted checkpoint to intercept a suspected transportation of marijuana. When the checkpoint did not yield any suspect, the Chief of Police instructed PO2 Pallayoc to proceed to Barangay Balbalayang to conduct surveillance operation. 2. At dawn on October 27, 2005, PO2 Pallayoc was tip by a secret agent who informed him that a baggage of marijuana has been loaded on a passenger jeepney that was about to leave for the poblacion. The agent mentioned 3 bags and one blue plastic bag. Further, the agent described a backpack bag with an O.K. marking. 3. PO2 Pallayoc boarded the said jeepney and found bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspapers. He then asked the other passengers about the owner of the bag, but no one knew. 4. When the jeepney reached poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted together with other passengers. Unfortunately, he did not noticed who took the black backpack from atop the jeepney. He only realized a few moments later that the said bags were already being carried away by two (2) women. He caught up with the women and introduced himself as a policeman. He told them that they were under arrest, but one of the women got away. 5. Among the testimonies of the accused is that she did not know what were contained in the bag as they were only told by a certain Lao-Ang to carry the bags. She averred that the packages she was carrying did not belong to her but to a neighbor who had asked her to carry the same for him. Issue: 1. Whether the accused testimony that she did not know of the contents of the bag excuses her for the crime? Ruling: 1. The accused is guilty. When an accused is charged with illegal possession or transportation of prohibited drugs, the ownership thereof is immaterial. Consequently, proof of ownership of the confiscated marijuana is not necessary. 2. Apellants alleged lack of knowledge does not constitute a valid defense. Lack of criminal intent and good faith are not exempting circumstances where the crime charged is malum prohibitum, as in the this case. Mere possession and/or delivery of a prohibited drug, without legal authority, is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act. 3. Anti-narcotics laws, like anti-gambling laws, are regulatory statutes. They are rules of convenience designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of the society, and their violation gives rise to crimes mala prohibita. Laws defining crimes mala prohibita condemn behavior directed not against particular individuals but against public order.

Jurisprudence defines "transport" as "to carry or convey from one place to another."30 There is no definitive moment when an accused "transports" a prohibited drug. When the circumstances establish the purpose of an accused to transport and the fact of transportation itself, there should be no question as to the perpetration of the criminal act.31 The fact that there is actual conveyance suffices to support a finding that the act of transporting was committed and it is immaterial whether or not the place of destination is reached.32 Moreover, appellants possession of the packages containing illegal drugs gave rise to the disputable presumption33 that she is the owner of the packages and their contents.34 Appellant failed to rebut this presumption. Her uncorroborated claim of lack of knowledge that she had prohibited drug in her possession is insufficient. Appellants narration of facts deserves little credence. If it is true that Bennie Lao-ang merely asked her and her companion to carry some baggages, it is but logical to first ask what the packages contained and where these would be taken. Likewise, if, as appellant said, Lao-ang ran away after they disembarked from the jeepney, appellant and her companion should have ran after him to give him the bags he had left with them, and not to continue on their journey without knowing where they were taking the bags. People vs. Delim Facts: 1. Marlon, Leon, and Ronald Delim were convicted for murder of Modesto Delim, resident of Bila, Sison, Pangasinan. Modesto is the adopted child of Marlons Dad. Marlon, Manuel, & Robert are brothers Leon and Ronald are their nephews. Around 6:30 PM, January 23, 1999, Modesto and family were preparing to eat dinner when Marlon Robert and Ronald arrived. Marlon poked his gun at Modesto while Robert and Ronald simultaneously grabbed and hog-tied the victim. A piece of cloth was placed in the mount of Modesto. Marlon, Robert, and Ronald herded Modesto out of the house on their way towards the direction of Paldit. Rita and Randy were warned by the intruders not to leave the house. Leon and Manuel guarded Rita and Randy until 7 am and told them to stay put. 2. As soon as the two left, Randy rushed to the house of his uncle to inform the latter of the incident the night before and sought his help for the retrieval of Modesto. Randy opted to first look for his father but to no avail. 3. IN the afternoon of January 27, 1999, Randy, in the company of his relatives found Modestos body already in state of decomposition. 4. The accused were then charged and the trial court rendered judgment finding them guilty of Aggravated Murder. 5. Accused assailed the decision, hence the petition. Issue: 1. Whether the crime charged in the Information is murder or kidnapping? Ruling:

1. The crime is murder. The facts recited in the Information describing the crime are controlling. Where the specific intent of the malefactor is determinative of the crime charged such specific intent must be alleged in the information and proved by the prosecution. For it to be kidnapping, there must be indubitable proof that the actual specific intent of the malefactor is to deprive the offended party of his liberty and not where such restraint of his freedom is merely an incident in the commission of another offense primarily intended by the malefactor. As held in US vs. ANcheta, it has been held that the detention and/or forcible taking away of the victims by the accused, even for an appreciable period of time but for the primary and ultimate purpose of killing them, holds the offenders liable for taking their lives or such other offenses they committed in relation thereto, but the incidental deprivation of the victims liberty does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention. If the primary and ultimate purpose of the accused is to kill the victim, the incidental deprivation of the victims liberty does not constitute the felony of kidnapping but is merely a preparatory act to the killing, and hence is merged into, or absorbed by, the killing of the victim. The crime committed would either be homicide or murder.
What is primordial then is the specific intent of the malefactors as disclosed in the information or criminal complaint that is determinative of what crime the accused is charged with that of murder or kidnapping. Philippine and American penal laws have a common thread on the concept of specific intent as an essential element of specific intent crimes. Specific intent is used to describe a state of mind which exists where circumstances indicate that an offender actively desired certain criminal consequences or objectively desired a specific result to follow his act or failure to act. 17 Specific intent involves a state of the mind. It is the particular purpose or specific intention in doing the prohibited act. Specific intent must be alleged in the Information and proved by the state in a prosecution for a crime requiring specific intent.18 Kidnapping and murder are specific intent crimes. Specific intent may be proved by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. It may be inferred from the circumstances of the actions of the accused as established by the evidence on record. 19 Specific intent is not synonymous with motive. Motive generally is referred to as the reason which prompts the accused to engage in a particular criminal activity. Motive is not an essential element of a crime and hence the prosecution need not prove the same. As a general rule, proof of motive for the commission of the offense charged does not show guilt and absence of proof of such motive does not establish the innocence of accused for the crime charged such as murder. 20 The history of crimes shows that murders are generally committed from motives comparatively trivial. 21 Crime is rarely rational. In murder, the specific intent is to kill the victim. In kidnapping, the specific intent is to deprive the victim of his/her liberty. If there is no motive for the crime, the accused cannot be convicted for kidnapping.22 In kidnapping for ransom, the motive is ransom. Where accused kills the victim to avenge the death of a loved one, the motive is revenge.

Intod vs CA Facts:

1. Sulpicio intend and three others went to the Salvador Mandaya and coerced the latter to accompany them in locating the bedroom of Palangpangan whom they intended to kill due to a land dispute. 2. After, having pinpointed, the culprits fired at the said room. It turn out, however, that Palangapangan was in another City and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired the shots. NO one was hit by the gun fire. 3. RTC convicted Intod of attempted murder. ON appeal, CA confirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, the petition. Issue: 1. Whether the accused is guilty of attempted murder or impossible crime? Ruling: 1. The accused is guilty of impossible crime. To hold the petitioner guilty of attempted murder is to render Article 4, paragraph 2 useless. Article 4, paragraph 2, clearly provides that a person is criminally liable for an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment. 2. The court distinguished legal impossibility from factual impossibility. Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed would not amount to a crime. Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the physical act; (3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime. The impossibility of killing a dead person falls in this category. On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. 16 One example is the man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty. 17 The case at bar belongs to this category. 3. Nevertheless, in our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase "inherent impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal impossibility. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Valenzuela vs. People Facts: While a security guard was manning his post at the open parking area of a supermarket, he saw the accused, Aristotel Valenzuela, hauling a push cart loaded with cases of detergent and unloaded them where his co-accused, Jovy Calderon, was waiting. Valenzuela then returned inside the supermarket, and later emerged with more cartons of detergent. Thereafter, Valenzuela hailed a taxi and started loading the cartons inside. As the taxi was about to leave, the security guard asked Valenzuela for the receipt of the merchandize. The accused reacted by fleeing on foot, but were subsequently apprehended at the scene. The trial court convicted

both Valenzuela and Calderon of the crime of consummated theft. Valenzuela appealed before the Court of Appeals, arguing that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft since he was not able to freely dispose of the articles stolen. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision, thus the Petition for Review was filed before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not the crime of theft has a frustrated stage? Ruling: No. Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present. In the crime of theft, the following elements should be present: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. The Court held that theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal property by one with intent to gain. Thus, it is immaterial that the offender is able or unable to freely dispose the property stolen since he has already committed all the acts of execution and the deprivation from the owner has already ensued from such acts. Therefore, theft cannot have a frustrated stage, and can only be attempted or consummated.