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SALIENT POINTS AND EN BANC DECISIONS1

ON POWERS AND STRUCTURE OF PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT
(Articles VI, VII, VIII of 1987 Constitution)

ARTICLE VI

The Legislative Departmenfsectt

SECTION 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which
shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to
the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.

Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation,

GR No. 180643, Mach 25, 2008 (En Banc)- Congress has legislative and oversight
powers.

Puno, Separate Opinion, Macalintal vs. Comelec- the power of oversight is intrinsic
to the grant of legislative power. It embraces all activities undertaken by Congress
to enhance its understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation
it has enacted.

Santiago vs. Comelec, GR No. 127325, March 19, 1997 (En Banc)- the provision on
the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is not self-
executory. R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms
and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.
Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by
"empowering" the COMELEC "to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act.

Lambino vs Comelec, GR No. 174153, October 25, 2006 (En Banc)- In California
where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution
just like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitative
test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change
is "so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the 'substantial entirety' of the
constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions." The court
examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree
of the change.

The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the
constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far
reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a
revision." Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper
subject of inquiry. Thus, "a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan"
includes "change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its

1
Prepared for the exclusive use of Barrister Law Review Center by Joan S. Largo, Professor, USC College of Law,
Cebu City
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Branches." A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes
changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of check
and balances."

An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable

provisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment is to improve specific
parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to
suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to be
dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan
contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the
document which have over-all implications for the entire document, to determine
how and to what extent they should be altered. Thus, for instance a switch from the
presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a revision because of its
over-all impact on the entire constitutional structure. So would a switch from a
bicameral system to a unicameral system be because of its effect on other important
provisions of the Constitution.

On the proposed amendment by initiative, that the proposed amendment must be

incorporated with, or attached to, the initiative petition signed by the people.

In view of the flaws in the Lambino petition, the Court did not revisit the Court’s
ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential
terms and conditions" to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. It
declaredthat it must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the constitutionality of a statute
if the case before the Court can be resolved on some other grounds. Such
avoidance is a logical consequence of the well-settled doctrine that courts will not
pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if the case can be resolved on some
other grounds.

SECTION 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who shall be elected
at large by the qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be provided by law.

SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the

Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read
and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years
immediately preceding the day of the election.

Art. IV, Section 2

In Re Aplication for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente Ching petitioner, BM

No. 914, October 1, 1999 (En Banc)- Under Section 1 of CA No. 625, legitimate
children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such
intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before
any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil
registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.
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Bengson vs. HRET, GR No. 142840, May 7, 2001 (En Banc)- Under the 1973
Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which were not
considered natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born before
January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority,
elected Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not considered
natural-born obviously because they were not Filipinos at birth and had to perform
an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers before the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not considered natural-born
because they also had to perform an act to perfect their Philippine citizenship. The
present Constitution, however, now considers those born of Filipino mothers before
the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the majority age as natural-born. After defining who are natural-born
citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed
natural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not
natural-born citizens.

Altarejos vs. Comelec, GR No. 163256, November 10, 2004 (En Banc)- The law is
clear that repatriation is effected "by taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of
Immigration." Hence, in addition to taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines, the registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in the proper civil
registry and the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting the repatriation
of a citizen. [But] The Court's ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections that
repatriation retroacts to the date of filing of one's application for repatriation subsists.

Valles vs. Comelec, GR No. 137000, August 9, 2000 (En Banc)- In order that
citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be express.
Petitioner's contention that the application of private respondent for an alien
certificate of registration, and her Australian passport, is bereft of merit. This issue
was put to rest in the case of Aznar vs. COMELEC and in the more recent case of
Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC. In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the
mere fact that respondent Osmena was a holder of a certificate stating that he is an
American did not mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that an application for an
alien certificate of registration was not tantamount to renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship. And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that the fact
that respondent Manzano was registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation and was holding an American passport on April 22,
1997, only a year before he filed a certificate of candidacy for vice-mayor of Makati,
were just assertions of his American nationality before the termination of his
American citizenship. Thus, the mere fact that one was a holder of an Australian
passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an
effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino
citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same
must be express. As held by this court in the aforecited case of Aznar, an application
for an alien certificate of registration does not amount to an express renunciation or
repudiation of one's citizenship. The application for an alien certificate of registration,
and the holding of an Australian passport, as in the case of Mercado vs. Manzano,
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were mere acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship before she effectively
renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual citizenship —
she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well.

Mercado vs. Manzano, GR No. 135083, May 26, 1999 (En Banc)- Dual citizenship is
different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise
when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle
of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a
person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently
considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our
Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to
possess dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in
foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born in the
Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers' country
such children are citizens of that country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws
of the latter's country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or
omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.

SECTION 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence,
unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their
election.

No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was elected.

SECTION 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through
a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

Mariano, Jr. vs Comelec, GR No. 118577, March 7, 1995 (En Banc)- In the case of
Tobias v. Abalos, G.R. No. 114783, December 8, 1994, this Court ruled that
reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as
in the charter of a new city. The Constitution (Section 5(1), Article VI) clearly
provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250)
members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not
preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a
general reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done by Congress in
enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district.
Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general
apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local
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government unit nationwide, would create an unequitable situation where a new city
or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an
indeterminate period of time. That intolerable situation will deprive the people of a
new city or province a particle of their sovereignty. Sovereignty cannot admit of any
kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number
of representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives
shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector.

Read RA 7941

Veterans Federation vs. Comelec, GR No. 136781, October 6, 2000 (En Banc)- To
determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the Constitution and
Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 mandate at least four inviolable parameters. These are:
First, the twenty percent allocation — the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House
of Representatives, including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold — only those parties garnering a minimum of two
percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a
seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit — each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes
it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying"
and two additional seats.

Fourth, proportional representation — the additional seats which a qualified party is

entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."

CIBAC vs. Comelec, GR No. 172103, April 13, 2007 (EN Banc)- The parties,
organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes
cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: provided, that those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes: provided, finally, that each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

The Court, in the leading case of Veterans, listed the four (4) inviolable parameters
to determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election mandated by the
Constitution and R.A. 7941.

In determining the number of additional seats for each party-list that has met the 2%
threshold, "proportional representation" is the touchstone to ascertain entitlement to
extra seats. The correct formula in ascertaining the entitlement to additional seats
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of the first party and other qualified party-list groups was clearly explicated in
Veterans.

Bantay Republic Act or BA- RA 7941 vs. Comelec, GR No. 177271, May 4, 2007
( En Banc)- Comelec has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of
the nominees of the party-list groups.

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact
and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or
each province, shall have at least one representative.

(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.

Tobias vs. Abalos, GR No. 114783, December 8, 1994 (En Banc)- reapportionment
of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a
new city. The Constitution (Section 5(1), Article VI) clearly provides that Congress
shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless
otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress
from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general
reapportionment law.

SECTION 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a

natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five
years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered
voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not
less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.

SECTION 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of
three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth
day of June next following their election.

No member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

SECTION 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and
the Members of the House of Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May.

SECTION 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a

special election may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the
Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the
unexpired term.

SECTION 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of

Representatives shall be determined by law. No increase in said compensation shall take
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effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the
House of Representatives approving such increase.

SECTION 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all

offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest
while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any
other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.

SECTION 12. All Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall,
upon assumption of office, make a full disclosure of their financial and business interests.
They shall notify the House concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may arise from
the filing of a proposed legislation of which they are authors.

SECTION 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any
other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any
office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term
for which he was elected.

Bitonio vs. COA, GR No. 147392, March 12, 2004 (En Banc)- Cabinet Secretaries,
Undersecretaries, and their Assistant Secretaries, are prohibited to hold other
government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions and to receive
compensation therefor, except in cases where the Constitution expressly provides.
The presence in the PEZA Board meetings is solely by virtue of his capacity as
representative of the Secretary of Labor. There was no separate or special
appointment for such position. Since the Secretary of Labor is prohibited from
receiving compensation for his additional office or employment, such prohibition
likewise applies to the petitioner who sat in the Board only in behalf of the Secretary
of Labor.

SECTION 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may

personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals,
or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be
interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by
the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any
government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He
shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary
benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.

SECTION 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of
July for its regular session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be
in session for such number of days as it may determine until thirty days before the opening
of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The
President may call a special session at any time.

SECTION 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House of
Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective Members.
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Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.

(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller
number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members
in such manner, and under such penalties, as such House may provide.

(3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for
disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or
expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.

Arroyo vs. De Venecia, GR No. 127255, August 14, 1007 (En Banc)- Cases, both
here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to
inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply
with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a
constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. In Osmeña v. Pendatun, it
was held: “At any rate, courts have declared that ‘the rules adopted by deliberative
bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them.’ And it has been said that ‘Parliamentary rules are merely
procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body.’ Consequently, ‘mere failure to
conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative
body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.’

Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 128055, April 18, 2001 (En Banc)- The order
of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of
Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension
contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is
imposed upon determination by the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the
case may be, upon an erring member.

(4) Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish
the same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the
yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be
entered in the Journal.

Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.

Arroyo vs. De Venecia, supra. - The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect
to matters that are required by the Constitution to be recorded therein.

(5) Neither House during the sessions of the Congress shall, without the consent of the
other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two
Houses shall be sitting.

SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be
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designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or
the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

Guerrero vs. Comelec, GR No. 137004, July 26, 2000 (En Banc)- The contention
that the jurisdiction of the HRET as defined under Article VI, Section 17 of the
Constitution is limited only to the qualifications prescribed under Article VI, Section 6
of the Constitution was rejected. Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution cannot be
circumscribed lexically. The word "qualifications" cannot be read as qualified by the
term "constitutional." Ubi lex non distinguit noc nos distinguire debemos. Basic is the
rule in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, the courts
should not distinguish. Moreover, the argument that HRET assumes jurisdiction
only if there is a valid proclamation of the winning candidate is likewise without merit.
In an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate
who has taken his oath of office and assumed his post as Congressman is raised,
that issue is best addressed to the HRET.

Barbers vs. Comelec, GR No. 165691, June 22, 2005 (En Banc)- The alleged
invalidity of Biazon's proclamation involves a dispute or contest relating to the
election returns of members of the Senate. Indisputably, the resolution of such
dispute falls within the sole jurisdiction of the SET.

Javier vs. Comelec, GR No. L-68379-81, September 22, 1986 (En Banc)- The
phrase "election, returns and qualifications" should be interpreted in its totality as
referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee's title. But if it is
necessary to specify, we can say that "election" referred to the conduct of the polls,
including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting
and counting of the votes; "returns" to the canvass of the returns and the
proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning the composition of the
board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns; and "qualifications"
to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed
winner, such as his delivery or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of
candidacy.

SECTION 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the

President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of
the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote,
except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within
thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a
majority vote of all the Members.

Matibag vs. Benipayo, GR No. 149036, April 2, 2002 (En Banc)- An ad interim
appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and
can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into
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office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments

does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim
appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. The ad
interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next adjournment,
signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President. The
Constitution imposes no condition on the effectivity of an ad interim appointment,
and thus an ad interim appointment takes effect immediately. The appointee can at
once assume office and exercise, as a de jure officer, all the powers pertaining to
the office.

SECTION 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments shall be
constituted within thirty days after the Senate and the House of Representatives shall have
been organized with the election of the President and the Speaker. The Commission on
Appointments shall meet only while the Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman
or a majority of all its Members, to discharge such powers and functions as are herein
conferred upon it.

SECTION 20. The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be preserved
and be open to the public in accordance with law, and such books shall be audited by the
Commission on Audit which shall publish annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and
expenses incurred for each Member.

SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.

In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Camilo Sabio,
GR No. 174340, October 17, 2006 (En Banc)- The 1987 Constitution recognizes the
power of investigation, not just of Congress, but also of "any of its committee." This
is significant because it constitutes a direct conferral of investigatory power upon the
committees and it means that the mechanisms which the Houses can take in order
to effectively perform its investigative function are also available to the committees.

SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the
consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House
shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their
departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the
Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled
appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters
related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the
President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.

Senate vs. Ermita, GR No. 169777, April 20, 2006 (En Banc)- Sections 21 and 22,
therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be
considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to
the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit
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information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to
conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of
Congress' oversight function.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are
implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as
imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department
heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances,
Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only
request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires
their appearance is "in aid of legislation" under Section 21, the appearance is
mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.
In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process
only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with
the intent discerned from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials
under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle
of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the
legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to
comply with its demands for information.
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to
exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt
by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be
exempted from this power — the President on whom executive power is vested,
hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It
is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due
respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-
standing custom.

By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this power
of inquiry. Unlike the Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial body; hence,
each member thereof is exempt on the basis not only of separation of powers but
also on the fiscal autonomy and the constitutional independence of the judiciary.

Gudani vs. Senga, GR No. 170165, August 15, 2006 (En Banc) - May the President
prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a legislative inquiry?
We hold that the President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her
power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who
defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, we also hold
that any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military
officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to
compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify
before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so
inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the
attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the
land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute. The refusal of the
President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is still subject
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to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature's

functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised
for Congress to interfere with the President's power as commander-in-chief, it is
similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congress's right to
conduct legislative inquiries.

Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,

supra.- Section 21 relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, its
aim is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while Section 22 pertains
to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain
information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function. Simply stated, while both
powers allow Congress or any of its committees to conduct inquiry, their objectives
are different. This distinction gives birth to another distinction with regard to the
use of compulsory process. Unlike in Section 21, Congress cannot compel the
appearance of executive officials under Section 22.

SECTION 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint
session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of
a state of war.

Gudani vs. Senga, supra.- Pursuant to the maintenance of civilian supremacy over
the military, the Constitution has allocated specific roles to the legislative and
executive branches of government in relation to military affairs. Military
appropriations, as with all other appropriations, are determined by Congress, as is
the power to declare the existence of a state of war. Congress is also empowered to
revoke a proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
The approval of the Commission on Appointments is also required before the
President can promote military officers from the rank of colonel or naval captain.
Otherwise, on the particulars of civilian dominance and administration over the
military, the Constitution is silent, except for the commander-in-chief clause which is
fertile in meaning and implication as to whatever inherent martial authority the
President may possess.

(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize
the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless
sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof.

David vs. Arroyo, GR No. 171396, May 3, 2006 (En Banc)- President Arroyo could
validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in the absence of
a Congressional enactment. But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the
taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest,
is a different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress. Generally, Congress
is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2),
Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body
cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave
emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and
 Page 13 of 38

exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow
Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions,
thus: (1)There must be a war or other emergency; (2) The delegation must be for a
limited period only; (3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as
the Congress may prescribe; and (4) The emergency powers must be exercised to
carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
Agan vs. PIATCO, GR No. 155001, May 5, 2003 (En Banc)- In the 1986
Constitutional Commission, the term "national emergency" was defined to include
threat from external aggression, calamities or national disasters, but not strikes
"unless it is of such proportion that would paralyze government service."

SECTION 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the
public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

Abakada Guro vs. Ermita, GR No. 168056, September 1, 2005 (En Banc) - it is not
the law — but the revenue bill — which is required by the Constitution to "originate
exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this,
because a bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the
Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. . . . At this point, what is
important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be
produced. To insist that a revenue statute — and not only the bill which initiated the
legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law — must substantially be
the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate's power not only to "concur
with amendments" but also to "propose amendments." It would be to violate the
coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the
House superior to the Senate.

SECTION 25. (1) The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended
by the President for the operation of the Government as specified in the budget. The form,
content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law.

(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill

unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or
enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.

PHILCONSA vs. Enriquez, GR No. 113105, August 19, 1994 (En Banc)- As the
Constitution is explicit that the provision which Congress can include in an
appropriations bill must "relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein"
and "be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates," it follows that
any provision which does not relate to any particular item, or which extends in its
operation beyond an item of appropriation, is considered "an inappropriate
provision" which can be vetoed separately from an item. Also to be included in the
category of "inappropriate provisions" are unconstitutional provisions and provisions
which are intended to amend other laws, because clearly these kind of laws have no
place in an appropriations bill. These are matters of general legislation more
appropriately dealt with in separate enactments.
 Page 14 of 38

(3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the
procedure for approving appropriations for other departments and agencies.

(4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and
shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to
be raised by a corresponding revenue proposed therein.

(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the
President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by
law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed only for
public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as
may be prescribed by law.

(7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general
appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the
preceding fiscal year shall be deemed reenacted and shall remain in force and effect until
the general appropriations bill is passed by the Congress.

SECTION 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been
distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President
certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the
vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the
Journal.

Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance, GR No. 115455, August 25, 1994 (En Banc)- The
presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also
that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President
certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, § 26(2) qualified
the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: (i) the bill has passed three
readings on separate days and (ii) it has been printed in its final form and distributed
three days before it is finally approved.

Farinas vs. Executive Secretary, GR No. 147387, December 10, 2003 (En Banc)-
Under the "enrolled bill doctrine," the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House
and the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of
Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment. The Court finds
no reason to deviate from the salutary rule in this case where the irregularities
alleged by the petitioners mostly involved the internal rules of Congress, e.g.,
creation of the 2nd or 3rd Bicameral Conference Committee by the House. This
 Page 15 of 38

Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these internal rules of
Congress, whether House or Senate. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and
with their observance the courts have no concern. Whatever doubts there may be as
to the formal validity of Rep. Act No. 9006 must be resolved in its favor.

Abakada Guro vs. Ermita, supra.- the "no-amendment rule" refers only to the
procedure to be followed by each house of Congress with regard to bills initiated in
each of said respective houses, before said bill is transmitted to the other house for
its concurrence or amendment. Verily, to construe said provision in a way as to
proscribe any further changes to a bill after one house has voted on it would lead to
absurdity as this would mean that the other house of Congress would be deprived of
its constitutional power to amend or introduce changes to said bill. Thus, Art. VI,
Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution cannot be taken to mean that the introduction by the
Bicameral Conference Committee of amendments and modifications to disagreeing
provisions in bills that have been acted upon by both houses of Congress is
prohibited.

SECTION 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law,
be presented to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall
veto it and return the same with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall
enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such
reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it
shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be
reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall
become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or
nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal.
The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within
thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had
signed it.

Compare with pocket veto possessed by US Congress

(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which
he does not object.

SECTION 28. (1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress
shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.

Abakada Guro vs. Ermita, supra.- Taxation is progressive when its rate goes up
depending on the resources of the person affected. The VAT is an antithesis of
progressive taxation. By its very nature, it is regressive. The principle of progressive
taxation has no relation with the VAT system inasmuch as the VAT paid by the
consumer or business for every goods bought or services enjoyed is the same
regardless of income. In other words, the VAT paid eats the same portion of an
income, whether big or small. The disparity lies in the income earned by a person or
 Page 16 of 38

profit margin marked by a business, such that the higher the income or profit margin,
the smaller the portion of the income or profit that is eaten by VAT. A converso, the
lower the income or profit margin, the bigger the part that the VAT eats away. At the
end of the day, it is really the lower income group or businesses with low-profit
margins that is always hardest hit. Nevertheless, the Constitution does not really
prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes, like the VAT. What it simply provides is that
Congress shall "evolve a progressive system of taxation."

(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and
subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of
the national development program of the Government.

(3) Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto,

mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually,
directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be
exempt from taxation.

Lung Center vs. Quezon City, GR No. 144104, June 29, 2004 (En Banc)- Under the
1973 and 1987 Constitutions and Rep. Act No. 7160 in order to be entitled to the
exemption, the petitioner is burdened to prove, by clear and unequivocal proof, that
(a) it is a charitable institution; and (b) its real properties are ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY
and EXCLUSIVELY used for charitable purposes. "Exclusive" is defined as
possessed and enjoyed to the exclusion of others; debarred from participation or
enjoyment; and "exclusively" is defined, "in a manner to exclude; as enjoying a
privilege exclusively." If real property is used for one or more commercial purposes,
it is not exclusively used for the exempted purposes but is subject to taxation. The
words "dominant use" or "principal use" cannot be substituted for the words "used
exclusively" without doing violence to the Constitutions and the law. Solely is
synonymous with exclusively. What is meant by actual, direct and exclusive use of
the property for charitable purposes is the direct and immediate and actual
application of the property itself to the purposes for which the charitable institution is
organized. It is not the use of the income from the real property that is determinative
of whether the property is used for tax-exempt purposes.

(4) No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a
majority of all the Members of the Congress.

SECTION 29. (1) No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of
an appropriation made by law.

(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed,

directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination,
sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other
religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or
dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government
orphanage or leprosarium.
 Page 17 of 38

(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a
special fund and paid out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund was
created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the
general funds of the Government.

SECTION 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence.

Fabian vs. Desierto, GR No. 129742, September 16, 1998 (En Banc)- Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the Supreme Court
from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases.
It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution
against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

SECTION 31. No law granting a title of royalty or nobility shall be enacted.

SECTION 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of
initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly
propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the
Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor signed by at
least ten per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters thereof.

ARTICLE VII

Executive Department

SECTION 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.

Marcos vs. Manglapus, GR No. 88211, September 15, 1989 (En Banc)- Although
the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the
President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of
 Page 18 of 38

"executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be

limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words,
executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated. The
President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the people [is] founded
on the duty of the President, as steward of the people.

SECTION 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the

Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day
of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately
preceding such election.

SECTION 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same qualifications and
term of office and be elected with and in the same manner as the President. He may be
removed from office in the same manner as the President.

Francisco vs. House of Representatives, GR No. 160261, November 10, 2003 (En
Banc)- If at least one third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of
Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the
House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at this point that an impeachable public
official is successfully impeached. That is, he or she is successfully charged with an
impeachment "case" before the Senate as impeachment court. The "impeachment
proceeding" is not initiated when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial
because that is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning of another
proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment proceeding" initiated when
the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because
something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is already a
further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding
is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee
on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that
follow.

The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment

requires no confirmation.

SECTION 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the
people for a term of six years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same date six years
thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any reelection. No person who has
succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified
for election to the same office at any time.

No Vice-President shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of the service for the full term for which he was elected.

Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Vice-President
shall be held on the second Monday of May.
 Page 19 of 38

The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board
of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the
President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the
Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all certificates in
the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and
the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the
manner provided by law, canvass the votes.

The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case
two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith
be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress,
voting separately.

The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice- President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose.

SECTION 5. Before they enter on the execution of their office, the President, the Vice-
President, or the Acting President shall take the following oath or affirmation:

"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully and conscientiously fulfill my duties as
President (or Vice-President or Acting President) of the Philippines, preserve and defend
its Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man, and consecrate myself to the
service of the Nation. So help me God." (In case of affirmation, last sentence will be
omitted.)

SECTION 6. The President shall have an official residence. The salaries of the President
and Vice-President shall be determined by law and shall not be decreased during their
tenure. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the
term of the incumbent during which such increase was approved. They shall not receive
during their tenure any other emolument from the Government or any other source.

Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 152259, July 29, 2004 (En Banc)-
Executive immunity applied only during the incumbency of a President. It could not
be used to shield a non-sitting President from prosecution for alleged criminal acts
done while sitting in office.

Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability, supra- In In re: Sealed Case, the U.S.
Court of Appeals delved deeper. It ruled that there are two (2) kinds of executive
privilege; one is the presidential communications privilege and, the other is the
deliberative process privilege. The former pertains to “communications,
documents or other materials that reflect presidential decision-making and
deliberations and that the President believes should remain confidential.” The
latter includes ‘advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations
comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies
are formulated.” Accordingly, they are characterized by marked distinctions.
 Page 20 of 38

Presidential communications privilege applies to decision-making of the

President while, the deliberative process privilege, to decision-making of
executive officials. The first is rooted in the constitutional principle of separation
of power and the President’s unique constitutional role; the second on common
law privilege. Unlike the deliberative process privilege, the presidential
communications privilege applies to documents in their entirety, and covers
final and post-decisional materials as well as pre-deliberative ones. As a
consequence, congressional or judicial negation of the presidential
communications privilege is always subject to greater scrutiny than denial of the
deliberative process privilege.

Turning on who are the officials covered by the presidential

communications privilege, In Re Sealed Case confines the privilege only
to White House Staff that has “operational proximity” to direct presidential
decision-making. Thus, the privilege is meant to encompass only those
functions that form the core of presidential authority, involving what the court
characterized as “quintessential and non-delegable Presidential power,” such
as commander-in-chief power, appointment and removal power, the power
to grant pardons and reprieves, the sole-authority to receive ambassadors
and other public officers, the power to negotiate treaties etc.

For the claim to be properly invoked, there must be a formal claim of

privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the
matter.” A formal and proper claim of executive privilege requires a “precise
and certain reason” for preserving their confidentiality.

Senate of the President vs. Ermita, GR No. 169777, April 20, 2006 (En
Banc)- The phrase "executive privilege" is not new in this jurisdiction. It has
been used even prior to the promulgation of the 1986 Constitution. Being of
American origin, it is best understood in light of how it has been defined and
used in the legal literature of the United States.
Schwartz defines executive privilege as "the power of the Government to
withhold information from the public, the courts, and the Congress." Similarly,
Rozell defines it as "the right of the President and high-level executive branch
officers to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the
public."
Executive privilege is, nonetheless, not a clear or unitary concept. It has
encompassed claims of varying kinds. Tribe, in fact, comments that while it is
customary to employ the phrase "executive privilege," it may be more
accurate to speak of executive privileges "since presidential refusals to
furnish information may be actuated by any of at least three distinct kinds of
considerations, and may be asserted, with differing degrees of success, in the
context of either judicial or legislative investigations."
One variety of the privilege, Tribe explains, is the state secrets privilege
invoked by U.S. Presidents, beginning with Washington, on the ground that
 Page 21 of 38

the information is of such nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial
military or diplomatic objectives. Another variety is the informer's privilege, or
the privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of persons who
furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the
enforcement of that law. Finally, a generic privilege for internal deliberations
has been said to attach to intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory
opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by
which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.
This privilege, based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers,
exempts the executive from disclosure requirements applicable to the
ordinary citizen or organization where such exemption is necessary to the
discharge of highly important executive responsibilities involved in
maintaining governmental operations, and extends not only to military and
diplomatic secrets but also to documents integral to an appropriate exercise
of the executive' domestic decisional and policy making functions, that is,
those documents reflecting the frank expression necessary in intra-
governmental advisory and deliberative communications.
Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the
public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a
sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a
claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it
and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that
executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the
mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of
the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against
executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.

SECTION 7. The President-elect and the Vice-President-elect shall assume office at the
beginning of their terms.

If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice-President-elect shall act as President until the
President-elect shall have qualified.

If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice-President-elect shall act as President
until a President shall have been chosen and qualified.

If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect shall have died or shall
have become permanently disabled, the Vice-President-elect shall become President.

Where no President and Vice-President shall have been chosen or shall have qualified, or
where both shall have died or become permanently disabled, the President of the Senate
or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall act as
President until a President or a Vice-President shall have been chosen and qualified.
 Page 22 of 38

The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one who is to act as President
shall be selected until a President or a Vice-President shall have qualified, in case of death,
permanent disability, or inability of the officials mentioned in the next preceding paragraph.

SECTION 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of

the President, the Vice-President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term.
In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the
President and Vice-President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or
Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified.

The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President in case of death,
permanent disability, or resignation of the Acting President. He shall serve until the
President or the Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified, and be subject to the
same restrictions of powers and disqualifications as the Acting President.

SECTION 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President during the
term for which he was elected, the President shall nominate a Vice-President from among
the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office
upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress,
voting separately.

SECTION 10. The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of the third day after
the vacancy in the offices of the President and Vice-President occurs, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a call and within seven days enact a law calling
for a special election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be held not earlier than
forty-five days nor later than sixty days from the time of such call. The bill calling such
special election shall be deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article VI of this
Constitution and shall become law upon its approval on third reading by the Congress.
Appropriations for the special election shall be charged against any current appropriations
and shall be exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25, Article VI of this
Constitution. The convening of the Congress cannot be suspended nor the special election
postponed. No special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months
before the date of the next presidential election.

SECTION 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written
declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-
President as Acting President.

Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the
Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that
the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President
shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.

Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker
of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall
 Page 23 of 38

reassume the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the
Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the
issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight
hours, in accordance with its rules and without need of call.

If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in
session, within twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote
of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as the President; otherwise, the President
shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office.

SECTION 12. In case of serious illness of the President, the public shall be informed
of the state of his health. The Members of the Cabinet in charge of national security and
foreign relations and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, shall not be
denied access to the President during such illness.

SECTION 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any
other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly
or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially
interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of
interest in the conduct of their office.

The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the
President shall not during his tenure be appointed as members of the Constitutional
Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries,
chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries.

Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, GR No. 83896, February 22, 1991 (En
Banc)- Does the prohibi

tion in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members,
their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for
appointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B which, for easy
reference is quoted anew, thus: "Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality blic
officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception
applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants. In order that such additional duties or functions may not
transgress the prohibition embodied in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, such additional duties or functions must be required by the primary
 Page 24 of 38

functions of the official concerned, who is to perform the same in an ex-officio

capacity as provided by law, without receiving any additional compensation therefor.

The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal
office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional
compensation for his services in the said position. The reason is that these services
are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal
office. It should be obvious that if, say, the Secretary of Finance attends a meeting
of the Monetary Board as an ex-officio member thereof, he is actually and in legal
contemplation performing the primary function of his principal office in defining policy
in monetary and banking matters, which come under the jurisdiction of his
department. For such attendance, therefore, he is not entitled to collect any extra
compensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an
allowance, or some other such euphemism. By whatever name it is designated,
such additional compensation is prohibited by the Constitution.

SECTION 14. Appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain effective,

unless revoked by the elected President within ninety days from his assumption or
reassumption of office.

SECTION 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up
to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

SECTION 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution.
He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards.

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the
Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only
until after disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of
the Congress.

Rufino vs. Endriga, GR No. 139554, July 21, 2006 (En Banc)- Under Section 16,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three groups of officers.
The first group refers to the heads of the Executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the
President by the Constitution. The second group refers to those whom the President
may be authorized by law to appoint. The third group refers to all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law. Under the
 Page 25 of 38

same Section 16, there is a fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose

appointments Congress may by law vest in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards. The present case involves the interpretation of Section 16,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution with respect to the appointment of this fourth
group of officers. The President appoints the first group of officers with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments. The President appoints the second and third
groups of officers without the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The
President appoints the third group of officers if the law is silent on who is the
appointing power, or if the law authorizing the head of a department, agency,
commission, or board to appoint is declared unconstitutional.

Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution authorizes Congress to vest "in the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards" the power to appoint
lower-ranked officers. In a department in the Executive branch, the head is the
Secretary. The law may not authorize the Undersecretary, acting as such
Undersecretary, to appoint lower-ranked officers in the Executive department. In an
agency, the power is vested in the head of the agency for it would be preposterous
to vest it in the agency itself. In a commission, the head is the chairperson of the
commission. In a board, the head is also the chairperson of the board. In the last
three situations, the law may not also authorize officers other than the heads of the
agency, commission, or board to appoint lower-ranked officers.

The grant of the power to appoint to the heads of agencies, commissions, or boards
is a matter of legislative grace. Congress has the discretion to grant to, or withhold
from, the heads of agencies, commissions, or boards the power to appoint lower-
ranked officers. If it so grants, Congress may impose certain conditions for the
exercise of such legislative delegation, like requiring the recommendation of
subordinate officers or the concurrence of the other members of the commission or
board.

This is in contrast to the President's power to appoint which is a self-executing

power vested by the Constitution itself and thus not subject to legislative limitations
or conditions. The power to appoint conferred directly by the Constitution on the
Supreme Court en banc and on the Constitutional Commissions is also self-
executing and not subject to legislative limitations or conditions.

The Constitution authorizes Congress to vest the power to appoint lower-ranked

officers specifically in the "heads" of the specified offices, and in no other person.
The word "heads" refers to the chairpersons of the commissions or boards and not
to their members.

The 1987 Constitution has established three branches of government — the

Executive, Legislative and Judicial. In addition, there are the independent
constitutional bodies — like the Commission on Elections, Commission on Audit,
Civil Service Commission, and the Ombudsman. Then there are the hybrid or quasi-
judicial agencies, exercising jurisdiction in specialized areas, that are under the
Executive branch for administrative supervision purposes, but whose decisions are
reviewable by the courts. Lastly, there are the local government units, which under
 Page 26 of 38

the Constitution enjoy local autonomy subject only to limitations Congress may
impose by law. Local government units are subject to general supervision by the
President.

The Cultural Center of the Philippines does not fall under the Legislative or Judicial
branches of government. The CCP is also not one of the independent constitutional
bodies. Neither is the CCP a quasi-judicial body nor a local government unit. Thus,
the CCP must fall under the Executive branch. Under the Revised Administrative
Code of 1987, any agency "not placed by law or order creating them under any
specific department" falls "under the Office of the President." Section 6(b) and (c) of
PD 15, which authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to fill vacancies in the Board,
runs afoul with the President's power of control. By stating that the "President shall
have control of all the executive . . . offices," the 1987 Constitution empowers the
President not only to influence but even to control all offices in the Executive branch,
including the CCP. Control is far greater than, and subsumes, influence.

SECTION 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

Carpio vs. Executive Secretary, GR No. 96409, February 14, 1992 (En Banc)- It is a
fundamentally accepted principle in Constitutional Law that the President has control
of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. Equally well accepted, as a
corollary rule to the control powers of the President, is the "Doctrine of Qualified
Political Agency". As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control
powers all at the same time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to
his Cabinet members, who in turn and by his authority, control the bureaus and
other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department.

Executive Secretary vs. Southwing Heavy Industries, GR No. 164171, February 20,
2006 (En Banc)- Police power is inherent in a government to enact laws, within
constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare
of society. It is lodged primarily with the legislature. By virtue of a valid delegation of
legislative power, it may also be exercised by the President and administrative
boards, as well as the lawmaking bodies on all municipal levels, including the
barangay. Such delegation confers upon the President quasi-legislative power which
may be defined as the authority delegated by the law-making body to the
administrative body to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the
provisions of the law and implement legislative policy. On the propriety of
challenging EO 156 in a declaratory relief proceeding, in Commission on Audit of
the Province of Cebu v. Province of Cebu, the Court entertained a suit for
declaratory relief to finally settle the doubt as to the proper interpretation of the
conflicting laws involved, notwithstanding a violation of the right of the party affected.

SECTION 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of
the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion,
 Page 27 of 38

when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or
in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all
its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension,
which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the
President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or
suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall
persist and public safety requires it.

Carpio vs. Executive Secretary, supra.- The President, as Commander-in-Chief, is

not a member of the Armed Forces. He remains a civilian whose duties under the
Commander-in-Chief provision "represent only a part of the organic duties imposed
upon him. All his other functions are clearly civil in nature." His position as a civilian
Commander-in-Chief is consistent with, and a testament to, the constitutional
principle that "civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military."

Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora, GR No. 141284, August 15, 2000 (En
Banc)- When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely
vested in his wisdom. There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to
bestow on the President full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to
determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. The full discretionary power
of the President to determine the factual basis for the exercise of the calling out
power is also implied and further reinforced in the rest of Section 18, Article VII.
Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension and the Court may review
the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent
provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President's action to call out
the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category
from the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply
lumped together the three powers and provided for their revocation and review
without any qualification. The reason for the difference in the treatment of the
aforementioned powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway
and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the
lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve
the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms,
and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by this Court.
Moreover, under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, in the exercise of the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or to impose martial law,
two conditions must concur: (1) there must be an actual invasion or rebellion and,
(2) public safety must require it. These conditions are not required in the case of the
power to call out the armed forces. The only criterion is that "whenever it becomes
necessary," the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion." The implication is that the President is given full
 Page 28 of 38

discretion and wide latitude in the exercise of the power to call as compared to the
two other powers.

Sanlakas vs. Reyes, GR No. 159085, February 3, 2004 (En Banc)- The above
provision grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a "sequence" of "graduated
power[s]." From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to
declare martial law. In the exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution requires
the concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual invasion or rebellion, and that
public safety requires the exercise of such power. However, as we observed in
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, "[t]hese conditions are not required in
the exercise of the calling out power. The only criterion is that 'whenever it becomes
necessary,' the President may call the armed forces 'to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion.'" Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18,
Article VII does not expressly prohibit the President from declaring a state of
rebellion. Note that the Constitution vests the President not only with Commander-
in-Chief powers but, first and foremost, with Executive powers. The President's
authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief
executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief
powers.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation
or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without any need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon
within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the
functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to
function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with the invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained
shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.

In Re: Ferdinand Arguelles, Jr. vs. Baladia, Jr., GR No. 167211, March 14, 2006
(En Banc)- A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled to it. Its essential object
and purpose is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint and to relieve a
person from it if such restraint is illegal. The singular function of a petition for
habeas corpus is to protect and secure the basic freedom of physical liberty.
 Page 29 of 38

Compare: Writ of Habeas Data (AM No.08-1-16-SC); Writ of Amparo (October 24,
2007)

SECTION 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this

Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit
fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the
Members of the Congress.

People vs. Salle, GR No. 103567, December 4, 1995 (En Banc)- The reason the
Constitutional Commission adopted the "conviction by final judgment" requirement,
reviving in effect the original provision of the 1973 Constitution on the pardoning
power, was, as expounded by Commissioner Napoleon Rama, to prevent the
President from exercising executive power in derogation of the judicial power.
Indeed, an appeal brings the entire case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
appellate court. A becoming regard for the doctrine of separation of powers
demands that such exclusive authority of the appellate court be fully respected and
kept unimpaired. For truly, had not the present Constitution adopted the "conviction
by final judgment" limitation, the President could, at any time, and even without the
knowledge of the court, extend executive clemency to any one whom he, in good
faith or otherwise, believes to merit presidential mercy. It cannot be denied that
under the Jones Law and the 1981 amendment to the 1973 Constitution on the
pardoning power which did no require conviction, the President had unimpeded
power to grant pardon even before the criminal case could be heard. And under the
1935 Constitution which required "conviction" only, the power could be exercised at
any time after conviction and regardless of the pendency of the appeal. In either
case, there could be the risk not only of a failure of justice but also of a frustration of
the system of administration of justice in view of the derogation of the jurisdiction of
the trial or appellate court. Where the President is not so prevented by the
Constitution, not even Congress can impose any restriction to prevent a presidential
folly. Hence, nothing but a change in the constitutional provision consisting in the
imposition of "convict ion by final judgment" requirement can change the rule. The
new Constitution did it. Hence, before an appellant may be validly granted pardon,
he must first ask for the withdrawal of his appeal, i.e., the appealed conviction must
first be brought to finality.

SECTION 20. The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject
to such limitations as may be provided by law. The Monetary Board shall, within thirty days
from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete
report of its decisions on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the
Government or government-owned and controlled corporations which would have the effect
of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters as may be provided by law.
 Page 30 of 38

SECTION 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

Bayan vs. Zamora, GR No. 138570, October 10, 2000 (En Banc)- Ratification is
generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the
government, as the case may be, through which the formal acceptance of the treaty
is proclaimed. A State may provide in its domestic legislation the process of
ratification of a treaty. The consent of the State to be bound by a treaty is expressed
by ratification when: (a) the treaty provides for such ratification, (b) it is otherwise
established that the negotiating States agreed that ratification should be required, (c)
the representative of the State has signed the treaty subject to ratification, or (d) the
intention of the State to sign the treaty subject to ratification appears from the full
powers of its representative, or was expressed during the negotiation.

Pimentel vs. Executive Secretary, GR No. 158088, July 6, 2005 (En Banc)- The
power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate.
The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent,
or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to
refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its
ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which
has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such
decision is within the competence of the President alone, which cannot be
encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus. This Court has no jurisdiction over
actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties. The
Court, therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as
it is beyond its jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the government to
transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the Senate. In our jurisdiction, the
power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as commonly believed, in the
legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent,
or concurrence, to the ratification.

SECTION 22. The President shall submit to the Congress within thirty days from the
opening of every regular session, as the basis of the general appropriations bill, a budget of
expenditures and sources of financing, including receipts from existing and proposed
revenue measures.

SECTION 23. The President shall address the Congress at the opening of its regular
session. He may also appear before it at any other time.
 Page 31 of 38

ARTICLE VIII

Judicial Department

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Francisco vs. House of Representatives, supra.- The major difference between the
judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court
is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S.
Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine
Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not
just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the
power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government
branch or instrumentality.

When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of
a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the
law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely
that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person
complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is
lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by
reason of the statute or act complained of. In fine, when the proceeding involves the
assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement
of personal interest.

In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public
funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law. Before he can invoke the power of judicial review,
however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the
illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct
injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not
sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.

At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit
should be entertained. This Court opted to grant standing to most of the petitioners,
given their allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of
Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the
expenditure of public funds.
 Page 32 of 38

As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action
which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator. Indeed, a member of the
House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives,
powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.

While an association has legal personality to represent its members, especially

when it is composed of substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital
interests, the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any
member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing
more, although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with standing. Its
interest is too general. It is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry.
However, a reading of the petition shows that it has advanced constitutional issues
which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and
weight as precedents. It, therefore, behooves this Court to relax the rules on
standing and to resolve the issues presented by it.

In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons
intervening must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of all
concerned to enable the court to deal properly with all interests involved in the suit,
for a judgment in a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is,
under the res judicata principle, binding on all members of the class whether or not
they were before the court.

There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following

determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano
are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2)
the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition
by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the
lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the
questions being raised. 90 Applying these determinants, this Court is satisfied that
the issues raised herein are indeed of transcendental importance.

From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional

Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty
which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political
question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that
Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions."
From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political questions:
(1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions."
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason being that
respect for the doctrine of separation of powers must be maintained. On the other
hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review
questions which are not truly political in nature.

Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Morato, GR No. 118910, November 16, 1995 (En Banc)- The
difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest has been noted by
authorities thus: "It is important to note . . . that standing because of its constitutional
and public policy underpinnings, is very different from questions relating to whether
 Page 33 of 38

a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to sue. Although all
three requirements are directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can
maintain an action, standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits,
as well as broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary in
certain areas. Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some
cases suits are brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the
operation of a law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or
voters who actually sue in the public interest. Hence the question in standing is
whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions."

SECTION 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over
cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.

No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of
tenure of its Members.

SECTION 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary
may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year
and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.

SECTION 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or
seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

Complaint of Mr. Aurelio Indencia against Justices Reynato Puno et al., AM No. 03-
11-30-SC, June 9, 2005 (En Banc)- There is only one Supreme Court from whose
decisions all other courts are required to take their bearings. While most of the
Court's work is performed by its three divisions, the Court remains one court —
single, unitary, complete and supreme. Flowing from this is the fact that, while
individual justices may dissent or only partially concur, when the Court states what
the law is, it speaks with only one voice. Any doctrine or principle of law laid down by
the Court may be modified or reversed only by the Court en banc.

(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive

agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other
cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those
involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees,
proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided
with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the
concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the
issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence of at least
 Page 34 of 38

three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be
decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a
decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court
sitting en banc.

SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus.

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the
Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance,
or regulation is in question.

(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty
imposed in relation thereto.

(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.

(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.

(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may
require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the
judge concerned.

(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

People vs. Mateo, GR No. 147678-87, July 7, 2004 (En Banc)- Procedural matters,
first and foremost, fall more squarely within the rule-making prerogative of the
Supreme Court than the law-making power of Congress. The rule here announced
additionally allowing an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals, a subordinate
appellate court, before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic
review, is such a procedural matter. Pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, more particularly Section 3 and Section 10 of Rule 122, Section
 Page 35 of 38

13 of Rule 124, Section 3 of Rule 125, and any other rule insofar as they provide for
direct appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Supreme Court in cases where
the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as well as the
resolution of the Supreme Court en banc, dated 19 September 1995, in "Internal
Rules of the Supreme Court" in cases similarly involving the death penalty, are to be
deemed modified accordingly.

IN RE: PETITION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA, ON LEGAL AND

MORAL GROUNDS, FROM BEING ELECTED IBP GOVERNOR FOR EASTERN
MINDANAO IN THE MAY 31, IBP ELECTIONS, A.C. No. 6052. December 11, 2003
(En Banc)- In his Respectful Comment respondent De Vera contends that the
Supreme Court has no jurisdiction on the present controversy. As noted earlier,
respondent De Vera submits that the election of the Officers of the IBP, including the
determination of the qualification of those who want to serve the IBP, is purely an
internal matter and exclusively within the jurisdiction of the IBP. The contention is
untenable. Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution confers on the Supreme
Court the power to promulgate rules affecting the IBP. Implicit in this constitutional
grant is the power to supervise all the activities of the IBP, including the election of
its officers.

(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil
Service Law.

SECTION 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and
the personnel thereof.

Maceda vs. Vasquez, GR No. 102781, April 22, 1993 (En Banc)- A judge who
falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the Supreme Court for
serious misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,
and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
However, in the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the
Supreme Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being
conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of administrative
supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation
of powers. Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the
Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from
the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court
clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the
judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the proper
administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other
branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the
doctrine of separation of powers. n fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge
or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman
must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to this Court for
determination whether said Judge or court employee had acted within the scope of
their administrative duties.
 Page 36 of 38

SECTION 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower
collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the
Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age and must have been for fifteen years or
more a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.

(2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no
person may be appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a
member of the Philippine Bar.

(3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity,

probity, and independence.

SECTION 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of
Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of
the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.

(2) The regular Members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term
of four years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first
appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor
of law for three years, the retired Justice for two years, and the representative of the private
sector for one year.

(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and
shall keep a record of its proceedings.

(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be
determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget
the appropriations for the Council.

(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the
Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may
assign to it.

SECTION 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be
appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial
and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.

For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the
submission of the list.

SECTION 10. The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their
continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased.

SECTION 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall
hold office during good behavior until they reached the age of seventy years or become
 Page 37 of 38

incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have
the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the
case and voted thereon.

SECTION 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by
law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions.

SECTION 13. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for
decision en banc or in division shall be reached in consultation before the case is assigned
to a Member for the writing of the opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect signed
by the Chief Justice shall be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case
and served upon the parties. Any Member who took no part, or dissented, or abstained
from a decision or resolution must state the reason therefor. The same requirements shall
be observed by all lower collegiate courts.

Pedragoza vs. Comelec, GR No. 169885, July 25, 2006 (En Banc)- The lack of
certification at the end of the decision would only serve as evidence of failure to
observe the certification requirement and may be basis for holding the official
responsible for the omission to account therefor [See I Record of the Constitutional
Commission 460]. Such absence of certification would not have the effect of
invalidating the decision.

Any Member who took no part, or dissented, or abstained from a decision or

resolution must state the reason therefor. By intent of the Constitution's framers, as
reflected in the language of the text, this requirement is mandatory.

SECTION 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be
refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.

Complaint of Mr. Aurelio Indencia, supra.- The complainant likewise alleges that the
disposition of his various motions and pleadings through minute resolutions
amounted to a deprivation of due process. The Court is not duty-bound to issue
decisions or resolutions signed by the justices all the time. It has ample discretion to
formulate ponencias, extended resolutions or even minute resolutions, depending on
its evaluation of a case, as long as a legal basis exists. When a minute resolution
(signed by the Clerk of Court upon orders of the Court) denies or dismisses a
petition or a motion for reconsideration for lack of merit, it is understood that the
challenged decision or order, together with all its findings of fact and legal
conclusions, are deemed sustained.

Partido ng Manggagawa vs. Comelec, GR No. 164702, March 15, 2006 (En Banc)-
Pro hac vice is a Latin term meaning "for this one particular occasion." A ruling
expressly qualified as pro hac vice cannot be relied upon as a precedent to govern
 Page 38 of 38

other cases. It was therefore erroneous for respondent Commission to apply the
November 20, 2003 Resolution and rule that the formula in Veterans has been
abandoned.

SECTION 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution
must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the
Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower
collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.

(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing
of the last pending, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court
itself.

(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed
by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof
attached to the record of the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification
shall state why a decision or resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period.

(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without
prejudice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence thereof, shall
decide or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for determination, without further
delay.

SECTION 16. The Supreme Court shall, within thirty days from the opening of each
regular session of the Congress, submit to the President and the Congress an annual
report on the operations and activities of the Judiciary.